Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam

of Vasubandhu

Volume III

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CHAPTER FIVE

The Latent Defilements

Om. Homage to the Buddha.

We said that the world, in all its variety, arises from action (iv.1). Now it is by reason of the anusayas, or latent defilements, that actions accumulate: in the absence of the anusayas, actions are not capable of producing a new existence. Consequently

1a. The roots of existence, that is, of rebirth or of action, are the anusayas

When a klesa or defilement enters into action, it accomplishes ten operations: 1. it makes solid its root, its präpti—the possession that a certain person already had of the klesa (ii.36, 38a)—preventing it from being broken; 2. it places itself in a series (that is, it continues to reproduce itself); 3. it accommodates its field, rendering the person (āśrava, ii.5, 6, 44d) fit for the arising of the klesa; 4. it engenders its offspring, that is, the upaklesas (v.46): hatred engenders anger, etc.; 5. it leads to action; 6. it aggregates its causes, namely, incorrect judgment; 7. it causes one to be mistaken with regard to the object of consciousness; 8. it bends the mental series towards the object or towards rebirth (iii.30); 9. it brings about a falling away of good; and 10. it becomes a bond (bandhana, v.45d) and prevents surmounting of the sphere of existence to which it belongs.

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How many anusayas are there?
There are, in all, six.
What are they?
1c-d. Six: attachment, and then anger, pride, ignorance, false views, and doubt.⁶

The words "and then (tathā)" serve to show that it is by reason of attachment that the others "take up their abode" (anusayana, v.17) in the object. We shall explain this point later.

1d-2a. These six make seven through the division of attachment.

There is the anusaya of attachment to pleasure or sensual desire (kāmārgānusaya);⁷ the anusaya of anger; the anusaya of attachment to existence; the anusaya of pride; the anusaya of ignorance; the anusaya of erroneous views; and the anusaya of doubt (vīcīkīśā).⁸

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What does the expression kāmārgānusaya signify? Is there an anusaya called kāmārāga? Or is there an anusaya of kāmārāga distinct from kāmārāga?

If one says that kāmārāga is an anusaya, one then contradicts the Sūtra which says, "The person who does not long dwell with his mind in the prey of (paryavasthitā) attachment to pleasure; who, when the wrapping (paryavasthāna) of attachment is about to be produced, knows well how to depart from it, for this person the wrapping which is attachment, perfectly destroyed of its life force, is abandoned along with its anusaya."⁹ To say that attachment is abandoned at the same time as its anusaya is to say that attachment and its anusaya are two distinct things.

If one explains kāmārāgānusya as the anusaya of kāmārāga, one must make the anusaya a thing not associated with the mind (ii.35) (and consisting of the possession, prāpti, ii.36, of the kāmārāga). But such a theory is in contradiction to the Abhidharma (Jñāna-prasthāna, TD 26, p. 946b25 and following) which teaches that "kāmārāgānusaya is associated with (i.e., can be accompanied by) three sensations, that of pleasure, satisfaction, and indifference (ii.7)." Now a dharma not associated with the mind cannot be accompanied by these sensations.¹⁰
According to the Vaibhāṣikas, kāmarāgānusaya is an anusaya called kāmarāga; it is the attachment itself which is anusaya; and the same for the other defilements: doubt (vīcikītsā) is the anusaya of doubt.

But the Sūtra which we have just quoted says that one abandons kāmarāga along with its anusaya. Hence the anusaya is not kāmarāga.\(^{11}\)

The Vaibhāṣikas answer: The expression “with its anusaya” should be explained as “with its anubandha”, that is, “with its consequences.”\(^{12}\) Or rather the Sutra uses the word anusaya in the sense of “possession” because possession is the cause of the anusaya (ii.35, trans. p. 208).\(^{13}\) But the Abhidharma, which always expresses itself literally and not figuratively, says that the anusaya is the klesa or defilement itself. Consequently the anusayas are associated with the mind.

(Besides this argument from authority, there is an argument from inference:)

"Because they defile the mind, because they hinder, because they are in contradiction with good, and yet because good appears, the anusayas are not disassociated from the mind."\(^{14}\)

This means that because of the anusayas, the mind is defiled; good which has not arisen is hindered from arising, and one falls away from good already arisen; consequently the anusayas are not dharmas disassociated from the mind.

But, one would say, some dharmas disassociated from the mind can have a similar effect.

No, for if the anusayas were disassociated from the mind, they would always be present; and, consequently, if we suppose that they have a similar effect, then good would never be able to arise. Now it is a fact that it does arise. Thus the anusayas are not disassociated from the mind.\(^{15}\)

But again, the masters who consider the anusayas as disassociated from the mind do not attribute this threefold activity
(defiling the mind, etc.) to the anusayas, but to the kleśa itself (that is, to the paryavasthāna, the active defilement; and this is not always present).

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The Sautrāntika theory is best.

Kāmarāgānusaya means "anusaya of kāmarāga". But the anusaya is neither associated with the mind, nor disassociated from it: for it is not a separate thing (dravya). What is called anusaya is the kleśa itself in a state of sleep, whereas the paryavasthāna is the kleśa in an awakened state. The sleeping kleśa is the non-manifested kleśa, in the state of being a seed; the awakened kleśa is the manifested kleśa, the kleśa in action. And by "seed" one should understand a certain capacity to produce the kleśa, a power belonging to the person engendered by the previous kleśa. In this same way there exists in a certain person the capacity of producing a consciousness of memory, a capacity engendered by a consciousness of preception; in this same way the capacity to produce rice, which belongs to the plant, the shoot, the stalk, etc., is engendered by the rice seed. 16

The masters 17 for whom the seed of the kleśa is a certain dharma distinct from the kleśa itself, disassociated from the mind and called an anusaya, must admit a dharma existing in and of itself, disassociated from the mind and the cause of memory. And the same would hold for the plant.

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[The Sarvastivadins answer]. You do not have the right to explain "anusaya of kāmarāga," for the Sūtra clearly teaches that anusaya is kāmarāga itself.

The Śaṭṭhaśātrasūtra says, "This person has agreeable sensation, and rāgānusaya" 18 [From all evidence, the Sūtra understands that, at the moment of agreeable sensation, there is active desire (rāga): and it designates this active desire by the name of anusaya].

But the Sūtra says, "He has rāgānusaya;" it does not say, "He
then has rāgānusāya.” [At the moment of agreeable sensation, the anuṣaya of desire (rāga) is in the process of arising, utpadyate; it has not yet arisen, utpanna. In other words, at the moment of the agreeable sensation, there is active rāga, awakened desire;] when this sensation ends, desire becomes dormant: then there is only the anuṣaya of desire, dormant desire, the seed of future awakened desire.

Or rather, we would say, when the Sūtra says rāgānusāya, it means rāga: the first is the effect of the second, and the cause can be designated by the name of its effect.

The examination of this chance problem is finished. Let us return to our subject.

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What is this division that the Sūtra sets up, attachment to agreeable objects (kāmarāga) and attachment to existence (bhavarāga)? What is attachment to existence?

2b. Attachment to existence arises from the two Dhātus.

Attachment to Rūpadhātu and to Ārūpyadhātu is called bhavarāga, attachment to existence [in opposition to kāmarāga, attachment to agreeable objects,—kāmas or kāmagunās,—which is attachment proper to Kāmadhātu, iii.3c-d].

Why is the name of attachment to existence (bhavarāga) reserved for attachment to the two higher Dhātus?

2c-d. It is so called because it is turned within, and in order to avoid the idea that these two Dhātus are deliverance.¹⁹

The School explains: In general, the attachment of the beings in these two Dhātus is with regard to absorption (samāpatti), (or more precisely, to “enjoyable” dhyāna, āsvādanasamprayuktadhyāna, viii.6). One says “in general” because these beings also have attachments with regard to their palaces, vimānas, etc.
This attachment, being an absorption, is turned within. This is why it alone receives the name of attachment to existence.

Further, certain persons imagine that the two Dhātus constitute deliverance: this is why the Blessed One gives the name "attachment to existence" to the attachment which has these two Dhātus for its object.

(According to us), existence (bhava) means the person. Beings in absorption enjoy both the absorption itself and their own persons. Being freed from attachment to pleasures, they only enjoy their own persons and not external objects. This is why attachment to the two higher Dhātus is called attachment to existence (bhavarāga).

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According to the Abhidharma (Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 943a27), these six anusayas make ten. How is this?

3. There are five (erroneous) views: a belief in a self (satkāyadrṣṭi), false views (mithyādṛṣṭi), a belief in the extremes (antagrāhadrṣṭi), the esteeming of views (dṛṣṭiṇāmaparāmarṣa), and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (śīlavrataparāmarṣa): thus there are ten anusayas.20

By dividing views (dṛṣṭi) into five, there are six anusayas, for a total of ten anusayas; five which are not views by nature, namely desire, anger, pride, ignorance and doubt; and five which are views, satkāyadrṣṭi, etc.

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In addition the Abhidharma (Jñānaprasthāna, ibid.) teaches that these ten anusayas make up thirty-six anusayas in Kāmadhātu, thirty-one anusayas in Rūpadhātu, and thirty-one anusayas in Ārūpyadhātu: in all ninety-eight anusayas.21

Thirty-two of the thirty-six anusayas of Kāmadhātu are abandoned by Seeing the Truths (see i.40, iv.11-12).
4. With the exception of three or two views, ten, seven, seven, eight anusayas are abandoned in Kāmadhātu by the Seeing of Suffering and the three other Truths respectively.\textsuperscript{22}

All of the above mentioned anusayas are, in Kāmadhātu, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering.

Seven are abandoned through the Seeing of Arising and through the Seeing of Extinction, with the exception of a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices.

Eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Path, with the exception of satkāyadrṣṭi and antagrāhadrṣṭi

This makes thirty-two anusayas abandoned through Seeing, because the mere Seeing of the Truths suffices to abandon them.

5a. Four are abandoned through Meditation.\textsuperscript{23}

Namely desire, anger, ignorance and pride: because one who has seen the Truths then abandons them through Meditation on the Path.

In this way satkāyadrṣṭi, the view of self and of things pertaining to a self, is unique, being susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering; and the same for antagrāhadrṣṭi, the belief in extremes.

False views is of four types, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, Arising, Extinction, and the Path; the same for the esteeming of bad views and doubt.

The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is of two types, being susceptible of being abandoned through 1.) the Seeing of Suffering and 2.) the Path.

Desire, anger, pride, and ignorance are of five types, being abandoned through the Seeing of each of the Truths, and through Meditation.

What is the characteristic or definition of the anusayas
susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering? ..

What is the definition of the anusayas susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation?

When it is possible to abandon the object (ālambana) of an anusaya through the Seeing of a certain Truth, it is said that this anusaya can be abandoned through the Seeing of this Truth.24 The others are abandoned through Meditation.

There are thus twelve views, four doubts, five desires, five angers, five ignorances, and five prides: in all thirty-six anusayas in Kāmadhātu.

5b-c. The same, with the exception of the angers, for Rūpadhātu.

The same sorts of anusayas, with the exception of the five angers, make up the thirty-one anusayas of Rūpadhātu.

5c. The same in Ārūpyadhātu.

The same thirty-one.

5d. In this way, there are ninety-eight.

The Ābhidhārmikas (Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 929c2) say that the six anusayas make ninety-eight through the differences of their aspect, their mode of expulsion (ii.52b), and their sphere of existence (their Dhātu).

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Among the ninety-eight anusayas, eighty-eight are abandoned through Seeing because they are struck, destroyed through the
"patiences" (*ksántis*, vi.25d), and ten are abandoned through Meditation because they are struck by the "knowledges" (*jñānas*). Is this a strict rule with regard to abandoning through Seeing and Meditation?

6a-c. When they arise in Bhavāgra (the highest state of Ārūpyadhātu), the *anusayas* which are struck by the *ksántis* are abandoned through Seeing and through Meditation.

The word "*ksántis*" refers to the *dharma-jñānakśántis* and the *anvaya-jñānakśántis* (vi.26c).

Among the *anusayas* which are struck by the *ksántis*, those which are in Bhavāgra are abandoned only by Seeing, for only *anvaya-jñānakśántis* causes them to be abandoned. [Only the Aryans, through the pure path, abandon these *anusayas*] (vi.45c).

Those in the eight *bhūmis* (i.e., Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu and the first three stages of Ārūpyadhātu) are abandoned either through Seeing or through Meditation: Āryans abandon them solely through Seeing, and not through Meditation, by means of the *dharma-jñānakśántis* or the *anvaya-jñānakśántis* accordingly as they belong to the *anusayas* of Kāmadhātu or of the higher spheres, whereas Prthagjanas abandon them only through Meditation, and not though Seeing, for these *anusayas* can be abandoned through a worldly knowledge (*lokasaṁvṛti-jñāna*, vii.9).

6c-d. The *anusayas* which are not struck by the *ksántis* are only abandoned through Meditation.

The *anusayas* which are struck by the "knowledges" (*jñānas*), at whichever stage they belong, are only abandoned through Meditation, whether they belong to an Āryan or to a Prthagjana. In fact, an Āryan abandons them through *anāsrava jñāna* meditation, or pure knowledge, whereas a Prthagjana abandons them through a worldly knowledge (*lokasaṁvṛti-jñāna*).
Some other masters maintain that non-Buddhists (bāhyaka) cannot abandon the anusayas abandoned through Seeing. For the Mahākarmavibhāgasūtra teaches that erroneous views are active among the non-Buddhists in Kāmadhātu, although they may be “detached” (vītarāga, that is, having abandoned the attachments of Kāmadhātu, attachments that one abandons through Meditation.) And the Brahmajālasūtra says that some non-Buddhists are entirely detached from all sorts of views (drṣṭr) of Kāmadhātu: there are among them some persons who conjure up systems concerning the past, eternalists, partial eternalists, or followers of chance. (As one could object: “the ‘views’ of these persons detached from Kāmadhātu are of the sphere of Rūpadhātu,” we would say that) Kāmadhātu cannot be, with regard to that which concerns it, the object of defilements (klesā) of Rūpadhātu, because such persons are detached from Kāmadhātu. But they have not abandoned the views of Kāmadhātu.

The Vaibhāṣikas explain this difficulty by saying that those who are detached lose (this detachment) when they produce a view, in the manner that Devadatta (Rockhill, p. 85) lost his rddhi (vii.48a).

We have seen that view is divided into five categories by reason of its aspect. What are the five views?

7. The view of self and things pertaining to self, the view of eternity and annihilation, the view of negation, the view that holds as high that which is low, and that which holds for cause and Path that which is not cause and Path: these
are the five views.

1. To believe in a self and in things pertaining to self (ātmātmīyagrāha) is satkāyadrṣṭi;\(^ {26}\) it is termed sat ("existence") because it perishes, and kāya because it is an accumulation or multiplicity. Satkāya means "an accumulation of perishing things," that is, the five upādānaskandhas\(^ {28}\) (i.8a-b).

The expression satkāya is put forth in order to discard the idea of permanence—this is why one says sat—and in order to discard the notion of a unity—this is why one says kāya. In fact, if one believes that the skandhas are a self, this is because one first and foremost attributes a permanence and unity to them.

Satkāyadrṣṭi means, then, "a view with regard to the satkāya."

By this, all the views whose object is an impure belief in extremes (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), etc., are views of the satkāya, that is, of the five skandhas. But even though they are views of the satkāya, they are not "views of the self or of things pertaining to self."\(^ {28}\)

Also it is only the belief in a self or in things pertaining to a self that receives the name of satkāyadrṣṭi, for according to a declaration of the Blessed One, "Oh monk, any monk or Brahmin who in this world believes in a self, what he considers to be a self is only the five upādānaskandhas."\(^ {29}\)

2. To believe in the eternity or in the annihilation of what one believes to be a self, is antagrāhadṛṣṭi, "a view that grasps extremes," for this is to falsely believe in the extreme (anta) thesis of eternity or annihilation.

3. The view that consists of negating (apavāda) that which really exists, the Truth of Suffering, etc. and which consists of saying nāsti, "that is not," is mithyādṛṣṭi or false view.\(^ {30}\) All falsely conceived views are "false views", but only mithyādṛṣṭi receives this name because it is the most false of all, as the worst odor is called the bad odor. It is a negation, whereas the other views are an
affirmation or erroneous attribution (*samāropikā*).\textsuperscript{31}

4. The view which considers that which is bad, low, abandoned (*hīna*, iv.127) as good, or "high," is called *drṣṭiparāmarśa*, "the esteeming of bad views."

What does *hīna* mean? It refers to everything that is impure, because the Saints abandon it (*prabhīna*). And the view that consist of esteeming this is called simply "consideration" (*parāmarśa*).

It would be best to say *drṣṭyādi-parāmarśa*, "esteeming that which is low, beginning with erroneous views." But the word *ādi* is omitted here.\textsuperscript{32}

5. The view which considers as cause that which is not cause, or as the path that which is not the Path, is called *śilavrataparāmarśa*: namely, to consider Maheśvara, Prajāpati, or any other entity which is not a cause of the world as a cause of the world; to consider the rituals of suicide,—entering into fire or drowning—as a cause of a heavenly rebirth when they do not in fact procure heaven; or to consider morality and ascetic practices as the only path to deliverance when they are themselves not the only path to deliverance, nor the "knowledges" (*jñāna*) of the Sāṃskhyas and the Yogins which are not a path to deliverance; and so too the rest.

Here too, [according to the Vaibhāṣikas,] the word *ādi* is omitted.\textsuperscript{33}

These are the five erroneous views.

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[Objection:] You have said that the erroneous view that regards as a cause of the world that which is not a cause of the world is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (*śilavrataparāmarśa*). In this hypothesis, the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is abandoned through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising, since it admits of error with regard to cause (=arising).

We would answer that those who consider the Lord (*Īśvara*) or
Prajāpati as a cause of the world regard the Lord and Prajāpati as eternal beings, one, personal, and active (ātman, kartar). It then follows that:

8. If one clings to the idea that the Lord, etc., is the cause of the world, this is by reason of false conceptions of permanence and personality. Thus this clinging is to be abandoned through Seeing (the Truth) of Suffering.\(^{34}\)

The belief in the eternity or in the personality of the Lord or Prajāpati is abandoned through Seeing the single Truth of Suffering; as a consequence the belief in their causality, which results from this first belief, is abandoned in the same way as this same first belief is abandoned.

[Objection:] The erroneous view that suicide through fire or drowning produces a heavenly rebirth, and the erroneous view that morality and ascetic practices produce by themselves purity, have nothing to do with the false conceptions of permanence and personality. Why do you say that one abandons them through Seeing the Truth of Suffering? It is through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising that one should abandon them.

The Mūlaśāstra (Jñānapraśṭhāna, TD 26, p. 1029a12) says, "There are some non-Buddhists who give rise to this view, who posit this theory: a person who adopts the habits of bulls (gośila), the habits of deer, or the habits of dogs, shall obtain purity, deliverance, and escape; he shall obtain the absolute going beyond of the happiness and suffering (of the three spheres of existence), and he shall reach the place beyond happiness and suffering. One should know that all these types of considering as cause that which is not truly cause is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of Suffering." The doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas is thus that these two opinions are to be abandoned through the Seeing the Truth of Suffering, because they allow error with regard to suffering.
But his argument is carried too far! All the defilements (kleśas) which have the impure for their object embrace error with regard to suffering. (In fact, all impurity is suffering).

Furthermore, we would ask what is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of the Path? If the Vaibhāṣikas answer, "The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices relative to the dharma which is abandoned through Seeing the Path, namely relative to one of the eight anusayas the first of which is wrong views," we would then answer that this esteeming of morality and ascetic practices also supposes error relative to suffering.

Moreover we do not see how the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices could be relative to a dharma to be abandoned through the Truth of the Path: 1. How could a person who entertains wrong views or doubt relative to the Path, thinking "There is no Path," or "Is there, or is there not, a Path?" imagine to obtain purification through this wrong view or through this doubt? 2. If this person, taking up the path of deliverance imagined by the Śāmkhyas, etc., says, "This is the path; the Buddhist Path is not the path," then this non-Buddhist imagines that he obtains purification through the path of the Śāmkhyas, and not through wrong views relative to the Path. Furthermore, when a person imagines that he obtains purification through a wrong view abandoned through the Seeing of Arising or Extinction, why is his esteeming of morality and ascetic practices not abandoned through the Seeing of these same two Truths?

This point remains to be examined.35

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We have spoken (v.8) of the two erroneous views of permanence (or eternity) and personality. Are there only two errors?

There are four errors: to hold that which is impermanent to be permanent, that which is suffering to be happiness, that which is
impure to be pure, and that which is not a "soul" to be a soul or self.

What is the nature of these four errors?

