Abhidharmakosabhasyam

of Vasubandhu

Volume I

Translated into French by Louis de La Vallée Poussin

English Version by Leo M. Pruden

ASIAN HUMANITIES PRESS
[An imprint of Jain Publishing Company]
Web Site – www.jainpub.com
CHAPTER ONE

The Dhātus

Om. Homage to the Buddha.

1. He has, in an absolute manner, destroyed all blindness; He has drawn out the world from the mire of transmigration: I render homage to Him, to this teacher of truth, before composing the treatise called the Abhidharmakośa.

Desiring to compose a treatise, with the intention of making known the greatness of his master, the author undertakes to render him homage and to first present his qualities.

"He" refers to the Buddha, the Blessed One.

"He has destroyed all blindness," that is to say, by him or through him blindness with respect to all things is destroyed.

"Blindness" is ignorance, for ignorance hinders the seeing of things as they truly are.

By this, the Buddha, the Blessed One1 is sufficiently designated, for he alone, through the possession of the antidote to ignorance (v. 60), has definitely destroyed all ignorance with respect to all knowable things, so that it cannot rearise.

But the Pratyekabuddhas and the Śrāvakas have also destroyed all blindness, for they are freed from all ignorance defiled by the defilements.

But they do not know the qualities proper to the Buddha (vii.28),2 objects very distant in space or time (vii.55),3 nor the infinite complex of things;4 therefore, they have not destroyed blindness in an absolute manner, for the ignorance freed from the defilements is active in them.5

Having thus praised the Blessed One from the point of view of qualities useful to himself, the author praises him from the point of view of qualities useful to others: "He has drawn out the world from
the mire of transmigration." Transmigration is a mire, because the world is bound up in it, and because it is difficult to traverse. The Blessed One, having pity on the world which finds itself drowned without recourse in this mire, has pulled it out, as much as possible, by extending to each one the hands of the teaching of the Good Law.

"I render homage," by prostrating myself even to my head "to this teacher of truth:" because he teaches in conformity with that which is, without error. By thus qualifying the Blessed One, the author indicates the manner in which the Blessed One is useful to others. It is by the true teaching that the Blessed One, the teacher, has pulled the world out of the mire of transmigration, not by his supernatural powers, nor by the granting of favors.

After having rendered homage to this teacher of truth, what will the author do? "I shall compose a treatise." A treatise is that which instructs disciples. Which treatise?

The Abhidharmakośa.

***

What is Abhidharma?

2a. Abhidharma is pure prajñā with its following.

Prajñā which will be defined below (ii.24, vii.1) is the discernment of the dharma. Pure prajñā is undefiled prajñā. The "following" of prajñā is its escort, namely the five pure skandhas (i.7a) which coexists with prajñā.

Such is the absolute meaning of Abhidharma.

2b. It is also prajñā, and the Treatise which brings about the obtaining of pure prajñā.

In common usage, the word Abhidharma also designates all prajñā which brings about the obtaining of Abhidharma in the absolute sense of the word; defiled prajñā whether it is innate or natural, or whether the result of an effort, the result of hearing, reflection, absorption
(srutacintābhāvanā-mayī, ii.71c), receives, along with its following, by convention, the name of Abhidharma.

One also gives the name of Abhidharma to the Treatise,14 for the Treatise also brings about the obtaining of pure prajñā: it is thus a factor in Abhidharma in the absolute sense of the word.

Dharma is that which bears (dbāraṇa) self-(or unique) characteristics.

The Abhidharma is called abhi-dharma because it envisions (abhimukha) the dharma which is the object of supreme knowledge, or the supreme dharma, Nirvāṇa; or rather it is so-called because it envisions the characteristics of the dharmas, both their self-characteristics and their common (or general) characteristics.

***

Why is the present work called the Abhidharmakośa?

2c-d. The present work is called the Abhidharmakośa because the Abhidharma enters into it through its meaning; or because the Abhidharma constitutes its foundation.

The Treatise that bears the name of Abhidharma enters by its meaning into this work, which is thus the Abhidharmakośa, "the sheath of the Abhidharma." Or rather as the Abhidharma is the point of support of this work, one can say that this work is drawn from out of the Abhidharma, as from a sheath; it is thus called the Abhidharmakośa, "the work which has the Abhidharma for a sheath."

Why was the Abhidharma taught? By whom was the Abhidharma originally taught? The answer to these two questions will tell us why the author piously undertakes the writing of the Abhidharmakośa.

3. Apart from the discernment of the dharmas, there is no means to extinguish the defilements, and it is by reason of the defilements that the world wanders in the ocean of existence. So it is with a view to this discernment that the Abhidharma has been, they say, spoken [by the Master].15
Apart from the discernment of dharmas, there does not exist any means for the extinguishing of the defilements (v.1), and these are the defilements which cause the world to wander in the great ocean of transmigration. This is why, say the Vaibhāṣikas, with a view to the discernment of the dharmas, the master, the Buddha, the Blessed One, spoke the Abhidharma. For, without the teaching of the Abhidharma, a disciple would be incapable of discerning the dharmas.

However, the Vaibhasikas explain, the Blessed One spoke the Abhidharma in fragments. And in the same way that the Sthavira Dharmatrāta made a collection of the Udānas scattered throughout the Scriptures,—the Udānavarga,—in this same way the Āryan Kātyāyāniputra and the other Saints established the Abhidharma [by collecting it into the seven Abhidharmas].

***

What are the dharmas of which the Abhidharma teaches the discerning?

4a. The dharmas are impure, "in a relationship with the defilements," or pure, "with no relationship to the defilements."

This is the complete teachings of all the dharmas. What are the impure dharmas?

4b-c. Conditioned dharmas, with the exception of the Path, are impure.

With the exception of the Path, all conditioned dharmas are defiled. Why is this?

4d. They are impure because the defilements adhere to them.

(For the samkṛtadharma see i.7a, ii.45c-d. For the defilements, the āsravas, see v.40.)

Without doubt certain defilements, for example false views, can have the Path or the unconditioned dharmas, for their object. This does not make the Path or these dharmas impure, or in a (necessary)
relationship with the defilements, because the defilements do not adhere to them. This point will be explained later in the Fifth Chapter.

What are the pure dharmas?

5a-b. The undefiled truth of the Path and the three unconditioned things are pure.  

What are the three unconditioned things?  

5c. Space and the two types of extinctions.  

The two extinctions are pratisamkhyānirodha, extinction due to knowledge, and apratisamkhyānirodha, extinction not due to knowledge.

The three unconditioned things and the truth of the Path are pure dharmas because the defilements do not adhere to them.

5c. Space is "that which does not hinder."

Space has for its nature not hindering matter which, in fact, takes place freely in space; and also of not being hindered by matter, for space is not displaced by matter.  

6a. Pratisamkhyānirodha is disjunction.  

(Conscious) disjunction (visamyoga, ii.57d) from the impure dharmas is pratisamkhyānirodha (ii.55) [or Nirvana]. Pratisamkhyā or pratisamkhyya signifies a certain pure prajñā, the comprehension of the Truths. The "extinction" of which one takes possession by this prajñā is called pratisamkhyānirodha; we could say pratisamkhyya-[prāpya]-nirodha, "the extinction obtained through pratisamkhyā," but the middle word (i.e., prāpya) is elided, as in the expression "ox-cart," and not "cart hitched to oxen" (goratha = go-[yukta]-ratha).

***

Is there but one single pratisamkhyānirodha from all of the impure dharmas?
Chapter One

No.
Why is this?


Each disjunction taken separately is *pratisamkhyānirodha*. The objects of “disjunction” are as numerous as the objects of “junction.” If it were otherwise, if *pratisamkhyānirodha* were single, then a person who has experienced the extinction of the defilement which is abandoned by seeing the Truth of Suffering, would have obtained at the same time the extinction of the defilements which are abandoned by the Seeing of the other Truths, and by Meditation. It would be useless for him to cultivate the part of the Path which is opposed to these defilements. (*Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 164c16).

This does not mean that all extinction is alike, that there is not an extinction corresponding to another extinction. This means that extinction does not have a “cause corresponding to its effect (*sabhāgaḥetu*)” and that it is not a “cause corresponding to its effect” (ii.52).

6c-d. A different type of extinction, which consists of the absolute hindering of arising, is called *apratisamkhyānirodha*.

*Apratisamkhyānirodha* is an extinction which is different from “disjunction;” it consists of the absolute hindering of the arising of future *dharmas*. It is so called because it is obtained, not by the comprehension of the Truths, but by the insufficiency of the causes of arising.

For example, when the organ of sight and the mental organ are occupied with a certain visible matter, other visible things, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles pass from the present into the past. It follows that the five sense consciousness, the visual consciousness, etc., which have had for their object other visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles, cannot arise, for the sense consciousnesses are not capable of grasping their object when the object is past. There is thus an absolute hindering of the arising of the said consciousnesses, by reason of the insufficiency of the cause of arising.
Here we have a four-fold alternative (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 164c16):

1. solely pratisaṁkhyānīrodha of the impure dharmas, past, present, and destined to arise;
2. solely apratisaṁkhyānīrodha of pure, conditioned dharmas, not destined to arise;
3. pratisaṁkhyānīrodha and apratisaṁkhyānīrodha of impure dharmas, not destined to arise; and
4. neither pratisaṁkhyānīrodha nor apratisaṁkhyānīrodha of pure dharmas, past, present or destined to arise.28

***

We have said that the impure dharmas are the conditioned dharmas, minus the Path. What are the conditioned dharmas?

7a-b. Conditioned things are the fivefold skandhas, matter, etc.29

These are the aggregate of matter, the aggregate of the sensations, the aggregate of ideas, the aggregate of mental formations, and the aggregate of consciousness.

Samkrta, conditioned, is explained etymologically as "that which has been created (kṛta) by causes in union and combination." There is no dharma which is engendered by a single cause (ii.64).

Even though the expression samskṛta signifies "that which has been created . . .," it also applies to future dharmas and to present dharmas, as well as to past dharmas; in fact, a dharma does not change its nature by changing its time period. In the same way, one calls milk in the udder dugdha, "that which has been drawn," and kindling indhana, or "wood to be burned."

7c-d. Conditioned things are the paths; they are the foundations of discourse; they are "possessed of leaving;" they are "possessed of causes."

1. Conditioned things are paths—that is to say, the time periods, the past, present and future—because they have for their nature
having gone, of going, of shall be going. In the same way, one says that a path led somewhere, that it goes, or that it will go to the town.

Or rather conditioned things are called paths (adhvān) because they are devoured (adyānte) by impermanence (ii.45c).

2. Discourse (kathā), means words, or speech (vākya); discourse has names or words (nāman, ii.36) for its foundation.

Should one take literally the definition given by the stanza, and say that conditioned things are words?

No. By “foundations of discourse” one should understand “the foundations of discourse, that is, words, together with that which the words signify.” If we understand “foundations of discourse” to be only words, we would be at variance with the Prakarāṇapāda which says; “The kathavastus, the foundations of discourse, are embraced within the eighteen dhātus.” (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 74a20).

3. Nihsāra signifies “leaving” (sāra = nihsaraṇa) which is the Nirvāṇa of all conditioned things. As one should depart from conditioned things, one qualifies them as “endowed with leaving.”

4. Conditioned things are dependent on causes; they are thus qualified as savastuka, that is, “having causes.”

The Vaibhāśikas believe that, in the expression savastuka, vastu signifies cause (hetu).

Such are the diverse synonyms of “conditioned things.”

8a-b. When they are impure, they are upādānakandhas.

Impure conditioned things constitute the five upādānakandhas. Everything that is upādānakandha is skandha; pure conditioned things are included within the skandhas, but are not included within the upādānakandhas (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 387a9).

The upādānas are defilements (kleśas, v.38).

The upādānakandhas are so called (1) because they proceed from the defilements, as one says “grass fire” or “straw fire;” (2) or rather because they are governed by the defilements, as one says “the king’s man;” (3) or rather because they give rise to the defilements, as one says “flower-bearing tree” or “fruit-bearing tree.”

8c. They are called “of battle.”
The defilements are of battle because they injure oneself and others. Impure conditioned things are qualified “of battle,” “in a relationship with battle,” because the defilements of battle adhere to them; equally, as we have seen, they are qualified as “impure,” “possessing impurity,” because the defilements adhere to them.

8c-d. They are also suffering, arising, the world, the locus of false opinions, existence.

1. Suffering, because they are odious to the Saints (vi.2).
2. Arising, because suffering arises from them (vi.2).
3. World, because they are in the process of decomposition. 38
4. Locus of opinions, because the five opinions abide in them and adhere to them (v.7) (Prakarana, p. 33b7).
5. Existence, because it exists. 39

***

We have seen that there are five skandhas (i.7, 20). Let us first study rūpaskandha (i.9-14b).

9a-b. Rūpa, or matter, is the five sense organs, five objects, and avijñāpti. 40

The five organs are the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch.

The five objects of the five organs are visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles.

And avijñāpti (i.11); such is rūpaskandha.

***

We have enumerated five things, visible matter, sound, etc.

9c-d. The points of support of the consciousnesses of these things, namely the subtle material elements, are the five organs, the organ of sight, etc. 41
The five which are the point of support of the consciousnesses of visible matter, sounds, odor, taste and tangibles, and which consist of the suprasensible subtle material elements, are, in this order, the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.

The Blessed One said in fact, "The eye, Oh Bhikṣus, an internal āyatana, a subtle matter derived from the primary elements . . ." 42

Or rather, (the point of support of the consciousnesses of these organs, are) the points of support of the visual consciousness, or eye consciousness, etc. 43 This interpretation is in conformity with the Prakarāṇa (p. 692c12) which says: "What is the organ of sight? It is the subtle matter which is the support of the consciousness of sight."

***

Let us now examine the five objects beginning with visible matter, rūpāyatana.

10a. Visible matter is twofold. 44

1. Visible matter is color and shape. Color is fourfold: blue, red, yellow, white; other colors proceed from out of these four colors. Shape (samsthāna, iv.3c) is eightfold: long, short, square, round, high, low, even, uneven. 45

10a. Or twentyfold.

2. Or there are some twenty types: the four primary colors, the eight shapes, and eight more colors: cloud, smoke, dust, mist, shade, hot light, light, darkness. Some make a color of the firmament [which appears like a wall of lapiz-lazuli]; this would give us the number twenty-one.

"Even" signifies "of even shape;" "uneven" is the opposite; mist is the vapor which rises from the ground and from water; "hot light" is the light of the sun; "light" is the light of the moon, the stars, fire, grasses and gems; "shade"—arisen from an obstacle to light—is where forms still remain visible; "darkness" is the opposite.

The other terms do not call for any explanation.
3. Visible matter can be color without being shape: blue, red, yellow, white, shade, hot light, light, darkness. There can be shapes without there being color: that part of the long, of the short, etc., which constitutes bodily action (kāyavijnāpita).

There can be color and shape at one and the same time: all the other categories of visible matter.

Some other Masters maintain that only hot light and light are exclusively color; for blue, red, etc., present themselves to the sight under the aspect of long, short, etc.

4. But, say the Sautrāntikas, how could a single thing be twofold, [color and shape together? For, in the system of the Vaibhāṣīkas, color and shape are distinct things, dravya, iv.3.]

Because color and shape are perceived in a single substance. The root vid has here the sense of “to know,” and not the sense of “to exist.”

But, reply the Sautrāntikas, you should admit that bodily action is at one and the same time color and shape.

10b. Sound is eightfold.

1. It is fourfold: having for its cause present primary elements forming part of the organs, having for its cause other primary elements (upāṭānupāṭāmahābhūtahetuka, i.34c-d), belonging to living beings, and not belonging to living beings. Each of these four categories is agreeable or disagreeable.

First category: sound caused by the hand or by the voice.
Second category: sound of the wind, of the trees, of water.
Third category: sound of vocal action (iv.3d). Fourth category: every other sound.

2. According to other masters, one sound can belong to the first two categories at one and the same time, for example, a sound produced by the coming together of a hand and a drum. But the School (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 663c12) does not admit that one atom [of matter] has for its cause only two tetrades of the primary elements; thus one cannot admit that one atom [of sound] is produced by the four primary
elements of a hand and the four primary elements of a drum.

10b-c. Taste is of six types.\(^50\)

Sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and astringent.

10c. Odor is fourfold.\(^51\)

For good odors and bad odors are either excessive or non-excessive. But, according to the *Prakarana* (p. 692c22), odor is threefold: good, bad, and equal or indifferent.

10d. The tangible is of eleven types.\(^52\)

1. Eleven things are tangible things: the four primary elements, softness, hardness, weight, lightness, cold, hunger, and thirst.

2. The elements will be explained below (i.12). "Softness" is smoothness; "hardness" is roughness; "weight" is that by which bodies are susceptible of being weighed (i.36); "lightness" is the opposite; "cold" is what produces a desire for heat; "hunger" is what produces a desire for food; "thirst" is what produces a desire for drinking. In fact the tangible which produces hunger and thirst is designated by the word hunger: the cause is designated by the name of the effect. In the same way that it is said "The appearance of the Buddha is (the cause of) happiness; the teaching of the religion is happiness; happiness, the harmony of the community; happiness, the austerities of monks who are in agreement."\(^53\)

3. Both hunger and thirst are lacking in Rūpadhātu,\(^54\) but the other tangibles are found there.

It is true that the clothes of the gods of Rūpadhātu, individually, have no weight; but, brought all together, they have weight.

It is true that bothersome cold is lacking in Rūpadhātu but beneficent or pleasing cold is found there: such is the opinion of the Vaibhaśikas. [It is the absorption that the gods enjoy, not the cold.]

It is possible\(^55\) for one visual consciousness to arise from a single thing, from a single category of visible matter: when a characteristic of this thing (blue, etc.) is separately distinguished. In other cases, one consciousness is produced by many things: when such a distinction is
lacking; for example, when one sees the multiple colors and shapes that an army or a pile of jewels present at a distance and bunched together. The same remark is applicable to the auditory consciousness, the olfactory consciousnesses, etc.

But one touch consciousness arises from only five things at most, namely the four primary elements and one another of the other tangibles, soft, hard, etc. Such is the opinion of certain masters.

But, according to another opinion, one touch consciousness can arise from eleven tangibles at one and the same time.

[Objection]. According to what you say, each of the five sense consciousnesses bears on a totality, for example the visual consciousness bears on blue, red, etc.; consequently the sense consciousnesses have "general characteristics for their object" and not, as Scripture teaches us, "specific characteristic" (svalakṣaṇa).

[The Vaibhāṣikas (Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 65c12) answer that the Scripture] means by specific characteristic not the specific characteristic of things, but the specific characteristic of an āyatana (ii.62c). 56

When the organs of touch and of taste attain their object at the same time (i.43c-d), which consciousness is the first to arise?

The one whose object is the strongest. But if the strength of the two objects is equal, the consciousness of taste arise first, because the desire for food dominates.

***

We have explained the objects of the five organs of sense consciousness, and how these objects are perceived. Let us now examine the avijñāpti, which is the eleventh category of rūpaskandha.

11. There is a serial continuity also in a person whose mind is distracted, or who is without mind, pure or impure, in dependence on the primary elements: this is called the avijñāpti. 57

"One whose mind is distracted" is one who has a mind different from the mind that provoked the avijñāpti,—for example, a bad mind
when the avijnāpti has been provoked by a good mind.

"One without mind" is one who has entered into one of the absorptions of non-consciousness called asamjñīsamāpatti [and nirodhasamāpatti] (ii.42).

"Also in a person . . ." the word "also" indicates that avijnāpti also exists in a person with a non-distracted mind, and in a person whose mind is not in the two absorptions.

"A serial continuity" is a flux.

"Pure or impure" means good or bad.

"In dependence on the primary elements:" this in order to distinguish the avijnāpti series from the prāpti series (ii.36). Avijnāpti depends on the primary elements, because they are its generating cause, etc. (ii.65; Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 663a26).

"This is called the avijnāpti" in order to indicate the reason for the name avijnāpti.

This serial continuity, while being by its nature matter and action,—like vijnāpti, bodily and vocal action,—nevertheless does nothing by way of informing another as vijnāpti does.

"Is called," in order to show that the author here expresses the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas, and not his own.

In short, avijnāpti is a rūpa, good or bad, arisen from vijnāpti or from absorption.

***

What are the primary elements?

12a-b. The primary elements are the elementary substance "earth," and the elementary substances "water," "fire" and "wind." 58

These four are the four dhātus, so called because they bear their own unique characteristics, as well as derived or secondary matter.

They are called "great" (=primary) because they are the point of support for all derived matter. Or it is because they assemble on a large scale in the mass of the earth, the water, the fire and the wind, where
their modes of activity are manifested together (Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 681a17, p. 663all).\textsuperscript{59}

What activity establishes the existence of these dhātus, and what is their nature?

12c. They are proven to exist by the actions of support, etc.

The elements of earth, water, fire, wind, are, in this order, proven to exist by the actions of support, cohesion, ripening and expansion. Expansion signifies growth and displacement. These are their actions.

12d. They are solidity, humidity, heat and motion.\textsuperscript{60}

As for their natures, the earth element is solidity, the water element is humidity, the fire element is heat, and the wind element is motion.\textsuperscript{61} Motion is what causes the series of states which constitutes a thing to reproduce itself in different places;\textsuperscript{62} in the same way that one speaks of the motion of a flame (iv.2c-d).

The Prakarana\textsuperscript{63} and the Sūtra\textsuperscript{64} say: "What is the wind element? It is lightness;" the Prakarana also says: "Lightness is a derived ōpa." Consequently, the dharma which has motion for its nature is the wind element:\textsuperscript{65} its nature (lightness) is manifested by its act of motion.

What is the difference between the earth element, and earth, etc?

13a. In common usage, what is designated by the word "earth" is color and shape.

That is, when one sees earth, one sees its color and its shape. As is the case for the earth,

13b. The same for water and fire.

In common usage, that which one designates (by the word water or fire) is color and shape.

13c. Wind is either the wind element,

But the wind element is simply called "wind" in the world.

13d. Or else [color and shape].\textsuperscript{66}
What is called “wind” in the world is also the wind element; in fact, one speaks of “black wind,” or “circular wind.”

***

Why do all these dharmaś, from visibles to avijñāta, receive the name rūpa? Why do they together constitute the rūpāskandha?

i. The Blessed One said: “Because it is incessantly broken, Oh Bhikṣus, one terms it rūpa upādānakandha. By what it is broken? It is broken by contact with the hand.”

“To be broken” signifies “to be damaged,” as stated in the Arthavargīya stanza of the Kṣudrakāgama (=Aṭṭhakavagga, i.2): “If the pleasures are lacking in a person who ardently searches out these pleasures, such a person is broken, as a person pierced by an arrow is broken.” (Compare Mbh xiii.193, 48).

But how is rūpa damaged?

By deteriorating, by being transformed.

ii. According to other masters, the quality that makes physical matter rūpa, namely rūpana, is not cutting off, deterioration, but rather impenetrability, impact or resistance, the obstacle that a rūpa opposes to its place being occupied by another rūpa (see i.43c-d).

[iii. Objections.]

1. If this is so, the rūpa that constitutes an atom, a “monad,” will not be rūpa, for a monad, not susceptible to deterioration or resistance, is free from rūpana.

Without doubt, a monad is devoid of rūpana; but a monad never exists in an isolated state; in the state of agglomeration, being an agglomerate, it is liable to deterioration and to resistance (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 390al).

2. Rūpas of the past and the future are not rūpa, for one cannot say that they are now in a state of resistance.

Without doubt, but they have been, and they shall be in this state. Whether past or future, they are of the same nature as the dharma which is now in a state of resistance. In the same way indhana is not only (presently) kindled wood, but also (future) fuel.
3. Avijñapti is not rūpa, for it is devoid of resistance.

Without doubt, but one can justify the quality of rūpa attributed to avijñapti:

a. Vijnapti, bodily or vocal action, from whence proceeds avijñapti, is rūpa; thus avijñapti is rūpa, as the shadow moves when the tree moves.

No. For avijñapti is not subject to modifications; further, in order that the comparison be exact, the avijñapti should perish when the vijnapti perishes, as is the case for the shadow and the tree.

b. Second explanation. Avijñapti is rūpa, for the primary elements, which constitute its point of support, are rūpa.\(^72\)

[Objection.] According to this principle, the five sense consciousnesses would be rūpa, for their point of support (the organ of sight, etc.) is rūpa.

This response is not valid. Avijñapti exists dependent upon the primary elements, as a shadow exists dependent on a tree, as the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the jewel. The visual consciousness is not dependent upon an organ which is solely the cause of its arising.

[Answer.] That the shadow, or the brilliance of a jewel exists dependent upon the tree, or on the jewel, is a hypothesis that does not conform to the principles of the Vaibhāṣikas (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 63c22). The Vaibhāṣikas hold that each one of the atoms of color which constitute shade and brilliance, exists dependent upon a tetrad of primary elements. And even supposing that: “The shadow is dependent upon the tree, since the shadow is dependent on the primary elements which are proper to it, and these are dependent upon the tree,”—the comparison to the shadow and avijñapti is inadmissible. The Vaibhāṣikas admit that avijñapti does not perish when the primary elements which serve as its point of support perish (iv. 4c-d). Consequently your refutation (“This response is not valid. Avijñapti . . .”) is worthless.

But, we would say, one can refute the objection: “According to this principle, the five sense consciousnesses would be rūpa.”

In fact, the support of visual consciousness is twofold: 1. the organ
of sight, which is in a state of "impact" (i.29b), which is rūpa; and 2. the mental organ (manas, i.44c-d) which is not rūpa.

Now the same does not hold for avijñapti whose point of support is exclusively rūpa. Thus, from the fact that avijñapti is called rūpa because its point of support is rūpa, one cannot conclude that visual consciousness should be called rūpa. Therefore, the second explanation is the right one.

***

The organs and objects which have been defined as rūpaskandha, 14a-b. These same organs and objects are regarded as ten āyatanas, ten dhātus.73

Considered as āyatana, origin of the mind and of the mental states (i.20), they are ten āyatanas: caksurāyatana, rūpāyatana, . . . kāyāyatana, spraṣṭaṇvāyatana.

Considered as dhātu, a mine (i.20), they are ten dhātus: caksur-dhātu, rūpadhātu . . . kāyadhātu, spraṣṭaṇvyadhātu.

***

We have explained rūpaskandha and how it is distributed into āyatanas and dhātus. We must now explain the skandhas.

14c. Sensation is painful impression, etc.74

Vedanāskandha is the threefold mode of feeling or experiencing sensation which is painful, pleasant, neither-painful-nor-pleasant. One should distinguish six classes of sensations: those which arise from the contact of the five material organs, the organ of sight, etc., with their object; and those which arise from contact with the mental organ (ii.7 and following).

14c-d. Ideas consist of the grasping of characteristics.75

The grasping of the diverse natures—perceiving that this is blue,
yellow, long, short, male, female, friend, enemy, agreeable, disagreeable, etc.—is *samjñaśkandha* (see i.16a). One can distinguish six types of *samjña*, according to organ, as for sensation.

15a-b. *Samkāraskandha* are the *saṃskāras* different from the other four *skandhas*.

The *saṃskāras* are everything that is conditioned (*saṃskṛta*, i.7a); but the name is reserved for those conditioned things which are not included in either the *skandhas* of *rūpa, vedāna*, or *samjña*, explained above, or in the *skandha* of *vijñāna* explained below (i.16).

It is true that the Blessed One said in a Sūtra, "The *saṃskāraskandha* is the six classes of volition;" but this definition excludes from *saṃskāraskandha* 1.) all the *viprayuktasaṃskāras* (ii.35), and 2.) the *samprayuktasaṃskāras* (ii.23b, 34), with the exception of volition itself. But the Sūtra expresses itself thus by reason of the capital importance of volition, which, being action by its nature, is by definition the factor which creates future existence. Also the Blessed One said, "The *upādānaskandha* called *saṃskāra* is so called because it conditions conditioned things," that is to say, because it creates and determines the five *skandhas* of future existence.

If we take the definition of the Sūtra literally, we would then arrive at the conclusion that the mental *dharmas*, with the exception of volition, and all of the *dharmas* of the *viprayukta* class (ii.35), do not form part of any *skandha*. They would thus not form part of the Truths of Suffering and Arising: one would not either know them, nor abandon them. Now the Blessed One said, "If there is a single *dharma* which is not known and penetrated, I declare that one cannot put an end to suffering" (vi.33). And again "If there is a single *dharma* which is not abandoned . . ." (*Samyukta TD* 2, p. 55b7, b23). Thus the collection of mental states and *viprayuktas* is included within the *saṃskāraskandha*.

15b-d. These three *skandhas*, with *avijñāpti* and unconditioned things, are the *dharmāyatana*, the *dharmadhātu*.

*Vedānāskandha, samjñaśkandha, saṃskāraskandha*, plus *avijñāpti*
Chapter One

(i.11) and the three unconditioned things (i.5b), are seven things which are called dharmāyatana or dharmadhātu.

16a. Consciousness is the impression relative to each object.81

Vijñānakandha is the impression relative to each object, the "raw grasping"82 of each object.83 Vijñānakandha is six classes of consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, touch, and mental consciousness:

Considered as āyatana (i.20a),

16b. It is the mental organ.

Considered as dbātu (i.20a),

16c. It is seven dbātus.

What are the seven?

16d. The six consciousnesses and the manas.

That is to say: the dbātu of the eye or visual consciousness (cakṣurvijñānadhātu), the dbātu of the ear or auditory consciousness (srotāvijñānadhātu), the dbātu of the nose or olfactory consciousness (gbrāṇavijñānadhātu), the dbātu of tongue or taste consciousness (jihvāvijñānadhātu), the dbātu of body or touch consciousness (kāyavijñānadhātu), the dbātu of mind or mental consciousness (manovijñānadhātu), and the dbātu of the mind (manodbātu).

We have seen that there are five skandhas, twelve āyatanas, and eighteen dbātus.

1. Rūpaskandha is ten āyatanas, ten dbātus, and avijñāpti.

2. The dharmāyatana, or dharmadhātu is vedanā, saṃjñā and saṃskārāskandha; avijñāpti; and the unconditioned things.

3. Vijñānakandha is the mana-āyatana; it is seven dbātus, namely the six classes of consciousness (vijñānakāya = vijñānadhātu) and the mental organ.

Could a manas or manodbātu be distinct from the six classes of consciousness, distinct from the sense consciousness and from the mental consciousness?

There is no manas distinct from the consciousness.84
17a-b. Of these six consciousness, the one which continually passes away, is the *manas*.\(^{85}\)

All consciousness which has just perished receives the name of *manodhātu*; in the same way, a man is both son and father, the same vegetable element is both fruit and seed.

[Objection.] If the six consciousnesses which make up six *dbhātus* constitute the *manas*, and if the *manas* is not a thing other than the six consciousnesses, then there would be either seventeen *dbhātus*,—by excluding the *manas* which is co-functional with the six consciousnesses,—or else twelve *dbhātus*, by excluding the six consciousnesses which are co-functional with the *manas*,—supposing of course that you want to enumerate distinct things and not mere designations.

This is true; but

17c-d. One counts eighteen *dbhātus* with a view to assigning a point of support to the sixth consciousness.

The first five consciousnesses have for their point of support the five material organs, organ of sight, etc. (see i.44c-d); but the sixth consciousness, the mental consciousness, does not have such a point of support. Consequently, with a view to attributing a point of support to this consciousness, one calls *manas* or *manodhātu*, or again *manā-āyatana* and *mana-indriya*, that which serves it as its point of support, that is to say, any one of the six consciousnesses which depend on these six points of support, and six objects.

[Objection.] If the consciousness or mind is called *manas* when, having perished, it is the point of support of another consciousness, the last mind of an Arhat will not be a *manas*, for it is not followed by a mind of which it would be the immediately antecedent cause and point of support (i.44c-d).

This last mind has indeed the nature of *manas*, the nature of being a point of support. If it is not followed by a new mind, namely the consciousness-of-conception of a new existence (*punarbhava*), this is not related to its nature; rather, this results from the absence of other causes, actions and defilements, necessary to the production of a new thought.
All conditioned dharmas are included within the totality of the skandhas (i.7); all of the impure dharmas are included within the totality of the upādānaskandhas (i.8); and all the dharmas are included within the totality of the āyatanas and the dhatus (i.14). But, more briefly,

18a-b. All the dharmas are included in one skandha, one āyatana, and one dhātu.

In rūpaskandha, mana-āyatana and dharmadhātu.

18c. A dharma is included in its own nature.

Not in another nature. Why is this?

18d. For it is distinct from the nature of others.

A dharma is not included (samgraha) in that from which it is distinct. For example, the organ of sight is included within the rūpaskandha, being rūpa by its nature; within the caksurāyatana and within the caksurdhātu, for it is the caksurāyatana and caksurdhātu; within the Truth of Suffering and Arising, for it is suffering and arising; but it is not included within the other skandhas, āyatanas, etc., for it is distinct by its nature from that which is not itself.

Without doubt the assemblies are won over by alms-giving and other samgrahavastus: there is therefore samgraha of one thing by a thing different from it.

But the samgraha is occasional and as a consequence, not real, but conventional.

But, there are two organs of sight, of hearing, and of smell; consequently one should count twenty-one dhātus.

19a-c. The organs of sight, of hearing, and of smell, although twofold, form only, in pairs, one dhātu, for their nature, their sphere of activity, and their consciousnesses are common.

The two organs of sight have a community of nature, for they
The Dhatus

are—both of them—the organ of sight; community of sphere, for they both have visible matter for their sphere; and community of consciousness, for they are both the point of support of the visual consciousness. Consequently the two organs of sight form a single dhātu.

The same holds for the organs of hearing and smell.

19d. It is for beauty's sake that they are twofold.

Although they form only one dhātu, these organs are produced in pairs, with a view to the beauty of the body. With but a single eye, a single ear, or a single nostril, one would be very ugly (ii.la; i.43, 30).

What is the meaning of the terms skandha, āyatana, and dhātu?

20a-b. Skandha signifies "heap," āyatana signifies "gate of entry," "gate of arising," and dhātu signifies "lineage."

i. In the Sūtra, skandha signifies "heap." "Whatever rūpa there is, past, present, or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or excellent, far or near, if one puts together all this rūpa, that which is past, etc., one has that which is called rūpaskandha." 90

[According to the Vaibhāṣikas,] (1) past rūpa is rūpa destroyed by impermanence, 91 future rūpa is rūpa which has not arisen, and present rūpa is rūpa which has arisen and which has not been destroyed; (2) rūpa is internal when it forms part of the series called "me" (i.39); all other rūpa is external; or rather the terms internal and external are understood from the point of view of āyatana: the organ of sight is internal because it forms part of my series or of the series of another; (3) rūpa is gross when it offers resistance; or rather these two designations are relative and not absolute.

Should one say that, in this second hypothesis, the gross and the subtle are not proven, since the same rūpa is gross or subtle according to whether one compares it to a rūpa more subtle or gross?

This objection is invalid, for terms of comparison do not vary:
when a rūpa is gross in relation to another rūpa, it is not subtle in relation to this same other rūpa: like father and son.

(4) Inferior rūpa is defiled rūpa; excellent rūpa is non-defiled rūpa; (5) past and future rūpa are distant; present rūpa is near. 92

The same for the other skandhas, with this difference: gross consciousness is that which has for its point of support the five organs; subtle consciousness is the mental consciousness; or rather consciousness is gross or subtle according to whether it belongs to a stage which is inferior or superior.

According to the Bhadanta, 93 (1) gross rūpa is that which is perceived by the five organs; all other rūpa is subtle; (2) "inferior" signifies "unpleasant," "excellent" signifies "pleasant;" (3) distant rūpa is that which is found in an invisible place; near rūpa is that which is found in a visible place.

[The explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas is bad, for] past rūpa, etc., has already been designated by its name. The same for sensation; it is far or near according to whether its point of support is visible or invisible; it is gross or subtle according to whether it is corporeal or mental (ii.7).

ii. āyatana signifies "gate of entry or of arising of the mind and of the mental states" (cittacaitta, ii.23). Etymologically, āyatana is that which extends (tanvanti) the entry (āya) of the mind and of the mental states. 94

iii. Dhātu signifies gotra, race, lineage. 95 In the same way that the place, the mountain, where there are many "families" of gems,—iron, copper, silver, gold,—is said "to have numerous dhātus," in this same way in the human complex or series, there are eighteen types of "families" which are called the eighteen dhātus.

Gotra is thus a mine. 96 Of what is the organ of the eye the mine? Of what are the other dhātus the mine?

The dhātus are the mine of their own species: the eye, being a "cause similar to its effect" (sabhāgahetu, ii.52) of the later moments of the existence of the eye, is the mine, the dhātu of the eye.

But then unconditioned things, which are eternal, cannot be considered as dhātu?

Let us say that they are the mine of the mind and mental states.
According to another opinion, dhātu signifies species. The specific nature of the eighteen dhātus is what is understood by the eighteen dhātus.

iv. [Objections.97] 1. If skandha signifies "heap," the skandhas have only a nominal existence, not a real existence, for collections are not a thing: for example a pile of wheat, or the pudgala.98

99 No, [reply the Vaibhāṣikas,] for an atom is a skandha.

As an atom in this hypothesis cannot have the quality of being a heap, do not say that skandha signifies "heap."

2. According to another opinion (Vibhāṣā TD 27, p. 407c9), skandha signifies "that which bears the burden, namely its effect."100 Or else skandha signifies "part, section,"101 as one says in the world, "I will lend you three skandhas, if you promise to return them to me."102

These two explanations are not in conformity with the Sūtra.103 The Sūtra, in fact, attributes the sense of heap to skandha and no other sense: "Whatever rūpa there is, past, present, or future, . . . if one puts together all this rūpa . . . ."

3. [The Vaibhāṣikas say: The Sūtra teaches that] all rūpa,—past rūpa, future rūpa, etc.,—is, individually, called skandha, the same way that it teaches that hair, etc., is earth-element (below, note 120); thus each "real" (atomic) element of past rūpa, future rūpa, etc., receives the name of skandha. Thus the skandhas have real existence and not merely nominal existence.

This interpretation is inadmissible, for the Sūtra says "... if one puts together all this rūpa, . . . one has that which is called rūpaskandha."

4. [The Sautrāntikas:] If this is the case, then the material āyatanas,—the organs and objects of the five sense consciousnesses,—have only a nominal existence, for the quality of being a "gate of arising of the mind or mental states" does not belong to atoms taken one by one, which are solely real, but to collections of atoms which constitute an organ of sight, a visible object, etc.

[Answer:] No, since each of these atoms individually possesses the quality of being "a gate of the arising of the mind," of being the cause of consciousness (compare i.44a-b.iii). If you do not accept this
doctrine, you will refuse to the organ, in its totality, the quality of being a cause of consciousness, for it does not produce a consciousness by itself, without the cooperation of an object.

5. On the other hand, the Vibhāṣā (TD 27, p. 384a18) expresses itself thus: "When the Ābhidhārnikas\footnote{104} take into consideration the fact that the term skandha is only the denomination of a heap, they say that an atom is part of a dhātu, an āyatana, and a skandha; when they do not take this fact into consideration, they say that an atom is a dhātu, an āyatana, a skandha.\footnote{105} In fact, one metaphorically designates the part by the whole; for example, "The robe is burned," for "One part of the robe is burned."

***

Why did the Blessed One give skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus as the triple designation of the dharmas?

20c-d. The teachings of the skandhas, etc., because error, faculty, joy are threefold.\footnote{106}

1. Error is threefold: the first category of persons go astray by considering mental phenomena as together constituting a self; the second are similarly mistaken with respect to the material elements; and the third similarly err with respect to both the mental and the material elements.

2. The moral faculties (ii.3c-d), the faculty of speculative consciousness (prajñendriya, ii.24d), are of three categories, sharp, mediocre, dull.

3. Joy is threefold: the first category of persons apply themselves to that which is said in brief; the second to that which is said normally; the third to that which is said at great length.

The teaching of the skandhas addresses itself to the first category of hearers, to those who are mistaken with respect to mental phenomena, who are of sharp faculties, and who are fond of a brief teaching; the teaching of the āyatanas addresses itself to the second
category, and the teaching of the dhātus addresses itself to the third category.\textsuperscript{107}

***

Sensation and ideas each constitute a separate skandha: all the other mental dharmas (ii.24) are placed within the saṁskāraskandha (i.15). Why is this?

21. The two mental states, sensation and ideas, are defined as distinct skandhas because they are the causes of the roots of dispute, because they are the causes of transmigration, and also by reason of the causes which justify the order of skandhas. (i.22b)\textsuperscript{108}

1. There are two roots of dispute:\textsuperscript{109} attachment to pleasure, and attachment to opinions. Sensation and ideas are, respectfully, the principal causes of these two roots. In fact, if one becomes attached to pleasures, it is because one relishes the sensation; if one becomes attached to opinions, it is by reason of erroneous or false ideas (viparĪtasamjñā, v.9)

2. Sensation and ideas are the causes of transmigration: those who are greedy for sensation and whose ideas are erroneous transmigrate.

3. The reasons which justify the order of the skandhas will be explained below (i.22b-d).

***

Why do unconditioned things, which form part of the dharmāyatana and the dharmadhātu (i.15d), not form part of the skandhas?

22a-b Unconditioned things are not named with respect to the skandhas, because they do not correspond to the concept.\textsuperscript{110}

1. Unconditioned things cannot be placed within any of the five skandhas, for they are not matter, nor sensation . . .
2. One cannot make a sixth skandha of the unconditioned: it does not correspond to the concept of skandha, since skandha signifies "heap," "capable of being put together." One cannot say of the unconditioned what the Sūtra says of matter: "If one puts together all this unconditioned, that which is past . . . , one has that which one calls the a asamskṛtaskandha," for the distinctions of past, etc., do not exist with respect to unconditioned things.

3. Furthermore, the expression upādānakṣaṇaskandha (i.8a) designates the totality of that which is the cause of defilements; the expression kṣaṇa designates the totality of that which is the cause of defilement (impure conditioned things) as well as the cause of purification (pure conditioned things: the Path). Thus unconditioned things, which are neither the cause of defilement, nor the cause of purification, cannot be placed either among the upādānakṣaṇaskandhas nor among the kṣaṇas.

4. According to one opinion, the same way that the end of a jug is not a jug, in this same way unconditioned things, which are the end or cessation of the kṣaṇas, are not kṣaṇas (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 385b18). And so according to this reasoning unconditioned things will be neither āyatana nor dhātu.

***

We have defined the kṣaṇas. We should now explain the order in which the kṣaṇas are enumerated.

22b-d. The order of the kṣaṇas is justified by their grossness, their defilement, the characteristic of the jug, etc., and also from the point of view of their spheres of influence.\textsuperscript{111}

1. Matter, being subject to resistance (i.29b), is the grossest of the kṣaṇas. Among the non-material kṣaṇas, sensation is the grossest, by reason of the grossness of its functioning: in fact, one localizes sensation in the hand, in the foot, etc. Ideas are grosser than the last two kṣaṇas. The samskāraskandha is grosser that the kṣaṇa of consciousness. The kṣaṇas are thus arranged in order of their diminishing grossness.
2. In the course of external transmigration, men and women are mutually infatuated by their bodies (rupas) because they are attached to the pleasures of sensation (vedanā). This attachment proceeds from erroneous ideas (samjñāviparyāsa), which are due to the defilements which are saṁskāras. And it is the mind (citta) which is defiled by the defilements. The skandhas are thus arranged according to the process of their defilement.

3. Matter is the pot, sensation is the food, ideas are the seasoning, the saṁskāras are the cook, and the mind is the consumer. We have a third reason for the order of the skandhas.

4. Finally, in considering the skandhas on the one hand, and the dhātus or spheres of existence (ii.14) on the other, one sees that Kāmadhātu is characterized by matter, namely by the five objects of sense enjoyment (kāmaguṇa: Dharmaskandha, 5.15, Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 376all: compare Kathāvatthu, viii.3). Rūpadhātu, that is to say the Four Dhyānas, is characterized by sensation (organs of pleasure, satisfaction, and indifference, viii.12). The first three stages of Ārūpyadātu are characterized by ideas: ideas of infinite space, etc. (viii.4).

The fourth stage of Ārūpyadātu, or the summit of existence, is characterized by volition, the saṁskāra par excellence, which there creates an existence of twenty-four thousand cosmic ages (iii.81c). Finally, these diverse stages are the "abodes of consciousness" (vijñānasathiti, iii.6): it is in these places that the mind resides. The first four skandhas constitute the field; the fifth constitutes the seed.

There are thus five skandhas, no more, no less. One sees how the reasons which justify the order of the skandhas also justify the doctrine that makes sensation and ideas separate skandhas: they are grosser than the other saṁskāras; they are the cause of the process of defilement; they are the food and the seasoning; and they reign over the two spheres of existence.

***

One should now explain the order in which the six āyatanas or dhātus which are the six organs of consciousness, the organ of sight,
etc., are enumerated: an order the function of which is to arrange the objects (viṣaya) and the consciousnesses which correspond to these organs (rūpadhātu, caksurviṃśitaṇḍhātu . . .)

23a. The first five are the first because their object is present.

Five, beginning with the organ of sight, are called the first, because they bear only on present, simultaneous objects. Conversely, the object of the mental organ can be either (1) simultaneous to this organ; (2) earlier or past; (3) later or future; (4) tritemporal, that is to say simultaneous, earlier and later; or (5) beyond time.

23b. The first four are the first because their object is solely derived or secondary matter.

The organs of sight, of hearing, of smell and of taste do not attain to the primary elements (i.12), but solely to matter which derives from the primary elements (bhautika, ii.50a, 65).

The object of touch is not constant (i.35a-b, 10d): sometimes primary elements, sometimes derived matter, sometimes both at the same time.

23c. These four are arranged according to the range and speed of their activity.

Their activity is at a distance, at a greater distance, very rapid.

The organ of sight and the organ of hearing bear on a distant object (i.43c-d). They are thus named first.

The organ of sight bears on objects at a greater distance than does the organ of hearing: for one can see a river of which one cannot make out the sound. The organ of sight is thus named before the organ of hearing.

Neither odor nor taste are perceived at a distance. But the activity of smell is more rapid than that of taste. The organ of smell perceives the odor of food before the organ of taste perceives its taste.

23d. Or rather the organs are arranged according to their position.
The point of support or the place of the organ of sight, that is to say, the eye, is the highest; below that, the place of the organ of hearing; below that, the place of the organ of smell; below that, the place of the organ of taste. As for the place of the organ of touch, that is to say the body, it is, for the most part, lower than the tongue. As for the mental organ, it is not matter (i.44a-b).

***

Among the ten āyatanas included within rūpaskandha, only one receives the name of rūpa-āyatana. And although all the āyatanas are dharmas, only one is called dharma-āyatana. Why?

24. A single āyatana is called rūpa-āyatana with a view to distinguishing it from the others, and by reason of its excellence. A single āyatana is called dharma-āyatana with a view to distinguishing it from the others, and because it includes many of the dharmas as well as the best dharma.¹¹²

The ten material āyatanas (i.14a-b) are, each one separately, āyatana: five are subjects, and five are the objects of a specific consciousness. They are not, in their totality, a single āyatana, a single source of consciousness, so that they could be called a rūpa-āyatana. Nine are individualized by specific names: caksurāyatana, srotrāyatana, sabdāyatana . . . The āyatana which does not bear any of these nine names, and which is matter, is sufficiently designated by the expression rūpa-āyatana, without there being any need to give it another name. Name.

But the nine other āyatanas are also both āyatana and rūpa: why is the name of rūpa-āyatana given in preference to the object of the organ of sight?

By reason of its excellence. It is rūpa, in fact, (1) by reason of pratigha: being subject to resistance, it is “deteriorated” through contact with the hand, etc.; (2) by reason of desanidarsana (i.13, p. 70): one can indicate it as being here, as being there; and (3) by reason of common usage: that which one understands in the world by rūpa, is
visible matter, color and shape.

The dharmāyatana (i.15b-d) is sufficiently distinguished from the other āyatana by the name of dharmāyatana. Same explanation as above. It includes numerous dharmas, sensations, ideas, etc.; it includes the best dharma, that is to say, Nirvāṇa. This is why the general name, dharmāyatana, is attributed to it par excellence.

According to another opinion,113 visible matter is called rūpa-yatana because it includes twenty varieties (blue, etc.), and because it is the sphere of three types of eyes, a fleshy eye, the divine eye, and the wisdom eye (mārīsa-, divya-, and prajñācaksus; Itivuttaka, 61).

***

The Sūtras name other skandhas, other āyatanas, and other dhātus. Are these included within the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus described above?

25. The eighty thousand dharmaskandhas that the Muni promulgated, depending on whether one regards them as "voice" or as "name," are included within the rūpakandha or the saṃskāraskandha.114

For the teachers who say "The word of the Buddha is, by its nature, voice," these skandhas are included within the rūpakandha; for those who consider the word of the Buddha as "name," these skandhas are included within the saṃskāraskandha (ii.36, 47a-b).

***

What is the dimension of a dharmaskandha?

26a. According to some, a dharmaskandha is of the dimension of the Treatise.115

That is to say, of the dimension of an Abhidharma Treatise known by the name of Dharmskandha, which is six thousand stanzas long.116
26b. The exposition of the *skandhas*, etc., constitutes so many *dharmaskandhas*.\(^{117}\)

According to another opinion, the exposition of the *skandhas*, *åyatanas*, *dhātus*, *pratītyasamutpāda*, the Truths, the foods, the *dhyānas*, the *apramānas*, the *ārūpyas*, the *vimoksas*, the *abhībhāyatanas*, the *kṛtsnāyatanas*, the *bodhipākṣikas*, the *abhijñās*, the *pratisamvids*, *pranidbiñāna*, or *araṇā*, etc., are each one of them separately so many *dharmaskandhas*.

26c-d. In fact, each *dharmaskandha* has been preached in order to heal a certain category of believer.

Beings, with respect to their dispositions (ii.26), number eighty thousand: some are dominated by affection, others by hatred, others by error, others by pride, etc. Eighty thousand *dharmaskandhas* have been preached by the Blessed One in order to cure them.

***

In the same way that the *dharmaskandhas* are included within *rūpaskandha* or *saṃskāraskandha*,

27. In this same way the other *skandhas*, *åyatanas* and *dhātus* should be suitably arranged within the *skandhas*, *åyatanas* and *dhātus* as described above, by taking into account the characteristics that have been attributed to them.

The other *skandhas*, *åyatanas* and *dhātus* which are mentioned in other Sūtras should be arranged within the five *skandhas*, twelve *åyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus*, by taking into consideration the unique characteristics which have been attributed to them in these works.

There are five pure *skandhas*, *śīla* (iv.13), *samādhi* (vi.68), *prajñā* (ii.25), *vimukti* (vi.76c), and *vimuktijñānaradārśana*: the first forms part of the *rūpaskandha*, the others of the *saṃskāraskandha* (*Samyutta*, i.99, *Dīgha*, iii.279, *Dharmasamgraha*, 23).

The first eight *kṛtsnāyatanas* (viii.35), being by their nature
absence of desire, form part of the dharmāyatana. If one considers them along with their following, they are by their nature five skandhas, and they are included within the mana-ayatana and the dharmāyatana.

The same holds for the abhibbāyatanas (viii.34).

The last two kṛtsnāyatanas and the four ārūpyāyatanas (viii.2c) are, by their nature, four skandhas, with the exclusion of rūpa. They are included within the mana-ayatana and the dharmāyatana.

The five "gates of entry into deliverance" (vimuktyāyatana) are, by their nature, speculative knowledge (prajñā); they are thus included within the dharmāyatana. If one considers their following, they are included within the sabdāyatana, the mana-ayatana, and the dharmāyatana.

Two other āyatanas are left: 1. the Asaṃjñisattvas (ii.41b-d), which are included within the ten āyatanas, with the exception of smell and taste; and 2. the Naivasamaṃjñāsaṃjñayatanopagas, which are included within the mana-ayatana and the dharmāyatana.

In this same way the sixty-two dhātus enumerated in the Bahudhātuka should be arranged within the eighteen dhātus by taking their nature into consideration.\(^{119}\)

***

Among the six dhātus or elements mentioned in the Sūtra,—earth element, water element, fire element, wind element, space element, and consciousness element—the last two have not been defined. Is the space element the same thing as all space, the first of the unconditioned things (i.5c)? Is all consciousness (vijñāna, i.16) the consciousness element?

28a-b. Cavities are called the space element; it is, one says, light and darkness.

[The cavity of the door, the window, etc., is the external space element; the cavity of the mouth, the nose, etc., is the internal space element.\(^{121}\)
According to the School (kīla), the void of the space element is light or darkness—that is to say, a certain type of color, of matter (i.9b), for that which one perceives in a cavity is light or darkness. Being by its nature light or darkness, the void will be day or night. The void is called aghasamantaka rūpa (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 388b5). Agha, some say, is etymologically explained as atyartham ghātāt: “because it is extremely capable of striking or of being struck.” One should thus understand agha as solid, agglomerated matter. The void is thus a type of matter close (sāmantaka) to agha.

According to another opinion, [our own], agha signifies “free from striking” (a-pratighatāt). A void is agha because other matter does not strike it; it is at the same time close to other matter; it is thus both agha and samāntaka.

28c. The consciousness element is an impure consciousness.

[Impure consciousness, that is to say, the mind which does not form part of the Path.] Why is it not called pure? Because these six dhātus are

28d. The support of arising.

The six dhātus are given in the Sūtra (note 120) as support, as the raison d'être of arising, that is to say, of the “mind at conception”, and of all existence until the “mind at death”.

The pure dharmas are opposed to arising, to existence. Thus the five sense consciousnesses, which are always impure, and the mental consciousness when it is impure, give us the consciousness element (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 389a8).

***

Of these six dhātus, the first four are included within the tangible, the fifth is included within visible matter, and the sixth within the seven dhātus enumerated above i.16c.

***
Among the eighteen *dhātus*, how many are visible, "capable of being pointed out?"

29a-b. Only rūpadhātu is visible.

One can indicate its place, here, there. The other *dhātus* are invisible.

29b-c. The ten *dhātus* which are exclusively material are capable of being struck.\(^{124}\)

The ten *dhātus* which are included within the *rūpaskandha* are capable of being struck.\(^{125}\)

1. Striking, or collision, is of three types: āvaraṇapratiṅghāta, visayaṇapratiṅghāta, and ālambanapratīghāta (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 391c6).

   a. Āvaraṇapratīghāta, being struck by reason of resistance: the quality that belongs to a body of making an obstacle to the arising of another body in the place where it itself is found; impenetrability. When a hand strikes a hand or a rock, when a rock strikes a rock or a hand, it is counterstruck or repelled.

   b. Visayaṇapratiṅghāta, the striking of the organ with that which is its sphere of action. According to the Prajñāpāta: \(^{126}\) "There is an eye, an organ of sight, which is struck by water and not by dryness, namely the eye of a fish; there is an eye which is struck by dryness and not by water, namely, the eyes of humans in general, (with the exception of fishermen); there is an eye which is struck by water and by dryness, namely, the eye of a crocodile, a crab, a frog, or fishermen; there is an eye which is neither struck by water nor by dryness, namely the eyes which are not of the preceding categories (for example, the eyes of beings who perish in the womb). There is an eye struck by night, namely the eye of a bat, an owl, etc.; there is an eye which is struck by daylight, namely the eye of humans in general, (with the exception of thieves, etc.); there is an eye which is struck by the night and by daylight, namely the eye of a dog, a jackal, a horse, a leopard, a cat, etc.; there is an eye which is not struck by either night or daylight, namely the eyes which are not of the preceding categories."\(^{127}\)

   c. Ālambanapratīghāta, the striking of the mind and mental states
with their object. (ii.62c).

What is the difference between a sphere, visaya, and an object, ālambana?

Visaya is the place where the organ exercises its activity, seeing, hearing, etc.; ālambana is what is grasped by the mind and the mental states. Thus, whereas the mind and mental states have both visaya and ālambana, the eye, the ear, etc., have only visaya.

Why term “striking” or “evolving” the activity of the organ or the mind with respects to its visaya or ālambana?

Because the organ does not proceed, is not active, beyond the visaya: thus it is struck by the visaya (for one says in common usage that one is struck by a wall beyond which one cannot “proceed”). Or rather, “to strike” signifies “to encounter”: this is the process or activity of the organ with respect to its own sphere.

2. When we say that ten dhatus are capable of being struck, or sapratigha, “characterized by pratighāta,” we are speaking of āvarana-pratighāta: these bodies are mutually impenetrable, capable of collision.

3. Are the dharmas which are sapratigha through “striking the sphere of action,” also sapratigha through “impenetrability?”

Four alternatives: 1. the seven cittadhātus (i.16c) and one part of the dharmadhātu, namely the samprayuktas (ii.23), are sapratigha solely through “striking the sphere of action;” 2. the five spheres, visible matter, etc. (i.9) are sapratigha solely through “impenetrability;” 3. the five organs, eye, etc. (i.9) are sapratigha from the above two points of view; 4. one part of the dharmadhātu, namely the viprayuktas (ii.35), are not sapratigha through “striking the sphere of action,” but are sapratigha through “striking the object.”

Let us now answer the second term of the question: the dharmas which are sapratigha through “striking the object” are also sapratigha through “striking the sphere of action”: but there are dharmas which are sapratigha through “striking the sphere of action” without being at the same time sapratigha through “striking the object,” namely the five organs.

4. The Bhadanta Kumāralābha says: “Sapratigha is that in which and with regard to which the consciousness can be hindered from
arising by a foreign body; \textit{apratīgha} is the opposite."\textsuperscript{128}

***

Among the eighteen \textit{dhātus}, how many are good, how many are bad, and how many are morally neutral (\textit{avyākṛta}, iv.8, 9, 45)?

29c. Eight \textit{dhātus} are morally neutral.

What are the eight? These are the ten \textit{dhātus} which are characterized as \textit{sapratīgha} (i.29b-c),

29d. Minus visible matter and sound.\textsuperscript{129}

"Minus visible matter and sound," that is to say, eight \textit{dhātus}: the five material organs, odor, taste and the tangible, are neutral, not being defined as good or bad; or rather, according to another opinion, not being defined from the point of view of retribution (\textit{vipāka}).

30a. The others are of three types.

The other \textit{dhātus} can be, according to the case, good, bad, or neutral.

1. The seven \textit{dhātus} (\textit{cittradhātavah}, i.16c). are good when they are associated with the three good roots (iv.8), bad when they are associated with bad roots, and neutral in all other cases.\textsuperscript{130}

2. The \textit{dharmadhātu} (i.15c-d) includes (1) the good roots, the \textit{dharmas} associated with these roots, the \textit{dharmas} that issue from these roots, and \textit{pratisamkhyāniruddha} or Nirvāṇa; (2) the bad roots, the \textit{dharmas} associated with these roots, the \textit{dharmas} that issue from these roots; and (3) neutral \textit{dharmas}, for example space.

3. \textit{Rūpadhātu} and \textit{sabdadhātu}, the visible matter and the audible, are good or bad when they constitute a bodily or vocal action (iv.26, 3d) that issued from a good or bad mind. They are neutral in all other cases.

***

Among the eighteen \textit{dhātus}, how many exist in each sphere of
existence, Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, and Ārūpyadhātu (iii.1-3)?

30a-b. All exist in Kāmadhātu.\(^{131}\)

All the dhātu are associated with, or bound to Kāmadhātu, not disassociated from Kāmadhātu (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 746cl).

30b. Fourteen exist in Rūpadhātu.

There are fourteen dhātu in Rūpadhātu.

30c-d. With the exception of odor, taste, the consciousness of odor, and the consciousness of taste.\(^{132}\)

1. Odor and taste are lacking there, for they are "morsel-food" (iii.39) and no one is born into Rūpadhātu who is not detached from this food. Since odor and taste are lacking, the consciousness of odor and taste are lacking also.

   Objection: Tangible things should be lacking also, for it is also tangible food by the "mouthful."

   No, for tangible things are not exclusively food. Tangibles which are not food do exist in Rūpadhātu.

   Objection: One can reason in the same way with respect to odor and taste.

   No. The tangible has a useful function apart from food: it serves as the point of support of the organs; it serves as a support in general; and it serves as clothing. Odor and taste have no function outside of eating: they are of no use to beings detached from food.

ii. Śrīlābha gives a different explanation: When a person in Kāmadhātu enters into absorption or dhyāna, he sees visible matter; he hears sounds; his body is comforted by a certain tangible which accompanies physical well-being produced by the dhyāna (vii.9b). One can conclude from this fact that, in the celestial abodes of Rūpadhātu which bear the name of dhyāna (upapattidhyāna, iii.2, viii.1), there are visible, audible and tangible things, but not taste and odor.

iii. We think that, if odor and taste are lacking in Rūpadhātu, the organs of smell and taste should also be lacking, for they do not serve any purpose. (Thus there are only twelve dhātu in Rūpadhātu.)
1. [Answer of a master who speaks for the Vaibhāṣikas, vaibhāṣikadesīya.] The organs of smell and taste are useful in Rūpadhātu, for, without them, beauty and elocution would be missing.

The nose, support of the subtle matter that constitutes the organ of smell, suffices for beauty (i.44); the tongue, the place of the organ of taste, suffices for elocution.

[The Vaibhāṣikadesīya.] The members,—nose and tongue,—which support the organ, cannot be deprived of this organ. There is no nose or tongue where the subtle matter that constitutes the organ of smell or the organ of taste is missing, in the same way that the sexual member is always endowed with a special organ of touch which is called the sexual organ (i.44a, ii.2c-d).

One can well conceive that the sexual member is lacking when the sexual organ is lacking, for, stripped of this organ, it serves no function; but the nose and the tongue are useful independent of the organs of smell and taste. Thus the nose and tongue exist in Rūpadhātu, although the organs which correspond to them are lacking. Thus there are only twelve dhātus in Rūpadhātu.

2. [Answer of the Vaibhāṣikas:] But an organ can arise without having any use, for example the organs of beings destined to perish in the womb.

Agreed! The arising of an organ can be without usefulness: but it is never without a cause. What is the cause of the arising of an organ, if not a certain act commanded by a desire relative to this organ? Now whoever is without attachment to the object, odor, is also without attachment to the organ, the organ of smell. Thus there is no reason for the organs of smell and taste to appear among beings who are reborn in Rūpadhātu, since these beings are detached from odors and tastes. Otherwise, why is the sexual organ lacking in Rūpadhātu?

Reply of the Vaibhāṣikas. The sexual organ is a cause of ugliness (ii.12).

Is it not beautiful among beings who possess the marks of the Mahāpuruṣas? Moreover, it is not by reason of its utility that the sexual organ arises, but rather by reason of its cause. Given its cause, it will arise, even if it is ugly.
3. [Argument from authority.] According to the Vaibhāśikas, to maintain that the organs of smell and taste are lacking in Rūpadhātu is to contradict the Sūtra. The Sūtra\textsuperscript{133} teaches that beings of Rūpadhātu possess, complete, all the organs: they are never one-eyed, or only one-eared (iii.98a).

This text teaches that beings of Rūpadhātu possess, complete, the organs that exist in Rūpadhātu. If the Vaibhāśikas do not understand it thus, they must then attribute the sexual organ to those beings.

[4. Reply and conclusion of the Vaibhāśikas.]
Although odor and taste are lacking there, the organs of smell and taste exist in Rūpadhātu.

In fact, a person who is detached from odors keeps his attachment with respect to the organ of smell which is part of his person. Thirst (=desire) enters into action with regard to these six organs of consciousness, not by reason of the object of these six organs, but by reason of the person himself. Thus the arising of the organs of smell and taste has a cause, even if one were detached from odors and tastes. But the same does not hold for the sexual organ. Attachment relative to this organ has for its principle attachment to the tactile consciousness of sexual union. Now beings who will be reborn in Rūpadhātu are detached from this consciousness; thus they have not accomplished actions commanded by a desire relative to the sexual organ; thus this organ is lacking in Rūpadhātu.\textsuperscript{134}

31a-b. In Ārūpyādhatu, there is a mental organ, an object of the mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.

Beings detached from matter arise in Ārūpyādhatu, thus the ten \textit{dhātus} which are material, namely the five organs and their objects, and the five consciousnesses which have for their point of support and for their objects a material \textit{dhātu} (viii.3c), are lacking in Ārūpyādhatu.

***

How many \textit{dhātus} are impure? How many are pure?

31c-d. The three \textit{dhātus} which have just been named can be
pure or impure.

They are pure when they form part of the Truth of the Path or of unconditioned things; in the opposite case they are impure (i.4).

31d. The others are impure.

The other dhātus, fifteen in number, are solely impure.\(^{135}\)

***

How many dhātus are associated with \(\text{vitarka}\) and with \(\text{vicāra}\), free from \(\text{vitarka}\) and associated with \(\text{vicāra}\), or free from both \(\text{vitarka}\) and \(\text{vicāra}\)?\(^{136}\)

32a-b. Five consciousnesses always include \(\text{vitarka}\) and \(\text{vicāra}\).

They are always associated with \(\text{vitarka}\) and with \(\text{vicāra}\), for they are gross, being turned towards externals. The word \(\text{hi}\), “always,” indicates restriction; they are exclusively dharmas which include \(\text{vitarka}\) and \(\text{vicāra}\).

32c. The last three dhātus are of three types.

These dhātus are the mental organ, the object of mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.

1. In Kāmadhātu and in the First Dhyāna (viii.7, 11), (1) the manodhātu, (2) manovijñānadhātu, and (3) that part of the dharmadhāytu which is associated with the mind (ii.23), with the exception of vitarka and vicāra themselves, are associated with vitarka and vicāra.

2. In the intermediary dhyāna (dhyānāntara, viii.22d), these same are free from vitarka, but associated with vicāra.

3. In the higher stages up to and including the last stage, these same are free from both vitarka and vicāra (vi.23c-d).

4. The part of the dharmadhātu which is disassociated from the mind (ii.35) and the vicāra of the intermediary dhyāna are free from both vitarka and vicāra.

5. As for vitarka, it is always accompanied by vicāra; it is always free from vitarka, since two simultaneous vitarkas are impossible. But
the vicāra of Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna are not placed within any of the three categories: in fact, it is always associated with vitarka, and it is never accompanied by vicāra, two simultaneous vicāras being impossible.

We therefore say that, in the stages which include vitarka and vicāra (viii.7), there are four categories: 1. The dharmas associated with the mind, with the exception of vitarka and vicāra, are accompanied by vitarka and vicāra. 2. Vitarka is free from vitarka, but accompanied by vicāra. 3. The dharmas disassociated from the mind are free from vitarka and vicāra. 4. Vicāra is free from vicāra, and is accompanied by vitarka.

32d. The other dhātus are free from the one and the other.

The other dhātus are the ten material dhātus. Not being associated with the mind, they are free from both vitarka and vicāra.

***

But, if the five sense consciousnesses are always accompanied by vitarka and vicāra, how are they defined as free from vikalpa?

33a-b. They are free from vikalpa to the extent that they are free from nirūpanāvikalpa and from anusmarāṇavikalpa.¹³⁷

According to the Vaibhāṣikas,¹³⁸ vikalpa is of three types: vikalpa in and of itself or by definition, vikalpa consisting of examination, and vikalpa consisting of remembering.¹³⁹ The five sense consciousnesses include the first type of vikalpa but not the other two.¹⁴⁰ This is why one says that they are free from vikalpa, in the same way that when a horse has only one foot, one says that it does not have any feet. "Vikalpa by definition" is vitarka, which we shall study in the chapter on the mental states (ii.33). As for the other two vikalpas:

33c-d. They are dispersed mental prajñā, mental memory whatever it may be.

Mental prajñā, that is, the discernment of the dharmas associated with the mental consciousness, but dispersed, that is to say, not
concentrated, not in the state of absorption (viii.1), is either *vikalpa* of examination or by definition. All mental memory, concentrated or not concentrated, is *vikalpa* of remembering.\(^{141}\)

***

How many *dhātus* "have an object," that is to say, are the subject of consciousness?

34a-b. The seven *dhātus* which are mind have an object.\(^{142}\)

Only the *dhātus* of visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, touch, and mental consciousness have an object, because they always grasp their spheres.

34b. And also one part of the *dharmadhātu*.

That part which consists of the *dharmas* associated with the mind (ii.23). The other *dhātus*, namely the ten material *dhātus* and the part of the *dharmadhātu* which is not associated with the mind (ii.35), do not have an object.

***

How many *dhātus* are non-appropriated? How many are appropriated?

34c. Nine are non-appropriated.

What are these nine? The seven that have been mentioned which have an object, together with one-half of the eighth.

34c. The eight that have been mentioned, and sound.

These nine are never appropriated: the seven *dhātus* of mind (i.16c), the *dharmadhātu* (i.15c), and sound are never appropriated.

34d. The other nine are of two types.

They are sometimes appropriated, sometimes non-appropriated.
1. The five organs of sense consciousness (caksurdhātu, etc.), of the present time, are appropriated. They are not appropriated in the future and in the past.

Four objects,—visible matter, odor, taste, and tangible things,—are appropriated when they are present, when they are an integral part of the organs. Every other visible matter, every other odor, every other taste, and every other tangible is not appropriated: for example, the physical matter,—color and shape,—of hair, body hair, nails and teeth,—with the exception of their roots, which are bound to the body or to the organ of touch; color and shape of excrement, urine, saliva, mucus, blood, etc.; the color and shape of earth, water, fire, etc.

2. What is the meaning of the expression "appropriated?" That which the mind and the mental states grasp and appropriate to themselves in the quality of a support is called "appropriated." Organic matter, that is to say matter which constitutes the five organs of consciousness, as well as matter not separable from organic matter, is "appropriated," is "made one's own," by the mind: this results from the fact that, in the case of well-being or illness, there is a reciprocal reaction between the mind and this matter. Matter that the Abhidharma calls "appropriated," is called in common language, sacetanā or sensitive matter.143

***

How many dhātu are primary matter, or the great, primary elements? How many are secondary matter, matter derived from the primary elements?144

35a. The tangible is of two types.

Tangibles are (1) the four primary elements, solidity, fluidity, heat, and motion (i.12); and (2) sevenfold secondary matter, the soft, the hard, etc. (i.10d).

35b. The other nine material dhātu are solely secondary matter.
The other material dhātus, the five organs and the objects of the first four organs, are solely secondary matter.

35c. As is the part of the dharmadhātu which is material.¹⁴⁵

The same for avijñapti (i.11), which forms part of the dharmadhātu (i.15c-d).

The dhātus of mind (i.16c) are neither primary matter nor secondary matter; the same for the dharmadhātu, with the exception of avijñapti.

i. According to the Bhadanta Buddhadeva, the ten āyatanas, that is, the five organs of consciousness and their objects, are solely primary matter.¹⁴⁶

An inadmissible opinion. The Sutra teaches, in a limited manner, that there are four primary elements, and it defines them in a limited manner as being solidity, fluidity, etc., (i.12d). Now solidity, fluidity, etc., are tangibles and solely tangibles: solidity is not perceived by the organ of sight. Furthermore, each organ attains to the secondary matter which is appropriate to it: color is not perceived by the organ of touch.¹⁴⁷

Further, that the tangible is primary matter and secondary matter, and that the nine other materials āyatanas are solely secondary matter, results from the same words of the Sūtra: "Oh Bhikṣus, the eye, the internal source of consciousness (i.39), a subtle matter derived from the primary elements, material sources, invisible, capable of being struck," and so on with respect to the four other material organs which are described in the same terms. With respect to the first four objects: "The visible matter is an external sources of consciousness, deriving from the primary elements, material, visible, capable of being struck." The same with respect to odor and taste. But, with respect to the tangible: "Tangibles are an external source of consciousness, the four primary elements and matter deriving from the four primary elements . . ."

ii. One can maintain that the five organs are primary matter, for the Sūtra (Samyukta, 11.1) says: "Everything that is in the eye, a ball of flesh, is solid, resistant . . ."
Reply. Here the Sūtra refers to the ball of flesh which is not separable from the organ of sight, and not to the organ itself.

So be it. But, according to the Garbhāvakrāntisūtra (note 120) "a person is the six dhātus," the primary element of earth, the primary element of water, the primary element of fire, the primary element of wind, the space element and the vijñāna element. Thus, in the embryonic state, the body is made up of primary matter, not secondary matter.

No. For in this first phrase, "a person is the six dhātus," the Sūtra means to describe the essence of a person, and it does not pretend to give an exhaustive definition. In fact, the Sūtra then says that a person is the six points of support of the mental dharma called contact (ii.24), that is to say, the six organs. Further, to take this definition literally: "a person is the six dhātus," one would infer the non-existence of the mental states (caitta, ii.24, 34), for the mental states are not included within vijñānadhātu, which is the mind.

Would one maintain that the mental states are the mind, and as a consequence are included within vijñānadhātu?

One cannot, for the Sūtra says "Sensation and ideas are dharmas which are mental states, dharmas associated with the mind, having the mind for their point of support;" and the Sūtra speaks of a "mind possessing desire;" thus desire, which is a mental state, is not the mind (vii.11d).

It is thus proven that our definition (i.35a-c) is correct.***

How many dhātus are agglomerations? How many are not agglomerations?

35d. The ten material dhātus are agglomerations.

The five organs of sense consciousness, and their objects, are agglomerations of atoms (ii.22).***
Among the eighteen dhātus, how many cut, and how many are cut; how many burn, and how many are burned; and how many weigh, and how many are weighed?

36e. Four external dhātus cut, are cut;

Visible matter, smell, taste and tangible cut, when they bear the name of axe, etc.; they are cut, when they bear the name of wood, etc.

What is the dharma that is called "to cut?"