9a-b. One distinguishes four errors within the three views.\textsuperscript{36}

That part of the belief in extremes which is a view of permanence constitutes one error; two parts of the esteeming of bad views constitute the errors of happiness and purity; and that part of the belief in a self and of things pertaining to a self which is a view of self constitutes one error.

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Some other masters maintain that all satkāyadrśti, that is, not simply the idea of self but also the idea of things pertaining to self, constitutes ātmaviparyāsa, "error with regard to the self."

[The Vaibhāṣikas say:] How could the idea of things pertaining to a self be part of error with regard to the self? In fact the Sūtra of the Viparyāsas does not indicate this. (It says simply, "It is an error to say that anātman is ātman") and the following: "He who sees a self prevailing within the five upādānakandhas sees 'mine'" [Thus the view of "mine" differs from the view of "self," a view from whence it derives.]

But we think that the view of self has two parts: to say "I" and to say "mine." If the idea of "mine" were a view different from the idea of "I," then the ideas expressed by other grammatical cases, such as mayā (by me) or mabhyam (to me) would thus constitute so many new views. Thus all belief in a self and in things pertaining to a self is totally included in the error of self.

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Chapter Five

Are not the other defilements errors because, in order for there to be error, a combination of three characteristics is indispensable? What are these three characteristics?

9b-c. Reflective judgment and affirmation because they allow complete error.

The view of annihilation (ucchedadṛṣṭi, a part of the belief in extremes, (anti)agrāhadṛṣṭi) and false views are not affirmations or erroneous attributions (samāropa), since they are directed towards the absence of existence.

The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices affirms that morality and practices suffice for purification: there is no total error in this, since morality and practices do contribute to purification.

The other defilements do not admit of reflective judgment, and as a consequence are not complete errors (viparyāsa).

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But the Blessed One said, "To consider the impermanent as permanent is an error of idea (samjñāviparyāsa), an error of thought (cittaviparyāsa), and an error of view (drṣṭiviparyāsa)," and thus following for happiness, purity, and the self. Now neither ideas nor thoughts admit of reflective judgment. Thus the definition proposed for error (viparyāsa) is inexact.

9d. Thought and idea are termed "error" by reason of view.

Only view is error, but by virtue of the esteeming of bad views (drṣṭiviparyāsa), ideas and thoughts associated with view and having its same aspect are also termed "errors."
Why does not the same hold for sensation and the other mental states associated with view?

Because one says in worldly language "error of idea," and "error of thought," but not "error of sensation."

A Srotaāpanna abandons all these errors (*Jñānaprasthāna, TD* 26, p. 957a294); for the Seeing of the Truths which brings about the abandonment of views also brings about the abandoning of the ideas and thoughts associated with these views.

1. Another School\(^{38}\) says: The error which consists of holding as permanent that which is impermanent contains three errors: error of idea, of thought and of view; and the rest. We then have twelve errors instead of four errors.

Among these twelve, eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths. Four, namely the errors of idea and thought relative to happiness and purity, are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths through Meditation.

In fact the Āryans, who by definition have abandoned all the *anusāyas* that one abandons through Seeing the Truths, certainly possess ideas of happiness and purity, since, when they are not detached, they produce an attachment to pleasure.

2. The Vaibhāṣikas do not consider this reasoning as conclusive. From the fact that these Āryans have ideas of happiness and purity, you conclude that they have error relative to happiness and purity. You should say that they also have the error relative to self, since they certainly have the idea and thought of a living being: attachment to pleasure relative to a woman or relative to themselves evidently presupposes the idea and the thought of a being.

Moreover one reads in the Sūtras, "The Āryan Śrāvaka teaches true seeing and knowing:\(^{39}\) this is the Truth of Suffering . . . At this moment the errors of idea, of thought and of view relative to the impermanent taken for the permanent, are abandoned by them," and the rest. As a consequence, only the ideas and thoughts provoked by erroneous views, or associated with erroneous views,
are errors, and not the others, which are abandoned through Meditation.

In fact, it happens that the Āryan, through an illusion which lasts only as long as he first sees an object, produces attachment to pleasure, such as the illusion caused by the circle of a fire-brand or by a painted Yakṣa. There is no error in the Āryan, but only a mistaken idea and thought (saṁjñācittaviabhrama, vi.60).40

3. But41 the Sthavira Ānanda said to the Āryan Vāgīśa, "Your mind is burned by the error of your ideas."42 How do we explain these words if one admits the thesis of the Vaibhāṣikas?

4. 43 As a consequence the Śaikṣa has not completely abandoned the eight errors of idea and thought. It is true that these errors are abandoned by means of correct knowledge of the Truths, and not without this knowledge.

The Śūtra that the Vaibhāṣikas quote (p. 783, line 29) thus indicates the means (upāya) of abandoning these said errors; there is no contradiction here with the Śūtra of Vāgīśa.44

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The anusāya of erroneous view is subdivided in this manner. Is it the same for the other anusāyas?

It is the same for pride.

10a. There are seven types of pride (māna):45

These are māna, adhimāna, mānātmāna, asmimāna, abhimāna, unamāna, and mithyāmāna.

In general, arrogance of the mind (ii.33b) is called māna. Māna is subdivided on the basis of its different modes: 1. Māna: when the mind makes itself lofty or develops pride by thinking, "I am superior" or "I am equal" relative to an inferior or to an equal. 2.
Adhimāna: to think, "I am superior," "I am equal," relative to an equal, or to a superior. 3. Mānātimāna: to think, "I am superior" relative to a superior. 4. Asmimāna: when the mind prides itself by taking the five upādānakandhas for its "self" and "mine." 5. Abhimāna to think that one possesses distinctions, that is, some dharmanas, pure or impure, which abide in absorption, when one does not possess them (v.27b-c). 6. Ūnamāna: to think, "I am slightly inferior" relative to that which is greatly superior. 7. Mithyāmāna: to attribute to oneself spiritual qualities which one does not possess.

Abhimāna has a substantial basis: it is savastuka; this is the pride of someone who has some qualities resembling the višeṣas. Mithyāmāna has no substantial basis: this is the pride of someone who has no qualities whatsoever but who believes that he has some.

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Yet the Śāstra (Jñānapraśthāna, TD 26, p. 1028b26) teaches nine types of pride, mānavidhā, or simply vidhā, namely, 1. "I am superior;" 2. "I am equal;" 3. "I am less good;" 4. "Another is better than I;" 5. "He is equal to me;" 6. "He is worse than I;" 7. "Another is not better than I;" 8. "He is not my equal;" and 9. "He is not worse than I."

Which of the seven types of pride make up these nine types?

10a-b. Three make nine types.

These nine types come from three mānas, namely māna, adhimāna and ūnamāna.

The first three are the three mānas which reside in the erroneous view of self. One first thinks "me." Then there arises in order adhimāna, māna, and ūnamāna. One has a type of māna
which consists of saying, “I am better,” *adhimāna* which resides in erroneous views, and the rest. The second three are, in their order, *ūnamāna*, *māna*, and *adhimāna*. The third three are, in their order, *māna*, *adhimāna*, and *ūnamāna*.

We see that although we think “I am a bit inferior” relative to some one greatly superior, this is indeed *ūnamāna*, for the mind prides itself in this thought; but how can this type of *māna* “He is not worse that I” be a locus of pride?

This is indeed a locus of pride, since one esteems oneself relative to a group of excellent persons which one regards as superior, even though one is really vastly inferior to them.

We have reproduced the explanation of the *Jñānaprasthāna*: but, according to the *Prakaraṇapāda* (*TD* 26, p. 693a29), the first type of pride, “I am better,” comes from three of the seven types of pride,—namely *māna*, *adhimāna*, *mānātimāna*,—accordingly as one judges oneself better than an inferior, better than an equal, or better than a superior.

How are the seven types of pride abandoned?

10b. They perish through Seeing and Meditation.

All, including *asmimāna*, perish, that is, are abandoned, through Seeing and Meditation.

Must we believe that, among the Āryans, the *anusāyas* which
are abandoned though Meditation and which have not yet been abandoned, are presently active?\textsuperscript{46}

Not necessarily.

10c-11a. The \textit{paryavasthāna} of killing, etc., is abandoned through Meditation; [the thirst for non-existence, etc.]\textsuperscript{47}

The \textit{paryavasthāna} of killing (see v.47), refers to the defilement, \textit{kleśa}, by which one voluntarily commits murder. "Of killing, etc.," refers to killing, stealing, adultery, and lying. These \textit{paryavasthānas} have the \textit{dharmas} abandoned through Meditation for their object.\textsuperscript{48}

11a. The thirst for non-existence, etc.

\textit{Vibhavatṛṣṇā},\textsuperscript{49} "the thirst for non-existence," is also abandoned through Meditation. By \textit{vibhava} ("non-existence") we mean the impermanence of the three Dhātus, Kāmadhātu, etc. Desire (\textit{tṛṣṇā}) which is directed to impermanence is called \textit{vibhavatṛṣṇā}.\textsuperscript{50}

The word "et cetera" (\textit{tathā}) shows that one should add a part of \textit{bhavatṛṣṇā}, the thirst for existence, to \textit{vibhavatṛṣṇā}, for example the desire "Would that I could become Airāvaṇa, King of the Nāgas!" [The same for the desire to become Kuvera, the desire to become a woman; but not the desire to become Indra].

ll-a-d. Among the Āryans the various types of pride, etc., and egotism, [—because they are nourished by views—] and bad regret, are impossible.\textsuperscript{51}

The types of pride, etc. are not produced, and do not become active among the Āryans, nor is there any longer "egotism" among them.

"Et cetera" signifies the \textit{anusayās} enumerated above, the
paryavasthānas of killing, the desire for non-existence and part of the desire for existence.

Why is this?

11b. Because they are nourished by views.

Because all these anusayās are nourished by erroneous views: when their nourishment is burned up, they no longer have the power to arise (or: the Āryans no longer produce them).

Māna and asmitā, "egotism," are nourished through wrong views; the desire for non-existence is nourished through the view of annihilation; and a part of the desire for existence is nourished through the view of eternalism.

Even though "bad regret" (ii.28) is abandoned through Meditation, it does not become active among the Āryans, because it is nourished by doubt.

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Among the ninety-eight anusayās, how many are universal? How many are not universal?

12. Universal anusayās are 1. the erroneous views and doubts which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and Arising, 2. the ignorance which is associated with them, and 3. independent ignorance.

This makes eleven anusayās: the five erroneous views which are abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering; wrong views and the esteeming of views abandoned through Seeing of Arising; and two doubts and two ignorances abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Seeing of Arising.
These eleven *anusayās* are called "universal," "going everywhere," because they grasp the entire Dhātu as their object. (See p. 790, line 1).54

1. Objection: Do these universals grasp their entire Dhātu successively or all at once?

In the first hypothesis, the definition would apply to the other *anusayās* as well; and the second hypothesis is inadmissible: in fact no one considers the totality of the Dhātu as a means of purification; it is only certain practices which are the object of the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices. In the same way, no one considers the totality of the Dhātus as the cause of the world, but only Īśvara, Prajāpati, etc.

2. [Answer of the Vaibhāṣikas:] We do not say that the universals have the entire Dhātu for their object all at once, but rather they have the Dhātu in its five categories for their object: "entire" refers to the totality of types.

3. But, if we understand universality in this way, desire and pride (*trṣṇā* and *māna*) would also be universals.

There is ātma-drṣṭi, "a view that there is the self," relative to the five *upādānakāndhas*: there will be ātma-trṣṇā, "desire for a self" relative to the same *skandhas*. There is agrādṛṣṭi, "opinion that this is better" (a *dṛṣṭiparāmarsa*), and *suddhindṛṣṭi*, "opinion that this is a means of purification" relative to a certain object: and there will be desire relative to this same object. And there will also be pride, *māna*, relative to the same objects.

In this hypothesis of their univerality, how are thirst and pride abandoned?

Like a belief in a self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*), etc., their object is abandoned through Seeing and Meditation. Or should we think that they are to be abandoned through Seeing (like *satkāyadrṣṭi*) or through Meditation.

The author answers: As their object is mixed, they are abandoned through Meditation. Or rather, they are abandoned through Seeing, for they exist through the efficacy of the view.
4. [The Vaibhāṣikas reply:] thirst and pride are special defilements and not general defilements (v.23). This is why they are not universal. (There is thirst and pride related to an object relative to which there is ātmadṛṣṭi, but not relative to the whole of this object at once.)

We have seen that eleven anusayas are universal (that is, bearing on all the categories) in their Dhatu, in the sphere of existence wherein the person is born in whom they are found:

13a-b. Among them, nine, with the exception of the two views, bear on the superior.\(^{55}\)

With the exception of a belief in a self (satkāyadṛṣṭi) and a belief in extremes (antagrābhadṛṣṭai), the nine other universals are also universals in a different Dhatu; they sometimes bear on a different Dhatu, sometimes on two, for it is said (in the Prakarana-apāda, TD 26, p. 711a24), “There are some anusayas of the realm of Kāmadhātu (that is, produced among the beings of Kāmadhātu) which bear on the dharmas of the realm of Rūpadhātu, on the dharmas of the realm of Ārūpyadhātu, or on the dharmas of both the realms of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu. (And there are some anusayas of the realm of Rūpadhātu which bear on the dharmas of the realm of Ārūpyadhātu).”

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[Objection:] When some beings in Kāmadhātu produce the opinion that Brahmā is a being, the opinion that he is permanent, they then entertain a belief in a self and a belief in extremes with regard to a thing belonging to a different, superior Dhatu. Thus you are wrong to exclude these two erroneous views from the list of the universal anusayas in a different Dhatu.

But one does not have the idea of a self and of things pertaining to a self with regard to Brahmā: thus the idea that he is
a being is not a belief in a self. And a belief in extremes is created by a belief in a self; thus the idea of the permanence of Brahmā is not a belief in extremes (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 93a4ff).

What sort of views would a belief in a living being and a belief in permanence be with respect to Brahmā?

The Ābhidhārmikas say that there are no erroneous views here, but only "false knowledge." (All speculative knowledge which errs, viparītālambana is not considered as views).

But why are the other false opinions which have Brahmā for their object (the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, etc.) considered as erroneous views, and not the two opinions of being and permanence?

The Siddhānta serves as authority (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 93a).

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Are only the anusayās universals?

13c-d. With the exception of the prāptis, dharmas coexistent with the universal anusayās are also universals.

"Coexistent dharmas" refer to sensation, etc. Not the prāptis, because the prāpti (adherence) and the prāpya (the thing adhered to) do not have the same result (ii.36c).

Are universal anusayās universal causes (ii.54c-d)?

1. Future universal anusayās are not universal causes. 2. Coexistents of past and present universal anusayās are universal causes, but not universal anusayās. 3. Past and present universal anusayās are universal causes. 4. Future coexistents of universal anusayās are neither universal anusayās nor universal causes.

***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many have a pure dharma for their object, that is, the Third and Fourth Truth, the Truth of Extinction and the Path? How many have an impure dharma?

14. Wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance which is bound (yukta) to them, and independent ignorance, abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, make six anusayas whose object is pure.56

Except for the six,—that is, the three anusayas abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction, namely wrong views, doubt, and the ignorance associated with them or independent of them, and these same three anusayas abandoned through Seeing the Path,—all the other anusayas have impure dharmas for their object.

15. The extinction of their own bhumi is the object of the anusayas which have extinction for their sphere; the Path with its six or nine bhūmis, is the object of the anusayas which have the Path for their sphere, for the Paths depend on one another.57

The three anusayas (wrong views, doubt, and ignorance) which are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and which have Extinction for their object, do not have Extinction for their total object: when they belong to Kāmadhātu, they bear on Extinction in Kāmadhātu, and so on from bhūmi to bhūmi, until: when they belong to Bhavāgra (naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana) they bear on Extinction in Bhavāgra.

When they are in the realm of Kāmadhātu, the three anusayas which have the Path for their object bear on the totality of the Path as well as on a portion of the dharmajñāna (vi.26), with its six bhūmis (namely anāgāmya, dhyānāniara, and the four
Dhyānas) (see ii.52c, vii.9).

When they are of the realm of Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu (four Dhyānas, four Ārūpyas), these same anusayas bear on the totality of the Path, and on a part of the anvayajñāna (vi.26), with its nine bhūmis (namely the preceeding six and the first three Ārūpyas). In fact the Paths are mutually dependent. (ii.52).

Although dharmajñāna and anvayajñāna are mutually dependent, because anvayajñāna is not opposed to Kāmadhātu, the three anusayas of the realm of Kāmadhātu which have the Path for their object do not have the Path which forms part of the anvayajñāna for their object.

But the dharmajñāna which is opposed to Kāmadhātu is also opposed to Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu (vii.9): consequently it will also be the object of the three anusayas of these two Dhātus which have the Path for their object.

Dharmajñāna in its entirety is not opposed to Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu, for the dharmajñāna of Suffering and Arising are not opposed to these two Dhātus. [Thus it is not the object of the three anusayas of these two Dhātus.]

And dharmajñāna is not opposed to Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu in their entirety [for it is not opposed to the dharma abandoned through Seeing. Thus it is not the object of the three anusayas of these two Dhātus], because the first two dharmajñānas are not opposed to these Dhātus, and because the first category of the anusayas of these two Dhātus, namely those which one abandons through Seeing, are not opposed by any dharmajñāna.

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Why do not lust (rāga), anger (pratigha), egotism (māna), the esteeming of bad views (marśa), and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (parāmarśa) bear on pure dharmas, on the Extinction of Suffering or on the Path?
16a. Lust does not bear on pure dharmas, because lust should be rejected.

The latent defilement of lust (rāgānusāya) should be abandoned; but if it has pure dharmas for its object, it will not be rejected; in the same manner, the aspiration after good dharmas [which takes the form of desire, but which is Right View] should not be rejected.59

16b. Anger does not, because pure dharmas do not do evil.

Anger arises with regard to a thing which does evil, and pure dharmas, the Extinction of Suffering or the Path, do not do evil.

16c. Egotism and the two esteemings do not, because pure dharmas are calm, pure, and excellent.

One cannot pride oneself on Extinction or the Path, for they are calm.60

The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is to hold as a cause of purification that which is not such: the pure dharmas are really purification, so one cannot have a false conception of purity (suddhigrāha), with regard to them.

The esteeming of bad views is to hold as excellent that which is vile: now the pure dharmas are what are best, so one cannot have a false conception of excellence (agragrāha), with regard to them.

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Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many become anusaya from the fact of being an object?61 How many become anusayana solely through association, (solely by reason of being dharmas
associated with the mind, sensation, etc.)?

17. Universal *anusayas*, relative to the object, become *anusayana* in all their spheres; the non-universals, in their one category.\(^{62}\)

From the point of view of the object, the universal *anusayas* (v. 12) become *anusayana*, that is, "become lodged in" the five categories of their sphere; the other in one category: the *anusayas* that one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering become *anusayana* in the *dharma*s that one abandons through the Seeing of Suffering . . . the *anusayas* that one abandons through Meditation become *anusayana* in the *dharma*s that one abandons through Meditation.

This general rule calls for more precision.

18a-b. Not the *anusayas* that bear on the pure *dharma*s or a higher sphere, because their object is not "made one's own" and opposes the *anusayas*.\(^{65}\)

The six *anusayas* which have the pure *dharma*s—Nirvāṇa or the Path (v. 14)—for their object, and the nine *anusayas* which have a higher sphere (v. 13a-b) for their object do not become *anusayana* in the object, because one does not do this thing by oneself either through the "view of self" or through desire.

Other *anusayas* would apply (*anusi*) to the thing which one considers (through a belief in a self) as the self, or which one makes one's own through desire, and they become *anusayana*, as dust is applied to a wet piece of cloth (see *Vyākhyā* ad i.4, p. 14.2). But the pure *dharma*s and the higher *bhūmis* are not susceptible of being considered as "self" or as "pertaining to self": thus the *anusayas* which have them for their object do not become *anusayana* in their object, because of the nature of their object.
We would remark in fact that the desire that seeks either the pure dharmas or a higher sphere is not the anusaya called "desire," but rather "an aspiration for good dharmas" (p. 32, 1.8).

Further, the pure dharmas, Nirvāṇa or the Path, are opposed to the kleśas which take them as their object; the dharmas of a higher bhūmi are opposed to the kleśas of a lower bhūmi: as a consequence the kleśas cannot become anusayana there, that is, install themselves there; in the same way that the sole of the foot cannot install itself on a rock which is red hot with fire.

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We have up to now understood the word anusayana, anusete, as "to become anusayana," in the sense of "to install," or "to become lodged in."

According to some other masters, anusayana should be understood as ānuguna. Nirvāṇa, etc., is not favorable (anuguna) to the arising and development of wrong views: in the same way that one says that if a person who has a cold takes a bitter medicine, there is no increase (anusayana) in the cold due to the medicine (Vyākhyā i.4, p. 13).

18c-d. Any anusaya which is associated with a certain dharma becomes anusayana through association with this dharma.64

"With a certain dharma," that is, with sensation, etc.

The word eva indicates reservation: "as long as the anusaya is not abandoned."

***

Are there any anusayas which do not have the pure dharmas
for their object, which do not have a superior Dhātu for their object yet which become anusayana solely through association with and not from the fact of the object?

Yes, universal anusayas which have a superior bhūmi for their object (namely the universal anusayas of the First Dhyāna which have the three higher Dhyānas for their object).

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Among the ninety-eight dhyānas, how many are bad (akuśala), and how many are morally neutral, that is, without retribution (avyākṛta)?

19. All the “higher” dhyānas are morally neutral. [The belief in a self, a belief in extremes, and ignorance are neutral in Kāmadhātu. The other anusayas, here, are bad.]65

All the anusayas belonging to Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu are neutral. In fact, all defiled dharmas, when they bear retribution, bear painful retribution. Now suffering does exist in these two spheres, for no causes (anger, etc.) for doing evil to others are present there.

19b. The belief in a self, a belief in extremes, and ignorance are neutral in Kāmadhātu.

In Kāmadhātu, a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and the ignorance which is associated with them, are neutral.

In fact, these anusayas are not in contradiction to giving and other good deeds. One thinks, “May I be happy in the future!,” and one give gifts and observes the precepts.66

The erroneous view of annihilation is favorable to deliverance.
This is why the Blessed One said, "Among the doctrines of the Tirthikas, the best is that which says, 'I do not exist, things of mine do not exist; I shall not exist, things pertaining to me shall not exist.'"

These two views—a belief in a self and a belief in the extremes—are only aberrations relative to things which constitute the pseudoperson; they do not being about harm to another: thus they are morally neutral.

But these different reasons—because they are not in contradiction to giving, etc.—could be applied to the "desire for heaven" and to egotism (asmimāna, v. 10), which should thus also be neutral; but the School does not admit this. Some ancient masters also say, "An innate belief in a self, which is to be found among the savage animals and birds, is neutral. But a cogitated belief in a self is bad." (The same holds for an innate and cogitated belief in the extremes).

19c. The other anusayas, here, are bad.

The other anusayas of Kāmadhātu are impure (asubha), that is, bad (akusala).

***

Among the ninety-eight anusayas, how many are roots of evil (akusalamūla)? How many are not?

20a-b. Lust, anger and mūdi, in Kāmadhātu, are roots of evil.69

All lust (rāga), all anger (pratigba), and all mūdi (that is, all delusion or moha) belonging to Kāmadhātu—with the
exception of the delusion which is a belief in a self and the belief in the extremes—are, in this order, the three roots of evil, greed, anger, and ignorance.

A belief in a self and a belief in the extremes are not roots of evil, for a root of evil is only that which is bad and is only a root of evil.\(^{71}\)

The other *anuṣayās* are not roots of evil.

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How many *dharmas* are neutral roots? How many are not?

20c. Three roots, desire, ignorance, and *mati* (that is, *prajñā*) are neutral.\(^{72}\)

The *Vaibhāṣikas* of Kāśmīr hold that desire, ignorance, and *prajñā* which are neutral, of whatever type they are up to and including the *prajñā* which arises from retribution,\(^{73}\) are neutral roots.\(^{74}\)

20d. The others are not roots, because their modality is of duality and elevation.

Doubt (*vicikitsā*) cannot be regarded as a root, being twofold and mobile by nature. Egotism (*māna*), being "an elevation" of the mind, is not a root, since it consists of elevation, the opposite of a root. For in this world roots are firm and reach downward.

21b-d. Four, [say the Aparāntakas]: desire, views, egotism, and delusion which are neutral; in fact there are three contemplations based on ignorance.\(^{75}\)
One can distinguish "absorption of desire" (trṣṇottaradhyāyin), "absorption of (wrong) views" (dṛṣṭyuttaradhyāyin), and "absorption of pride" (mānottaradhyāyin). Now these contemplations are such by reason of delusion or ignorance.76

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Are the fourteen "undefined points" (avyākṛtavastu) of which Scripture77 speaks so called because they are neutral (avyākṛta) in the sense that we have just studied?

No. In the Sūtra a neutral question is a question which should be set aside: that is, this type of question is called neutral, not answered, because it should be set aside, or rejected. The object of such a question is termed "an undefined point."

There are four types of questions: 1. a question to which one responds in a categorical manner; 2. a question to which one responds by distinguishing; 3. a question to which one responds by another question; and 4. a question which one should not answer.

22. Categorical response, as for death; a distinguishing response, as for rebirth; a response by a question, as for superiority; and a response by rejecting the question, as for non-identity.78

1. If one asks, "Do all beings die," one should answer in a categorical manner, "They do."

2. If one asks, "Will all beings be reborn?" one should answer by distinguishing, "Beings endowed with defilements will be reborn; being freed from defilements will not be reborn."

3. If one asks, "Is a person79 superior or inferior?," one should answer by the question, "In comparison with whom?" If he answers, "In comparison with the gods," one should answer, "He is inferior." If one answers, "In comparison with beings in the
painful realms of rebirth," one should answer, "He is superior."

4. If one asks, "Are the skandhas the same thing as a sattva or living being, or are they different?," this is a question that is to be rejected because the thing called a "living being" does not exist. In the same way one would reject the question, "Is the child of a sterile woman white or black?"

***

How can you say (in Karikā 22) that one has responded to this fourth question, since one did not answer whether the skandhas are, yes or no, identical to a living being?

This question is answered by saying, "This question is to be rejected": thus there is a response to it.\(^{80}\)

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Another says that the second question, like the first question, calls for a categorical response, "All beings do not arise."

But the author says that in order to justify the example given [by the Vaibhāṣikas] to the second type of question, to someone who asks, "Will those who die be reborn?",\(^{81}\) one should answer by distinguishing, ["All will not be reborn; those who are endowed with the defilements will be reborn, but not those who are freed from them.

[He says again that the third question also calls for a categorical response.] A human being in fact is at one and the same time superior and inferior according to the point of comparison. In the same manner as if one were to ask, "Is consciousness (vijñāna) a cause, or is it a result?," [one should answer, "It is a cause with respect to its result, and it is a result with respect to its cause." \(^{82}\)] But, says the author, to someone who asks in a categorical manner "Is a person superior or inferior?," it is not suitable to respond
categorically, "He is superior" or "He is inferior;" one should thus respond by distinguishing: one must first be assured of the intention of the questioner.

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The Ābhidhārmikas say: 1. A categorical response: If someone asks, "Is the Blessed One the Arhat Samyaksambuddha? Is the Dharma that he speaks well spoken? Is the Saṅgha of the Śrāvakas well instructed? Is physical matter (rupa) impermanent? . . . Is consciousness (vijñāna) impermanent? Can Suffering be known . . . Can the Path be known?" then to these questions one should answer in a categorical manner, by reason of the superior benefit (of such an answer).

2. An answer by distinguishing: If a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable One teaches me the dharmas," one should distinguish, "The dharmas are numerous, past, present, and future: which do you desire that I should teach you?." If he answers, "Teach me the past dharmas," one should distinguish, "The past dharmas are numerous: rūpa, vedana, saṃjñā, saṃskāras, and vijñāna." If he asks, "Teach me concerning rūpa," one should distinguish, "There are three rūpas, the good, the bad, and the neutral." If one asks, "Teach me concerning the good," one should distinguish, "There are seven types of good rūpa: abstention from killing . . . and abstention from idle words." If one asks, "Teach me abstention from killing," one should distinguish, "It is of three types, arisen from the three roots of good, non-greed (alobha), non-anger (advesa), and non-ignorance (amoha)." If one asks, "Teach me the abstention from killing arisen from non-greed," one should distinguish, "It is twofold, vijñāpti and avijñāpti. Which do you desire that I teach you?"

3. A response by a question: The same question, put by a false-hearted person, is a question to which one should respond by another question. If such a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable
One teach me the *dharmas,*" one should counter-interrogate him, "The *dharmas* are numerous: which do you desire that I teach you?" But one need not establish the distinctions (past, present, and future *dharmas*); one should continue to counter-interrogate him until the questioner remains silent or he himself explains. But if a good-hearted person and a false-hearted person do not question you, but content themselves with expressing a desire, "Teach me the *dharmas;"" and if, on the other hand, one does not answer them, if one does not explain to them, and if one is content to interrogate them, "Which *dharmas* shall I teach you?," how can you say that there is a question and a response?

The author answers: He who says, "Teach me the Path," asks concerning the Path, exactly as if he has said, "Which is the Path?" One the other hand, through this counter-interrogation, one explains to the questioner concerning his questions: is the Path then not explained (*vyākṛta*)?

If this is the case, then is there an answer by means of a question in the second and third type of question?

No, the responses differ, for sometimes there is distinction, and sometimes there is no distinction.

4. A question to be rejected: If one asks "Are the number of persons finite or infinite, etc.?," then this question should be rejected.

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One may find in the Sūtra itself the definition of these four questions and answers: the venerable Mahāsāṃghikas read a Sūtra (*Dirgha, TD* 1, p. 51bl, *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 609a24) which says, "Bhikṣus, there are four responses to questions. What are these four? There are some questions which one should reply categorically . . .; there are some questions which one should reject. What is
the question to which one should respond categorically? When one asks if all the skandhas are impermanent. What is the question to which one should respond by distinguishing? When someone asks what retribution in sensation a voluntary action requires. What is the question to which one should respond by a question? When someone asks if samjñā is the soul of a person, one should counter-interrogate, "My friend, what do you think of the soul?," and if he answers, "My friend, I think that the soul is coarse," one should respond that the samjñā is other than the soul (Dīgha, i.195). What is the question to be rejected? When someone asks if the world is eternal, non-eternal, eternal and non-eternal, neither eternal nor non-eternal; if the number of persons is finite, infinite, finite and infinite, neither finite and infinite; if the Tathāgata exists after death . . . ; or if the vital principle is other than the body. These questions, Oh Bhikṣus, are to be rejected."

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Within a certain person, an anusaya or latent defilement attaches itself to a certain object; this person is bound to this object by this anusaya.

We must examine to what object a person is bound by a past, present, or future anusaya.

From this point of view the anusayas or kleśas are of two types: specific kleśas, namely lust, anger, egotism; and general kleśas, namely views, doubt, and ignorance.

23. One is bound by lust, anger, and egotism, past and present, to the object from whence they have been produced without their having been abandoned.

When the specific kleśas have arisen with respect to a certain object—an object past, present or future, an object abandoned through Seeing, etc.—and is thus found in the past or in the
present, when they have not been abandoned, the person in whom
they are produced is bound to this object by these specific kleśas.
For, being specific, they are not necessarily produced within all
persons with respect to all things, but rather within a certain
person with respect to a certain thing.

24a-b. One is bound to all objects by the same future kleśas,
since they are mental states.

One is bound to any and all objects, past, present, and future,
[and of the five categories: to be abandoned through Seeing, etc.,
according to the case], by these same specific future kleśas, since
they belong to the manovijnāna. For the sphere of the mānas is
tritemporal.

24b. One is bound to the object of their time period by the
same future kleśas, since they are not mental states.

One is bound to future objects through future lust and anger
which differ from the preceeding—that is, non-mental states in a
relationship with the five sense consciousnesses. The five
consciousnesses, in fact, cognize only objects contemporaneous to
them.

Sometimes this rule concerns only future lust and anger of the
utpattidharmin or “destined to arise” category. It is otherwise
when they are not destined to arise.

24c. Not destined to arise, one is bound everywhere by the
same.

“Everywhere,” this is, to all objects, past, present, and future.

24c-d. One is bound everywhere by the others, whatever
they are.
One is bound to all the objects of the three time periods and the five categories, according to the case, by the other, general klesas—which, having for their object the five upādānakandhas, are produced within all and relative to all—in whatever period the said klesas belong.

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[The Sautrāntikas criticize this theory.] Do the klesas, and past and future objects, really exist?

If one says that they really exist, one admits that conditioned things always exist and are thus eternal; if they do not exist, how is it possible to say that a person is bound to these objects by the klesas, or that he is liberated from them?

The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that past and future dharmas really exist; conditioned things nevertheless are not eternal for they are endowed with the characteristics (lakṣānas, ii.45c-d) of conditioned things. In order to better illustrate their position we present, in summary fashion, their doctrine:

25a. The dharmas exist in the three time periods.

Why is this?

25a. Because the Blessed One has said it.

1. The Blessed One taught in his own words the existence of the past and the future, "Monks, if past rūpa did not exist, the learned holy Śrāvakas would 'not take into consideration' past rūpa . . . If future rūpa did not exist, the learned holy Śrāvakas would 'not delight in' future rūpa. It is because future rūpa exists that the learned holy Śrāvakas . . ."
25b. Because mental consciousness proceeds from two.

2. The Blessed One implicitly teaches the same doctrine when he says, "Consciousness is produced by reason of two. What are these two? The organ of sight and a visible thing . . . the manas and the dharmas." Now if the past and future dharmas do not exist, mental consciousness which has them for its object would not arise by reason of these two.

[These are the proofs taken from Scripture. As for proofs taken from reasoning:]

25c. Because it has an object.

3. A consciousness can arise given an object, but not if an object is not present. If past and future things do not exist, there would be consciousness without an object; thus there is no consciousness without an object.

25d. And because the past bears a result.

4. If the past does not exist, how can good and bad action give forth a result? In fact, at the moment when the result is produced, the retributive cause (ii.54c-d) is past.

Therefore, because of the proofs from Scripture and reasoning quoted above, the Vaibhāṣikas affirm the existence of both the past and the future.

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The masters who call themselves Sarvāstivādins, "believers in the existence of all," maintain that the past and the future exist.
25c-d. He who affirms the existence of the dharmas of the three time periods is held to be a Sarvāstivādin.

The masters who affirms the existence of all things, past, present and future, are Sarvāstivādins. Those who affirm the existence of the present and a part of the past, namely the existence of action which has not given forth its result; and the non-existence of the future and a part of the past, namely the non-existence of action which has given forth its result, are regarded as Vibhajyavādins; [they do not belong to the Sarvāstivādin School.]

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How many systems are there in this School? [How many ways are there of understanding the doctrine of the existence of all (sarvāstivāda)? which is the best?]

25d. There are four types of Sarvāstivādins accordingly as they teach a difference in existence (bhava), a difference in characteristic, a difference in condition, and mutual difference.

1. The Bhadanta Dharmatrāta defends bhāvanyathātva, that is, he affirms that the three time periods, past, present, and future, are differenciated by their non-identity of existence (bhāva).

When a dharma goes from one time period to another its nature is not modified, but its existence is. A gold vase which one breaks is an example which shows the difference of figure: its figure (saṃsthāna, i.10a) is modified, but not its color. An example which shows difference in qualities: milk becomes whey; its taste, force, and digestibility change, but not its color. In the same way, when a future dharma passes from the future into the present, its
future existence is abandoned, and its present existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same. When it passes from the present into the past, its present existence is abandoned, and its past existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same.

2. The Bhadanta Ghoṣaka defends *lakṣanānyathātva*, that is, the time periods differ through the difference in their characteristics.

A *dharma* goes through the time periods. When it is past, it is endowed with past characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), but it is not deprived of its present and future characteristics; when it is future, it is endowed with its future characteristics, but it is not deprived of its present and past characteristics; and when it is present, it is endowed with its present characteristics, but it is not deprived of its past and future characteristics. Example: a man attached to one woman is not detached with respect to other women.

3. The Bhadanta Vasumitra defends *avasthānyathātva*, that is, the time periods differ through the difference of condition (*avasthā*). A *dharma*, going through the time periods, having taken up a certain condition, becomes different through the difference of its condition, not through a difference in its substance. Example: a token placed on the square of ones, is called one; placed on the square of tens, ten; and placed on the square of hundreds, one hundred.

4. The Bhadanta Buddhadeva defends *anyonyathātva*, that is, the time periods are established through their mutual relationships.

A *dharma*, going throughout the time periods, takes different names through different relationships, that is, it is called past, future, or present, through a relationship with what precedes and with what follows. For example, the same woman is both a daughter and a mother.

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It is in this manner that these four masters maintain the existence of all.  

The first, professing "transformation" (parināma) may be refuted along with the Sāṅkhyas.

In the thesis of the second master, the time periods, past, present, and future, are confounded, since the three characteristics are found everywhere. The example moreover is lacking any similarity to the problem, for, within the man in question, there is active lust with respect to one woman, but there is only the "possession of lust" (ii.36) with respect to other women.

In the thesis of the fourth master, the three time periods exist at the same time: a past dharma, for example, is past in relation to that which proceeds it, future in relation to that which follows, and present in relation to what precedes and what follows.

26a. The third is the best.

Consequently the best system is that of Vasumitra,

26b. The three time periods are proven by reason of their activity,

According to which the time periods and the conditions are established through the operation of the activity of a dharma: when a dharma does not accomplish its operation, it is future; when it is accomplishing it, it is present; and when its operation has come to an end, it is past.

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[The Sautrāntikas criticize:] If the past and the future exist as things, they are present: why are they thus qualified as past and future?
It is action not yet completed, in the act of being completed, or already completed, which determine the time period of a dharma.99

Good enough. But what action would you assign to a tattabdam eye? The action of an eye is to see, and a tattabdam eye does not now see (i.42). Would you say that its action is to project and to give forth a result (phaladaṇaparigraha, ii.59)? But then if giving forth a result is an "action," then sabbagahetu causes, etc. (ii.59c) give forth their result when they are past, and so one arrives at the conclusion that they accomplish their action in the past and so would be as a consequence in the present. Or if an action, in order to be complete, calls for a projection and a giving forth of a result, these past causes would be at least semi-present. Thus the time periods are confounded.

27a. What is opposed [to the activity of a dharma?]

But, if it always exists, why doesn't a dharma always exercise its activity? What obstacle causes it to sometimes produce and sometimes not to produce its action? One cannot say that its inaction results from the non-presence of certain causes, since these causes also always exist.

27a. How can activity be past, etc.?

And how can activity itself be past, etc.? Would you imagine a second activity of activity? That would be absurd. But if the activity, in and of itself (sva-sattāpeksaya), is past, etc., why not admit that the same holds for the dharma? And who says that the time periods depend on past activity, etc.? Would you say that activity is neither past, present, nor future, but that, nevertheless, it exists? Then, being unconditioned (asamkṛta), it is eternal (nitya), and how can you then say that a dharma is future when it does not exercise its activity, or past when it not longer exercises it?
These objections would hold, [answer the Sarvāstivādins,] if activity were other than the dharma itself.\textsuperscript{100}

27b. But it is not other than the dharma.

Thus this error does not exist. Therefore

27b. The time periods are no longer justified.

If activity is the same as the dharma, and if the dharma always exist, its activity would also always exist. Why and how does one say that sometimes it is past, sometimes future? The distinction of the time periods is not justified.

[The Sarvāstivādins answer:] How is it not justified? In fact a conditioned dharma which has not arisen is called future; that which, having arisen, is not destroyed, is called present; and that which is destroyed is called past.

[The Sautrāntikas answer:] If, in the past and future, a dharma exists with the same nature (tenaivātmanā) as when it is present,

27b-c. Existing in the same manner, how can it be non-arisen or destroyed?

If the unique self-nature of a dharma continues to exist, how can this dharma be non-arisen or destroyed? What is it that it is lacking now, through the absence of which it is qualified as non-arisen? What is it that it is lacking later, through the absence of which it is qualified as destroyed? Consequently, if one does not admit that the dharma exists after having been non-existent and no longer exists after having existed, the three time periods cannot be established or proved to exist.\textsuperscript{101}
It is useful to examine the reasoning of the Sarvāstivādins.

1. The argument that, possessing the characteristics of conditioned things (arising, etc., ii.452), conditioned things are not eternal even though they exist both in the past and in the future, is pure verbiage, for, if it always exists, a dharma is not susceptible either of arising or of perishing. "A dharma is eternal, and it is not eternal:" to speak in this manner is to contradict oneself through one's own words.

This is what the stanza explains when it says, "Self nature always exists, but this does not mean that being is eternal, nor that being is different from its self nature: this is clearly stated by the Lord."102

2. With regard to the argument that the Blessed One taught the existence of the past and the future since he said "Past action exists, and future results exist",103 we would also say that the past exists, and that the future exists. Past is that which was existent; future is that which, given its cause, will exist: it is in this sense that we say that the past and the future exists. But they do not exist as substantial entities (dravyatas) as does the present.

[The Sarvāstivādins protest:] Who says that they exist like the present?

If they don't exist like the present, how do they exist?

The Sarvāstivādins answer: They exist with the nature of the past and the future.