To cut is to produce the sectioning of the process of an agglomeration the nature of which is to continue itself in an uninterrupted series. The axe cuts a piece of wood which is a series, and makes of it two series which exist and which develop separately.

The organs cannot be cut off. For example, when all of the parts of the organ of touch or the body are cut off, they are not, for all this, multiple: the members which have been cut, that is to say, separated from the trunk, do not possess touch.

The organs themselves do not cut, by reason of their translucidity, like the sparkle of a jewel.

36b. The same are burned and weighed.

The same holds for being burned and weigh as for cutting off and being cut off. Four external dhātus alone are burned. They weigh, for example, when they constitute a scales. Not the organs, by reason of their translucidity, like the sparkle of a jewel.

Sound does not cut off, is not cut off, is not burned, and does not weigh, for it does not exist in a series.

36c-d. There is no agreement with respect to that which is burned and weighed.

There is no agreement with respect to what burns and what is weighed. According to some, the same four external dhātus burn and are weighed. According to others, only the primary element of fire burns, when it manifests its own manner of being in the flame; only weight, which is one type of secondary matter (i.10d), is weighed: lightweight things, light, etc., where nevertheless rūpa manifests its
own manner of being, are not weighed.

***

Among the eighteen dhātus, how many are fruition, accumulation, or outflowing? How many are conjoined with material substances? And how many are momentary?

37a. Five internal dhātus are of fruition and accumulation.

i. Definitions.

1. Vipākaja, “of fruition,” or literally, “arisen from fruition” instead of “arisen from the cause of fruition” (vipākahetuja, ii.54), by omission of the middle word, the same way that one says “ox-cart” for “ox-drawn cart.”

Or else, in the expression vipākaja, “arisen from vipāka,” the word vipāka designates not the fruition, but the ripened action, the action arriving at the time period when it gives forth its fruit.\(^{153}\) That which arises from ripened action, namely the fruit of retribution, is called “arisen from vipāka.” The fruit is furthermore also called vipāka, because it is cooked (=done).\(^{154}\)

Or else the expression vipākaja, “arisen from fruition,” signifies “arisen from the causes of fruition,” but one should not say that the word “cause” is omitted. In fact, a cause is often designated by the name of its effect, the same way that an effect is often designated by the name of its cause: “The present six organs are past action” (Ekottara, p. 9a7; Samyutta, ii.65, iv.132; below ii.28).

2. Aupacayika, “of accumulation,” that is to say “that which is accumulated nearby” through certain foods (iii.39), certain actions (bathing, etc.), certain sleep, or certain absorptions (iv.6c). According to one opinion,\(^{155}\) chastity is also a cause of accumulation; but in reality, chastity causes there to be no diminution; it is not a cause of accumulation.

Matter “of accumulation” protects the matter “of retribution” as a wall does, by surrounding it.

3. Naisyandika, “of outflowing,” that is to say, nisyandaphala
(ii.57), "that which is produced by a cause similar to its effect."

ii. Five organs or internal dhātus, with the exclusion of the mental organ, are of fruition and accumulation. They are not outflowing, for they are outflowing only when they are fruition and accumulation.\textsuperscript{156}

iii. Sound is accumulation, for the voice is in a weak state when the body is emaciated.\textsuperscript{157} It is also outflowing. It is not a cause of fruition, for the voice proceeds from a desire for action (chanda, ii.24).\textsuperscript{158}

37b. Sound is not of retribution.

Objection. The Prajñaptisāstra says, "This mark of the Mahāpuruṣa (iii.98) which is called 'the voice of Brahmā' results from the perfect practice of abstaining from harmful language (iv.76c)."\textsuperscript{159} Thus sound is fruition.

Etiology of sound. First opinion. One should distinguish three moments: (1) action; (2) primary elements arising from this action which are of retribution; and (3) sound, which arises from the primary elements.

Second opinion. One should distinguish five moments: (1) action; (2) primary elements of retribution; (3) primary elements of accumulation; (4) primary elements of outflowing; and (5) sound. Thus sound is not retribution, because it does not immediately proceed from action.

Objection. To reason thus, bodily sensation (ii.7), not being produced immediately through action but being immediately produced through the primary elements arisen from action (iii.32), will not be retribution.

Reply. But sensation is not provoked by a desire to experience such a sensation, whereas sound is provoked by a desire to speak. If it were provoked by desire, it would not be retribution.

37c-d. The eight dhātus free from resistance are of outflowing and also of fruition.

iv. The eight dhātus not capable of resistance (i.29b), namely the seven dhātus of mind and the dharmadhātu, are outflowing and retribution; they are outflowing when they are produced by similar causes (sabhāgahetu, ii.52) or universal causes (sarvatragahetu, ii.54),
retribution when they are produced by retributive causes (*vipākabhetu*, ii.54c). They are not accumulation, because the non-material *dhātus* have nothing in common with agglomeration.

38a. The others are of three types.

v. The other *dhātus*, that is, the four not mentioned above,—visible matter, smell, taste, and tangibles,—are of three types: retribution, when they are not separable from organic matter (i.34); accumulation and outflowing.

***

38a. A single *dhātu* "is real."

The unconditioned, being permanent, is a "real thing." The unconditioned forms part of the *dharmadbātu* (i.15); the *dharmadbātu* is thus the single *dhātu* which "contains a real thing."

***

38b. The last three *dhātus* are momentary.

The last three *dhātus* are the mental organ, the object of mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.

In the *dharmas* of the moment called *duḥkhe dharmaṁajñānaksanti*, which is the first moment in the Path of Seeing the Truths (vi.25) and as a consequence the first moment which is pure, these three *dhātus* are "not produced by a cause similar to its effect" (*sabhāgabhetu*, ii.52), for, in the series which constitutes the person under consideration, a pure *dharma* has not yet appeared which would be a "cause similar to its effect" of *duḥkhe dharmaṁajñānaksanti*. This is why these three *dhātus* are called momentary, because, for a moment, they do not proceed from this type of cause.

In the group under consideration, the mind to which the *ksānti* is associated is *manodbātu* and *manovijnānadbātu*; the *dharmas* which coexist with this mind are *dharmadbātu*: pure discipline (iv.13c);
sensations, ideas, volition and other mental states; plus the präptis (ii.36) and the samśkritalakṣaṇas (ii.46).

***

There is a problem to be examined. Does he who obtains possession of the organ of sight where he had previously been lacking it, also obtain possession of the visual consciousness? And does he who obtains possession of the visual consciousness where he was previously lacking it, also obtain possession of the organ of sight?

38c-d. He can obtain the organ of sight and the visual consciousness either separately or together.160

1. A person lacking the organ of sight takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the visual consciousness: (a) a being of Kāmadhātu whose organs progressively appear (ii.14), for, before the organ of sight appears within him, he is already in possession of his past and future visual consciousness (in the intermediary state, iii.14; on "possession," ii.36b); and (b) a being who dies in Ārūpyadhatu and who is reborn in the heavens of the three higher Dhyānas, where the visual consciousness is lacking although the organ of sight exists there (viii.13a-c).

2. A person devoid of the visual consciousness takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the organ of sight: (a) a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyānas can manifest a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyāna (viii.13): he does not take possession of the organ of sight which he possesses already; and (b) a being who falls from one of the three higher Dhyānas and who is reborn in a lower sphere.

3. A person devoid of the two takes possession of the two: a being who falls from Ārūpyadhatu and who is reborn either in Kāmadhātu or in the First Dhyāna (world of Brahmā).

We have up to now understood the term that the stanza employs, "to obtain" (lābha) in the sense of pratilambha, taking possession; but one can also understand it in the sense of präpti, possession (ii.36b).
The question is thus posed: Is one who is endowed with the visual organ also endowed with visual consciousness? Four cases are possible:

(a) a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyānas necessarily possesses the visual organ, but possesses only the visual consciousness if he manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyāna;

(b) a being in Kāmadhātu who has not taken possession of the visual organ in the course of his embryonic life or who becomes blind: he remains in possession of the visual consciousness acquired in the course of his intermediary existence (iii.14) or at conception;

(c) a being in Kāmadhātu who has taken possession of the organ of sight and who has not lost it, a being born in the heaven of the First Dhyāna, a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyāna who manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyānas: these three categories of beings are endowed with both the organ and the consciousness;

(d) all other beings,—beings of Ārūpyadhātu,—are devoid of both the organ of sight and visual consciousness.

The taking possession of and possession, simultaneous or not, of the organ of sight and visible matter, of the visual consciousness and visible matter, of the organ of hearing and sound, etc., shall be defined, as fitting, in each case.

***

How many are external?

39a. Twelve are personal

What are these twelve?

39b. With the exception of visible matter, etc.\(^{161}\)

Twelve \textit{dhātus} are personal, the six organs and the six consciousnesses; six \textit{dhātus} are external, the six objects of consciousness, visible matter, etc.
But how can one speak of personal dhātus, or of external dhātus, since there is no ātman?

The mind is the object of the idea of self, the mind is what persons falsely grasp for their self. This mind receives, metaphorically, the name of ātman. Compare, for example, these two line of Scripture: "The sage obtains heaven, by means of a well subdued ātman," and "It is good to subdue the mind; the subdued mind brings happiness." Now the organs and the consciousnesses are close to the mind to which one gives the name of ātman: they are in fact the point of support of them; then one qualifies them as "internal," or "personal," whereas the visible and the other objects of the consciousness are held to be "external."

But can one say that the six consciousnesses are the point of support of the mind?

They are the point of support of the mind only when, having perished, they acquire the quality of mental organ (i.17). Thus they are not personal.

This objection is worthless. When the consciousnesses, having perished, becomes the point of support of the mind, it is indeed these consciousnesses themselves which become the point of support; thus, before becoming a point of support, they are not foreign to the quality of point of support. They are thus personal by reason of their future quality of point of support. If it were otherwise, the mental organ would be solely past; it would be neither present nor future. Now it is well understood that the eighteen dhātus belong to the three time periods. Moreover, if the present or future consciousness does not have the characteristic of manodhātu, it is absurd to attribute this characteristic to it once it is past. For a dharma does not change its characteristics in the course of time (v.25; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 109a18, p. 200b2).

***

Among the eighteen dhātus, how many are sabhāga, "active" or "in mutual assistance?" How many are tatsabhāga, "analogous to sabhāga?"
39b-c. The dhātu called dharmas is sabhāga.\(^{163}\)  

An object of consciousness is qualified as sabhāga when the consciousness which constitutes its proper sphere arises or is destined to arise with respect to it.

Now there is no dharma with respect to which an unlimited mental consciousness has not arisen or is destined to arise. All the Saints in fact necessarily produce the thought "All dharmas are impersonal" (vii.13a). It is true that this thought bears neither on itself, nor on the dharmas which are coexistent with it (sahabhū, ii.50b); but this thought and the dharmas which are coexistent with it are the object of a second moment of a thought of universal impersonality; all the dharmas are thus included within the object of these two moments of thought (vii.18c-d). Therefore the dharma-dhātu, the proper object of the mental consciousness, is, in its totality, sabhāga, active as an object.

39c-d. The other dhātus are also tatsabhāga.

The word "also" shows that they are both sabhāga and tatsabhāga. When are they tatsabhāga?

39d. When they do not do their proper work.

This implies the definition: they are sabhāga when they do their proper work.

1. The organ of sight which has seen, does now see or shall see visible matter, is termed sabhāga. The same with respect to the other organs, by indicating for each its own object and its own operation (karitra, ii.58).

2. According to the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr, the organ of sight is tatsabhāga in four cases: the organ of sight which has perished, which is now perishing, which will perish without having seen, and the organ of sight destined to arise (anutpattidharman, v.24). According to the Westerners, the organ of sight not destined to arise constitutes two categories depending on whether it is accompanied by visual consciousness or not.

The same with respect to the other organs of sense consciousness.
Chapter One

The mental organ is *tatsabhāga* only when it is not destined to arise; in fact, when it arises, it always has an object. 164

3. Visible matter, which has been seen, which is now seen, or which will be seen by the organ of sight, is *sabhāga*.

It is *tatsabhāga* when it has perished, is now perishing or shall perish without having seen, or when it is not destined to arise.

The same with respect to the other objects of sense consciousness by indicating for each organ the function which corresponds to it.

4. The organ of sight which is *sabhāga* or *tatsabhāga* is such for everyone, for the person to whom this organ belongs, and for other persons. The same for the other organs. But a certain visible thing is *sabhāga* for the person who sees it. In fact, the visible matter that a person sees can be seen by many, for example, the moon, a stage performance, or a contest, whereas two persons do not see by means of the same organ. Consequently, since one organ of sight is not general, it is though relationship with one person that it will be qualified as *sabhāga* or *tatsabhāga*; the organ of sight is *sabhāga* when he sees a visible thing, even though he has not seen, does not now see, or will not see another visible thing. On the contrary, the visible thing is general: one would qualify it as *sabhāga* and *tatsabhāga* by putting oneself in the point of view of numerous persons: it is *sabhāga* in relation to those who see it, *tatsabhāga* in relation to those who do not see it.

The same holds for sounds, smells, tastes, and the tangible things as for visible matter. 165

Granted, one would say, with respect to sound which, like visible matter, is perceived at a distance and can be perceived by many persons (i.43c-d). But smells, tastes and tangibles are not perceived at a distance, and are perceived only when they enter into a close relationship with the organ: thus the smell that one person perceives is not perceived by another. Thus these objects are not general, and we should compare them to the organs with respect to the qualification of *sabhāga*, or *tatsabhāga*: when they are *sabhāga* to one person, they are *sabhāga* to everyone.

We would answer: We regard these objects as general, because they
can be so. It can be the case that smell—the same atomic group of a
smell—which produces a consciousness of smell in one person, is also
perceived by another. Now this does not hold for the organs.
Consequently smells, tastes and tangibles should be compared to
visible matter and sounds.

5. The six consciousnesses are \textit{sabhāga} or \textit{tatsabhāga} depending on
whether they are destined to arise, or are not destined to arise, like the
mental organ.

6. What is the meaning of the expressions \textit{sabhāga} and \textit{tatsabhāga}?

\textit{Bhāga} signifies the mutual services that the organs, their objects
and their consciousnesses, render one another in their quality of point
of support of the consciousness, of objects of consciousness, of
consciousness supporting itself on the organ. Or else \textit{bhāga} signifies
possession of the activity or function; the function of the organ is to
see, etc.; the function of the object is to be the subject of the
consciousness (\textit{visaya} or \textit{ālambana}), of being seen, etc.; the function of
consciousness is to be the subject of consciousness, to be “the
discerner.”

The \textit{dharmas} which possess (sa-) \textit{bhāga} are termed \textit{sabhāga}, that is
to say, the organs, objects and consciousnesses which are endowed with
their proper function, or else the organs, objects and consciousness
which render one another mutual service. Or else the \textit{dharmas} which
have “contact” for their effect, that is, the encounter of the eye, visible
matter, the visual consciousness, etc., (iii.22), are \textit{sabhāga}.\textsuperscript{167}

That which is not \textit{sabhāga}, but is nevertheless analogous to
\textit{sabhāga}, is called \textit{tatsabhāga}, that is to say “analogous (\textit{sabhāga}) to that
(tat),” that is, “analogous to \textit{sabhāga}.”\textsuperscript{167}

***

How many \textit{dhātus} can be abandoned (\textit{bā}, v.28, vi.1) by Seeing the
Truths, in other words, by the Path of Seeing or through Seeing
(\textit{darsana}, vi.25b)? How many can be abandoned by Meditation or
repeated consideration of the Truths, in other words, by the Path of
Meditation or by Meditation? How many \textit{dhātus} are not to be
abandoned, or cannot be abandoned?

40a. Ten and five are abandoned through Meditation.

i. The ten material dhātus, organs and objects, and the five sense consciousnesses, are abandoned through Meditation.

40b. The last three are of three types.\(^{168}\)

From the point of view of abandoning them, the last three dhātus,—the mental organ, the mental object, and the mental consciousness,—include three types of dharmas:

(a) Eighty-eight anusayas (v.4), with their coexistent dharmas—whether these coexistents be of the samprayukta class (ii.24) or of the viprayukta class (ii.46, i.e., laksanās and anulaksanās)—are abandoned by Seeing, with the prāptis (ii.36) of the said anusayas and the said coexistents, with their following (anuprāptis and laksanas) of the said prāptis.

(b) The other impure dharmas are abandoned by Meditation: 1. ten anusayas (v.5) with the coexistents, prāptis, etc.; 2. the good-impure (kuśalasāsrava) and undefiled-neutral (anivṛtyākṛta, ii.66) samskāras; 3. the impure avijñāpti with its following (iv.13).

(c) The pure dharmas, that is, unconditioned things and the dharmas which form part of the Path, are not to be abandoned.

ii. Objection. [The Vatsiputriyas believe that,] not only the eighty-eight anusayas, but also some other dharmas are abandoned by Seeing. (1) The quality of Prthagjana\(^{169}\) is a dharma which is undefiled-neutral, and yet you place it among the dharmas abandoned by Meditation; (2) bad bodily or vocal action, retributed by a bad realm of rebirth, is "visible matter," and yet you also place it within the second category. Now the quality of Prthagjana and the action which causes a bad realm of rebirth are in contradiction with the Path of Seeing the Truths. Thus, according to us, both are abandoned through Seeing.

In order to refute the thesis [of the Vatsiputriyas,] the author says in summary:

40c. Neither the "undefiled," nor matter, are abandoned by Seeing the Truths.\(^{170}\)
1. Nothing that is defiled, that is bad, nor defiled-neutral (nivṛtāvāyākṛta, ii.66), and nothing that is material, can be abandoned by the Seeing of the Truths.

Now the quality of Prthagjana is not defiled: it can belong to a person who has cut off the good roots (iv.79), but it can also belong to a person who is "detached."

Bodily action and vocal action are rūpa.

The quality of Prthagjana and bodily or vocal action are not contradictory to the Truths,—for the former 1. is not defiled by the defilements, and 2. is not a consciousness, a dharma which has an object. Thus neither are abandoned by the Seeing of the Truths.

Further, if the quality of Prthagjana were abandoned by Seeing, it would follow that it would exist in the first state of the Path of Seeing—which is incorrect.

40d. Nor that which has arisen from the non-sixth.

2. "Sixth" signifies the mental organ. "Arisen from the non-sixth" is what has arisen from an organ different from the sixth organ, that is to say, what has arisen from the five organs, the organ of sight, etc. This then refers to the visual consciousness, etc. These are also not abandoned by Seeing.

***

Among the eighteen dhātu, how many are "view," how many are not "view?"

41a. The organ of sight and part of the dharmadhātu are view.

How many [parts are there to the dharmadhātu]?

41b. Eight parts.

What are these eight parts of the dharmadhātu?

(1-5) The five false views, of which the first is belief in a self and mine; they will be defined in the Chapter on the Defilements (v.7). (6)
Worldly correct views, that is to say, *prajñā* (ii.24) associated with the mental consciousness, good but impure. (7-8) And the view of the Śaikṣas and the Aśaikṣas, that is to say, pure view which is proper to the Arhat (vi.50).

These eight *dharmas*, which form part of the *dharmadhātu*, are "views."

Comparison. In the manner in which visible matter is seen at night and in the daytime, on a cloudy day and on a clear day, in this same way the *dharmas* are seen (1) by defiled worldly views,—five false opinions; (2) by non-defiled worldly view or worldly correct views; (3) by Śaikṣī views; and (4) by non-Aśaikṣī views.

***

Why are correct worldly views understood solely as *prajñā* associated with the mental consciousness?

41c-d. The *prajñā* which arises with the five sense consciousnesses, is not "view" because it is not judgment after deliberation.172

"View" is judgment that proceeds from the consideration of an object (*upadhyāna*, viii.1). Now the *prajñā* which arises with the five sense consciousnesses does not present this characteristic. Thus it is not "view." For the same reason, it happens that *prajñā*, even though mental, defiled or non-defiled, is not "view" when it is purely intuitive (vii.1).

***

But, one would say, the organ of sight does not possess "judgment which proceeds from a consideration of the object." How do you then say that it is "view?"

"View" is understood here as the seeing of visible matter.

42a. It is the organ of sight which sees visible matter.
i. A Vijñānavādin is a master who attributes sight, not to the organ of sight, but to visual consciousness. He says: If an organ sees, then the organ of a person occupied with hearing or touch consciousness, would see (i.6c-d).

42b. When it is sahāga.

We do not say that all organs of sight see. The organ of sight sees when it is sahāga (i.39), that is to say, when it is conjoined with visual consciousness.

42c. It is not the consciousness of which this organ is the point of support.

But then, that which sees is indeed the consciousness which is supported by the organ of sight.

42d. For obscured visible matter is not seen. Such is the opinion of the Vaibhaśikas. 173

No, for visible matter, obscured by a wall or any other screen, is not seen. Now the consciousness is non-material, not capable of being repulsed (apratigha, i.29b). Thus, if the visual consciousness were to see, it would see even the visible matter obscured by a screen.

[The Vijñānavādin replies.] The visual consciousness does not arise with respect to obscured visible matter; not arising with respect to them, it does not see them.

But why does it not arise with respect to these visible things? For us, the Vaibhaśikas, who attribute seeing to the organ and who admit that the organ, being sapratigha or capable of being arrested, does not exercise its activity with respect to obscured visible matter, we could easily explain how the visual consciousness does not arise with respect to obscured visible matter: the consciousness, in fact, exercises its activity on the same object that its point of support does. But if you believe that the consciousness sees, how would you explain the fact that it does not arise with respect to obscured visible matter?

2. The author takes into consideration the opinion of the Vijñānavādin and responds to the last reply of the Vaibhaśika.
Do you maintain that an organ of sight sees its object by entering into a close relationship with its object, in the manner in which the organ of touch feels a tangible object (i.43c-d)? In this hypothesis I would understand that the organ of sight, being capable of being arrested, does not see obscured visible matter. But you maintain that the organ of sight sees at a distance: you do not then have the right to say that, being capable of being arrested, it does not see obscured visible matter. Moreover, one sees obscured visible matter through a glass, a cloud, a crystal and water: how would you explain this fact? I would say then that the visual consciousness sees, it arises with respect to obscured visible matter when the screen does not form an obstacle to light; it does not arise in the contrary case.  

3. The Vaibhāṣikas make an appeal to Scripture. The Sūtra says, "Having seen visible matter through the organ of sight." Thus the organ sees, not the visual consciousness.

We would reply that the Sūtra intends to say, "Having seen visible matter by means of the organ of sight as point of support." In fact, the same Sūtra says, "Having discerned the dharmas through the mental organ": now this organ, being past (i.17), does not discern; it is through the mental consciousness that one discerns; therefore, if the text says "through the mental organ," it means "by supporting itself on the mental organ, the point of support of mental consciousness." The same for sight and the organ of sight.

One can also admit that the Sūtra attributes to the point of support, to the organ, the action which belongs to that which grasps this point of support, that is to say, to the consciousness. It is said in the world "the benches cry out," whereas the benches are actually the persons seated on the benches.

This way of speaking is common to Scripture. We read that "agreeable and disagreeable visible matter is discerned by the organ of sight." Now you do not maintain that the organ of sight discerns. You attribute discernment to the consciousness of which organ of sight is the point of support.

The Sūtra (Saṁyuktā, TD 2, p. 64a10) also says "The organ of sight, Oh Brahmin, is the gate of the sight of visible matter." This text
proves that the visual consciousness sees by this gate which is the
organ of sight. You would not maintain that "gate" signifies "sight,"
for it would be absurd to say "The organ of sight is the sight of the
sight of visible matter."

4. [Objection of the Vaibhāṣikas.] If the visual consciousness sees,
what it is that discerns (i.48a)?

What is the difference between the two functions of seeing and
discerning which would account for a single dharma not seeing and
discerning at one and the same time? Is it not admitted that a certain
type of praśña (darsanātmika, vii.1) sees and comprehends? In this
same way a certain consciousness, the visual consciousness, sees and
discerns. There is here only a single function designated by two names.

5. [Certain followers of the thesis "The visual consciousness sees,"
namely the Vātsīputrīyas, object:] If the organ of sight sees, what is
then the separately existing action of seeing that you attribute to this
organ, the agent of this action?

The objection cannot be made. In the same way that you would
have it that the consciousness discerns, without admitting any differ­
ence between the agent and the action, in that same way we hold that
an organ sees.

6. According to another opinion, [that of the Dharmaguptakas,] it
is the visual consciousness which sees; but, as the organ of sight is the
point of support of this consciousness, one says that it sees, the same
way one says that the bell rings, because it is the point of support of
the sound.

But, according to this principle, one should also say that the organ
of sight discerns, for it is the point of support of the visual
consciousness.

No. For in the world one agrees to give the name of "seeing" to the
visual consciousness; in fact, when this consciousness is produced, one
says "The color is seen;" one does not say that the color is discerned.
And the Vibhāṣā (TD 27, p. 489c19) confirms: "One terms 'seen' that
which is attained by the organ of sight, that which falls within its line
of vision and is perceived by the visual consciousness." One says then
in the world that the organ of sight sees, because it is the point of
support of the visual consciousness which sees; one does not say that it discerns, because the function attributed to the visual consciousness is seeing and not discernment. On the other hand, when one says that consciousness discerns, one does not mean that it discerns to the extent that it would be the point of support of a certain discernment, as one understands that the organ of sight sees because it is the point of support of the visual consciousness. One means that the consciousness discerns by itself, that it is in and of itself discernment, in the same way that one says that the sun creates the day.  

7. Opinion of the Sautrāntikas. What an empty discussion! The Sūtra teaches: "By reason of the organ of sight and of visible matter there arises the visual consciousness": there is not there either an organ that sees, or visible matter that is seen; there is not there any action of seeing, nor any agent that sees; this is only a play of cause and effect. In the light of practice, one speaks, metaphorically, of this process: "The eye sees, and the consciousness discerns." But one should not cling to these metaphors. The Blessed One has said that one should not take them in the manner of popular speech, that one should not seriously grasp an expression in use in the world.

8. According to the system of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr, the organ of sight sees, the organ of hearing hears, the organ of smell smells, the organ of taste tastes, the organ of touch touches, and the mental organ discerns.

***

Is visible matter seen by one eye or by both eyes?

43a-b. Visible matter is seen by the two eyes also, as the clarity of sight demonstrates.

[There is no fixed rule: one sees by one eye; one also sees by two eyes.]

The Ābhidhārmikas say: "Seen also by the two eyes; the two eyes being open, sight is clearer." Furthermore, when one eye is covered and the other half closed, one perceives two moons; but not when one
completely closes or half closes that which was open, or when one
opens or completely closes that which has been half closed.

One should not conclude that the visual consciousness is twofold
from the fact that its point of support is twofold, for the consciousness
is not material like rūpa; not having a mass it is not situated in a place.

***

We have said that the organ of sight sees, that the organs of
hearing, smell, taste, and touch each perceive their objects; and that the
mental organ discerns. Do these organs attain their object, [do they enter into a close physical relationship with their object]?

43c. The organ of sight, the organ of hearing, and the mental
organ know their object without attaining it.\textsuperscript{181}

i.1. The organ of sight sees visible matter at a distance: it does not see the eye-salve placed on the eye; the organ of hearing hears distant sounds.

The mental organ, being non-material, does not enter into a close physical relationship with its object.

2. If the organs of sight and hearing must necessarily enter into a close relationship with their object, then ascetics in \textit{dhyāna} would not attain divine sight or divine hearing, in the same way that they do not attain a divine sense of smell (vii.42).

[Objection.] If the organ of sight sees an object with which it is not in a close relationship, why does it not see visible matter which is too distant or obscured?\textsuperscript{182}

[Reply.] Why does a magnet not attract all iron? Moreover, the same difficulty remains even if you suppose that the organ enters into a close relationship with the object: why does the organ of sight not see the eye salve, the brush, and all the objects with which it is in close relationship? Or else, let us say that the same rule applies to the organ of sight and to the organs of smell and taste: the organ of smell senses only the smell with which it is in close relationship, but it does not sense the odor which constitutes the organ itself; in the same way, the
organ of sight sees only certain distant visible matter, but it does not see all distant visible matter.

According to certain masters, from the fact that one hears noise from the interior of the ear, one can conclude that the organ of hearing hears the sound with which it is in close relationship, as it also hears distant sound.\(^{183}\)

3. The other three organs, smell, taste, touch, perceive an object with which they are in close relationship. For smell, this results from the fact that in-breathing is necessary to the perception of the smell.\(^{184}\)

43d. For the other three organs, the opposite.

ii. What should one understand by the expression "to attain" (to enter into a close relationship)? What does one mean when one says that the nose "attains" its object, knows its object "after having attained it?"

To attain is "to arise in nirantaravā," in a state of non-separation.\(^{185}\) The object, which renews itself from moment to moment (iv.2c-d), is found to be arisen in nirantaravā with the organ and vice versa.

[What does nirantaravā mean? According to the Bhadanta, immediate juxtaposition, absence of interval; according to the Vaibhāṣikas, immediate vicinity, absence of an interposed body].\(^{186}\)

iii. The question is therefore posed whether the atoms do or do not touch one another.

1. The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr (Vibhāṣā TD 27, p. 683a24) say that atoms do not touch one another; (1) if atoms touch one another in their totality, things, that is to say, the different atoms, would "mix with one another," that is, they would only occupy one place; and (2) if atoms touched each other in one spot, they would thus have parts: and atoms do not have any parts.\(^{187}\)

But, if there is no contact among the atoms, how is sound produced?

For the very reason that there is no contact, sound is possible: if atoms were to touch one another, a hand in collision with a hand would dissolve into it, a rock in collision with another rock would
dissolve into it, as gum dissolves into gum. And sound would not be produced.

But if atoms do not touch one another, why does an agglomeration of atoms not fall to pieces when it is struck?

Because the wind element holds it together. A certain wind element has dispersion for its function, for example the wind of the period of the destruction of the world; a certain wind element has concentration for its function, for example the wind at the period of creation (iii.91, 100). 189

2. [The Vaibhaśikas continue the presentation of their doctrine].

One says that three organs attain their object, because their object is in a state of non-seperation from them. What does non-seperation consist of?

It consists of the fact that there is nothing which is in the interval between the two. This is also what is meant by "to attain."

Furthermore, as agglomerations have parts, there is no difficulty in agglomerations touching one another. And, from this point of view the definitions of the Vibhsa (TD 27, p. 684all; see also p. 380a19) are justified: "Does a thing-in-contact arise having for its cause a thing-in-contact, or does it arise having for its cause a thing-outside-of-contact?" Same question with respect to a thing-outside-of-contact.

"One cannot reply in an absolute manner. Sometimes a thing-outside-of-contact arises from a thing-in-contact, as when a thing-in-contact falls to pieces. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, as when a thing-outside-of-contact comes together. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, as when agglomerations come together. And sometimes a thing-outside-of-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, for example the particles of dust suspended in the void of a window."

The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: "If atoms touched one another, they would therefore endure two moments." 189

iv. Opinions of Vasubandhu. 1. The Bhadanta says: "There is not, in reality, any contact. One says, metaphorically, that atoms touch one another when they are juxtaposed without interval." (Quoted in Vibhsa, TD 27, p. 684a2; see note 189, end).
This opinion is the correct one. In fact, if atoms were to allow an interval between themselves, since this interval would be empty, what would hinder the progress of atoms into this interval? For it is admitted that atoms are impenetrable.

2. Agglomerations are not anything other than atoms. They are the same atoms which, in a state of aggregation, are a "thing-in-contact," in the same way that they are rūpa (i.13). It is thus absurd to deny that atoms touch one another, and yet to admit that agglomerations touch one another.

3. If you admit spatial division to the atom, then an atom certainly has parts, whether it enters into contact or not. If you deny it, why would the atom, even if it enters into contact, have parts?

***

Should we think that the organs solely grasp an object of their dimension,—if one believes that one sees suddenly extended objects, a mountain for example, it is through illusion, it is because one rapidly sees parts of a mountain: it is evidently thus when one sees the circle of fire delineated by an ember;—or else do the organs indifferently grasp an object of their dimension and of a different dimension?

44a-b. The three organs of which the organ of smell is the first, grasp an object of their dimension.

A given number of atoms of an organ, attaining the same number of atoms of an object, produce consciousness. This also holds for smell, taste, and touch.

But there is no rule for seeing and hearing. Sometimes the object is smaller than the organ, as when one sees the end of a hair; sometimes equal to the organ, as when one sees a grape; and sometimes larger than the organ, when, the eye being hardly open, one sees a mountain. The same for sound; one hears the buzzing of a mosquito, the noise of thunder, etc.

The question does not arise for the mental organ which is non-material.
(Here are some problems relating to the organs.)
i. How are atoms of the different organs arranged?

The atoms of the organ of sight are arranged on the pupil like the flower of the cumin, that is to say, on the surface; they are covered again by a membrane, of translucent color, which prevents them from dispersing. According to another opinion, they are arranged in depth, like a pill; being translucent, like crystal, they do not obscure one another.\textsuperscript{194} The atoms of the organ of hearing are arranged in the interior of the \textit{bhūrja}, that type of birch leaf which is found within the ear.

The atoms of the organ of smell are arranged within the interior of the nostril.

These first three organs from a garland.\textsuperscript{195}

The atoms of the organ of taste are arranged on the upper surface of the tongue in the form of a half-moon. In the middle of the tongue a space the dimension of the end of a hair is not occupied by the atoms of the organ. Such is the opinion expressed in Scripture.\textsuperscript{196}

The atoms of the organ of touch have the shape of the body.

The atoms of the female organ are like a drum. The atoms of the male organ are like a thumb.

\textit{The Dhātus} 123

***

ii. The atoms of the organ of sight can be \textit{sabhāga} (i.39) in their totality; \textit{tatsabhāga} in their totality; some \textit{sabhāga}, others \textit{tatsabhāga}. The same for the organs of hearing, smell and taste. But, it does not occur that the atoms of the organ of touch are all \textit{sabhāga}; even when the body is enveloped in the flames of Pratapana hell (iii.59), an infinite number of atoms are \textit{tatsabhāga}; for, says the School, the body would fall to pieces if all the atoms of touch were to work at the same time.

iii. It does not occur that consciousness is produced by one atom of
organ, or by one atom of object. In fact the five categories of consciousness have agglomerations for their support and their object.

It results from this that atoms are not perceived; they are thus "imperceptible". (Compare i.20a-b, iv.4).

***

The object of the first five consciousnesses is simultaneous with them; the object of the sixth consciousness is either earlier than it, simultaneous with it, or later than it; in other words, it is past, present, or future (i.23). Does the same hold for the point of support of the consciousness?

No, it does not.

Why is this?

44c. Relative to consciousness, the point of support of the sixth consciousness is past.

The sole point of support of the mental consciousness is the mental organ, this is, the consciousness which has just perished (i.17).

44d. The point of support of the first five is also simultaneous.

The point of support of the five consciousnesses is also simultaneous with them: that is, it is both earlier than, and simultaneous to the consciousness. In fact, the point of support of these consciousnesses is twofold: 1. the sense organ, organ of sight, etc., which is simultaneous with consciousness; and 2. the mental organ, which is past at the moment when the consciousness arises.

The five consciousnesses thus have two points of support.

One poses the question: Is that which is the point of support of the visual consciousness at the same time the "immediately antecedent and parallel cause" (samanantarapratyaya, ii.62) of this consciousness? Four cases: 1. the organ of sight, which is solely a point of support; 2. the totality of mental states, sensation, etc. (ii.24) which have just perished: they are solely the immediately antecedent cause; 3. the
consciousness which has just perished, or mental organ, which is at one and the same time a point of support and an immediately antecedent cause; and 4. the other dharmas are neither one nor the other.

The same for the consciousness of hearing, smell, taste and touch.

With respect to mental consciousness, one replies by speaking of the first term of the question: that which is the point of support of mental consciousness is always the parallel and immediately antecedent cause of this consciousness, but items that have perished are not its point of support.

***

Visual consciousness depends on the organ of sight and on visible matter. Why is the organ considered as the point of support of consciousness, to the exclusion of the object?

45a-b. The point of support of a consciousness is its organ, for consciousness changes according to the modality of the organ.197

When the organ of sight is the object of attention (employment of eye salve, etc.); when it is injured by dust, etc.; when it is alert; when it is sluggish and weak, consciousness reproduces modality: it is accompanied by pleasure or by pain, it is alert or weak. The object, on the contrary, has no influence on the modality of consciousness. Consequently, it is the organ, and not the object, which is the point of support of consciousness (ii.2a-b).

***

Consciousness knows the object. Why is it designated by the name of its organ “eye consciousness” . . . “manas consciousness” . . . “dharma consciousness?”

45c-d. For this reason, and also because it is “its own,” it is the organ which gives its name to the consciousness.
The consciousness takes the name of an organ because the organ is its point of support.

Because the organ is "its own:" the organ of a certain person is the point of support of the visual consciousness of this person alone. Visible matter, on the contrary, is general, for a certain visible thing is perceived by both the visual consciousness and the mental consciousness, by one person and by another person. The same observation holds for the organs of hearing, smell, taste, and touch, and for their objects, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangibles.

We conclude that the consciousness is named according to its organ because the organ is its point of support, and because the organ is its own thing. But the same does not hold for its object. One says in the world "sound of the drum," and not "sound of the stick;" "sprout of the wheat," and not "sprout of the field."

***

A being is born in a certain stage of the world, in Kāmādhātu, in the First Dhyāna, etc.; he is of this stage, and his body is also of this stage, and he sees, by the organ of sight, visible matter. Do the body, the organ of sight, visible matter and consciousness belong to the same stage or to different stages?

All can belong to different stages.

i. When a being born in Kāmādhātu sees, by means of an organ of sight of his stage, visible matter of his stage, then body, organ, visible matter and consciousness are in the same stage.

When this being sees visible matter of his stage, by means of an organ of sight of the First Dhyāna, then the body and visible matter are of Kāmādhātu, but his organ and consciousness are of the First Dhyāna; if he sees visible matter of the First Dhyāna by means of the same organ, then only the body is in Kāmādhātu; the other three are of the First Dhyāna.

When this being sees visible matter of Kāmādhātu by means of an organ of sight of the Second Dhyāna, then the body and visible matter are in Kāmādhātu, the organ is in the Second Dhyāna, and conscious-
ness is in the First Dhyāna; if he sees, by the same organ, visible matter of the Second Dhyāna, then the body is in Kāmadhātu, the organ and visible matter are in the Second Dhyāna, and consciousness is in the First Dhyāna. (viii.13a-c).

One would explain in the same way these cases where a being born in Kāmadhātu sees, by the organ of sight of the Third or Fourth Dhyāna, visible matter of these same stages or of a lower stage.

ii. When a being in the First Dhyāna sees visible matter of his stage by means of an organ of sight of his stage, then body, organ, visible matter and consciousness are of the same stage; if he sees visible matter of a lower stage by the same organ, then the body, organ, and consciousness are of his stage, the First Dhyāna.

When this being sees visible matter of his stage by means of an organ of sight of the Second Dhyāna, then three are of his stage (First Dhyāna), but the organ is in the Second Dhyāna; if he sees, by the same organ, visible matter of Kāmadhātu, then the body and consciousness are of his stage (First Dhyāna), visible matter is in a lower stage, and the organ is in the Second Dhyāna; if he sees visible matter of the Second Dhyāna by the same organ, then the body and consciousness are of his stage (First Dhyāna), but the organ and the visible matter are in the Second Dhyāna.

One would explain in the same way these cases where a being in the First Dhyāna sees, by means of an organ of sight of the Third or the Fourth Dhyāna, visible matter of these stages or of a lower stage.

iii. According to these same principles, we can explain those cases where a being in the Second, Third or Fourth Dhyāna, sees, by means of an organ of sight of his stage or of a different stage, visible matter of his stage or of a different stage.

The rule is the following:

46a. The organ of sight is not inferior to the body.

The body, the organ of sight, and visible matter can belong to five stages: Kāmadhātu, and the Four Dhyānas.

The consciousness of sight is of two stages only: Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna (viii.13a-c).
Thus stated, the organs of sight which a certain being uses can be of the stage to which the body of this being belongs, that is, of the stage where this being has arisen; it can be of a higher stage; but it can never be lower.

Visible matter and consciousness, through relationship to the organ, is either of the same stage or lower, but never of a higher stage.

46b. Visible matter is not higher than the organ.

Visible matter of a higher stage cannot be seen by an organ of sight of a lower stage.

46c. Nor consciousness.

A visual consciousness of a higher stage cannot arise from an organ of a lower stage.

46d. Visible matter, in relation to consciousness, and visible matter as well as consciousness, through relation to the body, is of all types.

Visible matter, through relationship with the visual consciousness, is either equal, or higher, or lower.

Visible matter and the visual consciousness, through relationship to the body, are as visible matter is through relationship to the consciousness, this is to say, equal, higher, or lower.

47a. The same holds for the organ of hearing.

The organ of hearing is not lower than the body, sound is not higher than the organ of hearing, nor is auditory consciousness; sound, through relationship to this latter, and sound and consciousness through relationship to the body, can be of all types.

47a-b. Three organs belong to their own stage.

With respect to the organs of smell, taste, and touch, the body, organ, object and consciousness belong exclusively to the stage where the being is born.

After having formulated this general rule, the author mentions one exception.
47c-d. The consciousness of touch is of its own stage or of a lower stage.

The body, the organ of touch and tangibles are always of the stage where the being is born. But the consciousness of touch (1) is of this stage, in the case of a being born in Kāmadhātu or in the First Dhyāna; or (2) is of a lower stage (First Dhyāna) in the case of a being born in the Second Dhyāna or above.

47d. There is no restriction with respect to the mental organ.

Sometimes the mental organ is of the same stage as the body, the dharmadhātu and the mental consciousness; sometimes it is lower or higher. If a body belongs to the first five stages—Kāmadhātu and the Four Dhyānas—, then the mental organ, the dharmadhātu, and the mental consciousness can be, in absorption or at conception, of any stage, all the stages not being moreover the same in each case. This will be explained in the Eighth Chapter which treats of the absorptions (viii.19c-d). We shall not speak here of this for the sake of brevity, the profit being small and the pains great.

***

There are eighteen dhātus and six consciousness. Which dhātu is discerned by which consciousness?

48a. Five external dhātus are discerned by two types of consciousness.

Visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles are known respectively, by the consciousness of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. They are all discerned by the mental consciousness. Each of these external dhātus is thus discerned by two consciousness.

The thirteen other dhātus, not being of the sphere of the sense consciousness, are discerned by a single mental consciousness.

***
How many of the $dhātus$ are eternal?

No $dhātu$ is totally eternal. But

48b. Unconditioned things are eternal.$^{198}$

Unconditioned things (i.5b) form part of the $dharma$dhatu (i.15c). Thus one part of the $dharma$dhatu is eternal.

***

How many of the $dhātus$ are indriyas, that is to say, predominate (ii.1)?

48c-d. The twelve internal $dhātus$ and one part of the $dharma$dhatu are indriyas.$^{199}$

A Sūtra$^{200}$ enumerates twenty-two indriyas: 1. organ of sight, 2. organ of hearing, 3. organ of smell, 4. organ of taste, 5. organ of touch, 6. mental organ, 7. male organ, 8. female organ, 9. vital organ, 10. faculty of sensation of pleasure, or sensation of pleasure, 11. faculty of sensation of displeasure, or sensation of displeasure, 12. faculty of sensation of satisfaction, or sensation of satisfaction ($saumana$nas$yen$-driya), 13. faculty of sensation of dissatisfaction, or sensation of dissatisfaction, 14. faculty of sensation of indifference, or sensation of indifference, 15. faculty of faith, 16. faculty of energy, 17. faculty of memory, 18. faculty of absorption, 19. faculty of discernment of dharmas, or faculty of prajñā, 20. anājñātāmājñāsyāmindriya, 21. ājñendriya, and 22. ājñatāvindriya.

The Ābhidhārmikas (Prakaraṇapāda, fol. 31b) do not count the group that forms the six organs of consciousness (the āyatanas), i.e., the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and the mental organ. They do not place the mental organ after the organ of touch, but after the vital organ, for the reason that the mental organ, the same as the organs of sensation (10-14), also have an ālambana (i.29b-d) and not solely a visaya as do the organs of sense consciousness (1-5).$^{201}$

Among the twenty-two indriyas, eleven—namely the vital organ (9), the five faculties of sensation (10-14), the five moral faculties
(15-19)—and one part of the last three, form part of the dharmadhātu.\textsuperscript{202}

The twelve internal dhātus are (1) the five organs of sense consciousness which form five dhātus and five indriyas (1-5); (2) the mental organ (i.16c), that is to say, the sixth indriya, which make up seven dhātus; and (3) one part of the last three indriyas.

The five remaining dhātus and one part of the dharmadhātu are not indriyas.
1. The authors of the Vinayavibhāga say: (1) there is a Buddha who is not a Bhagavat, namely the Pratyekabuddha, because he is sva-yam-ka, that is because he has obtained Bodhi by himself, because he has not fulfilled the task of dānapāramitā, etc. (vii.34); (2) there is a Bhagavat who is not a Buddha, namely the Bodhisattva in his last existence; (3) there is a Buddha Bhagavat; and (4) there are persons who are neither Buddha, nor Bhagavat (Vyākhyā, 3.12). One can also say that the Śrāvakas, or Disciples, are Buddhas (Āryadeva, Sātaka, 270), for they have acquired Bodhi (vi.67).

2. Śāriputra did not know the five pure skandhas (the precepts, etc.) of the Tathāgata.

3. Maudgalyāyana did not see that his mother was reborn in Maricilokadhatu. Śāriputra did not discover the roots-of-good of a candidate for the state of Bhikṣu (see vii.30); but the Buddha declares:

\[
moksasbhača abham asya susuṣṣaṃ upakṣaye / 
dhātupāsānaśivā nilāma ivā kāñcanaṃ //
\]

Compare Huber, Sūtrālāniṣkāra, p. 286.

4. As the stanza says:

\[
sarvakāraṁ kāraṇam ekasya mayuracandraśyāpi nāśarvaajñār ājñeyam sarvaajñājñāna- 
balam hi tat.
\]

5. The Pratyekabuddhas and the Śrāvakas have also abandoned (prabhiṇa) non-defiled ignorance (aśīṣṭam ajñānam), in exactly the same way as they have abandoned the organ of sight, etc., that is, by abandoning all desire (chandaśāga) with respect to it. But this non-defiled ignorance remains active within them (samudācarati) even though it is abandoned, exactly like the organ of sight.

Such is not the case for the Buddha: this is why the author says that he has destroyed (hata) obscurity in such a manner that it will not arise again.

6. "As much as possible," yathābhbhayam. This holds for oneself, as when one says, "He gives food for the Brahmins to eat."

7. We have the plural because the persons to be saved are numerous.

8. Expression of Āryadeva, Sātaka, 265.

9. First explanation: through the power of rddhi (vii.48), like Viśnu; through the power of giving, like Mahēśvara. Second explanation: through rddhi, through giving, and through its prabhāva (vii.34).

It is true that the Buddhās perform miracles (rddhiprātibhāya) in order to draw believers to themselves (āvarjanamātra); but it is through the miracle of the teaching (anusāsan) that they save the world by destroying its defilements (vii.47a-b).

10. The dharmas are mixed, like flowers; one discerns them and places them in bouquets: these are pure, those are impure, etc.

In this operation, a certain dharma associated with the mind (caśita, caśitasāka, ii.23), which is called prajñā, plays a primary role. As a consequence prajñā is defined as "discernment of the dharmas."

11. mala, stain, is a synonym for āsrava, vice. We translate āsrava by "pure." The āsravas are defined v.35. See below i.4.

12. The name "Abhidharma" signifies not only the pure consciousness which discerns the nature of things, but also all of the pure elements of the psychological moment in which this consciousness is produced: sensation, etc. (i.14c). One of these elements is material (rupa) and is called "pure discipline" (āsrava saṃvara, iv.13c).
13. Vyākhyā: paramārtha eva paramārthikah / paramārthe vā bhavah paramārthikah / paramārthena vā divyati caratiti paramārthikah

14. The Treatise is (1) an Abhidharma Sāstra or an Abhidharma Pañjika. In either case, some think that it should not be understood as "The Treatise, with its attendant works, receives the name of Abhidharma," for a book does not have any attendants; some believe that its attendants are made up of the laksānas (ii. 45c-d); (2) or the Jñānaprasthāna, considered as the body of the Abhidharma and having for its feet (and "attendants") the six books, Prakāranapāda, Vijnānakāya, Dharmakāya, Prajñāpātisāstra, Dhātukāya, and Saṃgūtiparyaya (Burnouf, Introduction, p. 448).

15. The first two lines are quoted, with the reading yad upaśāntaye, in a commentary (the Amṛtakanikā) on the Nāmasaṃgūti, 130; the third is quoted in the Vyākhyā.

16. The word kila shows that Vasubandhu presents here an opinion, the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas, that he does not accept. The Abhidharma treatises are not the word of the Master for the Sautrāntikas and for Vasubandhu. The problem of the authenticity of the Abhidharma treatises is studied in the Introduction.

17. The Tibetan version of the Udbānāvarga (Mdo XXVI) has been translated by W. Rockhill (London, 1883) and published by H. Beck (Berlin, 1911). A good part of the original has been discovered in Turkestan, JRAS, 1912, pp. 355-377; J. As. 1912, I.311, showing the correspondence with the Pāli sources). S. Lévi, J. As. 1912, II.215-222.


19. The conditioned dharmas, with the exception of those which form part of the Path, are termed sāstravā, "in a relationship with the defilements."

   How and why are they "in a relationship with the defilements?"
   1. One cannot say that they are "associated" (samprayukta) with the defilements, for only the mind and mental states which are defiled (kliśa) are associated with the defilements (i.23).
   2. One cannot say that they coexist (sahotpada) with the defilements. In this hypothesis (1) neither the external (bāhya,i.39a) dharmas, (2) nor the five upadānasāndhas (i.8) of a person within whom the defilements are not presently active would be "in a relationship with the defilements."
   3. One cannot say that they are the support (āśraya) of the defilements, for only the six organs of consciousness are the support of the defilements.
   4. One cannot say that they are the object (ālambana) of the defilements: in this hypothesis, Nirvāṇa (=nīrodhasāyata) would be "in a relationship with the defilements," for one can have false views with respect to Nirvāṇa; in this hypothesis too, a higher sphere would be "in a relationship with the defilements" through the fact of the defilements of a lower sphere which grasps them as its object (opinions condemned v.18).

   The author thus explains that a dharma is termed "in a relationship with the defilements" because the defilements adhere to it (anuṣṭhāna), that is, grow in them (pratistha) or take their dwelling and support in them (pratishthā), as a foot can stand on the earth but not on red hot fire. The defilements (anuṣṭhāna) develop (varasthāyante) taking their growth in or support from the dharmas which are "in a relationship with the defilements."

   According to another opinion, in the same way that one says "This food suits me" (mama anusete), meaning "This food is convenient to me, is favorable to me (anugunibhavati)," in this same way the defilements "come to these dharmas," "are favorable to these dharmas." One thus terms the dharmas to which the defilements are favorable, namely conditioned things with the exception of the Path, to be "in a relationship with the defilements," in fact, conditioned things are created by action aroused by the defilements; the defilements are thus favorable to them.
(Vyākhyā) See v.1, 18, 29, 39, 40.

The various schools are not in agreement on the question: Is the body of the Buddha "in a relationship with the defilements?" See i.31d.

20. The Truth of the Path is the totality of the dharmas which constitute Seeing and Meditation on the Truths (vi.25d, vii.3b).

On the asamśkṛtas, i.48b, ii.55c-d, and the Introduction.

21. Certain philosophers, namely the Vatsiputryas, say that there is only one asamśkṛta, namely Nirvāṇa. The Vaiśeṣikas admit many asamśkṛtas: the paramāṇus, etc. (Vyākhyā). Some admit three asamśkṛtas; others consider the śānyatā which is tathatālakṣaṇa as an asamśkṛta (Madhyamaka, vii.33, p. 176). Wassilief, p. 282. Kathāvattu, ii.9, vi.3.

22. On the two nirodhas, i.6, ii.55c; on the five nirodhas, i.20a-b.

23. On the difference between space (ākāśa) and a void (ākāśaddhātu), see i.28; on the non­existence of an asamśkṛta called "space" (a Sautrāntika theory), see ii.55c-d. Kathāvattu, vi.6-7.

The opinion of the Madhyamikas on space and other unconditioned things, an opinion identical to that of the Sautrāntikas, is presented by Āryadeva, Sātaka, ix.3 (Madhyamaka-vṛtti, 505; Catuḥśatikā, 202, As. Soc. of Bengal, iii, p. 483, 1914): "Where there is no matter (rupa), there is nothing which opposes the arising of material dharmas: the absence of matter receives the name ākāśa, because things shine brightly there (bhrāsam asyāntah kāsante bhāvāḥ). The Vaibhasikas suppose, in the Abhidharmaśāstra, that ākāśa is a reality (vastu), not seeing that Scripture must give a name to an unreal thing, to a pure negative (avastusato'kimcanyatsu) . . ."

24. Compare the discussion Kathāvattu, xix.3.

The Sarvāstivādins consider that "disjunction from a defilement," "the suppression of future defilement or suffering" (visamīyoga or nirodha) is a thing in and of itself, a real dharma, an entity (dravya). "Disjunction" is not produced by causes, and so is eternal. Through pratīsāmikhyā (comprehension of the Truths) one obtains the acquisition (prāpti, i.36b) of disjunction.

25. The Blessed One compared an impure (sārasva) object to a post, that is to say, an object which the defilements, desire, hatred, etc. can adhere to; the defilements of bonds, saṃyojana, are a rope; the puḍgala is the animal. (Compare Sānyutta, iv.282). A sārasva object is a samyojavastu, the saṃyojaniya.

26. Dharmadinnā was questioned by her former spouse the householder Viśākha: kim saṃbhāga ārya nirodhab? She answered: asabhāga āyusman viśākha. (Madhyamāgama, TD 1, p. 788c16, Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 162b11). Compare Majjhima, i.304: nibbānassa pan'aye kim patiḥghā . . .

27. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 164b13. The Kathāvattu, ii.9, attributes to the Mahāyānasakas (Wassilief, p. 282) and the Andhakas the distinction between patīsāmikha- and appatīsāmikha-nirodha. Saṃkara discusses the two nirodhas ad ii.2, 22 (see Kern Album, iii) but he confuses apratīsāmikhyānirodha andanityatnīrodha (i.20a-b).

28. This classification rests on two principles: 1. There can be pratīsāmikhyānirodha, (disjunction, detachment) from impure dharmas, of any time period whether they have been, are now or are not now destined to arise. 2. There is apratīsāmikhyānirodha of all dharmas, pure or impure, which are not destined to arise: future dharmas exist: they will arise if the causes of arising cause them to pass from the future into the present; they will not arise if one obtains their apratīsāmikhyānirodha. For example, at a certain moment, a Saint obtains not being able to arise in an animal womb: he obtains apratīsāmikhyānirodha of the animal womb, which for him is henceforth "not destined to arise" (anusatīsāmikhyā).

The Blessed One said of the Srotāpanna, "He has surpressed (niruddha) the hells, the animal wombs, existences as a preta" (Comp. Sānyutta, v.356, khiṃanirayo khiṃatiracchānayoniko . . .)
Apratisamhyānirodha is a dharma in and of itself which makes absolutely impossible, in one who possesses (prāpti) it, the arising of a certain dharmā. This absolute non-arising does not result from an insufficiency of causes, for, if the causes should present themselves someday, the dharmā would arise: thus it is the possession of apratisamhyānirodha which makes the sufficient coming together of causes, and arising, definitely impossible.

See ii.55c-d and v.24.

29. The term skandha is explained i.20.


Compare Anguttara, i.197.

31. TD 26, p. 728a24: “The three paths, the three kathavastus are embraced within eighteen dhātus, twelve āyatanaś, and five skandhas; they are known by the nine knowledges, with the exception of nirodhafīna; they are discerned by six consciousnesses; and they are affected by all the anuśayas.”

32. Why is not the unconditioned a “foundation of discourse?” Because it is not the cause of discourse (ii.55); because there is no history of an unconditioned thing, in the same way that one can say “Dipamkara was such . . . ; Maitreya will be . . . ; King Kapphina (?) is such.” (Vyākhyā)

33. According to the Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 716b23, which can be reconstructed: sanīsārā dharmāḥ katame? sarve sanīskṛtā dharmāḥ, one should “leave,” not only the impure dharmas, but also the Path. The Vyākhyā quotes the text on abandoning the raft, Majjhima, i.135, Vajracchedikā, para. 6: kolopamānā dharmanaparāyāyam ājanadādhir dharma api prabhūtavyāḥ prāg evādharma iti (Compare Bodhicaryāvatāra, i.33; Katha, ii.14).

34. According to the Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 716a3: savastukāh sapratyayā dharmāḥ katame? sanīskṛtā dharmāḥ. See ii.55 end.

35. Vastu signifies hetu according to the etymology: vasanty asmin prākāryāni paścāt tata utpattēḥ.

The Vyākhyā quotes here a fragment of the Bhāṣya ad ii.55 on the five meanings of the word vastu in Scripture (Vibhāṣa TD 27, p. 980b12) For Vasubandhu savastuka signifies “real”: conditioned things are real; unconditioned things are unreal.

36. The Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 386c12 and foll., presents fourteen explanations of the term upādānakhandha. Vasubandhu quotes the first three.


37. On rana, sarana, aranā (vii.35c), see Muséon, 1914, p. 35; Walleser, Die Streitlosigkeit des Subhūti (Heidelberg, 1917).

38. asmin eva robīta vṛtyāṃsamātrey kalavare lokam prajñāpayāmi lokasamudayam ca (Anūtta i.48: robītassadēvasutta). The Blessed One further said: lūhyate pralūhyate tasmā lokāḥ (Samyutta, iv.52). Aṭṭhasāsasāriyā, p. 256; Mahāvutpatti, 154.16 (Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhumi, Leipzig 1908, p. 38). The root is lūji, not loki.


Hstüan-tshang translates, “They are the threefold existence.”

Vasubandhu’s source appears to be the Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 715a9: “Which dharmas are bhava? Impure dharmas. Which dharmas are not bhava? Pure dharmas.”

40. Compare the Prakaraṇapāda, Chapter I, translated in the Introduction.
41. The five organs (*indriya*) are suprasensible (*atindriya*), transparent (*accha*), distinct from the object of the organs, distinct from visible things, from tangible things, etc. It is through reasoning or deduction that we cognize their existence. They have for their support (*adhisthāna*) what popular language calls the eye, etc. (1.44a-b).

On *pasadcakkhu, cakkhpasāda*, see *Dhammasaṅgani*, 616, 628.

42. See the Sūtra quoted i.35. Compare *Vibhaṅga*, 122, *Psychology*, 173.

43. The first interpretation according to the *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 369b21.

44. *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 64a5: *Mahāvyutpatti*, 101; compare *Dhammasaṅgani*, 617.

45. The Sautrāntikas deny that shape is anything other than color.


47. *Dhammasaṅgani*, 636.


49. *Sattvākhyā* = *sattvaṃ ācāste*, any dharma which denotes a living being is called *sattvākhyā*. When one understands the sound which constitute vocal action (*vāgvināightly*, iv.3d), one knows "This is a living being." Any sound different from speech is *asattvākhyā*.

50. According to the *Dharmāṅkandha*, TD 26, p. 500b24, it is of fourteen types. Compare *Dhammasaṅgani*, 629.

51. *Dhammasaṅgani*, 625.


53. *Dhammapada*, 194; *Udānavarga*, xxx.23. The appearance of the Buddhas is a cause of happiness, not happiness itself.

54. See i.30b.

55. According to *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 64all.

56. The *manovijnāna*, or mental consciousness, grasps the totality of the objects of the sense consciousnesses, visual consciousness (*caksuvināightly*), etc.; this is why one considers that it has *samānyalakṣāna* for its sphere; in other words, it is not specialized with respect to its object.

If, in the same way, one says that the visual consciousnesses bears on blue, yellow, red and white, we should say that it has the *samānyalakṣāna* for its sphere, because the characteristics of the "visible" *rupāyatana* are its object; the same for the auditory consciousness, the olfactory consciousness, etc. Now this is in opposition to Scripture.

Answer: When Scripture teaches that each one of the five sense consciousnesses has a *sva* *lakṣāna* for its sphere, this refers to the unique or self (*sva*) characteristics (*lakṣāna*) of the *āyatana*, namely the quality of being *rupāyatana*, that is, the quality of being visible, the "quality of being cognizable by the visual consciousness," or the quality of being *sabdāyatana*, the "quality of being cognizable by the auditory consciousness," etc. Scripture does not refer to the unique characteristic of things, namely the "quality of having a blue aspect" or the "quality of being cognizable by a visual consciousness having a blue aspect," etc. It is not from the point of view of the unique characteristics of these objects that the five consciousnesses are said "to have *sva* *lakṣāna* for their sphere," or in other words, are called "specialized with respect to their object."

57. *Avijñāpti* will be described in detail iv.3d etc. This can be translated as "non-information" or "non-informative." This is an action which does not cause anything to be known to another, and
in this it resembles mental action; but it is matter (rupa), in that it resembles bodily and vocal action. We shall see that the Sautrantikas and Vasubandhu do not admit the existence of a specific dharma called the avijñapti.

Sarhghabhadra thinks that the definition of avijñapti, as formulated by Vasubandhu, does not conform to the Vaibhasika doctrine. His objections (in the Nyāyānusāra) are reproduced, and refuted, by Yasomitra (Vyākhyā, 31.16-34.5). In the Samayaprānḍīpikā, he substitutes a new kārikā for one by Vasubandhu, which Yasomitra quotes:

krte‘pi visahhāge‘pi citte cittātaye ca yat / vyākṛtāpratigabhā rūpaṁ sā by avijñaptir iṣyate //

58. Sarhghabhadra explains: Why are the mahābhūtās termed dhātu? Because they are the place of origin of all the rūpadharmas; the mahābhūtās themselves have their origins in the mahābhūtas. Now, in the world, a place of origin receive the name of dhātu: it is thus that gold mines, etc., are called dhātus of gold, etc. Or rather they are called dhātus because they are the place of origin of the variety of sufferings. Example as above. Some say that they are called dhātus because they bear the unique characteristics of both the mahābhūtās and derived rūpa (TD 29, p. 335c13-17).

The dhātus also bear the name of mahābhūta. Why bhūta? Why mahābhūta?

At the moment when the diverse types of derived rūpa (blue, etc.) arise, each one of them comes forth under different aspects: this is why they are called bhūta. According to other masters it is by reason of the predominating (adhipati) power of the action of living beings, in the course of eternal saṁsāra, that they always exist: this is why they are called bhūta. Or rather, the appearance (upāda) of the dharmas is what is called bhava . . .

59. The etymological explanation of bhūtāni is bhūtāni tanvanti.

60. Water (in the popular sense of the word) supports vessels: thus the earth element manifests its own, proper activity; it is warm, it moves, etc.

See ii.22; Dhammasaṅgani, 962-966; Compendium, Appendix, p. 268.

61. Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 757a23. The Mahāvyutpatti (101) has khaṅkhaṭatva, dravatva, usṣṇatva, and laghusamudrāntavatva.

62. desāntarotpādanavabhāva . . . īraṇā, compare the source quoted in the Compendium: desantaruppatibhāvāvāna.


64. The Sūtra in question (Samyuktāgama, TD 2, p. 72c, Vībhāṣā, TD 27, p. 388a18) is perhaps the Garbhāvakrāntisūtra (Majjhima, III.239, below note 120). In the redaction known through the Śikṣāsamuccaya (p. 244), there is (1) for earth kākkaṭatva khaṅkhatasa (compare Mahāvastu, i.339, Divyāvadāna, 518.2; Dhammasaṅgani, 648; Harṣacarita, JRAS. 1899, p. 494); (2) for water: āpas abgata epiṣṭa sneha snehagata snehatva dravatva; (3) for fire: tejas tejogata uṣmatva; (4) for wind: vāyu vāyugata laghusamudrāntavatva.

65. This is to say: light (laghu) is derived rūpa; lightness (laghutva), which by its nature is movement (īraṇa) is the wind element; the wind element is thus laghusamudrāntavatva: that which produces lightness and motion.

66. Quoted in Vyākhyā, viii.35.

See viii.36b (vāyukṛtsnāyatana). Two opinions in Vībhāṣā, TD 27, p. 441a, p. 689b3 as to whether the wind is visible or not.

67. It appears that the Tibetan and Chinese sources call for the translation: "What is it that is broken? By contact with the hand . . ."
Chapter One

Samyutta, iii.86: ruppatti kho bhikkhave tasmā rūpaṁ ti vuccati / kena ruppatti / sūna . . . sirimāsapassampassena ruppatti. (See the interpretation of Shwe Zan Aung in the Compendium: “rupa means that which changes its form under the physical conditions of cold . . .”).

The Mahāvyutpatti has: rūpanād rūpaṃ. (111.3, 245.1137, 1153, 1154).

There are two roots: (1) rūp, which gives rūpa, form, color, beauty, rūpya, gold, etc.; and (2) rup, rumpere, in Vedic Sanskrit: ruppati, ropana, etc.; in Pāli: ruppati (=kuppata ghāṭiyati pūyiati domanassito bois); in Classical Sanskrit lup, lumpati.

68. The Sarvāstivādins understand: “Useful Chapters;” the Pāli signifies “The Octades.” (S. Lévi, J. As. 1915, i.412, 1916, ii.34).

Mahāniddesa, p. 5. Kern, Verspreide Geschriften, ii.261 (La Haye 1913) illustrates the meaning of rup by Jātaka iii, 368, Cariyapitaka, 3.6, etc.

69. Pratīghāta signifies svadete parasyotpatti pratibandha. See above p. 90.

Elsewhere, the thing which is sapratigha, “impenetrable,” is defined: yad desam āvṛṇoti, that which “covers” a place, that which is extended.

One shall see (i.43) the type of pratīghāta referred to in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, 618-619.

70. There is a third definition of rūpaṇa, Madhyamakavṛtti, 4569: tattadām ibhāmureti nirūpāpanād rūpaṃ = “This is called rūpa because one can indicate it as being here or there,” and Vyākyāyā ad i.24 pāṇyādīsaṃśparśair bādhanālakṣaṇanād rūpanāt / idam ibhāmureti desanārūpanac ca. Compare Mahāvyutpatti, 245.1139, desanārūpāna.

We have thus: rūpa, that which is impenetrable, that which occupies a place; thus “physical matter.”

Śaṅghabhadra also has another explanation: rūpa is so called because it indicates previous action as “This man has cultivated an action, anger, which has produced his bad appearance.”

71. See i.43c-d and ii.22.

72. This formula has passed into the Mahāvyutpatti, 109.2. The Japanese editor refers to Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 390al.

The Vyākyāyā mentions that this second explanation is due to the Vyḍḍhācārya, or “former master,” Vasubandhu.

On the Vasubandhu the teacher of Manoratha, in turn the teacher of Vasubandhu the author of the Kośa, see Bhāṣyam iii.27 and iv.3a, and the sources discussed in the Avant Propos to Cosmologie Bouddhique, p. viii (London,1918).

73. Śaṅghabhadra, in the Samayaaprātipiṇḍa, reads: ta evokta. Vasubandhu employs the expression itṣa, “is regarded by the Vaibhaṣikas,” because, for him, the skandhas do not really exist (i.20).

74. Vedanānubhava, ii.7, 8, 24; iii.32; Samyutta, iii.96; Dhammasaṅgaṇī, 3; Theorie des douze causes, p. 23.

75. Nimitta, characteristic, is understood as vastunovasthāvīṣeṣa, the diverse conditions or manners of being of the thing. Udgrahana signifies pariccheda, determination or discernment.

The Vijñānakāya, TD 26, p. 559b27, quoted in the Nyayabindupavrtpakṣasamkhṣepa (Mdo, 111, fol. 108b) and in the Madhyamakavṛtti (p. 74), says that the visual consciousness knows blue (nilam jānant), but does not know “This is blue” (no tu nilam iti). See the note ad i.33a-b. It is through saṁjñā that one gives a name to the visual impression, and to the external cause of the visual impression.

Objection: The consciousness (vijñāna) and ideas (saṁjñā) are always associated (ii.24); thus the visual consciousness will know the characteristics (nimitta) of the object. Answer: The saṁjñā which accompanies sense consciousness is weak and indistinct. Only the mental consciousness is
accompanied by an efficacious samjñā, and only it is savikalpaka (i.32-33).

Compare Samyutta iii.86; Atthasālīni, 291; Milinda, 61.

76. On the saṁskāras, Théorie des douze causes, p. 9-12.

77. Compare Samyutta, iii.60: katame ca bhikkhave samkhārā / chayime cetanākāyā / rūpasam-cetanā . . . dharmasaṁcetanā . . . Vibhanga, p. 144; Sumaṅgalavilāsini, p. 64.

78. Volition is action (iv.1), the cause of upapatti, and by opposition to thirst, the cause of abhinirvṛtti (vi.3).

79. This is to say: "because it conditions that which should be conditioned," as one says: "Cook the porridge that should be cooked."

80. a. Samyutta iii.67: saṁkhātam abhisamkharonti ca bhikkhave samathā vuccanti / kiñ ca samkhātam abhisamkharonti / rūpaṁ rūpattāya samkhātam abhisamkharonti / vedanaṁ vedanattaya . . .

b. Samyutta v.449: jātisamvattanike'pi samkhāre abhisamkharonti / jārasamvattanike'pi . . . / maraṇasaṁvattanike'pi . . . / te jātisamvattanike'pi samkhāre abhisamkharivotvā . . . jātipapātam pi papātam ahaṁ . . .

c. abhisamkharanakāraṇāb (Madhyamakavṛtti 343.9); citābhisaṁskāramanaś-kāraṇa cetanā (ibid. 137.7, Mahāvastu, i. 26 and 391).

81. See ii.34.

82. The Vyākhya explains upalabdhi by the gloss vastumātgrābhaṇa, and adds vedanādaya tu caitasikā viśesagrābhaṇaprāpab (The text of the Bibliotheca Buddhica has wrongly: caitasikāviśesā). "The consciousness (viññāna) or mind (citta) apprehends (grābhaṇa) only the thing itself (vastumātra); the 'mental states' (caitasika) or dharmas associated with the consciousness (ii.24), that is to say, sensation, etc. (vedanā samjñā . . .), apprehend particular characteristics, special conditions." For example, the consciousness of touch (kāya-viññāna) apprehends unevenness, softness, etc. (i.10d); it is associated with an agreeable sensation (vedanā) which apprehends a certain characteristic of unevenness or softness, the characteristic of being the cause of an agreeable sensation (sukhbavedanīyatā). The visual consciousness apprehends color (blue, etc.) and shape; it is associated with a certain "mental state" called samjñā, an idea, which apprehends a certain characteristic of color and shape under consideration: "This is a man, this is a woman, etc." (i.14c-d).

This doctrine has been adopted by the School of Nagarjuna. Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 65 cittaṁ arthamātgrābhī ca itta viśesāvastbhāgrābhaṁ sukhabhāyab; and by the School of Dignāga, Nyāyabindusā, p. 12, Tibetan version, p. 25.

The Japanese editor of the Kośa here quotes the Kōki (=the Cbi of P'kuang, TD 41, p. 26a14) and the Vibhaṣa which mentions four opinions on this problem.

See ii.34b-d.

83. According to Saṅghabhadra: "Even though numerous material objects are present, visual consciousness solely grasps visible matter, not sound; it grasps the blue, etc., but does not say that it is blue, etc., or that it is agreeable, disagreeable, male, female, etc., a stump, etc. . . ." (TD 29, p. 342a15).

84. The consciousnesses (viññāna) succeed one another; they can be visual . . . mental. The consciousness which disappears is the immediately antecedent cause (ii.62a), the support (āśraya) of the consciousness which immediately follows. Under this aspect it receives the name of manas, mana-dyatana, manodbhātu, and mana-indriya (ii.1). It is to the consciousness which follows what the organ of sight is to the visual consciousness.
According to the Vyākhyā, the Yogācārins admit a manodhātu, a manas or mental organ, distinct from the six consciousnesses. The Tāmraparñyās, the masters of Tāprobane, imagine (kalpayanti) a material organ, the heart (hrdayavastu), a support of the mental consciousness. This heart also exists in Ārāpyadhātu, the non-material sphere: these masters admit in fact the existence of matter in this sphere (vii.3c); they explain the prefix a in the sense of “a little,” as in āpiṅgala, “a little red.”

The Patthāna (quoted in Compendium of Philosophy, p. 276) assigns a material (rūpa) support to the mental consciousness, without giving the name of “heart” to this support, whereas it terms “eye” the support of the visual consciousness. But the later Abhidhamma (Visuddhi-dhamma, Abhidharmasaṅgaha) considers the heart as the organ of thought.

The teaching of the Vibhaṅga, p. 88, is less clear: “From the visual, auditory consciousness . . . tactile consciousness which has just perished there arises the mind, the manas, the mental organ (maniṣa = manas), the heart (=the mind), the manas, the manas organ . . .” (Atthanālīti, 343).

Avijñāpti forms part of rūpaskandha and dharmadhātu.

87. The problem of inclusion (samgraha) is examined in the Dhātukathāpakarana, Kathāvātthu, vii.1, Dhātukāya, and Prakarana (see below i.20, note 105).

88. Dīgha, iii.232; Dharmaśaṅgara, 19; Mahāvyutpatti, 35, etc.

89. Great ugliness results from the fact of having only one eye, one ear, or one nostril. But many animals, camels, cats, owls, etc., are not beautiful for having two eyes! They are not beautiful in comparison with other species, but, among their species, individuals having only one eye, etc., are ugly.