But, if they now exist, how can one attribute the nature of past and future to them? In fact, the Blessed One, in a text quoted by the Sarvāstivādins, had the intention of condemning the view that negates cause and effect (iv.79, v.7). He said "the past exists" in the sense of "the past was;" he said "the future exists" in the sense of "the future will be." The word "is" (asti) is a nipāta,104 in the same sense as the expressions, "There is (asti) previous non-existence of the lamp," "there is later non-existence of the lamp," and again, "This lamp is extinguished, but it was not extinguished by
me.” It is in this same way that the text says “the past exists, and the future exists.” To understand otherwise, being in the past, the past would not now be the past.

[The Sarvástivādins answer:] We see that the Blessed One, addressing the Lāgūḍāśikhiyaka ascetics, expressed himself in this way, “Past action, which has been destroyed, which has perished, and which has ceased, does exist.” According to the proposed explanation, the sense would be, “This action was.” Now can we suppose that the ascetics would not admit that past action has already passed away?

[The Sautrāntikas reply:] When the Blessed One says that past action exists, he had in view its power of giving forth a result, a power which was placed in the series of the agent through action which has now passed away. To understand otherwise, that is, if past action actually exists now in and of itself, how can it be considered as past?

Of the rest, Scripture contains a formal declaration. The Blessed One said in the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra, “The eye, Oh Bhiksū, arising, does not come from any place; perishing, it does not remain in any place. In this way, Oh Bhiksū, the eye exists after having been non-existent and, after having existed, disappears.” If a future eye existed, the Blessed One would not have said that the eye exists only after having been non-existent.

[The Sarvāstivādins would perhaps say:] The expression, “It exists after having been non-existent” signifies “after having been non-existent in the present” (vartamāne’dhvany abhūtvā), that is, “after having been non-existent as present” (vartamanabhāvena abhūtvā).

This is inadmissible, for the time periods do not differ from the eye.

Does this mean that one should understand this as, “After having been non-existent in its own nature (svalakṣaṇatās)?” But this is to explicitly acknowledge that a future eye does not now
exist.

3. As for the argument that "the past and the future exist, since the consciousness arises by reason of two things," should one understand that since the mental consciousness arises by reason of a mental organ and past, present, or future dharmas, these dharmas are a necessary condition for the mental consciousness to arise to the same extent as is the mental organ, that is, in the quality of "generating condition" (janakapratyaya)? Or are they solely "conditions in a quality of object" (ālambanamātra, ii.62c)? Evidently future dharmas, which will be produced after thousands of years or which will never be produced, are not the generating causes of a present mental consciousness. Evidently Nirvāṇa, which is contradictory to all arising, cannot be a generating cause. It is enough that the dharmas are a condition for the arising of a consciousness in their quality of being an object: let us admit that it is thus for future and past dharmas.

[The Sarvāstivādins ask:] If the past and future dharmas do not exist, how can they be the objects of consciousness?

They exist in the manner in which they are taken as objects.

And in what manner are they taken as objects?

[They are taken as objects with the mark of the past and the future,¹⁰⁷ as having existed or as coming into existence.] In fact, a person who remembers a past visible object of a past sensation, does not see "this is;" but he remembers "this was;" the man who foresees the future does not see the future as existing, but he foresees it as coming into existence (bhaviṣyat).

Another point. Memory (which is a certain mental consciousness) grasps a visible thing that has been seen, a sensation that has been felt, that is, a visible object and a sensation in a present state of being. If a dharma which one remembers is, in fact, the one grasped by the memory, it is presently manifested; if it is not one that one grasps through the memory, then the memory consciousness certainly has a non-existent object.
Would one say that past and future visible objects exist without being present, because past or future visible objects are nothing other than atoms (*paramāṇu*) in a state of dispersion (*viprakīrṇa*)? But we would say: (1) when the consciousness takes as its object, through memory or prevision, a past or future visible object, it does not take it as an object in a state of dispersion, but on the contrary, as an assembled collection (*samcitā*) of atoms; (2) if a past or future visible object is the visible object of the present with this small difference that the atoms are dispersed, then the atoms are thus eternal; there is never either production (*utpāda*) nor destruction of them; there is only association and dispersion of the atoms. To maintain such a thesis is to adopt the doctrine of the Ājīvikas and to reject the Sūtras of the Sugata: "The eye, Oh Bhikṣus, arising, does not come from any place . . . ;" (3) the argument does not hold for sensation and other "non-solid" (*amūrtanā*) dharmas: not being combinations of atoms (*aparamāṇu-samcitā*), we do not see how they can be, in the past or in the future, atoms in a state of dispersion. In fact, moreover, one remembers the sensation as it was experienced when it was present; one foresees it as it will be experienced when it will be present. If, past and future, it is such that one grasps it through memory or prevision, it would be eternal. Thus the mental consciousness termed "memory" has a non-existent object, namely a sensation that does not now presently exist.

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[The Vaibhāṣikas say:] If that which does not absolutely exist can be the object of consciousness, then a thirteenth āyatana (i.14) could be the object of consciousness.

[The author answers:] Then what is, according to you, the object of a consciousness which says, "There is no thirteenth āyatana?"

It is its name, "thirteenth āyatana."
Then this object is only a name; the thing designated, the object, does not exist. Furthermore, what will be the presently existing object upon which the consciousness of the previous non-existence of sound bears?

[The Vaibhãšikas answer:] The object of this consciousness is the sound itself [and not its non-existence.]

Then, anyone who is in quest of the non-existence of sound should make a noise!

[The Vaibhãšikas answer:] No, for the sound of which there is previous non-existence, exists in a future state, and it is this sound in its future state which is the object of the previously non-existent consciousness.

But if future sound, of which there is previous non-existence, exists in fact, how can there be the idea that it does not now exist?

[The Vaibhãšikas answer:] It does not presently exist (vartamãna nãsti); from whence there is the idea, "it does not now exist."

You do not have the right to speak in this manner, for it is the same dharma which is past, present, and future. Or, if there is a difference between future and present sound, and the idea "it does not now exist" bears on this difference, then you recognize that the distinctive characteristic of the present exists after not having existed. We will therefore have to prove that existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhava) can be an object of consciousness.

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[The Vaibhãšikas say:] If a non-existent thing can be an object of consciousness, how could the Bodhisattva in his last existence say, "It is impossible that I know, that I see that which does not exist in this world?"

The meaning of this text is clear: "I am not like other prideful (abhimãnika, v.10a) ascetics who attribute to themselves a
non-existent 'illumination':\textsuperscript{108} as for me, I only see as existing that which is." Moreover, to admit your thesis, the object of any idea (\textit{buddhi}) would be real: if all that one thinks is real, there is no longer any place for doubt or examination (\textit{vimarsa}); there would be no difference between the Bodhisattva and others.

Let us add moreover that ideas certainly have existent and non-existent things for their object, for the Blessed One explicitly said, "From the moment when I said to him, 'Come, Oh Bhiksus!' (iv.26c), my Srāvaka is instructed from evening until morning: he will know that which is as is (\textit{sacca satto jñāsyati}) and that which is not as not, that which is not the highest (\textit{sa-uttara}) as not the highest, and that which is the highest (\textit{anuttara}=Nirvāṇa) as the highest." (iv.127d)\textsuperscript{109}

Consequently the reason that the Sarvāstivādins gave in favor of the existence of the past and the future, that is, "because the object of the consciousness is existent" does not hold.

4. The Sarvāstivādins also deduce an argument from the result of action. But the Sautrāntikas do not admit that a result arises directly from a past action. A result arises from a special state of the series (\textit{cittasaṁtiṇānaviśesāt}), a state which proceeds from the action, as one shall see at the end of this work wherein we refute the doctrine of the Vātsiputṛiyas (\textit{ātmavādapratisedha}, see iv.85a).

But the masters who affirm the real existence (\textit{dravyatas}) of the past and the future should also admit the eternity of the result: what efficacy (\textit{sāmarthya}) can they attribute to the action? An efficacy with regard to production (\textit{utpāda})? An efficacy with regard to the action of making something present (\textit{vartamānīka-raṇa})?

a. This is to admit that arising exists after having been non-existent (\textit{abhūtvā bhavati}). If you say that arising itself pre-exists, how can you attribute the efficacy of a thing to that same thing? You cannot but join the School of the Vārṣagāṇyas, "That which is, solely is; that which is not, solely is not; that which is not, does not arise; and that which is, is not destroyed."\textsuperscript{110}
b. What should we understand by "the action of making something present?"

Will this be the fact of drawing something to another place? We see three difficulties in this: (1) the result will thus be eternal; (2) how could the result, when it is non-material (arūpin), be achieved?; and (3) movement would exist after having been non-existent.

Would this be the fact of modifying the unique or self nature of a pre-existent result (svabhāvaviṣeṣaṇa)? But is there not, in this thesis, the appearance of a modification previously non-existent?

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Consequently, the sarvāstivāda, "the doctrine of the existence of all," of the Sarvāstivādins who affirm the real existence of the past and the future, is not good within Buddhism. It is not in this sense that one should understand sarvāstivāda. Good sarvāstivāda consists in affirming the existence of "all" by understanding the word "all" as Scripture understands it. How do the Sūtras affirm that all exists? "When one says, 'all exists,' Oh Brahmins, this refers to the twelve āyatanas: these are equivalent terms."

Or rather, the "all" that exists is the three time periods. And it has been said how they exist: "That which has previously been, is the past . . ." (see above, p. 813).

But if the past and future do not exist, how can one be bound (sāmyukta) by a past or future kleśa to a thing (vastu) which is past or future?

One is bound by a past kleśa by reason of the existence, in the series, of an anusaya which has arisen from a past kleśa; one is bound by a future kleśa by reason of the existence of an anusaya which is the cause of the future anusaya of a kleśa which has had or will have this thing for its object.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: "The past and the future truly exist. As
regards that which cannot be explained, one should know that

27d. The nature of things is indeed profound;
certainly, it cannot be proven through reasoning."¹¹²
[Thus one need not deny the past and the future].¹¹³

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One can say that that which arises perishes: for example a
visible. One can say that that which arises differs from that which
perishes: in fact, that which arises is the future; that which
perishes is the present. Time also arises, for that which is arising is
embraced within time, it has time for its nature;¹¹⁴ and a dharma
arises from time, by reason of the multiplicity of the moments of
future time.¹¹⁵

We have thus finished with the problem presented to us by the
theory of the anusayas.

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When a person abandons an object¹¹⁶ through the disappear-
ance of the possession that he had of this object, is there for him
"disconnection" from this object through the cutting off of the
possession of the defilements which bears on this object? And
inversely, when there is disconnection, is there abandoning?

When there is disconnection from an object, there is always an
abandoning of this object; but one can have abandoning without
disconnection.

28. When that which is to be abandoned through the Seeing
of Suffering is abandoned, the ascetic remains in connection
with it from the fact of the other universal defilements; when the first category is abandoned, he remains in connection with it from the fact of the other defilements which have it as their object.\textsuperscript{117}

Let us suppose a person enters on to the path of the Seeing of Truths; the Seeing of Suffering has arisen in him, but not yet the Seeing of Arising. He has abandoned the things (\textit{vastu})\textsuperscript{118} which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, but he is not yet disjoined from these things by this: for he continues to be bound to these first things\textsuperscript{119} through the universal defilements (v.12) whose abandoning depends on the Seeing of Arising and which are relative to these first things.

In the Path of Meditation wherein one successively expells nine categories (strong-strong, etc.) of defilements, when the first category is abandoned and not the others, these other categories of defilements, which bear upon the first category, continue to bind. (vi.33)

***

How many \textit{anusayas} attach themselves (\textit{anus\ṣerate}) to each object?

We would never finish were we to examine this problem in detail. The Vaibhāṣikas (in \textit{Vibhāṣā, TD} 27, p. 449a16) give a summary exposition of this.

In general one can say that there are sixteen types of \textit{dharmas}, objects to which the \textit{anusayas} attach themselves: for each sphere there are five categories (categories to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc.); plus the pure \textit{dharmas}. The consciousnesses are of the same sixteen types.

When we know which \textit{dharmas} are the objects of which consciousness, we are then able to calculate how many \textit{anusayas}
attach themselves to these dharmas.

29. Abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and Arising, abandoned through Meditation, the dharmas in Kāmadhātu are the sphere of three consciousnesses of this sphere, of one consciousness of Rūpadhātu and the pure consciousness.\(^\text{120}\)

In all, these dharmas are the object of five consciousnesses. The three consciousnesses of Kāmadhātu are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, through the Seeing of Arising, and through Meditation (abhyaśa = bhāvanā). One consciousness of Rūpadhātu is abandoned through Meditation.

30a-b. The same three categories of dharmas in Rūpadhātu are the object of three consciousnesses of Rūpadhātu, three of Kāmadhātu, one of Ārūpyadhātu and the pure consciousness.\(^\text{121}\)

The three consciousnesses of Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu are the same as above: they are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and its Arising, and through Meditation. Consciousness in Ārūpyadhātu is abandoned through Meditation. In all, these dharmas are the objects of eight consciousnesses.

30c-d. The same categories of dharmas in Ārūpyadhātu are the objects of three consciousnesses of the three spheres and pure consciousness.

The same three consciousnesses. In all, these dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses.

31a-b. The dharmas abandoned through the Seeing of
Extinction and the Path are all the objects of the same consciousnesses with the addition of the consciousness of their own category.

(a) The dharmas of Kāmadhātu abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction: in all six consciousnesses.

(b) The dharmas of Kāmadhātu abandoned through the Seeing of the Path are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path: in all six consciousnesses.

(c) The dharmas of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path: they are the objects, respectively, of nine and eleven consciousnesses.

31c-d. The pure dharmas are the object of the last three consciousnesses of the three spheres and of pure consciousness.

They are the objects of ten consciousnesses, the consciousnesses of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, through Meditation, and the pure consciousness.

Here are two summarizing slokas: "The dharmas of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering and through Meditation, are, in the order of the spheres, the domain of five, of eight, of ten consciousnesses." "To the abandoning through Seeing the Extinction of Suffering and the Path, add the mind of their class. The pure dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses."

Such are the sixteen types of dharmas, objects of sixteen types of consciousness. We shall now examine what anusāya attaches
itself to what dharma.

A complete analysis would take us too far afield; we will content ourselves with studying a typical case.

1. Let us choose, among the objects of attachment, agreeable sensation, and let us see how many anusayas attach themselves to it.

Agreeable sensation is of seven types: (1) belonging to Kāmadhātu, to be abandoned through Meditation; (2-6) belonging to Rūpadhātu, of five categories; and (7) pure.

When it is pure, the anusayas do not attach themselves to it, as we have shown.

When they belong to Kāmadhātu, the anusayas abandoned through Meditation and all the universal anusayas attach themselves to it.

When they belong to Rūpadhātu, all the universal anusayas attach themselves to it.

2. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object?

The consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object is of twelve types: (1-4) belong to Kāmadhātu, for categories of consciousness (excepting the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering); (5-9) belong to Rūpadhātu, five categories; (10-11) belong to Ārupyadhātu, the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path and the one abandoned through Meditation; and (12) the pure consciousness.

Attaching themselves to it are, according to their types: 1. four categories of Meditation; anusaya of the sphere of Kāmadhātu; 2. the anusayas of the sphere of Rūpadhātu which have conditioned things for their object; 3. two categories of anusayas of the sphere of Ārupyadhātu; and 4. the universal anusayas (Vibbāṣā, TD 27, p. 452c20).

3. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness
which has for its object the consciousness having an agreeable sensation for its object?

The consciousness which has an agreeable sensation for its object, and which is of twelve types, is itself the object of a consciousness which can be of fourteen types, namely the twelve aforementioned types with the addition (13-14) of the consciousnesses of the sphere of Ārūpyadhātu abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Seeing of the Arising of Suffering.

Attaching themselves to this consciousness are, according to their types, the anusayas described above in the first two spheres, plus four categories in Ārūpyadhātu (by excluding the anusaya abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering).

The other dharmas (the twenty-two indriyas, i.48c-d, etc.) will be examined on the basis of this example.\textsuperscript{122}

\textit{***}

The mind is termed sānuṣaya, "having anusaya," from the fact of the anusayas. Should we think that, necessarily, the anusayas nourish themselves, and lodge in (anusūrate)\textsuperscript{123} the sānuṣaya mind?

Those which lodge in it are the non-abandoned anusayas, whose object is not abandoned (v.61c-d), and which are associated with the mind in question.

Those which do not lodge in it are the abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind in question.

32a-b. The defiled mind is sānuṣaya in two ways; the non-defiled mind solely from the fact of the anusayas which lodge therein.\textsuperscript{124}

The defiled mind is sānuṣaya from the fact of the anusayas
which lodge therein: the anusayas with which it is associated, whose object is not abandoned, which takes an object; and (2) from the fact of the anusayas which are not therein: the abandoned anusayas and that to which it is associated: for this mind continues to have them as companions.

The non-defiled mind is sānuṣaya from the fact of the anusayas which lodge therein: the non-abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind.

***

In what order are the ten anusayas produced (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 245b28 and following)?

Any one can arise after any one: there is thus no rule which applies to all of them. Nevertheless, for the order of their production:

32c. From moha, there is doubt.

At first, bound by ignorance (moha=avidyā), a person is in confusion with respect to the Truths: he does not take pleasure in the Truth of Suffering; he does not admit it.

From this state of confusion, there arises doubt; he understands the two thesis; he doubts whether suffering is true, or if non-suffering is true.

32d. From whence false views;

From doubt there arises false views: by reason of false teaching and false reflection, he comes to the judgement “This is not suffering.”

32e. From whence a belief in a self;
From false view there arises the view of personality; for, not recognizing the skandhas as suffering, he considers these skandhas as constituting a "self."

33a. From whence a belief in the extremes;

From whence there is the view of the two extremes, for a person, believing in a self, becomes attached to the idea of the eternity or the annihilation of the self.

33b. From whence the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices;

From this there is an esteeming of morality and practices considered to be a means of purification.

33c. From whence the esteeming of bad views;

From this, there is an esteeming of that which is inferior, the esteeming of what he considers as a means of purification.

33d. From whence lust and pride relative to one's own views;

From this there is attachment to one's own views, and pride and pleasure in these views.

33e. And hatred with respect to another:

From this there is dislike: for, quite full of his own views, he detests the views of others which are contrary to his own.
According to other masters, there is hatred for one's own opinions when one changes them; for lust and the other anusayas which are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths are those which have for their object the person himself and his own views.

33f. Such is the order.

This is the order of the arising of the ten kleśas.

***

How many causes give rise to the kleśas?

34. Kleśas [with complete causes] arise from the non-abandoning of the anusaya, from the presence of their object, and from erroneous judgment.\(^{125}\)

For example, lust arises (1) when the anusaya of lust is non-abandoned—not-completely-known (aparijñāta)—its opposition not having arisen (v.64); (2) when the dharmas which provoke the manifestation of lust, namely visible things, etc., are found in the field of experience (ābhāsagata=viṣayarūpatā-āpanna); and (3) when there is erroneous judgment.

The anusaya is cause; the dharmas are its object; and incorrect judgment is its immediate preparation: three distinct forces.

The same holds for the other kleśas

34a. With complete causes.

This is the case for the kleśas which proceed from all causes. For, according to the School, a kleśa can arise through the mere force of its object; as in the case of the Arhat who is subject to
falling away (vi.58b).

In a Sutra, the Blessed One said that the ninety-eight anusayas, with the ten wrappings of attachment (the paryavasthānas), are made up of three cankerous influences (āsravas), the cankerous influence of objects of pleasure (kāmāsrava), the cankerous influence of existence (bhavāsrava), and the cankerous influence of ignorance (avidyāsrava); four floods (ōgas), the flood of the objects of pleasure (kāmaugha), the flood of existence (bhavaugha), the flood of views (dṛṣṭyogha), and the flood of ignorance (avidhaugha); four yokes (yogas), the yoke of the objects of pleasure (kāmayoga), the yoke of existence (bhavayoga), the yoke of views (dṛṣṭiyoga), and the yoke of ignorance (avidyāyoga); and four clingings (upādānas), clinging to the objects of pleasure (kāmopādāna), the clinging to views (dṛṣṭyupādāna), the clinging to morality and ascetic practices (śilavratopādāna), and the clinging to a belief in a self (ātmavādopādāna).

***

What is the definition of the cankerous influences (āsravas)?

35a. In Kāmadhātu, the defilements, with the exception of ignorance, but with the wrappings of attachment, constitute āsravas;

The kleśas of Kāmadhātu, with the exception of the five ignorances, plus the ten wrappings (paryavasthānas, v.47) make up forty-one things: this is the cankerous influence of the objects of pleasure.