Sarīghabhadra explains sabbārtham in the sense of ādhipatyārtham, “with a view to its predominating factor” (see ii.1). He who possesses predominance is beautiful, and shines in the world. Individuals who only possess one eye do not possess “predominance,” the capacity for clear vision; for sight is not as clear with one eye as with two eyes . . . (i.43).

90. Sarīyukta, TD 2, p. 14c4: yat kiṃcid rūpam aitānāgatapratyutpannam ādhyātmikam vā bāhyan vā adārikam vā sūkṣmam vā hīnam vā prāṇitam vā dārum vā antikān vā tad ekādhyam abhisamāñśiyam āyam ucyate rūpaskandhaḥ.

Compare Vibhaṅga, p. 1.

The edition of the Vyākhyā has aikādhyam, but the Mahāvyutpatti 245, 243 has ekādhyam abhisamāñśiyam. Wōghara mentions ekādhyey in Divya, 35.24, 40.22.

91. Anityatāniruddha: destroyed by impermanence which is one of the characteristics of conditioned things (ii.45c-d).

There are five types of nirodha: (1) laksananirodha (ii.45c-d) which is posed here, (2) samāpattinirodha (ii.41c), (3) upapattinirodha (=āsaṃjñika, ii.41b), (4) pratisamkhyānirodha (i.6a-b), and (5) apratisamkhyānirodha (i.6c-d).

If the texts were to say, “In the past, rūpa is destroyed,” one could understand that this refers to nirodhas two to five. Now nirodhas two and three are the destruction of future mind and mental states; nirodha four is the destruction of an impure mind and mental states; and nirodha five is the destruction of future dharmas not destined to arise (anupatīdharman).

92. Āryadeva, Sataka, 258, shows that this definition contradicts the thesis of the existence of the future.

93. Hsüan-tsang translates: The Bhadanta Dharmaṭrāta. But the Vyākhyā says: The Bhadanta is a Sautrāntika Sthavira, or a Sautrāntika Sthavira of this name. Bhagavadaviseṣa thinks that this refers to the Sthavira Dharmaṭrāta.
We object to this: Dharmatrata is a follower of the teaching of the existence of the past and future, thus a Sarvastivadin, and we are concerned here with a Sautrantika, that is, a Darstantika. But the Bhandanta Dharmatrata has a Sarvastivadin theory presented later (v.25). The “Bhadanta” is a philosopher that the Vibhāṣa quotes under the simple name of Bhadanta, a philosopher who adheres to the Sautrantika system (sautrantika-darsanavalambin), whereas the Vibhāṣa calls the Bhadanta Dharmatrata by his name. Thus we have here a certain Sautrantika Sthavira Bhikṣu, who differs from Dharmatrata.

The Japanese editor refers to Vibhāṣa TD 27, p. 383b16, where it is said that Dharmatrata does not admit that the dharmayātana is rūpa (see iv.4a-b).

94. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 379a12, presents twenty opinions on the meaning of the term āyatana. The definition of the Kośa is reproduced in the Mahāvyutpatti, p. 552.
95. Vibhāṣa, TD p. 367c21, has eleven etymologies. We have here the first one.
96. Dhatu signifies “mine” in the expression suvāraṇagotra, Asaṅga, Sūtrakṛtākṣa, iii.9 and note of the translator.
97. The Vaibhāṣikas believe that the skandhas, the āyatanas and the dhātus really exist; the Sautrantikas hold that the dhātus are real, the skandhas and the āyatanas only “nominally” so; Vasubandhu holds the skandhas to be “nominal,” whereas the āyatanas and the dhātus are real.
98. The doctrine of the pudgala is discussed in a supplement, Chapter IX, of the Kośa, translated by Stcherbatsky, Académie de Petrograd, 1920.
99. Sarīghabhadrā: “This objection does not hold. Skandha does not signify ‘mass,’ but ‘that which is susceptible of being collected together in a mass’…” (TD 29, p. 343c25).
100. In the way that, in the world, skandha signifies shoulder, nāmarūpa are the two shoulders which bear the sadāyātana (iii.21).
101. That part which is rūpa, that part which is sensation ...
102. Paramārtha: “I shall return to you three skandhas.” Tibetan: dbul bar bya’i phun po gsun dag tu dbul bar bya’o.
103. Utsāra: Mahābhāṣya, i. p. 12; Kielhorn, JRAS, 1908, p. 501.
104. The Ābhidhārmikas are not always clearly distinguished from the Vaibhāṣikas. See Introduction.
105. Compare Prakaraṇapāda, Chapter VI (TD 26, p. 731c19): The caksurdhātu is embraced within one dhātu, one āyatana, and one skandha; it is known (jñeya) by seven jñānas (see Kośa, vii) with the exception of paracittajñāna, nirodhajñāna, and mārgajñāna: it is discerned by one vijñāna; it exists in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu; it is affected by the anusayas to be abandoned through Meditation (see Kośa, v.).

Dhātukathāpikaraṇa (PTS ed. 1892) p. 6: cakkhubhūtā ekena khandhena ekenāyatanena ekāya dhātuse sarisgubhūtā.

107. Teaching of the skandhas to persons of sharp faculties (prajñendriya). Example: yad bhikṣo na tvam sa te dharmah prabhātavah /aṅgatām bhagavan / katham asya bhikṣo samkṣiptoṇok-tārtham aṅjānāi /rūpaṁ bhadanta nāham sa me dharmah prabhātavah/

The three types of hearers—udghatitajñāna, aśvapiñciṣṭajñāṇa, and padariparama—correspond to the three types of faculties (Puggalapaññatti, p. 41; Sūtrakṛtākṣa, trans. p. 145).
109. Six vivādamulās in Dīgha, iii.246, etc.
111. According to Vibhāsā, TD 27, p. 384b1-6.
112. The Vibhāsā, TD 27, p. 399c4-7, enumerates eleven reason which justify the terms rūpāyatana and dhammāyatana.
113. This is the opinion of Dharmatrata (see his Saṁyukta Abhidhammathdaya, TD 28, p. 873a28-b2). i.17.
114. (1) According to the Sautrāntikas, the word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) is vācāvijñapti (iv.3d); according to another school (nīkāyavānta) it is nāman. The Vyākhyā quotes, on this point, the Jājaṇapramartha (See Cosmologie bouddhique, p. vii, note).
(2) In another canon, the Sūtra says that there are eighty-four thousand dharmskandhas. The Sūtra has Ānanda saying, "I have learned from the Buddha more than eighty-four thousand dharmskandhas: sāti kāme māśā dharmskandhasāhasāhaṃ bhagavatoṅkātā sammukham udgrhitāni (See Burnouf, Introduction, p. 34; Sumangalavilāsa, p. 24; Theragāthā, 1024; Prajñāpāramitā in the Akutobhaya of Nāgārjuna, i.8; Avadānabataka, i.155).
   See Takakusu’s analysis, JPTS, 1905, p. 112.
116. Eighty thousand dharmskandhas have perished; a single dharmskandha has been preserved (Vyākhyā).
117. This is the explanation of Buddhaghosa, Sumangalavilāsa, i.24.
118. The Vyākhyā quotes a Sūtra, a more developed form of Dīgha, iii.241 and Āṇguttara, i.21.
   *Vimuktyāyatana* = vimukter āyatvāram.
119. These are opposed to the sixty-two drṣṭis (Vibhāsā, TD 27, p. 376c6 and foll.). The Babbudātuka (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 723c13, Dharmskandha, Chapter XX) is closely related to Majjhima, i.61 (41 dhātus). Compare Asāṅga, Sūratālamkāra, i.2.
120. This refers to the Sūtra which explains the constituent elements of a person: saḍdhātār ayaṃ bbikṣo puruṣaḥ. Vasubandhu quotes it (i.35) under the name of Garbhāvakrāntisūtra (Vinayasaṁyukta-kavastu, Sec. 11, TD 24, p. 253a21; and in the Ratnakūṭa, Chap. 14, TD 11, p. 326b). In the Majjhima, this Sūtra is called the Dhātuvibhaṅgasutta (iii.239); it constitutes one of the sources of the Pūtaprataramāgama extracts of which are preserved in the Śikṣāsāmakumāra, p. 244, Bodhicaryavatāra, ix.88, Madhyama-kāvatāra, p. 269.
   See note 62, and note 143 and Prakaraṇapada quoted in the note ad ii.23c-d.
122. Pu-kuang says (TD 41, p. 32c28): "One says that aṅkāsaṇḍhātu is light and darkness in order to show that it is a type of color (vārṇa) and a real thing. The author does not believe that aṅkāsaṇḍhātu is a real thing, and this is why he adds the word kīla." For Vasubandhu and the Sautrāntikas, aṅkāsaṇḍhātu is solely the absence of a resistent body (sapratighadravyābhāvanā). See ii.55c-d.
   Vibhāsā, TD 27, p. 388b19: What difference is there between aṅkāsa and aṅkāsaṇḍhātu? The first
is non-material (arūpin), invisible (anidarśana), non-resistant (apraśīgha), pure (anāsrava), unconditioned (asaṃskeṇa); the second is material . . .

123. One edition of the Vākyāhyā reads āgha: āgham kīla citaśthānā rūpam iti citaśthān sanāgāthāstham / atyarthām hanti banyate cety āgham / . . . atyarthāśabdārya akāraśdeśah kṛto bhante ca ghaḍēśah. But the Burnouf MSS reads āgham . . . akāraśdeśah; we have, ad iii.72, āgha = citaśtharūpa; Mahāvyuṭpatī, 245.162.

124. See above p. 70 and following.

125. The dharmadātu is apart from cause: it includes avijñāpti which is material and non-susceptible to being struck.

126. See Kāramaprajñāptiśāstra, analyzed in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 339.


128. This means that the consciousness which arises having blue for its object (viṣaya) and the eye for its support (āṣraya), can be hindered from arising through the interposition of a foreign body between the eye and the blue object: the eye and the blue are thus sapraśīgha. But neither the manodhātu, which functions as the organ of the mental consciousness (manovijñāna), nor the dharmadātu, which is the object proper of the mental consciousness (for example sensation), are not sapraśīgha: nothing can hinder, by making an "obstacle" or a "screen" (āvarana), the mental consciousness from arising from the mental organ (manodhātu) with respect to the dharmadātu.

129. See ii.9a; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 263c12, p. 740b8.

130. The Mahāśāṣṭikas believe that the first four consciousnesses are always neutral; the consciousness of touch and the mental consciousness are of the three types.

131. The dharmas which do not belong to any sphere of existence, which are transcendent to existence (adhātupatīta, adhātvaśpa, aparayaśpa) are unconditioned things.

132. The examination of this problem is taken up again ii.12.

Compare Kathāvatthu, viii.7.

133. Compare Dīgha, i.34, 186.

134. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 746a4: "Do the male and female organs exist in Rūpadhātu? Neither of the sexual organs exist there. First opinion: it is because one desires to abandon these organs that one cultivates the dhyānas and is reborn in Rūpadhātu. If beings in Rūpadhātu were to possess these organs, they would not desire to be reborn in this sphere. Second opinion: these organs are created by gross food (iii.39); the Sūtra (iii.98c) says in fact that human beings at the beginning of the cosmic age do not possess these organs, that they all have the same form; later, when they eat of the juice of the earth, the two organs arise, and the difference of male and female appear; in the absence of gross food, the two organs will be missing. Third opinion: the two organs have a use in Kāmadhātu, but they do not have a use in Rūpadhātu: thus they are missing in Rūpadhātu . . .

On the gods of Kāmadhātu, see iii.70.

135. The Mahāsāṁghikas and the Sautrāntikas maintain that the body of the Buddha is pure (anāsrava) (see iv.4a-b, discussion of avijñāpti) (Compare Kathāvatthu, iv.3, xiv.4). Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 229a17, p. 391c27: "Certain masters, the Mahāsāṁghikas, maintain that the body of the Buddha is pure. They say, 'Scripture says that the Tathāgata remains above the world, that he is not mundane, that he is not defiled; thus we know that the body of the Buddha is pure.' In order to refute this opinion, we show that the body of the Buddha is impure. To say that it is pure is to contradict the Sūtra."

The body of the Buddha is not pure (anāsrava), because it can be the occasion of the
defilement of another. Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 871c1: The body of the Buddha is the result of ignorance and thirst; it is thus not pure. The Sūtra says that ten complete āyatanas (organ of sight . . . , visibles . . . ), and two partial āyatanas (manaāyata na dbharmas) are impure . . . If the body of the Buddha were pure, women would not have affection for him; he would not produce, among others, any desire, hatred, confusion, or pride . . .

Compare Vīyākyā, p. 14; above p. 58.

136. Same question in Vibhaga, 97, 435. Vitarka and vicāra are defined ii.28, 33.

137. These are called avikalapaka by reason of the text: caksurviṇānasamaṇgī niśam vijānāti no tu niśam iti (See above note 75).

138. Kila: this is an opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas without support in the Sūtras.

The opinion of Vasubandhu is explained later, ii.33. For him as for the Sautrantikas, vitarka and vicāra are citta, manovijñāna.

139. Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 219b7: svabhāvavikalpa is vitarka-vicāra; anumāṇavikalpa is the memory associated with mental consciousness; nirūpāṇavikalpa is non-absorbed prajñā of the sphere of the mental consciousness. In Kāmadhātu, the five consciousnesses have only the first type of vikalpa: they include memory, but not anumāṇavikalpa, for they are not capable of recognition; they include prajñā, but not nirūpāṇavikalpa, for they are not capable of examination.

Nyāyānusāra (TD 29, p. 350b11): The nature of svabhāvavikalpa is vitarka.

140. Saṅghabhadra: Prajñā and memory are associated with the five sense consciousnesses, but their functions are reduced therein (TD 29, p. 350b17).

141. Prajñā which is mental (mānasī), that is to say manasi bhavā, proceeds either from the hearing of Scripture or from reflection (frutacintāmayi), or is innate (upapattipratilambhikā); is dispersed (vyāgra), that is, non-concentrated prajñā, having different objects (agra), or "discrowned" (vigatapradhānā) by the fact that it successively grasps after different object.

Why give the name of abhinirūpāṇavikalpa to this prajñā?

Because it applies to a certain object in respect to its name (nāma peksayā) and examines (abhinirūpāna): "this is rūpa, vedana, anīya, dshkha," etc. However, concentrated (samābītā) prajñā, proceeding from absorption (bhavānāmayi), is applied to an object without taking into consideration its name. Thus it is not abhinirūpāṇavikalpa.

All mental memory (smṛti), that is to say, the mental memory, is or is not concentrated. For, according to the School, the mental memory uniquely has for its object the thing previously experienced and does not take into consideration its name, according to the definition: "What is memory? Expression of the mind (cetaso'bhilapa)." The mode of existence of memory connected to the five consciousnesses is not an expression (abhilāpa) of a thing previously experienced. It is thus not anumāṇavikalpa (Vīyākyā). See ii.24.

142. On the meaning of alambana, i.29b.

Compare Vibhaṅga, p. 95.

143. The Abhidhamma (Vibhaṅga, p. 96, Dhammasaṅgānī, 653, 1211, 1534) understands upādīna in the same sense. The modern commentators of the Abhidhamma translate upādīna as "issue of grasping;" they do not see the upādā = upādāyārūpa, bhavāika, and so create a great confusion.

Moreover the Vibhaṅga does not classify the dbhās as does the Abhidharma. (See also Suttavibhaṅga, p. 113; Mahāvyutpatti, 101.56; Divyāvadana, p. 54; Bodhicaryavatāra, viii.97, 101). And there is some fluctuation even in Sanskrit sources. For example, Mañjīrima iii.240, reproduced in the Pitāputrasaṅgama (see above p. 54, n. 1), gives the hair . . . excrements as ajjhattam paccattam kakkhalam upādīnam. Now hair is not upādīna. A description of corporeal matter
Footnotes

(adhyātmikā, see Majjhima, iii.90) has been confused with a description of organic matter (upātta).

Upātta matter, plus the manas, is called āśraya (see ii.5). This is the subtle bodies of the non-Buddhists.

145. Bhūta, mahābhūta; upādāya rūpa, bhautika; see i.22, 23-24, ii.12, 50a, 65. bhautika = bhūta bhava = derived from the bhūtas.


146. Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 661c14. There are two masters in this school, Buddhadeva and Dharmatrāta. Buddhadeva says: "Rūpa is solely the primary elements; the mental states (cātta) are solely mind (cittā)." He says that upādāyarūpa, secondary matter, is a species of the primary elements (mahābhūtaviveṣa), and that the mental states are a species of mind . . ." (Compare Kathāvatthu, vii.3). Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 383c24. The Sūtra says: "Rūpa is the four primary elements and that which derives from the four primary elements." Which opinion does the Sūtra intend to refute? It intends to refute the opinion of Buddhadeva. The Buddha sees that, in the future, there will be a master, Buddhadeva, who will say: "There is no derived, distinct rūpa apart from the primary elements." In order to refute this opinion, the Buddha says: "Rūpa is the four primary elements . . ." Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 730b26: "All conditioned things are either mahābhūta or cittā; there is no upādāyarūpa apart from the mahābhūtas; and there is no cātta (mental states) apart from the cīttā (the mind).

On the mind and mental states, see below p. 101 and ii.23c.

Buddhadeva is perhaps the master named on the lion inscription of Mathura.

147. Thus (1) the organs are not primary matter, not being "solid," etc.; (2) tangible things include primary matter, since a solid is perceived by touch; and (3) secondary matter perceived by the other organs is not perceived by touch.

148. See ii.5. The first four dhātus (earth . . . wind) are "radical substances," because the organs arise from these dhātus; the viññānadhātu or manodhātu is a "root," because it gives rise to manābharṣparāyatana. Or rather the first four dhātus are roots because they give rise to secondary matter, the viññānadhātu is a root because it gives rise to mental states (cīttā, cāttaśāka).

149. Thus the first five "supports of contact," the five organs of sense consciousness, are "secondary matter:" otherwise, they would be included in the definition: "A person is made up of the six dhātus."

150. According to the Abhidhamma (Dhammasaṅgani, 647), derived rūpa is not tangible. Sarṇghabhadra (TD 29, p. 352c1) refutes this opinion which he attributes to the Sthavira. On this subject see the Introduction for a discussion of the authenticity of the Sūtras.


151. Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 689c5 and foll.

153. This is the etymology vipacyata iti vipākaḥ; the vipāka is what has become ripe.

154. This is the etymology vipāka = vipakti.

155. It appears that this is the opinion of Dharmatrāta i.45 (TD 28, number 1552).

156. Let us consider one moment or state of existence of this subtle matter which is the organ of sight. One part of this matter is retribution of a former action; another part proceeds from food: all this matter is the outflowing result of a previous moment or state in the existence of the eye. But this previous moment or state is not, in and of itself, capable of generating the present moment: in fact, at death, the organ of sight ceases producing itself through outflowing. Thus by
definition the organ of sight is not an outflowing. But consider, on the contrary, the flesh that constitutes the body: it persists after death; it is thus an outflowing, the result, in each of the moments of its existence, of the previous moment.

The Kathavaṭṭhū, xii.4, xvi.8, does not hold that matter is retribution.


158. The Vatsiputtīyas and the Vibhajyavādins maintain that sound is retribution.

159. Compare Dīgha, iii.173, quoted by the Mahāsāṃghikas in the Kathavaṭṭhū, xii.3: saddo vipāko.

160. See Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 823a20, p. 449a16, and Dharmatrāta, TD 29, p. 396c20. These passages are discussed by Fa-pao in his Šhu, TD 41, p. 502a18 and following.

161. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 714a7 and foll. The difference between internal (ādhyātmika) dharmas and external (bāhya) dharmas is threefold: 1. difference from the point of view of the series (samitāna): the dharmas that are to be found in the person himself (svātmabhava) are internal; those that are to be found within another, and also those which are not integral to living beings (asattvbāhya, i.10b), are external; 2. difference from the point of view of the āyatanas: the āyatanas which are the support (āsraya) of the mind and mental states are internal; those which are objects (ālambana) are external; 3. difference from the point of view of living beings: the dharmas integral to living beings are internal; the others are external.

162. See Udānavarga, xxiii; Madhyamakavārtti, p. 354; Dhammapada, 160.


164. Vibhāṣā (TD 27, p. 368a21): The organ that has seen, now sees or shall see rūpa, and its tattabhāga (that is to say the organ which resembles this organ) is the caksurdbhātu. The organ which has seen is past caksurdbhātu; the organ which now sees is present caksurdbhātu; and the organ that shall see is future caksurdbhātu. As for tattabhāga, the masters of this land say that it is of four types: the past, present, and future tattabhāga eye is the caksurdbhātu which has perished, is now perishing, or shall perish without having seen the rūpa; one should add, as a fourth, the caksurdbhātu which absolutely will not arise.

Foreign (babirdēsaka) masters say that it is of five types: past, present, future, as above. Further, future caksurdbhātu which absolutely will not arise, is of two types, accordingly as it is, or is not, associated with the consciousness.

165. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 368b13. Three opinions. Can one see rūpa by means of the eye of another? Who maintains such an opinion? If one cannot see by means of the eye of another, how can the eye of a certain being be called sabhāga through relationship with other beings? Because the activity of the eye is definite: this activity consists of seeing. When the eye, after having been active, has perished, it is called sabhāga: neither for the person himself, nor for another, does this name sabhāga change. In this same way . . .

166. By explaining bhāga in the passive, bhajyata iti bhāgah.

167. The eye that perishes without having seen is similar to the eye that sees, etc.

The Mādhyamikas (Vṛtti, p. 32 and the note that should be corrected) make the best of this theory: "In reality, the sabhāga eye does not see visible things, because it is an organ, exactly like tattabhāga: na paramārthataḥ sabhāgam caṣuḥ pāṣyati rūpāṇi, caṣuṁridriyatvāt, tadyathātatsabhadgam.

168. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 265cb. The same problem is examined in the Vibhaṅga, pp. 12, 16, 97, and the Dhammasaṅgani, 1002, 1007, 1008.
169. On the quality of *prthbagjana*, ii.40c, vi.26a, 28c-d. In *Vibhaṣā*, TD 27, p. 231c13-23, divergent explanations of Vasumitra, the Bhadanta, and Ghoṣaka.

170. See ii.13, iv.lla-b.

171. We shall see that the first stage is *ānantaryamārga*, "the path which destroys the defilements;" the second stage is *vimuktimārga*, "the path of deliverence," the path in which the defilements are destroyed (vi.28).

172. Dhi in place of *prajñā*, for prosodical reasons (ii.57d).


174. This is the thesis of the Bhadanta (*Vibhaṣā*, TD 27, p. 63b23, c12).

175. *caksusā rūpāni drṣṭvā ... quoted iii.32d. Samyukta, TD 1, p. 87c26, p. 88a; Vibhanga, p. 381; Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 137; Dhammasaṅgani, 597. This is the argument of the Māhāsāṃghikas, *Kathāvatthu*, xviii.9.

176. Compare the formula: *tasyaiyam jñāna evam paśyatabh.*


178. Or rather: "One should not reject expressions in worldly use for the reason that they do not correspond to realities." *janapadaniruttanā nābbhiniveseta sāṃjñāni, ca lokasya nātikhetat. (Madhyama TD 1, p. 703a2, Samyukta, 13.12). Compare Majjhima, iii.230: janapadaniruttanā nābbhiniveseyya tamaḥśrīnāṃ nātikhāveyya; Samyutta, iv.230: yam ca sāmam flāsam ca atidhāvanti, yaṁ ca loke saccasammataṁ tam ca atidhāvanti. Itivuttaka, 49.*

179. According to the *Jñānaprasṭhāna*, TD 26, p. 919c27; *Vibhaṣā*, TD 27, p. 62bl. Against the Vatsiputiṇyas. See above note 173, at the end.
180. Argument of Vasubandhu, Pañcavastuka, i.10.

181. Compare Atthasālinī, 629.

Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 63b14 and foll: One says that the object is attained (prāpta) in a twofold sense: either because it is "grasped as object" or "perceived;" or because there is a juxtaposition (nirantarata) of the object and the organ. In the first sense, the six organs attain the object. In the second sense, only three organs—the organs of smell, taste and touch,—attain the object; but on the contrary, three organs, the organs of sight and hearing and the mental organ, perceive without attaining.

The organ of sight perceives visible things by reason of light; when a visible thing is close to the organ, it hinders the light: the organ does not see. The organ of hearing perceives sound by reason of space or the void; when a sound is close to the organ, it does not hinder the void: the organ hears... The organ of smell perceives by reason of the wind; the organ of taste, by reason of water; the organ of touch, by reason of the earth; and the mental organ, by reason of the act of attention (manaskāra).

Fa-pao (see TD 41, p. 508a19 and foll) observes that the rūpa of the moon does not leave the moon in order to juxtapose itself on the eye.

Compare Āryadeva, Śatāka, 288.

182. An objection of the Vaiśeṣikas.

183. This doctrine is refuted by Sarīghabhadra (TD 29, p. 370b12 and foll); Shen-t'ai attributes it to the Sāṃmītyas; Fa-pao, to certain masters of the Vibhāṣa (TD 41, p. 508b17).

184. Sarīghabhadra discusses this thesis (TD 29, p. 370b23 and foll).

185. Here and below (the definition of Bhadanta, p. 106), our Tibetan version translates nirantaraya by 'dab chags pa. But the Tibetan Siddhantas analyzed by Wassilief (p. 307) oppose the nirantaraya of the Bhadanta (bar med pa) to the nirantaraya of the other masters ('dab chags pa).

According to the Bodhicaryavatāra, p. 516, the organ and its object cannot be either separated (svayavadbāna, sāntara) or contiguous (nirantaraya).

186. Sarīghabhadra (TD 29, p. 371c7): What is the meaning of "to attain?" When an object arises in proximity to an organ, this latter grasps it. Thus one can say that smell, taste, and touch grasp the objects that they attain; in the same way one says that the organ of sight does not see eyelids, eye-lashes and the other visible matter that it attains. The eyelid does not touch the organ of sight: one says nevertheless that the organ attains it. From the fact that the eyelid arises in proximity to the organ, one says that this latter attains it. As the organ of sight does not see the visible matter thus attained, one says that the organ of sight grasps without attaining, not by attaining; moreover it does not grasp a very distant object. In this same way, even though smell grasps the object that it attains, it does not grasp what is very close.

187. Compare the Vīśāka of Vasubandhu, 12-14; Bodhicaryavatāra, p. 503; Praśastapāda, p. 43, etc.

188. According to Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 683c24: Do the atoms touch one another? They do not touch one another; if they touch one another, they touch one another in either their totality or partially. If they touch one another in their totality, they form but one single thing; if they partially touch one another they would thus have parts. And atoms do not have parts.

How is it that agglomerations, striking against one another, do not fall to pieces? They do not fall to pieces because vāyudhātu holds them together.

But does not vāyudhātu fall to pieces? Sometimes it falls to pieces, for example at the end of the cosmic period. Sometimes it holds together, for example at the beginning of the cosmic period.
If atoms do not touch one another, how can striking produce sound? Sound is produced for this very reason. For, if the atoms were to touch one another, how could there be the production of sound? If atoms touch one another, the hand and the body that it strikes would mix with one another, and there would be not free space, and how could sound arise? Vasumitra says: "Atoms do not touch one another: if they touch one another, they would thus last for a second moment." The Bhadanta says: There is no real contact; it is through acquiescence to popular truth that one say that there is contact when atoms arise in a union without interval (nirantara).

Does the thing in contact arise having for its case a thing in contact . . .

189. They should have arisen (first moment) in order to touch one another (second moment).

190. Vasubandhu believes that the Bhadanta understands "juxtaposition without interval" in the sense that atoms do not allow any intermediate space between them. Sañghabhadra is of a different opinion.

191. For Vasubandhu, atoms are immediately juxtaposed; nevertheless they do not mix one with another, for being impenetrable, they remain distinct in spite of their contiguity. See p. 70.

Here are the essentials of Sañghadra's explanations.

Nyāyānusāra, (TD 29, p. 372b12): The Bhadanta nevertheless says: "Atoms do not touch one another; but one says, by metaphor, that they touch one another, because they are juxtaposed without interval" (nirantara). The Sautrāntika (that is, Vasubandhu), indicating that that is the best theory, says: "This doctrine is the best; otherwise, the atoms would present some intermediate space (sāntara) between them; since these intermediate spaces are empty, what would hinder the atoms from going (one towards the other)? One admits that they are impenetrable (sapratigha)." This theory of the Bhadanta can neither be approved nor criticized; one should solely examine how there can be any absence of an intermediate space without there being contact: since this is not explicit, this theory is difficult to understand. If one says that atoms absolutely are without any intermediate space between them, and yet are not mixed one with another, they must have parts: a false opinion. Otherwise, if nirantara signifies "without interval" (anantara), how is it that the atoms do not touch one another? Consequently, the word nirantara signifies "close." The prefix nis signifies "certitude." As there is certainly an interval, the atoms are nirantara, "possessing intervals:" the same way as nirdahati, "he burns." Or rather the prefix nis signifies "absence." The atoms are called "without interposition" (nirantara), because there is not any rūpa of contact (sprṛṣa) of the dimension of a atom between them. When the atoms of the primary elements arise close to one another, without "interposition," they are said, by metaphor, to touch one another. We approve the understanding of the Bhadanta thusly . . .

192. Sañghabhadra (TD 29, p. 372c5) reproduces this paragraph (The Sautrāntika says: 'If you admit . . .'), and following: "This is not correct. 'To have parts' and 'to be spatially divided' are two expressions of the same idea. When one says that 'an atom does not have any parts,' one says in fact that it is foreign to all spatial division. How can you be in doubt with respect to this point and still say: 'If you admit spatial division . . .'? Since the atoms are foreign to this division, how can they touch one another? We have explained that contact can only be total or partial; thus the atom, foreign to any spatial division, cannot enter into contact. How can you thus say 'If you deny spatial division, there will be no difficulty in the atoms touching one another.' Thus the atoms are called nirantara, 'not separated,' because there is not any rūpa of contact of the dimension of an atom between them."

See ii.22 and the Introduction.

193. According to Vibhāṣa TD 27, p. 63c12.

194. The first opinion is that of the Sarvāstivādins.

195. mālāvad avasthita = madalena sampanktyāvasthita.
196. The text has *kila*. As a general rule, Vasubandhu uses the word *kila* when the opinion in question is a wrong opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas; but here the *Vyākhyā* says: *āgamasācanārthabhi kilāsabdabhi*.

197. According to *Vibhāṣa TD* p. 369c10 and foll.

198. Unconditioned things are eternal because they do not go from one time period to another time period (*advasamcarārabbavāta*, v.25). *Asaṃskṛta*, *nitya*, *dhrva*, (iv.9) and *dravya* (i.38) are synonyms.

199. According to another reading (*kecit pathanti*): *dhammarādhama* . . .

   See *Dhammasaṅgani*, 661.

200. The *Vyākhyā* quotes the conversation of the Brahmin Jātiśrōna with the Blessed One:

   *indriyānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānάnānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānानānānानānānानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानानānānānāनānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānानानानानानानānānānānānānānānānānānānानानानānानānānānānāनानानानानानānānānानānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānānानānānānānānānānānानानānानānānānānānānānānānानānānानानानānānānānānānānānānānānānānān

202. The last three *indriyas* are made up of (1-3) three sense faculties; (4-8) the five moral faculties; and (9) the mental organ (ii.4); 1-8 are *dharma dhātu*. 
CHAPTER TWO

The Indriyas

Oṁ. Homage to the Buddha.

We have enumerated the organs or indriyas with regard to the dhātus (i.48). What is the meaning of the word indriya?

The root idi signifies paramaśvarya or supreme authority (Dhātupāṭha, i.64). Whatever exercises supreme power or authority is called an indriya. Thus, in general, indriya signifies adhipati or ruler.¹

What is the object of the predominating influence of each indriya?

1a. According to the School, five are predominate with regard to things;²

1. Each of the five indriyas of which the organ of sight is the first—the five organs of sense consciousness—is a predominating influence (1) with regard to the beauty of the person; (2) with regard to the protection of the person; (3) with regard to the production of a consciousness and the mental states associated with this consciousness; and (4) with regard to their special mode of activity (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 730a29).

The organs of seeing and hearing are predominating influences (1) with regard to beauty, for the body in which they are missing is not beautiful (i.19); (2) with regard to protection, for by seeing and hearing, a person avoids that which would destroy him; (3) with regard to the production of the seeing and hearing consciousnesses, and of the mental states associated with them; and (4) with regard to their special activities, i.e., seeing visible things and hearing sounds.

The organs of smell, taste, and sensation are predominating influences (1) with regard to beauty, as above; (2) with regard to protection, through the consumption of solid foods (kavaḍikārābhāra,
(iii.39); (3) with regard to the production of their three consciousnesses; and (4) with regard to their special activities, i.e., perceiving smells, tasting tastes, and touching tangibles.

lb. Four predominate with regard to two things;

ii. Four indriyas, namely the two sexual organs, the vital organ, and the mental organ are each a predominating influence with regard to two things (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 731b12; see also b23, b5).

1. The sexual organs are the predominating influence (1) with regard to the distribution of living beings: it is by reason of these two that living beings form the categories of male and female; and (2) with regard to the differentiation of living beings: by reason of these two organs, there are, among the sexes, differences of physical form, voice, and manner of being.3

Some other masters4 do not admit this explanation. In fact there are sexual differences among the gods of Rūpadhātu who, however, do not possess sexual organs (i.30), and their distribution into sexes results from these differences. Thus, if the sexual organs are the predominating influences from two points of view, they are the predominating influences with regard to defilement and purification: in fact, the three types of eunuchs and bisexual beings are alien (1) to the dharmas of defilement, lack of discipline (iv.13b), mortal transgression (iv.103), the cutting off of the roots of good (iv.80); and (2) to the dharmas of purification, discipline (iv.13b), acquisition of the fruits (vi.51), and detachment (vairāgya, vi.45c) (see ii.19c-d).

2. The vital organ is the predominating influence (1) with regard to the "joining" of the nikāyasabhāga (ii.41a), i.e., that which concerns the arising of an existing thing; and (2) with regard to "maintaining" this nikāyasabhāga, i.e., that which concerns the prolongation of an existing thing from its arising to its extinction.

3. The mental organ is predominate (1) with regard to rebirth, as the Sūtra explains, "Then there is produced among the Gandharvas, beings in the intermediate existence, one or the other of two minds, a mind of desire or a mind of hatred . . ." (iii.15); (2) with regard to domination: the world and the dharmas submit to the mind. As the
stanza says: "The world is lead by the mind, conducted by the mind: (all dharmas obey this one dharma, the mind.)" 

iii. The five indriyas of sensation (i.e., the five sensations of pleasure, displeasure, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference; ii.7,) and the eight indriyas of faith, (force, memory, absorption and discernment (ii.24) and the three pure faculties, ii.10)

lc. Five and eight with regard to defilement and to purification.

are, respectively, predominant with regard to defilement and to purification.

The sensations are predominant with regard to defilement, for the defilements, lust, etc., attach themselves to the sensations, and take shelter therein. Faith and the seven other faculties are predominant with regard to purification, for it is by them that one obtains purity.6

According to other masters (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 73b6), the sensations are also predominant with regard to purification, so that the Sūtra says: "sukhitasya cittatī samādhīyate,7 duḥkhopaniśacchṛddhā8 sa naiṣkramyāśritaḥ saumanasyāḥbhayaḥ9 ("There are, by reason of visible things, etc., six sensations of satisfaction, six sensations of dissatisfaction, six sensations of indifference, favorable to naiṣkramya.") Such is the explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas.

[The Sautrāntikas10 criticize this explanation:] (1) the sense organs, the eyes, etc., are not predominant with regard to the protection of the person. Here predominance belongs to the consciousnesses, visual consciousness, hearing consciousness, etc.; and it is after having distinguished that one has avoided anything harmful that one takes solid food. (2) That which you understand as the "proper activity of the organ," namely the seeing of visible things, etc., belongs to the consciousness (i.42) and not to the organ. The explanations relative to the predominance of the other indriyas are equally incorrect.

How then should one understand the predominance of the indriyas?

2a-b. By reason of their predominance (1) with regard to the perception of their special object, (2) with regard to all objects, six organs.
That is, by reason of their predominance through their affinity to the six consciousnesses. The five organs, the first of which is the organ of sight, are predominant through their affinity to the five sense consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., each one of which distinguishes its own object, visible things, etc. The mental organ is predominant with regard to the mental consciousness which distinguishes all objects. It is in this way that the six sense organs are predominant.

But, we might say, the sense objects, visibles, etc., are also predominant through their affinity to the consciousness, and as a consequence, should they not also be considered as indriyas?

They are not predominant merely by this. "Predominance" means "predominant power." The eye is predominant, for (1) it exercises this predominance with regard to the arising of the consciousness that knows visible things, being the common cause of all consciousnesses of visible things, whereas each visible thing merely aids the arising of but one consciousness; (2) the visual consciousness is clear or obscure, active or well, accordingly as the eye is active or weak: now visible things do not exercise a similar influence. The same holds for the other sense organs and their objects (1.45a-b).

2c-d. It is by reason of their predominance in masculinity and femininity that one must distinguish two sexual organs within the body.

There are two separate sexual organs within the kāyendriya, or the organ of touch. These two organs are not distinct from the kāyendriya: they too cognize tangible things. But there is a part of the kāyendriya that receives the name of male organ or female organ because this part exercises predominance over masculinity or femininity. Femininity is the physical form, the voice, the hearing, and the dispositions proper to women. The same for masculinity. Since the differences of these two natures are due to these parts of the body, we know that these two parts are predominant through their two natures. Hence they constitute indriyas.

3. It is by reason of their predominance with regard to the
duration of existence, to defilement, to purification, that one considers the vital organ, the sensations, and the five the first of which is faith, as *indriyas*.

1. The vital organ is predominant with regard to the prolongation of existence from birth to death, but not, [as the Vaibhāṣikas say,] with regard to the connection of one existence with another: this connection depends on the mind.

2. The five sensations are predominant with regard to defilement, for the Sūtra\(^\text{12}\) says, "Lust finds its shelter in the sensation of pleasure; hatred, in the sensation of displeasure; confusion, in the sensation of indifference."\(^\text{13}\) [On this point the Sautrāṇṭikas are in agreement with the Vaibhāṣikas.]

3. The five faculties,—faith, force, memory, absorption, and discernment—are predominant with regard to purification, for, through their power, the defilements are disturbed and the Path is brought about.\(^\text{14}\)

4. By reason of their predominance with regard to ascending acquisitions, with regard to Nirvāṇa, etc., the *anājñātamājñās-yāmīndriya*, the *ajñendriya*, and the *ajñātāvīndriya*, are likewise.\(^\text{15}\)

"Likewise," that is, these three are, likewise, considered as predominating influences or *indriyas*. These are the three pure *indriyas*, which will be defined ii.10a-b.

1. The first is predominant through the acquisition of the second.
The second is predominant through the acquisition of the third.
The third is predominant through the acquisition of Nirvāṇa, or *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*. For there is no Parinirvāṇa when the mind is not delivered.\(^\text{16}\)

2. The word "et cetera" indicates that there is another explanation:
The first is predominant with regard to the extinctions of the defilements which are abandoned through Seeing the Truths (v.4).
The second, with regard to the extinction of the defilements which are abandoned through Meditation on the Truths (v.5a).
The third, with regard to blessedness-in-this-life, that is, the
experience of the satisfaction (prīti = saumanasya) and the well-being (sukha = prāsṛabdhisukha, viii.9b) that comes from deliverance from the defilements. (See below note 22).

***

Why are there only twenty-two indriyas? If you regard a "predominating influence" as an indriya, ignorance and the other parts of pratityasamutpāda (iii.21) would be indriyas, for these causes (avidyā, etc.) are predominant with regard to their effects (the samskāras, etc.). In the same way, the voice, hands, feet, the anus, and the penis are predominant with regard to words, grasping, walking (viharana=caṇḍramaṇa), excretion, and pleasure.\(^{17}\)

We would answer that there is no reason to add ignorance, etc., to the list proclaimed by the Blessed One.

In enumerating the indriyas, the Blessed One took into account the following characteristics:

5. The support of the mind; that which subdivides, prolongs, and defiles this support; that which prepares the purification and which does purify it: these are all the indriyas.\(^{18}\)

1. The support of the mind consists of the six organs of consciousness, from the organ of sight to the mental organ. These are the six internal āyatanas (i.39, iii.22) which are the primary constituents of a living being.\(^{19}\)

2. This sixfold support is differenciated by reason of the sexual organs.

3. It lasts for a time by reason of the vital organ.
4. It is defiled by reason of the five sensations.
5. Its purification is prepared by the five moral faculties, faith, etc.
6. It is purified by the three pure faculties.

The dharmas that possess the characteristic of being predominant with regard to the constitution, the subdivision, etc. of a living being are considered to be indriyas. This characteristic is missing in other dharmas, in voice, etc.
(Some other masters give a different definition:)

6. Or rather there are fourteen *indriyas*, support of transmigration, origin, duration, enjoyment of this support; the other *indriyas* have the same function with regard to Nirvāṇa.

The expression “or rather” introduces the explanation of other masters.

(1-6) The six organs (*saḍāyatana*, iii.22), from the organ of sight to the mental organ, are the support, the *raison d'être* of *samsāra*.  
(7-8) It is through the sexual organs that the *saḍāyatana* arises.  
(9) It is through the vital organ that the *saḍāyatana* lasts.  
(10-14) It is through the five sensations that the *saḍāyatana* enjoy.  
On the other hand:

(15-19) The five faculties,—faith, force, memory, absorption, discernment,—are the support of Nirvāṇa.

(20) Nirvāṇa is generated, appears for the first time, through the first pure faculty, *anājñātatamājñāsyāmāndriya*.  
(21) Nirvāṇa lasts, is developed, through the second pure faculty, *ājñendriya*.  
(22) Nirvāṇa is “experienced” by the third pure faculty, *ājñātāvindriya*, for, through this faculty, one experiences the satisfaction and well-being of deliverance (see above ii.4).

This determines the number of *indriyas*, as well as the order in which the Sūtra places them.

***

The voice, hands, feet, the anus, and the sexual parts are not *indriyas*.

1. The voice is not predominant with respect to words, for words suppose a certain instruction; 22 2-3. Hands and feet are not predominant with regard to grasping and walking, for grasping and walking are simply the hands and feet arising a second moment in another place and with a new figure (iv.2b-d). On the other hand, we
see that hands and feet are not indispensable for grasping and walking, for example with snakes.  

4. The anus is not predominant with regard to the expulsion of matter, for heavy things always fall in a void; further, wind pushes this matter and makes it go out; 5. The sexual parts are not predominant with regard to pleasure for pleasure is produced by the sexual organs.

If you consider the hands, the feet, etc., as indriyas, you must then place the throat, the teeth, the eyelids, and the joints, whose function it is to swallow, to chew, to open and close, to fold up and to extend the bones, among the indriyas. In this way, everything that is a cause, which exercises its action (purusakāra, ii.58) with regard to its effects, would be an indriya. But we must reserve the name of indriya to whatever possesses predominance.

***

We have defined the organs of consciousness and the sexual organs (i.9-44); the vital organ will be explained with the cittaviprayuktas (ii.35) among which it is placed; the five faculties,—faith, force, etc.,—being mental states, will be explained with the mental states (ii.24).

We shall examine here the organs of sensation and the pure faculties which are not found anywhere else.

7a-b. Disagreeable bodily sensation is the indriya of pain.  

(“Bodily” is “that which relates to the body,” that which is associated with the five sense consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc.)”Disagreeable” is that which does harm. Sensation in relation to the five organs of sense consciousness, and which does harm, is called duḥkhendriya.

7b-c. Agreeable is the indriya of pleasure.

“Agreeable” is that which does good, which comforts, is beneficent. Agreeable bodily sensation is termed sukhendriya.

7c-d. In the Third Dhyāna, agreeable mental sensation is also
an *indriya* of pleasure.

(Mental sensation is the sensation associated with mental consciousness.) Agreeable mental sensation of the Third Dhyāna is also called *sukhendriya*, an *indriya* of pleasure. This name, moreover, is reserved for agreeable bodily sensation; but in the Third Dhyāna, bodily sensation is absent because the five sense consciousnesses are not there. Then, when one speaks of the *sukha* or pleasure of the Third Dhyāna, one means agreeable mental sensation (see vii.9).

8a. Moreover, it is satisfaction.

"Moreover," that is, in the stages below the Third Dhyāna, in Kāmadhātu and in the first two Dhyānas, agreeable mental sensation is satisfaction or the *indriya* of satisfaction.

[Agreeable mental sensation is absent above the Third Dhyāna.]

In the Third Dhyāna, agreeable mental sensation is calm and tranquil, because the ascetic, in this Dhyāna, is detached from joy: hence it is pleasure and not satisfaction.²⁷

[Below the Third Dhyāna, agreeable mental sensation is gross and agitated, because, in the stages below the Third Dhyāna, the ascetic is not detached from joy: hence it is "satisfaction." ] Joy, [which has a joyous exaltation for its characteristic,] is not distinct from satisfaction.

8b-c. Disagreeable mental sensation is dissatisfaction.

(Sensation associated with mental consciousness and which harms is dissatisfaction or the *indriya* of dissatisfaction.)

8c. Intermediate bodily or mental sensation is equanimity.

Intermediate sensation, which neither comforts nor harms, is the sensation "neither-pain-nor-pleasure." This is what is termed the sensation or *indriya* of equanimity.

Is this sensation bodily or mental?

8d. It is both.

(Either bodily or mental, intermediate sensation is a sensation of equanimity.) The sensation of equanimity presents then a double
Chapter Two

characteristic; consequently it constitutes only one indriya, because there is no vikalpana here.

8e. For it has no vikalpana.

1. There is no vikalpa, or intellectual operation. Either bodily or mental, the sensation of equanimity is equally free from any intellectual element (vikalpa=abhinirūpanāvikalpa, i.33). As a general rule, agreeable or disagreeable mental sensation proceeds from a concept, from the concept of "dear" or "hateful," etc. Contrarily, bodily sensation is produced from an external object independent of psychological states: Arhats do not have sympathies and antipathies, they do not conceive of the idea of dear or the idea of hateful, and yet they are subject nevertheless to physical pain and pleasure. Then we should distinguish indriyas relative to agreeable and disagreeable sensations accordingly as these sensation are bodily or mental.

But the sensation of equanimity is produced spontaneously, exactly like a physical sensation; it is produced in a person who does not form any concept: hence we recognize that there is but one indriya for the two sensations of bodily and mental indifference.

2. There is no vikalpa or difference. Accordingly as the agreeable or disagreeable sensations are bodily or mental, they do good or harm according to a mode of operation that is special to them, and they are not felt in the same way. The sensation of equanimity creates neither good or harm; it is not differentiated; mental or physical, it is felt in the same way.

9a-b. Nine indriyas, in the Paths of Seeing, of Meditation and of the Aśaṅkṣa, constitute three indriyas.

The mental organ, the sensation of pleasure, the sensation of satisfaction, the sensation of equanimity, and faith, force, memory, absorption and discernment constitute the anājñātamājñāsyāṃāṃdriya for the saint who is on the Path of Seeing; ājñendriya for the saint who is on the Path of Meditation on the Truths; and ājñātāvāṃdriya for the saint who is on the path of the Aśaṅkṣa (i.e., the Arhat).

On the Path of Seeing, the saint is engaged in knowing that
which he does not know (*anājñātām ājñāturī pravṛtta*), namely the Four Truths: he thinks “I will know.” His *indriya* is then called the *anājñātāmājñāsyāmīndriya*.

On the Path of Meditation on the Truths, the saint does not have anything new to know, he is a wise one or ājña. But in order to cut off the defilements which remain in him, he newly knows and often repeats the Truths that he already knows. His *indriya* is called the ājñēndriya, the *indriya* of the wise one, or the wise *indriya*.

On the Path of the Aśaikṣa, the ascetic becomes conscious that he knows: he obtains the knowledge (*āva=avagama*) that the Truths are known (*ājñātam iti*). Possessing ājñāta-ava, he is an ājñātāvin, and his *indriya* is called the ājñātāvīndriya.

Or rather, the saint who is an ājñātāvin is one who has for his characteristics or habit knowing that the Truth is known: in fact, when the saint has obtained *kṣayajñāna* and *anupādajñāna* (vi.70), he knows in truth, “Pain is known; I have nothing more to know” and the rest.

***

We have explained the specific characteristics of the *indriyas*. We must explain their different natures: are they pure (9b-d), from retribution (10-llb), good (llc-d)? To what sphere do they belong (12)? How are they abandoned (13)?

***

How many are impure? How many are pure?

9b. Three are clean;

i. The last three *indriyas* are exclusively clean or pure. Stain (*mala*) and vice (*āsrava*) are synonyms.

9c. The material organs, the vital organ and the two painful sensations are impure;

The material organs are seven in number: the five organs, of
seeing, etc., plus the two sexual organs, for all these seven organs are included in rūpaskandha. Together with the vital organ, the sensation of pain, and the sensation of dissatisfaction, ten indriyas in all are exclusively impure.

9d. Nine are of two types.

The mental organ, the sensation of pleasure, the sensation of satisfaction, the sensation of equanimity, and the five moral faculties (faith, force, etc.) are nine indriyas that can be either pure or impure.

ii. According to other masters\textsuperscript{37} (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 7c3), the five moral faculties are solely pure, for the Blessed One said: "Whosoever is completely lacking, to whatever degree, any of these five indriyas, faith, etc., I declare him to be a person outside, one who belongs to the class of Prthagjanas."\textsuperscript{38} Hence anyone who possesses them, to whatever degree, is an Āryan; hence they are pure.

This text is not proof, for the Blessed One is speaking here of a person in whom the five pure moral faculties are absent. In fact, in the passage that precedes the quotation in question, the Blessed One defines the Āryapudgalas with reference to the five moral faculties.\textsuperscript{39} Hence he is referring to only the five moral faculties belonging to the Āryans, that is, pure. Whosoever is lacking them is evidently a Prthagjana.

Or rather, if this passage speaks of moral faculties in general, we would remark that there are two types of Prthagjana (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 8b3): those outside, and those inside; the first have cut off the roots of good (iv.79), whereas the second have not cut them off. It is with reference to the first that the Blessed One said: "I declare him to be a person outside, one who belongs to the class of Prthagjanas."\textsuperscript{40}

On the other hand, according to the Sūtra, even before setting into motion the Wheel of the Dharma (vi.54), there were in the world persons of sharp, medium, and weak faculties.\textsuperscript{41} Hence the moral faculties of faith, etc., are not necessarily and exclusively pure.

Finally, the Blessed One said: "If I do not know truly the origin, the disappearance, the advantages, the disadvantages, the escape of the five faculties of faith, force, etc., I shall not be liberated, gone out,
disassociated, delivered from the world of gods, Māras, and Brahmās, of a world wherein there are Brahmins and monks; I shall not reside with a mind free from error . . . "

Now a similar description does not apply to pure dharma, which are free from advantages, from disadvantages, and from escape.

Hence the moral faculties of faith, force, etc., can be either pure or impure.

Among the indriyas, how many are retribution (vipāka, ii.57c-d), and how many are not retribution?

10a. The vital organ is always retribution.

(Only the vital organ (ii.45a-b) is always retribution.)

i. [Objection.] The vital energies (ayuḥsamśkaras, see below) that a Bhikṣu Arhat stabilizes or increases, are evidently the vital organ. Of what action is the vital organ thus stabilized or prolonged the retribution?

The Mulasāstra (the Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 981a12) says: "How does a Bhikṣu stabilize the vital energies? An Arhat in possession of supernormal power (rddhimān-prāptādbhijñāḥ, vii.42), in possession of the mastery of mind, i.e., one who is asamayavimukta (vi.56, 64), gives, either to the Saṅgha or to a person, things useful to life, clothing, pots, etc.: after having given these things, he applies this thought to his life; he then enters into the Fourth or prāntakoṣika Dhyāna (vii.41); coming out of the absorption, he produces the thought and pronounces the words: 'May this action which should produce a retribution-in-joy be transformed and produce a retribution-in-life!' Then the action (the gift and the absorption) which should produce a retribution-in-joy produces a retribution-in-life."

According to other masters, the prolonged life of an Arhat is the result of the retribution of a previous action. According to them, there is a remnant of the result of retribution-in-life which should have ripened in a previous life, but which was interrupted by death before
its time (ii.45). And it is the force of the absorption of the Fourth Dhyāna that attracts this remnant and makes this remnant ripen now.

[The Mulasūtra continues] "How does a Bhikṣu cast off the vital energies? An Arhat in possession of supernormal powers . . . enters into the Fourth Dhyāna . . . ; coming out of this absorption, he produces the thought and pronounces these words: 'May the action that should produce a retribution-in-life be transformed and produce a retribution-in-joy!' Then the action that should produce a retribution-in-life produces a retribution-in-joy."

The Bhadanta Ghoṣaka said: By the force of the prāntakoṭika Dhyāna that this Arhat produced, the primary elements of Rūpadhātu are attracted and introduced into his body. These primary elements are favorable to, or contrary to, the vital energies. It is in this manner that the Arhat prologues or casts off his life.

Along with the Sautrāntikas, we say that the Arhats, through their mastery in absorption, cause the projection of the constitutive primary elements of the organs for a certain period of duration, a projection due to previous actions, to cease; inversely, they produce a new projection, born of absorption. Thus the vital organ, in the case of the prolonged life of an Arhat, is not retribution. But in other cases, it is retribution.

ii. One question gives rise to another.
1. Why does the Arhat prologue his vital energies? For two reasons: with a view to the good of others, and with a view to the longer duration of the Dharma. He sees that his life is going to end; he sees that others are incapable of assuring these two ends.

2. Why does the Arhat cast off his vital energies?
For two reasons: he sees that his dwelling in this world has only a small utility for the good of others, and so sees himself tormented by sickness, etc. As the stanza says:

"If the religious life has been well practiced, and the Way well cultivated, at the end of his life, he is happy, as at the disappearance of sickness."

3. Who, and in what place, extends or casts off his life?
In the three Dvipas (iii.53), male or female, a asamayavimukta Arhat who possesses prāntakotika Dhyāna (vi.56, 64): in fact, he possesses the mastery of absorption and he is free from the defilements.48

4. According to the Sūtra, the Blessed One, after having extended the jīvita samāskāras, casts off the samāskāras of āyus49

One asks 1.) what difference is there between the samāskāras of jīvita and of āyus; and 2.) what is the meaning of the plural “the samāskāras?”50

On the first point:51

a. According to certain masters, there is no difference. In fact, the Mūlasāstra (the Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26,p. 993b2; see the Prakarana-pāda TD 26, p. 694a23; see also the Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 732b27) says: “What is the vital organ? It is the āyus in the Three Dhātus.”

b. According to others52 the expression āyuh-samāskāras designates life which is the result of actions in a previous life; the expression jīvita-samāskāras designates life which is the result of actions in this life (gifts to the Saṅgha, etc.).

c. According to other masters,53 the āyuh-samāskāras are that by which existence lasts; the jīvita-samāskāras are that by which life is prolonged for a little while.

On the second point:

a. The Sūtra uses the plural because the Saint extends or casts off many samāskāras. There is no advantage, in fact, in extending a moment, or in casting off a moment: it is only by means of a series of moments that the Saint can procure the good of others; on the other hand, a moment cannot be a cause of suffering.

b. According to another opinion, the plural condemns the teaching according to which the jīvita or the āyus is an entity susceptible of duration.54

c. According to another opinion,55 the plural condemns the teaching of the Sarvāstivādins that see an entity or dharma in the jīvita and āyus. The terms jīvita and āyus designate a number of samāskāras existing simultaneously and belonging either to four or five skandhas according to their sphere of existence. If it were otherwise, the Sūtra
would not use the expression “the jīvita-skandhas,” it would say “The Blessed One extends some jīvitas, and casts off some āyus.”

5. Why does the Blessed One cast off [death] and extend [life]?

With the aim of showing that he possesses mastery over death, he casts off death; with the aim of showing that he possesses mastery over life, he extends it. He extends it for a period of three months, no more, no less; after three months, there is nothing more to do for his followers, after his task is well achieved, for, short of three months, he would leave his task unachieved.  

Or rather, with the aim of realizing this vow: “Any Bhikṣu who has well cultivated the four supernormal powers (rddhipāda, vi.69b), can live, if he so desires, a kalpa or more.”

The Vaibhāṣikas say: “The Blessed One casts off or extends with the aim of showing that he triumphs over the Māra who is the skandhas, and over the Māra who is death. In the first watch of the night, under the Bodhi Tree, he has already triumphed over the Māra who is a demon, and, in the third watch, over the Māra who is the defilements (Ekottarīka, TD 2, p. 760b17 and following).”  

10a-b. Twelve are of two types.

Which twelve?

10b-c. With the exception of the last eight and dissatisfaction.

With the exception of the vital organ, which is always retribution, and of the nine that will be mentioned below (10b-c) which are never retribution, the remaining twelve are of two types, sometimes retribution, and sometimes non-retribution. This refers to the seven material organs, to the mental organ and to the four sensations, the sensation of dissatisfaction being excluded.

1. The seven material organs (organ of seeing, . . . male organ) are not retribution to the extent that they arise from accumulation (aupacayika, i.37). In other cases, they are retribution.

2. The mental organ and the four organs of sensation are not retribution 1.) when they are good or soiled, for whatever is retribution is morally neutral (avyākṛta, ii.57); 2.) when, still being neutral, they
are, according to their type,\textsuperscript{61} either airyāpathika, sailpasthānika, or nairmāṇika (ii.72). In other cases, they are retribution.

3. The last eight, faith, etc., the anājñātamājñasyāmāndriya, etc., are good and consequently are not retribution.

4. But, we would say, how can one affirm that dissatisfaction is never retribution? In fact, the Sūtra says, “There is an action liable to result in satisfaction, there is an action liable to result in dissatisfaction, and there is an action liable to result in a sensation of equanimity.”\textsuperscript{62}

[According to the Vaibhāṣikas,] the expression daurmanasya-vedaniya should be understood not as “an action that should be experienced, resulting in a sensation of dissatisfaction,” but rather as “an action with which a sensation of dissatisfaction is associated.” In fact, the Sūtra says that contact is suhka-vedaniya: now pleasure (sukha) is not the retribution of contact.\textsuperscript{63} From all evidence, suhka-vedaniya contact is contact with which a sensation of pleasure is associated. Hence daurmanasya-vedaniya action is action with which a sensation of dissatisfaction is associated.

[We would answer:] You should explain the expressions saumanasya-vedaniya and upeksa-vedaniya as you explain the expression daurmanasya-vedaniya, since the three expressions figure in the same context in the Sūtra. It follows that a saurmanasya-vedaniya action is an action “with which the sensation of satisfaction is associated,” not an action “liable to retribution in satisfaction;” and it follows that as a consequence, the sensation of satisfaction is not retribution.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] We see no problem in explaining the expression saurmanasya-vedaniya either as “liable to retribution in satisfaction” or as “that with which satisfaction is associated.” But the second explanation of vedaniya is only valid for the expression daurmanasya-vedaniya. It refers to an action with which dissatisfaction is associated.

[We answer:] One could admit your interpretation of the Sūtra if there were no other issue, that is, if it had been rationally established that dissatisfaction is not retribution.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Dissatisfaction is produced by the imagination, when one thinks of something that he fears; he is assuaged in the same
way: when he thinks of something that he desires. Now such is not the case with retribution.

[But, we would say,] this is the case for satisfaction which will consequently not be retribution.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] If, as you maintain, dissatisfaction is retribution, when a person has committed a serious transgression and then experiences, with regard to it, dissatisfaction and remorse (kaukṛtya, ii.29d), one could say that the transgression has already brought forth a ripened result—which is inadmissible (ii.56a).

But you admit that satisfaction is retribution, and we would reason as you have just done: when a person has accomplished a meritorious action and thereby experiences satisfaction, then this action immediately brings forth a result of retribution.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Persons detached from desire do not possess the indriya of dissatisfaction; now, they possess the indriyas which are retribution, the organ of seeing, etc.; hence the indriya of dissatisfaction is not retribution.

[But, we would say,] how could such detached persons possess a satisfaction which would be retribution by its nature? Without doubt, they possess a satisfaction that arises from absorption, but this satisfaction is good, and it is then not retribution. They do not possess any other.

The fact is that persons so detached possess the indriya of satisfaction, which can be the nature of this indriya, whether it be retribution or not, whereas dissatisfaction is never produced among them. Hence, the Vaibhāṣikas conclude, the indriya of dissatisfaction is not retribution.

5. Eight indriyas,—the five organs of sense consciousness, the vital organ, and the sexual organs,—are, in a good rebirth, the retribution of good action; in a bad rebirth, they are the retribution of bad action.

The mental organ, in a good rebirth or in a bad rebirth, is retribution for good action or for bad action.

The sensations of pleasure, of satisfaction, and of equanimity are retribution for good actions.

The sensation of dislike is the retribution for a bad action.
The Indriyas

The material organs, in a good rebirth, are, we say, retribution for good actions. To an androgyne, in a good rebirth, both organs are the retribution for good action, but the quality of being an androgyne is obtained through bad action.  

Among the twenty-two *indriyas*, how many "have retribution?" How many are "without retribution?"

10a. Only one (i.e., dissatisfaction) has retribution;

1. Dissatisfaction always has retribution, for, on the one hand, it is never neutral, being the result of a concept (*vikalpavisesa*: the idea of a thing liked, or of a thing hated, etc., ii.8c); but, on the other hand, it is never pure, never being produced in a state of absorption.

10b. Ten (namely, the mental organ, the four sensations—with the exception of dissatisfaction—, and faith and its following) are twofold (i.e., admit of retribution, as well as being without retribution).

2. The first eight *indriyas* (organ of sight, etc.; vital organ, sexual organs) never have retribution, because they are neutral; the last three (*anājñatamājñasyāmīndriya*, etc.) never have retribution, because they are pure (*anāsrava*, iv.80).

lla-b. The mental organ (the four sensations, with the exception of dissatisfaction), and faith and its following;

3. As for the ten remaining *indriyas*:

The mental organ, the sensations of pleasure, satisfaction, and indifference, have retribution when they are bad or good-impure; they are without retribution when they are neutral or pure.

Among the twenty-two *indriyas*, how many are good, how many
are bad, and how many are neutral?

11c. Eight are good;⁶⁹

Eight, faith, etc., the anājñātamājñasyāmāndriya, etc., are only good. 

good.

11d. Dissatisfaction is of two types;

Dissatisfaction is good or bad (ii.28).

11e. The mental organ, and the sensations,—with the excep-
tion of dissatisfaction,—are of three types.

The mental organ and the four sensations are good, bad, or neutral.

11f. The others, of one type.

The organ of sight, etc., the vital organ, and the sexual organs are neutral.

***

Among the twenty-two indriyas, how many belong to each of the three spheres of existence?

12. The pure indriyas are absent from Kāmadhātu;

1. All of the indriyas are in the sphere of Kāmadhātu, with the exception of the last three, the immaculate or pure indriyas: these are not connected with the spheres of existence, rather, they transcend the spheres of existence. Thus nineteen indriyas, excluding the last three, are in the sphere of Kāmadhātu.

12b-c. The sexual organs and the two disagreeable sensations are absent from Rūpadhātu.

2. Excluding furthermore the two sexual organs and the two disagreeable sensations, the sensation of suffering and dissatisfaction, there are fifteen indriyas remaining in Rūpadhātu that are common to the first two spheres of existence (viii.12a-b).
(a) The sexual organs are absent from Rūpadhātu 1.) because the beings who are born in this sphere have abandoned the desire for sexual union, and 2.) because these organs are ugly (i.30b-d).

Nevertheless the Sūtra says: "That a female being is Brahmā—such does not happen, that is impossible. That a male being is Brahmā—such happens, that is possible." It appears that this Sūtra would pose difficulties.

No. Beings of Rūpadhātu are males without possessing the male organ. They possess the other aspects of masculinity that one sees among the males of Kāmadhātu, namely bodily form, sound of the voice, etc. (ii.2c-d).

(b). The sensation of suffering (duḥkha, physical suffering) is absent from Rūpadhātu (1) because of the “fluidity” or transparency of the body, from whence there is absence of pain produced by hurt; and (2) because of the absence of bad actions liable to retribution, from whence the absence of suffering “arisen from retribution.”

(c). The sensation of dissatisfaction is absent (1) because beings in Rūpadhātu are penetrated by calm; and (2) because all causes of irritation are absent.

12d. And all the material organs and the two agreeable sensations are absent from Ārūpyadhātu.

3. Excluding furthermore the material organs (eyes, etc, vii.3c), and the sensations of pleasure and satisfaction, there remains in Ārūpyadhātu the mental organ, the vital organ, the sensation of equanimity, and faith and its following (i.31).

***

Among the twenty-two indriyas, how many are abandoned through Seeing the Truths? How many through Meditation? How many are not abandoned?

13a. The mental organ and three sensations belong to three categories;
1. The mental organ, the sensations of pleasure, satisfaction and equanimity, are of three types.

13b. Dissatisfaction is abandoned (through Seeing and Meditation);

2. Dissatisfaction is abandoned through Seeing and through Meditation, for, never being pure, it is always an object of abandoning.

13c. Nine are abandoned through Meditation alone;

3. Nine indriyas, namely the five sense organs and the two sexual organs, the vital organ, and the sensation of dissatisfaction, are only of the class "abandoned through Mediation," for (1) the first eight are not soiled; (2) the ninth does not arise from the mind (āsāsthāja, 1.40); and (3) all are always impure.

13d. Five are either abandoned through Meditation or are not abandoned;

4. The five indriyas, the first of which is faith, (1) are not soiled, and hence are not abandoned through Seeing; (2) being able to be pure, they are able to be "not the object of abandoning."

13e. Three are not abandoned.

5. The last three (anājñatamājñāsyāmāndriya etc.) are not abandoned, (1) because they are pure, and (2) dharmas without defects are not to be rejected.

***

How many indriyas, having retribution for their nature, do beings in the different spheres of existence possess from their origins?

14a. In the Kāmas, beings possess from their origins two indriyas that are from retribution,73

The organ of touch and the vital organ.

14b. With the exception of apparitional beings.
1. In Kāmadhātu, beings that are born from a womb, from eggs, and from perspiration (iii.8) possess from their origin, i.e., from their conception, two indriyas which are from retribution, namely the organ of touch and the vital organ. It is only gradually that the other indriyas appear among them.

Why is not the mental organ and the sensation of equanimity counted herein?

Because, at conception, both of these are always soiled; hence they are not from retribution, they are not retribution (iii.38).

How many do apparitional beings possess?

14c. Some possess six;

2. (Apparitional beings, iii.9, possess six, seven or eight indriyas.) Beings without sex, namely beings at the beginning of the cosmic age (iii.98), possess six: the five organs of sense consciousness, plus the vital organ.

14d. Or seven.

Beings with sex possess seven indriyas, like the gods.

14e. Or eight

Bisexual beings possess eight indriyas. But can apparitional beings be bisexual? Yes, in bad rebirths.

14f. In Rūpadhātu, six;

Kāmadhātu is called “the Kāmas,” because of the primary role that belongs, in this sphere, to the kāmagunās or objects of desire (i.22b-d). Rūpadhātu is called “the Rūpas,” because of the primary role of the rūpas.74 The Sūtra employs this manner of speaking: “These calm deliverances, beyond the rūpas . . .”75

3. In Rūpadhātu, beings, from their origins, possess six indriyas which are from retribution, like apparitional beings without sex in Kāmadhātu.

14d. Above, one.
4. "Above" means in Ārūpyadhātu. This sphere of existence is not situated above Rūpadhātu (iii.3); but it is said to be above it because it is superior to Rūpadhātu from the point of view of absorption: the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu are cultivated after those of Rūpadhātu; and because it outweights it from the point of view of its mode of existence, from the point of view of the duration of its existence.

In this sphere of existence, beings initially possess one indriya which is of retribution, the vital organ.

***

We have explained how many indriyas, of the nature of retribution, are obtained at conception. Now how many indriyas perish at death?

15a. In Ārūpyadhātu, dying destroys the vital organ, the mental organ, and the sensation of indifference; in Rūpadhātu, it destroys eight indriyas;

In Rūpadhātu one must add the five organs of sense consciousness, the organ of sight, etc. In fact, apparitional beings are born and die with all their organs.

15b. In Kāmadhātu, ten, nine, eight;

In Kāmadhātu, death takes place either at one stroke or gradually. In the first case, eight, nine or ten indriyas die, accordingly as the being is without sex, with sex, or bisexual.

16a. Or four when death is gradual.

In the second case four indriyas die lastly and together; the organ of touch, the vital organ, the mental organ and the organ of indifference. These four indriyas die at the same time.

The preceding concerns the case where the mind of the dying person is soiled or not-soiled-neutral.

16b. In the case of a good death, add all five indriyas. 76

If ones mind is good, one should, in the three spheres of existence,
add the five moral faculties, faith, etc.\textsuperscript{77}

A being in Arupadhatu, at death, abandons at the last moment the three \textit{indriyas} named in the Karika.

\[\text{***}\]

In the Teaching of the \textit{Indriyas}\textsuperscript{78} all of the characteristics of the \textit{indriyas} are examined, both their natures and their operations. We ask then how many \textit{indriyas} come into play in the acquisition of the results of the religious life (\textit{srāmanyaphala}, vi.52).

16c. One obtains the two highest results through nine \textit{indriyas};

The highest results are the results of Srotaāpanna and Arhat, for these two results are the first and last. The intermediary fruits are found between the the first and the last.

1. The result of Srotaāpanna (vi.35c) is obtained through nine \textit{indriyas}: the mental organ, equanimity,\textsuperscript{79} and the five moral faculties, faith, etc.; \textit{anājñātāmājñāsyāṃindriya} and \textit{ājñendriya} (ii.10a-b).\textsuperscript{80}

\textit{Anājñātāmājñāsyāṃindriya} constitutes \textit{ānantaryamārga} (vi.30c), and \textit{ājñā} constitutes \textit{vimuktimārga}:\textsuperscript{81} it is through these two \textit{indriyas} that one obtains the result of Srotaāpanna, for the first encourages the possession of disjunction from the defilements (\textit{visamīyoga}, ii.55d 1, vi.52); the second supports and makes firm this possession.\textsuperscript{82}

2. The result of Arhat (vi.45) is obtained through nine \textit{indriyas}: the mental organ, either satisfaction, pleasure or indifference, the five moral faculties, \textit{ājñendriya} and \textit{ājñātavindriya}.

Here \textit{ājñendriya} constitutes \textit{ānantaryamārga}, and \textit{ājñātavindriya} constitutes \textit{vimuktimārga}.\textsuperscript{83}

16d. The two intermediary results through seven, eight or nine.

3. The result of Sakṛdāgāmin (vi.36) is obtained either by an \textit{ānupūrvaka} (vi.33a)—an ascetic who, before pursuing the acquisition of the result of Sakṛdāgāmin, has obtained the result of Srotaāpanna; or by a \textit{bhūyovītarāga} (vi.29c-d)—an ascetic who, before entering into the pure path, i.e., into the comprehension of the Truths, has freed
himself through the impure, worldly path, from the first six categories of defilements of Ōṣadhi: consequently, when he has achieved the Path of Seeing the Truths, he becomes a Sakṛdāgāmin without having been a Srotāpanna first.  

The anupūrvaka—a Srotāpanna—obtains the result of Sakṛdāgāmin either through a worldly path, which does not admit of Meditation on the Truths, or through the Pure Path. In the first case, he possesses seven indriyas: the mental organ, indifference, and the five moral faculties; in the second case, eight indriyas: the same plus ajñendriya.

The bhūyovītarāga—who is a Prthagjana—obtains the result of Sakṛdāgāmin by means of nine indriyas. He realizes the comprehension of the Truths; he then realizes anājñatamājñāsyāmīndriya and ājñendriya, as in the acquisition of the result of Srotāpanna.

4. The result of Anāgāmin is obtained either by an anupūrvaka—the ascetic who has already obtained the previous results,—or by a vītarāga—the ascetic who, without having entered into the Pure Path, has freed himself from the nine categories of defilements of Ōṣadhi, or from the defilements of the higher stages, up to and including Ākiriṇcanyāyatana.

The anupūrvaka obtains the result of Anāgāmin through seven or eight indriyas, according to whether he uses the worldly path or the Pure Path, as the above anupūrvaka obtains the result of Sakṛdāgāmin.

The vītarāga obtains the result of Anāgāmin through the comprehension of the truths, through nine indriyas, as the above bhūyovītarāga obtains the result of Sakṛdāgāmin.

These general definitions call for more precision.

1. The vītarāga obtains the result of Anāgāmin by “understanding the Truths.” In order to understand the Truths, he places himself either in an absorption of the Third Dhyāna, an absorption of either the First or the Second Dhyāna, an absorption of anāgamyā or dhyānāntara, or of the Fourth Dhyāna: according to the case, his indriya of sensation is the indriya of pleasure, satisfaction, or equanimity.

Contrarily, the bhūyovītarāga always obtains the result of Sakṛdāgāmin with the indriya of indifference.
2. The anupūrvaka who seeks for the result of Anāgāmin within the absorption of anāgamyā, can, when his moral faculties are strong, depart at the last moment (the ninth vimuktimārga) of the anāgamyā and enter into the First or Second Dhyana.

When he expels the defilements through the worldly path, it is then through eight, and not seven indriyas, that he obtains the result: in fact, the anāgamyā to which the next to last moment (ninth ānantaryamārga) belongs, admits of the sensation of equanimity, and the First or Second Dhyana, within which the last moment takes place, admits of the sensation of satisfaction. Disjunction from the defilements results then from equanimity and from satisfaction; in this same way we have seen that disjunction, in the case of the Srotaāpanna, results from ājñāsyāmīndriya and ājñendriya.

When he expels the defilements through the pure path, that is, through Meditation on the Truths, one must add the ājñendriya as a ninth indriya. Ānantaryamārga and vimuktimārga are both two ājñendriyas.85

***

We read in the Mūlaśāstra (Jñānapraśṭhāna, TD 26, p. 994cl): "Through how many indriyas is the quality of Arhat obtained? By eleven."

In fact, the quality of Arhat is obtained, as we have said, through nine indriyas. The Śāstra answers, "By eleven," for it does not speak with reference to the acquisition of the quality of Arhat, but with respect to the person who acquires this quality.

17a-b. It is said that the quality of Arhat is obtained through eleven indriyas, because a determined person can so obtain them.

A saint can fall many times from the quality of Arhat (vi.58) and reobtain it by means of diverse absorptions, sometimes with the indriyas of pleasure (Third Dhyāna), sometimes with that of satisfaction (First and Second Dhyāna), or sometimes with that of equanimity.
(anāgamyā, etc.). But the three indriyas never coexist.

But, one would say, why does the Sūtra not speak from this same point of view when it speaks of the quality of Anāgāmin?

The case is different. It does not hold that the saint, fallen from the result of Anāgāmin, gains it again by means of the indriya of pleasure. On the other hand, the vītarāga, the person detached from all the defilements of Kāmadhātu, and who has obtained the result of Anāgāmin cannot fall from this result, because his detachment is obtained through two paths: it is produced through the worldly path and confirmed through the Pure Path.

***

How many indriyas does the person possess who possesses such indriyas?

17c-d. He who possesses the mental organ or the vital organ or the organ of equanimity necessarily possesses three indriyas.

He who possesses one of these three organs necessarily possesses the other two: when one of them is absent, the other two are also absent.

The possession of the other indriyas is not so determined. He who possesses these three organs may or may not possess the others.

1. A being born in Ārūpyadhātu does not possess the organs of seeing, hearing, smelling, or taste. A being in Kāmadhātu does not possess these organs when he has not yet acquired them (beginning of embryonic life) or when he has lost them (through blindness, etc., or through gradual death).

2. A being born in Ārūpyadhātu does not possess the organ of touch.

3. A being born in Ārūpyadhātu or Rūpadhātu does not possess the female organ. A being born in Kāmadhātu cannot possess it when he had not acquired it or when he has lost it. The same for the male organ.

4. A Prthaghjana born in the Fourth Dhyāna, in the Second
Dhyāna, or in the Ārūpyas, does not possess the organ of pleasure.

5. A Prthagjana born in the Fourth Dhyana, in the Third Dhyana, or in the Ārūpyas, does not possess the organ of satisfaction.

6. A being born in Rūpadhātu or in Ārūpyadhātu does not possess the organ of displeasure.

7. A detached person does not possess the organ of dissatisfaction.

8. A person who has cut off the roots of good (iv.79) does not possess the five moral faculties, faith, etc.

9. Neither a Prthagjana nor a Saint in possession of a result possesses anājñātamatājñāsyāmīndriya.

10. The Prthagjana, the Saint who is in the Path of the Seeing the Truths (vi.31a-b) and the Arhat do not possess ājñendriya.

11. The Prthagjana and the Śaiksas do not possess ājñātavāndriya.

This enumeration permits us to establish those indriyas possessed by those categories of non-specified beings.

18a. He who possesses the organ of pleasure or the organ of touch certainly possesses four organs.

He who possesses the organ of pleasure also possesses the vital organ, the mental organ, and the organ of equanimity. He who possesses the organ of touch does possesses these same three indriyas.

18b. He who possesses one of the organs of sense consciousness necessarily possesses five organs.

He who possesses the organ of sight also possesses the vital organ, the mental organ, the organ of indifference and the organ of touch.

The same for him who possesses the organ of hearing, etc.

18c. The same for him who possesses the organ of satisfaction.

He who possesses the organ of satisfaction also possesses the vital organ, the mental organ, the organ of equanimity and the organ of pleasure.

But, one would ask, what sort of organ of pleasure can a being possess who is born in the heaven of the Second Dhyāna and who does not therein cultivate the absorption of the Third Dhyāna?
He possesses the organ of defiled pleasure of the Third Dhyāna.

18. He who possesses the organ of displeasure certainly possesses seven organs.

This being evidently belongs to Kāmadhātu since he possesses the organ of displeasure. He necessarily possesses the vital organ, the mental organ, the organ of touch and four organs of sensation: the organ of dissatisfaction is not in him when he is detached.

18d-19a. Whoever possesses the female organ, etc., necessarily possesses eight organs.\(^{90}\)

One should understand: Whoever possesses the female organ, or the male organ, or the organ of dissatisfaction, or one of the moral faculties,—faith, force, memory, absorption, and discernment.

He who possesses a sexual organ necessarily possesses, in addition to this organ, seven organs, which have been specified in 18c-d, for this being evidently belongs to Kāmadhātu.

He who possesses the organ of dissatisfaction necessarily possesses, in addition to this organ, these same seven organs.

He who possesses one of the moral faculties can be born in any of the three spheres of existence; he necessarily possesses the five moral faculties, which are seen together, plus the vital organ, the mental organ, and the organ of indifference.

19b. He who possesses \(\text{ājñendriya}\) or \(\text{ājñatavindriya}\) necessarily possesses eleven organs.

These are the vital organ, the mental organ, the organs of pleasure, satisfaction, and equanimity;\(^{91}\) the five moral faculties; and the eleventh, which is either \(\text{ājñendriya}\) or \(\text{ājñatavindriya}\).

19c. He who possesses \(\text{ājñasyāmīndriya}\) necessarily possesses thirteen organs.

In fact, it is only in Kāmadhātu that one cultivates the Path of Seeing the Truths (vi.55). Thus the possessor of this \text{indriya} is a being in Kāmadhātu. He necessarily possesses the vital organ, the mental
organ, the organ of touch, the four organs of sensation, the five moral faculties and ājñāsyāmāndriya. He does not necessarily possess the organ of dissatisfaction, nor the organs of sight, etc.; in fact, he can be “detached,” in which case dissatisfaction is not in him; he can be blind, etc.  

What is the smallest number of organs it is possible for a being to possess? (Vibhāṣa TD 27, p. 767b5-11).

20a-b. A being who is lacking any good at all possesses a minimum of eight organs, the organ of touch, sensations, the vital organ, and the mental organ.

A being who is lacking good is one who has cut off the roots of good. He necessarily belongs to Kāmadhātu (iv.79); he cannot be “detached.” Thus he necessarily possesses the organs enumerated.

“Sensation” in the Kārikā is vid. That is, “one who feels” (vedayate) by understanding kartari kvip; or “sensation” (vedanā) (bhāvasādhanā: aucādikah kvip).

20c. It is the same with an ignorant person who is born in Ārūpyadhātu;

The Prthagjana is termed ignorant (because he has not seen the Truths).

20d. He possesses eight organs, namely, equanimity, life, the mental organ, and the good organs.

The good organs are the moral faculties, faith, etc. Since it is a question of an ignorant person, and since the total is eight, the pure organs (ājñāsyāmi, etc.) are not alluded to here by the author.

What are the largest number of organs it is possible for a being to
possess?

21a-b. At the maximum, nineteen: [a bisexual being,] with the exception of the immaculate organs.

A bisexual being necessarily belongs to Kāmadhātu. He is not "detached;" he can possess the moral faculties; and he can possess all the organs of sense consciousness. But he is a Prthagjana: thus he necessarily lacks the pure organs (ājñāsyāmi, etc.).

The pure organs are termed "immaculate" in the Kārikā. The ājñāsyāmi, the ājñā and the ājñātāvin are pure because they are not in relation with the vices either in the quality of an object, or through association (v.17).

21c. The Āryan, not detached, can possess all the organs,

The Āryan who is not detached, and hence a Śaikṣa and not an Arhat, possesses at most nineteen organs.

21d. With the exception of a sexual organ and two pure organs.

One must exclude either the male organ, or the female organ; one must exclude the ājñātāvindriya in all cases; furthermore, one must exclude the ājñendriya when the Śaikṣa is in the path of Seeing the Truths, or the ājñāsyāmīndriya when the Śaikṣa is in the Path of Absorption in the Truths.93

***

[ii. Atoms or paramāṇus.]

The conditioned dharmas (i.7a) are, as we have seen, of different natures—physical matter, sensation, ideas, etc. One asks if, in the same way, they arise independently one from another; or rather if, in certain cases, they necessarily arise together.

Certain conditioned dharmas are divided into five categories: rūpa or physical matter; citta or the mind; caittas, mental states or dharmas associated with the mind (ii.23-34); cittaviprayuktas, i.e., samskāras not
associated with the mind (ii.35-48); and the *asamśkritas* or unconditioned *dharmas*. These last are unarisen (i.5, ii.58): we do not have to occupy ourselves with them here.

We shall first study the simultaneous arising of the material *dharmas*.

22. In Kāmādhētu, an atom into which there is no entry of sound, and into which there is no entry of any organ, is made up of eight substances;\(^{94}\)

By *paramāṇu*, we do not understand here a *paramāṇu* in its proper sense, a *dravyaparamāṇu*, an atom or monad which is a thing, a substance (*dravya*, i.13), but a *saṃghātaparamāṇu*, a molecule, i.e., the most subtle among the aggregates of matter, for there is nothing, among the aggregates of matter, which is more subtle.\(^{95}\)

1. In Kāmādhētu, the molecule into which sound does not enter, and into which no organ enters, is made up of eight substances, but of no less than eight: namely the four primary elements (*mahābhūtas*, i.12c), and the four derived elements,—visibles (*rūpa*, i.10a), odors, tastes, and tangibles (ii.50c-d; 65a-b).

22b. When the organ of touch enters into it, it is made up of nine substances;

2. The molecule into which sound does not enter, but into which the organ of touch\(^{96}\) enters, admits of a ninth substance, the *dravya* which is the organ of touch.

22c. When any other organ enters into it, it is made up of ten substances.\(^{97}\)

3. The molecule into which sound does not enter, but into which all other organs other than the organ of touch (the organ of sight, *cakṣurindriya*, etc.) enter, consists of a tenth substance, the *dravya* that is this other organ (organ of sight, etc.): for the organs of seeing, hearing, etc. do not exist independently of the organ of touch nor do they constitute distinct *āyatanas*.

4. When sound enters into the aforementioned aggregates, the
total rises to nine, ten, or eleven substances: in fact, sound which is produced by the primary elements that form part of the organism (upātta, i.10b) does not exist independently of the organs.  

5. If the four primary elements, earth element, etc., are never disassociated, but coexist in every aggregate or molecule, how is it that, in any given aggregate, one perceives either solidity, or viscosity, or heat, or movement, and not these four substances or characteristics at one given time?

One perceives in any given aggregate those substances (dravya, earth element, etc.) that are most active in it, and not the others. In the same way, when one touches a pile of pieces of plants and needles, one perceives the needles; when one eats some salted soup, one perceives the taste of salt.

How does one know that a given aggregate consists of the primary elements when their presence in it is not perceived?

All of the primary elements manifest their presence through their own actions, namely support (dhrti), cohesion (samgraha), maturing (pakti), and expansion (vyūhana) (i.12c).

According to another opinion, that of the Bhadanta Śrīlābha, the aggregates are made up of the four primary elements, since, given the action of certain causes, solid things become liquid, etc. The fire element exists in water, since this latter is more or less cold, a fact which is explained by the presence of the element of fire in a more or less great quantity.

But, we would say, whether cold is more or less active does not imply that there has been a mixture of a certain substance (dravya), the cold, with its opposite, heat. So too sound and sensation, even though homogeneous, vary in intensity.

According to another opinion, [that of the Sautrāntikas,] the primary elements which are not perceived in a given aggregate exist in the state of potentiality, and not in action, and not in and of themselves. Thus the Blessed One was able to say (Samyuktāgama, TD 2, p., 129a3), "There are many dhātus or mineral substances in this piece of wood." The Blessed One meant that this piece of wood contained the seeds, the potentialities of many dhātus; for gold, silver,
etc., do not exist in the wood at the present time.

[The Sautrāntikas again object:] How does one prove the presence of color in wind? 103

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer:] This is an object of faith (śraddhanīya), and not of reasoning (anumeyya). Or rather physical matter exists in the wind, since one perceives smell by reason of the contact of the wind with an object possessing an odor; now odor is never disassociated from physical matter. 104

6. We know that odor and taste are missing in Rūpadhātu (i.30); one must then reduce the number of molecules in Rūpadhātu. We will have six, seven, or eight substances, and when sound intervenes, seven, eight, or nine. We shall not explain this in detail.

7. (Objection. The Vaibhāṣikas say that molecules in Kāmadhātu consist of, at a minimum, eight dravyas, eight things or substances.) Are we to understand dravyas as individual substances, as things that have their own characteristics, 105 or as āyatanas that one can term dravyas, substances, since they each possess distinctive general characteristics? 106

In the first hypothesis the numbers proposed are too few. A molecule, you say, consists of four “derived elements,” rūpa first: it will consist of, we would say, not only of the rūpa of color (varna, blue or red dravya, etc.) but also of the rūpa of figure (samsthdna, i.10, iv.3c), since many atoms are agglomerated in these. It consists of the “derived matter” called “tangible:” it will be, we should say, heavy or light, hard or soft; it could be cold or hunger, or thirst; it then consists of the dravyas that are either heaviness or lightness, softness or hardness, cold, hunger and thirst (i.10d). Hence the numbers proposed above are too few. But if, on the contrary, the Vaibhāṣikas mean to speak of dravyas as āyatanas, then the numbers are still too few, for the primary elements form part of the āyatana “tangible” (i.35a); one should then say that a molecule consists of four substances, visible, odor, taste, and touch.

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer.] Our definition of a molecule is the best one. The word dravya is to be understood, in this case, as substances properly so-called, and as āyatanas. Among the eight dravyas of a
molecule, there are 1.) four substances properly so-called, the four primary elements, the supports and sources of derived matter; and 2.) four āyatanas, four types of derived matter, supported by the primary elements: visibles, odors, tastes and tangibles (abstractions created from the primary elements, and included within tangibles).

This answer is not good, for each of these four derived elements is supported by all four of the primary elements. The molecule will then consist of twenty dravyas.107

No, [answer the Vaibhāṣikas,] for we are speaking of the nature of the primary elements, solidity, etc. The nature of all four of the primary elements remains the same, in that they support the derived element of odor or the derived elements of visibles, tastes, and tangibles.

But why do you express yourself in an ambiguous manner and use the word dravya in two different meanings? Words are subject to caprice, but one must examine their meaning.

[iii. The mental states or caittas.]

23a. The mind and its mental states are necessarily generated together.108

The mind and its mental states cannot be independently generated.

23d. All things are necessarily generated with their characteristics.

All conditioned dharmas, physical matter, the mind (ii.34), its mental states, and the samskāras disassociated from the mind (ii.35), are necessarily generated with their samskṛtalakṣaṇas—arising, duration, old age, and impermanence (ii.46a).

23c. Sometimes with possession.

Among the conditioned dharmas, those that are integral to living beings (sattvākhyā, i.10) are necessarily generated with the prāpti relative to each one of them (ii.37b). There is no prāpti for the others. That is why the Kārikā says “sometimes.”
What are the mental states?  

23c-d. The mental states are of five types, mahābhūmikas, etc.

The mental states are the mahābhūmikas, those that accompany all minds; the kusalamahābhūmikas, those that accompany all good minds; the klesamahābhūmikas, those that accompany all defiled minds; the akusalamahābhūmikas, those that accompany all bad minds; and the parītaklesabhūmikas, those that have small defilements for their sphere.

Bhūmi or sphere signifies "place of origin." The place of origin of a dharma is the bhūmi of this dharma.

The "great sphere" or mahābhūmi is so called because it is the sphere, the place of origin, of great dharmas (that is, of dharmas of great extension, that are found everywhere). The dharmas that are inherent in the mahābhūmi are called mahābhūmika, that is, the dharmas that are always found in all minds.  

What are the mahābhūmikas, the mental states found in all minds?

24. Sensation, volition, motion, desire for action, contact, discernment, memory, the act of attention, approval, and absorption or concentration coexist in every mind.

According to the School, all the ten dharmas exist in every moment of the mind.

1. Vedanā is the threefold sensation, pleasant, painful, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant. (i.14).

2. Cetanā is that which conditions, informs, and shapes the mind (cittābhisaṁskāra, i.15; iv.1).

3. Samjñā is samjñāna, that which grasps the marks (male, female, etc.) of an object (viśayanimittodgrahaṇa, i.14, ii.34b-d).
4. *Chanda* is the desire for action.\(^{113}\)

5. *Sparśa* is the state of contact arisen out of the encounter of the organ, the object and the consciousness; in other words, the *dharma* by virtue of which the organ, the object, and the consciousness are as if they were touching one another (iii.30).

6. *Prajñā*, which the Kārikā designates under the name of *mati*, is discernment of the *dharma* (i.2)\(^{114}\)

7. *Smṛti* is non-failing with regard to the object; a *dharma* by virtue of which the mind does not forget the object, by virtue of which it cherishes it in order to so express it (*abhilāsatāva*).\(^{115}\)

8. *Manaskāra* is the modification (*ābhoga*)\(^{116}\) of the mind; in other words, "to bend" or "to apply" the mind towards an object. (*Manaskāra* is explained as *manasah kārah* or *manah karoty āvarjayati*, ii.72).

9. *Adhimukti* is approval.\(^{117}\)

10. *Samādhi* is the unity of the object with the mind (*cittākāgratā*): (*agra = ālambana*, i.33); this is the *dharma* by virtue of which the mind, in an uninterrupted series, remains on an object (viii.1)\(^{118}\)

How do we know that these ten mental states, distinct in nature, coexist in one and the same mind?

Subtle, unquestionably, are the specific characteristics of the mind and its mental states. One discerns them, only with difficulty even when one is content to consider each of the mental states as developing in a homogeneous series; how much more so when one envisions them in the (psychological) moment (*ksana*) in which they all exist. If the differences of the taste of vegetables, tastes that we know through a material organ, are difficult to distinguish, how much more so is this true with non-material *dharma* that are perceived through the mental consciousness.

***

The "sphere" of the good *dharma* of great extension is termed *kusalamābabhūmi*. The mental states that arise from this sphere are termed *kusalamābabhūmikas*: the *dharma* that are found in all good minds.
25. Faith, diligence, aptitude, indifference, respect, fear, two roots, non-violence, and energy are found only in a good mind, and are found in all good minds.\textsuperscript{119}

These ten dharmas are always found in all good minds.

1. \textit{Sraddha} or faith is clarification of the mind.\textsuperscript{120} According to another opinion,\textsuperscript{121} it is adherence to the doctrine of the results of actions (vi.78b), to the Three Precious Ones (vi.73c), and to the Truths.

2. \textit{Apramāda} or diligence is bhāvanā, that is, the taking possession of, and the cultivation of good dharmas.\textsuperscript{122}

[Objection.] The taking possession of and the cultivation of good dharmas is none other than the good dharmas being grasped and cultivated. How can you make a partial mental dharma of diligence?

Diligence is application to good dharmas. One says, by metaphor, that it is bhāvanā (cultivation). By this fact, it is the cause of bhāvanā.

According to another school,\textsuperscript{123} diligence is the guarding of the mind.

3. \textit{Praśrabdhi} is the dharma through which the mind is clever, light, and apt.\textsuperscript{124}

But, [the Sautrāntikas observe,\textsuperscript{125}] does not the Sutra speak of the praśrabdhi of the body?\textsuperscript{126}

The Sūtra speaks of the praśrabdhi of the body as it speaks of bodily sensation. (All sensation is, in its nature, mental; sometimes the Sūtra terms the sensation that has for its support the five organs constituted of atoms a “bodily” sensation associated with the five sense consciousnesses [ii.7a]. In the same way that praśrabdhi of the mind depends on the five organs, praśrabdhi of the five sense consciousnesses is termed “praśrabdhi of the body.”)

[The Sautrāntikas answer:] How can the praśrabdhi of the body, thus understood, be counted among the parts of Bodhi (\textit{sārībodhyānīga}, vi.68)? In fact, the five sense consciousnesses are of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, for they are not “absorbed,” that is, they are not produced in the state of absorption, whereas the parts of Bodhi are “absorbed” (vi.71a). Thus, in our opinion, in the Sūtra alluded to, praśrabdhi of the body is aptitude of the body (kāyakarmānīyātā, viii.9).
[The Sarvāstivādins:] How can *praśrabdhi* of the body, thus understood, be a part of Bodhi? The aptitude of the body is, in fact, impure.

[The Sautrāntikas:] But it is propitious to *praśrabdhi* of the mind, which is a part of Bodhi; for this reason it receives the name "part of Bodhi." The Sūtra often expresses itself in this manner. For example, it teaches that joy constitutes the part of Bodhi called joy (*prītisam-bodhyāṅga*, vi.71).\(^{127}\) It teaches that hostility and the causes of hostility constitute the obstacle of wickedness (*vyāpādanivarana*, v.59).\(^{128}\) It teaches that insight, resolution, and effort constitute "the element of speculative consciousness" (*prajñāskandha*, vii.76): for neither resolution, which is by its nature discursive thought (*vitarka*), nor effort, which is by nature energy, are speculative consciousness; but they are favorable to this consciousness and are, consequently, considered as consciousness.\(^{129}\) *Praśrabdhi* of the body, being a condition of *praśrabdhi* of the mind, is placed, as are these, with these, among the parts of Bodhi.

4. *Upeksā* or equanimity, is mental indifference, the *dharma* by which the mind remains equal, even, free from modification.\(^{130}\)

[The Sautrāntikas:] If all minds are associated with attention, which is of the nature of "inflexion" or modification, how can all good minds be associated with equanimity, which is by its nature non-inflexion?

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] We have already remarked on this: the specific characteristics of the mind and its mental states are very difficult to know and determine.

[The Sautrāntikas:] This is not the point: it is quite inadmissible that the same mind be associated with mental states which repudiate both modification and non-modification, and both pleasure and displeasure.\(^{131}\)

[The Vaibhāṣikas:]\(^{132}\) There is modification towards a certain object, and non-modification with regard to another object: hence, there is no contradiction to the coexistence of modification and non-modification.
[The Sautrāntikas:] If this is so, then associated mental states cannot be on the same object, which is contradictory to your definition of associated dharmas (ii.34d). For us, the dharmas that are contradictory, here manaskāra and upeksā and otherwise vitarka and vicāra (ii.33), do not exist simultaneously, but successively.

5-6. We shall explain respect and fear later (ii.32).

7-8. The two roots of good are absence-of-desire and absence-of-hatred (advesa, iv.8). Absence-of-error, the third root of good, is “discernment,” prajñā, by nature: hence it is already named among the mahābhūnikas.133

9. Non-violence is non-cruelty.134
10. Energy is endurance of the mind.135

Such are the mental states that are associated with all good minds.

***

The sphere of the mahākleśādharmas is termed mahākleśabhūmi. The mental states that belong to this sphere, that is, the mental states that exist in all defiled minds, are kleśamahābhūnikas.

What are the defiled mental states?

26a-c. Error, non-diligence, idleness, disbelief, torpor, and dissipation are always and exclusively in soiled minds.

1. Error, moha is ignorance (avidyā, iii.29), non-knowledge, non-clarity.136
2. Non-diligence, pramāda, the opposite of diligence, is the non-taking possession of and the non-cultivation of good dharmas.
3. Idleness, kausīdya, is the opposite of energy.
4. Disbelief, āsraddhya, is the opposite of faith.
5. Torpor, styāna, is the opposite of aptitude (vii.11d).

The Abhidharma (Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 925b10) says: “What is torpor? The weight of the body, the weight of the mind, inaptitude of the body, inaptitude of the mind. Torpor of the body and torpor of the mind are termed torpor.”

Now torpor is a “mental state.” How can one have torpor of the body?
In the same way that there is bodily sensation (as above, p. 191).

Only these six dharmas are *kleśamahābhūmikas*.

***

1. But the Mūla Abhidharma\(^{138}\) says, on the one hand that there are ten *kleśamahābhūmikas*, but on the other hand, it omits torpor from its enumeration. What are these ten?

They are disbelief (*asrāddhyā*), idleness (*kausādya*), default of memory (*musitasmrātā*), distraction (*vikṣepa*), ignorance (*avidyā*), non-observation (*asamprajanyā*), wrong judgment (*ayonisomanaskāra*), wrong resolution (*mithyādhimokṣa*), dissipation (*auddhatya*), and diligence (*pramāda*).

How foolish you are (*devanāmpriyah*),\(^{139}\) grasping the letter of the text and ignoring its intention (*prāptijño na tv iṣṭijñah*).\(^{140}\)

What is its intention?

Five of the dharmas mentioned in the Abhidharma as *kleśamahābhūmikas*, namely default of memory, distraction, non-observation, wrong judgment, and wrong resolution, have already been mentioned as *mahābhūmikas*: there is no reason to name them again as *kleśamahābhūmikas*. The same for the root of good non-error: even though it is a *kusalamahābhūmika*, it is not catalogued as such, because, being *prajñā* by nature, it is classed as a *mahābhūmika* (as above, note 114).

In fact default of memory is nothing other than defiled memory (*smṛti*). Distraction (iv.58) is defiled *samādhi*. Non-observation is defiled *prajñā*. Wrong judgment is defiled judgment. And wrong resolution is defiled resolution.

This is why the Mūla Abhidharma lists ten *kleśamahābhūmikas* in admitting the state of *mahābhūmikas* to a state of defilement.

***

Is a *mahābhūmika* also a *kleśamahābhūmika*?
There are four alternatives: 1. sensation, ideas, volition, contact and desire (chanda) are only mahābhūmikas; 2. disbelief, idleness, ignorance, dissipation, and diligence are only klesamahābhūmikas; 3. memory, samādhi, prajñā, judgment, and resolution belong to both categories; and 4. the other dharmas (klesamahābhūmikas, etc.)

Certain Masters (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 220a22) maintain that distraction is not wrong samādhi: the alternatives then are differently established: distraction is added to the second category, and samādhi is put into the third.

2. As for the statement: "the Mūla Abhidharma omits torpor from its enumeration" of the klesamahābhūmika, it is admitted that torpor is associated with all defiled dharmas.

If torpor is omitted from the list, is this my fault or the fault of the author of the Abhidharma?

The Ābhidhārmikas explain the omission: torpor should be named; but it is not named because it is favorable to samādhi. In fact, they claim, persons with a torpid disposition (styaṇacarita), or dull persons, realize meditation sooner than do dissipated persons.

But who is dull without being dissipated? Who is dissipated without being dull? Torpor and dissipation always go together.

Yes, torpor and dissipation go together. But the term carita indicates excess. The person in whom torpor dominates is called "dull," even though he is also dissipated.

We know this as well as you do; but it is by reason of their nature that the dharmas are classified into different categories. It is then established that six dharmas are klesamahābhūmikas, because only they are produced in all defiled minds.

***

26c-d. Disrespect and the absence of fear are always and exclusively found in bad minds.

These two dharmas, which will be defined below (ii.32) are always found in bad minds. Consequently they are called akusalamahābhūmikas.
27. Anger, enmity, dissimulation, jealousy, stubbornness, hypocrisy, greed, the spirit of deception, pride-intoxication, the spirit of violence, etc., are the parittaklesabhūmikas.

They are called this because they have parittaklesas for their spheres. Parittaklesa, “small defilement,” means avidyā or ignorance (iii.28c-d) in an isolated state, not associated with lust, etc. (kevalā avenikī avidyā, v.14).

They are only associated with ignorance, with the ignorance that is cast off through the Path of Meditation, ignorance of the sphere of mental consciousness. This is why they are called parittakleśabhūmikas.

These will be studied in the Fifth Chapter (v.46 and following).

We have studied five categories of mental states. There are other mental states that are indeterminate, aniyata, which are sometimes associated with a good mind, and sometimes with a bad or a neutral mind: regret (kaukṛtya, ii.28), apathy (middha, v.47, vii.11d), vitarka (ii.33), vicāra, etc.

How many mental states are necessarily produced with each mind of each class—with a good, bad, or neutral mind?

28a. The mind in Kāmadhātu, when it is good, always consists of twenty-two mental states, as it is always associated with vitarka and vicāra.

There are five classes of minds in Kāmadhātu: 1) the good mind constitutes one class; 2-3) the bad mind constitutes two classes,
accordingly as it is "independent," that is, associated only with ignorance, or associated with the other defilements, lust, etc.; and 4-5) the neutral mind that is free of retribution constitutes two classes according as it is soiled, that is, associated with satkāyadrṣṭī or with antagrāhadrṣṭī\textsuperscript{147} (v.3), or not defiled, that is, "possessing retribution," etc. (i.37, ii.71).

The mind in Kāmadhātu is always associated with vitarka and vicāra (ii.33a-b). This mind, when it is good, consists of twenty-two mental states: ten mahābhūmikas, ten kusalamahābhūmikas, plus two aniyatas, namely vitarka and vicāra.

When the good mind includes regret (kaukṛtya), the total rises to twenty-three.

What does the word kaukṛtya (regret) mean?\textsuperscript{148}

Kaukṛtya is, properly, the nature of that which is wrongly done, but here kaukṛtya means a mental state that has for its object kaukṛtya in its literal sense, namely regret relative to an error. In the same way, vimokṣamukha which has śūnyatā or absence of atman for its object is termed śūnyatā (viii.24-25); non-desire which has asubhā or the loathsome (vi.llc-d) for its object is called asubhā. In the same way, in the world, one says that the village, the town, the country, are all brought together, designating thus the inhabitants by the name of the location. Kaukṛtya in its proper sense is the support, the raison d’être of regret; hence regret is termed kaukṛtya. For the result receives the name of its cause, for example in the text: "The six sparsāyatanas are previous actions."\textsuperscript{149}

But how can one designate "regret over errors," regret relative to an action not done, by the name of kaukṛtya?

Because one says "It is poorly done on my part not to have done this action," thus designating an omission as "done" or "poorly done."

When is regret good?

When it is relative to a good action omitted or to a bad action accomplished. It is bad when it is relative to a bad action omitted or to a good action accomplished.

These two types of regret bear on the two categories of action.
29a. A bad mind consists of twenty mental states when it is independent of, or associated with views (drṣṭi);

1. An independent mind is a mind associated with ignorance (avidyā, v.1), but not associated with other defilements, lust, etc.¹⁵⁰

A bad mind associated with views is a mind associated with mithyādrṣṭi, with drṣṭiparāmarśa, or with śila-vrata-parāmarśa (v.3); a mind associated with satkāyadṛṣṭi and with antagrāhadṛṣṭi is not bad, but defiled-neutral.

In these two cases, a bad mind consists of ten mahābhūmikas, six klesamahābhūmikas, two akusalamahābhūmikas, plus two aniyatas, namely vitarka and vicāra.

View itself is not counted, for a view is a certain type of prajñā, and prajñā is a mahābhūmika.¹⁵¹

29b. Twenty-one, when it is associated with one of the four defilements, with anger, etc., with regret.

2. Associated with lust, hostility, pride, or doubt (rāga, pratigha, māna, vicikitsā, v.1), a bad mind consists of twenty-one mental states, the same as above, plus lust or hostility, etc.

Associated with anger, etc., that is, with one of the minor defilements (upakleśas) enumerated above, ii.27—

30a. A neutral mind consists of eighteen mental states when it is defiled;

In Kāmadhātu, a neutral mind, that is, a mind free of retribution, is defiled, that is covered by defilement when it is associated with satkāyadṛṣṭi or antagrāhadṛṣṭi. This mind consists of ten mahābhūmikas, six klesamahābhūmikas, plus vitarka and vicāra.

30b. In the contrary case, twelve.

Not defiled, a neutral mind consists of twelve mental states: the ten mahābhūmikas, vitarka, and vicāra.

The Foreigners believe that regret can be indefinite, for example, in a dream. An indefinite-non-defiled mind associated with indefinite regret would consist of thirteen mental states.
30c-d. Apathy is not in contradiction to any category; wherever it is found, it is added.

Apathy (middha, v.47, vii.11d) can be good, bad, or neutral. The mind with which it is associated would then consist of twenty-three mental states instead of twenty-two, twenty-four instead of twenty-three, etc., accordingly as it is good and free from regret, or good and accompanied by regret, etc.

31a. The bad mental states, regret and apathy, are absent from the First Dhyāna.

In the First Dhyāna there is missing 1) hostility (pratigha, v.1), 2) the series anger, etc. (ii.27), with the exception of hypocrisy (sāthya), deception (māyā), and pride-intoxication (mada); 3) the two akusala-mahābhūmikas, disrespect and the absence of fear (ii.32); plus 4) regret, since dissatisfaction (ii.8b-c) is absent, and 5) laziness, since food through the mouth (iii.38d) is absent. The other mental states of Kāmadhātu exist in the First Dhyāna.152

31b. Further on, vitarka is also missing absent from the intermediate dhyāna.

Furthermore, vitarka is absent from the intermediate dhyāna.

31c. Further on, again, vicāra, etc.

In the Second Dhyāna and above, up to and including Ārūpyadhātu, vicāra, hypocrisy, and deception are also absent.153 Pride-intoxication exists in the three spheres of existence (v.53c-d).

According to the Sūtra,154 hypocrisy and deception exist as far as the world of Brahmā, but not above the heavens where beings are in assembly. Mahābrahmā, sitting in his assembly, was questioned by the Bhikṣu Aśvajit: "Where do the four primary elements completely disappear?" Incapable of responding, he boasted: "I am Brahmā, great Brahmā,155 the Lord, the Creator, the Transformer, the Generator, the Nourisher, the Father of all." Finally, when Aśvajit was leaving the assembly, Brahmā counselled him to return to the presence of the Master and ask him.156
We have seen how many mental states are associated with each type of mind of the three spheres of existence. We have to define the mental states enumerated above.

What is the difference between disrespect (abhī) and absence of fear (anapatrāpya)?

32a. Disrespect is lack of veneration.\textsuperscript{157}

Lack of respect, that is, the lack of veneration,\textsuperscript{158} the lack of fearful submission with regard to the qualities (maitrī, karuṇā, etc.) of oneself and others, and with regard to persons endowed with these qualities, is ābhīkya; abhī is a mental dharma opposed to respect.

32b. Anapatrāpya or atrapā is the dharma that causes a person not to see the unpleasant consequences of his transgressions.\textsuperscript{159}

"Transgressions" are what are scorned by good persons.

"Unpleasant consequences" are called in the Kārikā bhaya or fear, because these unpleasant consequences engender fear.

The condition of the person who does not see the consequences of transgression—the dharma that produces this condition,—is anapatrāpya or atrapā.

[Objection:] What do you understand by the expression "does not see the unpleasant consequences" \textit{abhayadarsitva}? Whether you interpret this phrase as \textit{abhayasya darsitvam}, "he sees that there are no unpleasant consequences," or as \textit{bhayasya adarsitvam}, "he does not see that there are unpleasant consequences," none of these explanations is satisfactory. In the first case, we have defiled prajñā, an inexact knowledge; in the second case, we simply have ignorance.

The expression \textit{abhayadarsitvam} signifies neither "view" (defiled prajñā), nor "non-view" (ignorance). It describes a special dharma that is placed among the minor defilements (upaklesas, v.46), which has false views and ignorance for its cause, and which is termed anapatrāpya (Vibhāṣā, \textit{TD} 27, p. 180a17).
According to other Masters, \textit{\=a\=b\=r\=i\=k\=\=y\=a} is the absence of shame \textit{vis-a-vis} oneself, in the commission of a transgression; \textit{anapat\=r\=\=p\=\=y\=a} is the absence of shame \textit{vis-a-vis} others.\textsuperscript{161}

But cannot one consider oneself and others at the same time?

We do not say that the two forms of the absence of shame are simultaneous.

There is \textit{\=a\=b\=r\=i\=k\=\=y\=a}, an outflowing of lust, when the person does not experience the shame of transgression when considering oneself; there is \textit{anapat\=r\=\=p\=\=y\=a}, an outflowing from mental confusion, when he does not experience the shame of transgression when considering others.

\textit{Hri} and \textit{aprat\=r\=\=p\=\=y\=a} are opposed to these two bad \textit{dharma}. Their definition, according to the first theory, is "respect, veneration, fearful submission," or "fear of the consequence of transgression;" according to the second theory, "modesty," "respect for humans."

Some think that affection (\textit{preman}) and respect (\textit{gaurava}) are the same thing.

32c. Affection is faith.\textsuperscript{162}

Affection is of two types, defiled and non-defiled (\textit{Vibh\=a\=\=\=\=a, TD} 27, p. 151a8).

The first is attachment; for example, affection for wife and sons. The second is faith; for example, affection for a master or for virtuous persons.

1. All faith is not affection, namely faith with regard to the Truths of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering.
2. All affection is not faith, namely defiled affection.
3. Faith can be affection, namely faith with regard to the Truths of the Extinction of Suffering and the Path.
4. The other mental states, the \textit{dharma}s disassociated from the mind, etc., are neither faith nor affection.

According to another opinion,—ours,—faith is a belief in qualities: affection is produced from this belief. Affection is then not faith, but the result of faith.

32c. Respect is \textit{hri}.\textsuperscript{163}
As we have explained above (32a), respect is veneration, etc.

1. All hri is not respect, namely hri with respect to the Truths of Suffering and the Origin of Suffering.\(^{164}\)

2. Hri with respect to the Truths of the Extinction of Suffering and the Path is also respect.

According to another opinion, respect is veneration; shame is born from respect and this shame is called hri. Hence respect, the cause of hri, is not hri.

There are four alternatives concerning affection and respect:

1. Affection which is not respect, namely affection with regard to wife, to children, to companions in the religious life, to pupils.

2. Respect which is not affection, namely respect with regard to someone else's master, to a person endowed with qualities, etc.

3. Respect which is affection, namely respect with regard to one's master, one's father, mother, etc.

4. Neither respect nor affection for other persons.

32d. Both exist in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu.

Affection and respect do not exist in Ārūpyadhātu.

But you have said that affection is faith, and that respect is hri: now faith and hri are kuśalamahābhūmikas (ii.25): hence affection and respect should exist in Ārūpyadhātu.

Affection and respect are of two types: relative to dharmas and relative to persons. The text refers to the second type; the first type does exist in all three spheres of existence.

33a-b. Vitarka and vicāra are grossness and subtlety of the mind.\(^{165}\)

The grossness, that is, the gross state of the mind is termed vitarka; the subtlety, that is, the subtle state of the mind is termed vicāra. How can vitarka and vicāra be associated with the mind at one and the same time? Can the mind, at one and the same time, be both gross and subtle?

According to one opinion,\(^{166}\) we may compare vicāra to cold water, the mind to cheese which floats on the surface of this cold water, and
vitarka to the heat of the sun which operates on this cheese. By reason of the water and sun, the cheese is not too runny nor too hard. In this same way, vitarka and vicāra are associated with the mind: it is neither too subtle, by reason of vitarka, nor too gross, by reason of vicāra.

But, we would say, it follows from this explanation that vitarka and vicāra are not grossness and subtlety of mind, but the cause of its grossness and its subtlety: the cold water and the warm light of the sun are not the hard or the runny state of the cheese, but rather the cause of these states.

Other objections present themselves. Grossness and subtlety of mind are relative things. They admit of many degrees: a mind of the First Dhyāna is subtle in comparison with a mind in Kāmādhatu, but gross in comparision with a mind in the Second Dhyāna; the qualities and the defilements can be more or less gross or subtle in one and the same stage, for they are divided into nine categories. Thus, if vitarka and vicāra are grossness and subtlety of the mind, we would have to admit that they both exist up to the highest stage of Ārūpyadhātu. Now they cease at the Second Dhyāna, and adding to this the fact that no specific or generic differences can be established between grossness and subtlety, one then cannot differentiate vitarka and vicāra.

According to another opinion, [that of the Sautrāntikas,] vitarka and vicāra are the "factors of voice." The Sūtra says in fact, "It is after having examined, after having judged (vitarkya, vicārya) that one speaks, not without having examined, not without having judged." The factors of voice that are called gross are called vitarkas; those that are subtle are called vicaras. (According to this explanation, we should understand vitarka and vicāra not as two distinct dharmas, but rather a collection of mind and mental states which provoke speech, and which is sometimes gross, sometimes subtle.)

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] What contradiction is there in two dharmas, the first (vitarka) gross, and the second (vicāra) subtle, being associated with the same mind?

[The Sautrāntikas:] There would not be any contradiction if these two dharmas were specifically different; for example, sensations and ideas—although the first are gross and the second subtle (i.22)—can
coexist. But two states of the same species, one in a strong state and the other in a weak state, one gross and one subtle, cannot coexist.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] But there is a specific difference between *vitarka* and *vicāra*.

[The Sautrāntikas:] What is this difference?

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] This difference is inexpressible; but it is manifested through the force or the weakness of the mind.\(^{170}\)

[The Sautrāntikas:] The force and the weakness of the mind do not demonstrate the presence of two specifically different *dharmas*, for the same species is sometimes strong, sometimes weak.

According to another opinion,—ours,—*vitarka* and *vicāra* are not associated with one and the same mind. They exist in turn.\(^{171}\) The Vaibhāṣikas would object that the First Dhyāna has five parts (viii.7) among which are *vitarka* and *vicāra*. We would answer that the First Dhyāna has five parts in the sense that five parts are possible in the First Dhyāna: but any given moment of the First Dhyāna possesses only four parts, namely *prīti*, *sukha*, and *samādhi*, plus *vitarka* or *vicāra*.

***

What difference is there between *māna* (pride) and *mada* (pride-intoxication) (*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 223a6)?

33b. *Māna*, the error of pride, is arrogance. But *mada*, pride-intoxication, is the abolition of the mind of one who is enamoured with his own qualities.

It is arrogance of mind (*cetasā unnatih*) with respect to others. Measuring (*mā*) the superiority of qualities that one has, or that one believes to have over others, one becomes haughty and depreciates others.

Be reason of its attachment to its own qualities, the mind becomes puffed up, exhausts itself, and abolishes itself.\(^{172}\) According to other Masters, in the same way that wine produces a certain joyous excitation that is called intoxication, so too does the attachment that a person has
for his own qualities. 

***

We have defined the mind (*citta*, i.16) and its mental states. We have seen in what categories the mental states are placed, in what numbers they are generated together, and what their different characteristics are. The mind and its mental states receive, in the Scriptures, different names.

34a-b. The names mind (*citta*), spirit (*manas*), and consciousness (*vijñāna*) designate the same thing.

The mind is termed *citta* because it accumulates (*cinoti*); it is termed *manas* because it knows (*manute*) and it is termed *vijñāna* because it distinguishes its object (*ālambanaṁ vijñānāti*).

Some say that the mind is termed *citta* because it is spotted (*citra*) by good and bad elements; to the extent that it is the support (*āśrayabhūta*) of the mind that follows, it is *manas* (i.17); and to the extent that it grasps the support through the organ and its object (*āśritabhūta*), it is *vijñāna*.

Hence these three names express different meanings, but they designate the same object; in this same way

34b-d. The mind and its mental states "have a support," "have an object," "have an aspect," and are "associated."

These four different names, "have a support," etc., designate the same object.

The mind and its mental states "have a support" because they rely on the organs (organ of sight, etc., mental organ); "have an object" (*sālambana*, i.34) or "a subject of consciousness," because they grasp their "sphere;" "have an aspect," because they take form according to their object; and are "associated," that is, similar and united, because they are similar to one another and are not separated from each other.

How are they *samprayukta* or associated, that is, "similar and united?"
34d. In five ways.

The mind and its mental states are associated by reason of five equalities or identities, identity of support (āśraya), of object (ālambana), of aspect (ākāra), of time (kāla), and equality in the number of dravyas. That is: the mental states (sensation, etc.) and the mind are associated (1-3) because they have the same support, the same object, and the same aspect; (4) because they are simultaneous; and (5) because, in this association, each type is represented by only one individual substance (dravya): in any given moment there can be only one mind produced; to this one, unique mind there is found associated one sensation, one idea, or one mental state of each type (see ii.53c-d).

We have explained the mind and its mental states, in full, with their characteristics.\(^{179}\)

***

[i. The dharmas not associated with the mind]

What are the samskāras not associated with the mind?

35-36a. The dharmas "not associated with the mind" are prāpti, aprāpti, sabhāgāta, āsamjñika, and two absorptions, life, characteristics, nāmakāya, etc., and that which is of this type.\(^{180}\)

These dharmas are not associated with the mind; they are not of the nature of rūpa or physical matter; they are included within the samskāraskandha (i.15): they are called the cittaviprayuktasamskāras, (1) because they are disjoined from the mind, and (2) because, being non-material, they resemble the mind.

36b. Prāpti is acquisition and possession.\(^{181}\)

Prāpti is of two types: (1) acquisition of that which has not been obtained (prāpta) or of that which had been lost; and (2) possession of that which, having been obtained, has not been lost. Aprāpti is the opposite.
36c. There is prāpti and aprāpti of dharmas that belong to the person himself.\(^{182}\)

1. When a conditioned dharma "falls into the personal series," there is prāpti or aprāpti of this dharma, but not if it falls into the series of another person, for no one possesses the dharmas of another; nor if it does not fall into any series, for no one possesses the dharmas "which are not of a living being" (asattvākhyya, i.10b).\(^{183}\)

2. As for unconditioned dharmas, there is prāpti of pratisamkhyāniruddha and apratisamkhyāniruddha (i.6, ii.55).

36d. And of the two extinctions.

a. All beings possess the apratisamkhyāniruddha of the dharmas that do not arise without a cause.

b. The Abhidharma (Jñānapraṇasthāna, TD 26, p. 1022a) expresses itself in this way: "Who possesses pure dharmas? All beings possess pratisamkhyāniruddha with the exception of the sakalabandhana-ādikṣaṇasthas, that is, with the exception of the Āryans bound with all the bonds and who are found in the first moment of the Path, and with the exception of the Pṛthagjanas bound by all the bonds. The others, both Āryans and Pṛthagjanas, possess pratisamkhyāniruddha."\(^{184}\)

c. No one possesses space (ākāśa). Hence there is no prāpti of space.

[According to the Vaibhāṣikas,] prāpti and aprāpti are in opposition: everything that is susceptible of prāpti is also susceptible of aprāpti. As shall be explained, the stanza does not speak of this in a straightforward manner.

[The Sautrāntikas] deny the existence of a dharma called prāpti or possession.

[1. How do the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas prove the existence of a substance (dravyadharma)\(^{185}\) termed prāpti?]

[The Sarvāstivādins:] A Sutra (Madhyamgama, TD 1, p. 735b29 and following?) says, "Through the production, the acquisition, and the possession of ten dharmas belonging to an Arhat, the Saint becomes a person having abandoned five things."\(^{186}\)

[The Sautrāntikas:] If you conclude from this text that prāpti
exists, we would remark that one "possesses" dharmas "that do not belong to living beings," and also dharmas that do belong to another. In fact, a Sūtra (=the Cakravartisūtra) says, "Know, Oh Bhikṣus, that the Cakravartin King possesses seven jewels ..."¹⁸⁷ Now, among the jewels, there are the jewels of a wheel, a wife, etc.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] In this text, the expression "to possess" (samanvägata) signifies "master of." One says that the Cakravartin King enjoys mastery over jewels, for they go as he wishes. But in the Sūtra on the Possession of the Ten Dharmas of an Arhat (Dasāsaiksadharmanvāgamasūtra), the word "possession" designates a thing in and of itself.¹⁸⁸

2. [The Sautrāntikas:] If the word "possession" signifies "mastery" in the Cakravartisūtra, how do you ascertain that, in another Sūtra, this same word designates a supposed präpti, a thing in and of itself? In fact 1.) this präpti is not directly perceived, as is the case for color, sound, etc., and as is the case for lust, anger, etc.; 2.) one cannot conclude the existence of präpti by reason of its effects, as is the case for the sense organs, the organ of sight, etc. (i.9): for a similar effect is not perceived.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] Error! Possession has an effect. It is the cause of the arising of the dharmas.¹⁸⁹

[The Sautrāntikas:] This answer is unfortunate. 1. You maintain that one can possess the two extinctions; now these, being unconditioned, do not arise: only conditioned things are "caused" (i.7d). 2. As for the conditioned dharmas, there is not now, in any given person, possession of the dharmas that he has not yet acquired,¹⁹⁰ nor does he any longer possess the dharmas whose possession he has abandoned through his changing of his sphere of existence or through "detachment."¹⁹¹ the possession of the first has never existed, and the possession of the second has perished. Hence how can these dharmas arise if the cause of their arising is präpti?

[The Sarvāstivādins:] The arising of these dharmas has for its cause a präpti which arises at the same time as they do.

[The Sautrāntikas:] An unfortunate answer! If the dharmas arise by virtue of präpti, 1.) arising and the arising-of-arising (ii.45c) have
no use; 2.) the dharmas "that do not belong to living beings" do not arise; and 3.) how does one explain the difference in the degree of defilement,—weak, medium, and strong defilement,—among persons who are 'bound to all bonds'? all in fact possess the same prāptis of all the defilements of Kāmadhātu. Would you say that this difference proceeds from causes distinct from prāpti?

We would answer that these causes are the only cause of weak, medium, or strong defilements; why would one want to assign it to prāpti?

3. [The Sarvāstivādins:] Who maintains that prāpti is the cause of the arising of dharmas? Such is not the role that we attribute to it. For us, prāpti is the cause that determines the state or condition of beings. Let us explain. Let us suppose the non-existence of prāpti: what difference would there be between an Āryan at the moment in which he produces a mundane thought and a Prthagjana? Now the difference consists solely in that the Āryan, even when he has a worldly thought, is in possession (prāpti) of a certain number of pure dharmas.

[The Sautrāntikas]: For us, there is this difference that the first has abandoned certain defilements, while the second has not yet abandoned them.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] Without doubt; but if we suppose the non-existence of prāpti, how can we say that a defilement is abandoned or not abandoned? There can only be the abandoning of a defilement through the disappearance of the prāpti of this defilement; the defilement is not abandoned as long as its prāpti lasts.

4. [The Doctrine of the Sautrāntikas:] To us, the abandoning or the non-abandoning of a defilement consists of a certain condition of the person (ācāraya, ii.5 and 6, 44d). The personality of the Āryan is modified, becoming different from what it was through the power of the Path (Seeing the Truths, Meditation). The defilement, once it has been destroyed through the force of the Path, cannot be manifested again. Like seed which is burned by fire and which becomes different from what it once was, and is no longer capable of germinating, we say that the Āryan has abandoned the defilement, because his person no longer maintains the seeds capable of producing a defilement. The
worldly path does not definitively destroy the defilement; it only damages it or disturbs it: one would say that a Prthagjana—who is able to practice only the worldly path—has abandoned the defilement when his person no longer contains even the seeds of defilement damaged by this path. Contrarily one says that a person has not abandoned defilement when the seeds are neither burnt nor damaged. One says that a person is in possession of the defilement when he has not "abandoned" them in the manner that we have just explained; we say that he is in non-possession of the defilements when he has not abandoned it. "Possession" and "non-possession" are not things in and of themselves, but designations.

This then concerns possession and non-possession of defilement. But concerning the possession and non-possession of good dharmas, we must distinguish 1.) the innate good dharmas, which do not entail any effort, and 2.) the good dharmas that are obtained through effort or cultivation (prayogika, ii.71b).

We say that a person possesses the first when his person possesses intact the quality of being a seed of these good dharmas. When this quality is damaged, we say that the person does not possess the good dharmas. In fact, while the seeds of defilement can be destroyed completely and definitively, as is the case among the Aryans, good dharmas never have their roots definitively cut off, with the restriction that one says of a person who has cut off the roots of good through false views (samucchinnakusalamula, iv.79c) that he has only abandoned these roots, because the quality of being a seed of these roots, a quality that belongs to his person, has been damaged through false views.

We say that a person possesses the second—the good dharmas produced through effort, through hearing, reflection, and meditation—when, these dharmas having arisen, his capacity to produce them [anew] is not damaged.

Hence what we understand by "possession" or the "fact of being endowed with" (samanvagama) is not a dharma constituting a separate thing in and of itself, namely the supposed prapti of the Sarvastivadins, but a certain condition of the person: 1. the seeds of
defilement have not been uprooted through the Path of the Saints; 2. the seeds of defilement have not been damaged by means of the worldly path; 3. the seeds of innate good have not been damaged through false views; and 4. the seeds of good “obtained through effort” are in good condition at the moment when one wants to produce this good. When the person is in such a condition, this is what we call “possession of defilements,” etc.

***

But what should we understand by “seeds” [ask the Sarvāstivādins]? By seeds we understand namarūpa (iii.30), that is, the complex of the five skandhas, capable of generating a result, either immediately or mediately, by means of the parināma-visesa of its series.

The series is the saṃskāras of the past, the present and the future, in relation to causality, that constitutes an uninterrupted series.

The parināma, or the evolution of the series, is the modification of this series, the fact that this series arises differently from itself at each moment.

The visesa, or culminating point of this evolution, is the moment of this series that possesses the capacity of immediately producing a result.192

[The Vaibhāṣikas object:] The Sūtra says, “He who is in possession of greed is not capable of producing the foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthānas, vi.14).”

[The Sautrāntikas:] In this text, we must understand by “possession” of greed the “consenting to greed,” or “not rejecting greed.” The Sūtra does not say that a person who has the seeds of greed in him is incapable of producing the foundations of mindfulness; it says rather that active greed renders this person presently incapable of producing these spiritual exercises.

In short, in whichever manner it is that we understand possession, either as “cause of the arising of the dharmas,” or as “origin of the condition of beings,” or as “special state of the person,” or as
“consenting to,” possession appears to us, not as an entity, a thing in and of itself, but as a “dharma of designation.” This same holds for non-possession, which is purely and simply the negation of possession.

***

The Vaibhāṣikas say that prāpti and aprāpti are things in and of themselves.
Why?
Because this is our teaching.¹⁹³

37a. There is threefold prāpti of the dharmas of the three periods.
Past dharmas can be the object of a threefold prāpti, past, present, and future. The same for present and future dharmas.¹⁹⁴

37b. There is good prāpti, etc., of good dharmas, etc.
The prāpti of good, bad, or neutral dharmas is, respectively, good, bad, or neutral.

37c. The prāptis of the dharmas belonging to the spheres of existence are of their spheres.¹⁹⁵

The dharmas belonging to the spheres of existence are impure dharmas. The prāpti of a dharma in Kāmadhātu is, itself, in Kāmadhātu; and thus following.

37d. There is fourfold prāpti of the dharmas that do not belong to the spheres of existence.¹⁹⁶

In general, the prāpti of these dharmas—the pure dharmas—is fourfold: it belongs to the three spheres, and it is pure. But there are distinctions:

1. The prāpti of apratisamkhyāniruddha (see ii.36c-d) is of the sphere to which the person who obtains it belongs.
2. The prāpti of pratisamkhyāniruddha is of Rūpadhātu, of Ārūpya-
dhātu, and pure.\textsuperscript{197}

3. The \textit{prāpti} of the Path (mārgasatya, vi.25d) is Śaikṣa; the \textit{prāpti} of the Aśaikṣa \textit{dharmas} is Aśaikṣa.\textsuperscript{198}

But there is

38a. Threefold \textit{prāpti} of the \textit{dharmas} which are neither Śaikṣa nor Aśaikṣa.

These \textit{dharmas}—the naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣas, vi.45b—are the impure \textit{dharmas} and the unconditioned \textit{dharmas}; they are called this because they differ from the \textit{dharmas} of the Śaikṣa and from the \textit{dharmas} of the Aśaikṣa.

In general, the \textit{prāpti} of these \textit{dharmas} is threefold. Their distinctions are:

1. The \textit{prāpti} of the impure \textit{dharmas} is neither Śaikṣa-nor Aśaikṣa;
2. In this same way the \textit{prāpti} of apratisamkhyānirodha and the \textit{prāpti} of pratisamkhyānirodha are obtained by a non-Āryan;\textsuperscript{199}
3. The \textit{prāpti} of pratisamkhyānirodha is Śaikṣa when this \it{nirodha} is obtained through the path of the Śaikṣas; it is Aśaikṣa when this \it{nirodha} is obtained through the path of the Aśaikṣas.

***

The \textit{prāpti} of the \textit{dharmas} to be abandoned either through Seeing, or through Meditation, is destroyed, respectively, either through Seeing or through Meditation; it belongs then, from the point of view of abandoning them, to the category of these \textit{dharmas} (ii.33).

As for the \textit{dharmas} which should not be abandoned, their \textit{prāpti} presents difficulties:

38b. There is twofold \textit{prāpti} of the \textit{dharmas} that should not be abandoned.

These \textit{dharmas} are the pure \textit{dharmas} (i.40b, ii.13d).

The \textit{prāpti} of apratisamkhyānirodha is abandoned through the Path of Meditation.
The same for the präpti of pratisamkhyänirodha obtained by the non-Āryan.

But the präpti of pratisamkhyänirodha obtained through the Path is pure and should not be abandoned. The same for the präpti of the Path. 200

We have established the general principal that the dharmas of the three periods are susceptible of a threefold präpti (ii.37a). We must be more precise.

38c. The präpti of a neutral dharma is simultaneous to it.

The präpti of an undefiled-neutral dharma is simultaneous to this dharma: one possesses it when it is present, not when it is past or future. When it is past, the präpti is past, and when it is future, the präpti is future: this by reason of the weakness 201 of this dharma.

38d. With the exception of the two supernormal faculties and apparition.

This rule does not apply to all undefiled-neutral dharmas. The supernormal faculties of seeing and hearing (cakṣurabhijña, śrotrabhijña, vii.45) and the mind capable of creating apparitional beings (nirmāṇacitta, ii.72) are strong, for they are realized through a special effort; consequently one possesses them in the past, the present, and the future. Certain Masters 202 maintain that the undefiled-neutral dharmas “of craftsmanship” and “of attitude” (airiyāpathika, ii.72), when they have been the object of an intense practice are also possessed in the past and future.

39a. The same for the präpti of defiled rūpa.

The präpti of defiled-neutral rūpa is only simultaneous to this rūpa. This rūpa is bodily action and vocal action resulting from a defiled-neutral mind. This action, even through produced by a strong mind, is incapable, as is the mind itself, of creating avijñāpti (iv.7a); hence it is weak. Thus one possesses it in the present, but not in the past or the future.

***
Is the tritemporal character of the *prāpti* of the good and the bad dharmas subject to any restriction, as is the case with the *prāpti* of the neutral dharmas?

39b. The *prāpti* of the *rūpa* of Kāmadhātu is not previous to this *rūpa*.

This *rūpa*, good or bad, for example the *prātimokṣa-sarnīvara* (iv.19 and following), is not possessed previous to its being produced. The *prāpti* is simultaneous and later, but not earlier.

***

Can non-possession be, like *prāpti*, good, bad, or neutral?

39c. *Aprāpti* is undefiled-neutral.203

*Aprāpti* is always *anivrāvyākṛta* (ii.66).

39d. *Aprāpti* of the dharmas of the past or the future is threefold.

*Aprāpti* of past or future dharmas can be past, present, or future. But one necessarily possesses the present dharmas: hence the *aprāpti* of present dharmas can be only past or future.

40a. *Aprāpti* of the dharmas forming part of the spheres of existence, and of the immaculate dharmas, is threefold.

*Aprāpti* of the dharmas of the sphere of Kāmadhātu belong either to Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, or Ārūpyadhātu accordingly as the person endowed with this *aprāpti* belongs to such a sphere of existence. The same for the *aprāpti* of pure dharmas.

In fact, *aprāpti* is never pure.

Why?

40b-c. According to the School, a Pṛthagjana is a person who has not acquired the Path.204

1. As it says in the Mūlaśāstra (*Jñānaprasthāna*, TD 26, p. 928c5;
Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 232b9), “What is the state of Prṭhagjana? The non-possession of the dharmas of the Āryans (āryadharmānām alābhāḥ).” Now the state of Prṭhagjana is not pure; hence their non-possession (aprāpti=alābha) is not pure.

Let us examine this definition. When the Śāstra says that the state of Prṭhagjana is the non-possession of the dharmas of the Āryans, which dharmas of the Āryans does it mean?

The dharmas beginning with duḥkhe dharmaṃaṃnikṣaṇtī and including the whole pure path or the Path of the Āryans (vi.25).

[The Sarvāstivādins:] The Śāstra means all these dharmas, since it does not specify any.

Be careful! To believe you, a person in possession of duḥkhe ksānti would be a Prṭhagjana if he did not possess all of the other Āryan dharmas.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] The Śāstra means the non-possession that is not accompanied by possession: the person of whom you speak, although not possessing the other dharmas of the Āryans, is not a Prṭhagjana because the non-possession of these other dharmas is accompanied by the possession of the ksānti. This is quite evident, for, in the contrary interpretation, the Buddha the Blessed One, not possessing the dharmas of the “family” of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas (vi.23), would be a Prṭhagjana.

Very well. But then the Śāstra would say “The state of Prṭhagjana is the absolute non-possession (alābha eva) of the Āryan dharmas” and not “... the non-possession (alābha) ...”

[The Sarvāstivādins:] The Śāstra expresses itself very well, for the ekapadas (Nirukta, 2.2) permit a restrictive sense and the particle eva is not necessary: for example abhakkṣa signifies “that which lives solely on water,” and vāyuṣakṣa, “that which lives solely on wind.”

2. According to another opinion, the state of Prṭhagjana is the non-possession of the first stage of the Path of Seeing, duḥkhe dharmaṃaṃnikṣaṇtī and its concomitant dharmas (vi.25).

[Objection.] In this hypothesis, at the sixteenth moment (mārgenaṃvayaṇāna), the saint will be a Prṭhagjana and not an Āryan, for at this moment, the initial ksānti is lost.
No, for the non-possession of the *ksānti* which constitutes the state of Pṛthagjana has been absolutely destroyed in the first stage.

[Objection.] The *ksānti* in question is threefold: of the family of the Śrāvakas, of the family of the Pratyekabuddhas, and of the family of the Buddhas (vi.23). Of which of these three types are you speaking in your definition of the state of Pṛthagjana?

We mean to speak of three types of *ksānti*.

Be careful! The Buddha, not possessing the three types of *ksānti*, would then be a Pṛthagjana!

We intend to speak of the non-possession of the *ksānti* which is not accompanied by possession . . . and thus following, as above, to the example "that which lives solely on water," "that which lives solely on wind."

Hence the effort attempted in order to avoid the objection: "Be careful! To believe you, a person in possession of *duhkhe dharmajñānakśānti* would be a Pṛthagjana . . ." is in vain. The best explanation is that of the Sautrāntikas. To them, the state of Pṛthagjana is a series in which the *dharmas* of the Āryans have not arisen.

***

How does non-possession perish?

40c-d. It is abandoned through acquisition (*prāpti*), and through passing to another stage.

For example, the non-possession of the Path, which constitutes the state of Pṛthagjana, is abandoned (1) when one acquires the Path, and (2) when one passes to another stage. The same holds for the non-possession of the other *dharmas*.

[Objection:] Non-possession is abandoned (1) when one produces the non-possession of non-possession, that is to say, when, changing one's stage of existence, one ceases to possess the state of Pṛthagjana; and (2) when the possession of non-possession is cut off, that is to say, when, acquiring the Path, one cuts off the state of Pṛthagjana.

Does this mean that there is possession of possession and non-
possession, and that there is non-possession of possession and non-

Yes. There is possession and non-possession of possession and
non-possession, which is called "secondary possession" (anuprāpti), or
"secondary non-possession." One then distinguishes between mūla-
prāti and anuprāpti or prātiprāpti.

Doesn't this doctrine lead to infinite progression?

No, for one possessess possession through the fact of possession of
possession and vice versa. There is possession of the one through the
fact of the other. Let us explain. When a certain dharma is produced in
a given person, three dharman arise together, namely: 1) this dharma
itself, which is called the mūladharma; 2) the prāpti of this mūla-
dharma; and 3) the prāpti of this prāpti. The person in question
possesses the mūladharma and the prāpti of the prāpti by the fact of
the arising of the prāpti; he possesses this prāpti by the fact of the
arising of the prāpti. Hence there is no infinite progression. When a
good or a defiled dharma arises, at this very moment three dharman
arise together, inclusive of this good or defiled dharma, namely: the
mūladharma, its prāpti, and the prāpti of this prāpti which is the
prāpti of the prātiprāpti of the first moment, plus three anuprāptis
through the fact that one is in possession of the three aforementioned
prāptis. In this third moment eighteen dharman arise together, namely
nine prāptis: the prāptis of the three dharman produced in the first
moment, prāptis of the six dharman produced in the second moment,
plus nine anuprāptis through the fact that one in in possession of the
nine aforementioned prāptis.

Thus the prāptis continue increasing in number from moment to
moment. The prāptis of present and future defilements (kleśa and
upakleśa), and of innate (upapattilābhika, ii.71b) good dharman with
the dharman that are associated (samprayukta, ii.53c-d) and co-existent
(sahabhū, ii.50b) with them throughout beginningless and endless
transmigration, arise, from moment to moment, in an infinite number.
If one considers the series of one single being in the course of
transmigration, those prāptis which arise at each moment are infinite
in number. Considering all beings together, they (i.e., the prāptis) are
without measure, and without limit. Happily, they possess a great quality: they are non-material, and give way one to the other. If they were material, there could not be found enough room in the universe for the *präftis* of one single being, and even less for the *präftis* of two beings!

***

What is "genre" or sameness of class designation? 214

41a. *Sabha-gata* is that which causes resemblance between living beings. 215

1. There exists an entity called *sabha-gata*, a *dharma* by virtue of which living beings, as well as the *dharman* "that fall into the series of living beings" (*sattvasamikhyata*, i.10), have resemblance between them (*Vibhaṣa, TD* 27, p. 138a9).

2. The Śāstra (*Jñānapraśthāna*, etc.) designates this entity by the name of *nikāyasabhāga*: the author uses the term *sabha-gata* for metric reasons.

3. *Sabha-gata* is of two types, general and particular. The first is found in all living beings: by virtue of it, there is resemblance of any living being with all other living beings. This is called *sattva-sabha-gata*. The second has numerous subdivisions: each of these subdivisions is found only in certain beings. Living beings are differentiated according to their spheres of existence, the different stages of these spheres, their realm of rebirth (*gati*, iii.4), their wombs (iii.9), their caste (*jāti*, as Brahmins, etc.), their sex, the state of Upāsaka (iv.14), Bhikṣu, Śaikṣa, or Arhat, etc. 216 This holds as well for *sabha-gatās*, by virtue of which each living being of a certain species resembles living beings of this same species.

4. There is, furthermore, *sabha-gata* of *dharman* that belong to living beings, *dharman-sabha-gata*, which in turn distinguishes the *skandhas*, the *āyatanas* and the *dhātus*: *skandha-sabha-gata*, etc., *rupa-skandha-sabha-gata*, etc.
5. In the absence of a separate entity, namely sabhāgata, how does one explain general ideas (buddhi) and expressions (prajñāpti), such as “living beings,” etc., applied to some beings that differ one from another? In this same way, it is solely by reason of dharmasabhāgata that the ideas and expressions, “skandha,” “dhātus,” etc., are justified.\textsuperscript{217}

6. Do we conclude that one transmigrates, that one dies and is born without abandoning and without taking up a certain sattvasabhāgata (state of a human being, etc.)? There are four alternatives: 1. to die in a place (Kāmadhātu for example) and be reborn in the same place: the sabhāgata remains the same, regardless of transmigration; 2. to enter into one’s predetermined realm of rebirth (niyāmāvakrānti, vi.26a): without there being transmigration, there is yet the abandoning of the sabhāgata of the Prthagjanas and the acquisition of the sabhāgata of the Saints; 3. to die in one realm of rebirth, the human realm of rebirth, etc., and to be reborn in another realm of rebirth; 4. all other cases.

[The Sautrāntikas do not admit the existence of a dharma called sabhāgata and present many objections to it.]

1. If a certain entity called "the genre of Prthagjana" exists, for what purpose do we imagine the state of Prthagjana consisting of the non-possession of the Āryadharman (ii.40c)? Someone will be a Prthagjana through the genre of Prthagjana in the way that someone is a human through the genre “human” for the Vaibhāšikas do not imagine a state of human different from the genre “human.”

2. Ordinary people do not recognize sabhāgata through the direct preception of the senses (pratyakṣa); they do not infer the existence of the sabhāgata through an operation of the intelligence (prajñā), for sabhāgata does not exercise any action by which one could know it: although people do not know anything of sattvasabhāgata they recognize the non-difference of the species of beings. Hence, what would be the use in supposing that a sabhāgata exists?

3. Why does the School refuse sabhāgata to things that are not living beings, such as rice and corn, gold and iron, mango and bread-fruit trees?

4. The different sabhāgatās that the School recognizes, sabhāgatās
of living beings, of spheres, of realms of rebirth, etc., are distinct one from another. Yet one has, for all of them, common ideas and designations: all are **sabhāgatās**.

5. [The Sarvāstivādins are the proponents of the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas.] The Vaiśeṣikas admit a certain entity (padārtha) called "sameness" (sāmāṇya), by virtue of which there is produced, with regard to things, similar ideas and designations; they believe also in another entity, called "difference" (viṣēṣa), from whence proceeds specific ideas and designations with regard to different species.

The Vaibhāṣikas protest that their theory is not to be confused with that of the Vaiśeṣikas, who believe that genre or sameness (sāmāṇya) a unique substance (padārtha), exists in a multitude of individuals. Hence even if they approve of the Vaiśeṣikas admitting genre (sāmāṇya), they still condemn their interpretation of it. As for **sabhāgatā**, it exists in and of itself (as a dravya), for the Blessed One, speaking of a murderer who is reborn in hell, continues, saying, "If he is reborn here, if he obtains the **sabhāgatā** of humans . . ."²¹⁸

[The Sautrāntikas answer:] By expressing itself in this way, the Sūtra does not teach the existence of a thing in and of itself called **sabhāgatā**. What then does the Sūtra designate by the word **sabhāgatā**? By the expression **sabhāgatā** of humans," etc., the Sūtra means a similarity in the manner of being: in the same way, **sabhāgatā** of rice, corn, beans, etc.

This opinion is not admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas.²¹⁹

---

**What is non-consciousness (āsamsaṁjñīka)?**

41b-c. Non-consciousness is that which, among the Non-conscious Ones, arrests the mind and its mental states.²²⁰

Among the beings who take birth among the Non-Conscious Ones, i.e., the non-conscious gods, there is a dharma that arrests the mind and its mental states, and which is called "non-consciousness." By this dharma, the mind and future dharmas are, for a certain time,
hindered from being produced and do not have the power to arise. This dharma is similar to what arrests the water of a river, that is, to a dike.

This dharma is exclusively

41d. Retribution.

It is exclusively the retribution of non-conscious absorption (asamjñisamāpatti, ii.42a). 221

Where do these non-conscious gods reside?

41d. They live in Brhatphala.

In the heaven of the Brhatphalas there is a raised place which is the dwelling of the Non-Conscious Ones, in the same way as the dhyānāntarikā, the dwelling of the Mahābrāhma gods, is raised within the heaven of the Brahmapurohitas (iii.2c; 222 Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 784b5).

Are the Non-Conscious Ones called this because they are always non-conscious, or are they sometimes conscious?

They are conscious at birth and at death (iii.42; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 784c8); 223 they are called non-conscious because their consciousness is suspended for a very long time. When, after this long time, they produce a consciousness again, they die. As it says in the Sūtra “When they produce consciousness again, they die, like a person awakening after sleep.”

Dying in the non-conscious heaven, they are necessarily reborn in Kāmadhātu and nowhere else. (1) In fact, the force of asamjñisamāpatti (ii.42a), by which these beings are born among the Non-Conscious Ones, is exhausted; they have not been in a position to practice asamjñisamāpatti: hence they die, as arrows fall to the ground when their impetus is spent. (2) On the other hand, beings who are reborn among the Non-Conscious Ones necessarily possess an action “retributive in Kāmadhātu” and “retributive in the second existence” (iv.50b). In this same way beings who are reborn in Uttarakuru (iii.90c-d) necessarily possesses an action retributive in a heavenly realm of rebirth immediately after their existence in Uttarakuru.
The Mūlaśāstra says, “What are the two samapātis or absorptions? They are asamjñīsamāpatti, the non-conscious absorption, and nirodhasamāpatti, the absorption of extinction.”

What is the non-conscious absorption?

In the same way that āsamjñīka is a dharma that arrests the mind and its mental states,

42a. The same for the non-conscious absorption.

The non-conscious absorption is an absorption in which the ascetic is non-conscious, or in an absorption free from consciousness.

The word “the same” shows that this absorption, like āsamjñīka, arrests the mind and its mental states.

To which bhūmi does it belong?

42b. In the Fourth Dhyāna.

In order to cultivate this absorption, the ascetic should have entered the Fourth Dhyāna.

Why does one cultivate it?

42c. Through desire for deliverance.

The ascetic falsely imagines that āsamjñīka, the non-consciousness that constitutes the result of the non-conscious absorption, is true deliverance.

Āsamjñīka, being retribution, is necessarily morally neutral. As for the non-conscious absorption, it is

42d. Good.

It produces as its retributive result the five skandhas of a non-conscious god, who, as we know, is conscious at birth and at death.

To what category does it belong from the point of view of retribution?

42e. Solely retribution in the next existence.
It is not “retributive in this life” or “retributive later;” it is no longer of “unnecessary retribution” (iv.50).