35b. In Rūpadhātu and Ārupyadhātu, only the anusayas themselves constitute the cankerous influence of existence.¹²⁶
But there are, in the two higher spheres, two wrappings, namely torpor and dissipation (ii.26a-c, v.47). The Prakarana\textsuperscript{127} says, "What is the cankerous influence of existence? With the exception of ignorance, it is the other connections (samyojanas), bonds (bandhanas), anusayas, upaklesas and wrappings (paryavasthanas) of Rupadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu."

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmir say that the wrappings of attachment are not mentioned as forming part of the cankerous influence of existence because, in the two higher spheres, they are not independent.\textsuperscript{128}

***

Why are the anusayas of the two higher spheres placed together in order to make one single cankerous influence of existence?

36a-b. They are morally neutral, proceed inwards, and belong to the stage of absorption: this is why they are put together.

They both present the threefold common characteristics of being morally neutral, of being turned inward (that is, of not depending on objects), and of belonging to the spheres of absorption: they are thus united into a single cankerous influence.

And again they are called the cankerous influence of existence for the same reason that one distinguishes the cankerous influence of existence (v.2).

From the above, it results that the avidyās, "the ignorances," of the three spheres,—in all fifteen things,—(v.4) constitute the cankerous influence of ignorance.

Why do the ignorances constitute a separate cankerous influence?
36c d. Ignorance is the root: it is thus said to constitute a separate cankerous influence.\textsuperscript{129}

In the manner in which the cankerous influences are explained,

37a-b. So too for the floods and the yokes. But views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke by reason of their acuteness.

The "floods" and the "yokes" are explained in the same manner. The cankerous influence of the objects of sensual pleasure (\textit{kāma-ogha}) without views, is both the flood of the objects of sensual pleasure and the yoke of the objects of sensual pleasure; so too the cankerous influence of existence, without views, is both the flood of existence and the yoke of existence.

According to the School,\textsuperscript{130} it is by reason of their characteristic of sharpness that views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke.

[Why are they not a separate cankerous influence?]

37c-d. They are not a separate cankerous influence, because, without companions, they are not favorable to installation.

[We shall explain below, v.40, the etymology of the word \textit{āsrava} or cankerous influence.] The \textit{āsravas} are so called because they seat themselves (\textit{āsayantīty āsravāpāṁ nirvacanam}). Isolated (\textit{asahāya}) views are not favorable to installation (\textit{āsana}), being acute. Thus one does not make a separate place among the \textit{āsravas} or cankerous influences for them; they figure in the category of the cankerous influences, but are not mixed with the other \textit{anusayas}.

Therefore we have:

\begin{itemize}
  \item a. The flood of the objects of sensual pleasure is made up of five
lusts, five hatreds, five egotisms, four doubts, and ten wrappings: in all twenty-nine things.

b. The flood of existence is made up of ten lusts, ten egotisms, eight doubts: in all twenty-eight things.

c. The flood of views is made up of the twelve views of the three Dhātus: in all thirty-six things.

d. The flood of ignorance is made up of the five ignorances of the three Dhātus: in all fifteen things.

The same for the yokes.

38a-c. So too the upādānas (the clingings), by placing ignorance [with the first two] and by dividing the drṣṭis into two.

We have five clingings:

a. Clinging to the objects of sensual pleasure (kāmayoga) is made up of the yoke of the objects of sensual pleasure plus the ignorances of Kāmadhātu, that is, five lusts, five hatreds, five egotisms, five ignorances, four doubts, and ten wrappings: in all thirty-four things.

b. Clinging to the belief in a soul (ātmavadopādāna) is made up of the yoke of existence plus the ignorances of the two higher spheres, that is, ten lusts, ten egotisms, ten ignorances, and eight doubts: in all thirty-eight things.

c. The clinging to views is made up of the yoke of views without the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices: in all thirty things.

d. Clinging to morality and ascetic practices is made up of the six remaining things.

Why distinguish "the presumption of morality and of ascetic practices" from the other views and make it a separate clinging?
Because it is in opposition to the Path and deludes the two classes of devotees: holding as path that which is not Path, the laity are deluded with expectations of obtaining heaven through abstinence, etc., and clerics are deluded with expectations of obtaining purity through the renouncing of agreeable things. (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 284a4).

But why doesn't ignorance constitute a separate clinging?

38c-d. Ignorance is not the grasper; like clinging, it is mixed with the other anusayas.

Ignorance has non-intellection for its characteristic; it is not at all sharp; thus it does not grasp; therefore, say the School, it is only mixed with the other defilements as is clinging.

But, we would say, the Blessed One said in the Sūtra, "What is the yoke of the object of sensual pleasure (kāmayoga)? With regard to the objects of pleasure (kāmas), within the person who does not know the origin of the object of pleasure, it is kāmarāga, kāmaprema, kāmeccchā, kāmamūrchā, kāmagṛddha, kāmaparigardha, kāmanandī, kāmaniyanti, and kāmādhyavasāna which overpowers the mind: these are the yokes of the objects of sensual pleasure." The Blessed One defines the other yokes in the same way. In another Sutra, he says that chandarāga is a clinging. Thus chandarāga with respect to the objects of pleasure, views, etc., is what is called clinging to the objects of pleasure (kamopādāna), etc.

What is the meaning of the words anusaya (latent defilement), āsrava (cankerous influence), ōgha (flood), yoga (yoke) and upādāna (clinging)?
39. They are atomic; they adhere; they nourish themselves in two ways; they continually bind: this is why they are termed *anusāyas*.

They are atomic, for their mode of existences is subtle, being difficult to know. They adhere through the adhesion of their *prāptis*; they nourish themselves (*anuśerate*) in two ways, both from the object and from the *dharmas* with which they are associated; and they continually bind, for, unless one makes an effort, and even when one creates an obstacle to them, they will appear and reappear.

40. They fix and they flow, they carry away, they attach, they seize: such is the etymology of the words *āsravas*, etc.

The *anusāyas* fix, "seat" (*āsayanti*) beings in transmigration; they flow (*āsravanti*) from the highest heaven (*Bhavāgra = Naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana, iii.3, 81*) to *Avīci* (*iii.58*); they flow out (*kṣar*) by the six organs which are as wounds. They are thus called cankerous influences, or *āsravas*.

The *anusāyas* carry away (*haranti*); they are thus called *oghas* or floods.

The *anusāyas* cause beings to be attached (*sleṣayanti*); they are thus called *yogas* or yokes.

The *anusāyas* seize (*upagrhnanti*); they are thus called *upādānas* or clippings.

The best explanation is the following.

1. By means of the *anusāyas*, the mental series flows into the objects; the *anusāyas* are thus *āsravas* or cankerous influences. In conformity with the comparison of the Sūtra "In the same way that one makes great efforts in order to steer a boat against the current but when these efforts begin to weaken, the boat is carried
(ḥaryate) with the stream; [so too, it is with great pains that the mental series is freed from its objects through the good dharmas].”

2. When they are very violent, the anusayas are called oghas; in fact they carry away, as in a flood, those who are bound to them, and who necessarily yield to their impulses.

3. When they do not enter into activity with an extreme violence, the anusayas are called yogas, because they yoke one to the very many sufferings of transmigration; or rather because they adhere with obstinace.

4. The anusayas are called upādānas, because, through their action, one clings to things of the senses, etc. (kāmādhyupādāna).

***

These same anusayas or latent defilements which make up four categories—cankerous influences, floods, yokes, and clingings,—also make up five categories: saṃyojanas or connections (v.41-45), bandhanas or bonds (v.45d), anusayas, upakleśas (v.46), and paryavasthānas or wrappings (v.47-49b).

41a-b. There are said to be five types by reason of their division into connections, etc.

The nine saṃyojanas or connections are: 1) affection, 2) aversion, 3) pride, 4) ignorance, 5) view, 6) unjustified estimation, 7) doubt, 8) envy, and 9) avarice.

Anunaya-saṃyojana or the attachment of affection is lust of the three Dhātus. One should understand the other connections in the same way, each according to its type: the second, the eighth, and ninth belong exclusively to Kāmadhātu.
Drṣṭi-samyojana or the attachment to views is made up of the first three views (a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and false views); parāmarṣa-samyojana, the attachment to esteeming, is made up of the last two (namely, the esteeming of views and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices). The question is thus posed: Does it happen that a person is attached through the connection of affection, and not through the connection of views, to the dharmas associated with views (that is, to the sensations, etc., associated with existence), while drṣtyanusaya, the latent defilement of views, is not active with respect to these dharmas?

Yes. Let us consider a person who has produced the knowledge of the Arising of Suffering but not the knowledge of the Extinction of Suffering. Within him arises a connection of affection with respect to the dharmas associated with the views of esteeming views and esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, dharmas which are abandoned through the Truth of Extinction and the Path. This person will be attached to these dharmas through the connection of affection, but not through the connection of views; for he has abandoned the universal connection of views which is abandoned through the Truths of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering, and there does not exist in him any non-universal connection of views which bears on these dharmas or which is associated with them. Nevertheless latent defilement of views is active with respect to these dharmas, for the two drṣṭis which are esteeming (the connection of esteeming) and which have not yet been abandoned, are active through association.

***

Why does one makes one connection—the connection of views—out of the first three views, and another connection,—the connection of esteeming—out of the last two?

41c-d. Two views constitute separate connection by reason of their equal number of things, and by reason of their
common characteristic of esteeming.\textsuperscript{153}

The first three views make up eighteen distinct things: false views of Kāmadhātu are abandoned by each one of the four Truths, etc. (v.4,5); the same for the last two (twelve esteeming of views and six esteeming of morality and ascetic practices).

The last two views are, by their nature, esteeming, but not the first three. They take the first ones as their object, but the opposite is not true.

***

Why do envy and avarice make up two connections, while the other wrappings (paryavasthānas, v.47) are not distinct connections (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 258c21)?

42. Envy and avarice are each a connection because, among the wrappings, they are at one and the same time completely bad and independent.

“Independent” means bound to a single ignorance (v.14). These two characteristics are not encountered in the other wrappings.

According to another opinion—[according to the author]—this reason is good for the master who admits only eight wrappings; but for the master who admits ten wrappings (below, p. 841), the reason proposed raises no difficulties, for anger and hypocrisy also present the twofold characteristic of being bad and independent: they are also classified as connections.\textsuperscript{154}

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The Blessed One said moreover,¹⁵⁵ that, among the connections,

43a. Five are inferior.

Namely a belief in a self, the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, doubt, desire for the objects of sensual pleasure (kāmacchanda) and anger.

"Inferior" (avarabbāgīya) means that which is in relation to, that which is favorable to the "inferior part" (avarabbāga), that is, to Kāmadhātu¹⁵⁶ (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 252b25). Now, among these five connections:

43b-c. Two cause one not to get out of Kāmadhātu; three cause one to return there.

Desire for the objects of sensual pleasure and anger obstruct leaving Kāmadhātu; a belief in a self and the two remaining connections cause one, once he has left Kāmadhātu, to return there: as the jailor of a prison and his helpers.

According to another opinion,¹⁵⁷ it is by reason of the three that one does not leave the state of being inferior, namely a Prṭhagjana; and it is by reason of the two that one does not get out of the inferior sphere, that is, out of Kāmadhātu. This is why these five connections are termed "inferior."

The Blessed One said, in fact, that one becomes a Srotaāpanna by the complete abandoning of the three connections in question.¹⁵⁸ But, on the other hand, the Srotaāpanna has also abandoned three desires: a belief in the extremes, false views, and the esteeming of views. It appears that the Blessed One should term these views connections favorable to the quality of Prṭhagjana.

43c-d. Three, because they make up the gate and the root.
There are three categories of *kleśa*: \(^{159}\) 1. simple, to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, namely a belief in a self and a belief in the extremes; 2. twofold, to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Path, namely the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices; and 3. fourfold, to be abandoned through Seeing the Four Noble Truths, namely doubt, false views, and the esteeming of views. By indicating the first three as connections, the Blessed One indicates the gate to the other *kleśas*, the beginning of each category.

He also indicates the root, for a belief in the extremes is set into motion by a belief in a self, the esteeming of views by the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, and false views by doubt.

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Others\(^{160}\) say:

44. Three are indicated because three things create an obstacle to arriving at deliverance: a non-desire to go, error with respect to the Path, and doubt with respect to the Path.

In the same way that, in the world, these three things form an obstacle to progress to another place, in this same way they form an obstacle to progress towards deliverance: a. a belief in a self, which inspires a fear of deliverance and causes one not to desire to arrive at it; b. the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices through which, having recourse to another path, one becomes deluded about the Path; and c. doubts, doubt about the Path. The Blessed One, wishing to teach that the Srotāpānna has completely abandoned these three obstacles, says that he has abandoned three connections.
In the same way that the Blessed One characterized five connections as “inferior,” in this same way\(^{161}\)

45a-c. Five are “superior,” namely two lusts, those which arise from Rūpadhātu and from Ārūpyadhātu, namely dissipation, pride and ignorance.

They are “superior,” which means that one cannot pass beyond the higher spheres when one has not abandoned them.

This exposition of the connections is finished.

How many bandhanas or bonds are there?

Three, namely all lust, all hatred, and all ignorance.\(^ {162}\)

Why are only these three called bonds?

45d. There are three bonds by reason of sensation.\(^ {163}\)

There are three bonds by reason of the three sensations. Lust creates anusayana, that is, “becomes lodged in and grows” in agreeable sensation, both by taking it as its object and by association; hatred in disagreeable sensation; and ignorance, and—but not in the same manner—lust and hatred, in the sensation of indifference (ii.8c).\(^ {164}\)

Or rather the preceding rule refers to the sensation of personality.
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The *anusayas* have been explained above.\(^{165}\)

***

We must now explain the *upakleśas*. The *kleśas* are *upakleśas* because they defile the mind.

46. Defiled mental states, forming part of the *saṃskāraskandha*, but different from the *kleśas*, are also *upakleśas* without being *kleśas*.

*Dharmas* different from the *kleśas*, defiled mental states, included within the *saṃskāraskandha* (i.15), are solely *upakleśas*. *Upakleśas* means that which is found near (*upa*) the *kleśa*, or close to which the *kleśa* is found, (i.e., which is produced following the *kleśa*). Not being roots, they are not *kleśas*;\(^{166}\) the *upakleśas* are enumerated in the *Kṣudravastūka*.\(^{167}\)

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Let us now explain the relationship of the *kleśas* with the wrappings and the *kleśamalas* (see p. 846, line 13).

What are the *paryavasthānas* or wrappings?

A *kleśa* is also a wrapping, as we can see from the text: “One experiences a suffering which proceeds from the wrapping which is lust.”\(^{168}\)

The *Prakaraṇapādaśāstra* (*TD* 26, p. 693c20) teaches that there are eight wrappings:
47. There are eight types of wrappings: disrespect, absence of fear, envy, avarice, dissipation, regret, torpor, and languor.

The system of the Vaibhāṣikas admits ten, by adding

48a. Also anger and hypocrisy.

1-2. Disrespect and absence of fear, ii.32.

3. Envy or mental dissatisfaction concerns the prosperity of another.

4. Avarice is “tenacity” (āgraha, Mahāvyutpatti, 109.29) of the mind, which is opposed to either spiritual or material giving (iv.113) (Atthasālinī, 373).


6. Regret, ii.28. Regret is good or bad, but only defiled regret is a wrapping.


8. Languor (ii.27, vii.lld) is a compression of the mind which rends it incapable of commanding the body. Languor can be good, bad, or neutral, but only defiled languor is a wrapping (ii.30c-d).

9. Anger (ii.27) is irritation of the mind with respect to living beings and to things (sattva and asattva), an irritation distinct from that of regret, anger or hostility.

10. Hypocrisy is hiding one’s faults (ii.27).

***
What is the origin of the wrappings?

48b. From out of lust there proceeds disrespect, dissipation, and avarice.

These three upakleśas proceed from lust ("to proceed" means to be an outflowing, nisyaṇda, ii.57c).

48c. There is no agreement with regard to hypocrisy.

There is no agreement with regard to hypocrisy: according to some, it proceeds from out of desire ("thirst"); according to others, from out of ignorance; according to others, from out of one or the other accordingly as it refers to persons who are knowledgeable or who are ignorant.\(^{172}\)

48d. From out of ignorance there proceeds torpor, languor, and absence of fear.

These three proceed from ignorance.

49a-b. From out of doubt there proceeds regret and anger; from out of hatred there proceeds envy.

It is thus that these ten upakleśas are an outflowing of the kleśas.\(^{173}\)

***

(In the same way that foul things, mala, leave the body, so too the kleśamalas, "filth of the kleśas," come out of the kleśas). What
are the kleśamalas?

49c-50b. (The other upakleśas are the six kleśamalas:) cheating, crookedness, drunkenness of pride, esteeming evil, enmity, and hostility.

1. Cheating is the dharma that causes one to delude another.

2. Double-dealing or crookedness of mind causes one not to say things as one should, not to deny when one should,174 or to explain something in a confused manner.

3. The drunkenness of pride, as ii.34c-d.

4. Esteeming evil is what which causes one not to accept remonstrances.

5. Enmity is aversion.

6. Hostility is what is translated into deeds and words harmful to another (see note 170).

50b-51b. From out of lust there proceeds cheating and the drunkenness of pride; from anger enmity and hostility; esteeming evil from out of the esteeming of views; and crookedness from out of view.

Crookedness is an outflowing of view, for it is said in a stanza, “What is crookedness? It is transgressing views.”175

[The wrappings and the malas arise from the kleśas; they are thus upakleśas.]

***

How are they abandoned?
51c. Disrespect, absence of fear, torpor, languor, and dissipation are abandoned through Seeing and Meditation.

Five wrappings—namely the five the first of which is disrespect—being associated with two *kleśas*, are twofold: abandoned through Seeing and Meditation. They are abandoned through Seeing the Truth through which the *kleśa* to which they are associated is abandoned.

52a. The other wrappings are solely abandoned through Meditation.

The other wrappings, envy and the rest, are abandoned only by Meditation: in fact they are of the so-called "autonomous" category,176 being associated with a single ignorance which is abandoned through Meditation.

52b. And so too the *malas*, being autonomous.

The same holds for the *kleśamalas*.

***

(Are the *upakleśas* all bad?)

52c. In Kāmadhātu, they are of two types; the others are bad;

Torpor, dissipation, and languor are both bad and neutral.

52d. Above, the *upakleśas* are neutral.
Above Kāmabhūtu, the *upaklesas*—to the extent that they exist there—are neutral.

53a. Cheating and crookedness exist in Kāmabhūtu and in the First Dhyāna.

These two *upaklesas* exist in two spheres, Kāmabhūtu and Rūpadhātu.

53b. Since Brahmā tried to deceive.

We cannot doubt this, for Mahābrahmā attempted to deceive the Āyusman Āsvajit by giving him an inexact definition of himself.177

53c. Torpor, dissipation, and pridefulness exist in all three spheres. The others in Kāmabhūtu.

Of the sixteen *upaklesas*, ten wrappings and six *malas*, eleven exist only in Kāmabhūtu, with the exception of cheating, crookedness, torpor, dissipation, and pridefulness.

54a. Those that are abandoned through Seeing the Truths are of the spheres of the *manovijñāna*, plus pride and languor.

*Kleśas* and *upaklesas* which are abandoned through Seeing are supported by the *manovijñāna* alone; so too pride and languor which are abandoned through Meditation; for these two, in their totality (in the three spheres), are of the sphere of the *manas*.

54b. Plus the autonomous *upaklesas*. 
In the same way, the autonomous *upakleśas* (envy, avarice, etc.) are abandoned through Meditation.

54c. The others have the six consciousnesses for their support.

The others are supported by the six consciousnesses: lust is abandoned through Meditation, as are hatred and ignorance, as well as the *upakleśas* which are associated with them, disrespect, absence of fear, torpor, and dissipation, and those which are included in the *kleśamahābhūmikas* (disbelief, idleness, and non-diligence) (ii.26a-v).

With which sense organs (*sukhendriya*, etc., ii.7) are the *kleśas* and the *upakleśas* associated?

I. First, with respect to the *kleśas* of Kāmadhātu:

55a. Lust is associated with two agreeable sensations.

Lust is associated with pleasure and satisfaction.

55b. Hatred with the contrary.\(^{178}\)

Hatred is associated with displeasure and dissatisfaction, for lust and hatred have respectively happiness and dejection for their aspect, for both of them belong to the six consciousnesses.

55c. *Moḥa* (or *avidyā*) with all.

Being associated with all the *kleśas*, ignorance is associated with the five sensations.\(^{179}\)
55c-d. The view of negation with dissatisfaction and sensation.\textsuperscript{180}

False view is associated with dissatisfaction among those persons who have done meritorious actions and who regret that their actions are without result; it is associated with satisfaction among transgressors.

56a. Doubt with dissatisfaction.

If one who aspires to certitude doubts, then he is dissatisfied.

56b. The others with satisfaction.

The others, that is, the views with the exception of false views and egotism—are associated with satisfaction, for they have the aspect of happiness.