Without doubt, an ascetic can fall from this absorption after having produced it; but, [according to the Vaibhāṣikas,] he will produce it again and be reborn among the Non-Conscious Ones. This is to say that the ascetic who takes possession of this absorption will certainly not enter into a “predestined” realm of rebirth (vi.26a). 226

This absorption is cultivated only by Prthagjanas.

42f. Not by Āryans.

The Āryans consider this absorption as a precipice, a calamity, and do not value entering it.

On the contrary, Prthagjanas identify non-consciousness (āsām-jñīka) with true deliverance; they have no idea of “going out” with respect to it; hence they cultivate the absorption that leads to it. But Āryans know that the impure cannot be true deliverance. Hence they do not cultivate this absorption.

When Āryans enter into the Fourth Dhyāna, do they obtain the prāpti of this past and future absorption, the same as one obtains the prāpti of the Fourth Dhyāna of the past and the future as soon as one enters into the Fourth Dhyāna? 227

Non-Āryans do not obtain the prāpti of the non-conscious absorption of the past and future.

Why?

Having cultivated it many time previously, this absorption can only be realized through great effort; as it is not mind,

42g. It is obtained in one time period.

One takes possession of this absorption, not in the past, not in the future, but in one time period, that is, in the present, as is also the case for the prātimokṣa discipline (iv.35). In the second moment of this absorption, and in all the moments that follow the obtaining of this absorption until the moment when it ends, one possesses it in the past and in the present. On the other hand, since this absorption is not mind, it is impossible for one to acquire a future prāpti of this absorption. 228
What is *nirodhasamāpatti* or the "absorption of extinction?" 229

43a. In the same way, the absorption that bears the name of *nirodha* or "extinction."

That is to say, the absorption of extinction is like *āsamjñīka*, the non-conscious absorption: it is a *dharma* that arrests the mind and its mental states.

What are the differences between the non-conscious absorption and the absorption of extinction?

43b. It is viewed as tranquility;

1. Āryans cultivate this absorption because they consider it as the absorption of tranquility. 230 One cultivates the non-conscious absorption because one regards non-consciousness as being deliverance (*niḥsaraṇa-mokṣa*).

43c. Arisen from Bhavāgra;

2. It belongs to the sphere of Bhavāgra, that is, one penetrates it upon leaving *naivasamjñānāsāmujñāyatana* absorption (viii.4), whereas the non-conscious absorption belongs to the sphere of the Fourth Dhyāna.

43d. Good;

3. It is good; it is not neutral or defiled, for its originating cause is good (iv.9b).

43e. Of two retributions and neutral;

4. It admits of two types of retribution, being either "retributive in the next existence," or "retributive later" (*aparaparyāyavedanīya*, iv.50). 231 Its retribution is also unnecessary, for the ascetic who has practiced it can obtain Nirvāṇa in the present existence.

Of what does its retribution consist?

This absorption produces the four *skandhas* of Bhavāgra, i.e., an existence in Bhavāgra (iii.3).
43f. Āryans

5. It is produced only by Āryans, not by Pṛthajānās. These latter cannot produce it (1) because they fear annihilation,²³² and (2) because this absorption can only be produced through the power of the Path: in fact, it is the ascetic who has seen Nirvāṇa who is determined to obtain it.²³³

43g. It is obtained through effort.

6. Although obtained by the Āryans, it is not obtained merely through the fact of detachment. It is only realized through effort.

One does not possess this absorption in the past or in the future; this point has been explained in the matter of the non-conscious absorption.

44a. In that which concerns the Muni, it is obtained through Bodhi itself.

The Buddha obtains the absorption of extinction at the moment when he becomes a Buddha, that is, at the moment of kṣayajñāna (vi.67). No quality of the Buddha is obtained through effort; all of his qualities are acquired through the simple fact of detachment: as soon as he desires it, the mass of qualities arise at will.²³⁴

How is it that the Blessed One, without having formerly produced this absorption (i.e., nirodhasamāpatti), would become, at the moment of Bodhi (kṣayajñāna), “twofold delivered,” that is, delivered from the obstacles of the defilements and delivered from the obstacles to absorption (samāpattiyāvarana, vi.64)?

He becomes “twofold delivered” exactly as if he had previously produced this absorption, for he possesses the power of realizing this absorption whenever he wishes (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 780b26).

The Masters of the West (Pāścātya)²³⁵ maintain that the Bodhisattva first produced this absorption in the state of Śāikṣa, and then obtained Bodhi. Why do we not adopt this opinion?

This would be to follow the Netrīpadasāstra of the Sthavira Upagupta, which says, “One who, after having produced the absorption of extinction, produces kṣayajñāna, should be called a Tathāgata.”
44b. But not previously.

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmir deny that the Bodhisattva produces the absorption of extinction before producing kṣayajñāna.

44c. For the Muni conquers Bodhi in thirty-four moments.236

The School admits in fact (Vibhāṣa TD 7, p. 780b10) that the Bodhisattva obtains Bodhi in thirty-four moments, namely sixteen moments that constitute the “comprehension of the Truths” (satyā-bhīsamāya, vi.27) and eighteen moments that constitute the abandoning of the defilements relative to Bhavāgra (=naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana), i.e., nine ānantaryamārgas and nine vimuktimārgas (vi.44). The eighteenth moment is kṣayajñāna. These thirty-four moments suffice, for, before entering into the “comprehension of the Truths,” the Bodhisattva, still a Pṛthagjana (iii.41), detaches himself through the worldly path from all spheres, with the exception of Bhavāgra. The eighteen moments form a path during the course of which the Saint does not produce a mind of a different nature, that is, a worldly, impure mind, for example the mind entering the absorption of extinction. Hence the Bodhisattva, in the stage of Śaikṣa, that is, before becoming an Arhat, enters the comprehension of the Truths and the eighteenth moment of the abandoning of Bhavāgra, but he does not produce the absorption of extinction.

The Foreigners (bahirdesaka)237 say, “What harm is there in the Bodhisattva producing this impure mind?”

In this hypothesis, the Bodhisattva oversteps his resolution (vyutthānasāyaḥ syāt);238 now the Bohisattva does not overstep his resolution.

This is true, he does not overstep his resolution; but this does not mean that he would not overstep the Pure Path in producing an impure mind.

How, in this hypothesis, would he not overstep his resolution?

He has taken upon himself the resolution (Madhyamāgama, TD 1, p. 777a12), “I shall not leave this sitting position before I obtain the destruction of all the defilements.” Now he does not overstep this resolution, for it is in one “sitting” (āsana, vi.24a-b) that he realizes his
Although the two absorptions, the non-conscious absorption and the absorption of extinction, present many differences, they have this in common:

44d. But these two absorptions take place in persons in Kāmādhātu and Rūpadhātu.

To deny that the non-conscious absorption is produced in Rūpadhātu is to contradict the Mūlaśāstra, which says, "There is an existence in Rūpadhātu that does not admit of the five skandhas, namely (1) the existence of beings in Rūpadhātu who, conscious by nature, enter into the non-conscious absorption and into the absorption of extinction, and (2) the existence of beings in Rūpadhātu who are in possession of āsajñā, and who are born among the Non-Conscious Ones."

From this text it results that the two absorptions are cultivated by beings of Kāmādhātu and Rūpadhātu.

There is however this difference between the two absorptions:

44e. The absorption of extinction is, for the first time, among humans.

A person who has never produced the non-conscious absorption can produce this absorption either in Kāmādhātu or in Rūpadhātu; but it is necessary to be a human in order to produce the absorption of extinction for the first time. A human, an Āryan, who has produced this absorption can fall from it, and losing possession (prāpti) of it, can be reborn in Rūpadhātu and produce this absorption anew.

But the question is raised whether one can fall from the absorption of extinction, which is similar (sadṛśa) to Nirvāṇa.

Yes, [answer the Vaibhāṣikas;] to deny falling is to contradict the Udāyi-sūtra, which says, "Brothers, a Bhikṣu is endowed with morality, with absorption, and with discernment. It is possible for him to enter many times into the absorption of extinction and leave it. If, in this life, he does not attain ājñā, nor attain it at the moment of his death; but after the destruction of his body, going beyond the gods of
gross eating, he is reborn in a heavenly mental body; and thus reborn it is possible for him to then enter many times into the absorption of extinction and leave it.”

This text shows in fact that one can fall from nirodhasamāpatti.

On the one hand the Buddha would have us understand that the mental body that Śāriputra speaks of belongs to Rūpadhātu. On the other hand, the absorption of extinction is of the realm of Bhavāgra, the highest state of Ārūpyadhātu. If a Bhikṣu who possesses it does not fall from it, and if he does not lose it, he will not be able to repeat his birth in Rūpadhātu.

According to another school, the absorption of extinction also belongs to the Fourth Dhyāna and is not subject to falling.

This opinion is not correct. This absorption does not belong to the Fourth Dhyāna, for the Sūtra teaches that one acquires nine absorptions one after the other.

How then do you explain the vyukrantaka absorption (viii.18c) in which the ascetic passes over different stages of absorption?

The rule of the successive production of the absorptions concerns the beginner. He who has acquired mastery passes over the absorptions at will.

There are differences between these two absorptions:
1. from the point of view of their spheres: the first is of the Fourth Dhyāna, the second of Bhavāgra (naivasamājñānasamājñāyatana)
2. from the point of view of their antecedents or preparations (prayoga): the first proceeds from the idea of deliverance falsely identified with non-consciousness; the second, from the idea of stillness;
3. from the point of view of the person (samātāna): the first is produced in a Pṛthagjana; the second, in an Āryan;
4. from the point of view of the nature of their retribution: the first produces birth among the Non-Conscious Ones; the second, birth in Bhavāgra (Kathavatthu, xv.10);
5. from the point of view of the characteristic of their retribution. The retribution of the first is necessary, and takes place in the next existence; the retribution of the second is necessary in the case of an Anāgāmin, but not necessary in the case of an Arhat; and when it does take place, it takes place in the next existence or later;

6. from the point of view of its production for the first time. The first is indifferently produced within the two spheres of existence; the second, only among humans.

***

The characteristic common to these two absorptions is the arresting of the mind and its mental states.

Why is the first called "absorption free from ideas" (asamjñisamāpatti) and the second "absorption of extinction of ideas and sensations" (samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti)?

Because the preparation from the first merely opposes ideas, whereas preparation for the second opposes both ideas and sensations. In the same way paracittajñāna (vii.5b), "knowledge of the mind of another," bears on the mental states of someone else: it receives this restrictive name because its preparation alludes only to the mind of another.

***

In the two absorptions, the mind is interrupted for a long time. How, upon coming out of this absorption, can a new mind be born from a mind destroyed for a long time?

The Vaibhāṣikas find no difficulty in this: past dharmaś exist (v.25). Consequently the mind previous to this absorption, the mind-in-absorption (samāpatticitta) or "the mind of entry into the absorption" is the similar and immediate cause (samanantarapratyāna, ii.62) of the mind after the absorption or the "mind-of-leaving" (vyuthānacitta; Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 777b18).

[The Sautrantikas reason as follows:] When a person is born in
Ārūpyadhātu, rūpa or matter is cut off for a long period of time (iii.81b): if this person is then reborn in Kāmadhātu or in Rūpadhātu, his new rūpa does not proceed from the series of rūpa previously interrupted for a long time, but rather, from the mind. In the same way, the mind of leaving the absorption does not have for its cause the mind previous to the absorption: it is born from “a body possessing organs”. This is why the Ancient Masters said, “Two dharmas are the seed one of the other: these two dharmas are a mind and a body possessing organs.”

Vasumitra says in the treatise entitled Paripṛcchā: 256 “This difficulty, i.e., ‘How is the mind reborn after absorption?’, interests those who consider the absorption of extinction as free from mind. But I maintain that this absorption is accompanied by a subtle mind. The difficulty does not exist for me.” 257

The Bhadanta Ghoṣaka regards this opinion as wrong. In fact, if any consciousness (vijñāna) resides in this absorption, there would be contact (sparsa) through the coming together of the three, consciousness, organ, and object; by reason of contact, there would be sensation (vedanā) and ideas (saṃjñā) (iii.30b). As the Blessed One teaches, “By reason of the mental organ and the dharmas, mental consciousness arises; by the coming together of these three, there is contact; sensation, ideas, and volition arise at the same time.” 258 Hence, if one admits that the mind (vijñāna, citta) continues to exist in this absorption, sensation and ideas will not be arrested in it. Now this absorption is called the extinction of sensation and ideas (saṃjñāvedītanirodha).

[Vasumitra answers:] The Sūtra says, “By reason of sensation, there is thirst,” and yet, although Arhats experience sensation, thirst does not arise in them. The same here: every contact is not a cause of sensation.

This reasoning is not conclusive. The Sūtra, in fact, specifies, “Thirst arises by reason of sensation born of contact which is accompanied by ignorance” (iii.27). 259 Whereas it says, “Sensation arises by reason of contact.” Hence, say the Vaibhāṣikas, the mind is interrupted in the absorption of extinction.
[Vasumitra asks:] If this absorption is completely free of mind, how is it an absorption (samāpatti)?

It is called an absorption because it puts the primary elements into a state of equilibrium contrary to the production of the mind; or rather because ascetics penetrate (samapadyante) it by the power of their minds: it is for this reason that the Dhyānas, etc., are called samāpattis.

***

Should one consider the two absorptions as existing in and of themselves (dravyatas)?

Yes, [answer the Sarvāstivādins,] for they thwart the arising of the mind.

No, [answer the Sautrāntikas,] it is not what you term “absorption” that hinders the arising of the mind; rather, it is the “mind in absorption” (samāpatticitta), the mind that precedes the state of absorption: this mind, being opposed to the arising of the mind, causes other minds to not arise for a certain time. The mind of absorption renders the person or series contrary to, and unfitted to the arising of the mind. What is called “absorption” is simply the non-existence of the mind for a certain period of time; not a thing in and of itself (dravyadharma), but a "thing of designation" (prajñaptidharma).

[The Sarvāstivādins:] How can an absorption be conditioned (samśkṛta) if it is not a thing in and of itself?

This “non-existence of the mind” was not realized before the mind of absorption; it ceases when the ascetic produces anew the mind (vyutthānacitta: the mind leaving the absorption). One can then, in a manner of speaking, designate it as being “conditioned,” since it begins and ends. Or rather, what we call “absorption” is the condition of the person, a condition that results from the mind of absorption.

The same holds for non-consciousness (āsāṁjñika, ii.41b-c). Āsāṁjñika is not a thing in and of itself that hinders the arising of the mind; but we designate by this term the state of non-consciousness of the Non-Conscious gods, a state that results from a certain mind.
The Vaibhāṣikas do not agree with this opinion; they maintain that āsāṃjñika and the two absorptions are things in and of themselves.\textsuperscript{262}

***

What is the vital organ?

45a. Jīvita is life (āyus).\textsuperscript{263}

In fact, the Abhidharma\textsuperscript{264} says, "What is the jīvitendriya? The āyus of the three spheres of existence."

What sort of dharma is the āyus?

45b. The support of warmth and consciousness.

For the Blessed One said, "When life, warmth and consciousness leave the body, the body lies abandoned, like wood, lacking feeling.\textsuperscript{265} There exists then a distinct dharma, a support of warmth and of consciousness, a cause of the duration of the series, named āyus.\textsuperscript{266}

***

[The Sautrāntikas deny that the vital organ exists in and of itself.]

[1. The Sautrāntikas:] If the āyus supports warmth and consciousness, what supports it?

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] It is supported by warmth and consciousness.

[The Sautrāntikas:] If these three dharmaś,—life, warmth, and consciousness,—mutually support one another and continue to exist by means of this mutual support, how do they come to an end? Which perishes first, the destruction of which entails the destruction of the others? For if one of them does not perish first, then these three dharmaś will be eternal and will not perish.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] The āyus is supported by means of actions; the āyus has been projected through actions and continues to exist as long as the projection of action allows it to do so.

[The Sautrāntikas:] If this is so, why admit that warmth and consciousness are supported by actions? What do we have to do with
the āyus?

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] That which is supported by action is, in its nature, retribution. If the consciousness were supported by action, all consciousness from the womb to death, would be retribution: and this is false. Hence the necessity of the āyus, supported by action, the support of warmth and consciousness.

[The Sautrāntikas:] You say then that action supports warmth and that warmth supports consciousness. Then the āyus is useless.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] The āyus is necessary, for warmth is absent in Ārūpyadhātu. What is the support of consciousness in Ārūpyadhātu if the āyus does not exist?

[The Sautrāntikas:] In Ārūpyadhātu, consciousness is supported by action.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Do you have the right to change your mind? Sometimes you maintain that the consciousness is supported by warmth, and sometimes you maintain that it is supported by actions. But on the other hand, you have admitted that one should avoid the conclusion that all consciousnesses, from the womb to death, are retribution. Consequently the āyus exists, and it is the support of warmth and consciousness.

[2. The Sautrāntikas:] We do not deny the existence of the āyus. We only say that the āyus is not a thing in and of itself.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Then what is the dharma that you call āyus?

[The Sautrāntikas:] It is a certain power that the action of a previous existence places in a being at the moment of its conception, a power through which the skandhas renew themselves for a determined length of time in this homogeneous series that constitutes an existence (nikāyasabhāga, ii.41), in the same way a seed places a certain power in the sprout by which the plant develops to maturity. In this same way too a shot arrow has a certain power which causes it to travel for a certain period of time.

[The Vaibhāṣikas believe that] a certain sort of gūna or "quality," called saniskāra or vega (impetus) arises in the arrow. By the force of this gūna, the arrow travels without stopping until the moment it falls.
The *samskāra* is unique; on the one hand, the arrow does not encounter any obstacle: hence no difference is possible in the speed of the arrow. On the other hand, the arrow will not fall. Would you say the the “wind” creates an obstacle to the *samskāra*? The “wind” which creates an obstacle is the same either far or near, and so the arrow would either fall at first, or it will never fall.

The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the āyus is a thing in and of itself.269

[ii. How Death takes Place.]

Does death take place solely through the exhaustion of life?

The Prajñāpāramitāsūtra270 says, “It happens that one dies through the exhaustion of life without one dying through the exhaustion of merit. Four alternatives: 1. death through exhaustion of action that ripened in life; 2. death through the exhaustion of actions that ripened in objects of enjoyment; 271 3. death through the exhaustion of these two types of actions; and 4. death through the fact of not avoiding causes that harm, for example, excess of food.”

We must add death due to the abandoning of the āyuḥsamskāra (ii.10).272

When life is exhausted, the exhaustion of actions that ripen in the objects of enjoyment has no efficacy for death; and vice versa. Consequently the third alternative should be understood as “death because the two types of actions are exhausted.”

[iii. Death before its proper time (akālamāraṇa, iii.85c).]

The Jñānapraṇasthāna (TD 26, p. 997b28) says, “Should one say of the āyus that it is ‘dependent on the series,’ or that ‘it lasts once it has arisen?’ The āyus is of the first category for beings in Kāmadhātu who are not in one of the two absorptions (asamjñāsamāpatti and nirodhasamāpatti); but it is of the second category for beings in Kāmaghātu who are in the two absorptions, and for beings in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu.”

What is the meaning of this passage?

If the āyus is killed when the body is killed, then the āyus is “bound to the body-series.” If the body cannot be damaged, then the āyus lasts all the time for which it has been produced, and one says that the āyus
lasts once it has arisen.  

The Masters of Kašmir say that the first type of āyus is “subject to obstruction,” but that the second is not subject to obstruction.

Thus there is premature death.

According to the Sūtra, there are four modes of existence: existence that can be destroyed by oneself and not by another, etc. Four alternatives: 1. existence destroyed by oneself: certain beings in Kāmadhātu, namely the Krīdāpradūṣika gods and the Manaḥpradūṣika gods destroy their own existence through their excess of joy or anger; we must also add the Buddhas who enter into Nirvāṇa; 2. existences destroyed by others: beings in the womb and in eggs; 3. existences destroyed by oneself and by others: beings in Kāmadhātu in general; we must exclude beings in hell, beings in the intermediate state (iii.12), etc.; 4. existences that are neither destroyed by oneself nor by others: beings in the intermediate state, all beings in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu, and a part of the beings in Kāmadhātu: beings in hell (iii.82), the inhabitants of Uttarakuru (iii.78c), persons in the absorption of kindness (vii.29), persons in the non-conscious absorption (ii.42, Kathāvatthu, xv.9); the Rājarṣi, that is, the Cakravartin who has left the householders’ life; a messenger of the Buddha; persons whom the Buddha prophesied would live a certain length of time: Dharmila, Uttarā, Gaṅgila, the son of the merchant Yaśas, Kumāra, Jivaka, etc.; the Bodhisattva in his last existence; the mother of the Bodhisattva pregnant with the Bodhisattva; the Cakravartin; the mother of the Cakravartin pregnant with the Cakravartin.

[Objection:] The Sūtra tells us of a question by Śāriputra and the Blessed One’s answer to it: “‘Lord, What are the beings whose existence cannot be destroyed either by themselves, or by others?’ ‘Śāriputra, beings who are born in Naivasamjñānasamjñayatana . . .’” that is, in the highest sphere of Ārūpyadhātu, Bhavāgra. How can you say, in the light of this passage, that the existence of all beings in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu is protected from all destruction, either by themselves or others?

The School (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 772a29) explains, “Beings in Rūpadhātu and the first three stages of Ārūpyadhātu can destroy their
existence 'by themselves,'" that is, by a course of action within their own realm, and 'by others,' namely by a course of action belonging to the preliminary stages of a higher stage (vi.48, viii.22). But in the last stage of Ārūpyadhatu a course of action belonging to this stage and also of actions of a superior stage are both absent; hence the existence of beings who reside therein cannot be modified either by themselves or by others.

This answer appears weak to us; in fact, one can, in the last stage of Ārūpyadhatu practice a course of action belonging to the immediately lower stage (ākiñcanyāyatana, viii.20). One must then admit another explanation (Vibhāṣa, ibid.). In his response to Śāriputa, the Buddha, by naming the beings of Naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana, intends to designate all beings in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu, for in naming the last one designates the first. We can demonstrate that such is the usage. Sometimes Scripture names the first term of a list the totality of which is alluded to, for example, "The first sukhopapatti (iii.72), namely (tadyathā) the Brahmakāyika gods." We should then also understand, "the Brahmakāyikas, the Brahma-prabhāhitās, and the Mahābrahmās." Sometimes Scripture names the last term, "The second sukhopapatti, namely the Ābhāsvara gods." We should then understand, "the Parīttābhas, the Apramāṇābhas, and the Ābhāsvaras."

But one can contest this explanation. In the two passages given above the word tadyathā is used to introduce an example. We must translate tadyathā not as "namely" but as "for example." It is a rule concerning examples that when one names one case one designates all similar cases. And we admit that, in the two above passages on the sukhopapattis, the Scripture designated all the terms of the list by naming only the first and the last. However the answer of the Blessed One to Śāriputra does not contain the word tadyathā.

We would say that this explanation does not introduce an example, for we find it in Sūtras that give a complete enumeration, "Material beings, diverse of body, diverse of ideas, namely (tadyathā) human beings and part of the gods . . ." (iii.6). Thus the word tadyathā introduces a definition (upadānasānta). Hence the Blessed One, in his answer to Śāriputra, designates the beginning by naming the end,
that is, he is speaking of the totality of the two higher spheres.\textsuperscript{281}

***

What are the characteristics of conditioned \textit{dharmas}?

45c-d. Their characteristics are arising, old age, duration, and impermanence.\textsuperscript{282}

These four \textit{dharmas}, arising, old age, duration, and impermanence, are the characteristics of conditioned things. A \textit{dharma} in which these characteristics are found is conditioned; a \textit{dharma} in which they are not found is unconditioned.\textsuperscript{283}

Arising produces or causes to produce conditioned things; duration stabilizes them or causes them to last; old age makes them deteriorate; and impermanence destroys them.

Does not the Sūtra teach the existence of some three “conditioned characteristics” of conditioned things? The Sūtra says, in fact, “There are, oh Bhiksus, three characteristics of conditioned things, which are themselves conditioned. What are these three? The production or origin of conditioned things is an object of consciousness; its disappearance and also its duration-modification is an object of consciousness.”\textsuperscript{284}

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] The Sūtra should enumerate four characteristics. The characteristic that it omits is the characteristic of duration or \textit{sthitī}. Truth to tell, it does use \textit{sthitī} in the compound, \textit{sthitīyanyathātva}, “duration-modification;” but \textit{sthitīyanyathātva} is an expression that signifies “old age.” As the Sūtra says “production” (\textit{upāda}) in place of “arising” (\textit{jāti}) and “disappearance” (\textit{vyaya}) in place of “impermanence” (\textit{anityatā}), in this same way it also says \textit{sthitīyanyathātva} in place of “old age” (\textit{jara}).

If the Sūtra specifies only three characteristics, it is because, with a view to rousing disgust among believers, it points out as the characteristics of conditioned things those \textit{dharmas} which cause conditioned things to pass through the three time periods: the power
of its arising causes it to pass from the future into the present; old age and impermanence cause it to pass from the present into the past, and, after old age has weakened it, impermanence finishes it. The School gives a comparison (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 201b7): Suppose there is a man in a dark forest, and there are three enemies there who wish to kill him. The first causes this man to leave the forest; the second weakens him, and the third destroys his vital principle. Such is the role of the three characteristics with regard to conditioned things. Duration, on the contrary, sustains conditioned things and causes them to last; this is why the Sūtra does not count it among the characteristics. Further, the unconditioned lasts eternally in its own nature: the characteristic of duration is not without resemblance to the persistence of the unconditioned. So in order to avoid any confusion, the Sūtra does not indicate duration as a characteristic of conditioned things.

[The Sautrāntikas think that] the Sūtra does name duration; it names it by associating it with old age: sāṁcitanyathātva, that is to say, "sthiti and anyathātva."

What advantage is there, would you say, in making one single characteristic out of these two characteristics?

Persons are attracted to duration: in order to incite disgust with respect to duration, the Sūtra names it together with old age, like prosperity associated with black ears.

Conclusion: there are four characteristics.

***

The arising, duration, etc., of any sort of dharma is also conditioned. They should also arise, last, grow old, and perish; they should then, in their turn, possess four characteristics: arising-of-arising, etc., which will be the secondary characteristics (anulaksana) of the dharma under consideration. These secondary characteristics, being conditioned, have in their turn four characteristics, and so we have infinite progression.

There is no infinite progression.
46a. They have in their turn characteristics termed arising-of-arising, duration-of-duration, etc.;

Four primary characteristics are as described above.

The four secondary characteristics (anulaksana) are arising-of-arising, duration-of-duration, old age-of-old age, and impermanence-of-impermanence.

All conditioned things are conditioned by these primary characteristics; these, in their turn, are conditioned by the four secondary characteristics.

You say that each of the primary characteristics should have, exactly as the dharma that it characterizes, four characteristics, and thus following: you do not understand that these are the activity, the operation (vṛtti=dharma-kārita=puruṣakāra, iv.58) of the different characteristics.

46b. The primary characteristic refers to eight dharms, the secondary characteristic to one dharma.¹²⁸⁷

When a dharma arises—which we will term the principle dharma or muladhāma, a mind or a mental state—nine dharms, including it, arise together: the principal dharma, four primary characteristics, and four secondary characteristics. The first primary characteristic, primary arising causes the principle dharma, plus three primary characteristics (duration, old age, and impermanence), plus the four secondary characteristics to arise: in all eight dharms. It does not cause itself to be produced: it arises through the secondary characteristic arising-of-arising (jāti-jāti). In the same way a hen lays many eggs and each egg causes the birth of only one other chicken (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 200c19); in the same way primary arising causes eight dharms to arise, whereas arising-of-arising causes only one dharma to arise, namely primary arising.

It is the same for the other primary and secondary characteristics. Duration-of-duration causes primary duration to last, which in turn causes the principal dharma to last, as well as the three primary characteristics and the four secondary characteristics comprising duration-of-duration. The same for primary old age and imperma-
nence which causes eight dharmas to age and to perish, and which age and perish themselves through the secondary characteristics which correspond to them, old age-of-old age and impermanence-of-impermanence.

Hence the characteristics themselves have characteristics called anulaksanas; they are four in number and not sixteen, and there is no infinite progression.

***

The Sautrāntikas say:

i. All this is to analyze emptiness! Arising, duration, etc., are not entities, separate things in and of themselves. We know things either through direct perception, through inference, or through the testimony of Scripture: these three means of correct knowledge (pramāṇa) are missing with respect to these characteristics.

But, [reply the Sarvastivādins,] the Sūtra says “The production of conditioned things is an object of consciousness . . .”

Ignorant! You are attached to the words and err with regard to their meaning. The Blessed One however said that it is the meaning, and not the letter, that is the recourse. As for the sense of this Sūtra, it is obvious.

Blinded by ignorance, foolish persons imagine that the series of conditioned phenomena (saṁskāras) is a “self” or belongs to a “self,” and, as a consequence, they are attached to this series. The Blessed One wanted to put an end to this erroneous imagination and to the attachment which results from it: he wanted to show that the series is conditioned, that is to say, “produced through successive causes” (pratītyasaṁputpanna); and he taught the three marks of that which is produced through successive causes, saying that “Three saṁskṛtalaksana of the saṁskṛta are the object of consciousness.” It is the series that the Blessed One means to designate as conditioned, for, quite clearly, he does not attribute the three marks to each moment of the series, since he says that these marks are the object of consciousness: in fact, the production of the moment, its aging, and its disappearance,
are not the objects of consciousness; whatever is not the object of consciousness cannot be a mark.

If the Sūtra uses the word *saṁskṛta* twice, "There are three *saṁskṛtalaksanas* of the *saṁskṛta,*" this is in order that one should know that these three marks are not marks showing the presence of the *saṁskṛtas*, as herons indicate the nearness of water; nor are they qualitative signs of the *saṁskṛta*, as the marks of a young girl permit one to say that she is good or bad; no, when these marks are found on a thing, they show that this thing is a *saṁskṛta.* [Hence we would translate this canonical text as "Conditioned things possess three visible marks which show that it is conditioned, that is, produced through successive causes. These marks are its arising, its duration-modification, and its impermanence."]

ii. According to us, what one should understand by production or arising is the fact that the series begins; disappearance or impermanence is the end or cessation of the series; duration is the series continuing from its beginning until its end; evolution or old age is the modification of the continuous series, the difference between its successive states. It is from this point of view—that is, by considering arising, enduring, prolonging itself, and modifying itself—that the Blessed One says to Sundarananda, who is perpetually attentive to his states of mind, "Fine, my man! You know that your sensations arise, last, end, and disappear." 291

We would then say, 292

"Arising is the beginning of the series, disappearance is its rupture; duration is the series itself; evolution is the difference between its successive states."

And again,

"Arising is existence following upon non-existence; duration is the series; impermanence is the rupture of the series; and evolution is supposed to be the difference between the successive states of the series."

"Since the *dharma* are momentary, would you say that the *dharmas* will perish [immediately] if duration is lacking? But [if the *dharmas* are momentary], they perish spontaneously: in vain you
attribute duration to a momentary dharma.”

Consequently it is the series that the Sūtra refers to when it speaks of duration, and the definition of the Abhidharma (Prakaraṇapāda, TD, p. 694a26) is justified, “What is duration? The samāskāras arisen and not destroyed.” The nature of the “moment” (ksanadharma) cannot be “arisen and not be destroyed.”

Yet the Jñānaprasthāna (TD 26, p. 926b21) says, “Relative to one mind, what is production? It is arising. What is disappearance? It is death. What is evolution? It is old age.”

But this passage of the Śāstra does not refer to a moment of the mind, but to the mind of a homogeneous existence (nikāyasabba-gacitta). [In a homogeneous existence (ii.41) the minds are multiple, but this multiplicity can be designated as being one mind.]

iii. However, since one cannot consider characteristics as things in and of themselves, one can say that each moment taken separately possesses the four characteristics.

In fact, (1) each moment exists after having been non-existent: its existence, following upon its non-existence, is its arising; (2) after having existed, it does not exist anymore: this is its disappearance; (3) the duration of the moment is the concatenation or the process of successive moments: in fact, if the subsequent moment resembles the previous moment, it is then its substitute: the previous moment still exists or still lasts. Thus the subsequent moment can be considered as the duration of the previous moment; (4) the dissimilitude of duration is its transformation.

Would you say that there is no dissimilitude when the successive moments are similar (sadrśa)?

There is dissimilitude, as this results from the difference in time of the slower or faster falling of a vajra that is or is not projected, and which is projected with or without force: difference due in each case to a transformation or a difference of the primary elements of the vajra. When the dharmas succeed themselves in a homogeneous series, the difference is small; that is why, although they differ, they are considered as similar.

[The Sarvāstivādins object:] Your definition of characteristics does
not hold for all conditioned dharmas. In fact, your definition of
duration supposes a subsequent moment: but such a moment does not
exist for the last moment of the mind of an Arhat. Hence the last
moment of a sound, a flame, or an Arhat, has neither duration nor
transformation.

We do not attribute duration to all conditioned dharmas! We say
rather, that all duration is subject to transformation. The Blessed One
teaches three characteristics, because, in certain cases, there are three
characteristics. But, for the last moment of a flame, there is only
production and disappearance, and no duration or transformation.

In short, conditioned dharmas exist after having existed; after
having existed, they no longer exist; the series of dharmas is their
duration; dissimilarity of the series is their transformation. Such is the
teaching that the Blessed One gives in the Sūtra of the Three
Characteristics. This has nothing to do with things in and of
themselves, arising, etc.

[i. The Vaibhāṣikas object:] According to you, arising is the
dharma itself in so far as it exists after having been non-existent. The
dharma which is the "thing characterized" (lakṣya), would then be the
characteristic (lakṣana) also.

What is wrong with that? The marks of a Mahāpuruṣa are not
different or distinct from the Mahāpuruṣa himself. The horns, the
hump, the fetlock, the hoof, and the tail of a cow, which are its marks,
are not different from the cow. The primary elements do not exist
apart from their individual characteristics, solidity, etc. (i.12d). In this
same way, for the Vaibhāṣikas who affirm the "momentariness" of the
dharmas, the rising of smoke is none other than the smoke itself.

Let us look at this a bit closer. Although I grasp the individual
nature of visible things, etc., which are conditioned, yet as long as I do
not know the fact that they did not exist previously, that they will not
exist later, and that their series transforms itself, then I shall not know
their quality of being conditioned. Consequently, the quality of being
conditioned does not have for a mark the quality of being conditioned,
but rather previous non-existence, etc. And there do not exist
characteristics, things in and of themselves, distinct from visible things
and other conditioned things.

v. If we admit the reality of characteristics, then since they are given as simultaneous, we would have to admit that one dharma arises, lasts, grows old and perishes at one and the same time.

It is in vain that the Sarvāstivādins pretend that the characteristics do not exercise their activity at one and the same time; that arising engenders before being born itself, being still in a future state, and that once it is born it does not engender any longer; that duration, old age, and impermanence exercise their activity when they are present and not in a future state; and that, consequently, the last three characteristics are active in a moment when the first is no longer active, so the four characteristics can be simultaneous without contradiction.

Let us first consider arising which, being future, engenders. One must examine whether a future dharma, supposing that it does exist, can be active. If future arising produces the operation of engendering, how can one say that it is future? In fact, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, a future dharma is one that does not exercise its activity. You would have to define future. On the other hand, when a dharma has arisen, has been engendered, and the operation of arising is past, how can you say that arising is then of the present? You would have to define present.

And either the activity of the other characteristics is exercised simultaneously, or their activity is exercised in succession. In the first hypothesis, whereas duration makes a dharma last, old age makes it age and impermanence destroys it: the dharma lasts, ages and perishes at the same time. As for the second hypothesis, to admit that the activity of these characteristics is not simultaneous is to admit three moments, and this is to renounce the doctrine of momentariness.

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer:] For us, the kṣana or moment is the time during which the characteristics have achieved their operation.

Then explain why, in this hypothesis, duration, arising at the same time as old age and impermanence, accomplishes its operation of “making last that which should last” before old age and impermanence accomplish their operation of making things age and destroying them. If you answer that duration, being stronger, accomplishes its operation
first, then we would ask how duration is weakened later in such a manner that, encountering old age and impermanence, it ages and perishes, not alone, but with the \textit{dharma} that it should have made last.

You say perhaps that duration, having achieved its task, cannot perform it again, in the same way that arising, having engendered something, engenders no more. The comparison is not legitimate. The operation of arising consists of attracting the \textit{dharma} that it should engender from the future and causing it to enter into the present; once the \textit{dharma} has entered into the present, arising is incapable of making it enter therein again. But the operation of duration is to make the \textit{dharma} "which should be made to last" last, of hindering the \textit{dharma} which makes old age and perishing last. Duration is capable of making that which lasts last indefinitely. Consequently, duration is capable of repeating its operation.

By reason of what obstacle or from what adverse forces would the activity of duration cease once it has begun? Would these forces be old age and impermanence, old age weakening duration which impermanence then kills? Since, in this hypothesis, old age and impermanence are stronger than duration, it is proper then that they exercise their activity first. Further, according to your conception of duration and its role, it is through the activity of duration that, not only the principal \textit{dharma}, but also old age and impermanence, last. Hence, when the activity of duration ends, the principal \textit{dharma}, as well as old age and impermanence, cease their duration. We ask how, and with regard to what object, old age and impermanence exercise their activity of aging and causing to perish?

We do not see what it is that old age and impermanence have to do. It is through duration that one \textit{dharma}, once it arises, does not perish for a \textit{certain time}, does not perish as soon as it arises. If duration, its task completed, neglects the \textit{dharma}, it will quite certainly not last any longer; that is to say, it perishes in and of itself.

We well understand the duration and impermanence of the \textit{dharma}, "A \textit{dharma}, after having arisen, does not perish," "A \textit{dharma}, after having lasted, perishes." But how can one attribute old age to a \textit{dharma}? Old age is a transformation, a dissimilarity between two
states. Now, can one say of a single dharma that it becomes different from itself?

“If it remains this, it is not that; if it is transformed, it is no longer this. Hence the transformation of a dharma is impossible.”

According to another School,\textsuperscript{298} it is with the cooperation of external causes of destruction, fire or a hammer, etc., that the characteristics of impermanence causes certain dharmas to perish, as wood or a pot.

This is a theory as absurd as a sick person, who, after having taken a medicine, begs the gods to render it efficacious! In the logic of this system, it is the external causes of destruction which destroy, and the characteristic of impermanence serves no function.

The same School admits that the mind and its mental states, like sound or a flame, perish immediately, without any foreign causes intervening, through the characteristic of impermanence. Impermanence and duration accomplish their operation at one and the same time: a dharma lasts and perishes at the same time. This is inadmissable.

We conclude that it is with regard to the series that the Blessed One teaches the characteristics of conditioned things. Thus understood, the Sutra does not invite criticism, “There are three characteristics that show that the conditioned is conditioned, that it is produced through successive causes . . .”\textsuperscript{299}

***

If arising engenders, in a future state, the dharma that it should engender, why do not all future dharmas arise at one and the same time?\textsuperscript{300}

46c-d. Arising engenders the dharma that it should engender, but not without the cooperation of causes and conditions.\textsuperscript{301}

Isolated arising does not have the force of engendering the dharma that it should engender independent of the cooperation of causes and conditions.

[1. Objection of the Sautrāntikas:] If this is the case, we rather
believe that it is the cause that engenders, and not arising; this characteristic accompanies the dharma since the beginning of time and causes the dharma to arise when, finally, the cause of this dharma encounters another! When the causes are completed, the dharma arises; when they are not completed, it does not arise: what efficacy can we attribute to arising?\textsuperscript{302}

[2. The Sarvāstivādins answer:] Do you pretend to know all the dharmas that exist? The nature of dharmas is subtle!\textsuperscript{303} Even though one sees them, one does not know their nature.

Moreover, in the absence of the characteristic “arising,” the idea of “birth” (jatabuddhi = jata iti) would be absent.\textsuperscript{304} And if arising is nothing other than the dharma itself existing after having been non-existent, the genitive “the arising of warmth” or “the arising of sensation” would not be justified; for this amounts to saying “the warmth of warmth” or “the sensation of sensation.” This is the same for duration, old age, and extinction.

[3. Reply of the Sautrāntikas:] This theory leads you very far afield: in order to justify the idea of empty (śūnya), or the idea of the impersonal, you would admit the existence of an entity called “emptiness” or the existence of an entity called “non-self.” And again, in order to justify the ideas of one and two, large and small, separate, associated and disassociated, this and that, existant, etc., you would admit, in agreement with the Vaiśeṣikas, a long series of entities: number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, quality of being that, quality of being this, existence, etc. It obliges you to create a “pot-ness” in order to justify the idea of a pot.

As for the genitive, you do not admit that the individual nature of warmth and warmth are different things, and yet you speak of the individual nature of warmth.

Hence you have not proven that “arising” is a thing in and of itself; you have not proven that this is not merely a designation of a dharma in so far as it exists after having been non-existent.

When I want to teach someone that a certain dharma exists which formerly did not exist, I say to him, “This dharma has arisen,” and I designate this dharma as being born. Many dharmas,—warmth,
sensation, etc.,—arise, that is to say, "exist after having been non-existent." Hence there are many arisings, that is, many dharmas arising. Since arising is multiple, in order to distinguish it from other arisings, so that my questioner knows that it refers to an arising having the name "warmth" and not to an arising having the name "sensation," I will employ the genitive, "the arising of warmth," or "the arising of sensation," although the arising of warmth is only the warmth arising. In the same way one says, in the world, "the odor of sandalwood," although sandalwood is only odor, or "the body of the bust," although a bust is only its body. 305

[4. The Sarvāstivādins answer:] We hold to the existence of the characteristic "arising," which belongs to conditioned things and does not belong to unconditioned things, and we can easily explain this by virtue of the fact that unconditioned things do not arise. But if conditioned things arise without "arising," why do unconditioned things, space, etc., not arise?

We say that conditioned things arise, for they exist after having been non-existent. But how can unconditioned things arise, since they are eternal? You explain that certain dharmas,—the unconditioned dharmas,—are devoid of the characteristic "arising," because, you say, such is the nature of things (dharmatā): we say, rather, that by virtue of the nature of things, none of the dharmas are susceptible of arising. Moreover, according to you, all conditioned things equally possess the characteristic "arising" that you refuse to unconditioned things: yet you admit that certain causes are capable of producing warmth but incapable of producing sensation. In the same way, according to you, since conditioned and unconditioned things are equally devoid of the characteristic of "arising," all causes that produce conditioned things are ineffacacious with regard to unconditioned things.

[5. The Vaibhāṣikas say that] the four characteristics, arising, etc., are things in and of themselves. 306

Why? 307 Should we abandon the Āgamas 308 for the sole reason that there are persons who object to them? One does not renounce sowing for fear of deer, and one does not renounce eating dainties because of flies. 309 One must refute objections and adhere to the
Doctrine.

***

What is nāmakāya, padakāya, and vyañjanakāya?

47a-b. Nāmakāya, etc., are collections of sanij纳斯, vākyas, and akṣaras.\(^{310}\)

1. Nāman, “name” or “word” is understood as “that which causes ideas to arise,”\(^{311}\) for example the words “warmth,” “sound,” “odor,” etc.

2. Pada or “phrase” is understood as vākya, a discourse, a phrase allowing the development necessary for a complete sentence,\(^{312}\) for example the stanza, “Impermanent are the saṃskāras . . .” and the rest.\(^{313}\) Or rather, one should understand pada as that which causes one to comprehend the different modalities of activity, quality, and time which concern a certain person: for example, he cooks, he reads, he goes; it is black, yellow, or red;\(^{314}\) he cooks, he will cook, or he cooked.\(^{315}\)

3. Vyañjana is understood as akṣara or phoneme (varṇa), vowels and consonents, for example, a, ā, [i, ō], etc.

But are not the akṣaras the names of the letters? One does not make or one does not pronounce phonemes with a view to designating, or of giving an idea of the letters; but one makes or one writes the letters with a view to giving an idea of the phonemes, so that, when one does not understand them, one still has an idea of them through writing. Consequently the phonemes are not the names of letters.

4. Kāya or “body” means “collection;” samukti, in fact, has the sense of samavāya according to the Dhātupātha, iv.114.

Hence we have: nāmakāya = color, sound, odor, etc.; padakāya = “The saniskāras are impermanent, the dharmas are impersonal; Nirvana is tranquil . . .” etc.; and vyañjanakāya = ka, kha, ga, gha . . .

***
[1. Objection of the Sautrāntikas:] Are not words, phrases, and phonemes (nāman, pada, vyanjana) “voice” (vāc) by nature, and consequently “sound” (śabda)? Hence they form part of the rūpaskandha; they are not samśkāras disassociated from the mind as the Sarvāstivādins believe.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] They are not “voice.” Voice is “vocal sound,” and a vocal sound only; for example, a cry does not cause one to attain to or comprehend an object. But a word (nāman) which moreover is a function of vocal sound, illumines, causes one to attain to, or signifies the object.

[The Sautrāntikas:] What I call “voice” is not merely vocal sound, but a vocal sound that causes one to attain to an object, that is, a vocal sound with regard to which persons who are speaking are in agreement as to what a certain thing signifies. It is thus that the Ancients have invested the sound go with the power to signify nine things: “The sages have established the sound go in nine things, that is, cardinal region, cattle, land, a beam of light, a word, a diamond, an eye, a haven, and water.” The philosopher for whom “it is the word (nāman) which illumines the object” should admit that the sound go has been endowed by convention with these different meanings. Then if a given object is signified to the hearer by a certain word, it is indeed vocal sound and nothing else, that signifies it. What advantage is there in supposing the existence of an entity you call “word?”

[2. The Sautrāntikas continue:] A word is either produced by the voice or revealed by the voice.

a. In the first hypothesis, since voice is vocal sound by nature, any vocal sound whatsoever, even the cry of an animal, would produce a word. If you answer that a word is produced solely through a vocal sound of a certain nature—the articulation of sound, varṇātmaka—we would say that this sort of vocal sound which is capable of producing a word would be quite capable of designating an object also.

In the second hypothesis, this same criticism holds by replacing the verb “to produce” with the verb “to manifest.”

b. But it is absurd to suppose that the voice produces a word. In fact, sounds do not exist at the same time—one has, for example,
r-u-p-a—whereas the word, which you define as a dharma, an entity, cannot arise in parts. Then how can the voice, when it produces a word, produce it? You say that the case is analogous to that of avijñāpti (iv.3d): the last moment of the vijñāpti, a corporeal or vocal act, creates avijñāpti by reason of its previous moments. But, we would say, if the last moment of the sound of the voice creates the word, it would suffice to understand the last sound in order to attain or comprehend the object.

It is not an evasion to suppose that voice engenders the phoneme (vyanjana), that a phoneme engenders a word, and that a word causes comprehension of objects. In fact, the same objection is present, "The phonemes do not exist at the same time, etc."

For these same reasons, it is absurd to suppose that the voice manifests a word. [Sounds do not exist at the same time, and a dharma, one entity, such as a word, cannot be manifested in parts . . . and following].

c. [The hypothesis that "voice" engenders a phoneme—a hypothesis that we have previously tolerated—calls moreover for some new remarks]. Experts vainly apply their minds but do not discover a phoneme distinct from the voice. Moreover, the voice neither engenders nor manifests the phoneme, for the same reasons that allow that the voice neither engenders nor manifests a word. [Since the "voice" is vocal sound by nature, all vocal sound would engender or manifest phonemes. If you reply that phonemes are only engendered or manifested by the vocal sound of a certain nature . . . as above ad 2a2.]

[3. But the Sarvāstivādins may suppose that] a word arises with its object, like the characteristic "arising." The question of knowing whether it is produced or manifested by the voice, disappears.

In this hypothesis, no present word would designate a past or future thing. Moreover, a father, a mother, or other persons arbitrarily fix the word that is the proper name of a son, etc.: how can you admit that the word, like the characteristic "arising," arises simultaneously with the object? Finally, unconditioned things would not have any name, since they do not arise: a consequence that the Sarvāstivādins
cannot admit.

[4. But the Sarvāstivādins are warranted by a text.] The Blessed One said, "A stanza (gāthā) depends on words, and a poem depends on stanzas." 319

[The Sautrāntikas answer that] word (nāman) is a sound (śabda) upon which persons have come to an agreement that it signifies a certain thing. 320 A stanza (gāthā) is a certain arrangement of words: it is in this sense that it, according to the Blessed One, depends on words. To admit an entity in and of itself called pada, is a very superfluous hypothesis. You might as well maintain that there exists, distinct from ants and minds, things in and of themselves termed "a row of ants" or "a succession of minds." 321 Recognize then that only the phonemes (aṅkṣaras), which are sounds, exist in and of themselves.

The Vaibhāṣikas admit nāmakāya, padakāya, and vyāñjanakāya, as saṁskāras disassociated from the mind, for, they say, none of these dharmas serve as a gate of understanding. 322

***

We ask: (1) to which sphere of existence do the phonemes, words, and phrases belong? (2) Do they belong to living beings (sattvākhyā, i.10b)? (3) Are they of retribution, of accumulation or of out-flowing (i.37)? and (4) Are they good, bad, or neutral?

47c-d. They exist in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu; they belong to living beings; they are out-flowing; and they are neutral. 323

The phonemes, etc., belong to two spheres of existence. According to one opinion, they also exist in Ārūpyadhātu, but there they are "unpronounceable." 324

They belong to living beings, being produced through the efforts of living beings and consisting of articulated sounds (varga), etc. In fact, they belong to the person who speaks, not to the things that they designate.

They are an out-flowing, being produced through sabhāgahetu
(ii.52); they are not of retribution, since they proceed from the desire of the person who speaks; they are not of accumulation, since they are not material.

They are non-defiled-neutral (anivṛtiavyākṛta, ii.28).\(^{325}\)

***

We shall briefly explain the characteristics, not as yet mentioned, of the other dharmas disassociated from the mind (ii.35).

47d-48b. The same for “genre,” (sabhāgata) which is also from retribution, and which belongs to the three spheres of existence.

“The same for,” that is to say, like phonemes, words, and phrases, sabhāgata is of the first two spheres of existence; it belongs to living beings; it is from out-flowing; and it is non-defiled-neutral.

But sabhāgata is not only from out-flowing: it is also of retribution; it not only belongs to the first two spheres of existence, it also belongs to the third.

48b. Possession (prāpti) is of two types.\(^{326}\)

It is of out-flowing and of retribution.

48c. Its characteristics also.

Its characteristics, arising, etc., are of two types, like possession.

48c-d. The absorptions and non-possession (aprāpti) are of out-flowing.

The two absorptions and non-possession are only out-flowings.

As for their spheres, their relationship with living beings, their moral qualifications (good, etc.), the explanations have been given above. The characteristics belong to all conditioned things, hence they belong to living beings and to non-living beings. For the āsamjñīka and the āyus, see ii.41d and 45a.

***
We have seen (9ii.47c-d) that arising, in order to engender the dharma that it should engender, needs the cooperation of hetus or causes, and pratyayas or conditions. What are the hetus, and what are the pratyayas?\textsuperscript{327}

49. The hetus are sixfold: kāraṇahetu, sahabhū, sahbāga, samprayutaka, sarvatraga, and vipāka.\textsuperscript{328}

Kāraṇahetu is reason for existence; sahabhūhetu is coexistent cause; sahbāgahetu is parallel cause; samprayuktakahetu is associated cause; sarvatragahetu is universal cause, and vipākahetu is retributive cause: such are the six types of causes that the Ābhidhārmikas (Jñāna-prasthāna, TD p. 920c5) recognize.\textsuperscript{329}

50a. All dharmas are kāraṇahetu with regard to all, with the exception of themselves.

A dharma is not a kāraṇahetu of itself.

With this exception, that all of the dharmas are kāraṇahetu with regard to all other conditioned dharmas, because no dharma constitutes an obstacle to the arising of the dharmas susceptible of arising.

It results from this definition that the dharmas that are sahabhūhetu, etc., are also kāraṇahetu: all other hetus are included within kāraṇahetu. The betu that does not receive a special name, which is simply kāraṇa, "reason for existence," without any other qualification is kāraṇahetu: it receives as its particular name the name that suits all the hetus. Compare this with the name of the rūpāyatana (i.24).

***

Kāraṇahetu calls for the following observations:

1. Vices are produced among the ignorant; once the Truths are known, they are not produced, as the stars are not visible when the sun shines. Hence the consciousness of the Truths, or the sun, causes an obstacle to the vices, or to the stars. Then it is false to say that all conditioned dharmas are kāraṇahetu because they create no obstacle to arising.
We understand that the consciousness of the Truths and the clarity of the sun create no obstacle to the arising of the dharma which is "arising" (utpadyamāna), that is to say of the dharma, which, its causes being completed, continues to exist.

2. What is called cause or reason for existence, may be what is capable of causing, or of not causing, an obstacle! In fact, when their lord does not oppress them, villagers say, "We are fortunate through the actions of our master." But can one call cause that which, being incapable of causing an obstacle, does not cause an obstacle? Nirvāṇa is incapable of creating any obstacle to the arising of any conditioned thing: such too are future dharmas with regard to past dharmas, or creatures of hell or animals with regard to beings in Ārūpyadhātu: Nirvāṇa, future dharmas, or creatures in hell are as if they did not exist with regard to their being an obstacle to the arising of the conditioned things in question. Can one consider them as causes?

They are causes; for, even when the lord is incapable of harming them, the villagers express themselves as we have said; but not about a non-existent lord.

3. The definition that we have given of kāraṇahetu is a general definition and includes that which is kāraṇahetu par excellence and that which is simply kāraṇahetu. Kāraṇahetu par excellence is the generating cause: in this sense, eye and color are the kāraṇahetu of the consciousness of sight; as food is with regard to the body, the seeds, etc., with regard to the sprout, etc. (see ii.56b).

4. Objection.] If all the dharmas are the causes of other dharmas because they do not cause any obstacle, why do not all the dharmas arise together? Why, when one murder is committed, are not all creatures, like the murderer himself, guilty of the crime of murder?

This objection is useless. In fact, all the dharmas receive the name of kāraṇahetu because they do not create any obstacle: it is not that they are all agents.

5. According to other masters, all kāraṇahetus possess a real efficacy with regard to all dharmas. For example Nirvāṇa and the consciousness of sight: a mental consciousness, good or bad, arises having Nirvāṇa as its object (ālambana, ii.62c-d); from this mental
consciousness there later arises a consciousness of sight; then Nirvāṇa has efficacy, albeit mediately, with regard to the consciousness of sight.

The same argument applies to future dharmas, to beings in hell, etc.

***

50c-d. Sahabhūbetu, coexistent causes, namely the elements (bhūta), the mind and the companions of the mind, characteristics and the thing characterized, are the dharmas that are causes one of the other.334

11. The dharmas that are causes (purusakāraphala, ii.58) one of the other, are called sahabhūbetu.335

For example, the primary elements (mahābhūta)336 are, among themselves, sahabhūbetu. The same for the mind and its companions (ii.51); the same for the characteristics, arising, etc. (ii.45b), and the dharmas that they characterize.

In the category of sahabhūbetu are then included all conditioned dharmas which are in a mutual relationship of causality.337

2. We have reason not to complete the above definition. A dharma is a sahabhūbetu of its secondary characteristics (anulaksana, ii.45) without being in a mutual relationship of causality with them: for the secondary characteristics are not the sahabhūbetu of their dharma. This is a case to be added to the definition.338

***

What dharmas are called “the companions of the mind?”

51a-c. The companions of the mind are: the mental states; the two disciplines (samvara); and the characteristics (lakṣaṇas) of the mental states, the two disciplines and the mind.

These are all the dharmas associated with the mind (cittasaṁ-prayukta, ii.24), the discipline of absorption and pure discipline
(iv.17d), and the characteristics, arising, etc. (ii.45b) of all these, and also of the mind.

[Why are they termed “companions of the mind”?]

51d. From the point of view of time, of result, etc., and of goodness, etc.

The companions are associated with the mind:
1. In regard to time: they have the same arising, the same duration, and the same destruction as does the mind; they are of the same time period as the mind.

When we say “the same arising . . . ,” we understand the word “same” in the sense of concomitance: the companions arise, last, and perish at the same time as does the mind; but their arising is distinct.

The minds that are not destined to arise do not arise, nor last, nor perish: the same for their companions. This is why the phrase, ”The companions are of the same time period as the mind” is added. [The mind which should arise is future until the moment when it arises if it is to arise: its companions are hence future; it is past after the moment when it shall perish if it arose: its companions are then past.]

2. In regard to the result, etc. Result means purusakāraphala (ii.58a-b) and visamnyogaphala (ii.57d); and “et cetera” refers to vipākaphala (ii.57) and nisyandaphala (ii.57c).

The companions have the same result, the same vipāka, and the same nisyanda as the mind: ”same” indicates identity.

3. In regard to goodness, etc. The companions are good, bad, or neutral, like the mind which they accompany.

There are then ten reasons why the companions are termed companions.

***

The mind having the least number of companions is a sahabhūhetu of fifty-eight dharmas: namely 1) the ten mahābhūmikas (ii.23) with the four characteristics of each of them; and 2) the four characteristics and the four secondary characteristics (anulakṣāna,
ii.46).

If, from these fifty-eight dharmas, the four secondary characteristics of the mind—which have no effect upon it—are set aside, then we have fifty-four dharmas that are sahabhūhetu of the same mind.342

According to another opinion, only fourteen dharmas are sahabhūhetu of this mind, namely its four characteristics and the ten mahābhūmikas. As the secondary characteristics have no effect on the mind, the characteristics of the mahābhūmikas likewise have no effect on the mind.

The Vaibhāṣikas reject this opinion—that the forty characteristics of the mahābhūmikas are not sahabhūhetu of the mind,—as contradictory to the doctrine of the Prakaraṇagrantha according to which "the four characteristics,—arising, duration, old age, and impermanence,—of the belief in self (satkāyadrsti) . . . and in the dharmas associated with this belief (comprising the mahābhūmikas), are at the same time a result and a cause of the belief in self."343

Certain Masters, in their reading of the Prakaraṇagrantha, omit the words, "and of the dharmas associated with this belief." According to the Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmir, these words figure in the text; or, if they are missing, the context indicates that one should supply them and that the passage as it stands is incomplete.

***

Any dharma that is a sahabhūhetu cause is a sahabhū or a coexistent item. But there are some coexistent items that are not sahabhūhetu:

1. the secondary characteristics of the principal dharma (mūla-dharma) are not a sahabhūhetu regarding this dharma (ii.46a-b);
2. these same are not sahabhūhetu among themselves;
3. the secondary characteristics of the companions of the mind are not a sahabhūhetu regarding the mind;
4. these same are not a sahabhūhetu among themselves;
5. derived matter, blue, etc., susceptible of resistance and which has also arisen together, are not a sahabhūhetu among themselves;
6. a part of derived matter not susceptible to resistance and also arisen together with them, is not a sahabhūhetu; with the exception of the two disciplines (see I.136);

7. no derived matter, even though arisen with the elements, is a sahabhūhetu with the elements;

8. possession (prāpti), even when it arises with the dharma to which it is related, is not a sahabhūhetu to it.

The dharmas of these eight categories are coexistant (sahabhu), but are not sahabhūhetu, because their results, vipāka or nisyanda, are not identical (see p. 259). As for possession, it does not always accompany the dharma: it arises either before the dharma, or after it, or at the same time as it (ii.37-38).

***

[The Sautrāntikas criticize the doctrine of coexistant causes.]

All this may be right, that is, "what is a sahabhūhetu cause, a mutually coexistant cause, is a coexistant item," and the rest. Nevertheless, in the world, the relationship of cause to effect is well proven in certain cases: the cause is previous to the effect. It is in this way that a seed is the cause of the sprout, the sprout of the stalk, etc. But one does not prove a similar relationship between simultaneous things. You should then demonstrate that dharmas arisen together can be in a cause and effect relationship.

[The Sarvāstivādins supply two examples.] The lamp arises with its light; the sprout, growing in the light, arises with its shadow. Now a lamp is the cause of its light and a sprout is the cause of its shadow. Thus cause and effect can be simultaneous.

[The Sautrāntikas:] These examples are not proven. We must examine whether a lamp is the cause of its light, or if, as we think, a lamp with its light are both the effect of a complex of previous causes and conditions, oil, wick, etc. In the same way, a complex of previous causes (seed, light) is the cause of the sprout and its shadow, of the sprout with its shadow.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] The relationship of cause and effect is
proven by the existence and the non-existence of what is called effect, similar to the existence and the non-existence of what is called cause. The definition of the Logicians (hetukas) is very good: "When A is or is not, and when B is or is not, then A is considered as cause, and B is considered as effect." Granted this, if we examine the dharmas that we have defined as mutually coexistent and sahabhūhetu, we see that they all exist when one of them exists, and that none exist when one of them is absent. They are then in a relationship of mutual cause and effect.

[The Sautrāntikas:] Admitting that among the simultaneous dharmas, one dharma can be the cause of another dharma, then the organ of sight is the cause of visual consciousness. But how many simultaneous dharmas are the cause and effect of one another?

[The Sarvāstivādins:] Mutual causality is proven by the definition that we have given of causality. When the mind exists, its mental states exist, and vice versa.

[The Sautrāntikas:] Very well, but then the Sarvāstivādins should revise their system. In fact, they have denied mutual causality to derived matter (physical matter, taste, etc.) although physical matter never exists without taste (ii.22); they have denied mutual causality to derived matter and to the primary elements, and mutual causality to secondary characteristics and the mind.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] In the same way that three staffs stand up supported one on the other, the causal relationship of simultaneous things, the mind and its mental states, etc., is proven.

[The Sautrāntikas:] This new example should be examined. We ask whether the three staffs stand up together through the force that the three staffs possess through arising together, or rather, if the force of the complex of previous causes which caused them to arise together does not now also cause them to arise supported one on the other. Further, there are things here other than the mutual force of support: there is a rope and a hook, and there is the ground.

But, [reply the Sarvāstivādins,] mutually coexistent items have causes other than the sahabhūhetu, namely sabbāgahetu, sarvatragahetu, and vipākahetu, which have a role analogous to that of the
cord, etc. *Sabhūhētu* is then proven.

***

52a. Similar *dharmas* are *sabhāgahētu* or similar causes.\(^{346}\)

*Similars (sabhāga) are sabhāgahētu of similars.*

1. The five good *skandhas* are *sabhāgahētu* of the five good *skandhas*. When they are defiled, that is to say, bad, and defiled-neutral, they are *sabhāgahētu* of defiled ones. Neutral, that is, undefiled-neutral, they are *sabhāgahētu* of neutral ones.

   Nevertheless, different masters are not in agreement on this last point. According to some, neutral *rūpa* is *sabhāgahētu* of the five neutral *skandhas*, but the four *skandhas*,—sensation, etc.—are not *sabhāgahētu* of *rūpa*.\(^ {347}\)

   According to others, four *skandhas* are *sabhāghētu* of the five; but *rūpa* is not *sabhāgahētu* of the four.

   And according to others, *rūpa* is not *sabhāgahētu* of the four, and vice versa.

2. From the point of view of one existence, the first embryonic state is the similar cause of ten states: these are the five embryonic states, *kalala, arbuda, pesin, ghana*, and *prasākhā*; and the five post-embryonic states, *bāla, kumāra, yuvan, madhya* and *vrddha*. The second embryonic state is the *sabhāgahētu* of nine states (*arbuda* to *vārdḍha*), and thus following. A previous moment of each state is the similar cause of the later moments of that same state (compare iv.53).

   From the point of view of the states of existence followed by the same species, each of the states of the previous existence is the similar cause of the ten states.

   The same holds for external things, corn, rice, etc., that is, the quality of *sabhāgahētu* remains confined in each series: corn is a similar cause of corn, not of rice.

   [3. The Dārśāntikas deny that] physical matter (*rūpa*) is a similar cause of matter; but this contradicts the Book (*Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 985b14*), which says, "Past primary elements are the *hetu* and the
adhipati of future primary elements.” Adhipati means adhipati-pratyaya (predominating conditions, ii.62d); and hetu means sabbā-gabetu, for the hetus are here evidently apart from cause.

***

Are all similar dharmas similar causes of similar dharmas? No. Similar causes are the similar dharmas which

52b. Belong to the same category (nikāya) and the same stage (bhū).

This means that the dharmas belonging to a certain category and to a certain stage (bhūmi) are a similar cause of dharmas of the same category and the same stage.

The dharmas are classed into five categories accordingly as they are susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing each of the Four Truths, or through Meditation (i.40).

The dharmas belong to nine stages: they are either in Kāmadhātu, or in one of the Four Dhyānas, or in one of the Four Ārūpyas.

A dharma susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing the Truth of Suffering is a similar cause of another dharma susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing the Truth of Suffering, and not of the dharmas belonging to the other four categories; and thus following.

***

Sabbāgabetu has not yet been exactly defined. In fact, only those dharmas are similar causes which have

52b. Arisen previously.

An arisen dharma, that is to say, any previously past or present dharma is a similar cause of a later similar dharma, arisen or not arisen. A future dharma cannot be a similar cause.348

1. On what authority does this definition rest?

It rests on the Mūlaśāstra, for the Jñānaprasthāna (TD 26, p.
920c15) says, "What is similar cause (sabhāgahetu)? The root of good, arisen and previous, is a cause in the quality of a similar cause with regard to the later root of good and of the dharmas associated with it, of the same category and stage. In that way, the roots of good of the past are a similar cause with regard to past and present roots of good; past and present roots of good are similar causes with regard to future roots of good."

2. [Objection:] A future dharma is a similar cause, for we read in this same Jñānaprasthāna, "[Question:] Is there a period when the dharma which is the cause of a certain dharma is not a cause? [Answer:] There is never a time when this dharma is not a cause."

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] This text does not contradict the first; for the Jñānaprasthāna does not refer to that which is a cause in the quality of a similar cause (sabhāgahetu), but rather that which is a cause in the qualities of sababbāhetu, samprayuktakahetu, or vipākahetu.

According to another opinion, that of the "followers of the last place" (paramāvasthāvādin), the answer of the Jñānaprasthāna, "There is never a time when this dharma is not a cause" refers to sabhāgahetu, and they justify themselves as follows: A future dharma, in an arising state, is certainly sabhāgahetu. Hence, taking into account a future dharma in its last place, the Jñānaprasthāna can say that there is never a time when the dharma is not a cause, that it is always a cause, since, at a certain moment in the future, it is a cause.

This explanation does not resolve the difficulty. In fact, if a future dharma, after not having been a cause becomes a cause by arriving at a state of arising, then it has not always been a cause: but now the Jñānaprasthāna says absolutely that there is never a time when it is not a cause.

Furthermore, this explanation cannot be reconciled with the answer that the Jñānaprasthāna (p. 1026b19; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 87a2) gives to another question, "Is there a period in which the dharma that is an immediately antecedent condition (samanantara, ii.62a-b) of a certain dharma is not samanantara? Yes, when it has not yet arisen." Now the case of samanantara is analogous to that of sabhāgahetu: future samanantara, arriving at a state of arising, is samanantara.
Hence if the interpretation of the answer, "There is never a time when this dharma is not a cause," in the sense of "In the future, in an arising state, it is sabhāgabetu" is correct, then the Jñānaprasthāna, dealing with samanantara, should answer as for sabhāgabetu, "This dharma is never samanantara." Now the Jñānaprasthāna answers, "It is not samanantara when it has not arisen." Hence the word "cause" in the first answer should not be understood as sabhāgabetu.

The "followers of the last place" say that the Jñānaprasthāna answers the first question by saying, "There is never a time when it is not a cause," and the second by saying, "It is not a cause when it has not arisen," in order to show that one can answer in these two ways in order to express the same sense. One can answer the first question as the second, and the second as the first.

What a singular process of explanation! The author of the Śāstra would then be totally useless! Hence the first explanation proposed is the best explanation.

3. If a future dharma is not a similar cause (sabhāgabetu), why does the Prakaraṇapāda teach that future satkāyadrṣṭi has satkāyadrṣṭi as its cause, and is in turn the cause of satkāyadrṣṭi? We read, in fact (in the text quoted in note 342, para. B1(b)), "with the exception of future satkāyadrṣṭi and the Truth of Suffering which is associated with it" (anāgatāṁ satkāyadrṣṭi tatsamprayuktāṁ ca duḥkhhasatyāṁ sthapayitvā). 349

This reading, [answer the Vaibhāṣikas,] is corrupted. It should read, "with the exception of the Truth of Suffering associated with future satkāyadrṣṭi (anāgatasatkāyadrṣṭisamprayuktāṁ). If we were to suppose that your reading is authentic, we must, because of the sense that the text expresses, consider it as without authority (na tantram), and as having been determined by the context of discourse (that is, through imitation of the preceding phrase).

4. If a future dharma is not sabhāgabetu, how do you explain the following bhāṣyam of the Prajñāpti? 350 This Treatise says in fact, "All the dharmas are determined from a fourfold point of view: cause, result, support (āśraya), and object (ālambana)." 351

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer:] When it says, "This dharma is never
the cause of that dharma," the Treatise does not mean to speak of all types of causes. By cause, we must understand samprayuktakahetu and sababhāhetu; by result, adhipatiphala and purusakāraphala (ii.58); by support, the six organs (organ of sight, etc.); and by object, the six spheres (visaya), visible things, etc.

5. If a future dharma is not sabhāgahetu, then sabhāgahetu did not exist at first, but then does exist.

But this is precisely what the Vaibhāṣikas affirm! The condition (avasthā) of sabhāgahetu of the sabhāgahetu is new, that is, it exists after having been non-existent; but the thing itself, the dravya which is a certain sabhāgahetu, is not new. A future dharma is not sabhāgahetu, but once it has arisen, it becomes sabhāgahetu. In fact, the result of the complex of causes, is the condition of a thing and not the thing itself (dravya), the dharma. (A future dharma exists as a thing, dravyatas; the complex of causes causes it to pass from the future into the present, endows it with the condition of the present, and endows it, by this fact, with the quality of sabhāgahetu; see v.25.)

6. What harm do you see in this future dharma being a similar cause (sabhāgahetu) in the same way that it is a retributive cause (vipākahetu, ii.54)?

It it were sabhāgahetu, it would be mentioned as such in the Jñānaprasthāna (see above p. 263 line 27); now the Jñānaprasthāna, answering the question, "What is sabhāgahetu?" does not say that future roots of good are sabhāgahetu of future roots of good.

We do not think that the omission of future dharma from this text creates an argument against us. This text, in fact mentions only the sabhāgahetus that are capable of "grasping" and of "giving forth" a result (phaladānagrahaṇasamartha, ii.59).

No, for the result of sabhāgahetu is an "out-flowing result of out-flowing," a result similar to its cause (nisyandaphala, ii.57c), and this type of result does not suit a future dharma, because, in the future, there is no anteriority and posteriority. One cannot, on the other hand, admit that a past or present dharma already arisen is an out-flowing of a future dharma, in the same way that a past dharma is not an out-flowing of a present dharma, for a result is not anterior to its cause.
Hence a future dharma is not a similar cause.

7. If this is the case, then a future dharma would no longer be a vipākahetu, a retributive cause (ii.54c), for 1) a retributive result (vipākaphala, ii.56a) cannot be either simultaneous or anterior to its cause; and 2) because future dharmas have no earlier or later periods of time.

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer that] the cause is not the same. A similar cause (sabhagahetu) and its out-flowing (nisyanda) result are similar dharmas. Now this is to suppose that they exist in the future, that they lack anteriority and posteriority, and that they are the mutual cause of one another, and as a consequences the results of one another: now it is not admissable that two dharmas are an out-flowing of one another. On the contrary, a retributive cause and a retributive result are dissimilar. Even if the anteriority and the posteriority were absent, a cause remains only a cause, and a result remains only a result. The quality of sabhāgahetu results from a condition or state (avasthā): a future dharma is not sabhāgahetu; but when it enters into a present or a past condition, it becomes sabhāgahetu. Its quality of retributive cause results from the nature of the dharma itself.

***

We have said that a dharma is a similar cause (sabhāgahetu) of only those dharmas that belong to its stage. Does this restriction apply to all the dharmas?

It applies only to impure dharmas, not to pure dharmas:

52c-d. But the Path is sabhāgahetu to the Path, without distinguishing the nine stages.

The Path is of nine stages or spheres—the anāgamya, the dhyānāntara, the Four primary (mūla) Dhyānas, and the three inferior, primary Ārūpyas (vi.20c)—in the sense that an ascetic, abiding in these nine states of absorption, can cultivate the Path.

The dharmas that constitute the Path are similar causes of the dharmas that constitute the Path, from stage to stage. In fact, the Path
resides in the different stages as a visitor, without forming part of the spheres of existence to which these stages belong: the desire of Kāmādhātu, of Rūpadhātu, of Arūpyadhātu, are not on the Path. The Path, whatever be the stage upon which the ascetic relies in order to cultivate it, stays of the same nature; the Path is hence a similar cause of the Path.

Nevertheless, the complete Path is not a similar cause of the complete Path. One does not have to take into account the stage in which it is cultivated, but rather the characteristics proper to the Path itself.

52d. The Path is sabhāgāhetu to an equal or superior Path.

Not of an inferior Path, because the Path is always acquired through effort.

Let us define the terms, “inferior,” “equal,” and “superior Path.”

1. When past or present duṣṭhe dharma-jñānakṣānti (the first moment of the Path of Seeing, darśanamārga, vi.25d) is a similar cause of this same kṣānti of the future, the caused Path is equal to the causing Path.

When this kṣānti is a similar cause of duṣṭhe dharma-jñāna (the second moment of the Path of Seeing, darśanamārga, vi.26a) the caused Path is superior to the causing Path.