Which \textit{anusayas} have we considered up to now?

56b. Those arisen in Kāmadhātu.

Having indicates the difference of these \textit{anusayas}, the author notes a common characteristic:

56c. All are associated with indifference.

All these \textit{anusayas} are associated with the \textit{indriya} of indifference, for, says the School, there is necessarily indifference when the series of the \textit{kleśa} is going to be broken.
II. With respect to the *kleśas* of the higher spheres:

56c-d. In the higher stages, they are associated with their own sensations, to be determined according to the stage.

In the higher stages, the *anuśayās* are associated with the sensation which are proper to them, to the extent that these sensations exist there (see ii.12, viii.12).

In the stage—the First Dhyāna—where there are four consciousnesses, seeing, hearing, touch, and mental consciousness, the *anuśayās* which are produced with each of these consciousnesses are associated with the sensations proper to this consciousness: there one finds (1) the sensation of pleasure corresponding to the consciousnesses of seeing, hearing, and touch; (2) the sensation of satisfaction corresponding to the mental consciousness; and (3) the sensation of indifference corresponding to the four consciousnesses.\(^{180}\)

In the stages—the Second Dhyāna, etc.—where only the mental consciousness is found, the *anuśayās* which are produced with this consciousness are associated with the sensations proper to this consciousness in the state in question:\(^{182}\) Second Dhyāna, satisfaction and indifference: Third Dhyāna, pleasure and indifference; Fourth Dhyāna and Ārūpyas, indifference.

III. With respect to the *upakleśas*:

57a-c. Regret, envy, anger, hostility, aversion, and the esteeming of evil are associated with dissatisfaction.

These *upakleśas* are associated with the *indriya* of dissatisfaction because they have dejection for their mode and they belong to
the sphere of the *manas*.

57d. Avarice, with the contrary.

Avarice is associated with the *indriya* of satisfaction; it has happiness for its mode, for it proceeds greed.

58a-b. Crookedness, cheating, hypocrisy, and languor are associated with one and the other.

"Associated with the *indriya* of satisfaction and with the *indriya* of dissatisfaction:" it happens that one deceives another with satisfaction, and one deceives with dissatisfaction.

58b-c. Pridefulness is associated with the two agreeable sensations.

In the Third Dhyāna, pridefulness is associated with the *indriya* of pleasure; below, with the *indriya* of satisfaction; above, with the *indriya* of indifference. Thus

58c. Indifference is everywhere.

All are associated with indifference. In the way that there is no restriction in the association of the *kleśa* and the *upakleśas* with ignorance, so too with indifference.

58d. The four others with five.

Four wrappings—namely disrespect, absence of fear, torpor, and dissipation—are associated with the five sensations, because the first two are *akusalamahābhūmikas*, and the last two are
The Latent Defilements

kleṣamahābhūmikas (ii.26).

***

From another point of view, the Sūtra declares that there are five "hindrances" or "obstacles" (nīvaraṇas), among the kleṣas and upakleṣas: 1. kāmacchanda, 2. anger, 3. torpor-languor, 4. dissipation-regret, and 5. doubt.

Does this refer to the torpor, dissipation, and doubt of all the three Dhātus, or only of Kāmadhātu?

The Sūtra says that the hindrances are exclusively bad; consequently

59a. The hindrances exist in Kāmadhātu.

But in none of the other Dhātus.

Why do torpor-and-languor and dissipation-and-regret constitute, as groups, two hindrances?

59b-c. Two make up a single hindrance, because they have the same opposites, the same nourishment, and the same result.

"Opposite," that is, opposition or counter-nourishment.

The Sūtra teaches that torpor and languor have the same nourishment, and the same counter-nourishment: "What is the nourishment of torpor-languor? Five dharmas, namely tandri (bad omens seen in dreams), arati (unhappiness), vijrmbhikā (physical exhaustion), bhakte'samatā (uneven consumption of food), and cetaso linatva (mental depression). What is the counter-nourishment? Alokasamjñā."
Torpor and languor have the same action or task of rendering the mind languid.

In this same way dissipation and regret have the same nourishment, the same counter-nourishment, and the same effect. Its nourishment is four dharmas: preoccupation relative to one’s relatives (jñātavitarka), preoccupation relative to one’s land (janapadavitarka), preoccupation relative to the deathless ones (amaravitarka), and remembrance of one’s former merry-making and companions (paurāṇasya ca hasitakrīditaramita-paribhāvatasyā-nusmartā). Its counter-nourishment is calmness. Its effect is to agitate the mind.

But all the klesas are a “hindrance.” Why does the Sūtra distinguish five hindrances?

59c-d. Only five, be reason of the destruction of a skandha, by reason of doubt.

Kāmacchanda and anger destroy the element of morality, torpor-languor destroy the element of discrimination, and dissipation-regret destroy the element of absorption. And in the absence of discrimination and absorption, there is doubt concerning the Truths.

But, one would say, if this explanation is correct, dissipation-regret, which hinders absorption, should be listed, in the list of the hindrances, before torpor-languor. Thus these two hindrances destroy, in the order in which they are named, the two elements of absorption and discrimination: the danger to the person who applies himself to absorption is in torpor-languor; the danger to him who applies himself to discrimination of the dharmas is in dissipation-regret.

Other masters give another explanation. How do they explain this? The monk on his rounds perceives an agreeable or disagreeable object, and considers it as such; when he returns to the monastery the enjoyment and the aversion which proceed
from this agreeable-disagreeable impression, first hinder his entry into absorption. Then, when the monk has entered into absorption, as he does not correctly cultivate calm and insight (samatha and vipaśyanā), there is then produced torpor-languor and dissipation-regret which, in this order, hinder his absorption (samādhi = samatha) and his discrimination (prajñā = vipaśyanā). Finally, when he has left the absorption, doubt hinders his reflection on the dharmas. It is in this way that there are the five hinderances.

There is one point to be examined.

Let us consider the kleśas “universal in a different sphere” (visabhāgadbhatusarvatraga, v.13)—that is, those that form the group of false views, etc., and are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and of the Arising of Suffering—which have for their object the two higher spheres. This object is “completely known” by the anvayajñānas of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering which bear on the higher spheres (v.14, vi.26, vii.3c): but it is not at the moment when these anvayajñānas are produced that the kleśas in question are abandoned, for, also having Kāmadhātu for their sphere, these kleśas have been formerly destroyed by the dharma-jñānas of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering the production of which is before that of the anvayajñānas.

Conversely, with respect to the kleśas having an impure object (sāsravālambana, v.16) and to be abandoned through the Seeing the Extinction of Suffering and the Path—those which form the esteeming of false views group—it is not when their object (the group of false views to be abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering and of the Path) is “completely known” (by the dharma-jñānas and anvayajñānas of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering) that they are abandoned. Rather they are abandoned only later by the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering and by the Path.

Thus how can one say that these two categories of kleśas are abandoned by a knowledge of their object?
It is not an absolute principle that the klešas are abandoned by a knowledge of their object. They are abandoned in four ways.

With respect to the klešas abandoned through Seeing:

60a-c. Destruction by a knowledge of the object, by the destruction of the klešas of which they are the object, and by the abandoning of the object.¹⁹⁶

1. The klešas (1) bearing on the bhūmi to which they belong, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering, or (2) having a pure object, abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering and the Path (v.14), are abandoned through a knowledge of their object.

2. The universal klešas in another sphere, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering, are abandoned through the destruction of the kleśa of which they are the object. These klešas (v.12) are of the object of a universal kleśa in its own sphere: by the destruction of those, these are also destroyed.¹⁹⁷

3. The klešas having an impure object, abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering and the Path are abandoned through the abandoning of their object. These klešas have for their object the kleśa which has a pure object (v.14). By the destruction of those, these are also destroyed.¹⁹⁸

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With respect to the klešas abandoned through Meditation,

60d. There is destruction through the arising of the opposition.
When a path is opposed to one category of *kleśa*, this path, by arising, causes this category of defilement to be abandoned.

Which path is opposed to which category?

This will be taught in detail (vi.33): “The weak-weak path is opposed to the strong-strong category . . . The strong-strong path is opposed to the weak-weak category.”

How many types of oppositions are there?

61a-c. Opposition is fourfold: abandoning, maintaining, removal, and disgust.

1. The Uninterrupted Path (*ānantaryamārga*, vi.28, 65) is a *prahāna-pratipakṣa*, “an opposition which results in abandoning.”

2. The next path, the Path of Deliverance (*vimuktimārga*), is an *adbhūra-pratipakṣa*, “opposition through which the abandoning obtained by the proceeding path, is found to be maintained, affirmed.”

3. The next path, *viṣeṣamārga* is the *dūribhāva-pratipakṣa*, “opposition by which the possession of the *kleśa* previously cut off, is found to be removed.”

According to others, the Path of Deliverance is itself the opposition of removal (*dūribhāva-pratipakṣa*), for the possession of the *kleśa* is also removed from it.

4. The path which consists of considering a sphere of existence as bad (impermanent, etc.) and which finds disgust in it is the path of opposition through disgust (*vidūṣanā-pratipakṣa*, see vi.50).

But we say, here is the correct order: 1. opposition through disgust is the Preparatory Path (*prayogamārga*);¹⁹⁹ 2. opposition through abandoning is the whole of the Uninterrupted Path; 3. opposition through which the proceeding path is maintained is the Path of Deliverance; and 4. opposition by which the possession of the *kleśa* previously cut off, is removed is the Distinguished Path.
When one abandons the *kleśas*, through separation from what are they abandoned?

61c-d. The *kleśa* is supposed to become abandoned through separation from its object.\(^{201}\)

The *kleśa*, in fact, cannot be separated from its *samprayoga*, (that is, from the *dharmas* associated with the mind, sensations, etc. ii.24);\(^{202}\) but it can be separated from its object in such a manner that it no longer re-arises bearing on this object.

So be it. A future *kleśa* can be separated from its object, but how can a past *kleśa* be? [The thing that it has taken as its object remains having been taken as object]. Would you say that the expression *ālambanāt prahātavyaḥ*, "to be abandoned through separation from its object," signifies *ālambanaparijnānāt prahātavyaḥ*, "to be abandoned through perfect knowledge of the object?" But the rule that the *kleśa* is abandoned through knowledge of the object is not absolute (see above, p. 854); consequently there is a difficulty to be resolved here.\(^{203}\)

What does one do in order that the *kleśas* may be termed *prahīna*, or "abandoned?"

A personal *kleśa* is abandoned through the cutting off of *prāpti* or the possession of this *kleśa* (ii.36b) which exists in the personal series. As for the *kleśa* of another, or for *rūpa* in its totality (*kuśala*, etc.), or for the undefiled *dharmas*, these diverse things are abandoned through the abandoning of the personal *kleśa* which takes them as its object (*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 274c21, p. 411a27, etc.)
How many types of separation are there?

There are four, say the School:

62. Separation through difference of nature, through opposition, through separation of place, and through time; as, for example, the primary elements, the precepts, places, and the two time periods.²⁰⁴

1. Separation through difference of nature: although the primary elements (mahābhūta) arise together (sahāja, ii.65), they are separated one from the other by the fact of their different natures.

2. Separation by opposition: one is separated from immorality by the precepts.

3. Separation of place by difference of place: the oceans of the East and the West.

4. Separation by time: as the past and the future. One says that the past and the future are separated: from what are they separated?

They are separated from the present.

How can the past which has just perished and the future which is about to arise be separated from the present?

It is by reason of the difference of time period that, according to us, the past and the future are separated; not by reason of the fact that they will be distant in the past or in the future. For if this were the case, the present would also be separate, for it constitutes a different time period. We say that the past and the future are separated through their activity (kārita, see v.25).

But how can an unconditioned thing, which is always inactive, be considered as near?²⁰⁵

Because, universally, they possess the two extinctions
This argument would hold for the past and the future (one possesses past and future good *dharmas*, etc.); but how can space, which one cannot possess (iii.36), be near?

We say that the past and the future are separated from one another because they are separated by the present; the present is near because it is near to the past and future; an unconditioned thing is near because it is not separated or hindered by anything.

But then the past and the future will be at one and the same time far and near, being far from each other and near to the present.

Here is the correct explanation. The future is separated from the unique, self characteristics of the *dharmas*, because it has not attained them; the past is separated from them because it has fallen away from them.

***

It has been said that the *kleśas* are not destroyed through the arising of their opposition or opposites (v.60d). We would ask if, through the Distinguished Path (*vīṣeṣamārga*, vi.65b-d), there is a "progressive abandoning (*vīṣeṣa-prabhāṇa*)" of the *kleśas*?

No. Of all the *kleśas*, there is

63a. Destruction all at once.

The *kleśa* is destroyed through the Path which is its "path of abandoning." But

63a-b. The acquisition of disconnection from the *kleśas* takes place many times.
In how many moments?
In six moments:

63c-d. There is arising of the opposition, the acquisition of results, and the perfection of the faculties.

"Opposition" here means the "Path of Deliverance (vimukti-mārga)." "Results" means the four results of the religious life, the result of Srotāpanna, etc. (vi.51). "Perfection of the faculties" refers to indriyasamcāra (vi.60c).208

Disconnection from the kleśas is acquired in these moments: for certain kleśas, according to the case, in six moments; but in decreasing number down to two for others.209

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Under certain conditions, disconnection (visamīyoga) receives the name of parijñā, "perfect knowledge" (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 406b9). There are two types of perfect knowledge: jñānaparijñā, "perfect knowledge consisting of knowledge," which is pure knowledge; and prabhānaparijñā, "perfect knowledge which produces abandoning," which is abandoning itself, for the effect is designated by the name of its cause.210

***

Does all abandoning constitute one perfect knowledge?
No.
Why is this?
64a. There are nine perfect knowledges.\textsuperscript{211}

That is,

64b-c. The destruction of the first two types of Kāma consistutite one perfect knowledge.

That is, the destruction of the first two types of kleśa of Kāmadhātu, the kleśas abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering.

64c. The destruction of the two types consists of two.

The abandoning of the kleśas of Kāmadhātu abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering consititutes one perfect knowledge; the same for the abandoning of the kleśas of Kāmadhātu abandoned through the Seeing of the Path.

As the abandoning of the kleśas of Kāmadhātu abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths constitutes three perfect knowledges,

64d. In that same way, above, there are three perfect knowledges.

The same for the two higher spheres taken together, the abandoning of the kleśas abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering consitsutes one perfect knowledge; the abandoning of the kleśas abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering constitutes the second perfect knowledge; and the abandoning of the kleśas abandoned through the Seeing of the Path constitutes one perfect knowledge. Thus there are six perfect knowledges for the abandoning of the kleśas
which belong to the three spheres and which are abandoned by the Seeing of the Truths.

65a-c. There are three other perfect knowledges: the destruction of the *avarabhāgīya* cankerous influences, the cankerous influences of Rūpadhātu, and of all the cankerous influences.

The abandoning of the *avarabhāgīya* cankerous influences (v.43a), that is, the cankerous influences of Kāmadhātu, constitute one perfect knowledge.

The abandoning of the cankerous influences of Rūpadhātu, which is called *rūparāgaksayaparijñā* "perfect knowledge consisting of the destruction of attachment to Rūpadhātu" (*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 322a15) constitutes one perfect knowledge.

The third perfect knowledge is the total abandoning of the cankerous influences of Ārūpyadhātu, which is called *sarvasamy-ojanaparyādānaparijñā*, "perfect knowledge consisting of the annihilation of all the bonds" (v.41).

[These three perfect knowledges are the abandoning of the types of *klesa* abandoned though Meditation.]

Rūpadhātu is distinguished from Ārūpyadhātu with respect to the abandoning of the *klesas* abandoned through Meditation; one does not establish this distinction with respect to the abandoning of the *klesas* abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths: the opposition is the same for these (*anvayajñāna, vii.2c-d), but not for those. Thus three are nine perfect knowledges.

65c. Six are the result of the patiences (see above p. 775).

The first six perfect knowledges, which consist of the abandoning of the *klesas* abandoned through Seeing the Truths, are the result of the "patiences" (*kṣāntis, vi.25c).*
65d. The others, the results of the knowledges.

The three perfect knowledges, the first of which is the perfect knowledge which consists of the abandoning (of the cankerous influences) of Kāmadrātū, are obtained through the Path of Meditation; thus they are the result of the "knowledges."

How can a perfect knowledge be the result of a patience (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 321a21)?

Because the patiences are the associates of the jñānas or knowledges: in the manner in which the associates of a king improperly receive the name of king; or rather, because a patience and a knowledge have the same result.

***

(In what stage of absorption does one obtain the perfect knowledges?)

66a-b. All are the result of anāgāmya; five or eight are the result of the dhyānas. 212

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, five are the result of the mauladhyānas or the "principal absorptions" (in opposition to the sāmantakas or absorptions preparatory to the Dhyānas, viii.6, 22a), namely, those which consist of the abandoning of the kleṣas of the sphere of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu (perfect knowledges four, five, six, eight and nine). The abandoning of the kleṣas of the sphere of Kāmadrātū (perfect knowledges one, two, three, and seven) is the result of only anāgāmya, that is, of the absorption preparatory to the First Dhyāna.

According to the Bhadanta Ghoṣaka, eight are the result of the principal absorptions (namely one to six, eight, and nine). Let us
suppose, he says, a person detached from Kāmadhātu by the mundane or impure path (sāsrava, laukikamārga, vi.49) enters into the Seeing of the Truths or the Path of Seeing (which is always pure) being supported by (i.e., in) the Dhyānas: his abandoning of the klesas of Kāmadhātu abandoned by Seeing, and his taking of possession of disconnection from these klesas, should be considered as the result of the path of Seeing, for it is pure. The single perfect knowledge which consists of the abandoning of the cankerous influence of Kāmadhātu (perfect knowledge number seven) is solely the result of anāgāmya.

This holds as well for dhyānāntara (viii.22d) as for the principle Dhyānas.

66c. One is the result of a sāmantaka.213

The perfect knowledge consisting of the destructin of attachment to Rūpadhātu (perfect knowledge number eight) is the result of the sāmantaka, or preparatory stage (viii.22a) of Ākāśānanta-tyāyatana.

(In order to enter into the First Ārūpya, one should disengage oneself from the defilements of Rūpadhātu: this is what one does in this preparatory stage).

66d. One is also the result of three maulārūpys.214

The perfect knowledge which consists of the annihilation of all the bonds is the result of the three principle Ārūpyas.

67a. All are the result of the Āryan Path.

The nine perfect knowledges are obtained through the pure path.
67b. Two of the worldly path.

Perfect knowledges numbers seven and eight are also obtained through the impure path.

67c. Two also through anvaya;

The last two perfect knowledges are the result of anvayajñāna (vii.3c: a knowledge of Suffering etc., of the two higher spheres) included in the Path of Meditation.

67d. Three through dharmajñāna;

The last three are the result of dharmajñāna (knowledge of Suffering, etc., of Kāmadhātu) included in the Path of Meditation, for this knowledge is opposed to the kleśas of the three spheres abandoned through Meditation.

67e. Five or six, from one and the other groups.

Six are the result of the dharmajñāna group, namely those which are the result of the dharmakṣāntis and the dharmajñānas; five are the result of the anvayajñāna group, namely those which are the result of anvayakṣāntis and the anvayajñānas. The expression “group” is to be understood for the kṣāntis and the jñānas.

***

Why is not all abandoning (prahāna) considered a perfect knowledge (parijñā)?
With regard to abandoning,—the result of the patiences (Path of Seeing the Truths)—:

68a-c. There is perfect knowledge by reason of the pure acquisition of disconnection, the partial abandoning of Bhavāgra, and the destruction of two causes.  

The abandoning which includes these three characteristics receives the name of perfect knowledge.

The abandoning of a Prthagjana (ii.40b-c) can include the abandoning of two causes ("universal" kleṣas); but a Prthagjana can never obtain the pure acquisition of disconnection (ii.38b); he never "mutilates" Bhavāgra.

After his entry into the Path of Seeing until the third moment (duḥkhe'nvayajñānaksānti, vi.25c), the Āryan's abandonings include the pure acquisition of disconnection, but not the "mutilation" of Bhavāgra, nor the destruction of the two universal causes (sarvatragabete, ii.54a, v.12) abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering. In the fourth moment (duḥkhe'nvayajñāna), Bhavāgra is "mutilated," and so too in the fifth (samudaye dharma'vājñānaksānti): but the two causes are not destroyed. But in the other dharma'vānas (moments six, ten, and fourteen) and in the other anvayajñānas (moments eight, twelve, and sixteen), the abandoning includes these three characteristics and receives the name of perfect knowledge.

With respect to the three perfect knowledges which consist of the abandonings, the results of knowledge (Path of Meditation on the Truths), they are thus called by reason of these three characteristics and by reason of a fourth:

68d. By the reason of the fact that one passes over a sphere.

That is, because the ascetic detaches himself from a sphere
(Kāmadr̥t̥u in the seventh perfect knowledge, etc.) in its totality.

Other masters formulate a fifth cause: the fact of being disjoined from a twofold bond. It does not suffice to abandon a kleśa (abandoned through Seeing): one must also abandon the kleśas (abandoned through Seeing or Meditation) which grasp this first kleśa as their object.

But this reason is included in “destruction of two causes” and in “the passing over a sphere.” Thus we do not make it a separate cause.

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How many perfect knowledges can one possess?

69a-b. One who is to be found in the Path of Seeing of the Truths is either not endowed with perfect knowledge, or is endowed with from one to five perfect knowledges.

A Prthagjana has no perfect knowledges.

In the Path of Seeing, the Āryan is not endowed with any perfect knowledge until samudaye dharmañjñānakāśānti (vi.25c and foll.); he is endowed with one perfect knowledge in samudaye’nvayajñāna and samudaye’nvayajñānakāśānti; with two in samudaye’nvayajñāna and nirodhe dharmañjñānakāśānti; with three in nirodhe dharmañjñāna and nirodhe’nvayajñānakāśānti; with four in nirodhe’nvayajñāna and mārge dharmañjñānakāśānti; with five in mārge dharmañjñāna and mārge’nvayajñānakāśānti.

69c-d. Abiding in Meditation, with six, with one, or with two.

As long as one has not obtained detachment from Kāmadr̥t̥u,
the Āryan, after mārgenaśvayajñāna—or when, having obtained it, one has fallen away from it—possesses six perfect knowledges in the Path of Meditation.

When one has obtained this detachment—either before or after the comprehension of the Truths (abhisamaya=Path of Seeing, vi.25c)—one is endowed with a single perfect knowledge of the abandoning of the cankerous influences of Kāmadr̥t̥u.\textsuperscript{219}

The Arhat who obtains the quality of Arhat is endowed with a single perfect knowledge of the annihilation of all the bonds.

The Arhat who falls away (vi.56a) from the quality of Arhat through a wrapping (paryavasthāna, v.47) of Rūpadhātu finds himself again in the condition of an Āryan who is detached from Kāmadr̥t̥u: one is thus endowed with a single perfect knowledge of the abandoning of the cankerous influences of Kāmadr̥t̥u. Falling away through one defilement of Kāmadr̥t̥u, he finds himself again in the condition of an Āryan not detached from this sphere: six perfect knowledges. Falling away through one defilement of Ārūpyadr̥t̥u, he finds himself in the condition of an Āryan who obtains detachment from Rūpadhāt̥u: he is endowed with two perfect knowledges: the perfect knowledge of the abandoning of the cankerous influences of Kāmadr̥t̥u and the perfect knowledge of the destruction of attachment to Rūpadhātu.\textsuperscript{220}

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Why is there only a single perfect knowledge attributed to the Anāgāmin and to the Arhat?

70a-b. One reduces the perfect knowledges to a single unit where there is detachment from one sphere and the acquisition of a result.
"To add up" (saṁkalana) means to total, to count together as a unit.

The acquisition of the last two results coincides with the detachment from a sphere.

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How many perfect knowledges can one lose and obtain (Vibbhaṣa, TD 27, p. 324b6)?

70c-d. One loses one, two, five, or six perfect knowledges; in this same way one obtains them, but never five.

The saint who falls away from the quality of Arhat or from the detachment of Kāmādhātu loses one perfect knowledge.

The Anāgāmin detached from Rūpadhātu who falls away from the detachment of Kāmādhātu loses two perfect knowledges.

When the saint who has arrived at the sixteenth moment (mārga'nvajñāna) is detached from Kāmādhātu before entering into the Path of Seeing, he loses five perfect knowledges, for at this moment he obtains the perfect knowledge that he has abandoned the cankerous influences of Kāmādhātu.

When one is not detached from Kāmādhātu before entering into the Path of Seeing, that is, when he is an ānupūrvaka (ii.16d) he then obtains the sixth perfect knowledge which he will lose, with the five others, when he acquires detachment from Kāmādhātu.

One who, in the two paths, obtains one perfect knowledge not previously possessed, obtains one perfect knowledge.

One who falls away from a single detachment of Ārūpyadhātu, obtains two perfect knowledges (the sixth and the seventh).

One who falls away from the result of Anāgāmin obtains six perfect knowledges.
1. For an etymology and explanation of the word *anuṣaya*, see v.39; on the role of the *anuṣayas* and their *anuṣayanas*, v.17.

Pali sources: Seven *anuṣayas*, *Anguttara*, iv.9; *Vibhaṅga*, 340, 383; *Visuddhimagga*, 197; *Compendium*, 179, note 2; JPTS, 1910-12, p. 86 (Yamaka). For their nature as disassociated from the mind, morally neutral, not grasping an object, and distinct from the *pāryutthānas*, see *Kathāvatthu*, ix.4, xi.1, xiv.5; problems discussed page 768 and following.

Theory of *kleśa-anuṣaya* and of its abandoning in classical Yoga, see *Yogasūtra*, ii.7 and following (which often reminds us of the *Kośa*).

Pali sources on the abandoning of the defilements, below note 22.

2. *upacayam gacchanti.* Ipso facto "to accumulate" means to gain force and fruitfulness (results?), "to necessarily produce a retribution": vīpākādānāya niyatiḥbhavanti. See iv.50 and 120.

3. *Bhava* can be understood in the sense of *punarbhava*, rebirth or new existence; or, as in the formula for Pratītyasamutpāda, in the sense of *karmabhava* (iii.12, 13, 24, 36), that is, action, for action only accumulates by reason of the *anuṣayas* (*Vyākhyā*).

The author explains below (vi.3, end) the roles of desire (or defilement), action and ignorance in the production of a new existence.

4. As we see in the *Bhāṣya*, *kleśa* is the equivalent of *anuṣaya* for the Sarvāstivādins; the same for *pāryavasthāna* (*pāryutthāna*). For the Sarvāstivādins, the *anuṣaya* of a *kleśa*, for example kāmarāga or sensual desire, is the *kleśa* itself; for the Vātsiputriyas, it is the *prāpti* or possession of this *kleśa*: a person who is not presently bound by the defilement, "possesses" the defilement that he has had and which he will have; for the Sautrāntikas, it is the seed of the *kleśa*, the dormant *kleśa*. See below note 16.

5. *yaḥ kleśo yaddhātukab sa tam dhātum nātikāmāyayati.*

Samghabhadrā adds: 11. it puts one in a bad state, it makes one unfit (āśrayadauṣṭhulyam janayaty akarmayatāpādanāt) (ii.26a-c); 12. it is hostile to spiritual qualities (gūnān dveṣṭi); 13. it provokes shameful actions and makes someone the object of blame; 14. it makes one leave the good path, for its disposes one to follow erroneous masters; 15. it plants the seeds of all sufferings of transmigration; and 16. it causes the physical universe to deteriorate (iii.99, iv.85).

6. See below v.20, note 69.

7. Attachment to the objects of the five material sense organs, visible things, sounds, etc. (the *pañca kāmagnāḥ*).


Compare *Anguttara* iii.233 = v.323: na kāmarāgaparīṣṭhitena cetāsā vibarati na kāmarāgaparedena uppamassā ca kāmarāgassa niśaraṇāṁ yathābhūtām prajānātī ...; v.188: uttarim niśaraṇāṁ yathābhūtām ... 

The most likely explanation is the following. A *rāga; rāgaparīṣṭhitena* is an explosion of *rāga, rāga* in action. We can understand *Vibhaṅga*, p. 383 as referring to *rāga* in a subtle state, as potential = *rāganuṣaya*; the manifested *rāga = rāgaparīṣṭhitena*; and *rāga* as a bond = *rāgasamyojana*.

According to the *Kośa*, v.47, *pāryavasthāna* is a synonym for *kleśa*, defilement (but the Ñetra quoted can be understood: *rāgaparīṣṭhitena* = an explosion of desire). *Ibidem* *pāryavasthāna* is understood, rightly, as shamelessness, etc. (eight or ten *pāryavasthānas*). *Pāryavasthāna, pāryavasthitā, "anger," "in the prey of anger, outside of oneself," in many places in the *Divyāvadāna* (references in Speyer, *Avadānasaṅkha*, Index) we have *sūrenā pāryavasthānena pāryavasthitāḥ, krodhapāryavasthitāḥ*; in p. 520.9 *pāryavasthāna* is used to
describe all the defilements in an active state: "his paryavasthāna of affection disappears in order to make room for the paryavasthāna of hatred." Childers: Māreṇa pariyuṭhitacitto: having a mind possessed by Māra.

The distinction between paryavasthāna and paryutthāna appears to be chiefly verbal: there is paryutthāna when a defilement rises (kun nas lādiṇ ba: to arise, to expand, to explode); there is paryavasthāna when a defilement surrounds (kun nas dkris pa). We have seen that rāgapariyuṭhīta = rāgapateta (Anguttara, iii.233). Some expressions of equivocal meaning are brought together in Anguttara, i.66; kāmarāga-vinivesa-vinibandha-paligedha- paryutthāna-ajjhosāna.

10. According to Vasumitra (172a, Wassilief, p. 265), the Mahāsāṃghikas say: "The anusayas are neither mind (citta) nor mental states (caitta). They do not have an object (analambana, comp. Kośa, i.34, ii.34b). The anusayas are different from the paryavasthānas (kun nas dkris pa): the first are disassociated from the mind (viprayuktā), whereas the second are associated with the mind (samprayuktā)." The Sarvāstivādins (173b, Wassilief, p. 274) say: "The anusayas are mental states, and are associated with the mind. All the anusayas are paryavasthānas, but all paryavasthānas are not anusaya."

According to Bhavya (180a, Rockhill, p. 188), the Ekavyavahārikas say: "Since the mind is pure in nature, one cannot say that the anusayas are associated with the mind or disassociated from the mind. The anusayas are different from paryutthānas (kun nas lādiṇ ba)." [See Mahāvyutpatti, 30.9.55; 109.59.57]. On the mind which is pure by nature, Anguttara, i.10, Kośa, vi.77, Wassilief, 265.

According to Nettipakarana, p. 79: "Former avidyā is the cause of later avidyā: former avidyā is anusaya of avidyā; later avidyā is the paryutthāna of avidyā."

The Andhakas maintain: "Anuṣaya is different from paryuyṭṭhāna": an ordinary person’s mind is good, but he does not however cease from being "endowed with anusaya" (saṅusaya); but one cannot say that he is paryuyṭṭhāna, enveloped [by the defilements]. (Kathāvadāthu, xiv.5). The same Andhakas maintain that paryuyṭṭhāna is disassociated from the mind (xiv.6).

The Andhakas and certain Uttarapathakas say that the anusayas do not have an object (anāramana) (ix.4); the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Saṃmityiyas say that the anusayas are morally neutral, without causes, and disassociated from the mind (xi.1). Anuṣaya as distinct from paryuyṭṭhāna, Vibhaṅga, p. 383.

11. The objectors, according to the Vyākhya, are the Vātsiputriyas; according to the Japanese editor (=Kyokuga Saeki), the Mahāsāṃghikas (See Vasumitra quoted note 10).

12. The anubandha of one defilement is the fact that it is favorable to the production of other defilements. We can also understand anuṣaya in the sense of anuvṛtti: "One abandons kāmarāga together with its continuation."

13. By metaphor, anusaya = anusayaprāpti, a cause being designated by the name of its effect (upacāra); in its correct sense (mukhyavrūti), anusaya = paryavasthāna.

14. This is the argumentation of Dharmottara, the author of Taishō no 1550 (Note of the Japanese editor).

15. If an anusaya is disassociated from the mind, the anusaya is the "possession" of the defilement; now as long as a person is not definitively detached from the defilement, he keeps the "possession" of the defilement; thus he can never have a good mind.
16. On the theory of the seed (bija) and of its capacity (sakti), see ii.36d (trans. pp. 211, 274); Chapter IX, trans. Stcherbatski, p. 947, Hsüan-tsang, xxx.13b. On memory, Chapter IX, Stcherbatski, p. 852; xxx.7a.

17. The Vātsiputriyas (Vyākhya) or the Mahāsarāṅghikas (Japanese editor).

18. Reading of the Vyākhya; according to the Tibetan version: rāgānuṣaya'nuṣete. Majjhima, iii.285: so sukhāya vedanāya puṭṭo samāno abhinandati abhivudati ajjhosāyatīthai / tassa rāgānuṣaya anuseti.

19. Quoted in the Vyākhya below ad 36a-b with the reading kṛtah.

20. Paramārtha: "... these also make ten."

21. The anusayas are ten on the basis of their natures. By taking into consideration the sphere to which they belong and their mode of expulsion (Seeing each of the Four Truths and Meditation), one obtains the number of ninety-eight. According to the Yogācāras, one hundred and eight, see v.8; and below note 35.

Vasubandhu, faithful to his task, presents the system of the Abhidharma. Here is a summary of the Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 702a8 - p. 711b5:

How many of the twenty-eight anusayas belong to Kāmadhatu? ... How many are abandoned through Seeing? ... How many of the thirty-eight anusayas of Kāmadhatu are abandoned through Seeing? ... How many through the Seeing of Suffering?

What is the meaning of the word anusaya? It signifies ānu, anusayana, anusanga, anubandha (Kośa, v.39). The anusaya which is not abandoned, not perfectly known (parijñā) "becomes active and grows" (anusete, glossed in the Kośa by pratisphām labbate, puṣṭim labbate) by reason of two things: its object (ālabhana), and the dharma associated (saṃprayoga) with it. It "becomes active" in the Dhātu to which it belongs, not in another (v.18).

There are twelve anusayas: kāmarāgānusaya, pratīgha, rūparāgā, ārūpyarāgā, māna, avidyā, satkāyadrṣṭi, antagrābadṛṣṭi, mithyādrṣṭi, drṣṭiparāmarṣa, śīvarataparāmarṣa, and vicikitsānusaya.

How does kāmarāgānusaya "become active?" By reason of the agreeable, of the pleasant ... How so pratīgha? By reason of the disagreeable ... How so rūparāgā? By reason of the agreeable ... How so māna? ...

Why is kāmarāgānusaya produced? For three reasons: 1. Kāmarāgānusaya is not abandoned or completely known; 2. some dharmas favorable to an explosion (paryavasthāna) of the kāmarāga present themselves; and 3. there is incorrect judgment (ayonīśomanasiśāra) ... (v.34).

These twelve anusayas make seven (by counting rūparāgā and ārūpyarāgā under the name of bhavarāga; by counting the five drṣṭis under the name of drṣṭyanusaya) ...

These seven anusayas make ninety-eight (by counting all of the categories of kāmarāga as categories of kāmarāgānusayas to be expelled through the Seeing of Suffering, etc.)

How many of the ninety-eight are universal (sarvatraga), how many are non-universal (v.17)? [Twenty-seven are universal; sixty-five are non-universal; and six are both. ...] (p. 702c7). How many have impure things for their object (sāsravālabhana) (v.18) (p. 703a16), how many have conditioned things (saṃskṛtalabhana) (p. 703b5) for their object?

How many "become active and grow" (anusete, see v.17) from their object? from associated dharmas from their object and from associated dharmas? from neither the one or the other? [The examination of this problem fills many pages, 702b22-711b5: How many "become active and grow" from the fact of the object; etc., from the dharmas abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering? ... from thoughts associated with a false view abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction? ... from an avidyā abandoned by the Seeing of Extinction? ... from an avidyā with a false view abandoned by the Seeing of Extinction? ...]
22. Some notes on the abandoning (prahāna) of the defilements according to the Pali sources (see vi.1):

1) Majjhima, i.7, distinguishes the āsavas abandoned through dassana, saṁvara, paṭis evana, adhīvāsana, parivajjana, vinodana and bhāvanā.

2) According to the Dhammasaṅgani the three errors of satkāyadrsti, vicikitsā and śīravatapārāmarśa, along with the defilements (rāga, etc.) which reside in these three errors, are abandoned through Seeing, along with the sensations, ideas, etc., which are associated with them, and with the actions which they produce (1002-1—6); all of the rest of the rāgas, deveṣas, mohas, with their associated defilements, sensations, and actions, are abandoned through cultivation or Meditation (1007). The causes (hetu) of the first group are abandoned through Seeing, whereas the causes of the second are abandoned through Meditation (1010-11). Good (kusala) things, physical matter (rupa) and unconditioned things (asamkhatā dhātu) cannot be abandoned. Compare Kośa, i.40.

3) Kathavatthu, i.4, presents the thesis of a gradual abandoning of the defilements through the successive Seeing of the Truths of Suffering, etc.

4) Atthasālini, p. 234, anusayapajahana through the path of Sotāpanna and Arhat; p. 376, the abandoning of the saṁyojanas through the four Paths (See the table set up by Mrs Rhys Davids, Psychology, p. 303).

5) Visuddhimagga, p. 570 (Warren, p. 193), the order of the abandoning (pahānakkama) of the upadanas: the last three are abandoned by the Sotāpanna; the first (kāmupādāna) by the Arhat; p. 684-6, by which the nāṇa (of Sotāpanna, etc.) are the different saṁyojanas, kilesas to be killed (vājja = vadhya of the Kośa, v.6) ... upādānas, (seven) anussayas, malas, kammaphatas, etc.; diṭṭhivicikitsā by the nāṇa of the Sotāpanna, kāmarāga and paṭigha by the nāṇa of the Anāgāmin, and māna, bhavarāga, and avidyā by the nāṇa of the Arhat.

6) Many types of prahāna are named and defined in the Atthasālini p. 351, and in the Sumangalavilāsinī, p. 20, which are not totally in agreement.

The Sumangalavilāsinī says that, through Vinaya, one obtains morality (siла), thus viśikkamappahāna, the abandoning of the outflowing of the defilements, that is, the abandoning of transgressions: for morality is opposed (patipakkha) to the viśikkama of the kilesas; it is opposed to the outflowing of the defilements and their manifestation through actions. This abandoning is also called tadaṅgapahāna, "partial abandoning." For the Atthasālini, tadaṅgapahāna is the abandoning of a certain defilement or error (belief in an ātman, belief in a bad path, in eternity, in annihilation; to not see as dangerous that which is dangerous, etc.) through the Seeing of the composite character of the self, through the Seeing of the Path, etc. Maung Tin translates: "elimination of the factor in question." Through Sūtra, one obtains absorption and, as a consequence, pariyuṭhānapahāna or vikkhambhānapahāna, the (temporary) abandoning of the explosion or the manifestation of the defilements; an abandoning which consists of the fact of hindering, of conquering the defilements (Mahāvyutpatti, 130.5).

Through Abhidharma, one obtains paññā, and, as a consequence anusayapahāna or samuccchedappahāna, the abandoning of the seeds of the defilements, an abandoning which consists of the definitive destruction (samucccheda) of the defilements.

23. The two Paths, the Path of Seeing, and Path of Meditation, are explained in Kośa, vi.1, 26, 49.

24. For example, the view of negation (nāstidṛṣṭi) or mithyadṛṣṭi, when it consists of negating the Truth of Suffering, constitutes an anusaya abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering.

25. See vi.28, note.

26. Burnouf (Introduction, 263) explains: "the opinion that the body is what exists, that is, that it is the self which solely exists." Childers, according to his correspondent Subhūti,
explains sakkāya = sakāya = svakāya (as we have anuddaya = anudaya, etc.), Muller, *Simplified Grammar*, p. 19). We thus have: sakkāyadṛṣṭi = the theory of one's body, the theory that the body is personal (Mrs Rhys Davids, *Psychology*, p. 257, quotes the *Suttanipāta*, 950, 951 with respect to this). See Vībhāṣā quoted note 28. E. Senart holds to satkārya (*Mélanges Harlez*, p. 292). Walleser, *ZDMG*. 64, 581, gives svat-khāya.

Atthasālīmi, p. 348: sakkāyadīthīs vijjamānaṭṭhena sati khandhapañcakasankhāte kāye sayam va sati tasmin kāye dīpṭhitī. Expositor, p. 450: a view arising with respect to the body in the sense of existing, and called the five aggregates, or, itself appearing as the view arising with respect to the body (??).


Sakkāya = pañcupāñcakkhandhā, *Majjhima*, i.299.

Sakkāyadṛṣṭi is not "bad," *Kośa*, iv.12d, v.19.

27. As is shown by Hsüan-tsang's version and by other sources, Vasubandhu here presents the explanation of the Sautrāntikas. It is on this etymology that the Tibetan version rests: *jīg tshogs la lsa ba* = "a view of the collection of that which perishes." We shall see below how *sat* = *jīg* = *buais* 壁(* = to perish, to deteriorate = meib 滅 (Paramārtha).