And thus following up to anutpāda-jñāna (vi.50) which, not having a superior, can only be the similar cause of an equal Path, namely a future anutpāda-jñāna.

To state it more precisely, the Path of Seeing (darśanamārga) is a similar cause of the Path of Seeing, the Path of Meditation (bhāvanā-mārga), and the Path of the Aśaikṣas (aṣaikṣamārga); the Path of Meditation is a similar cause of the Path of Meditation and the Path of the Aśaikṣa; and the Path of the Aśaikṣa is a similar cause of an equal or superior Path of the Aśaikṣa.

3. Any Path can be cultivated by an ascetic of weak faculties or active faculties: a Path of weak faculties is the similar cause of the same Path of weak faculties and of active faculties; a Path of active faculties is the similar cause of the same Path of active faculties. Consequently
the Paths of śraddhānusārin (vi.29), śraddhābhādimukta (vi.31) and samayavimukta (vi.56-7) are, respectively, the similar causes of six, four, and two Paths; the Paths of dharmānusārin (vi.29), drṣṭiprāpti (vi.31) and asamayavimukta (vi.56-7) are, respectively, the similar causes of three, two, and one Path.

When a Path cultivated in a higher stage is the similar cause of a Path cultivated in a lower stage, how can it be the cause of an equal or higher Path?

The Path cultivated in a lower stage can be equal or higher 1) from the point of view of the faculties (indriyas) which can be weak or active in any stage, or 2) from the point of view of the accumulation of causes.354

It does not follow that the same person successively grasps śraddhānusārin and dharmānusārin Paths; yet the first, in the past or present, is a similar cause of the second, the later one.355

***

Does the rule of equal or higher results apply only to the pure dharmas, that is, to the dharmas that form part of the Path?

53a. The dharmas acquired through cultivation are sābhāgaḥetu of the same two classes, the equal and the higher.

Worldly dharmas acquired through effort or exercise are similar causes of equal or higher dharmas, but not of inferior dharmas.

What are the dharmas acquired through effort?

53b. Those which arise through hearing, through reflection, etc.

The dharmas "acquired through effort" are the opposite of the "innate" dharmas. These former dharmas are qualities (guna) proceeding from hearing (śrūta), that is, from the Word of the Buddha, from reflection (cintā), and from meditation (bhāvanā).

Since they are acquired through effort, they are the similar cause of greater or of equal, but not of lesser, good.
The dharmas of hearing in Kāmadhātu are similar causes of the dharmas of hearing and reflection in Kāmadhātu; but not of the dharmas of meditation, because these dharmas do not exist in Kāmadhātu, and because a dharma is a similar cause of dharmas of the same sphere of existence.

The dharmas of hearing in Rūpadhātu are similar causes of the dharmas of hearing and meditation in Rūpadhātu; but not of the dharmas of reflection, because these dharmas do not exist in this sphere of existence: in Rūpadhātu, as soon as one begins to reflect, one immediately enters into absorption (samādhi).

The dharmas of meditation in Rūpadhātu are similar causes of the dharmas of meditation in Rūpadhātu, but not of the dharmas of hearing in Rūpadhātu, because these are less good.

The dharmas of meditation in Ārūpyadhātu are the similar causes of the dharmas of meditation in Ārūpyadhātu. The dharmas of hearing and of reflection do not exist in this sphere of existence.

Furthermore, one must consider that the dharmas acquired through effort are of nine classes: weak-weak, medium-weak, etc. The weak-weak are the similar causes of dharmas of nine classes; the medium-weak, of dharmas of eight classes, with the exception of the weak-weak; and thus following.

The nine classes of the “innate” good dharmas are similar cause of one another. The same holds for the defiled dharmas.

The undefiled-neutral dharmas are of four categories (ii.72), the following being “better” than the preceding: dharmas arisen from retribution (vipākajā, i.37); dharmas relative to lying down, to sitting attitudes, etc.; dharmas relative to professional work; and the mind that can create fictive beings (nīrmanacittā, vii.48). These four categories are, respectively, the similar cause of four, three, two, and one category.

Furthermore, as a mind capable of creating fictive beings of the sphere of Kāmadhātu can be the result of each of the Four Dhyānas (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 89a12), there is reason to establish here the same distinctions: the minds capable of creating fictive beings constitute four classes, and are, according to their class, similar causes of four, three,
two, or one mind capable of creating fictive beings. In fact, since it is a result of a higher Dhyāna, the mind capable of creating fictive beings is not the similar cause of a mind capable of creating fictive beings which is the result of a lower Dhyāna: from one similar cause (a mind capable of creating fictive beings) realized with the greatest effort, there cannot proceed a dharma less good, realized with less effort.

***

Once these principles have been established, the following questions are stated and resolved:356

1. Is there a pure dharma, already arisen, which is not the cause of a pure dharma not destined to arise?

Yes. Duḥkhe dharmajñāna already arisen is a cause of duḥkhe dharmajñānaksānti not destined to arise. Furthermore, a better good is not the cause of lesser good.

2. Is there, in a series, a pure dharma, previously acquired (of which one has first obtained the prāpti), which is not the cause of a pure dharma arisen later?

Yes. Future duḥkhe dharmajñānaksānti [whose possession (prāpti) has been obtained in the first moment of the Path] are not the cause of duḥkhe dharmajñāna already arisen. This is because a result cannot be anterior to its cause, and because a future dharma is not a similar cause.

3. Is there a pure dharma, arisen previously, which is not the cause of a pure dharma arisen later?

Yes. The best is not the cause of less good. For example, when one realizes an inferior result after having fallen from a superior result, the superior result was not the cause of this inferior result. Furthermore, possession of duḥkhe dharmajñāna which has previously arisen is not a cause of the possession of the dharmajñānaksānti which will arise in the following moments (duḥkhe'nvayajñānaksāntikṣape, etc.), because these new possessions are less good.

***
53c-d. The mind and its mental states are only *sanprayuk-takahetu*, causes through association.\(^{357}\)

Mind and mental states are *sanprayuktakahetu*.

Is this to say that minds and mental states, arisen at different moments and in different series, are among themselves *sanprayuktakahetu*?

No.

Would you then say that the mind and mental states of the same aspect, that is, having the same aspect of blue, etc., and of the same object (*ekālambana*), that is, having for their object the same blue, etc., are *sanprayuktakahetu*?

No. This definition gives rise to the same criticism: minds and mental states of different time periods and of different series can have the same aspect and the same object.

Would you say that the mind and mental states of the same aspect and the same object, can be, furthermore, of the same time period?

This still does not suffice: for many persons can see a new moon at one and the same time.

Consequently, the author adds

53d. Which has the same support.

The mind and mental states which have the same support are, among themselves, *sanprayuktakahetu*.

"Same" signifies single or undivided.\(^{358}\)

For example, a given moment (*ksana*) of the organ of sight is the support 1) of a visual consciousness, and 2) of the sensation (*vedanā*) and the other mental states which are associated with this consciousness. And the same for the other organs until *manas*: a certain moment of the mental organ (*manas*) is the support of a mental consciousness and of the mental states associated with this consciousness.

Whatever is *sanprayuktakahetu* is also *sahabhūhetu*. What is the difference between these two causes?\(^{359}\)

Some *dharmas* are called *sahabhūhetu* because they are mutually the results of one another. As companions in a caravan travel thanks to
the support that they give one another, in this same way the mind is
the result of mental states, and the mental states are the result of the
mind.

Some dharmas are called samprayuktakabetu, mutual cause
through association, because they function identically, that is, because
there is among them the five similarities or identities defined above
ii.34. The travel of the companions in a caravan is assured by the
mutual support that they give one another; furthermore, they use the
same food, the same drinks, etc. In this same way, the mind and its
mental states use the same support, have the same aspect, etc.: if one
of these five identities is missing, they no longer function in the same
way and are not associated.

***

54a-b. Former universals are sarvatragabetu or universal causes
of the defiled dharmas of their own stage.

Universals, which we shall study in the Chapter on the Defile-
ments (v.12), arisen previously, that is, of the past or present, and
belonging to a certain stage (bhūmi), are the universal cause of later
defiled dharmas, of the same stage, which are defiled by nature, either
through association or through their origin (iv.9c).

Universals are only the cause of defiled dharmas; they are the cause
of defiled dharmas in their own category and in other categories
(nikāya, ii.52b): it is through their power that there arises, with their
following, defilements belonging to categories different from them.360
They then constitute a cause different from sabhāgabetu.361

Then would the defiled dharmas of an Āryan (rāga or lust, etc.)
have the universals for their cause? Yet the Āryan has abandoned all
universals, for these are abandoned by Seeing the Truths.

The Vaibhāsikas of Kaśmīr admit that all defiled dharmas have the
dharmas abandoned through Seeing the Truths for their cause. For the
PrakaranaPāda362 expresses itself in these terms: "What dharmas have
for a cause the dharmas abandoned through Seeing the Truths? Defiled
dharmas363 and the retribution of the dharmas abandoned through
Seeing the Truths.

"What dharmas have for a cause neutral (avyākṛta) [dharmas]? Neutral conditioned dharmas and bad dharmas.

"Is there a duḥkhasatya which has for its cause a belief in self (satkayadrṣṭi) and which is not in turn the cause of a belief in self? ..." and the rest to: "with the exception of the arising-old age-duration-impermanence of the belief in a future self and its following, and of all other defiled duḥkhasatya."

[Objection:] If some bad dharmas have for their causes not only some bad dharmas but some neutral dharmas as well, how should one explain this bhāṣyam of the Prajñāpīṭi, "Is there a bad dharma which has only a bad dharma for its cause? Yes; the first defiled volition (cetanā) that an Āryan produces upon falling from detachment."

[Answer:] The neutral dharmas, which are abandoned through Seeing the Truths, are the cause (i.e., sarvatragahetu) of this bad volition. If the Prajñāpīṭi does not mention it, it is because it intends to name only the causes that have not been abandoned.

***

54c-d. Bad dharmas and impure good dharmas are retributive causes.

1. Bad dharmas—which are all impure—and impure good dharmas are only retributive causes, because their nature is to ripen.

Neutral dharmas are not retributive causes, because they are weak: as rotten seeds, even though moistened, do not grow.

Pure dharmas are not retributive causes because they are not moistened through desire (trṣṇā): as intact seeds, not moistened, do not grow.

Furthermore, pure dharmas are not bound to any sphere of existence: thus to which sphere could the result of retribution that they would produce belong?

The dharmas that are neither neutral nor pure possess the two qualities necessary for retribution, the proper force, and the moisten-
ing of thirst, the same as intact and moistened seeds.

2. [Objection:] What is the meaning of the expression *vipākahetu*? You have a choice between two interpretations of this compound: *vipākahetu* signifies either "cause of *vipāka" or "cause which is *vipāka."

In the first case, the suffix *a* (*ghan*) marks the state (*bhāva*): the *vipāka* (=*vipakti*) is the result of the operation indicated by the root *vi-pac*.

In the second case, the suffix *a* marks the operation (*karman*): the *vipāka* is that which become ripe (*vipacyate*), that is to say, the action arrives at the moment when it gives forth a result.

To which of these two interpretations do you hold? If you accept the first, how would you justify the text (*Jñānaprasthāna, TD* 26, p. 974a26), "The eye arises from *vipāka"? If you accept the second, how would you justify the expression, "*vipāka of action"?"

[Answer:] We have shown (i.37) that both explanations of the word *vipāka* are correct. When one examines results, one must understand the word *vipāka* according to the first explanation; the meaning is result of retribution. The text, "The eye arises from *vipāka" should be understood as "The eye arises from the cause of *vipāka."

3. What is the meaning of the compound *vi-pāka*? The prefix *vi* indicates difference. *Vipāka* is a *pāka* or result dissimilar from its cause.\(^{370}\)

How is that?

In Kāmadhātu, 1) a retributive cause (*vipākahetu*) consisting of only one *skandha* can produce a single result: possession (*pṛāpti*, ii.36b) with its characteristics (*lakṣanas*, ii.45c); 2) a retributive cause consisting of two *skandhas* can produce a single result: bodily and vocal action with its characteristics; 3) a retributive cause consisting of four *skandhas* can produce a single result: the mind and its mental states, good and bad, with their *lakṣanas*.

In Rūpadhātu, 1) a retributive cause consisting of a single *skandha* can produce a single result: possession with its characteristics, that is, *asamjñīsamāpatti* (ii.42a) with its characteristics; 2) a retributive cause consisting of two *skandhas* can produce a single result: *vijñāpti* (iv.2)
of the First Dhyāna with its characteristics; 3) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: a good mind, not of absorption (for the mind of absorption always consists of rūpa and discipline, iv.13, and is thus five skandhas), with its characteristics; 4) a retributive cause consisting of five skandhas can produce a single result: the mind of absorption with its characteristics.

In Ārūpyadhātu, 1) a retributive cause consisting of a single skandha can produce a single result: possession, nirodhasamāpatti (ii.43), with their respective characteristics; 2) a retributive cause consisting of four skandhas can produce a single result: the mind and its mental states with their characteristics.

4. There is action the retribution of which is included in a single āyatana, in a single dharmāyatana (i.15): action that has for its retribution the vital organ (jīvitendriya, ii.45a).371

In fact, action that has the vital organ for its retribution necessarily has the vital organ and its characteristics (ii.45c) for its retribution; both form part of the dharmāyatana.

Action that has the mental organ (manas) for its retribution necessarily has two āyatanas for its retribution, namely the manā-āyatana (i.16b) and the dharmāyatana (which embraces sensations, etc., and the characteristics which necessarily accompany the mental organ).

Action that has tangible things (spraṣṭavyāyatana, i.10d) for its retribution necessarily has two āyatanas for its retribution, namely the tangible things and the dharmāyatana (which includes the characteristics of tangible things).

Action that has the organ of touch (kāyāyatana, i.9a) for its retribution necessarily has three āyatanas for its retribution, the organ of touch, tangibles (namely the four primary elements that support the organ of touch), and the dharmāyatana (which includes its characteristics).

In the same way, action which has either physical matter (rupāyatana), odors (gandhāyatana), or taste (rasāyatana) for its retribution, necessarily has three āyatanas for its retribution: tangible things and the dharmāyatana as above, plus, according to the cause, the
āyatana of physical matter, odor, or taste.

Action which has either the eye, the ear, the nose, or the tongue for its retribution, necessarily has four āyatanas for its retribution: 1) one of the four organs, 2) the organ of touch, 3) tangible things, and 4) the dharmāyatana.

An action can have five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven āyatanas for its retribution. 372

Action, in fact, is of two types: of varied result and of non-varied result. The same holds for seeds: lotus, pomegranate, fig, millet, corn, etc.

5. The retribution of an action can belong to a single time period or to three time periods; 373 but the reverse is not true, 374 for a result cannot be inferior to its cause. The retribution from an action lasting an instant can last numerous instants; but the reverse is not true, for the same reason (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 98a7).

Retribution is not simultaneous to the action which produces it, for a retributive result is not experienced at the moment when the action is accomplished. Retribution does not immediately follow an action, for it is the immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya, ii.63b) that attracts the moment that immediately follows the action: in fact, the retributive cause depends on the development of the series for the realization of its result.

***

To which time period should a dharma belong in order that it might be each of these six causes? We have implicitly stated this rule, but we have not yet taught it in the Kārikā:

55a-b. Sarvatragahetu and sabbāgabetu are of two time periods; three causes are of three time periods. 375

A past and present dharma can be sarvatraga and sabbāgabetu (ii.52b). Past, present, and future dharmas can be samprayukta, sahabhū, and vipākabetu. The Kārikā does not speak of kāraṇahetu (ii.50a)): the conditioned dharmas of the three time periods are
kāraṇahetu; the unconditioned dharmas are outside of time.

***

Which causes correspond to which results? By reason of which results are they recognized as causes?

55c-d. Conditioned things and disconnection are results.\textsuperscript{376}

The Mūlaśāstra says, "What dharmas are results? Conditioned things and pratisamākhyānirōdha."\textsuperscript{377}

[Objection:] If the unconditioned is a result, it should have a cause, from which cause one could say that it is the result. Furthermore, since you maintain that it is a cause (kāraṇahetu, ii.50a), it should have a result, from which result one could say that it is a cause.

Only conditioned things, [the Sarvāstivādins answer,] have cause and result.

55d. The unconditioned has neither cause nor result.\textsuperscript{378}

For we cannot attribute to it any of the six causes, nor any of the five results.

i. 1. Why not admit that the part of the Path which is called ānantaryamārga\textsuperscript{379} is the kāraṇahetu of the result of disconnection (visamīyogaphala, ii.57d)?

We have seen that kāraṇahetu is a cause that does not create any obstacles to arising; but disconnection, being unconditioned, does not arise. Thus one cannot attribute a kāraṇahetu to it.

2. Then how is disconnection a result? Of what is it the result?

It is the result of the Path, for it is obtained due to the force of the Path (vi.51): in other words, it is through the Path that an ascetic obtains possession (prāpti, ii.36c-d) of disconnection.

3. Hence it is the obtaining or the possession of disconnection which is the result of the Path, and not disconnection itself: for the Path is efficacious with regard to the obtaining of disconnection, but not with regard to disconnection.

Wrong! The efficacy of the Path possesses diversity with regard to
both obtaining and disconnection.

The Path produces obtaining; the Path causes one to obtain disconnection. Hence, although the Path is not the cause of disconnection (=prastisamkhyānirodha), one can say that it is the result of the Path.\textsuperscript{380}

4. Since no unconditioned thing has adhipatiphala (ii.58d), how can one define it as kāraṇahetu?

Any unconditioned thing is kāraṇahetu, for it does not create an obstacle to the arising of any dharma; but it does not have any result, for, being outside of time, it can neither project nor produce a result (ii.59a-b).

[5. The Sautrāntikas deny that] an unconditioned thing is a cause. In fact, the Sūtra does not say that a cause can be unconditioned; it says that a cause is only conditioned, "All the betus, all the pratyayas which have for a result the production of physical matter . . . of the consciousness, are also impermanent."\textsuperscript{381} Produced by impermanent betus and pratyayas, how can physical matter . . . and consciousness be permanent?"

[The Sarvāstivādins answer:] If a permanent thing, that is, an unconditioned thing is not a cause, it will not be "an object as condition" (ālambanapratyaya, ii.63) of the consciousness that it refers to.

[The Sautrāntikas:] The Sūtra declares that the betus and the pratyayas which are capable of producing are impermanent. It does not say that all conditions (pratyayas) of the consciousness are impermanent. An unconditioned thing could then be "an object as condition" of the consciousness; for "an object as condition" is not itself productive.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] The Sūtra says that productive causes are impermanent: hence the Sūtra does not deny that an unconditioned thing is kāraṇahetu, that is, "a cause that does not create an obstacle."

[The Sautrāntikas:] The Sūtra admits the existence of "an object as a condition" (ii.61c); but it does not speak of a kāraṇahetu, "a cause that does not create an obstacle." It is not proven that an unconditioned thing is a cause.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] In fact, the Sūtra does not say that that
which does not create an obstacle is a cause; but it does not contradict this. Many Sūtras have disappeared. How can you be sure that some Sūtra does not attribute the quality of kāraṇahetu to unconditioned things?

***

[ii. The Sautrāntikas:] What is the dharma that is called visamīyoga or disconnection?

[The Sarvāstivādins: The Mūlaśāstra (Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 923b6) says that] disconnection is pratisamākhyānīrodha (ii.57d).

[The Sautrāntikas:] When I asked you (i.6) what pratisamākhyānīrodha is, you answered, "It is disconnection;" I asked you what disconnection is, and you answered, "It is pratisamākhyānīrodha!" The two answers are circular and do not explain the nature of the dharma, the unconditioned, to which they refer. You owe us another explanation.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] This dharma, in its nature, is real, but indescribable; only the Āryans "realize" it internally, each for himself. It is only possible to indicate its general characteristics, by saying that there is a real entity (dravya), distinct from others, which is good and eternal, and which receives the name of pratisamākhyānīrodha, and which is also called disconnection or visamīyoga.

***

iii. The Sautrāntikas affirm that the three types of unconditioned things (i.5b) are not real. The three dharmas that it refers to are not distinct and real entities like color, sensation, etc.382

1. What is called "space" (ākāśa) is solely the absence of any tangible thing, that is, the absence of a resistant body. Persons say, in their obscurity, that there is space when they do not encounter any obstacle.

2. What is called pratisamākhyānīrodha or Nirvāṇa is—when both the defilements already produced and the existence already produced
are destroyed—the absence of any other defilements or any other existence, and that by reason of the force of the consciousness (pratisamkhyā=prajñā). 383

3. When, independent of the force of consciousness (pratisamkhyā) and by reason of the mere absence of causes there is an absence of arising dharmas, this is what is called apratisamkhyānirodha. For example, when premature death interrupts existence (nikāyasabhāga, ii.10, 14), there is apratisamkhyānirodha of the dharmas which would have arisen in the course of this existence if it had continued.

4. According to another school, apratisamkhyānirodha is the future non-arising of the defilements by reason of consciousness (prajñā); apratisamkhyānirodha is the future non-arising of suffering, that is, of existence, by reason of the disappearance of the defilements, and not directly by reason of consciousness. (The first would then be sopadhiśeṣa nirvāṇadhātu, and the second would be nirupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇadhātu).

But, [the Sautrāntikas remark,] the future non-arising of suffering supposes consciousness (pratisamkhyā); it is then included within pratisamkhyānirodha.

***

5. Another School385 defines apratisamkhyānirodha as "later non-existence of the dharmas which have arisen" by virtue of their spontaneous destruction.386

In this hypothesis, apratisamkhyānirodha would not be eternal, since it is non-existent as long as the dharma as cause (i.e., the defilement) has not perished.

But does not pratisamkhyānirodha have a certain consciousness, the pratisamkhyā, for its antecedent? Consequently it too would not be eternal, for, if its antecedent were absent, its consequence would also be absent.

You cannot say that pratisamkhyānirodha is not eternal because its antecedent is pratisamkhyā: in fact, it does not have pratisamkhyā for its antecedent. One cannot say that pratisamkhyā is earlier, or that the
"non-arising of the non-arisen dharmas" is later. Let us explain. Non-arising always exists in and of itself. If pratisamkhyā is absent, the dharmas would arise; but if pratisamkhyā arises, the dharmas would absolutely not arise. The efficacy of pratisamkhyā with regard to their non-arising consists in this: 1) that before pratisamkhyā, there is no obstacle to their arising; 2) but given pratisamkhyā, the dharmas, the arising of which has not been previously hindered, do not arise.

***

[iv. The Sarvāstivādins refute the Sautrāntikas.] If Nirvāṇa is simply non-arising (anutpāda), how does one explain the Sūtra (Sānyuktagama, TD 2, p. 182bd15) which says, "The cultivation of the five faculties,—faith, etc.,—has for its result the abandoning of past, present, and future suffering"? 387 In fact, this abandoning is nothing other than Nirvāṇa, and there can only be non-arising of a future dharma, not of a past or present dharma.

[1. The Sautrāntikas:] This Sūtra does not contradict our definition of Nirvāṇa. In fact, "the abandoning of past and present suffering" means the abandoning of the defilements bearing past and present suffering. Our interpretation is justified by another text (Sānyukta, TD 2, p.19a8?) which says, "Abandon desire (chandarāga) relative to rūpa, to sensation . . . and to consciousness. When desire is abandoned, rūpa, . . . and consciousness will be abandoned and comprehended by you." 389 It is in this manner that we should understand "the abandoning of past and present suffering" of which the Sūtra speaks when it speaks of the faculties.

If one adopts another reading of this Sūtra on the faculties, to wit, "The cultivation of the faculties . . . has for its result the abandoning of past, present, and future defilements," the explanation is the same.

Or rather, past defilement is the defilement of a previous existence; present defilement is the defilement of the present existence; these do not refer to the defilement of a given past or present moment. The same for the eighteen trṣṇāvicaritas (Anguttara, ii.212) or "modes of thirst": the modes (vicaritas) that are related to a past
existence are called past modes, those that are related to a present existence are called present modes, and those that are related to a future existence are called future modes.

Past defilements and present defilements place in the present series seeds that bring forth the arising of future defilement: when these seeds are abandoned, past and present defilement is abandoned: in the same way as one says that an action is exhausted when its retribution is exhausted.

The "abandoning" of future suffering and future defilement is the fact that they absolutely do not arise, given the absence of seeds.

How does one otherwise understand the abandoning of past or present suffering? There is no good reason to make an effort to destroy that which has perished or that which is perishing.

[2. The Sarvāstivādins:] If unconditioned things do not exist, how can the Sutra say "Detachment (virāga) is the best of all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas?" How can a dharma which does not exist be the best among the dharmas which do not exist? 390

[The Sautrāntikas:] We do not say that unconditioned things do not exist. They exist in fact in the manner in which we say that they exist. Let us explain. Before sound is produced, we say "There is non-existence (of sound) prior to the sound;" after the sound has perished, we say "There is non-existence (of sound) after the sound," and yet it had not been proven that non-existence exists: 391 the same holds for unconditioned things.

Although it is non-existent, one unconditioned thing merits being praised, namely detachment (virāga), the absolute future non-existence of any wrong. This non-existent thing is the most distinguished of all non-existent things. The Sūtra praises it by saying that it is the best, so that believers shall conceive joy and affection with regard to it.

[3. The Sarvāstivādins:] If pratisamkhyānirodha or Nirvāṇa is non-existent, how can it be one of the Truths. How can it be the Third Noble Truth?

What should we understand by "Noble Truth" or ārayasatya? Without doubt the sense of satya (Truth) is "not incorrect." The
Āryans see that which exists and that which does not exist in a not incorrect manner: in that which is suffering, they see only suffering, and in the non-existence of suffering, they see the non-existence of suffering. What contradiction do you find between the non-existence of suffering and pratisarākhyānirodha being a Truth?

And this non-existence is the Third Truth, because the Āryans see it and proclaim it immediately after the Second Truth.

[4. The Sarvāstivādins:] But if unconditioned things are non-existent, the consciousness that has space and the two `extinctions' for its object would have a non-thing for its object.

We do not see any inconvenience in this, as we shall explain in the discussion on the past and future (v.25).

[5. The Sarvāstivādins:] What harm do you see in maintaining that unconditioned things really exist? What advantage do you see in this?

This advantage that the Vaibhāṣika doctrine is found to be safeguarded.

May the gods be charged with defending this doctrine, if they judge that it is possible! But to maintain the existence of unconditioned things in and of themselves is to affirm a non-existent thing to be real. In fact, unconditioned things are not known through direct perception (pratyakṣa), as is the case for physical matter, sensation, etc.; and they are not known through inference (anumāna), by reason of their activity, as is the case for the sense organs.

6. Furthermore, if nirodha or extinction is a thing in and of itself, how do you justify the genitive, duḥkhasya nirodhaḥ, “the extinction of suffering,” as the extinction of the defilement, or the extinction of the object of defilement? In our system, the extinction of a thing is simply the non-existence of this thing. “Extinction of suffering” means that “suffering will not exist any more.” But we cannot conceive of any cause and effect relationship, of any effect and cause relationship, of a relationship of the whole to the part, etc., between the things, that is to say, the defilements, and its extinction conceived of as an entity in itself, which would justify the genitive.

We affirm, [answer the Sarvāstivādins,] that extinction is a thing in and of itself. Yet we can specify extinction as being in a relationship
with such things (extinction of lust, etc.), for one takes possession (prāpti, ii.37b) of extinction at the moment when one cuts off the possession of a certain thing.

But, we would answer, what is it that determines or specifies the taking of possession of extinction? 392

[7. The Sarvastivadins:] The Sutra speaks of the Bhikṣu who has obtained Nirvāṇa in this life. 393 If Nirvana is non-existence, how could he obtain it?

[The Sautrāntikas:] The Bhikṣu, through the possession of the adverse force of the antidote, that is, through the possession of the Path, has obtained a personality (āśraya) contrary to the defilements, and contrary to a new existence. This is why the Sūtra says that he has obtained Nirvāṇa.

8. Moreover we have a text that shows that Nirvāṇa is pure non-existence. The Sūtra (Sānyukta, TD 2, p. 88a7) 394 says, "The complete abandoning, the purification, the exhausting, the detachment, the extinction, the abatement, the definitive passing away of this suffering; and the non-rebirth, the non-grasping, the non-appearance of another suffering—this is calm, this is excellent, namely the rejection of all upadhi, the exhausting of thirst, detachment, extinction, Nirvāṇa."

[The Sarvāstivādins:] When the Sūtra says that Nirvāṇa is the non-appearance of a new suffering, the Sūtra means that there is no appearance of suffering in Nirvāṇa. 395

[The Sautrāntikas:] I do not see that the locative "in Nirvāṇa" has any force to establish that Nirvāṇa is a thing. In what sense do you understand the locative asmin? If this means asmin sati, "if Nirvāṇa exists, there is no appearance of suffering," then suffering would never appear, since Nirvāṇa is eternal. If this means asmin prāpta, "if Nirvāṇa has been obtained," you would have to admit that future suffering will not appear while the Path—by virtue of which you suppose that Nirvāṇa is obtained—either is, or rather has been obtained. 396

9. Consequently the comparison of the Sūtra is excellent, "The deliverance of his mind is like the Nirvāṇa of a flame." 397 That is to
say, as the extinction of a flame is only the "passing away" of the flame and not a certain thing in and of itself, so too is the deliverance of the mind of the Blessed One.

[10. The Sautrāntikas] are still warranted by the authority of the Abhidharma wherein we read, “What are the avastuka dharmas? They are the unconditioned things.” The term avastuka signifies "unreal," "without self-nature."

[The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this interpretation.] The term vastu, in fact, is used in five different meanings: 1. vastu in the sense of a thing in and of itself, for example, "When one has obtained this vastu (aśubhā, vi.11), one is in possession of the vastu" (Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 1026c11; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 985a22); 2. vastu in the sense of any object of consciousness, for example "All the dharmas are known through different knowledges, each knowing its own object" (Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 713c20); 3. vastu in the sense of "bond of attachment," for example, "Is the person who is bound to a vastu through the bond of affection, bound to this same vastu through the bond of hostility?" (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 298b-c); 4. vastu in the sense of cause, for example, "What are the dharmas possessing a cause? The conditioned dharmas" (Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 716a4); 5. vastu in the sense of "act of appropriating to oneself", for example, "vastu of fields, vastu of a house, vastu of a shop, vastu of riches: abandoning the act of appropriating these to himself, he renounces them" (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 288b5).

The Vaibhāṣikas conclude: In the passage that concerns us, vastu has the meaning of cause; avastuka signifies "that which has no cause." Unconditioned things, although real, always lack activity, have no cause which produces them, and produce no effects.

***

We must explain what type of result proceeds from each type of cause.

56a. Retribution is the result of the last cause.401
The last cause is the retributive cause, vipākabētu, because the retributive cause is named last in this list. The first result, vipākaphala (iii.57), is the result of this cause.

56b. The predominating result is the result of the first.⁴⁰²

The first cause is kāraṇabētu or reason for being; the last result proceeds from it.

This result is called adhipaja, arisen from predominence, or adhipata, belonging to predominance, because it is the result of the predominating cause (adhipatiphala, ii.58c-d). The kāraṇabētu is considered as playing the role of a master (adhipati).

But, we say, the quality of not creating an obstacle (anāvaraṇabhavevaṃtravasthāna, ii.50a) suffices to constitute kāraṇabētu. How can one regard it as a “predominating cause?”

Kāraṇabētu is either a “non-efficacious cause” and one then regards it as predominant because it creates no obstacle; or an “efficacious cause,” and one then regards it as predominant because it possesses mastery, a predominating and generating activity. For example, the ten āyatanas (form and the organ of sight, etc.) are predominant with regard to the five sense consciousnesses; the collective action of living beings is predominant with regard to the physical world.⁴⁰³ The organ of hearing exercises an indirect pre­dominence (ādhipatya) with regard to the visual consciousness, for, after having understood, a person experiences the desire to see. And thus following. (See ii.50a).

56c-d. Outflowing is the result of the similar cause and the universal cause.

An outflowing result (nisyandaphala) proceeds from sabhāgabētu (ii.52) and from sarvatragabētu (ii.54): for the result of these two causes is similar to its causes (ii.57c; iv.85).

56d. The pauruṣa or virile result, is the result of two causes.

The result of sabhāgabētu (ii.59) and samprayuktakabētu (ii.53c) is
called *prauruṣa* or virile, that is, the result of *puruṣakāra* or virile activity.

*Puruṣakāra* or virile activity is not distinct from the person himself, for action is not distinct from him who accomplished the action. The result of virile activity (*puruṣakāraprāphala*) can thus be termed the virile (*prauruṣa*) result.

What do we understand by “virile activity?”

The activity of a *dharma* is termed its virile activity (*puruṣakāra*), because it is similar to the activity of a person (*puruṣakāra*). In the same way, in the world, a certain plant is called *kākajangha*, because it resembles the foot of a crow; heros are called *mattahastin*, because they resemble an enraged elephant.

Are *samprayuktahetu* and *sabhābhyetu* the only causes that result in virile activity?

According to one opinion, all other causes have this type of result, with the exception of retributive causes (*vipākhetu*). This result is, in fact, either simultaneous to, or immediately following its cause; but such is not the case with a retributive result.

According to other Masters, a retributive cause also distantly results in virile activity, for example the fruits reaped by a laborer.

(Hence a *dharma* is 1) *nisyandaphala*, because it arises similar to its cause, 2) *puruṣakāraprāphala*, because it arises through the force of its cause, and 3) *adhipatiprāphala*, because it arises by reason of the “non-obstacle” of its cause.)

***

What are the characteristics of the different results?

57a. Retribution is a neutral *dharma*.

Retribution (*vipāka*) is an undefiled, neutral (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*) *dharma*.

Among the undefiled, neutral *dharmas*, some belong to living beings, while others do not belong to living beings. Consequently the author specifies
57b. Belonging to living beings.

that is, they arise in the series of living beings.

Some of those dharmas belonging to living beings are said to be of accumulation (aupacayika, having come from food, etc., i.37) and some are said to be of an outflowing (naisyandika, coming from a cause which is similar to them, i.37, ii.57c). Consequently the author specifies

57c. They arise later than a non-neutral dharma.

A non-neutral action is called this because it produces retribution; non-neutral actions are bad actions and good-impure (kusalasāsrava, ii.54c-d) actions. From actions of this nature there arises later,—not at the same time, and not immediately afterwards,—the result that one terms "retributive result" or "matured result" (vipākaphala).

Why not consider the dharmas that do not form part of living beings,—mountains, rivers, etc.,—as retributive results? Do they not arise from good or bad actions?

The dharmas that do not form part of living beings are, by nature, common in that everyone may partake of them. Now retributive results, by definition, are unique: another person never experiences the retributive results of actions that I accomplish. Action produces a "predominating result" (adhipatiphala) in addition to a retributive result: all beings experience this result in common, because the collectivity of their actions cooperate in their creation (see above, note 403).

57d. A result that resembles its cause is called outflowing.

A dharma resembling its cause is an outflowing result (naisyandaphala). Two causes, the similar cause and the universal cause (sabhāgahetu, ii.52, and sarvatragahetu, ii.54a-b) produce an outflowing result.

If the result of the universal cause is an outflowing result, a result similar to its cause, why not give the universal cause the name of similar cause?

A result of a universal cause is always similar to its cause 1) from
the point of view of the stage: like it, it belongs to Kāmaghātu, etc.; and 2) from the point of view of its moral character: like it, it is defiled.

But it can belong to a different category than the category of its cause. "Category" means the method of abandoning: it is susceptible of being abandoned by Seeing the Truth of Suffering, etc. (ii.52b). When there is a similarity between a cause and its result from this last point of view, the universal cause is at one and the same time a similar cause.

Four alternative cases present themselves:
1. A similar cause which is not a universal cause: for example, a non-universal defilement (rāga, etc.) related to the defilements of their own category;
2. A universal cause which is not a similar cause: the universal defilements related to a defilement of another category;
3. A universal cause which is also a similar cause: the universal defilements related to a defilement of their own category;
4. All other dharma are neither similar causes nor universal causes.⁴⁰⁶

57e. Extinction through intelligence is disconnection.

Disconnection (visamyoga) or visamyogaphala, "result that consists of disconnection" is extinction (kṣaya=nirodha) obtained by the speculative consciousness (dhī=prajñā). Visamyogaphala is hence pratisamkhyānirodha. (See above p. 280).

58a-b. A dharma is the result of the virile activity of the dharma through the force by which it arises.

This refers to a conditioned dharma.

Examples: the absorption of the First Dhyāna is the result of the virile activity of a mind in Kāmaghātu which instigates it or prepares it; the absorption of the Second Dhyāna is the result of the virile activity of a mind in the First Dhyāna.

A pure dharma can be the result of the virile activity of an impure dharma (the laukikāgradharma have duṣkhe dharmaṣānti for their result, vi.25c-d).
A mind that can create fictive beings (nirmāṇacittā) is the result of the virile activity of a mind in a Dhyāna (vii.48). And thus following. 407

Pratisamkhyaninrodha or Nirvāṇa is considered to be a “result of virile activity;” now the definition given in Karikā 58a-b does not apply to nirodha which, being eternal, does not arise. We say then that it is the result of the virile activity of the dharma by the force of which one obtains possession of it.

58c-d. Any conditioned dharma is the predominating result (adhīpatiphala) of conditioned dharmas, with the exception of the dharmas that are later than it. 408

What difference is there between the result of virile activity and a predominating result?
The first refers to the agent; the second refers to both the agent and the non-agent. For example, a created thing is the result of the virile activity and the predominating result of the artisan who created it; it is only the predominating result of what is not the artisan.

***

In what condition (avasthā)—the past, present, or future—is each of the causes (hetu) found when they grasp and when they produce their result?

[59. Five causes grasp their results in the present; two produce it in the present; two produce it in both past and present; and one produces it in the past. 409

What is understood by “grasping a result” and “producing a result?” 410

A dharma grasps a result when it become its seed. 411

A dharma produces a result at the moment when it gives this result the power of arising, that is, at the moment when, the future result being turned towards arising or is ready to arise, this dharma gives it the power that causes it to enter into the present.]
59a-b. Five causes grasp their result in the present.

Five causes grasp their results only when they are in the present: in the past, they have already grasped their results; in the future, they have no activity (v.25).

The same holds for kāraṇahetu; but the stanza does not mention it, because kāraṇahetu does not necessarily have a result.

59b. Two produce their result in the present.

The mutually coexistent cause (saḥabha) and the associated cause (saṃprayuktaka) produce their results only when they are in the present: these two causes in fact grasp and produce their results at the same time.

59c. Two produce their results in both the past and the present.

The similar cause (saḥhāga) and the universal cause (sarvatraga) produce their results both when they are in the present and when they are in the past.

How can they produce their outflowing results (nīsyanda, ii.56c) when they are in the present? We have seen (ii.52b, 54a) that they are earlier than their results.

One says that they produce their results in the present, because they produce them immediately. When their result has arisen, they are past: they have already produced it; they do not produce the same result twice. 412

***

i. It happens that, at a given moment, a good similar cause (saḥhāgahetu) grasps a result but does not produce a result. Four alternatives: to grasp, to produce, to grasp and to produce, and to neither grasp nor to produce. 413

1. The possession of the roots of good that the person who has cut off the roots of good (iv.80a) abandons at the last moment, grasps a result, but does not produce a result. 414
2. The possession of the roots of good that the person who again takes up the roots of good (iv.80c) acquires in the first moment, produces a result, but does not grasp a result.

We must say: This same possession,—the possession abandoned at the last moment by the person who has cut off the roots of good,—produces its result, but does not grasp it at the moment when this person again takes up the roots of good.

3. The possession of the person whose roots of good are not cut off—with the exception of the two proceeding cases: that of the person who has achieved cutting them off, and that of the person who again takes up the roots of good—both grasp and produce.

4. In all other cases, possession neither grasps nor produces: for example, the possession of the roots of good of a person whose roots of good are cut off; the possession of the roots of good of a superior stage by a person who has fallen from this stage: these possessions have already grasped their result, and hence do not grasp it any more; they do not produce it, since the person cannot have possession of these roots at the present time.

ii. The Vibbāśā establishes the same alternatives with respect to bad similar causes:

1. The possession of the bad dharmas that a person who obtains detachment from desire abandons at the last moment.

2. The possession that a person who fell from detachment acquires in the first moment.

We must say: These same possessions, when a person falls from detachment.

3. The possession of a person who is not detached, with the exception of the two preceding cases.

4. Possession in all other cases: for example the possession of a person detached and not subject to falling.

iii. There are also four alternatives regarding defiled-neutral similar causes:

1. The last possession of defiled-neutral dharmas that the saint who becomes an Arhat abandons.

2. The first possession that a fallen Arhat acquires.
Or better: the aforementioned possession of an Arhat who has fallen.

3. The possession of a non-detached person in Bhavāgra, the two preceding cases being excluded.

4. Possession in all other cases: the possession of an Arhat.

   iv. When an undefiled-neutral similar cause produces its result, it grasps it (for the undefiled-neutral lasts until Nirvāṇa), but it can grasp its result without producing it: for example, in the case of the last skandhas of an Arhat which have no outflowing (nisyanda).

   v. We have up to now considered the dharmas that are not "subject to consciousness" (sālambana). If we consider the mind and its mental states in their successive moments, we can establish the four following alternatives for good similar causes:

   1. It grasps but does not produce. When a good mind is immediately followed by a defiled or undefiled-neutral mind, this good mind, as a similar cause, grasps, that is, projects an outflowing result, namely a good future mind, which is or is not destined to arise; it does not produce an outflowing result, since the mind that follows it, defiled or undefiled-neutral, is not the outflowing of a good mind.

   2. It produces but does not grasp. When a good mind immediately follows a defiled or undefiled-neutral mind, a good earlier mind produces an outflowing result, namely the good mind that we have just considered; this earlier mind does not grasp a result, since it grasped it formerly.

   3. It grasps and it produces. Two good minds follow one another, the first grasping and producing an outflowing result, which is the second mind.

   4. It neither grasps nor produces. When defiled or undefiled-neutral minds succeed one another, the earlier good mind, as a similar cause, formerly grasped its result and shall later produce its result; but for an instant it neither grasps nor produces.

   We can in like manner establish the alternatives regarding bad similar causes.

59d. One cause produces its result in the past.
The retributive cause produces its result when it is in the past, for this result is not simultaneous to, nor immediately following its cause.

***

Some other Masters, [the scholars of the West (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 630b15)] say that there are four results different from the five results that we have just mentioned. These four are:

1. *pratiṣṭhāphala*, a base result: a circle of water is the result of the circle of wind (iii.45) and thus following to plants, which are the result of earth;

2. *prayogaphala*, a result of preparatory exercise: *anutpādajñāna*, etc. (vi.50) is the result of *subhā*, etc. (vi.11);

3. *sāmagriphala*, a result of a complex: the visual consciousness is the result of the organ of sight, of a visible thing, of light and of an act of attention (*Madhyamakavṛtti*, 454);

4. *bhāvanāphala*, a result of meditation: a mind capable of creating fictive beings (vii.48) is the result of a Dhyāna.

[According to the Sarvāstivādins,] the first of these four results is included in the category of the predominant result; the other three are included in the category of virile result.

***

We have explained causes and results. We must now examine how many causes produce the different *dharmas*.

From this point of view, the *dharmas* are ranged into four categories: 1. defiled *dharmas*, that is, the defilements, the *dharmas* associated with a defilement, and the *dharmas* having their origins in a defilement (iv.8); 2. retributive *dharmas* or *dharmas* arisen from a retributive cause (*vipākahetu*, ii.54c); 3. the first pure *dharmas*, that is, *duḥkhe dharmajñānakśānti* (i.38b, vi.27) and the *dharmas* coexistent with this *kśānti*; and 4. the other *dharmas*, that is, the neutral *dharmas*, with the exception of the *dharmas* of retribution, and the good *dharmas*, with the exception of the first pure *dharmas*. 
60-61b. The mind and its mental states are: 1) defiled; 2) arisen from a retributive cause; 3) others; and 4) pure for the first time, arising from causes that remain when one excludes, in this order, 1) the retributive cause, 2) the universal cause, 3) these two causes, 4) these two causes plus the similar cause. The associated cause is further excluded with respect to the dharmas that are not mind or mental states.

The mind and its mental states, 1) when they are defiled, arise from five causes excluding the retributive cause; 2) when they are retributive, they arise from five causes with the exclusion of the universal cause; 3) when they are different from these two categories and from the fourth, they arise from four causes, with the exclusion of the retributive cause and the universal cause; 4) when they are pure for the first time, they arise from three causes, with the exclusion of the aforementioned two causes and the similar cause.

The dharmas that are not mind or mental states, namely the material dharmas and the saṃskāras not associated with the mind (ii.35), accordingly as they fall into one of four categories, arising from causes proper to this category with the exclusion of the associated causes are: defiled and retributive, four causes; different, three causes; pure for the first time (anāsravasarāvīvara, iv.13), two causes.

These is no dharma that comes from a single cause: the reason for being and the mutually coexistent cause are never absent.

***

We have explained causes (hetu). What are conditions (pratyaya)?

61c. The pratyayas are said to be four.

Where is this said?

In the Sūtra, it says "There are four conditions (pratyayas), namely causes as a condition (hetupratyayatā), an equal and immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyayatā), an object as condition (ālambanapratyayatā), and a predominating influence as condition (adhipatipratyayatā)."
Pratyayatā means "a type of pratyaya."\textsuperscript{418}  

***

What is "cause as a condition"?

61d. The pratyaya that bears the name of hetu is five hetus.

Excepting kāraṇahetu, the five remaining hetus constitute hetu-pratyayatā, causes as condition.

***

What is "an equal and immediately antecedent condition"?

62a-b. The mind and its mental states that have arisen, with the exception of the last ones, are an equal and immediately antecedent condition.

If one excepts the last mind and the last mental states of the Arhat at the moment of Nirvāṇa, all minds and mental states which have arisen are an equal and immediately antecedent condition.

i. Only mind and mental states are equal and immediately antecedent conditions. Of what dharmas are they the equal and immediately antecedent conditions?

1. This type of condition is called samanantara (equal and immediately antecedent) because it produces equal (sama) and immediate (anantara) dharmas. The prefix sam is understood in the sense of equality.

Consequently\textsuperscript{419} only minds and their mental states are equal and immediately antecedent conditions, for there is no equality between a cause and its result with respect to the other dharmas, for example the material dharmas. In fact, after a rūpa of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, there can arise at the same time two rūpas, one of Kāmadhātu, the other from Rūpadhātu\textsuperscript{420}, or two rūpas, one from Kāmadhātu, the other pure;\textsuperscript{421} whereas one mind in Kāmadhātu and one mind in Rūpadhātu can never arise at the same time after a mind in
Kāmadhātu. The appearance of the rūpas is confused: now an equal and immediately antecedent condition does not produce confused results; hence material dharmas are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions.

Vasumitra says: A second rūpa of accumulation can arise in the same body, without which the series of a rūpa of accumulation would be broken; hence rūpa is not an equal and immediately antecedent condition.\textsuperscript{422}

The Bhadanta\textsuperscript{423} says: A rūpa dharma is immediately followed by more or by less. Hence it is not an equal and immediately antecedent condition. Less arises from more: as when a great mass of straw, burned, becomes ash. More arises from less: as when a small seed produces the roots of a fig tree, its trunk, its branches, and its leaves.

2. [Objection:] When minds immediately succeed one another, do they always admit the same number of types of associated mental states? No. The earlier mind admits of a larger number of types of mental states, and the following mind, a lesser number; and vice versa. Minds, good, bad, or neutral, succeed one another; but they do not admit of the same number of associated mental states (ii.28-30); the absorptions, which succeed one another, admit of or do not admit of vitarka and vicāra (viii.7). Hence there is no equality for the mental states as well as for the material dharmas (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 52a21).

That is true: there is a succession from less to more, and vice versa (second opinion of the Vibhāṣa); but only by the accumulation or the diminution of the number of types of mental states (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 50c5). There is never any inequality with respect to a determined type: more numerous sensations never arise after less numerous sensations, nor vice versa; this means that a mind accompanied by a single sensation is never followed by a mind associated with two or three sensations. The same for ideas (samjñā) and the other mental states.

Thus is it only in relation to its own type that an earlier mental state is an equal and immediately antecedent condition of a later mental state? Is sensation then the equal and immediately antecedent condition of a single sensation?
No. In a general way the earlier mental states are equal and immediately antecedent conditions of the mental states that follow, and only of the mental states of their type. But there is no succession from less to more with respect to one type, and vice versa: this justifies the expression *samanantara*, "equal and immediate."

3. The Ābhidhārmikas who take the name of Sāṃtānasabhāgikas (*Vibhaśa, TD* 27, p. 50c5) maintain on the contrary that a *dharma* of a certain type is only an equal and immediately antecedent condition of a *dharma* of that same type: mind arises from mind, sensation arises from sensation, etc.

[Objection:] In this hypothesis, when a defiled (*kliṣṭa=akuśala* or *nivṛtvāvyākṛta*) *dharma* arises after an undefiled *dharma*, this defiled *dharma* does not proceed from an equal and immediately antecedent condition.

It is a previously destroyed defilement that is the equal and immediately antecedent condition of the defilement that defiles this second *dharma*. The previous defilement is considered as immediately preceding the later defilement, even though it is separated by an undefiled *dharma*, separation by a *dharma* of a different nature does not constitute separation, as the leaving-mind of the absorption of extinction (*niruddhasamāpatti*, ii.43a) has for its equal and immediately antecedent condition the mind-of-entry-into-absorption which was previously destroyed: absorption does not constitute a separation.

We think that the theory of the Sāṃtānasabhāgikas is inadmissible, for, in this theory, a pure mind produced for the first time (i.38b) would not have any equal and immediately antecedent condition.

4. The *samskāras* dissociated from the mind (*viprayukta*, ii.35), like the material *dharmas*, are produced disparately: hence they are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions. In fact after possession in the sphere of Kāmadhātu, possession relative to the *dharmas* of the three spheres of existence and to pure *dharmas* etc., can be produced at the same time.

ii. Why deny that the future *dharmas* are equal and immediately antecedent conditions?

*Future dharmas* are disparate: there is not, among them, any early
and later (see p. 266).  

A. Then how does the Blessed One know that such and such a future dharma will arise first, and that such and such a dharma will arise later? He knows the order of the arising of all that arises until the end of time.

1. First answer. His consciousness results from an inference (anumāna) drawn from the past and the present. He sees the past: "From such a type of action such a retributive result arises; such a dharma proceeds from such a dharma;" and he sees the present: "Here is such a type of action: such a retributive result shall arise in the future from this action; here is such a dharma: such a dharma shall proceed from this dharma."

However the consciousness of the Blessed One is called pranidhi-jñāna (vii.37), and is not a consciousness from inference. By means of inferences drawn from the past and from the present, the Blessed One immediately sees the dharma that resides, disparately, in the future, and he produces the consciousness, "This man, having accomplished such an action, shall certainly receive such a future retribution."

To believe you, if the Blessed One does not consider the past, then he does not know the future. Hence he is not omniscient.

2. According to other Masters, there is in the series of beings a certain dharma which is the indication of the results which will arise in the future, namely a certain saṃskāra disassociated from the mind. The Blessed One contemplates it, and he knows future results without his having cultivated the Dhyānas and the Abhijñās (vii.42; cyutypapādajñāna) for it.

The Sautrāntikas: If this is the case, then the Blessed One would be an interpreter of signs; he would not be a "seer."

3. Consequently the Blessed One knows immediately and at his will all things, not be inference, and not by divination. This is the opinion of the Sautrāntikas, justified by the word of the Blessed One (Ekottara, TD 2, p.640a4; comp. Dīgha, i.31), "The qualities of the Buddhas, the spheres of the Buddhas, are incomprehensible."

B. If the future does not have any earlier or later division of time, how can one say, "Only duhkhe dharma jñānaaksanti arises immediately
after the *laukika agradharmas*, and not any other *dharma*" (vi.27) and thus following until "Kṣayajñāna arises immediately after *vajropamusāmādhi* (vi.46c)?"

[The Vaibhāṣikas (*Vibhāṣa, TD* 27, p. 51bl) answer:] If the arising of this *dharma* is bound to that *dharma*, then immediately after that, this arises, as a bud arises after the seed without any equal and immediately antecedent condition intervening.

iii. Why are the last mind and the last mental states of the Arhat equal and immediately antecedent conditions (*Vibhāṣa, TD* 27, 50a22)?

Because no mind or mental states arise after them.

But you have said (i.17) that the *manas* is the mind that is disappearing and which serves as the support of the following mind. Since no mind follows the last mind of an Arhat, this last mind should not receive either the name of *manas*, or the name of equal and immediately antecedent condition; and yet you consider it as being *manas*.

The case is not the same. That which constitutes the *manas* is not its activity, the fact of supporting the susequent mind; rather, it is the quality of being a support (*āśraya*) for this mind; whether his (latter mind) arises or does not arise is of little importance. The last mind of an Arhat is “support:” if a subsequent mind, which would be supported by this support, does not arise, it is through the lack of other causes necessary to its arising. On the contrary, what constitutes an equal and immediately antecedent condition is its activity. Once this condition has grasped or projected a result, nothing in the world can hinder this result from arising. Hence the last mind of an Arhat is justly called *manas*, but not an equal and immediately antecedent condition.

iv. Does a *dharma* which is *cittasamanantara*, that is, which has a certain mind (*cittanirantarā*) for its equal and immediate antecedent condition, immediately follow this mind?432

There are four alternatives:

1. The mind and the mental states of leaving of the two absorptions free from mind (ii.41), and all the moments of these two absorptions with the exception of the first, have the mind entering into absorption for their equal and immediately antecedent condition,
but they do not immediately follow this mind (ii.64b).

2. The characteristics (lakṣaṇas, ii.45c) 1) of the first moment of the two absorptions, and 2) of all minds and all mental states of a conscious state, immediately follow a mind, but do not have any equal and immediately antecedent condition.

3. The first moment of the two absorptions, and all minds and mental states of a conscious state, have the mind that they immediately follow for their equal and immediately antecedent condition.

4. The characteristics 1) of all the moments of the two absorptions with the exception of the first, and 2) of the mind and the mental states of leaving these two absorptions, have no equal and immediately antecedent condition, for they are dharmas disassociated from the mind (viprayuktā, ii.35); and they do not immediately follow a mind.

***

What is an objea as condition?

62c. All dharmas are the objects of consciousness.

All the dharmas, conditioned as well as unconditioned, are "objects of consciousness" of the mind and its mental states, but not indiscriminately so. For example, the visual consciousness and the mental states, sensation, etc., which are associated with it, have all visible things for their object; the hearing consciousness, sounds; the smelling consciousness, odors; and the touch consciousness, tangible things. The mental consciousness and the mental states that are associated with it have all the dharmas for their objects. (Kārikā 62c is then understood literally with respect to the manas).

When a dharma is the object of a mind, it is not possible that this dharma, at any moment, is not the object of this mind. This means that even if a visible object is not grasped as an object by the visual consciousness, it is an object, for, whether it is grasped or not grasped as an object, its nature remains the same, as fuel is combustible, even when it is not on fire.

We can establish a threefold determination in considering the
problem from the point of view of the mind that grasps a dharma as its object. The mind is determined 1) with regard to its āyatana: for example, a visual consciousness is supported only on a visible thing (rūpa-āyatana); 2) with regard to the dravya or substantial thing: a certain visual consciousness, the consciousness of blue, of red, etc., is supported by blue, red, etc. (see i.10); and 3) with regard to a moment (ksaṇa): a certain visual consciousness is supported in a certain moment of blue.

Is the mind determined in the same way with regard to its support (āśraya), that is, its organ, the organ of sight, etc.?

The response is affirmative. However, in the present, the mind is bound to its support; but in the past and the future, it is separated from it.

According to others, it is bound to its support in both the past and the present.

***

What is a predominating condition?

62d. The cause termed kāraṇa is called adhipati, predominant.

Adhipatipratyaya or predominating condition is kāraṇahetu, the “reason for being” cause (ii.50a), for kāraṇahetu is a “predominating condition” (adhipatipratyaya).

This name is justified from two points of view. The predominating condition is that which belongs to the greatest number of dharmas, and which is exercised with respect to the greatest number of dharmas.

1. All the dharmas are “an object as condition” of the mental consciousness. However the dharmas coexisting with a certain mind are not the object of this mind, whereas they are kāraṇahetu of it. Thus the dharmas, without exception, are “predominating conditions” as kāraṇahetu, not as “an object as condition.”

2. Every dharma has all dharmas for its kāraṇahetu, with the exception of itself.

No dharma of any type is a condition of itself. And a conditioned
dharma is not a condition of an unconditioned dharma, and vice versa.

***

In what state (avasthā), past, present, or future, are the dharmas found with regard to which the diverse conditions exercise their activity?

Let us first examine cause as condition, that is, as five causes, with the exclusion of karaṇahetu.

63a-b. Two causes exercise their activity with regard to a perishing dharma.⁴³⁵

"Perishing" means "of the present." A present dharma is called "perishing," "in the act of perishing," because, having arisen, it is turned towards its destruction.

Sahabhūḥetu (ii.50b) and samprayuktahetu (53c) operate with regard to a present dharma, because they operate with regard to a dharma that arises at the same time as they do.⁴³⁶

63b-c. Three, with regard to an arising dharma.

"An arising dharma" means a future dharma, because a future dharma, not having arisen, is turned towards arising.

The three causes in question are sabbhāgahetu (ii.52a), sarvatra-gahetu (54a), and vipākahetu (54c).

Concerning the other conditions:

63c-d. Two other conditions, in reverse order.

First in the list of conditions there comes the equal and immediately antecedent condition: it exercises it activity as do the three causes, namely with regard to an arising dharma, for the minds and mental states of a given moment cede their place to the mind and mental states which are arising.

Next in the list there comes an object as condition: it exercises its activity as do the two causes, namely with regard to a perishing dharma: this perishing dharma is mind and mental states, the "subjects
of the consciousness” (ālambaka), which, perishing,—that is, of the present,—grasp a present object.

The activity of predominant influence as a condition only consists in not creating any obstacle either to a past, present, or future dharma.

***

The different types of dharmas arise by reason of how many conditions?

64a. The mind and its mental states arise by reason of four conditions.437

1. Causes as conditions: the five causes; 2. equal and immediately antecedent condition: the earlier mind and mental states, which have arisen not separated by other minds or mental states; 3. an object as condition: the five objects of which physical matter is the first, or, in the case of the mental consciousness, all the dharmas; and 4. a predominating influence as condition: all the dharmas, except the mind and its mental states whose arising is under consideration.

64b. The two absorptions, by reason of three.

One must exclude the object as condition, because the absorption of non-consciousness (ii.42) and the absorption of extinction (ii.43) do not grasp an object. We have: 1. causes as conditions: two causes, sahabhūbetu (the laksānas, arising, etc. ii.45c, of the absorption), and sabbhāgabhetu (the good former dharmas, already arisen, belonging to the stage of absorption, that is, to the Fourth Dhyāna or to Bhavāgra, according to the case); 2. an equal and immediately antecedent condition, the mind of entry into the absorption and the mental states that are associated with this mind; the mind of entry is not separated by any mind of any of the moments of the absorption; and 3. the predominating influence as condition, as above.

These two absorptions arise from an application, from an inflection of the mind: they then have the mind as an equal and immediately antecedent condition. They hinder the arising of the mind: thus they
are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions of the mind leaving the absorption, even though they are immediately contiguous to it (nirantara, see p. 301).

64c. The other dharmas, by reason of two.

The other dharmas, namely the other samskāras disassociated form the mind and the material dharmas, arise by reason of the causes as conditions and the predominating influence as condition (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 702b21).

All the dharmas that arise arise by reason of the five causes and the four conditions that we have just explained. The world does not proceed from a single cause that is called God, or Puruṣa, or Pradhāna, or any other name.438

How do you prove this thesis?
If you think that the thesis is proven through arguments, you betray your doctrine that the world arises from a single cause.

64d. Not from God or from any other cause, since there is a succession, etc.439

That things are produced by a single cause, by God, Mahadeva, or Vāsudeva, is inadmissible for many reasons.

1. If things were produced by a single cause, they would arise all at the same time: now each of us knows that they arise successively.

[The Theist:] They arise successively by virtue of the desires of God, who says, "May this arise now! May this perish now! May this arise and perish later!"

If this were the case, then things do not arise from a single cause, since the desires (of God) are multiple. Moreover these multiple desires would have to be simultaneous, since God, the cause of these desires, is not multiple, and things would all arise at the same time.

a. [ The Theist:] The desires of God are not simultaneous, because God, in order to produce his desires, takes into account other causes.
If this were so, then God is not the single unique cause of all things. And the causes that God takes into account are produced successively: they depend then on causes which are themselves dependent on other causes: an infinite regression.

[The Theist:] It is admitted that the series of causes has no beginning.

This would admit that *samsāra* does not have an origin. You then abandon the doctrine of a single cause and return to the Buddhist theory of causes (*hetus*) and conditions (*pratyaya*).

b. [The Theist:] The desires of God are simultaneous, but things do not arise at the same time because they arise as God wishes them to arise, that is, in succession.

This is inadmissible. The desires of God remain what they are. Let us explain. Suppose that God desires “May this arise now! May that arise later!” We do not see why the second desire, at first non-efficacious, will be efficacious later; why, if it is efficacious later, it will not be so initially.

What advantage does God obtain from this great effort by which he produces the world?

[The Theist:] God produces the world for his own satisfaction (*prūti*).

He is then not God, the Sovereign (*īśvara*), in what concerns his own satisfaction, since he cannot realize it without a means (*upāya*). And if he is not sovereign with regard to his own satisfaction, how can he be sovereign with regard to the world? Further, do you say that God finds satisfaction in seeing the creatures that he has created in the prey of all the sufferings of existence, including the tortures of the hells? Homage to this God! Well said, in truth, is the popular stanza, “He is called Rudra because he burns, because he is excited, ferocious, terrible, an eater of flesh, blood, and marrow.”

3. The followers of God, the single cause of the world, deny visible causes,—causes and conditions,—the efficacy of the seed with regard to the sprout, etc. If, modifying their position, they admit the existence of these causes, and pretend that these causes serve God as auxiliaries, this then is no more that a pious affirmation, for we do not maintain
any activity of a cause besides the activity of the so-called secondary causes. Furthermore, God would not be sovereign with regard to auxiliary causes, since these cooperate in the production of the effect through their own efficacy. Perhaps, in order to avoid the negation of causes, which are visible, and in order to avoid the affirmation of present action by God, which is not visible, the Theist would say that the work of God is creation: but creation, dependent only on God, would never have a beginning, like God himself, and this is a consequence that the Theist rejects.

We would refute the doctrine of Puruṣa, of Pradhāna, etc., as we have refuted the theist doctrine, mutatis mutandis. Thus, no dharma arises from a single cause.

Alas, persons are unclear! Like the birds and the animals, truly worth of pity, they go from existence to existence, accomplishing diverse actions; they experience the results of these actions and falsely believe that God is the cause of these results. (We must explain the Truth in order to put an end to this false conception.)

***

We have seen (ii.64c) that the material dharmas arise by reason of two conditions, causes as conditions and predominating influences as conditions. We must specify and see how the primary elements (bhūtas or mahābhūtas), and the dharmas of derived matter (upādāyarūpa or bhautikas), are causes as conditions, either among themselves, or one from the other.

65a. The primary elements are the cause of the derived elements in two ways.

The four primary elements of earth, etc., are causes of the four primary elements in the quality of similar causes (sabhāgabetu), and of mutually coexistent causes (sabhābhubetu).

65b. And of the derived elements, in five ways.

The four primary elements are causes of the derived elements—
color, taste, etc.—in five ways, in the quality of janana, nisraya, pratiṣṭhā, upastambha, and upābṛmhaṇahetu.\textsuperscript{444}

Jananaḥetu or generating cause, because the derived elements arise from them, like a child from his parents.\textsuperscript{445}

Nisrayahetu or tutelage cause, because the bhautikas, once arisen, submerge their influence, as a monk is under the tutelage of his Ācārya and his Upādhyāya.

Pratiṣṭhāhetu or supporting cause, because the derived elements are supported by them, as a picture is supported by a wall.\textsuperscript{446}

Upastambhahetu or maintaining cause, because the primary elements are the cause of the non-interruption of the derived elements.

Upābṛmhaṇahetu or growth cause, because the primary elements are the cause of the development of the derived elements.

This means that the primary elements (bhūtas) are, with regard to the derived elements (bhautikas), the cause of arising (janmahetu), the cause of transformation (vikārahetu), the supporting cause (ādhārahetu), the cause of duration (sthitihetu), and the cause of development (vṛddhibetu).

65c. Derived elements are the cause of the derived elements in three ways.

In the quality of sahabhū, sabhāga and vipākahetu. We do not mention kāraṇahetu, for any dharma is a kāraṇahetu of any other dharma.

1. The actions of the body and voice of the category described in ii.51a (i.e., the two disciplines), which are derived elements, are sahabbhūhetu.

2. All the derived elements which have arisen, are, with regard to similar (sabhāga) derived elements, sabhāgahetu.

3. The actions of the body and voice are vipākahetu: the eye is produced through retribution of action, etc.

65d. And the cause of the primary elements, in one way.

The actions of the body and voice produce the primary elements as a retributive result: they are then vipākahetu.
We have seen that antecedent minds and mental states are the equal and immediately antecedent condition of subsequent minds and mental states. But we have not explained how many types of mind arise immediately after each type of mind.

In order to define its role, we must first establish a classification of the mind.

First, we must distinguish twelve categories.

66a. Good, bad, defiled-neutral, undefiled-neutral minds in Kāmadhātu.\textsuperscript{447}

Four types of minds belong to Kāmadhātu: good, bad, defiled-neutral, and undefiled-neutral.

66b. Good defiled-neutral, undefiled-neutral minds in Rūpadhātu and in Ārūpyadhātu.

Three types of minds are in the two higher spheres: all of the above, excluding the bad mind.

66c. And two pure minds.

The two pure minds are those of the Šaikṣa and the Arhat or Aśaikṣa. In all, these constitute twelve minds.

[These twelve minds do not indiscriminately arise one after the other:]

67a. Nine types of minds can arise after a good mind in Kāmadhātu.\textsuperscript{448}

1. Immediately after a good mind in Kāmadhātu there can arise nine minds, namely: (1-4) the four minds in Kāmadhātu; (5-6) two minds in Rūpadhātu: good, when a ascetic enters into absorption, and defiled-neutral, when a person who dies in Kāmadhātu with a good mind passes into the intermediate existence of Rūpadhātu (iii.38); (7) a mind in Ārūpyadhātu, a defiled-neutral mind, when one dying in Kāmadhātu is reborn in Ārūpyadhātu; not good, for, since Ārūpya-
dhātu is estranged from Kāmadhātu by four estrangements,⁴⁴⁹ one cannot pass directly from Kāmadhātu into an absorption of Ārūpyadhātu; (8-9) the two pure minds, of Śaikṣa or of Āśaikṣa, at entry into the Understanding of the Truths (vi.27).

67b. Such a [good] mind can arise after eight types of minds.

2. A good mind can arise immediately after eight minds, namely: (1-4) the four minds in Kāmadhātu, (5-6) two minds in Rūpadhātu, good and defiled-neutral minds, upon leaving an absorption. It happens in fact that an ascetic, bothered by a defiled (kliśṭa) absorption, leaves this absorption: after the defiled (kliśṭa=nivrta) mind, which is this absorption, he produces a good mind of a lower stage (viii.14); and (7-8) two pure minds, of Śaikṣa or Āśaikṣa, upon leaving the Understanding of the Truths.

67c. A bad mind can arise after ten types of minds.

3. A kliśṭa mind, that is to say, a bad and a defiled-neutral mind can arise after ten minds—excluding the two pure minds, for a mind of rebirth into Kāmadhātu is defiled (ii.14, iii.38) and can follow any kind of mind belonging to the three spheres of existence.

67d. Four types of minds can arise after such a (= bad) mind.

4. Four minds can arise after a kliśṭa mind, namely the four minds of Kāmadhātu.

67e. The same for a defiled-neutral mind.

5. An undefiled-neutral mind can arise after five minds.

68a. An undefiled-neutral mind can arise after five types of mind.

Namely the four minds in Kāmadhātu, plus a good mind in Rūpadhātu: for a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nimāṇacitta) in Kāmadhātu, a mind that has for its object the creation of an object of Kāmadhātu, follows a good mind in Rūpadhātu.
68b. Seven types of mind can arise after an undefiled-neutral mind.

6. After an undefiled-neutral mind there can arise seven minds, namely: (1-4) the four minds in Kāmadhātu, (5-6) two minds in Rūpadhātu, good minds, for, after the aforementioned mind of creation, a good mind reappears in Rūpadhātu, and a defiled-neutral mind, when a person, dying with this mind, is reborn in Rūpadhātu the first mind of which is necessarily a defiled-neutral mind (iii.38); (7) a mind of Ārūpyadhātu, a defiled-neutral mind, when a person, dying with this mind, is reborn in Ārūpyadhātu.

68c. In Rūpadhātu eleven types of minds can arise after a good mind.

1. Eleven minds, excluding an undefiled-neutral mind in Rūpadhātu, can arise immediately after a good mind in Rūpadhātu.

68d. A good mind can arise after nine types of minds.

2. A good mind can arise after nine minds, excluding the two defiled minds in Kāmadhātu (bad and defiled-neutral) and an undefiled-neutral mind in Ārūpyadhātu.

69a. A defiled-neutral mind can arise after eight types of minds.

3. A defiled-neutral mind can arise after eight minds, excluding the two defiled minds in Kāmadhātu and the two pure minds.

69b. Six types of minds can arise after a defiled-neutral mind.

4. Six minds can arise after a defiled-neutral mind, namely the three minds in Rūpadhātu, and the good, bad, and defiled-neutral minds in Kāmadhātu.

69c. An undefiled-neutral mind can arise after three types of mind.

5. An undefiled-neutral mind can arise after the three minds in Rūpadhātu.
69d. Six types of mind can arise after such a (defiled-neutral) mind.

6. Six minds can arise after an undefiled-neutral mind, namely: (1-3) the three minds in Rūpadhātu, (4-5) the two defiled minds in Kāmadhātu (bad and defiled-neutral), and (6) the defiled mind in Arupyadhatu (defiled-neutral).

69e. As above, so too in Ārūpyadhātu, for these (undefiled-neutral minds).

1. An undefiled-neutral mind in Ārūpyadhātu can arise after the three minds of this sphere.

2. Six minds can arise after an undefiled-neutral mind in Ārūpyadhātu, namely: (1-3) the three minds of this sphere, and (4-6) the defiled minds in Kāmadhātu (two) and Rūpadhātu (one).

70a. Nine types of minds can arise after a good mind.

3. Nine minds can arise after a good mind, with the exception of a good mind in Kāmadhātu and an undefiled-neutral mind in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu.

70b. Such a (good mind) can arise after six types of mind.

4. A good mind can arise after six minds, namely (1-3) the three minds in Ārūpyadhātu, (4) a good mind in Rūpadhātu, and (5-6) the two pure minds.

70c. Seven types of minds can arise after a defiled-neutral mind.

5. Seven minds can arise after a defiled-neutral mind, namely (1-3) the three minds in Ārūpyadhātu, (4) a good mind in Rūpadhātu, (5-6) two defiled minds in Kāmadhātu, and (7) a defiled mind in Rūpadhātu.

70d. And the same for it.

6. A defiled-neutral mind can arise after seven minds, with the exception of the two defiled minds in Kāmadhātu, a defiled mind in Rūpadhātu and the two pure minds.
70e. A Šaikṣa mind can arise after four types of minds.

A Šaikṣa mind, the mind belonging to the saint who is not an Arhat, can arise after four minds, namely a Šaikṣa mind and a good mind in each of the three spheres.

70f. But five types of minds can arise after such (a Šaikṣa mind).

Five minds can arise after a Šaikṣa mind, namely the four that have just been named and an Aśaikṣa mind.

70g. An Aśaikṣa mind can arise after five types of minds.

An Aśaikṣa mind can arise after five minds, namely after a Šaikṣa mind, an Aśaikṣa mind, and a good mind of each of the three spheres.

71a. Four types of minds can arise after such (an Aśaikṣa mind).

Four minds can arise after an Aśaikṣa mind, namely an Aśaikṣa mind and a good mind of each of three spheres.

The twelve types of mind succeed one another in conformity with these rules.

And again,

71b. The twelve types of mind make twenty.

How is this?

71c. By dividing the good mind of the three Dhātus into two, the acquired and the innate minds.

1. A good mind of each of the three spheres is divided into two categories, 1.) that acquired through effort,⁴⁵⁰ and 2.) that acquired by birth.⁴⁵¹ [We then have six types of good mind corresponding to three types of the first list.]

72a. By dividing an undefiled-neutral mind in Kāmadhātu into four: the retributive mind, the mind of attitude, the mind of application, and a mind that can create fictive beings.
An undefiled-neutral mind of Kāmadrātu is divided into four categories: a.) arisen from a retributive cause (vipākāja, ii.57); b.) relative to attitudes (airyāpathika), walking, standing, sitting, lying down; c.) relative to the arts (sailpasthānika);\(^{452}\) and c.) relative to fictive creations: the mind by which a possessor of supernatural power creates visible things, etc., is called the result of abbijñā (abbijñāphala, vii.49) (see above p. 270).

72b. By excluding the undefiled-neutral mind of application in Rūpadhātu.

An undefiled-neutral mind in Rūpadhātu is divided into only three categories, for sailpasthānika does not exist in this sphere.

[There is no reason to divide the undefiled-neutral mind of Ārūpyadhātu, for it is exclusively arisen from a retributive cause.]

We then have seven types of undefiled-neutral minds corresponding to the two undefiled-neutral minds of the first list. By taking into account the good minds, we obtain a total of twenty.

Three undefiled-neutral minds, the airyāpathika mind and following, have visible things, odors, taste, and tangible things for their object.\(^{453}\) The sailpasthānika mind, furthermore, has sound for its object.\(^{454}\)

These three undefiled-neutral minds are solely mental consciousnesses. However the five sense consciousnesses precede and prepare the airyāpathika and sailpasthānika minds.\(^{455}\)

According to another opinion,\(^{456}\) there is a mental consciousness produced by the airyāpathika mind,\(^{457}\) which has the twelves āyatanas, from the organ of sight to the dharmāyatanas, for its object.

2. Twenty minds arise one after another, in conformity with the following rules:

i. Kāmadrātu: eight types of mind of the sphere of Kāmadrātu, namely two good minds, two kliṣṭa (bad, defiled-neutral) minds, and four undefiled-neutral minds.

1. Good Acquired through Effort.

Followed by ten: (1-7) seven minds of the same sphere, with the exception of abbijñāphala (nirmāṇacitta); (8) a mind of Rūpadhātu
acquired through effort; and (9-10) a Śaikṣa mind and an Aśaikṣa mind.

It follows seven: (1-4) four minds of the same sphere, the two good minds and the two kliṣta minds; (5-6) a mind acquired through effort and an undefiled mind of Rūpadhātu; (7-8) a Śaikṣa mind and an Aśaikṣa mind.

2. Good Acquired through Birth.

Followed by ten: (1-7) seven minds of the same sphere, with the exception of abhijñāphala; (8-9) undefiled-neutral minds of Rūpadhātu and Arūpyadhātu.

It follows eleven: (1-7) seven minds of the same sphere, with the exception of abhijñāphala; (8-9) a mind acquired through effort and an undefiled-neutral mind of Rūpadhātu; (10-11) a Śaikṣa mind and an Aśaikṣa mind.

3-4. Bad and defiled-neutral.

Followed by seven minds of the same sphere, with the exception of abhijñāphala.

They follow fourteen: (1-7) seven minds of the same sphere, with the exception of abhijñāphala; (8-11) four minds of Rūpadhātu, with the exception of a mind acquired through effort and abhijñāphala; (12-14) three minds of Arūpyadhātu, with the exception of a mind acquired through effort.

5-6. Vipākaka and airyāpathika.

Followed by eight: (1-6) six minds of the same sphere, with the exception of a mind acquired through effort and abhijñāphala; (7-8) an undefiled-neutral mind of Rūpadhātu and of Arūpyadhātu.

They follow seven minds of the same sphere follow, with the exception of abhijñāphala.

7. Sailpasthānika.

Followed by six minds of the same sphere, with the exception of a mind acquired through effort and abhijñāphala.

They follow seven minds of the same sphere, with the exception of abhijñāphala.

8. Abhijñāphala.

Followed by two minds, abhijñāphala of the same sphere and a
mind acquired through effort in Rūpadhātu.

It follows two: the same.

***

ii. Rūpadhātu: six types of mind of the sphere of Rūpadhātu, namely two good minds, one kliṣta (defiled-neutral) mind, and three undefiled-neutral minds.

1. Good Acquired through Effort.

Followed by twelve: (1-6) six of the same sphere, (7-9) three of Kāmadhātu: good acquired through effort, good acquired through birth; and abhijñāphala; 10) a mind of Arūpyadhātu acquired through effort; and (11-12) a Śaikṣa mind and an Aśaikṣa mind.

If follows ten: (1-4) four of the same sphere, excepting airyāpatherika and vipākaja, (5-6) two of Kāmadhātu, acquired through effort and abhijñāphala; (7-8) two of Arūpyadhātu, acquired through effort and defiled-neutral; and (9-10) a Śaikṣa mind and an Aśaikṣa mind.

2. Good Acquired through Birth.

Followed by eight: (1-5) five of the same sphere, except abhijñāphala; (6-7) two of Kāmadhātu, bad and defiled-neutral; 458 and (8) a defiled-neutral mind of Arūpyadhātu.

It follows five of the same sphere, except abhijñāphala.

3. Defiled-neutral minds.

Followed by nine minds: (1-5) five minds of the same sphere, with the exception of an abhijñāphala mind; (6-9) four minds of Kāmadhātu, two good minds and two kliṣta minds.

They follow eleven minds: (1-5) five minds of the same sphere, with the exception of an abhijñāphala mind; (6-8) three minds of Kāmadhātu, an mind acquired through birth, an airyāpatherika mind, and a vipākaja mind; (9-11) three minds of Arūpyadhātu, with the exception of a mind acquired though effort.

4-5. Vipākaja and airyāpatherika minds.

Followed by seven minds: (1-4) four minds of the same sphere, with the exception of a mind acquired through effort and an abhijñāphala mind; (5-6) two minds of Kāmadhātu, a bad mind and a
defiled-neutral mind; (7) one mind of Ārūpyadhātu, a defiled-neutral mind.

They follow five minds of the same sphere, with the exception of an abhijñāphala mind.

6. Abhijñaphala.

Followed by two minds of the same sphere, a mind acquired through effort and an abhijñāphala mind.

It follows two minds: the same.

***

iii. Ārūpyadhātu: four types of mind of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu, namely two good minds, a defiled-neutral mind and a vipākaja mind.

1. Good Acquired through Effort.

Followed by seven mind: (1-4) four minds of the same sphere; (5) a mind of Rūpadhātu acquired through effort; and (6-7) a Śaikṣa mind and an Aśaikṣa mind.

2. Good Acquired through Birth.

Followed by seven minds: (1-4) four minds of the same sphere; (5) a defiled-neutral mind of Rūpadhātu; (6-7) a bad mind and a defiled-neutral mind of Kāmadhātu.

It follows four minds of the same sphere.

3. Defiled-neutral.

Followed by eight minds: (1-4) four minds of the same sphere; (5-6) a mind acquired through effort and a defiled-neutral mind of Rūpadhātu; (7-8) a bad mind and a defiled-neutral mind of Kāmadhātu.

It follows ten minds: (1-4) four minds of the same sphere; (5-10) a mind acquired through birth, an airyāpathika mind, and an vipākaja mind of Rūpadhātu and Kāmadhātu.

4. Vipākaja.

Followed by six minds: (1-3) three minds of the same sphere, with the exception of a mind acquired through effort; (4) a defiled-neutral mind of Rūpadhātu; (5-6) a bad mind and a defiled-neutral mind of Kāmadhātu. Four minds follow, of this same sphere.
v. The two pure minds:

1. Šaikša.

Followed by six minds: (1-3) a mind acquired through effort of the three spheres; (4) an mind acquired through effort of Kāmadhātu; and (5-6) a Šaikša mind and an Āśaikša mind.

It follows four minds: (1-3) a mind acquired through effort of the three spheres; (4) a Šaikša mind.

2. Āśaikša.

Followed by five minds: the six minds which follow Šaikša with the exception of the Šaikša mind.

It follows five minds: (1-3) a mind acquired through effort of the three spheres, (4-5) a Šaikša mind and an Āśaikša mind.

3. Remarks.

a. Vipākaja, airyāpathika and sailpasthānika minds arise immediately after a mind in Kāmadhātu acquired through effort. For what reason is this not reciprocally true?

A vipākaja mind is not favorable to a mind acquired through effort, because it is weak, and because it develops spontaneously.

Airyāpathika and sailpasthānika minds are not favorable to a mind acquired through effort because their reason for being is the creation of an attitude or a created thing.

Contrarily, the niskramanacitta or the mind of leaving,—that is, any mind, a vipākaja mind, etc., by which a Yogin leaves the series of minds acquired through effort, such as reading, philosophical reflection, etc.—develops spontaneously. The mind of leaving can then immediately follow a mind acquired through effort.

b. Objection: If a mind acquired through effort does not arise immediately after the vipākaja, etc., because these are not favorable to it, still less will it arise after a defiled (kliśta) mind which is contrary to it.
A defiled mind is contrary to a mind acquired through effort. Yet, when an ascetic is exhausted from the activity of the defilements, a mind acquired through effort arises from the fact that the ascetic lays hold of a perfect consciousness (parijñāna) of this activity.

c. The innate good mind of Kāmadhātu is sharp; hence it can arise after the two pure minds and also after a mind in Rūpadhātu acquired through effort, but, as it develops spontaneously, it is not followed by these same minds.

An innate good mind of Kāmadhātu, being sharp, can arise after a defiled mind of Rūpadhātu; but an innate good mind of Rūpadhātu, not being sharp, cannot arise after a defiled mind of Arūpyadhātu.

[4. The minds arise immediately one after another, and they arise by reason of an act of attention. We must then study the act of attention.]

i. We can distinguish three acts of attention:

1. Svalaṅkṣanamanaskāra, an act of attention to specific characteristics, for example the judgements “Rūpa has rūpana for its characteristic . . . vijñāna has prativijñāpti for its characteristic” (i.13, 16).

2. Sāmānyalakṣaṇamanaskāra, an act of attention to common or general characteristics, to the sixteen aspects of the Truths, impermanence, etc., and “The conditioned dharmas are impermanent” (see vii.10).

3. Adhimuktimanaskāra: this act of attention is not, like the first two, directed to that which exists; rather, it proceeds from adhimukti, that is, from constructive imagination (adhimuktyā . . . manaskārah, see p. 190); it presides over the contemplations of aśubhā (vi.9),459 the apramāṇas (viii.29), the vimokṣas (viii.32) the abhibhvāyatanas (viii.34) the kṛtsnāyatanas (viii.35), etc.

[c. The innate good mind of Kāmadhātu is sharp; hence it can arise after the two pure minds and also after a mind in Rūpadhātu acquired through effort, but, as it develops spontaneously, it is not followed by these same minds.

An innate good mind of Kāmadhātu, being sharp, can arise after a defiled mind of Rūpadhātu; but an innate good mind of Rūpadhātu, not being sharp, cannot arise after a defiled mind of Ārūpyadhātu.]
[According to the first Master quoted by the Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 53a19] one can realize the Path after these three acts of attention, and, inversely, one can produce these three acts of attention immediately after the Path. This opinion is supported by the text, "He produces the part of Bodhi called memory in company with (that is, after) the contemplation of repulsive things (aśubba)."

[According to the third Master quoted in the Vibhāṣa] it is solely after an act of attention to general characteristics that one can realize the Path; after the Path, one can produce the three acts of attention. As for the text quoted by the first Master, it should be understood in the sense that, after having subdued his mind by means of the contemplation of repulsive things, an ascetic is capable of producing an act of attention to general characteristics, after which he realizes the Path. The text refers to this indirect action of the contemplation of repulsive things and so says, "aśubbāsahagatam . . ."

[According to the fourth Master of the Vibhāṣa,) it is only after an act of attention to general characteristics that an ascetic can realize the Path; furthermore, after the Path, he can only produce acts of attention to general characteristics.

The author refutes the third Master: Certainly, we indeed see that an ascetic who has entered into samyaktvanīyāma, onto the Path (see iv.27) by relying on one of the three lower stages (i.e., anāgamya, First Dhyāna, dhyānāntara), can produce, upon coming out of the Path, an act of attention to general characteristics in Kāmadhātu and can be established in hearing or in reflection, because the stages in question are near; but, when an ascetic has entered samyaktvanīyāma by relying on the Second, Third, or Fourth Dhyāna, to which stage could the act of attention to general characteristics belong that he produces upon coming out of the Path?

He will produce an act of attention to general characteristics in Kāmadhātu, because Kāmadhātu is too estranged from the higher Dhyānas. He will not produce an act of attention to general characteristics of the sphere of one of the three higher Dhyānas, because he has not previously obtained conscious acts of attention, except in the course of the practice of the nirvedhābhāgīyas (vi.17: contemplations pre-
liminary to entry onto the Path): now an Āryan cannot again realize the nirvedhabhāgīyas, for we cannot admit that he would for a second time realize the preparatory path, since he already possesses its result.

But, we would say, there exists other acts of attention to general characteristics (sāmānyamanaskāras) which have been cultivated at the same time as the nirvedhabhāgīyas (as they refer to the Truths, but which differ by not referring to all their sixteen aspects): for example, seeing that "all samaskāras are impermanent," "all dharmas are impersonal," "Nirvāṇa is tranquil" (a general or sāmānya judgement, since it refers to any Nirvāṇa). It is this other type of sāmānyamanaskāra that an ascetic brings forth upon leaving the Path.

The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this opinion, because it is illogical. [In fact, the cultivation of the manaskāras of this type is bound to the nirvedhabhāgīyas]. (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 53b3).

(The correct doctrine is that the Path can be followed by the three categories of the act of attention.) When one obtains the result of Arhat based on Anāgāmya (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 53b25), the mind leaving the absorption is either of this stage (Anāgāmya) or of the sphere of Kāmadhātu. When one obtains the same result based on Ākīñcanya, the mind of leaving is either of this same stage (Ākīñcanya), or of naivasamjnānāsamjnāyatana (Bhavāgra). When one obtains the same result by relying on any other stage, the mind of leaving is solely of this other stage.

ii. There are four types of acts of attention: 1.) an innate or natural act of attention, upapati-pratilambhika, 2.) attention produced from the teaching, śrutamaya, 3.) from reflection, cintāmaya, and 4.) from meditation, bhāvanāmaya. Three are possible in Kāmadhātu, the first, the second, and the third, for meditation is not of Kāmadhātu. Three are possible in Rūpadhātu, the first, the second, and the fourth, for, in this sphere, as soon as one meditates or reflects (cintā), one enters into absorption. Two are possible in Ārūpyadhātu, the first and the fourth. There are then eight acts of attention, three, three and two (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 53b14).

The Path is never produced after an act of innate attention, to whichever sphere it may belong, for the Path requires effort. The Path
The Indriyas

is hence produced after five acts of attention, two of Kāmadhātu, two of Rūpadhātu, and one of Ārūpyadhātu. But, after the Path, an act of innate attention of Kāmadhātu can arise, because it is sharp.

***

How many minds are acquired when one manifests each of the twelve types of minds?

73a-b. With the defiled mind of each of the three spheres, there is obtaining of six, of six, and of two minds respectively.

"Obtaining" means taking possession of what one did not previously possess.

i. Obtaining the six minds with a defiled mind of Kāmadhātu.

a. One obtains a good mind of Kāmadhātu (1) when one again takes up the roots of good with a mind of doubt, which is defiled (iv.80c); or (2) when one returns to Kāmadhātu by falling from the higher spheres. The mind of conception is necessarily defiled (iii.38); with this mind one takes possession of a good mind of Kāmadhātu, for one did not previously possess it.

b-c. One obtains a bad mind and defiled-neutral mind of Kāmadhātu (1) when one returns to Kāmadhātu by falling from the higher spheres: for then one takes possession of whichever of these two minds manifests itself; or (2) when one falls from the detachment of Kāmadhātu.

d. One obtains a defiled-neutral mind of Rūpadhātu when one falls from Ārūpyadhātu into Kāmadhātu. One in fact takes possession of a defiled-neutral mind of Rūpadhātu with a defiled mind of conception in Kāmadhātu.

e-f. One obtains a defiled-neutral mind of Ārūpyadhātu and a Śaiksā mind when one falls from the quality of an Arhat through the mind of Kāmadhātu.

ii. Obtaining the six minds with a defiled mind of Rūpadhātu.

One obtains one undefiled-neutral mind of Kāmadhātu (the mind capable of creating fictive beings, nirmāṇacitata) and the three minds
of Rūpadhātu when one falls from Ārūpyadhātu into Rūpadhātu.

One obtains a defiled-neutral mind of Ārūpyadhātu and a Śaikṣa mind when one falls from the quality of an Arhat through a mind of Rūpadhātu.

iii. One obtains a defiled-neutral mind of Ārūpyadhātu and a Śaikṣa mind with the defiled mind of Ārūpyadhātu when one falls from the quality of Arhat through a mind of Ārūpyadhātu.

73b-c. There is the obtaining of three with a good mind of Rūpadhātu.

One obtains three minds with a good mind of Rūpadhātu: this mind itself, and the undefiled-neutral minds of Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, that is, the minds capable of creating fictive beings relative to these two spheres.

73c-d. There is an obtaining of four with a Śaikṣa mind.

When one realizes the first Śaikṣa mind, namely duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti (vi.25d), one obtains four minds: (1) the Śaikṣa mind itself, (2-3) two undefiled-neutral minds, one of Kāmadhātu and one of Rūpadhātu (the mind capable of creating fictive beings), and (4) a good mind of Ārūpyadhātu: there is, by virtue of the Path, entry into the Path (niyāmāvakrānti, vi.26a) and detachment from Kāmadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu.

73d. One obtains these same minds with the other minds.

One obtains the minds not specified above only when they manifest themselves.

According to another opinion, without making any distinction among the spheres, it is said that "The wise say that, with a defiled mind, one obtains nine minds; with a good mind one obtains six; and with a neutral mind one obtains a neutral mind." 462

Concerning the good mind, one should correct this passage so that it reads "one obtains seven." When a person again takes up the roots of good by means of Right View (samyagdrṣṭi, iv.80), he obtains a good mind of Kāmadhātu; when he detaches himself from Kāma-
dhātu, he obtains the minds capable of creating fictive beings of Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, which are two undefiled-neutral minds; when he takes up the absorptions of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu, he obtains the good minds of these two spheres; upon entry onto the Path, he obtains a Śāikṣa mind; upon his entry into the result of Arhatship, he obtains an Aśāikṣa mind.

For the two other minds, the reckoning of the minds obtained is established according to the explanation that we have given. Here is a stanza which serves as a memory-aide:

"At conception, in absorption, in detachment, in falling, and in the taking up again of the roots of good, one obtains minds that one did not possess."
Chapter Two

1. Below ad ii.2a, adhipatya = adhikaprabhutva, sovereignty or predominating power. See Siddhāntakaumudi quoted in Dict. de Saint-Petersbourg; Garbe, Sāmkhya-Philosophie, 257. Compare the explanation of the indriyas in the Atthasālinī, 304, etc.

2. Kārikā ii.1, in the Samayapradīpikā, omits the word kila by which Vasubandhu indicates that he does not share this doctrine of the School. Kārikās ii.2-4, where Vasubandhu presents the teaching of the Sautrāntikas, are omitted in the Samayapradīpikā.

3. Buddhaghosa explains in Atthasālinī (641) that boys’ games are not the same as girls’ games.

4. According to the Vyākhyā, Ancient Masters (pūrva-cārya).


6. Hsüan-tsang: “for all the pure dharmas arise and develop following them.”

7. “The mind of one who experiences agreeable sensation is recollected.” An extract from the Sūtra on the Vimuktyāyannas, quoted in Vibhanga, p. 56 ad i.27; Mahāvyutpatti, 81.

8. “Faith arises from suffering,” Saṁyutta, ii.31. For this sense of the word upānissad, “cause,” see below ii.49 (note on hetu and pratyaya), Vibhanga, iv.351 = Suttanipāta (Duṣyatañnapasananutta) (kā upānissā savanāyā), Sātrālaṁkāra, xi.9 (yogopaniṣaḍ = having effort for its cause). In the sense of “comparision,” ”to being together,” Pāṇini i.4.79, Vajracchedikā, 35.10, 42.7 and Hoernle, Manuscript Remains, i. p. 192 (upaniṣāṁ na kmyate), Sūkhavatīvyāha, 31.9, Mahāvyutpatti, 223.15 (where the Tibetan has rgyu). In the sense of upāṁśu, “secret,” Yaśomitra (ad ii.49) mentions Dhīgha, ii.259 (suryopanisado devāḥ = suryassūpanissā devāḥ): upaniṣācchabdas tu kadadcid upāṁśau kadadcid prāmukhye tadyathā sūryopanisado devā ity upāṁśuprayoga upaniṣatprayoga iti.

9. The Sūtra says: caksurviṁyāyāṁ rūpāṁ prayutpadyate saumanasayanā niṣkramyāśrītām / / manāb prayitiḥ dharmanāṁ cotpadyate saumanasayanā / / daurmanasayanā upekṣā. Niṣkramyā = “pure or impure path,” or rather “departure (niṣkramaṇa) or detachment from one sphere of existence (dīwān) or from saṁstāra.” See also iv.77b-c.

Aṣrīta = “having for its object,” or rather “favorable to.”

We have then: “There is, by reason of visible things, etc., six sensations of satisfaction, six sensations of dissatisfaction, and six sensations of equanimity, favorable to niṣkramyā.”

Compare Majjhima, iii.218, Saṁyutta, iv.232, Majjhima, iii.217, Milinda, 45 (nekkhammasita).

10. Vasubandhu says: “Some other masters . . .”

11. Compare Dhammasaṅgāyī, 633, and Atthasālinī, 641.


13. Sensation-of-pleasure (sukha) also means sensation-of-satisfaction (saumanasya); see ii.7.

Compare v.23 and 54; also Yogasūtra, ii.7-8: sukhānustayī rāgāḥ / duḥkhānustayī duṣṭaḥ.

14. In the worldly (laukika) path faith and the other moral faculties disturb the defilements; in the nirvedhābhāgīyas (vi.45c), they “lead to” the Path; pure, they constitute anājñātāmājñāyāṁ, etc. (ii.9b, vi.68).
15. Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang translate the first line: "By reason of their predominence with respect to the acquisition of higher and higher paths, of Nirvāṇa, etc."

_Dhammasangani_, 286, 505, 553; _Nettipakarana_ 15, 60; _Compendium_, p. 177.

16. Ājñātāvindriya is confused with the quality of Arhat; it includes _ksayajñāna_ and _anutpādaajñāna_: knowledge that the defilements are destroyed and will no more arise, etc. (vi.45, _Nettipakarana_, p. 15); he is "delivered" (vimukta) through deliverence from the defilements (klesavimukti) and through deliverence from existence (saṁtānavimukti): it is thus predominant in relation to parinirvāṇa or nirupadhisēṣanirvāṇa.

17. Objection of the Sāṅkhya. _Sāṅkhyakārikā_, 34.

18. This _kārikā_ becomes _kārikā_ 2 in the _Samayapradīpikā_.

19. We encounter this expression i.35 (see also note 20). The six supports of the organs (_indriyādbhiṣṭāna_), that is to say the visible eye, etc., and the six consciousnesses (_saḍ viṣṇaṇakāyab_ _sattvadṛavya_, constituents of the living being, but not primary (_maula_); they depend on the predominating quality of the six organs.

20. _Sādāyatana_ is essentially the living being who is said to transmigrate: it is thus the support of transmigration.

21. Only two _āyatanas_, _kāya_ and _manas_, exist from conception (ii.14).

22. The newborn infant can see, but cannot speak. Words are action (_karmāṇa_) of the tongue which is the support (_adbiṣṭāna_) of the organ of taste (_jīvendriya_). For the Sāṅkhya, the organs of action (_karmendriya_ _kāyendnyaikadesastānpurusendriyavyatiriktakalpita_) are, like the organs of consciousness, suprasensible substances (_asindriya_). "Voice" is the power to speak, "hand" is the power to grasp, etc.

23. You affirm that snakes possess subtle (_sūksma_) hands and feet, but you must prove it.

24. _Upastha_ is conceived as distinct from the male or female organ, which is one part, one place, of the organ of touch (_kāyendriyaikadesastānpurusendriyavyatiriktakalpita_).

"Pleasure" (_ānanda_) is _kliṣṭa saukhyā_.

25. Compare the definitions of the _Vibhaṅga_, p. 123.

26. The body is the organ of sight and the four other organs of sense consciousness: these organs, in fact, are collections (_kāya_) or accumulations (_saṁcaya_) of atoms. Sensation which is produced in a "body," or which accompanies a "body" upon which they are supported, is called bodily. (See ii.25, or bodily _prārabdhi_.)

27. _Sukha_ is _sāta_, the agreeable, that which does good (_sātatvād hi sukham ucyate_); in addition, satisfaction supposes joy (_prīti_).

This problem is taken up again viii.9b.

28. One should make an exception of agreeable mental sensation which proceeds from absorption (_saṁādhi_) or which is the result of retribution (_vipākaphala_) (ii.57).

29. It is solely _vipākaphala_ and _naiṣyandikī_ (ii.57c).

30. In fact, the group (_kalāpa_) which is made up of the three pure _indriyas_ includes only seven _indriyas_, for the three sensations never coexist. When an ascetic, in order to cultivate the Path, abides in the first two Dhyānas, he possesses a single sensation of satisfaction (_saṁmanas-yendriya_); he possesses a single sensation of pleasure (_sukhendriya_ _sukha_ _saukhyā_) when he cultivates the Path in the third Dhyāna; and he possesses a single sensation of indifference (_upekṣendriya_ _upekṣa_ _svēkṣanā_ _sāmākhyā_) when he cultivates the Path in the other stages (_anāgamyā, dhyānāntara_, Fourth Dhyāna, first three _Ārāpyas_). See ii.16c-17b.
31. Darśanamārga includes the first fifteen moments of the comprehension of the Truths (abhisamaya), moments in the course of which one sees that which one has not previously seen (vi.28c-d). It is exclusively pure, anāsrava, vi.1.

32. In the Abhidhamma, we have anāśīlaṁtaṁsaṁsāṁvidhī (Vibhaṅga, p. 124).

33. The term bhāvāna has many meanings. In the expression bhāvanāmaya, it is synonymous with samādhi or absorption. Some other meanings are studied vii.27 (compare ii.25.2). In the expression bhāvanāmārga, "Path of Meditation," bhāvāna signifies "repeated view, meditation."

There are two bhāvanāmārgas:
   a. Pure (anāsrava) or supermundane (lokottara) bhāvanāmārga, which is under consideration here: this is a meditation on the Truths which have already been seen in darśanamārga. This path begins with the sixteenth moment of the comprehension of the Truths (vi.28c-d) and terminates with the acquisition of the quality of Arhat.
   b. Impure (sārava) or worldly (laukika) bhāvanāmārga; it does not have the Truths for its object (vi.49); it disturbs (viśkambh) the defilements without uprooting them; it can precede and follow darśanamārga.

34. Dhātupāṭha, i.631.

35. Paramārtha differs from Hsüan-tsang.

36. The Japanese editor quotes on this subject Harivarman’s Ch’eng-shih lun, TD 32, p. 282a18.

37. According to the Japanese editor, the Mahāsāsakas; the Hetuvādins and the Mahāsāsakas in Kathāvatthu, xix.8. Compare ibid. iii.6.

38. Savinyutta, vi.204: yassa kho bhikkhave imāni pañcindriyāni sabbena sabbāni sabbathā sabbānī nattbi tām abhi bhābīrī puthujjanāpakkhe ṭhito ti vaddāmi. See ii.40b-c.

39. This text is quoted in the Vijñānakāya, TD 26, p. 535b29 and foll. with some elaboration.

40. Compare Sumanāgalavilāsini, p. 59, on the two types of prthahjana, the andha and the kalyāṇa.

41. Dīgha, ii.38, Majjhima, i.169. The Kathāvatthu quotes Dīgha, ii.38 ( . . . tikkindriya mudindriya . . . ).


43. Compare Vibhaṅga, p. 125; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 741b19.

44. On life and death, see ii.45.


46. Vyākhya: The Buddha for the good of others, the Śrīvaka for the duration of the Law. See Lévi and Chavannes, "Les seize Arhats protecteurs de la Loi," J.As. 1916, ii.9 and following.

47. One should understand roga, gandha, and śalya, corresponding to the three sufferings, vi.3.

48. Literally: "his series is not supported by the defilements." These are the kleṣas which support and make the series last. A samayavimukta Arhat is free from the defilements, but does not have mastery of absorption; a drṣṭiprapta Arhat possesses this mastery, but he is not free from the defilements (vi.56).

49. Compare Divyāvadāna, 203; atha Bhagavāṁs tadrāpāṁ samādhiṁ samāpaṁno yathā samābīte cīte jīvatāsīsāṅkāṇān adhīṣṭhāya āyuḥsamāṅkāṇāṁ uṣtrasāṁ ugrabdhāḥ. We have the singular in the Mahāvastu, i.125.19.

50. The Pali has the plural in other contexts, Majjhima, i.295 (aṅgī ayusamkhārā aṅgī vedaniyā dhammā), Jātaka, iv.215 (āyusamkhārā khiyanti).

51. Vībhāṣā, TD 27, p. 657c10 and foll., enumerates fourteen opinions on this point.

52. Eleventh opinion in the Vībhāṣā.

53. Sixth opinion in the Vībhāṣā.

54. Doctrine of the Sāṁmitiyas, according to the Japanese editor.

55. Opinion of the Sautrāntikas.

56. According to the Japanese editor, this is the opinion of the author.

57. Vībhāṣā, TD 27, p. 657c5, the fifth of the six opinions.

58. According to the very clear version of Paramārtha, “a kalpa or more than a kalpa,” but customarily translated as “a kalpa or the rest of the kalpa” (Windisch, Rhys Davids, 0. Franke). Dīgha, ii.103, iii.77; Divya, 201. Kathavatthu, xi.5.

59. They adopt the sixth opinion of the Vībhāṣā.

60. Dharmasāṅgraha, lxx; Mahāvastu, iii.273, 281; Śīkṣāsamuccaya, 198.10; Madhyamakārvṛtti, 49 n. 4, xxii, 10; Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.36 (The Blessed One is a jīna because he has conquered the four Māras); Yu-chia chih-ti lun, xxix, translated by S. Lévi, Seize Arhats, p. 7 (J.As.. 1916, ii). In iconography (Foucher, École des Hautes Études, XIII, ii.19), the Buddha is flanked by four Māras, blue, yellow, red and green. The list of the four Māras in word-lists, Zachariae, Gel. Gott. Anz. 1888, p. 853. See also the lists of Childers (five Māras with the addition of abhisamkhāramā). The Nettipakarana distinguishes kilesamāra and sattamāra (=devaputra).

61. The sensation of suffering (duḥkha-dhānya) is never airya-patibha, etc.

62. Ekottarāgama, TD 2, p. 602b13. The Tipitaka speaks of sukhavedaniya karman, “which is retributed in pleasure” (Āṅguttara iv.382, etc.) (see iv.45); sukhavedaniya, daurmanasyavedaniya sparṣa (Sāmyutta, v.211, etc.). See iv.57d.

63. According to the etymology of the author, saumanasyavedaniya signifies “action allowing satisfaction to be experienced by right of retribution (saumanasyam vipākatena vedaniyam asya). According to the Vaibhāṣikas, “action in which satisfaction should be experienced” (saumanasyam vedaniyam asmin): this is saṃprayogavedaniyatā (iv.49).

64. According to the Sūtra, those “non-detached” have two thorns, physical suffering (kāyika duḥkha) and mental suffering (caitatska daurmanasya); those “detached” are free from mental suffering.

65. Thus persons who are detached do not possess all the indriyas which are retribution.

66. Omitted by Hsüan-tsang.

67. The quality of an androgyne, that is the possession (pratilambha) of the two organs, is a dharma disassociated (viprayukta) from the mind, ii.35.

68. This is to implicitly say that the first eight indriyas, as well as the last three, are always without retribution. Hsüan-tsang completes the kārikā in order to explicitly fix this point.
Chapter Two

The kārikā has tat tu ekam savipākam: tu in the sense of eva, and out of place; the meaning would appear to call for: tad ekam savipākam eva = only dissatisfaction exclusively "possesses retribution."

69. Hsüan-tsang: The last eight are solely good; dissatisfaction is good or evil; the mind and the other sensations are of three types; the first eight are solely neutral.
Compare Vibhaṅga, p. 125.

70. See the definition of the Tathāgatabalas in Vibhaṅga, p. 336: aṭṭhānam etam anavakāso yam itthi sakkattāṁ kāreyya mārattāṁ kāreyya brahmattāṁ kāreyya n’etāṁ thānāṁ vijjati.

71. Dīgha, iii.262, Aṅguttara, iv.408, v.150.

72. Compare i.40; Vibhaṅga, p. 133.


74. Which we should understand as, "because the rūpas are luminous (accha = bhāsvara) there," or rather "because the rūpas, not the kāmaguṇas, are important there." See i.22a-b, no. 4, a different doctrine.

75. Compare Saṁyutta, ii.123.

76. Compare Abhidhammasaṅgāba, Compendium, p. 166.

77. On the psychological state at death, see iii.42-43b. In what part of the body the mental consciousness is destroyed, iii.43c-44a. How the vital parts perish, iii.44b.


79. For, at the moment when he obtains the fruit of Srotaāpanna, the ascetic is always in the state of anāgamyā absorption (vi.48), which includes the sensation of indifference.

80. The fruit of Srotaāpanna is obtained in the sixteenth moment of the comprehension of the Truths; the first fifteen are ājñāśayāmi, the sixteenth ājñā.

81. The first moment is ānantaryāmārga; the second, vimuktimārga; and thus following. But one can consider all the moments which precede the sixteenth moment as ānantaryāmārga in relationship to this moment.

82. Ānantaryāmārga destroys the defilements and leads to the possession of disjunction from defilement: it drives out the thief. Vimuktimārga closes the door. The Japanese editor here quotes the Vibhāṣa TD 27, p. 465c9, where the masters of the West, followers of a non-Kaśmīrean doctrine, are quoted.

83. The fruit of Arhat is obtained at the moment of vajropamasamādhi (vi.44c-d), or ānantaryāmārga, which is ājñedriya. Thus ājñedriya is actually present. Kṣayajñāna, or vimuktimārga, which is ājñatāvindriya, is in the process of arising (utpādabhūmikha). Sensation of satisfaction, etc. according to the nature of the absorption in which the ascetic realizes vajropamasamādhi.

84. This doctrine of the worldly path is condemned in the Kathāvatthu, i.5 and xviii.5. Buddhaghosa attributes it to the Sarhmitiyas.

85. Only the ānupūrvaka changes from absorption, not the viṭarāga. This later, in fact, if he begins the comprehension of the Truths (satyābhisamaya) in the absorption of anāgamyā, will not pass to the sixteenth moment in the First Dhyāna. What interests him is the comprehension of the
Truths, not the Dhyāna with which he is familiar. On the contrary, the ānupārvaka is interested in dhyāna which is new to him.

86. The Anāgāmin who falls from the detachment of the higher spheres, up to and including the Second Dhyāna, will not fall because of this from the result of Anāgāmin: he remains an Anāgāmin when he falls from the detachment of the First Dhyāna: having thus fallen, he cannot reobtain the result by the indriya of pleasure, for this indriya is of the Third Dhyāna, and the Third Dhyāna is beyond his scope.

Would one say that he can reobtain this result through the indriya of satisfaction? He would be able to if, setting out again to obtain this result in the absorption of anāgamyā, he would be capable of passing, in the last moment, into the First Dhyāna. But he does not lose it: only an ascetic whose mental faculties are active can carry out this passage, and the ascetic that is under consideration here is of weak mental faculties, since he has fallen. Only ascetics of weak faculties fall from a result.

Would one say that, having fallen, an ascetic can carry out the transformation of his faculties (indriyasamnicāra, vi.41c-61b) and make them active? Without doubt, and he will obtain the result with eight or nine indriyas accordingly as his path is worldly or pure, as we have said, for, in no case will he reobtain this result with the indriya of pleasure.

87. The Āryan possesses the “pure” organ of pleasure, for he does not lose this organ by changing his sphere (see note 93).

88. Omitted by Hsian-tsang. See viii.12a-b.

89. There is, in Kāmadhātu, an organ of pleasure in relation to the five sense consciousnesses; in the First Dhyāna, an organ of pleasure in relation to three sense consciousnesses (smell and taste being excluded, i.306); in the Second Dhyāna, there is no organ of pleasure (viii.12); and in the Third Dhyāna, there is an organ of pleasure related to the mental consciousness (ii.7c-d). Thus a being born in the heaven of the Second Dhyāna, if he does not practice the absorption of the Third Dhyāna, he will not possess the organ of pleasure, for, by being reborn in the Second Dhyāna, he has lost the organ of pleasure in the lower spheres. Response: according to the Vaibhāṣīka doctrine (siddhānta) every being born in a lower sphere possesses the defiled (kliṣṭa) organ of the higher spheres if he has not abandoned it.

90. See iv.80a which quotes the Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 997a16 and 1000c3. Ad iv.79d, the number of the organs in the first Dvipas.

91. How is a possessor of ajñendriya,—which means a Saikṣa,—necessarily in possession of the organs of pleasure and satisfaction? He can in fact be found in the heaven of the Fourth Dhyāna or in Ārūpyadhātu.

An Āryan necessarily obtains the organ of satisfaction when he is detached from Kāmadhātu; he necessarily obtains the organ of pleasure when he is detached from the Second Dhyāna; even when he transmigrates (bhūmisāmīcāra), he does not lose the good (subha) that he has obtained (according to iv.40); he loses the good obtained (iv.40), but this is in order to obtain the same type of good of a superior quality.

92. But can he be without sex? This is a difficulty, for we have seen (p. 154) that beings without sex cannot obtain either the discipline, nor a result, nor detachment.

According to one opinion, the person who has obtained the discipline can obtain a result; now this person preserves the discipline even though he loses his sex, for the Abhidharma specifies that he loses the discipline by becoming an androgyne (iv.38c) and it does not specify that he loses it by losing his sex. One can again envision gradual death: a person who has practiced the nirvedhabhāgīyas (vi.17) could, after the loss of the sexual organ, see the Truths at the moment of his death.
Second opinion. The possessor of अज्ञात्य-मिन्द्रिया is never without sex. But he does not possess the female organ when he is a male, and she does not possess the male organ when she is a female. Thus one cannot say that one necessarily possesses the one or the other.

93. See i.48c.

94. On the meaning of this term, see below page 187.

95. According to Sarṣţhabhadra (TD 29, p. 799a24-29): Among the रूपas "susceptible of resistance" (सप्रातिग्न्य), the most subtle part, which is not susceptible of being divided again, is called परमानु; that is to say: the परमानु is not susceptible of being divided into many parts by another रूप, or by the mind. This is what is called the smallest रूपa; as it has no parts, it is called the "smallest." In the same way a क्‍सण is called the smallest amount of time and cannot be divided in half-क्‍सण (iii.86).

An agglomeration of these अनु, which is not susceptible of disaggregation, is called संगमभानु.

In कमाद्धतु, a minimum of eight things (द्रव्यa) arise together in order to constitute a संगमभानु which is not sound, nor an organ. What are these things? Four महाभूतास and four उपादायas, namely, रूपa, रासa, गन्धa, and स्प्रास्तायa.

96. The molecules into which the organ of touch, the organ of sight, etc., enter, are not the "atoms" which are mentioned i.44a-b.

97. Vasubandhu follows Dharmottara, Abdharmabhārdaya, TD 28, p. 811b5, Upaśānta, Abdharmabhārdaya, TD 28, p. 837c15, and Dharmatrāta, Abdharmabhārdaya, TD 28, p. 882b4: "The atoms which reside in four organs are of ten types; in the organ of touch, of nine types; elsewhere, of eight types, when there is smell (that is to say: in कमाद्धतु)." Upaśānta: "... external, of eight types: in a stage where there is smell."

An analogous doctrine is the Abhidhamma of Buddhaghosa (Atthaśālī, 634) and the Compendium (p. 164). See below i.13, 43c and Th. Stcherbatiski, The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, p. 953.

98. One molecule of sound produced by the hands is made up of the hands of the four primary elements, the four derived matters, sound, and the organ of touch: or of ten substances; produced by the tongue, eleven substances, with the addition of the organ of taste whose invisible atoms are arranged over the tongue (Note of de La Vallée Poussin).

99. See J. Bloch, Formation de la langue marate, p. 42: सिंका (सिक्यa), "a cord to suspend objects."

100. Elemental water (अभद्धतु) exists in wood (दारु): it is elemental water which holds things together (संग्राब्हा) and which prevents them from dispersing. Elemental fire (तेजस) matures (पक्ति) and rots wood. And it is by elemental wind that wood moves (व्युंहस, व्याक्षणa). Elemental earth exists within water, since water supports (द्रव्तस) ships, etc. See i.12c-d, Vyākhyā, p. 34.

101. Fire creates by reason of its heat, and so contains elemental water; water becomes solid by cold, and so contains elemental earth; solid bodies, rubbed one against the other, become hot; thus they contain elemental fire, etc.

102. One the meaning of द्रव्यa, i.20.

103. A presence which results from the definition, "The molecule includes eight substances."

104. See also i.13c-d.

105. Blue is a द्रव्यa.
106. *Rūpa* possesses the characteristic of "resistance" (*rupyate*) which is common to color and shape, to blue, etc.

107. We have seen (i.13) that an atom or monad never exists in an isolated state. The Japanese editor quotes on this point the six chapter *Commentary* of Hui-hui. Pelliot discovered this quotation in T'ao 83.5, for. 414 (=vol. 83, p. 414 recto b of the *Zoku zōkyō*), where it is accompanied by a gloss that justifies the number of 1,379 atoms in one molecule of a visible thing, etc.

Here, barring error, is the meaning of this gloss:

An atom never exists in an isolated state. We have, at a minimum, groups—or molecules—of seven atoms: four faces, top and bottom: six sides; plus the center; thus seven. A molecule of derived matter (*mahābhūtāny upādāya rūpam, bhautikam rūpam*), for example a molecule of "visible matter" (*rūpa*) or of smell (*gandha*), consists of seven atoms of visible matter and of smell.

Each of these seven atoms is supported by complexes of seven atoms, seven atoms having for their natures the four primary elements, seven atoms where the four great elements are present.

Each of these seven atoms included four atoms, atoms of earth, water, fire, and wind: the atoms of earth includes seven atoms of earth, etc.

Thus we have (1) seven atoms of earth, water, fire, and wind,—in all twenty-eight atoms,—which constitute an atom of four-primary-elements.

(2) An atom of four-primary-elements does not exist in an isolated state: seven are grouped together (7 x 28 = 196 atoms) in order to support one atom of derived matter.

(3) The atoms of derived matter, with its supports, atoms of four-primary-elements (1 x 197 = 197 atoms), form a group with six other similar atoms: each atom of derived matter is thus made up of 1,379 atoms (7 x 197).

(But all derived matter possesses visibility, smell, taste, and tangibility. Thus this number should be multiplied by four in order to obtain the smallest part of matter existing in an isolated state.)

108. *Citta* = *manas* = *vijñāna*; *caita* = *caitasa* = *caitasika* = *cittasamprayukta*.

109. A. Theory of *caittas* according to Vasubandhu, and according to the Sautrāntikas.

B. *Prakarana* and *Dhátukāya*.

C. The Abhidhamma.

A. The commentary of the *Vijñaptimātrāstra* says that the Sautrāntikas have two systems. One, the Dārśāntikas, maintain that only the mind exists, that mental states do not exist, in agreement with Buddhadeva (see i.35 note); others admit the existence of mental states and are divided into many opinions: there are three mental states: *vedanā, samjñā, and cetanā*; that there are four (with the addition of *sparśa*), ten (the ten *mahābhūmikas*), fourteen (with the addition of *lobba, dveṣa, mōba, māna*); furthermore certain Sautrāntikas admit all the mental states of the Sarvāstivādins. (The references of Wassilief, p. 309, differ; read "the Bhadanta Sautrāntika" instead of Bhāttopama).

See ii.26c-d; iii.32a-b.

Vasubandhu presents his doctrine of the mental states in his *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*, TD 31, p. 848c3-9: "What are the *caittas*? The dharmas associated (*samprayukta*) with the mind, namely (1) five universals (*sarvaga*): *sparśa, manaskūra, vedanā, samjñā, and cetanā*; (2) five particulars (*pratimātavīṣaya*): *chanda, adhimukti, smṛti, samādhi, and prajñā*; (3) eleven good: *śraddhā, bṛi, apratāpya, alobha kuśalamūla, advēṣa kuśalamūla, amoha kuśalamūla, virya, praśrabdhi, apramāda, upekṣa*; and *abhinīsa*; (4) six defilements (*klesa*): *rāga, pratiṣheṣa, māna, avidyā, dṛṣṭi*, and *vikicchā*; (5) the others (*śeṣa*) are *upakleṣa*: *krodha, upanītha, māraśa, pradāsa, irṣyā, mātsarya, māyā, śaḍhya, mada, vibhirṇīsa, ābhrīka, anapatrāpya, styāna, auddhāya, āśraddhāya, kausūda,*
There are five dharmas: 1. rūpa, 2. citta, 3. caittadharma, 4. cittaviprayuktasarīṇākāra, 5. asamākṣa. . . What is citta? Cittā is manas, vijnāna, that is to say the six categories of vijnāna, consciousness of sight, etc. What are the caittas? All the dharmas associated with the mind. What are these dharmas? They are vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā, sparśa, manasikāra, chanda, adhimukti, smṛti, samādhi, prajñā, śraddhā, viṇa, vitarka, vicāra, pramāda, apramāda, kuśalamāla, akuśalamāla, avyaktamāla, all the saṃyojanas, anusayas, upakleśas, paryavasthānas (v.47), all knowledge (jñāna, vii.1), all opinion (drṣṭi), all comprehension (abhisaṃaya, vi.27); furthermore all dharmas of this type, associated with the mind, are citta.

Later on (p. 698b28; see also Dhātukāya, TD 26, p. 614b10): "There are 18 dhātus, 12 āyatana, 5 skandha, 5 upādānakandhas, 6 dhātus, 10 mahābhūmikas, 10 kuśalamahābhūmikas, 10 kleśamahābhūmikas, 10 parāttakleśabhūmikas, 5 kleśas, 5 saṃspāras, 5 drṣṭis, 5 indriyās, 5 dhāmās, 6 vijnānakāyas, 6 sparśakāyas, 6 vedanākāyas, 6 saṃjñākāyas, 6 cetanākāyas, 6 śraddhākāyas, What are the 18 dhātus? . . . What are the ten dhātus? The primary element of earth . . . (Kosa, i.28). What are the ten mahābhūmikas? Vedanā . . . prajñā. What are the ten kuśalamahābhūmikas? Śraddhā, viṇa, brahma, aparātapa, aloka, advega, prātābhed, upeksā, apramāda, abhivimśa. What are the ten kleśamahābhūmikas? Aśraddhā . . . pramāda (list quoted above ii.26a-c). What are the ten parāttakleśabhūmikas? Krodha, upādha, maṃśa, īrṣyā, maśārtya, śaṭhya, māya, mada, abhivimśa. What are the five kleśas? Kāmārāga, rūpārāga, ārāyārāga, pratiṣgha, vīcīkṛta (v.1). What are the five drṣṭis? Satkāyadrṣṭi, antagrāhadṛṣṭi, mūhyādṛṣṭi, dyapatrādṛṣṭi, śilavratapādṛṣṭa (v.3) What are the five saṃspāras? Pratīgya, samspāra, vidyāsamspāra, avidyāsamspāra, nāsavyādyāvidyāsamspāra (iii.30c-31a). What are the five indriyās? Sukhendriya, duḥkhendriya, saṃsārāyādi, adhikṣāyādi, upeksendriya (ii.7). What are the five dhāmās? Vitarka, vicāra, viṇa, ābhirīka, anapatrāyā. (In the Kosa, i.27, vitarka and viṇa are classified as anīyata; ii.26d, ābhirīka and anapatrāyā are classified as akūśalamahābhūmika, a category conceived later, see iii.32a-b; the viṇa referred to here in the Prakāraṇa and the Dhātukāya, without doubt refers to the six vijnānakāyas.) What are the six vijnānakāyas? Caksuviṣṇūjana . . . manovijñāna. What are the six saṃspārakāyas? Caksuḥsamspāra . . . manoḥsamspāra (iii.30b). What are the six vedanākāyas? Caksuḥsamspāraśajavedanā . . . (iii.32a). What are the six saṃjñākāyas? Caksuḥsamspārasajasaṃjñā . . . What are the six cetanākāyas? Caksuḥsamspārasajacentanā . . . What are the six śraddhākāyas? Caksuḥsamspārasajā śraddhākāya. The Dhātukāya proceeds by explaining the mahābhūmikas: "What is vedanā?" (See ii.24, note IIIb)

C. Kathāvattu, vii.2-3, the Rājagirikas and the Siddhāthikas deny the saṃprayoga of the dharmas, and deny the existences of the caittas; ix.8, the Uttarāpaṭhakas make a mahābhūmika of viṭarka (the technical term is missing). Visuddhimagga, xiv. Abhidhammasamgaha, ii. In Compendium, p. 237, S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids have some interesting observations on the development of the doctrine of the caittas.

110. According to the Vībhāṣā TD 27, p. 80b8, quoted by the Japanese editor: What is the meaning of the expression mahābhūmikadharma? a. The mind is great; these ten dharmas are its bhūmi, the locus of the origin of the mind; being the bhūmi of the "great," they are called mahābhūmi. Being mahābhūmi and dharmas, they are mahābhūmikadharman. b. Some say: The mind is great, due to the superiority of its nature and its activity; it is great and it is bhūmi; and it is called mahābhūmi, because it is the locus which serves as the support of the caittas. Because one encounters the ten dharmas, vedanā, etc., throughout the mahābhūmi, they are called the mahābhūmikadharman. c. Some say: The ten dharmas, vedanā, etc., are found everywhere with the mind, and so are
called "great;" the mind, being their bhūmi, is called mahābhūmi; vedanā, etc., being inherent in the mahābhūmi, are called mahābhūmikadbharms.

Vasubandhu reproduces the third etymology.

We shall see (iii.32a-b) that Srilāba does not admit this definition of the term mahābhūmika.

111. A. Hsuan-tsang corrects: Vedanā, samjñā, cetanā, sparsa, chandra, prajñā, smidt, manaskāra, adhimbukti, and samādhi.

The order of the Abhidharma (Prakaraṇapāda, Dbātukāya) is: adhimbukti, smidt, samādhi, and prajñā. Vasubandhu (Pāñcaskandhāka) distinguishes five universals (satuaga): sparsa, manaskāra, vedanā, samjñā, and cetanā, and five particulars (pratiniyataviṣaya): chandra, adhimbukti, smidt, samādhi, and prajñā.

The order of Mahāvyutpatti 104 (which reads adhimokṣa) differs from other sources.

B. The Dbātukāya (TD 26, p. 614c22) gives some definitions which are completely in the style of the Abhidharmma. For example, samādhi is defined: "The sthiti of the mind, samāsthiti (teng-chu 無住), abхиsthiti (bsien-chu 現住), upaṭsthiti (chin-chu 幹住), avipṣeṣa (puluan 不亂), aghaṭṭana (pu-san 不散), Mahāvyutpatti, 245.226) samādhāraṇa (śhe-ch'ib 撄持), samatha, samādhi, and cittasyaikāgrata, is what is called samādhi." (Vībhanga, p. 217, Dhammasamgaṇi, 11).

In the same way vedanā is vedanā, samvedanā, prativarvedanā, vedita, that which feels, that which is included within vedanā. Schmidt is smidt, anusmidt, pratismrta, smarana, asampramotsata . . . cetaso'bhilāpa.

12. The word kila shows that the author is presenting the opinion of the School. He explains his own doctrine in the Pāñcaskandhāka (Vyākhyā).

13. Compare Atthasālini, 329: kattukamyaṭṭā. According to the Pāñcaskandhāka: abhiprete vastuni abhikṣaḥ. (See ii.55c-d, iii.1, where chanda is defined as anāgata prāṭibhanā).


15. Pāñcaskandhāka: saṃsūte vastuni asampramotsata / cetaso'bbilapata. See i.33.

16. On abboga, S. Lévi ad Sātārāṇikāra, i.16, and Muséon, 1914.

17. This term presents a difficulty. Vyākhyā: adhimbukts tadālambanasya gunato'vabhāranāda (-ṇam?) rucir iti anye / yathāniscayaṃ dhāraneti yogācāracitāḥ: "Adhimbukti is the consideration of the object from the point of view of its qualities; according to others, complaisance; according to the Ascetics (the Yogācārins), the contemplation of the object in conformity with the decision taken." (This last point is explained ad ii.72, adhimuktsimankāra).

According to the the Pāñcaskandhāka, adhimokṣa is nisīte vastuny avadhāraṇam.

See the Prakaraṇapāda, TD 26, p. 693a17.

Paramārtha translates: "Adhimbukti (hsiang liao 相了) is a dharma which makes the mind lively (ming liao 明了, paṭu) with respect to the characteristic of the object." This is a gloss, not a translation.

Hsüan-tsang translates: "Adhimbukti, that is neng yū ching yin-k'o 能於境印可." We can translate: "that which makes a sign of approbation with respect to the object." The expression yin (=mudrā) k'o (possible) is mentioned by Rosenberg in many word lists. A. Waley, who has consulted the Japanese glosses, translates: "the sign of approval given to a disciple who has understood what has been taught him." We would thus have k'o = k'o-i = "this is allowable" (A. Debesse). Adhimbukti is the approbation of the object, the dharma by reason of which one grasps the object under consideration; it marks the first stage of the act of attention. See the note of Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium, p. 17 and 241, on adhimokkha: "... the settled state of a mind ...; it is deciding to attend to this, not that irrespective of more complicated procedure as to what this or that appears to be."
Chapter Two

Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 384b9): Approbation (yin-k'o) with respect to an object is called adhibhūtakṣīti. According to other masters, adhi signifies "superiority, sovereignty;" mūkti signifies vimokṣa. Adhibhūtakṣīti is a dhārma by virtue of which the mind exercises its sovereignty over an object without any obstacle; like adhīla. Adhibhūtakṣīti is a separate object, for the Śūtra says: "The mind, by reason of adhibhūtakṣīti, approves of (yin-k'o) the object." When the mental states arise, all approve (yin) the object; as a consequence adhibhūtakṣīti is a mahābhāṭīkṣīti. Nevertheless the Sthavira says: "It is not proven that adhibhūtakṣīti is a separate thing, for we see that its characteristic is not distinguished from that of knowledge (jñāna): the characteristic of adhibhūtakṣīti is that the mind is determined (niṣcita) with respect to its object. But this is not different from the characteristic of knowledge (jñāna). Consequently adhibhūtakṣīti is not a separate thing." This is not correct, for approbation (yin-k'o) brings about determination.

Some say: "Adhibhūtakṣīti is determination (avadhāraṇa, niṣcaya)." This is to give the cause of determination (namely adhibhūtakṣīti) the name of its effect. If this is the case, then adhibhūtakṣīti and determination would not be simultaneous. No: for these two mutually condition one another: by reason of discernment (pratissāmkiṣyā) there arise approbation, and by reason of approbation there arises determination (niṣcaya). There is no contradiction: thus there is no obstacle to their being simultaneous. If all thought include these two, then all the categories of mind will be approbation and determination. This objection is worthless, for it happens that their activity is damaged when they are dominated by dharma: even if there is approbation (yin) and determination, they are small and recognized only with difficulty.

118. Pañcaskandhaka: upaparikṣye vastuni citatasyaśākratā.

119. According to the Vībhāṣā, TD 27, p. 220b2, and the Prakaraṇa: śraddhā, virya, hri, āpatrapā, aloha, adveṣa, praśrabdhi, upekaṣā, apramāda, avibhīma. The Mahāvīryutpatti (104) lists the third root (amoha) and places virya after the roots. The Pañcaskandhaka also lists the third root and has the same order as the Mahāvīryutpatti with the exception that it places apramāda before upekaṣā.

120. In other words, śraddhā is the dhārma by which (yadyogat) the mind, troubled by the kleśas and the upakleśas, becomes clear, as troubled water becomes clear by the presence of a gem which purifies water (udakaprasaktakamani). Same example in Atthasālinī, 304.

121. Explanation adopted by Vasubandhu in the Pañcaskandhaka.

122. Bhāvanā signifies "taking possession," "frequentation" (pratilambha, niṣevana) according to vii.27.

123. The Mahāsāṅghikas. Diligence holds the mind safe from the dharmas of defilement (sāṅkheṭika).

124. The Abhidhamma distinguishes passaddhi and labutā (Dhammasaṅgani, 40-43) which the Abhidharma appears to identify. Praśrabdhi in the dhyānas is analyzed viii.9.

125. According to the Japanese editor. Pañcaskandhaka: "Praśrabdhi is an attitude of the mind and body, a dhārma opposed to dausthulya" (S. Lévi, Sūtraśālākāra, vi.2, Wogihara, p. 29).

126. Praśrabdhisambodhyāṅga is twofold, cittapraśrabdhi and kāya-praśrabdhi (Prakaraṇapāda, TD 26, p. 700a16). Samyuktaṅgama, TD 2, p. 191c5: ... tatra yaḍa kāya-praśrabdhīs tad api praśrabdhisambodhyāṅgam abhijñāyai sāṁbhode nivṛtvāya sāṁvartate / yaḍa cittapraśrabdhīs tad api sāṁbhodhyāṅgam ... A shorter recension in Samyutta, v.111. In the presence of this text, say the Sautrāntikas, how can you define praśrabdhi as solely "an attitude of the mind?"  


128. The Blessed One said that the nine aṅgāvastus (Anguttara, iv.408) are vyāpādānivaraṇa.
129. When the Path is made up of three elements, sīlaśkandha, samādhiśkandha, and prajñāśkandha, resolution and effort are placed within the prajñāśkandha with Seeing which, alone, is prajñā by its nature. We read in the Prajñāśkandhanirdesa: prajñāśkandhaḥ katuṣṭẖaḥ/samyagārthaḥ samyakāyaṃkalpaḥ samyagvyāyāmaḥ.

130. This samākārpeṣa is to be distinguished from vedanāpeṣa (i.14, ii.8c-d) and from apanāneṣa (viii.29). The Atthasālīni (397) lists ten upeṣas: here we have a definition of jhāνupekkhā: majjhatalakkhaṇṇaḥ anābhogarasā avyāpārupacuppeṭṭhānaḥ... (p. 174.2).

131. Literally: There are some things difficult to know that one can know. But it is quite difficult to know (or to admit) that there is no contradiction (opposition, impossibility of coexistence) between contradictory dharmaḥ: asti hi nāma durjñānam api jñāyate / idam tu khalu atidurjñānam yad virodho 'py avirodhaḥ.

132. According to Hsusian-tsang and the glosses of the Japanese editor:

- The Vaibhāṣikas. What contradiction is there in that attention is flexion of the mind, and that indifference is non-flexion of the mind? In fact, we consider attention and indifference to be distinct dharmas.

- The Sautrāntikas. Then attention and indifference will not have the same object; or rather one should admit that all mental states (greed, hatred, etc.) are associated.

We encounter other dharmas (vitarka, vicāra) which present the same characteristics of opposition...

133. The Pañcasūkha places amoha among the kuśalamabābhūmikas (by the fact that prajñā can be "erroneous"). Alōbha is the opposite of lobha, udvega and an-upādāna (?). Adveṣa is the opposite of dveṣa, namely goodwill (maithri, viii.29). Amoba is the opposite of moha, samyakāyaṃkalpa (vi.69).

134. Pañcasūkha: "Avibhimsā is compassion (karuna, viii.29), the opposite of vibhimsā."

135. Endurance is good action (kuśala-kriya); for endurance in evil action is not vīrya, but kausidya. The Blessed One said: "The vīrya of persons foreign to this religion (itobhāyaka) is kausidya" (ii.26a). Pañcasūkha: "Vīrya is the endurance of the mind in good, the opposite of kausidya."

136. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, the Path of Seeing expels avidyā, the Path of Mediation expells ajñāna, and the Path of Āsākṣa expells non-clearness.

137. Compare Dharmasāṅgani, 429.

138. See above note 109.

139. Ko'yam devānāṁprīyo nāma / rjakājātiyo devānāṁprīyā ity eke vyācaksate /astraḥ bi devānāṁ prīyo bhavati /mārko devānāṁprīyā ity apare /yo hiśvarānām iṣṭḥab sa na tādanena śikṣata iti mārko bhavati (Vyākhyā). The Japanese editor quotes numerous glosses.

140. Pāṭhabrāmanyamatreṇa daśa kleśamabhābhūmikāḥ prāptā ity etam eva prāptim jānīte (Vyākhyā).

Vasubandhu reproduces the formula of the Mahābhāṣya ad ii.4.56 (the story of the Grammarian and the Cow-herder).

See S. Lévi, J. As. 1891, ii.549 ("Notes de chronologie indienne. Devānāṁprīya, Aśoka et Kātyāyana"). According to Kern, Manual, 133, the meaning of "idiot" derives from the sense of "harmless, pious": this appears to be somewhat possible. See de La Vallée Poussin's note in the Bulletin de l'Academie de Bruxelles, 1923.

141. Vyākhyā: abhiḍabhārmiṇkāḥ.

Perhaps by the plural (abhiṣa) Vasubandhu is designating Dharmatrāta, the author of
Chapter Two

Samyukta-Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, number 1551, and his followers. This appears to result from the passages which follow (TD 28, p. 881bl7):

"... The klesamahābhūmikas are: mithyādhimokṣa, asaṃprabhāṇya, āyoniśomanaskāra, aśrāddhyā, kaśvādyā, viśēpa, avidyā, auddhatya, and pramāda.

"Mithyādhimokṣa consists of the ten klesamahābhūmikas which are found in all defiled minds. Abri and ātaraśa are called akuśalamahābhūmikas.

"The ten klesamahābhūmikas are found in all defiled minds. The ten dharmas the first of which is mithyādhimokṣa, accompany all defiled minds, sense consciousnesses or mental consciousnesses, of Kamadhatu, Rūpadhatu, and Ārūpyadhatu. They are thus klesamahābhūmikas. Question: Styāna is found in all defiled minds; why is it not counted among the klesamahābhūmikas? Answer: Because it is favorable to samādhi. This is why styāna is not counted in the list. Is a dharma which is a mahābhūmika also a klesamahābhūmika? Four alternatives: 1. mahābhūmikas without being klesamahābhūmikas . . ."

142. The author does not admit this opinion. Torpor (styāna, laya) and dissipation, which are defiled dharmas, are opposed to the "white" dharmas, like samādhi.

143. According to the Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 220b4, there are five akuśalamahābhūmikas: avidyā, styāna, auddhatya, abri, and anapratapya. See iii.32a-b and above note 102.

144. Hsüan-tsang translates: "... the dharmas of this nature (=āt) are termed parītaklesābhūmikas."

Sarhghabhadra: The text says "the dharmas of this nature," in order to include aksānti, arati āgbāta, etc. (TD 29, p. 392a6).

145. Dharmatrāta: Because they are abandoned through Meditation and not through the Seeing of the Truths, because they are associated with the mental consciousness and not with the five other consciousnesses, and because they do not arise with all minds and exist separately, they are parītaklesābhūmika.

146. According to the Chinese. The Japanese editor explains the final et cetera by rāga (v.2), pratigbha, māna (v.10), and vicīkītā.

The Vyākhyā reads: "kaukrtya, middha, etc." and explains "etc." by arati, vijṛmbhitā, tendri, bhakte'samatā, etc. It continues: The klesas, rāga, etc., are also indeterminate, for they are not classified in any of the five categories: they are not mahābhūmikas, because they are not found in any minds; they are not kusājamahābhūmikas, because they are repugnant to the good; they are not klesamahābhūmikas, because they are not found in any defiled mind: for there is no rāga or lust in a mind full of hatred (sapatigbha).

The Ācārya Vasumitra has written a summary, mnemonic śloka: "The tradition (smṛta) is that there are eight aniyatas, namely vītarka, vicāra, kaukrtya, middha, pratigbha, sakti (=rāga), māna, and vicīkītā". But we do not admit this number of eight. Why are the drṣīs (v.3a) not aniyata? There is no mithyādṛṣṭi in a mind full of hatred or scepticism.

147. Compare Kathāvatthu, xiv.8.

148. Dharmasāṅgani, 1161, Atthasālini, 784-787.

149. Compare i.37.

150. Avenika = rāgādīptabgbātu.

151. All drṣī is samātirikā prajñā (i.41c-d, vii.1).

152. The mind of the First Dhyāna, when it is good, contains twenty-two mental states; defiled-neutral, it contains eighteen mental states whether it is independent of, or associated with drṣī, nineteen when it is associated with rāga, māna or vicīkītā . . .
153. Literally: The word "also" (apt) shows that in addition to vicāra, one should exclude śāhya and māyā.


155. By adding: "I am the great Brahmā", he distinguishes himself from the other Brahmas.

156. Compare Dīgha, i.219, and below iv.8a, v.53a-b.

157. Jñānaprasthāna, i. Para. 5 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 924c26 and following.

158. Praśīla = guru, because śiyām praśītaḥ.

159. Compare the definition of adbhīṭa: ...

160. These masters observes that the two roots hri and trap (Dhātupāta, iii.3 and i.399) are synonyms and signify shame (lajjā): from whence one cannot see how abri would be disrespect and atrapā the absence of fear in the commission of transgressions.

161. Vasubandhu, in the Pañcaskandhaka, adopts this definition.

162. Jñānaprasthāna, i. Para. 4 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 923a13 and following.

163. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 151a15.

164. For one cannot have respect for impure (sāsra) dharmas. (Note of the Japanese editor).

165. This definition comes from a Sūtra which is not designated in our sources. See i.33.

166. Seventh opinion of the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 219b3.

167. Argument presented in the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 269b10, and attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas.

168. That is, "it makes the voice surge forth," vāksamutthāpaka.

169. Compare Majjhima i.301, Sarīyutta ov.293: pubbe kho ... vitakketvā vicāretvā pacchā vācam bhīmadit. On the other hand, Vibhanga, 135: vācīsamcetanā = vācīsamkharo.

170. Samghabhadra says that vitarka and vicāra are associated with each thought; but these two dharmas do not enter into activity, do not reveal themselves by their action (udbhūtavr̥tti) at one and the same time: the mind and mental states are grosser when vitarka, which is always present, enters into activity ... In the same way rāga and moha are coexistent: but a person is termed rāgacarita, acting though rāga, when rāga manifests itself ...

171. Vitarka and vicāra do not exist simultaneously, but successively (paryāyena). What is the difference between vitarka and vicāra? The ancient masters (puruṣācarāya) say: "What is vitarka? A mental conversation (manojalpa) of inquiry (paryēṣaka), which has for its support volition (cetana) or the speculative consciousness (prajñā) depending on whether it does or does not contain deduction (abhyāsa). This is the grosser state of mind. What is vicāra? A mental conversation of appreciation, of judgment (pratyavekṣaka), which has for its support volition ..." According to this theory, vitarka and vicāra constitute almost two identical psychological complexes: they differ in that the first includes "inquiry" and the second "judgment." Some give an example: Someone feels numerous pots in order to know which one is well baked, and which one is soft: this inquiry (ābha) is vitarka; finally, this person arrives at the conclusion, "There are such a number of each category:" this is vicāra.

The Vyākhyā, ad i.37, quotes Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaka which is very close to the opinion
of some ancient masters: vitarkaḥ katamah / paryesaḥ manojalpaḥ cetanāprajñāviśeṣaḥ / yā citsasya vairaktaḥ // vicāraḥ katamah / pratyaveksaḥ manojalpaḥ cetanāprajñāviśeṣaḥ / yā citsasya sūkṣmaḥ // The Vyākhyā adds: anabhyudāvasthāyāṁ cetanā abhyudāvasthāyāṁ prajñeti vyavasthāyate.

3.172. Paryādīyate = sarviniruddhaye; see Śīkṣāsamuccaya, 177.15, Divya, Sūtrālamkāra, i.12.

Śaṅghabhadra’s definition: yah svadharmeṣv eva raktasya darpaḥ cetasāḥ paryādānaṃ kuṭalanyakriyābhyupapattisambhāro madāḥ.

3.173. Mada is sensation, “defiled satisfaction” (kliṣṭa saumanati). The Vaibhāṣikas do not admit this explanation: in fact, satisfaction does not exist beyond the Second Dhyāna: but, according to v.53c, mada exists in the three spheres of existence.

3.174. Compare Dīgha, i.21, Sarīyutta, ii.94.

3.175. Its meaning is that it accumulates good and evil (Vyākhyā). Tibetan: 'byed pas: because it distinguishes. Atthasālinī, 293: ālambaraṁ cintotīṣi cittam.


3.177. The Vyākhyā adds: bhāvānaśarvinivesayogena sūtrāntikamatena yogācāramatena vā.

Paramārtha reads: citsāṁ śubhāśubhār dhātubhis tān vā cintotīṣi cittam. The Tibetan translates in the same way: “because it is charged (bsags-pas) with good and evil dhātu.”

3.178. The consciousness (vijñāna) discerns a blue object, etc.; sensation feels it as agreeable, etc.; ideas grasp its characteristics, etc. Or rather: consciousness perceives the object, in a general manner, as a perceptible (upalabhyaṭārūpam grhāt); the mental states perceive its specific characteristics (viveṣarūpena): sensation is susceptible of being agreeably experienced (anu-bhavaniyatiṭārūpam); ideas are susceptible of being defined (paricchedyaṭārūpam), etc. (116a).

3.179. That is to say saha vistaraprabhedābhyām or aha vistaraprabheneda.

3.180. The iti indicates that one should add other viprayuktas like saṁghabbeda (iv.99), etc. to this list. The Prakaraṇa says: ye’py evamśamāyakāt: “The dharmaṇa which are of this type are also cittaviprayukta.” Same formula in the Skandhapāntaka.

According to the Prakaraṇa, the samśārās disassociated from the mind are: prāpti, asamjñīnaṃsatpatti, nirōdhasamaṇḍatti, asamjñīṣika, jīviteṇḍriya, nikāyasabbhāga, āsrayaprāpti, dravyaprāpti (?), āyatanaprāpti, jāti, jāra, sthiti, anityaṇa nāmakaṇa, and vyānishanakaya and all the other dharmanas of this type disassociated from the mind.

Prāpti is defined as dharmanāṁ prāptih; āsrayaprāpti is āsrayāyatanaprāpti; dravyaprāpti (?) is skandhāṇāṁ prāptih; āyatanaprāpti is ādyāṃkābhyāyatanaprāpti (TD 26, p. 694a19).

Prakaranapāda (p. 694a14): What is prāpti? Prāpti of the dharmanas. What is asamjñīṇaṃsatpatti? The cessation of the mind and mental states having for its antecedent the idea of departure attached to the abandoning of the defilement of the Subhakṛṣṇanās but not to the abandoning of higher defilements. What is nirōdhasamaṇḍatti? The cessation of the mind and mental states having for its antecedent the idea of calm attached to the abandoning of the defilement of ākṛmāṇyaṇatiṇa. What is asamjñīṣika? The cessation of the mind and mental states of those who are born among the Asamjñīṣitva gods. What is jīviteṇḍriya? Āyus of the Three Dhātus. What is nikāyasabbhāga? The resemblance of beings.

3.181. See i.38c-d, ii.59b.

The terms lāṭha and samanvāgama do not have the same meanings in the Abhidharma and
in the *Kathāvatthu*, ix.12. For the Theravādins, *labha* signifies "possession," for example the power that the Saints possess to realize at their will any given absorption; *samanvāgama* is understood as the actual realization. Elsewhere (iv.4) *paṭilabbhasamānāgama* and *samanvābhāvasamānāgama*, possessor of power (*samanvāgama* of the Abhidharma) versus its actual possession (*sārmukhibhāva* of the Abhidharma) are distinguished. See also xix.4.

182. There is in me *praṇīti* or *aprāṇīti* relative to my defilement, to my action . . . , that is to say, I possess or do not possess my future or past defilement . . . But there is no relation of possession or of non-possession between me and the defilement of another.

183. Hairs should be regarded as "belonging to a living being," for they are bound (*sambaddha*) to the material organs.

184. A person "bound with all the bonds" (*sakalabandhana*) is one who has not obtained, by the worldly (*laūkika*) path, the abandoning (= *pratisamkhyaniruddha*) of any of the nine categories of defilements of Kāmadhātu. An Āryan, at the first moment (*ādikṣaṇa* = *dūḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*) has not yet obtained the abandoning of the defilements abandoned through the Path (vi.77). A person who has obtained the abandoning of one category of defilement is called *ekapraturopatiṅkita* (vi.30a).

185. *Dravyadharmah* = *dravyato dharmah*, or rather *dravyam ca tad dharmas ca sa dravyadharmaḥ*, that is to say *vidyāmānasaṃvalokṣaya dharmah* See below p. 211-212.

186. These ten *dharmas* are the eight parts of the Path, plus *samyagvimukti* and *samyagjñāna* (*Aṅguttara*, v.222); the five abandoned items are not the group of *satkāyadrṣṭi*, *sīlawatapatāmarṣa*, *vīcikitsa*, *kāmacchanda*, and *vyāpada*, for this group has been abandoned with the acquisition of the result of *Anāgāmin*; rather, it is a group relative to the higher spheres, *rūparūga*, *ārūpyarūga*, *auddhatya*, *māna*, and *avidyā*.


188. According to Scripture, things (*vastu*) are either *dravyasat* or *praṇīptaḥsat*, "really existant," or "existing as designation."

189. The cause of arising of a thought of greed is the "possession" of this future thought of greed.

190. The pure *dharmas*, *dūḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*, etc.

191. The undefiled and defiled *dharmas* of Kāmadhātu respectively.

192. These definitions answer the questions of the Vaibhāṣikas: "Is the seed a thing (*dravya*) different from the mind, or not different from the mind?," "Is this series a permanent (*anasthita*) thing within which different *dharmas* successively arise?," "Should *parināma* be included as is the *parināma* of the Sāṅkhya?"

See ii.54c-d The doctrine of the evolution of the series is presented again iv.3c.

193. Tibetan and Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang: "The two paths (the doctrine of the Sautrāntikas and the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas) are good. How is this? The first is not in contradiction with reason; and the second is our system."


194. The *praṇīti* of past *dharmas* is (1) either past, that is: "which has arisen and which has perished:" it was either earlier (*agraja*), or later (*paścātkalaja*), or simultaneous (*sahaja*) to these *dharmas*; (2) or it is future, that is: "that which has not arisen:" it will be later than these *dharmas*; (3) or present, that is: "that which has arisen and which has not perished:" it is later than these *dharmas*. And thus following.
No dharma is susceptible of this threefold prapti. For example, the prapti of the dharmas "of retribution" is solely simultaneous to these dharmas (ii.38c). One does not "possess" these dharmas before they have arisen, nor after they have perished.

195. The impure dharmas belong to the planes of existence, dhātvāpta, dhātu-patīta.

196. These are the aparāiyapannas of the Abhidhamma.

197. Pratisamkhyānirodha or "disjunction of defilement" (visāmyyoga, i.6a-b, ii.57d) can be obtained by a Prthagjana or by an Āryan. In the first case, the prapti is of Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu depending on whether the nirodha is obtained by a (worldly) path of Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu. In the second case, it is of Rūpadhātu and pure, when the nirodha is obtained by a Rūpadhātu (or worldly) path; of Ārūpyadhātu and pure, when the nirodha is obtained by a path of Ārūpyadhātu; and pure, when the nirodha is obtained by the pure Path (according to the principle formulated vi.46).

198. The Saikṣa dharmas are the pure dharmas of the Saikṣa, of the saint who is not an Arhat; the dharmas of an Āśāikṣa are the pure dharmas of the Arhat.

199. Paramārtha: "The same way as the prapti, obtained by a non-Āryan, of apratisamkhyānirodha and pratisamkhyānirodha." Hsüan-tsang: "... the prapti of pratisamkhyānirodha obtained through a non-Āryan path."

200. One case is not envisioned: the prapti of pratisamkhyānirodha, by means of a worldly path, by an Āryan. This prapti is at one an the same time pure and impure, as we shall see vi.46.

201. Durbaratva: anabhisaṃskāravattvā, because it is not the result of an effort.

202. Vāsāhāyā: The Vaibhāsikas. For example, Viśvakarman, the heavenly artisan, possesses past, present, and future saUpasthānikas; the Sthavira Asvajit possesses the airyāpathikas.

203. The non-possession of the defilements is not defiled, for, in this hypothesis, it would be lacking in a person liberated from the defilements: but it is not good, for it is lacking in the person who has cut off the roots of good (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 799a21).

204. If an aprāpti can be pure, this would be the aprāpti of the pure dharmas; now the definition of a Prthagjana proves that the aprāpti of the pure dharmas is not pure.

205. Second masters of the Vibhāṣā.

206. Compare Kathavattu, iv.4.

207. Aprāpti or alābha belongs to the sphere of existence (dhātu) to which the person belongs who is endowed with it (ii.40a). Thus a being in Kāmadhātu is solely endowed with the quality of Prthagjana (which is aprāpti, ii.40b-c) of the sphere of Kāmadhātu. Thus one cannot say that, by the acquisition of the Path, this being loses the quality of Prthagjana of the sphere of the three realms of existence. Nevertheless, by the acquisition of the Path, any quality of Prthagjana, of whatever sphere, becomes impossible. One can thus say that this quality, under its triple form (of Kāmadhātu, etc.), is abandoned, even though a given being is endowed with it under but one form.

Two aspects of its abandoning are distinguished, vibāni and prabhāna.

208. A Prthagjana, detaching himself from Kāmadhātu, passes into the First Dhyāna: he loses the quality of Prthagjana of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, but he does not become, by this fact, an Āryan: for another quality of Prthagjana, of the sphere of the First Dhyāna, appears. The same way for the other stages, whether one ascends or descends.
209. By taking possession of the good dharmas of hearing and reflection of Kāmadhātu, one loses the aprāpti of these dharmas; by taking possession of the innate good dharmas (ii.71b), one loses the aprāpti of the roots of good which have been cut off (samuccinakusala). When, dying in Kāmadhātu, one is reborn in the First Dhyāna, one loses the aprāpti of the dharmas of the First Dhyāna . . . This theory raises some delicate problems which the Vyākhyā summarily examines.

210. Compare ii.45c-d: the play of birth (jāti) and the arising of birth (jātiṣṭhā). The case of the neutral (avyākṛta) dharma is not examined here, because this dharma is possessed solely at the moment when it exists (sasya sabajaiva prāptih): the numbers differ.

211. The Japanese editor observes that one should add four lakṣanas and four amulakṣanas (ii.45c-d) for each of these three dharmas; we thus have twenty-seven dharmas of the first moment.

212. At the fourth moment one possesses twenty-seven prāptis, namely the prāptis of the dharmas produced at the three preceding moments, three, six, and eighteen, plus twenty-seven anuprāptis, or forty-four dharmas. At the fifth moment, eighty-one prāptis and as many anuprāptis.

213. At the fourth moment one possesses twenty-seven prāptis, namely the prāptis of the dharmas produced at the three preceding moments, three, six, and eighteen, plus twenty-seven anuprāptis, or forty-four dharmas. At the fifth moment, eighty-one prāptis and as many anuprāptis.

214. Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 694a23: "What is nikāyasabhāga? The commonness of nature (t'ung-lei hsing) of living beings."

215. Each living being possesses his own sattvasabhāga. Nevertheless sattvasabhāga is said to be general because it is not differentiaced. To conceive of it as unique and eternal is an error of the Vaibhāṣikas.

216. By et cetera one should understand: upāsikā, bhikṣunī, the naivasaṅkṣaṅsaṅśaṅsaṅka, etc.

217. "It is by reason of their dharmasabhāga that the dhātus are of Kāmadhātu . . ."

218. Compare Anguttara, iv.247, etc. The Daśabhūmaka replaces the formula sa ced . . . with atha cet punar manusyeṣūpapadyate.

219. Hsüan-tsang translates: "This is not admissible, for it is in contradiction with our system;" he omits the formula "The Vaibhāṣikas say" (The Vaibhāṣikas say: "This is not admissible . . ."

220. Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 694a19. Dīgha, iii.263: sant'āvuso sattā asaṅñino appatisaṅvedino seyyathāpi devā asaṅñasattā. i.28, iii.33 . . . saṅhappādā ca pana te devā tambā kāyā cavanti. One of the nine sattvaṅvāsas, Anguttara, iv.401; Kośa, iii.6c.

221. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 615a5, five opinions.

222. But the foreigners pretend that there are nine divisions in the heaven of the Fourth Dhyāna. On the Vṛhatphalas (Vehapphalas), see Burnouf, Introduction, p. 614.


224. On the meaning of the word samāpatti, see p. 232.

225. The complete name is sanīṭīveśāsanaṁ nirodhasaṁpatti, see p. 230. Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 694a19: Asanīṭīsasamāpatti is an arresting of the mind and mental states which has for its antecedents the idea of deliverence (niḥsaranamanaṁsaṅkāraparvaka) and which is obtained by a person free from defilements of the Subhākṛtñas, but not from higher defilements. Nirodhasaṁpatti is an arresting of the mind and mental states which has for its antecedents the
idea of calmness, and which is obtained by a person free from the defilements of *ākīnca*niyāyatana. Vasubandhu, in his *Pañcasandhika*, draws his inspiration from these definitions.

226. One obtains *apratisamkhyānirroda* or the definitive disappearance of bad realms of rebirth, *āsarvajnā*, birth among the Mahābrāhmaṇas and the Kuruś, and an eighth rebirth by entry into *niyāma*.

227. Whoever enters into the Fourth Dhyāna obtains in the same body the *prāpti* of all the four Dhyānas which he has cultivated or will cultivate in the course of his transmigration.

228. The future good mind is the object of a former *prāpti*.

229. On *nirodhasamāpatti*, *sarvajñavedīnirrodhasamāpatti* (see below p. 230, see vi.43c-d, viii.33a (vimokṣa), *Kathavatthu*, vi.5, xv.7. In the *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 777a14 numerous opinions on this absorption: for some, it is only one thing (*dravya*), *nirodhasākṣatkarā*; for others, eleven things: the ten *mahābhūmikās* and *cittanirroda*; for others, twenty-one things: the *mahābhūmikās*, the *kusalamahābhūmikās* and *cittanirroda* . . .

230. *Vibhāra* = *samādhi viśeṣa*.

231. It is “retributed later:” when an existence in Rūpadhātu in interposed between an existence in Kamadhūtu in the course of which one produces it, and an existence in Bhavāgra which is its result.

232. This absorption takes place in Bhavāgra, from whence matter (*rūpa*) is absent. Prthagjanas fear that the arresting of the mind and mental states is, under these conditions, annihilation. They do not have the same fear with respect to *asamjñīsamāpatti*, which takes place in the Fourth Dhyāna, where matter persists. By this fact, there remains, within *nirodhasamāpatti*, *nikāyasamābhāga*, *jīvitendriya* and other *samskāras* disassociated from the mind; but Prthagjanas do not see them.

233. According to one variant, followed by the Chinese translators, *deśpadharmanirvāṇasya* . . . That is, “The Aryan hopes to obtain, aims to obtain Nirvāṇa-at-death by means of this absorption, within this absorption.”


235. The Japanese editor quotes different opinions of old commentaries on the *Kośa*: the Westerners are the Sarvāstivādinins of Gandhāra, or the Sautrāntikas, or the masters of the land of Indhu. They are called “Westeners” because they are to the west of Kāsmīr, and “foreigners” (*babirdeśaka*) because they are outside of Kasmīr. See below note 237.

236. See iv.24c-d. Compare *Kathavatthu*, i.5, xviii.5.

237. The Masters of the land of Indhu, of the same opinion as the Westerners.

238. *Vyuttānāsaya* = *vyuttānābhīṣprāya*: “having a resolution susceptible of giving up, of surrendering.” According to another interpretation, *āsaya* = *kusāla* = *kusalamūla*; thus: “having roots of good susceptible of giving up, of being interrupted.” Now the roots of good of the Bodhisattvas are such that, once they have begun to be actualized, they do not cease before Bodhi is obtained. *Vyuttāna* also signifies “departure from absorption” (*Saṃyutta*, iii.265, etc.).

239. See *Vibhāṣā* TD 27, p. 204b3-c4: All the attitudes are good. Why does the Bodhisattva take up the sitting attitude? . . .

240. Hsian-tsang adds: “The first doctrine is the best, because it is our system.”
241. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 773bll. Three opinions: solely in Kāmadhātu; also in the three lower Dhvānas; and also in the Fourth Dhvāna.

According to the *Vibhāṣā, nirodhasamāpatti* cannot be prolonged beyond seven days-and-nights.

242. The *Jñānaprasthāna, TD* 26, p. 1024a8, posits a fourfold question: Is there an existence in Rūpadhātu which does not include the five skandhas? Is there an existence including the five skandhas and which is not Rūpadhātu? Is there an existence in Rūpadhātu which includes the five skandhas? Is there an existence which is neither in Rūpadhātu and which does not include the five skandhas?

243. The *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Kośa* do not employ the word skandha but a synonym, a word that the MSS of the *Vākyāyā* transcribe as both vṛyavākāra and vṛyavacāra. Hsūn-tsang translates this is *hsing 行*, the equivalent of *samskṛta, vibarata, etc.*; Paramārtha translates this as *p'ān 判*, the equivalent of *niti, naya*, "to judge," "to decide." The reading vṛyavākāra appears certain according to Pali sources.

   a. Pali sources. *Vokāra = khandha (Childers); Vibhanga, 137: saṁaññabhavo asaṁaññabhavo nevasaṁaññamāsaṁaññabhavo ekāvokārabhavo ca tuvokārabhavo pañcavokārabhavo; Yamaka, according to Kathāvāthu, trans. p. 38; Kathāvāthu, iii.11: if non-conscious beings possess an existence including vokāra or five vokāras. (Buddhaghosa explains: vividhena visum visum karṣyati).

   b. *Vyākhyā. Vṛyavākāra* is the name that the Buddha Kasyapa gives to the skandhas. *Vṛyavākāra (viṣeṣenāvākāra)* signifies savyavākāra according to Panini, v.27.127; thus, "that which deceives, that which contradicts (viṣamvadanti) by its impermanence," a definition which applies to the skandhas according to the stanza "Rūpa is like foam . . ." (Śāryāntra, iii.142).

   c. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p.959bll. The former Tathāgatas Śamyakasambuddhas called the skandhas vṛyavākāras; but the Tathāgata Śamyakasambuddha Śākyamuni calls the vṛyavākāras skandhas. The former Buddhas spoke of five vṛyavākāras, Śākyamuni speaks of five upāddānakandhas. Here, in the Abhidharma, one speaks of existence "having five vṛyavākāras," (pañca-) in order to show that the five skandhas of which Śākyamuni speaks are the five vṛyavākāras of which the former Buddhas spoke. Why did the former Buddhas use the term vṛyavākāra, whereas the present Buddha uses the word skandha? Because the Buddhas see that this is suitable to say to their followers . . . Why this expression vṛyavākāra? By reason of pravṛttis (sāntarāś, liu-ch'uan 決流 the skandhas which have formerly arisen develop by reason of the later skandhas, or rather the skandhas which have arisen later develop by reason of former skandhas . . .

244. When these beings, conscious by nature, become non-conscious in one of the two absorption, they are visabhāga-citte sthita, "placed in a mind contrary to their nature."

245. This Sūtra was preached by Śāriputra: it bears the name of Udāyin, because the adversary of Śāriputra is Udāyin. The Sanskrit redaction is very close to the Pāli text. *Madhyamāgama TD* 1, p.49c7 and *Āṅguttara*, iii.192. "trāvastyaṁ niḍānam / tatrāyusmān śāriputro bhikṣuṁ āmantrayate sma / ibhūyusmanto bhikṣub filasarippannaṁ ca bhavati samādhisanātpannas ca pratīṭasaranāpannas ca / so bhikṣuṁ manyuśvādaṁ uṣnānaṁ sariputro bhikṣuṁ samāpadyate ca vaṭṭiḥṣṭhāṁ ca / asti caīt sandhānāṁ iti yathābhūtāṁ prajāpāni / sa nevaṁ ḍrṣṭa eva bharme pratiṣṭhayaśāyāṁ āraṇrayati nāpi maranastamye bhedāc ca kāyāvatākramya devān kavaḍikārabbhakyaṁ anyatamaṁ divye manomaya kāya utpadyate / sa tatropanno . . .

   *Vyākhyā: pratiṣṭhayaiva = pūrvam eva.*

   This Sūtra is discussed viii.3c (the thesis of the existence of rūpa in Ārūpyadhātu). Compare *Dīgā, i.195.*

246. *Ājñām āraṇayati*, as in *Mahāvastu*, iii.53.9. Paramārtha: "He does not obtain aṇṇatāvindriya." Hsūn-tsang: "He does not apply himself in the manner to obtain the quality of Arhat . . ."
247. It is termed *manomaya* or mental, because it arises independently of the elements of generation; but this does not mean that it is a body created from ideas, *samjñāmaya* (*Dīgha*, i.195), and belonging to Ārūpyadhatu, as Udayin thinks.

On the "mental bodies" of the Bodhisattva in the *Mahāvastu*, see *Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique*, p. 258.

248. Note of the Japanese editor: i. The mental body gods of which the Sūtra speaks are (a) of Rūpadhatu, for the Sarvāstivādins (same opinion, *Dīgha*, i.195); (b) of Rūpadhatu and Ārūpyadhatu, for the Sautrāntikas; or (c) the Asamjñāsatvās, for Udayin. ii. According to the Sarvāstivādins there is falling from the absorption of extinction; but there is no falling, according to the Sautrāntikas and Udayin.

But, according to the *Vyākhyā*, the Sautrāntikas admit a falling from absorption; they nevertheless deny that a Saint falls out of Āryamārga (*contra* the Sarvāstivādins), from whence the difficulties that the *Vyākhyā* resolves.

249. The Mahāsāṅghikas, etc., according to P'u-kuang, *TD* 41, p. 99c15.

250. *Dīgha, TD* 1, p. 110a24; *Dīgha, iii.266*; *Mahāvyutpatti*, 68.7: *navānupūrvasamāpattayas*: the four *dhyānas*, the four *ārūpyas* and the absorption of extinction.

251. *Prātīhamakalpikah = āditaḥ samāpattividhāyakah*.

252. One prepares himself for *asamjñīsamāpatti* by thinking: "*Samjñā* is a sickness, a thorn, an abscess; the cessation of *samjñā* is tranquil, excellent."

253. The preparation includes the resolution "I shall know the mind of another."

254. The philosophical systems (*siddhānta*) are in disagreement. The Vaibhāṣikas, etc., hold that the absorptions and *asamjñīka* are lacking mind (*acittakāṇya eva ...*): the Sthavira Vasumitra, etc., hold that they are endowed with mind (*saṣittakāṇi*) from the fact of a non-manifested mental conciousness (*aparīṣṭaṃ avanovijñāna*); and the Yogācārinś hold that they have mind from the fact of the *alayavijñāna* (*Vyākhyā*).

255. This question is posed by the Sautrāntikas. For them, the mind which has just perished, and the mind which perished a long time ago, are equally non-existent: however the mind which has just perished is the cause of the mind which immediately follows it: compare the movement of the beam of a balance (*tulādandaṃ nīmanīvanīcattatvam*, comp. *Śālistamba* in the *Bodhicaryavatara*, 483.3).

256. The author indicates the name of the treatise because Vasumitra (called either the Sthavira or Bhadanta) wrote other books, the *Pañcavastuka*, etc. (*Vyākhyā*). There is a commentary on the *Pañcavastuka* by Dharmatrīta, *TD* 28, number 1555.

The Japanese editor remarks that this does not refer to the Vasumitra of the *Vibhāṣā*, but to a Sautrāntika. (See P'u-kuang, *TD* 41, p. 100b12.)

257. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 774a14: "The Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins maintain that there is a subtle mind which is not interrupted in the absorption of extinction. They say, 'There are no beings who are at one and the same time without mind and without *rupa*; there is no absorption which is without mind. If an absorption were without mind, then the vital organ would be cut off; one would not term this established in absorption, but rather "dead."'"

258. *Samyuktāgama*, *TD* 2, p. 74b20 and following; compare *Samyutta*, ii.72 and sources quoted *as Kośa*, iii.30b.

259. *Samyuktāgama*, *TD* 2, p. 83a2; *Samyutta*, iii.96.

260. This formula occurs in the *Mahāvyutpatti*, 68.9.
Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 782a22: One who is in nirodhasamāpatti cannot be burned by fire, drowned by water, wounded by the sword, or killed by another (Compare the legends of Sarhjlva, Khānu-Koṇḍañña, in the Visuddhi, xii. JTPS, 1891, 112). Why does he possess this quality? Vasumitra says because this samāpatti cannot be damaged; thus he who is in it cannot be damaged. Moreover samāpatti produces equality of the mind. Here, there is not mind, so how can one speak of samāpatti? Samāpatti is of two types: that which produces equality of mind, and that which produces equality of the primary elements. Even though the two samāpattis cut off the equality of the mind since they interrupt the mind, they bring about the equality of the primary elements.

261. Āśraya has been defined ii.5-6; see also p. 209.

262. Hsüan-tsang translates: "This theory is not good, for it is in contradiction with our system." Let us add: "So say the Vaibhasikas." See above note 218.

263. Buddhaghosa attributes to the Pabbaseliyas and to the Sammitiyas the Abhidharma doctrine that the jīvendriya is a cittacippayutta arūpadhamma. See Kathāvatthu, viii.10, Compendium, p. 156; Vibhanga, p. 123, Dhammasaṅgani, 19, 635, Atthasālīni, 644.


265. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 150b9, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 789al, Samyutta, iii.143 (varients); compare Majjhima, i.296. Quoted below ad iv.73a-b.

266. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 771a7: This Sūtra is quoted by the Vibhajyavādins in order to prove that these three dharman—life, heat, and consciousness—are always united and not separated. But Vasumitra observes that the Sūtra refers to the series of a certain āśraya ... Life (āyus) forms part of the saṅskāraskandha, the dharmadhatu, and the dharmāyatanā; heat, of the rūpaskandha and the sprastavyayatanā; and consciousness, of the vijnānakandha, the seven dhatus and the manāyatana: thus one should not take the Sūtra literally. Furthermore, if these three dharman always go together, there would be heat in Arūpyadhatu, life and consciousness among non-living beings, and consciousness in the non-conscious absorption.

267. Hsüan-tsang: "In addition to that we have said. What have you said? In order to avoid this consequence . . ."

268. Vaiṣeṣikadarsana, v.1.16; H. Ui, Vaiṣeṣika philosophy, p. 163. The example of the arrow has no real value for the Vaiśeṣikas who hold that vega is a thing in and of itself. Thus the author here refutes the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas.

269. Hsüan-tsang: "There is a thing in and of itself, the support of heat and consciousness, called āyus: this is the best doctrine." Note of the Japanese editor: The author adopts the opinion of the Sarvāstivādins. But we may suppose that Hsüan-tsang has omitted the words "The Vaibhasikas say: . . ." for in his Pañcakāndhaka, Vasubandhu adopts the Saunāntika thesis.

270. Karmaprajñāpatisāstra, Chap. xi (Mdo 72, fol. 240b).

271. On the different results of action, iv.85 and following. On bhoga, Yogasūtra, ii.13.


273. This is an explanation of the Foreigners (Bahirdeśaka). The explanation of the Kaśmīreans differs only in its words. Or rather these latter understand that the āyus of the first category is bound to its own series (svasamitayupanibaddha), but susceptible of being hindered.

274. According to Kathāvatthu, xvii.2, the Rajagirikas and the Siddharthikas deny the premature death of an Arhat (Kośa, ii.10). According to Rockhill (Life of Buddha, p. 189) and Wassilieff, p.
244, the Prajñāpāramitā śāstras deny premature death. The Bodhicaryāvatāra (ii.55) admits a "natural" (kāla) death and one hundred premature deaths, due to each of the humors (vāta, pitta, ślesman) and to the humors joined together, for a total of four hundred and four deaths.

Further (1) samuccchedamarana, the death of an Arhat; (2) khaṇikamarana, the constant disappearance of the dharmas eaten up by impermanence; (3) sammutimaranā, the death that one attributes to a tree, etc. The Abhidhamma distinguishes (1) kālamaranā (natural death) (a) by exhaustion of merit (punā), (b) by exhaustion of the span of life (āyu), and (c) by exhaustion of the two; (2) akālamarana (premature death) by reason of an action which cuts off existence (upacchedakammanā), in the case of Dūṣi Māra, Kalabhū, etc., and in the case of persons assassinated in retribution of a previous action (Visuddhimagga, viii. apud Warren, p. 252; Commentary on the Anguttara, P.T.S., p. 111; Nettipakarana, p. 29; Milinda, p. 301. Abhidhammasaṅgaha, Compendium, p. 149.

Jain doctrine, Umasvati, Tattvārthāddhigamasūtra, ii.52: dvividhāny āyūṃsī... 

275. Literally: taking possession of existence, ātma-bhāvapratañjambha. Majjhima, iii.53 distinguishes two types, saṇṭṭapajjha and avyāpajjha.

276. Dīgha, iii.231, Aṅguttara, i.159: attāvuso attabhāvapajjābhbo yasmin attabhāvapajjābhbo attasamcetanā yeva kamati no parasamcetanā... See Kośa, vi.56. Vācāyāyā: atāsamaṇcetanā = ātmanā māraṇan; parasamcetanā = pareṇa māraṇam.

277. Dīgha, i.19, iii.31. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 997b9. There is no agreement as to whether this refers to the Four Kings and the heaven of the Thirty-three Gods, or to other categories of gods in Kāmadhātu.

278. For example a certain Śuka was sent by the Blessed One to Āmarāpāli; the Licchavis were engaged in military exercises (yogya), and seeing him they covered him with a rain of arrows. But the messenger of the Buddha cannot be killed before he has completed his mission.

279. Perhaps we should understand: "the persons to whom the Buddha gives an order know that they will live yet that much more time." The notes of J. Przyluski on Yaśas and Jivaka make this version plausible enough: "In Mahāvagga, i.7, Para. 4 is almost incomprehensible. Yaśas cries out 'What a danger!' and we do not know to what danger he is alluding. In the corresponding passage of the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins everything is explained: 'Then Yaśas, having passed beyond the gate of the village, arrived at the river of Vārāṇasi. Then the Blessed One was walking on the bank of this river. Yaśas, seeing the water, gave forth a cry as he had formerly done. The Buddha, hearing this cry, said to the young man: 'This place has nothing to cause fear. Cross the current and come.'" (Tōk. xvii., 3.26a).

"The wife of Subhadra (comp. Divyāvadāna, 262-270) died before having given birth; the body was cremated but the infant was not burned. The Buddha told Jivaka to go and take the infant from out of the midst of the flames: Jivaka obeyed and returned without having had any ill effect (xvii.1.6a)."

280. Tibetan: gaṅ gā len. The Chinese transcriptions give Gaṅjīla; see the unsuccessful suicide attempts of Gaṅgika, Avadhānāsūtaka, 98.

281. The fact that the word tadyathā is lacking in the response of the Blessed One does not prove that this response should be understood literally.

282. Paramārtha: "Further, there are the laksāṇas of the samāskṛtas..."

Hsüan-tsang: "The laksāṇas are namely the arising, duration, change, and destruction of the samāskṛtas."

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 198a8 and following; Dharmottara's Abhidharmabṛdaya, TD 28, p.
811b17. A provisional definition of *sāṁskṛta* has been given i.7a-b.

283. But cannot one say that duration is a characteristic of an unconditioned thing? No. Characteristics are things in and of themselves (*dravyāntararūpa*) distinct from the *dharma* characterized, which causes arising, duration, decline and the perishing of this same *dharma*. An unconditioned thing lasts but does not possess the characteristic "duration," see below p. 239 line 11.

284. This is *Trilaksana-sūtra* (see below p. 242 line 9). *Samyuktāgama*, TD 2, p. 85b10; *Aṅguttara*, i.152: *tīṁimāni bhikkhave saṁkhatassa samkhatālakkhaṇāni / katamāni tīṁ / utpādo paṁñāyai vayo paṁñāyai śītassa aṁāti ṣaṁkhatām paṁñāyai*. The Sanskrit redaction has: *sthityanyathāv* (Madhyamakavṛtti, i.145); *Kathāvattu*, trans. p. 55: *ṭhitānāṁ aṁātiḥ*.


285. The same comparison, with a different moral, *Atthasadāni*, 655.


287. The theory of the *laksanas* and *anulaksanas* is refuted by Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka*, vii.1 and following. See Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 148, on the theory of the Sāṃkhya system who admit seven *laksanas* and seven *anulaksanas*: *utpāda, utpaddotpāda*, etc.

288. Space is a pure negative, a pure absence of any matter susceptible of resistance. It cannot be analyzed (*vipapyate, vibhidyate*).

289. See note 293.

290. See the sources quoted in Madhyamakavṛtti, 268, 598.


Tibetan: The *kula-putra* Nanda (Comp. *Aṅguttara*, iv.166).

Compare *Samyutta*, vi.180; *Majjhima*, iii.25 (where the Blessed One says to Śāriputra what he says here to Nanda): dharmā* viditā uppaṁjanti viditā upaṭṭhabanti viditā abhassatāṁ gacchanti.

292. *Majjhima*, iii.25 contains the formula *evam kilā me dharmā abhūtā sambhonti* which becomes the thesis of the Sautrāntikas: *abhūtā bhūva utpāda* (p. 243 line 17), which we read in *Milinda*, p. 51: *abhūtā sambhosi*, and which is contradicted by the Sarvāstivādins and by *Milinda*, p. 52: *nātthi keci sambhārā ye abhavantā jāyanti*. Nāgasena is a Vibhajyavādin, p. 50.

293. If one says, "It is by reason of its duration (*sthitisadbhdvāt*) that a *dharma*, once arisen, does not perish for a moment; lacking duration, even this moment itself would not exist," such is not the case, for the moment exists by reason of the cause which produces it. If one says, "It is duration which causes, which embraces (*upagṛhṇāt*) a *dharma* engendered by causes," we would ask, "If duration does not accomplish this task, what will happen?" "The *dharma* would not exist (*atmasattā dharmasya na bhavat*)." "Then say that duration engenders, not that it cause something to endure."

If one says, "Duration causes the series to continue (*avaṣṭhāpayati*)," then the name of duration should be reserved for its causes.

294. Smoke is momentary; when it "reproduces itself" in a place higher than that which it first
occupied, persons say that it rises (urdhvagamanākhyāṁ labhate) and they conceive of the rising (urdhvagamanavatam) as distinct from the smoke (see iv.2b).

295. If, grasping the unique self nature of a visible thing, I were to grasp it as being conditioned (saṁskṛtam iti) before knowing of its former non-existence, one could say that “conditioned” is a mark of a conditioned thing, that a conditioned thing is characterized by a conditioned thing (tenaive tal laksitam syāt). But such is not the case.

296. The Vaibhāṣikas are “followers of momentariness” (ksanikavādin): dharmas last only a moment and perish of themselves. See iv.2b; Wassilief, p. 325. But the difficulty is: what does kṣaṇa mean?

297. Some other definitions, iii.86a.

298. The Sarīńmitīyas (see iv.2c).

299. In the Introduction we have studied the different theories relative to impermanence (anityatva) and momentariness (ksanikatva).

300. See above p. 245. A conditioned dharma is engendered by its characteristic “arising.” “Arising” arises at the same time as the dharma which it engenders; being “future” it engenders it before arising itself.

301. Causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya) are defined ii.49, 61c.

302. The Vyākyāya quotes the response made by the Bhadanta Anantavarman to this objection: “The eye does not produce the visible consciousness without the coming together of clearness, etc.; it is no less a cause of the visual consciousness.” Response: “We state that the blind do not see, that the non-blind do see: thus we state the efficacy of the eye. The same does not hold for arising.”

Anantavarman is quoted in the Vyākyāya ad ii.71b-72, iii.35d and vii.32.

303. The nature of the mental states, spaṁśa, etc. is subtle and difficult to distinguish. Without doubt, reply the Sautrāntikas, but the Blessed One explained the efficacy of spaṁśa, etc.: “All that which is vedanā, saṁjñā, and saṁskāras, exists by reason of spaṁśa . . . ;” but he did not explain the efficacy of “arising.”

304. The idea of “color” has for its object specific characteristics (svalaksana) of the “color.” But the idea of “arisen,” as “the color has arisen,” does not bear on the color, since I have the same idea of arising when it refers to sensation: “sensation has arisen.” Thus the idea of “arisen” bears on the action produced by a certain dharma, independent of its color, its sensation, and its “arising.”

305. The Buddhists (baudhasiddhānta) believe that sandalwood is only a certain collection of odors, etc. (gandhādisamūha). The Vaibhāṣikas believe that sandalwood exists in and of itself; this is why the author gives the example of the bust, an example admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas. See Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 66; Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya, p. 84, 148, etc.

306. Vībhāṣa, TD 27, p. 198a15: Some maintain that the saṁskṛtalaksānas are not real things, namely the Dārśāntikas who say: “The saṁskṛtalaksānas are included within the viprayuktasamānikaśanskandha; the viprayuktasamānikaśanskandha is not real; thus the saṁskṛtalaksānas are not real.” In order to refute their opinion . . .

307. Hsüan-tsang: “This theory is best. Why?”

308. Namely the Abhidharmaśāstras.

309. We have four proverbs which have the same meaning, that is, one should not renounce a
thing in and of itself because of the defects that it presents, or because of the risks that it entails.

a. Na bi bhiksukhaḥ santiti sthalyo nādhīśīryante.

b. Na ca mṛgāḥ santiti yavā (var. śālayo) nādyante.

These two proverbs, which often go together, have been studied by Col. Jacob, in his *Second Handful of Popular Maxims* (Bombay, Nirnayasagar, 1909, p. 42, index sub voc. na bi bhiksikāḥ), with the references which follow: *Mahābhāṣya*, i.99, ii.194, iii.23 (Kielhorn), in the same context (na bi doṣāḥ santiti praibhāṣā na kartavyā laṃkānaṁ vā na praneṣam / na bi bhiksukāḥ . . . ); *Vācaspatimisra, Nyāyāvatārikā-pāryāyika*, pp. 62, 441; Bhāmṛti, p. 54; *Sarvadarsanamsamgraha*, p. 3 of Cowell's translation. We should add the *Kāmasūtra* (see Cat. Oxford, 216b), where the two proverbs are attributed to Vatsyāyana (mentioned by Weber, *Indische Studien*, XIII, p. 326).

c. Ato'jīrṇabhayān nābāraṇaparyaṇyo bhiksukabhayān na sthālyā anadhiśīryanam doṣesu praividbhātavayam itī nyāyab.

Col. Jacob quotes, for this third proverb, *Pancāpādikā*, p. 63 (of which the final doṣesu praividbhātavayam is found in Vasubandhu), *Jivanmuktiviveka*, p. 8 (which attributes the proverb to Anandabodhacarya), and *Hitopadesa*, ii.50, doṣabhītān anārāmabhāṇ . . .

d. Na māksikāḥ patantiti modakāḥ na bhaksyante.

A proverb for which we do not have any other references than Vasubandhu. It appears that the Buddhists, being bhiksus, have substituted mendicant (bhiksuka) and sthāli in the proverb, making it a proverb less biting than one containing flies and cakes.

310. Surendranath Dasgupta, in his *Study of Patañjali* (Calcutta, 1920), give in brief (p. 192-201) the various theories concerning sīpoṣa.

311. The word *sānīśākaraṇa* belongs to popular language (lokabhāṣā); it is the equivalent of nāmabhēya, name or appellation, for one says "'Devadatta' is a sānīśākaraṇa sound." But here it means "That which makes an idea arise." In fact sānīśa is a mental dharma, "idea," "notion," or "concept" (i.14c-d); nāman is what "creates" or engenders this dharma.

312. This does not refer to pada as a declined or conjugated form (Pāṇini, i.4.14).

313. One should consider the entire stanza as a pada:

\[
\text{anityā vata sāṃskāraḥ utpādyavayabharmanab} / \\
\text{utpadya hi nirudhyante teśāṁ vyuṣpaśamanab sukhaḥ} //
\]

that can be explained in different ways:

a. Thesis (pratijñā): "The sāṃskāras are impermanent." Argument (hetu): "because their nature is to arise and to perish." Example (drṣṭānta): "those things which, born, then die, are impermanent."

b. The argument: "Their nature is to arise and to perish," is proven by the remark: "In fact, being born, they die."

c. "The sāṃskāras are impermanent, in other words, their nature is to be born and to perish;" "because, being born, they perish:" "being impermanent, they are suffering, thus the arresting of them is happiness:" this is what the Buddha intended to teach to his followers.

This is the stanza that Śakra uttered at the death of the Blessed One, *Dīgha*, TD 1, p.26c21; *Samyutta*, i.158; *Dialogues*, ii.176; *Jātaka*, 94; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 39; Manuscript Dutreuil de Rhins, J. Ar. 1898, ii.300 (quoted in part, p. 108); *Udana-varga*, i.1; Mdo, 26, *Anityatāsūtra*; J. Przyluski, *Funerailles*, p. 9.

314. A type of "nominal phrase."

315. Nāman manifests (dyotaka) unique self characteristics (svalakṣaṇa); pada manifests the diverse relationships in which the thing whose self characteristic is known is to be found.


317. That is to say: "given a voice, a word—a dharma disassociated from the mind—arises" (vāc
352 Chapter Two

satyāṃ sa cittaviprayukta utpadyate).

318. This means that "a word—a dharma disassociated from the mind—arises with its vocal sound in the process of arising: the vocal sound manifests it with a view to designating an object" (ghosenotpadyamānena sa cittaviprayukto dharma utpadyate / sa tam prakāśayaty arthadyotanāya).

319. Samyuktāgama, TD 2, p. 266b9. Samyutta, i.38: nāmasamniśritā gāthā. Gāthā is a "phrase" (vākya); it depends on words, since it exists when sounds have arisen. Consequently, word and phrase exist in and of themselves.

320. Mahāvyutpatti, 245.319, has the word kṛtāvadhi.

321. Pañktivat, "like a line of ants;" but the different ants which form the line exist at the same time; we shall give a new example, cittānupūrvyavat, "like a succession of thoughts."

322. The dharmas which are of the sphere of consciousness of the Tathāgatas (tathāgata-jñānagocarapatita) are tarkagamya.


324. Phonemes, etc. are not "voice" by their nature. Nothing prevents their existing in Ārāpyadāna, but, as the voice is missing in this sphere of existence, they cannot be pronounced there. The Vaibhāṣikas: But how can you say that they exist where they are not pronounced?

325. The words that designate good dharmas are not themselves good, for when a person who has cut off the roots of good speaks of the good dharmas, he then possesses (prāpti) the words which designate these dharmas.

326. Hsiian-tsang corrects: The prāptis are of three types, ksānika (i.38), outflowing, and retribution.

327. The Vyākhyā makes the following remarks: a. There is no difference between hetu and pratyaya, for the Blessed One said: dvau hetu dvau pratyayau samyagdṛṣṭer utpādaya / katamau dvau / parataṣ ca ghoṣo'dhyātamanā ca yoniṣo manasiṣkāraḥ. (Anguttara, i.87: dvē'me bhikkhave paccayā suṁmaṭṭhīthā uppādaya . . . parato ca ghoṣo yoniṣo ca manasiṣkāro).

b. Hetu, pratraya, nidāna, kāraṇa, nimitta, linga, and upaniṣad are synonyms.

c. Why is a separate exposition of the hetus and the pratyayas given? Because the exposition of the hetus includes an examination of its cause as "non-obstructing cause," "mutual cause," "parallel cause," etc. (ii.49); an exposition of the pratyayas includes an examination of its cause as hetu, immediately antecedent cause, etc. (ii.62).

328. See Abhidharmabṛddha, TD 28, p. 811c17.

329. In what Sūtra are the six types of hetu taught? In fact the Abhidharma only explains, appreciates, and comments on the Sūtra (sarvo hy abhidharmah sūtrarthaḥ sūtranikasah sūtravyākhyānam).

The Vaibhāṣikas say that the Sūtra which treats of this point has disappeared (antarbhita). The Ekottarāgama enumerates the dharmas up to the categories of one hundred dharmas; it does not contain any more than ten categories up to ten (ādātakā) (See Introduction).

But there are some Sūtras which characterize each type of hetu, and the Vyākhyā furnishes some examples borrowed, it would appear, from Saṅghabhadra (TD, 29, p. 79b16).

(a) kāraṇabete: "The visual consciousness arises by reason of the organ of the eye and visible things." (Samyutta, iv.87, etc.).

(b) sababbhūbete: "These three parts of the path accompany (anuvart) Right Views." "Contact is the coming together of the three; then there arises together sensation, ideas, and volition."
(c) sabhāgahetu: "This person (pudgala) is endowed with good dharmanas, and with bad dharmanas; his good dharmanas may perish, his bad dharmanas may develop, but an anusabhagata root of good is not cut off (asti cāsyaṇusabagatarā kuśalamūlam asamucchinnam), from whence there arises another root of good: this person, in the future, will become pure" (vīśuddhīdharmā bhavisyati, cp. Anguttara, iii.315).

In a similar context, Samyutta, iii.131 (compare Kathavatthu, p. 215) has anusabhagata which Sarghhabhadra here translates exactly (sui chū hsing 隨俱行); this refers to a strong root of good, indentified (Sarghhabhadra, TD 29, p. 99b19) with the puṇa-ānu-dhātu (?) (chū sui chieh 久隨界) of the school of the Sthaviras.

But the MSS of the Vyākhyā have anusabhagata and we see that, in the Bhaṣya of iv.79d, the Chinese translation of the āśāṇapraṣṭhāna gives the exact equivalent: wei chū hsing 微俱行. In this passage anusabhagata is the equivalent of mṛdu-mṛdu: "What are the roots of good termed anusabhagata? Those which are abandoned last of all when the roots of good have been broken; those through the absence of which the roots of good are said to have been broken. (We have seen above, p. 210, that, properly speaking, the roots of good are never broken off.)

(d) samprayuktakahetu: "Faith (sraddha) has Seeing (dārśana) for its root, and is associated with avetyajñanā (vi.74): what this person knows (vijñāti), he penetrates to through prajñā (prajñātā)."

(e) sarvatragahetu: "The bodily actions, the vocal actions, the volition, the resolution, and the samskāras which follow the actions of a person who has false views (mithyādṛṣṭi, v.7), etc.,—all these dharmanas have for their consequence unhappiness and hideousness. Why? Because he has a transgressed (pāpika) view, namely false views." (Anguttara, v.212).

(f) vipākahetu: "He shall savor the retribution of action done here . . ."

330. Since the consciousness of the Truths has taken place, the causes of the defilements are not completed, because the prāpti of the defilements is cut off by this consciousness.

331. Montaigne, iii.9: The princes give me much, if they show me nothing; and it is good enough for me if they do not do me ill.


333. All cause should be an effect: kāraṇe sati kāryeṇa bhavitavyam.

334. The suffix vat in the sense of tadyathā.

335. One does not say that all the coexistent (sahabbu) dharmanas are sahabbhūbetu. For example, derived (bhautika) rūpa, blue, etc., coexist with the primary elements: but it is not sahabbhūbetu with them. (See p. 259-260).

336. See i.24, ii.22, 65.

337. A conditioned dharma and its characteristics are sahabbhūbetu among themselves; a dharma is not sahabbhūbetu with the characteristics of another dharma.

338. Vyākhyā: Upasamāṅkhyaṁkaṇaraṇaṁ ca mahāsāstratāpradarśanārtham sopasamāṅkhyānaṁ hi vyākaraṇādī mahāsāstram dṛṣṭyate.

339. The first part of this paragraph is based on the Vyākhyā.

340. The ten reasons are not always joined together. For example, in the case of the neutral mind not destined to arise, its companions are companions for four reasons: (1) same time period, (2) same result (puruṣakāra), (3) same niṣyanda, and (4) same quality of being neutral.

341. Namely the undefiled-neutral (anivṛtānyākṛta) mind after the second dhyāna; vitarka, vicāra, the kuśalamahābhūmikas are missing from it.
342. The mind reigns (rājayate) over its anulaksanas: these have no action (vyāpāra) over the mind, as we have seen ii.46.

343. The Japanese editor refers to the Prakarana, TD 26, p. 745a25. See below p. 265 and p. 273 where the same text is referred to.

The Prakarana examines the relationship between the Four Truths and the belief in a self (satkāyadrṣṭi). The Vyākhyā gives the following extract:

A. There are Four Truths. Among the Truths, how many have satkāyadrṣṭi for their cause without being a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi; how many are a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi without having satkāyadrṣṭi for their cause; how many have satkāyadrṣṭi for their cause and are not a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi? Answer: Two Truths do not have satkāyadrṣṭi for their cause and are not a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi, namely the Truth of Extinction and the Truth of the Path; one must distinguish the two other Truths.

B. The Truth of Suffering can (1) have satkāyadrṣṭi for its cause without in turn being a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi; (2) have satkāyadrṣṭi for its cause and not be a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi; and (3) not have satkāyadrṣṭi for its cause and not be a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi: there are only three alternatives; the second (to be a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi without having satkāyadrṣṭi for its cause) is missing.

1. To have satkāyadrṣṭi for its cause without being a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi are all the Truths of defiled Suffering (that is to say, all the dharmas which are suffering and which are kliṣṭa) with the exception of (a) the past and present defilements (anusāya) which can be abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering, and by the Truth of Suffering associated with these defilements (for example the sensation associated with satkāyadrṣṭi which is abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering); (b) the future Truths of Suffering which are associated with satkāyadrṣṭi (see p. 265 line 22); and (c) the arising-old age-duration-impermanence of satkāyadrṣṭi and of the dharmas associated with this belief (tatsamprayuktānām ca dharmānām: these last words are omitted in certain recensions).

2. The Truth of Suffering which has been excluded in the preceding paragraph has satkāyadrṣṭi for its cause and is a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi.

3. The Truth of undefiled Suffering, (that is, the dharmas which are suffering but which are good) do not have satkāyadrṣṭi for their cause and are not a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi.

The Chinese versions, TD 26, number 1541 (p. 673b20) and TD 26, number 1542 (p. 745a), correspond to the preceding texts. Some omissions (the phrases: "To this question, it answers," iti prasne visarjanam karoti, and "There are only three alternatives; the second is missing," trikoṭikam, dvitiyd kośir nāsti are missing). There are some sensible enough variations in the definition of the dharmas which have satkāyadrṣṭi for their cause and which are a cause of satkāyadrṣṭi: (a) past and present defilements which can be abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering, and the Truth of the Suffering associated with these defilements (TD 26, number 1542: and the Truth of Suffering associated, coexistent, etc., with these defilements), (b) past and present universal (sarvatraga) defilements which can be abandoned by the Seeing of Arising, and the Truth of the Suffering which is associated with it (TD 27, number 1542: associated causes, mutually coexistent causes, etc.), and (c) future Truth of Suffering which is associated with satkāyadrṣṭi and of the dharmas associated with it.

344. Where a mahābhūta is found, the other mahābhūtas are found also, etc.

245. I understand: "One moment (ksana) of the caksurindriya is a cause of simultaneous visual consciousness."

346. See ii.59.

347. According to the samavīśṭayoh rule, ii.52d. The four non-material skandhas are "best" or viśiṣṭa, whereas rūpa is "less good," nyūna.

349. According to the opponent of the Vaibhaśikas, the Prakaraṇa teaches that future satkāyaadrṣṭi and the dharmas which are associated with it are at one and the same time the effect and the cause of satkāyaadrṣṭi. Now future satkāyaadrṣṭi is neither a mutually coexistent cause (sahabhū), nor an associated cause (saṃprayuktaka), nor retribution (vipāka); the rest, excluding kāraṇahetu, are similar (sabhāga) and universal (śaruṣa) causes.

For the Vaibhaśikas, the Prakaraṇa speaks here, not of future satkāyaadrṣṭi, but of the dharmas (sensation, etc.) associated with this satkāyaadrṣṭi as coexistent and associated cause, and the effect of satkāyaadrṣṭi is considered as coexistent and associated causes.

We have three readings; in addition to the two readings quoted here, there is also the text: anāgatam ca satkāyaadrṣṭisamprayuktam duḥkhasatyam sāhāpayitvā: “with the exception, furthermore, of the Truth of future Suffering and which is associated with satkāyaadrṣṭi.” (See note 343, section B.1.b).

350. See below note 365.

351. This means: “The dharma which is the cause of a certain dharma is never the non-cause of this same dharma; the dharma which is the result of a certain dharma . . . ; the dharma (organ of sight, etc.) which is the support of a certain dharma (visual consciousness, etc.) . . . ; the dharma (color, etc.) which is the object of a certain dharma (visual consciousness) is never the non-object of this same dharma.

352. According to Hsuan-tsang: “Cause refers to kārana, sahabhū, saṃprayuktaka and vipākabhetus; result, the adhipati, puruṣakāra and vipākaphalas.” Paramārtha: “Cause refers to the saṃprayuktakahetu; result, the adhipati and puruṣakāraṇaphalas.

353. The paths of śraddhānusārin, śraddhādhimukta and samayavimukta are the paths of darśana, bhāvanā (=Śaikṣa) and Asaikṣa of the ascetics of weak faculties; the paths of dharmaṇusārin, drṣṭiprāpta and asamayavimukta are respectively the same path of the ascetics of strong faculties.

354. The second of the first fifteen moments (darśanamārga, vi.27), produced in a lower stage, is superior to the first moment in a higher stage, because it has for its causes (1) the cause of the first moment, and (2) its own cause, and thus following; bhāvanāmārga has for its causes (1) the causes of darśanamārga, and (2) its own causes; and the asaikṣamārga has for its cause (1) the causes of darśana and bhāvanāmārga, and (2) its own causes.

Furthermore, in bhāvanāmārga and asaikṣamārga, the path destroys nine categories of defilements, strong-strong, strong-mediocre, etc.; it is successively weak-weak, weak-mediocre, weak-strong, mediocre-weak, etc. Now the weak-mediocre path has for its causes (1) the cause of the weak-weak path, and (2) its own causes.

355. One can say that the path of śraddhānusārin is the sabbāgahetu of six paths. This thesis gives rise to a discussion in which the master Vasumitra wrongly maintains that a śraddhānusārin is capable of making his faculties strong. (Vyākhyā).


358. Sama can be understood as tulya, parallel; this is why the author states it precisely.

359. Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 81b9, mentions six opinions on this point.

360. The defilements susceptible of being abandoned by the Seeing of Arising, Extinction and the
Chapter Two

Path, and by Meditation, proceed from the universal causes susceptible of being abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering. The defilements susceptible of being abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering, Extinction and the Path, and by Meditation, proceed from the universal causes susceptible of being abandoned by the Seeing of Arising.

361. They are called "universals" (sarvaga), because they go towards (gacchanti), "occupy" (bhajante), and have for their object (alambante) all categories of defilement; or because they are the cause (hetubhavam gacchanti) of all categories of defilement.

362. See above p. 259.

363. Since the text has "the defiled dharmas," without specifying otherwise, this refers to the defiled dharmas of the Prthagjanas and the Aryans.

364. This refers to the neutral asamisketas, nivrtyayakta and anivrtyayakta, not to the two neutral asamisketas, space and apratisamkhyanirdha.

365. The word "future" is missing in Paramartha. See above p. 259.

366. Hsuan-tsang translates: "How should one explain the Prajñaptipadāśāstra," for "this Bhāṣya of the Prajñāpti" signifies "this explanation that one reads in the Prajñāpti." See the Tibetan version of the Karmaprajñāpti, Chap. ix. (Mdo. 63, fol. 229b-236a): Para. 1. Does there exist a past volition which arises from a past cause, but not from a future cause, nor from a present cause? . . . Para.2: Do there exists good dharmas which arise from good causes? . . . Do there exist neutral dharmas which arise from bad causes? Yes: (1) the dharmas which are the retribution of bad action; (2) the dharmas of Kamadhūtu associated with satkāyadrśti and antagrāhadrśti. Para. 3. Do there exist good dharmas which arise solely from good causes? Yes: the volition associated with the parts of Bodhi . . . Do there exist bad dharmas which arise solely from bad causes? . . ."

We know through J. Takakusu (JPTS. 1905, p. 77) that the Karmaprajñāpti no longer exists in Chinese. TD 26, number 1538 is the Kāraṇaprajñāpti; TD 32, number 1644 is a treatise analogous to the Lokaḥrajñāpti: one will find a summary of these two Prajñāptis in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 295-350.

367. "At the moment when he falls from detachment, the bad volition of the Aryan has solely bad dharmas for its cause, causes in the quality of sahaḥhū and samprayuktakahetu; it does not have neutral dharmas for its cause since the Aryan has abandoned satkāyadrśti and antagrāhadrśti;" such is the interpretation of the objector.

368. Self power (sva-fakti) is lacking in neutral dharmas, and a co-factor (sahakārikārana) is lacking in pure dharmas. See iii.36b.


370. Here Hsüan-tsang has some remarks missing in Paramārtha:

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the prefix vi indicates difference: vipāka signifies "a different pāka" (Mahāvyutpatti, 245.182). That is to say only the vipākabhu gives forth a pāka or result not similar to itself. Sahabhū, samprayuktakha, sahaḥga, and sarvatragabhetus give forth results similar to themselves (good, bad, neutral); kāraṇabhu gives forth a dissimilar result: vipākabhu is never neutral but its result is always neutral.

(According to the Sautrantikas,) a result receives the name of vipāka under two conditions: it should be produced by the last state of the evolution of a series (samānaparināmanavīṣa; see above p. 211); and it should more or less last a long time by reason of the more or less great force of its cause. Now, the results that have issued from sahaḥbhū and samprayuktakabhu do not present the first characteristic, for these causes project and realize their result at the same time as
they (ii.59); and the results that have issued from the three causes, kārāṇa, sabhāga, and sarvatragabeta, do not present the second characteristic; for there is no limit to the arising repeated by these results during the length of their transmigration. Consequently the sole explanation of vipāka is "transformation (viparīṭṇāma?) and maturation."

371. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 97c7. (Hsüan-tsang: "the action which produces the vital organ, etc." Et cetera refers to either nikāyasabhāga or its characteristics).

The Ācārya Vasumitra does not admit this proposition. The vital organ of life (jīvātendriya) is the result of an action which projects an existence (ākṣepakakarman, iv.95). If the retribution which constitutes this organ matures (vipacayate) in Kāmadhātu, one necessarily has kāya-indriya and jīvita-indriya in the first stages of his embryonic life; in the last stages five other organs (indriya) are added. If the vital organ matures in Rūpadhātu, one has seven āyatana; in Ārūpyadhātu, one has manāyatana and dharma yatana. Yasomitra discusses these remarks and quotes Samghabhadra. The propositions combated by Vasumitra refers to Ārūpyadhātu: at a certain moment, there is no mind (manāyatana) which is retribution for a being born in this sphere.

372. Never twelve, for the sābdāyatana is never retribution (i.37b–c).

373. The retribution of a former action can have begun, can continue in the present moment, and can prolong itself in the future.

374. The Japanese editor gives the heroic career of the Bodhisattva as an example of a prolonged action.

375. Compare ii.59.

376. Disconnection (visāmyoga) or visāmyogaphala (ii.57d, vi.46), is pratisamkhyānirodha or Nirvāṇa (i.6), one of the unconditioned things (asaṁskṛtā). It does not have a cause, and it is not a result; but it is a cause (kārāṇabeta, ii.50a) and it is a result (ii.57d).

377. Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 716b9, which can be reconstructed: phaladharmaḥ katame / sarve saṁskṛtā pratisamkhyānirodhaḥ ca / na phaladharmaḥ katame / ākāśam apratisamkhyānirodhaḥ / saphaladharmaḥ katame / sarve saṁskṛtā / apphaladharmaḥ katame / sarve saṁskṛtā: "What dharmas are result? All conditioned things and pratisamkhyānirodha. What dharmas are not result? Space and apratisamkhyānirodha. What dharmas have a result? All conditioned things. What dharmas do not have a result? All unconditioned things." See also Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 941bl.


379. Ānantarayaṁṛga cuts off defilements and is followed by vimuktiṁṛga, "the path in which the defilement is already cut off," within which the ascetic takes possession (prāpti) of disconnection, vi.28.

380. Certain masters maintain that there are five types of causes: (1) kāraka, efficient cause, the seed of the bud; (2) jñāpaka, indicating cause, the smoke of the fire; (3) svaṁjaka, revealing cause, the lamp on the pot; (4) dhvamsaka, destructive cause, the hammer on the pot; and (5) prāpaka, the adducent cause.

381. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 2a22: ye hetavo ye pratayā ... vijnānasyotpādīya te py anityāḥ.

382. In the pages which follow, Vasubandhu does not do full justice to the arguments of the Sarvāstivādins-Vaibhāṣikas; he does not mention the texts, for example Udāna, viii.3 (līvuttaka, 43, Udānavarga, xxvi.21), which at least renders the reality of Nirvāṇa likely. Saṁghabhadra refutes Vasubandhu and the other masters who deny unconditioned things (Nyāyānusāra, TD 29,
p. 431b17-c2). His exposition is too long to include here: we have given a partial translation of it in the Introduction.

383. a. The extinction of analaya is the Extinction of the Arising of Suffering (samudaya-satyanirodha, Extinction of what is, in truth, the Arising of Suffering): sopadhiseasanirvana.

The Extinction of Arising or existence (janman) is the Extinction of Suffering (duhkha-satyanirodha, Extinction of what is, in truth, Suffering): nirupadbiiseasanirvana.

b. Analaya means the traces (vasanâ) of the ninety-eight analayas described in Chapter V.

384. According to the Japanese editor, the Sthaviras.

385. According to the Japanese editor, the Mahasamghikas.

386. Svarasanirodhat, not by the force of prajña, as is the case for pratisarhkhyanirodha.

387. Compare Kathavatthu, xix.1.

388. That is, chanda (future desire: anagata prârthana) and râga (attachment to what one possesses: prâpte'rthe'dhyavasânam)

389. The prabhâna of râpa is to be understood as ânantaryamârga, and parîjñâ is to be understood as vimuktsimârga (vi.30). (Gloss of the Japanese editor).

Compare Sarivyutta, iii.8 (for its doctrine).

390. Sarivyutta, TD 2, p. 222c4: ye kecid bhiksavo dharmdh samśkritâ va asanskrâta va virâgas têyam agra akhyâyate (quoted in Vyâkhya, iv.127) Anguttara, i.34, Itivuttaka, Para. 90: yâvatâ Cundi dharmma sankhata va asankhata va virago tesam aggam akkhayati.

"Detachment" or viraga is râga-kshaya, pratisarhkhyanirodha, nirvâna. Nirvâna is better than apratisamkhyânirodha and space (iv.127d).

391. Hsiian-tsang differs: One can not say from its non-existence that it exists. The value of the verb "to be" is thus proven ("this verb does not signify "to exist"). It is thus that Scripture states that they are unconditioned things.

392. Vyâkhya: tasya virodhasya yo'yan prâpter nîyama/ âsyaiva nirodhasya prâptir nánasyetî / / tasmin prâptimiyame ko hetu// na hi nirodhasya prâptyâ sârdham kaścit sambandho'osti hetupalâdibhâvâsamabhavât.

393. Drstâdharmanirvânaprâpta, that is "which is to be found in Nirvâna with residue" (sopadhiseasanirvânisthâ).

394. A variant of the end of Mahâvastu, ii.285: etam sântam etam prâñitam yathâvas etam aviparitam yam idari sarvapadhipratimahsargo sarvasaṁskârasamattho dharmopacchedo tâma-vinâya virâgo nirodho nirvânam.

We have Anguttara i.100: parikkhaya pahana khaya vaya virâga nirodha caga paśinissagga; v.421: asesavirâga nirodha caga paśinissaggam mutti anâlaya; Sarivyutta, i.36: sabbasaṁskârasama thâ . . ; Itivuttaka, 51: upadhipatimissagga. See also the Sanskrit versions of Majjhima, i.497 in Pischel, Fragments of Indikutsari, p. 8 (vñâtibhâva) and Avadanaâsataka, ii.187 (vñâtibhâva).

395. In other words, aprâdurbhava = nâmin prâdurbhavah. This is an adhikaraṇasâdhana etymology. The Sautrânâtikas understand aprâdurbhava as aprâdurbhūti (an abhâvasâdhana etymology).

The explanation of the Sarvâstivâdins is reproduced in Madhyamakavrtti, p. 525, and attributed to the philosophy which considers Nirvâna as a bhâva, a padârtha similar to a dîke which arrests the process of the defilements, action and arising.

396. In fact the Path destroys the Arising of Suffering, duhkhasamudaya. Who could imagine a thing in and of itself called nirodha with respect to the Path?
Footnotes

397. *Dīgha*, ii.157; *Sānīyutta*, i.159; *Theragāthā*, 906:

$pajjotasseva nibbānam vimokho cetaso abhū.


pradyotasseva nirvāṇām vimokṣas tasya cetasaḥ.

This happens at the moment of Nirvāṇa-without-residue. The definition *bhavanirodha nibbānam*, *Aṅguttara*, v.9, *Sānīyutta*, ii.116, etc.

398. See *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27., p. 161a10. We read in *Prakaraṇa*, TD 26, p. 716a3, a definition that can be reconstructed: *avastūkā apratyaya dharmāḥ katame? asaṃskṛtā dharmāḥ* (see i.7).

399. This is the text quoted *ad i.7*.

400. The *Vyākhyā ad* i.7 (Petrograd edition, p. 22) reproduces all these explanations.


b. *vipākaphala*: vipāka is produced by bad or good-impure dharma; if the cause is good or bad, the result is always neutral. As this result is different from its cause and has "matured" (pāka), it is called *vipāka* (visadṛśa pāka).

c. *visamyogaphala*: The *ānantaryamārgas* cut off the defilements; they have the cutting off of the defilements for their *visamyogaphala* and *purusakāraphala*; they have the *vimuktimārga* for their *nisyandaphala* and *purusakāraphala*; and they have all the former paths, equal or higher than their types, for their *nisyandaphala*.

See also the *Abhidharmāvatārāsāstra* (TD 28, p. 988b12) ii.14, where the names of the results are explained.

402. iv.85a-b, 110a.

403. The "receptacle" or physical world (*bhājanaloka*, iii.45, iv.1) is produced by the good and bad actions of the totality of living beings: it is neutral; however it is not retribution *vipāka*, because retribution is a dharma "belonging to living beings" (p. 289); consequently, it is the *adhipatiphala* of actions considered as kāraṇabete.

404. Missing in Paramārtha.

405. The prefix *ad* in *udbhava* signifies "later" (*uttarakāla*). Absorption (*samāddhi*) produces an increase of the primary elements of the body: these primary elements are called "of increase" (*aupacayika*) because they arise either at the same time as the absorption, or immediately after; they are not retribution. In this way a mind that can create fictive beings (*nirmanacitta*, i.37, vii.48) is neutral, belonging to a living being, created by a definite action (i.e., an absorption); but, arising immediately after the absorption, it is not retribution. Furthermore, the result of retribution always belongs to the same stage as the action from whence it proceeds.

406. Good dharmas are not the *sabhāgabete* of defiled dharmas, etc.

407. The mind at death (*maranacitta*) of a being who dies in Kāmadhatu can have for its virile result the first moment of an intermediary being of Rūpadhatu. These examples show the difference between the *purusakāraphala* and the outflowing result (*nisyandaphala*). Four cases: 1. *purusakāraphala* which is not *nisyandaphala*: examples as above; 2. *nisyandaphala*, the result of *sabhāga* and *sarvatraga* causes which do not immediately follow; 3. *nisyanda* and *purusakāraphala*, parallel result, of the same stage, but immediate; 4. neither of the two: fruit of retribution.
408. See ii.56b and iv.85.

409. Compare ii.55a-b.

410. These definitions are given later (vi.22a7) in the original. De La Vallée Poussin placed them here for the convenience of the reader.

411. The dharma always exists, whether it is in the past, the present or the future. We say that it takes or projects a result at the moment when, becoming present, it becomes the cause or seed of a result. The Vyākyā observes that the comparison of the seed is a Sautrāntika theory. Also "this reading does not exist in certain manuscripts" (kvacit pustake nāsty eṣa pāṭhāḥ). Moreover the Vyākyā explains: pratigrhṇantītyā akṣipanti betubhāvenopatisthanta ity arthaḥ.

412. On this subtle point, see Sarṅghabhadra, Nyāyāvatāra, TD 29, 98a3.

413. According to the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 89b13.

414. The last prāptis of good that one cuts off, namely the prāptis of the roots of good which are weak-weak (mdurumdris) project their result (phalaparighraṁ kurvanṛti), but they do not give forth their result (nisyandaphala), since the "good" moment in which they should give forth or engender (janya) it is lacking.

415. Vasubhandhu criticizes the doctrines of the Vaibhāṣikas. In fact, this paragraph is poorly worded (svadhyāya): when a person again takes up the roots of good, he acquires, tri-temporally, the prāptis of the roots of good: the past prāptis acquired at this moment give forth their result, but they do not grasp it: for they have already grasped it; but how can one say that present prāptis do not grasp their result? Thus the proposed definition is lacking precision. Sarṅghabhadra defends the reading of the Vibhāṣā.


417. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 79a26: "It is true that these six causes (hetu) are not mentioned in the Sūtras; the Sūtra only says that there are four pratayahātās."

With respect to the relation of the hetus and the pratayahās, the first master of the Vibhāṣā says that (1) the hetupratyaya includes five hetus, with the exception of kāraṇahetu, and (2) kāraṇahetu includes the other three pratayahās. The second master of the Vibhāṣā says that (1) hetupratyaya includes five hetus, and (2) kāraṇahetu is only adhipatipratyaya: this is the system adopted by Vasubandhu. In the Mahāyāna, sabhāgahetu is at one and the same time hetupratyaya and adhipatipratyaya, whereas the other five hetus are adhipatipratyaya.

The Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 712b12, enumerates four pratayahās. The Vijñānakāya, TD 26, p. 547b22, defines them as functions of the vijñānas: "What is the hetupratyaya of a visual consciousness? The coexistent (sabhabhū) and associated (sāmparyukta) dharmas. What is its samanantarapratyaya? The mind and its mental states to which it is equal and immediate, the visual consciousness arisen and arising. What is its ālambanapratyaya? Visible things. What is its adhipatipratyaya? All the dharmas, with the exception of itself... Of what is the visual consciousness the hetupratyaya? Of the coexistent and associated dharmas. Of what is it the samanantarapratyaya? Of the minds and mental states, arisen or arising, equal and immediate to this visual consciousness. Of what is it the ālambanapratyaya? Of the minds and mental states which grasp it for an object. Of what is it the adhipatipratyaya? Of all the dharmas with the exception of itself."

The four pratayahās are defined in the Abhidharmahrdaya, ii.16, as in our book: the hetupratyaya includes the five hetus; and adhipatipratyaya corresponds to kāraṇahetu.
For the paccayas of the Abhidhamma, the Dukkaṭaṭṭhāma appears to be the capital authority. Its points of contact with the Abhidharma are numerous, but the nomenclature differs; for example, the sabajādhipatipaccaya is our sababhiḥetu. See also Kathāvatthu, xv.1-2.

418. Namely pratayapratākāra, as one says gotā, a type of cow (Vyākhyā).

419. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 52a8 and following, the second masters.

420. This refers to avijñaptirūpa. When, after having undertaken the Prātimokṣasaraṇa (an avijñaptirūpa in Kāmaghātu), a person enters into impure (sāsrava) dhyāna, he produces the samvarā of dhyāna (an avijñaptirūpa in Rūpadhātu), whereas the avijñaptirūpa in Kāmaghātu continues to reproduce itself (see iv.17b-c).

421. In the case where, having undertaken the Prātimokṣasaraṇa, a person enters into pure dhyāna.

422. This is the second opinion presented in the Vibhāṣā. When, after having eaten, a person falls asleep or enters into absorption, there arises at the same time a rūpa of increase produced by sleep or absorption (see i.37).

423. On the Bhadanta, the Sautrāntika Sthavira (Vyākhyā), see note 93. Fourth opinion of the Vibhāṣā.

424. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 52a21, gives two opinions. Vasubandhu presents the second.

425. Simultaneous dharmas, presenting neither anteriority nor posteriority, cannot be in and of themselves samanantarapratyaya.

426. The first masters of the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 51b15. Hsüan-tsang: "He infers from the past and from the present, but sees in a direct manner."


428. Hsüan-tsang: The Blessed One sees that such a result arises from such a past action: such a dharma immediately arises from such a dharma; that, from such a past action, there arises such a result: from such a dharma there immediately arises such a dharma. Having seen in this manner, he is capable of knowing, with regard to future confused dharmas that such a dharma will immediately arise after such a dharma. Although he knows in this manner, this is not a knowledge from induction, for the Blessed One, inferring according to the sequence of the arising of the causes and effects of the past and the present, knows then by a direct seeing the confused dharmas of the future and "In the future, such a being will accomplish such an action, and shall receive such a retribution." This is pranidhiṃjñāna, not anumāṇajñāṇa.


Paramārtha (TD 29, p. 194b10) differs: "There is, in the series of beings, a certain conditioned dharma associated with the mind which is an indication of the future result."

Nyāyāvatāra: "There is presently, within beings, an indication of the causes and effects of the future, similar to a prognostic sign (yin-hsian 印相，chāyā nimitta), or rather a rūpa, or a samāskāra disassociated from the mind."

Paramārtha and the Nyāyāvatāra: hsien-hsian 先相; Hsüan-tsang: hsien-chao 先兆, presage or omen.


431. Hsüan-tsang: If it were thus, the Buddha would know the future by reason of indications (chyan-hsian 占相) . . .
432. According to Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 52c12; compare Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 764a28 and following.


434. The first two opinions of the Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 57a14. Third opinion: the mind is bound to its support in the past, the present, and the future.

435. According to Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 703a3 and following.

436. Hsian-tsang: "because they cause a result arisen at the same time as they have to possess operation."


438. Vyākhyā: Īśvara, Puruṣa, Pradhāna, time (kāla), unique or self nature (svabhāva), atoms, etc.

439. Compare Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix. 119; Śaṅdarśanasanātāgraha, p. 11; the Subṛṭlekhā (JPTS, 1886), 50, etc.

440. Śloka of Vyāsa in the Satarudriya (Vyākhyā), Mahābhārata, vii.203, 140, xiii, 161.7: yan nirdahati yat tīkṣṇo yat ugro yat pratāpaṃ / māṁsaśāntīmahajjādo yat tato rudrā ucye. Burnouf, Introduction, p. 568, has mentioned this quotation.

441. Vipāka and puruṣākāraṇaṇa.

442. Addition of Hsian-tsang.

443. On the bhūtas, i.12, ii.22.

444. Hsian-tsang adds that these five causes are all varieties of kāraṇabeta.

See Vyākhyā, i.11, where the causal relationship between the bhūtas which form part of the person (āśraya), and that type of bhautika which is avijñāpī, is explained.

445. These definitions according to Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 663a28. Sarīghabhādra, TD 29, p. 452a19 and following, presents other explanations, and gives other examples.

446. See above ad 59d. First pratiṣṭhāpābhālapa.

447. The doctrine of the twelve minds is presented in Vijñānakāśya TD 26, p. 593b7 and in the work of Dharmatrāta, TD 28, p. 954b12 and following: "In Kāmadhātu, four; in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu, three each, also Śāikṣa and Aśāikṣa engender nine and it is produced by eight . . . "There follows (kārikās 35-46) the doctrine of twenty minds (Koṭa, ii.71b-72) which includes the exposition, in kārikās, of the rules of succession of the minds. Vasubandhu contents himself, as we shall see, with giving a bhāṣyam; but Yasōmitra, under the name of samgrahaślokas, furnishes us with a versified redaction of them which perhaps preserves for us a fragment of the original text of Dharmatrāta.

448. Compare Kathavattu, xiv.1. where the Theravadins maintain, against the Mahāsāṁghikas, that good is not followed by bad, etc.

449. The four estrangements are āśraya, ākāra, ālambana, and pratipakṣādārata:

a. Persons (āśraya) of Ārūpyadhātu cannot "manifest" (sanātmabhikar), or assimilate to themselves, any dharma of Kāmadhātu, whereas beings in Rūpadhātu manifest, or assimilate to themselves a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nirmanottata) of Kāmadhātu (ii.53b).

b. The mind of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu does not apply to Kāmadhātu the categories (ākāra) of "grosser," etc. (vi.49) as does a mind of the sphere of Rūpadhātu.

c. And in the same way, it does not grasp Kāmadhātu as an object (ālambana).

d. And in the same way it does not oppose the defilements of Kāmadhātu as do the Dhyānas.

On four other estrangements, vi.62.
450. That is to say 1. śrutamaya, 2. cintāmaya, 3. bhāvanāmaya, produced by hearing or study, by reflection, and by absorption. One and two exist in Kamadhatu, one and three in Rupadhatu, and three in Arupadhatu, as we have seen above p. 269-270 and following; compare p. 322.

451. This is the kusala of which a being, who is reborn in Kāmadhatu or Rūpadhatu, obtains possession (prāpti) at the moment of the arising of antarābhava (antarābhavaprastisam-dhikṣane); at the moment of arising for a being who is reborn in Ārūpyadhatu.

452. A list of the ilipatānakarmasthānas (Mahāvyutpatti, 76.5) is quoted in the Divyāvodāna, p. 58, 100: the art of riding on the head of an elephant, on the back of a horse, the art of archery, etc.

453. The visible things, etc. (1) of the bed and the body, etc. (2) of instruments (bow, arrow, etc.), and (3) of the thing that one wants to create.

454. Because one learns the arts by listening to instruction. Vipaṭaka is not mentioned here; thus it has the five bhautikas, visible things, etc., for its object.

455. In fact the mind relative to walking, etc., takes place after one has seen, felt, etc. Hsiian-tsang corrects the Bhāṣya: "Four or five sense consciousnesses are preparatory to airyāpatabika and to saīlpasthānīka respectively." One should understand that the auditory consciousness is lacking for airyāpatabika.

456. Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 661a16. The Bhadanta Anantavarman (Vyākyā ad ii.46c-d), in his Explanation of the Vibhaṣa (Vibhaṣāvyākyāna), presents the opinion according to which one should admit the anivrīṭvyākṛtas not included within the four abovementioned avyākṛtas, namely the anivrīṭvyākṛtas defined vii.51.

457. Hsiian-tsang: "through airyāpatabika and saīlpasthānīka."

458. First mind of the intermediary existence (antarābhava) of Rūpadhatu.

459. By an effort of imagination, by virtue of a decision, the ascetic sees the body as the body really is not, namely as being made up only of rotten bones, etc.: this is the meditation on the repulsive, aśubha. In the same way, in the rddhis (vii.48), the ascetic imagines that the earth element is small, and that the water element is great (compare Dhīgha, ii.108).

460. Samyuktāgama, TD 2, p. 197b3: aśubhāsabhagatam saṁśīradbhāyangam bhāvayati. "Mindfulness" forms part of the Path; sabagata signifies "immediately following."

461. The Vibhaṣa discusses whether the kūsla mind of which one thus takes possession is solely upapattiprāśilambhika (acquired through birth), or also prāyogika (acquired through effort).

462. This is a kārikā from the hand of Dharmatrāta, TD 28, p. 944bl-12: "If one obtains nine types of dharmas, be should know that this is with a kūśa mind; the kūsa mind obtains six types; the avyākṛta mind, avyākṛta” (Trans. of Sarghavaranman). Paramārtha: "When the kūśa mind is produced, one obtains, it is said, nine types of mind; with the kūsa mind . . ." (TD 28, p. 198a6).