Hsüan-tsang: "To believe in the self and in things pertaining to a self is the sat-kā-ya view. We have sat because it perishes (*buais* 壁); collection is what is called kā-ya: that is, "collection of impermanent things." Kā-ya is sat, from whence sat-kāya. This sat-kāya is the *five upādānakandhas.* This expression is used in order to avoid the idea of permanence and of unity, for it is by reason of these two ideas that there is a belief in a self. The Vaibhāṣikas explain: because it exists (*yu 有 *), it is *sat*; the sense of "body" (*kāya*) is as above. One says that this view rests on the "existing body" in order to avoid the idea that the idea of self and of things pertaining to a self does not have an object [gloss of the Japanese editor: a refutation of the Sautrāntikas]. This view is called sat-kāya because it is produced by reason of *sat-kāya."

Commentary of the Vijnaptimātra School: "The Sautrāntikas say that *sat* signifies "false, deceiving" (wei 僞 ); *ka-ya* = "body,* ta-li-se-chib 達利瑟致 = "view," "body" signifies "accumulation," and is a metaphorical expression for accumulation; the view produced by reason of body-accumulation is the "false-body-view." The Buddha refutes the future Sarvāstivādins doctrine that the name is "existent-body-view;" consequently he says the word *sat,* "to deceive" (sa wei 藩偽 ). This same word *sat* signifies "existent;" but here it signifies "false" according to the etymology *sidantiti sat iti* [Reading of S. Lévi].

Samghabhadra (*TD* 29, p. 605c15) explains: "By the force of cause (*hetu,* doubtless sabbāgabetu, see ii.52a trans. page 262) and the teachings, some fools recognize a "self" and "things pertaining to a self" in the five *upādānakandhas.* This view is called sakkāyadṛṣṭi. *Sat* because it exists; collection (*chī ‘聚 = rāsi, etc.*) is called kāya: the sense is *samavāya* (bo-bo 和合 ), or *ācaya (chī-chū 積聚 ). Kāya is sat, thus satkāya. The sense is that of real existence and of multiplicity. This view admits the existence of a "self": now the self does not exist. One designates the object of this view by the word *sat* in order to avoid the idea that this view arises having a non-existent thing for its object; and in the fear that, as a consequence, there would be a belief in the reality of the "self," this object is designated by the word kāya. That is: Those who believe in a "self" as a unique entity, a "self" either in a series (=the series of minds, *cittasamātati*), or in many series (=series of minds and mental states, series of mental elements): now these series are not a "self," because the kāya is a multiplicity. As this view of "self" has satkāya for its object, it is called sakkāyadṛṣṭi; the meaning is that this view has for its object the five *upādānakandhas.* In fact the Sūtra says, "What all the Brahmins and monks who believe in a self, really have in view are the five *upādānakandhas. The Blessed One gives the name of sakkāyadṛṣṭi to one single view of "self" and of "things pertaining to a self," so that one will not believe that the consciousness has a non-existent thing for its object (since the "self" does not exist), nor that the "self" exists (since the consciousness had for its object an existent thing and not a non-existent
Chapter Five

thing). The Sautrantika (that is, Vasubandhu) gives the following explanation: "We have sat because it perishes; collection (chil) is what is termed kāya, that is, 'a collection of impermanent things.' Kāya is sat, thus satkāya. This satkāya is the five upādānaskandhas. This expression is used in order to avoid the idea of permanence and unity, for it is by reason of these two ideas that there is a belief in self." But what good is there in adding the word sat (with the meaning of "perishable")? The word kāya suffices to avoid the idea of permanence. If sat signifies perishable, one should simply say kāyadrsti: there is no dharma which is eternal and susceptible of forming a collection. Thus what value is there in qualifying kāya by a word signifying perishable?

28. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 255a21: This view, having satkāya (yu-shen 有身) for its sphere (satkāye pravartata iī), is called satkāyadrsti.

Question: Are there other views that have satkāya for their spheres, not asatkāya, and which are called satkāyadrsti?

Other views have svakāya for their sphere, or parakāya, or satkāya, or asatkāya; thus they are not called satkāyadrsti. They have the svakāya for their sphere, that is, their own sphere (dbhātu) and stage (bhēmi) for their object; or they have parakāya for their sphere, that is, another sphere, another stage. They have satkāya for their sphere, that is, the impure . . . This view, which has satkāya for its sphere, believes in a "self" and in "things pertaining to a self"; thus it is called satkāyadrsti. Even though they have satkāya for their sphere, the others do not believe in a "self" or in "things pertaining to a self": thus they are not called satkāyadrsti . . . Vasumitra says: This view is called satkāyadrsti because it has only svakāya for its sphere; the five upādānaskandhas are called svakāya.

29. Sāmyuktā, TD 2, p. 151a22; Madhyama, TD 1, p. 788a19; Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 38a14; Kōsa, trans. by Hsüan-tsang, TD 29, p. 154c; Sāmyutta, iii.46: ye keci bhikkhave sa am and vān akavibbhad attānaṁ samanupassanāṁ samanupassanti sabbe te paccāpāṅān khandhāṁ samanupassanti etosāṁ va aññatārām.

30. See Kōsa, iv.66a, 78b, 79c, 96; Dhammasaṅgāṇi, Para. 381, etc.

31. How is the view of annihilation, ucchedadrsti, a view of affirmation? Here the author speaks in general (Vyākhyā).


33. Silavrata is included in rūpakandha; one should add ādi in order to mention the other skandhas. On silavrata, see iv.64c, v.38a-c; Suttaniṭa, p. 108; Mahāniddesa, 66-68, 88-90, 310, 416; Dhammasaṅgāṇi, 1006; Atthasālinī, 355; Huber, Śūrālāṁkāra, p. 125, 127, 130.

34. On the Lord, the creator of the world, see ii.64d (trans. page 306), Aṅguttara, i.173, Majjhima, ii.227, Dīgha, i.18 (Brahmā).

35. Vyākhyā: tad idam acāryena samāyavasthaṁ kṛtam na svamataṁ darśītam / anye yogacāramatim apekṣayaṁ kṛtam. Yaśomitra reproduces the explanation of someone (kaścit) who refutes the objection of atiprasanga (p. 780, line 1) and that of Samghabhadra; he presents the system of the Yogacārins: according to the Yogacārins, there are one hundred and twenty-eight kleśas or anuśayas. In Kāmadhātu forty are expelled through the Seeing of the Truths (each of the ten is expelled by each Truth); six are expelled through Meditation, namely akalpikā satkāyadrsti (spontaneous, not philosophical, belief in a self), ucchedadrsti, sabaja rāga (innate lust), pratīgha, māna and avidyā; the same, with the exception of the five pratīghas, in each of the two higher Dhātus.

The Abhisamayālaṁkāraloka (fol. 120 of my MSS) gives the same total: expelled through Seeing, one hundred and twelve (forty, thirty-six and thirty-six according to Dhātu); expelled through Meditation, six, five and five: rāga, dveṣa, māna, avidyā, satkāyadrsti and antagāhadrsti (dveṣa is absent in the higher Dhātus). See vi.1.
I know of the one hundred and eight "kleśas only through the note of Przyluski, Açoka, page 323.

36. On the vipāryāsas, Anūgata, ii.52; Nettipakkaraṇa, passim (vipāllāsa), Vibhaṅga, 376 (vipāryesa); compare Samyutta, i.188, Dhammasaṅgāṇi, vipāryesagāha and the note of Atthasāliṁi, page 253; Sīkṣāsamuccaya, 198.11; Friendly Epistle, 48, Yogasūtra, ii.5 (definition of avidyā).

37. Mahāsāṃghītidharmaparayāya; Anūgata, ii.52 (vipāllāsa); Vibhaṅga, 376 (saññā, citta, dātiḥvipāryesas); Visuddhimagga, 683.


Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 536c8: "Some others say that, among the twelve errors (vipāryāsa), eight are solely abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths, and four, also through Meditation. These masters are the Vibhajyavādins." On the Vibhajyavādins, see Pu-kuang, TD 41, p. 310b23: "They say that there is no formal opinion which is completely correct (fei chin li 非盡理 ), that [the past and the future] exist in part, do not exist in part, and that one should distinguish the two: thus they are called 'the school of those who speak after having distinguished' (fen pieh shou pu 分別說部 ), in Sanskrit: Vibhajyavādins."

According to the Vījñaptimātravṛtti (wei shib shu 唯識疏 ), iv.35.10: "Those who are called Vibhajyavādins are now the Prajñaptivādins (shuo chia pu 偈解部 )."

According to the Samayaśedoparacancakra (tsung lun 宗論 ): "Two hundred years later there emerged a school from out of the Mahāsāṃghikas called the Prajñaptivādins" (see Wassilieiev page 251, and the note where we see that, in this version of the Samayabheda, one of the two Chinese translators here reads Vibhajyavādins). A commentator remarks: "According to these two explanations, the Vibhajyavādins form but a single school [with the Prajñaptivādins]. But the Vibhaṣa, 23.5 says: "The Mahāsāṃghikas, etc., are called Vibhajyavādins." So too the Arthapradīpa (? i-teng 義燈 ): "Either the Vibhajyavādins are certain masters of the Great Vehicle, or all the schools of the Small Vehicle are called Vibhajyavādins: these latter are not a definite school. Also, in the Samgraha (? she-lun 攝論 ), the Vibhajyavādins are strictly defined as being the Mahīśāsakas: in the Vibhaṣa, they are strictly defined as being the Sāṁmītiyas" (Note of Saeki ad xix.9a9).

Note the classic references to the Vibhajyavādins, Commentary on the Kathāvatthu, Vasumitra, etc., in Kern, Wassilieiev, Waters, etc. See v.25.

39. "Seeing" (pāṣyati) designates the consciousness obtained through ānāntaryamārga; "knowing" (jñāti), the consciousness obtained through vimuktimārga (vi.28).

40. The Blessed One said: . . . srutavata āryārāvakasya smṛtisāmāptam evāsā bhiṁcā bhāc anukampayā / atha ca punah kṣipram evāsāṁ parikṣayam paryādānām ca gacchanti.


42. The Tibetan only gives the first line of the stanza, but quoted completely by Hsüan-tsang. This is Samyutta, i.188; Teraṅgāthā, 1223; Visuddhimagga, page 37-38. Cf. Suttaniṣṭha, 340. According to the Vṛyākyāya: kāmarāgāḥbhibhūtāvāc cittaṁ me paridabhyate / anāga me gautama bhūmi sāntim (?) tvam anukampayā / vipāryesaṁ samījñānānāṁ cittaṁ te paridabhyate / nimmattām varjyaṁ tasmāc chubbham rāgopasambitam // Vāgiśa was a Srotaāpanna, and consequently freed from all the anuṣayas that one abandons through the Seeing of the Truths.

43. According to the Vṛyākyāya: "As the doctrine of the other school, nikāyaantarīya, (note 38 above) is contradicted by the Vaibhāṣikas by means of a text of Scripture, and as the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas is similarly contradicted by the other school, as a consequence some other
masters, constituting a third party, took the words and resolved the problem of the contradiction of the Sūtras.”

According to Hsüan-tsang: "Other masters say..." The Japanese editor believes that the author is now presenting the opinion of the Sautrāntikas.

44. One can also explain that the expression of this Sūtra: "to see and to know the Truth: this is Suffering," does not refer to only darśanamārga, the Path of Seeing the Truths, which Vāgīśa possesses, but also to bhāvanāmārga, the Path of Meditation [which, when it is pure (anāttrava) bears on the Truths, vi.1] and Vāgīśa does not possess this second Path.

45. Mānasatīyoyana, Prakaraṇapāda, TD 26, p. 693a29; Vibhaṅga, 353; Dhammasaṅgani, 1116, trans. 298; Comm. page 372 (Expositor, page 478); Āṅguttara, ii.430. Abhimārama-
mīmāṃsā in Majjhima, i.486 and elsewhere.

46. The Āryan is a person who has seen the Truths and who has expelled the anusayas, satkāyadrsti, etc., which are expelled through Seeing (darśana); but he has not necessarily expelled the anusayas whose expulsion requires bhāvana (Meditation, or repeated seeing of the Truths, etc.). However these non-expelled anusayas do not become active within him.

47. Tathā is translated as et cetera, according to the commentary; the simplest meaning is "in the same manner;" see Kośa v.l.b. for an interpretation of the same word.

48. According to the rule: ye yaddaṁsahayā ālambanāṁ te taddaṁsahayāḥ / avasīṣṭā bhāvanāheyāḥ. See above page and v.60-61.

49. Dīgha iii.216 distinguishes kāmaṁsā, bhavaṁsā, vibhavaṁsā and rūpaṁsā, arūpaṁsā, nirodhaṁsā.

On vibhavaṁsā, see Visuddhimagga, 568, 594, and Madhyamakavṛtti, 530 note 4.

Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p138a9: There are three trṣṇā, kāmaṁsā, bhavaṁsā, vibhavaṁsā... There are some masters, namely the Vibhajyavadins, who say that vibhavaṁsā that the Sūtra mentions is abandoned by Seeing and by Meditation. It was in order to refute this opinion and to show that the vibhavaṁsā mentioned in the Sūtra is abandoned by Seeing alone, that this treatise was composed (tso ssu lun 作斯論): Should we say that vibhavaṁsā is abandoned through Seeing or Meditation? Answer: We should say that it is abandoned through Meditation. Vibhava is the anityatā (impermanence = non-existence, destruction) of the nikāyasabhba (ii.41); the trṣṇā which has this anityatā for its object is called vibhavaṁsā; thus it is solely abandoned through Meditation, for nikāyasabhba is abandoned through Meditation. There are some masters who say that vibhavaṁsā is abandoned either through Seeing or through Meditation. When is it abandoned through Seeing? When it is attachment (rūga) to the vibhava of the dharma abandoned through Seeing. When is it abandoned through Meditation? When it is attachment to the vibhava of the dharmas abandoned through Meditation.

Question: Who maintains this opinion? Answer: The Vibhajyavadins. They say that vibhava is the anityatā of the Three Dhatus, that vibhavaṁsā is the trṣṇā relative to this anityatā, that, anityatā being abandoned through Seeing and Meditation, the same holds true for the trṣṇā relative to it... Certain masters say: If one follows the Sūtra (sūtrārtha), vibhavaṁsā is abandoned solely through Meditation; but according to the Truth (tattvārtha) it is abandoned through both Seeing and Meditation. How is this? The Sūtra says: "It is as if someone overwhelmed by fear and by suffering thinks: May I, after death, be annihilated, disappear, no longer exist!” In this Sūtra one should understand vibhava as the anityatā subsequent to nikāyasabhba: this vibhava is abandoned through Meditation, and so vibhavaṁsā is not abandoned through Seeing. Here the Master (lun-chu) presents the meaning of the Sūtra... When one is attached to the truth, one should say as the Vibhajyavadins above: "Vibhava is the name of the anityatā of the Three Dhatus...”

Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 138c26: Why does the Srotaāpanna not produce vibhavaṁsā? Answer: Because he sees the nature of things (dharma); that is, seeing that the nature of things is a series of causes and effect, he does not desire annihilation (uccheda). In the
second place, because he believes in the result of action; that is, believing that action and its effect are the successive parts of one series, he does not desire annihilation. Again, because he understands emptiness, the Srotaäpanna obtains सून्याताविमोक्षसामुखा (viii.24); he knows that there is no present existence, nor subsequent non-existence of the "self" and "things pertaining to self;" consequently he does not produce त्रस्त, the desire for annihilation, or subsequent destruction. Furthermore, विख्वादश्रिष्टि is nourished (upacita) by विख्वादश्रिष्टि (v.7), and विख्वादश्रिष्टि manifests itself following it; now the Srotaäpanna has already abandoned विख्वादश्रिष्टि, so he does not produce विख्वादश्रिष्टि.

50. In order to demonstrate that one can "love impermanence," YaSomitra quotes the Sutra: यावद आयम आत्मा जीवति तिष्ठति ध्रीयते यापयति तवत सरोगह सागराद सासल्याद साजवराद साप्रिदाहकाः।यताः कायम आत्मा उच्चिद्याते विनायति ना भवति।इयतायं आत्मा सम्यकासञ्जचिन्नं भवति।/ 51. asmitā = asmisāna.
52. Hsiian-tsang reads bhagnaprṣṭhatvāt, "their back being burned." The Tibetan has rkañ, marrow.
53. Independent or अवेन्की � avidyā, is the avidyā which does not accompany other anuṣayas, rāga, etc.

On the universals, ii.54a-b.
54. That is: they bear, in their Dhatu, on the five categories (निकायस, ii.52b), which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. According to another explanation, they are called universals because they are the cause of anuṣayas belonging to all five categories.
55. According to Hsüan-tsang, "superior" refers to the higher Dhatus or bhūmis. These anuṣayas are not in the lower ones. On the sarvatragas and the bhūmis, see v.18.
56. Ṭhānaya, TD 27, p. 93a5. Some say that, not having any object, avidyā does not have any pure dharmas for its object; in fact, it is not jñāna by nature; rather, it forms an obstacle to the knowledge of things . . . (Samghabhadra TD 29, p. 613b10). See iii.28c, v.38d.
57. See Ṭhānaya, TD 27, p. 94a12.
58. Hsüan-tsang adds: "which are abandoned through the Seeing of अनस्रव, " according to Ṭhānaya, TD 27, p. 93a15, which Vasubandhu summarizes in Kārika 16.
59. According to other authorities, कुसलदधर्मचक्षु is śraddhā (ii.25) or again the universal mental state of अधिमुक्ति (ii.24). Kāṭṭhavatthu, ix.2.
60. One prides himself solely on gross and mobile things which provoke satisfaction in the lower bhūmis.
61. Our texts interpret anuṣete, or anuṣayana, in the sense of puṣṭim labhate, "to undertake growth," and pratiṣṭhaṁ labhate, "to begin, to become active;" see i. English trans. page 59 and v.39. The Tibetan version anuṣete = rgyas 'gyur = to become great. The Chinese suı-tseng 隨增 has the same meaning.

In certain cases an anuṣaya grows by the fact that it becomes active in the object; in other cases it grows by the fact of the sensations, etc., which favor its growth.

On the two types of anuṣayana, see Śāntaśuddhaya, TD 28, p. 901b6ff, Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 898c11, Ṭhānaya, TD 27, p. 257a26, and p. 442b24 to 452b19 (Saeki also refers to Ṭhānaya 32.1 and 16.1). Saeki quotes the Ṭhānaya, p. 110a20: Certain masters say that the anuṣayas do not constitute anuṣayana in the dharmas associated with the mind. The Dārṣṭāntikas say: To affirm that the anuṣaya constitutes the object of anuṣayana is to admit that it grows by the fact of the pure dharmas or the dharmas of a higher sphere, when it has for its object similar dharmas [and this contradicts the thesis v.18a-b]; to affirm that it
constitutes anuiayana in associated dharmas is to admit that the anusaya [for example, attachment] will never be cut off, or that even if it is cut off, it will always be anusayana, for one cannot definitively disjoin the mind from associated dharmas [, for example, from agreeable sensation which nourishes attachment.]." See below note 62.

62. See v.39.

63. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 444c21: "Is a locus of anusaya also a locus of anuiayana? [That is: is the object on which an anusaya can bear—the thing relative to which one takes up attachment, hatred, doubt, false view, etc.—always favorable to the development (puṣṭi) and the installation (pratiṣṭhāḥabba) of the anusaya?] Pure (anāsrava) things (Nirvāṇa and the Path) are loci of anusaya but not loci of anuiayana. Vasumitra says: When one produces anusaya having impure (sāsrava) things for their object, the anusayas progressively increase (sui-tseng) [that is, they grow by the fact of these things taken as object], in the same way that the organ of sight of a person who looks at the moon develops (tseng-ch'ang 增長); when one produces anusayas having pure things for their object, the anusayas diminish, like the organ of sight of a person who looks at the sun."

64. As long as rāga is not abandoned, it will continue to develop from the fact of the agreeable sensation which is associated with the mind.

65. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 259c8.

66. See note 27, and also Bodhisattvabhumi, Muse on, 1906, 224.

67. According to the Japanese editor, the Sautrāntikas.

68. This refers to the doctrine of Kāpila and the Vaiśeṣikas, of the philosophical proponents of an ātman.

69. On the roots of evil, iv.8c-d. The commentary on the Nāmasaṅgiti quotes an Abhidharma treatise which enumerates the six anusayas: māṇḍragvīcīkṣās ca rāgapratīghaṃūdhayah.

70. The word "all" signifies "of the five categories," abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. (ii.52b).

71. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 259c8-260a9: Some (= the Dārśāntikas) say that all kleśas are bad (akusala); others, that the kleśas of Kāmadhātu are bad, whereas the kleśas of the other Dhātus are neutral; a third hold that, among the three bonds (saṃyojana) of Kāmadhātu, one bond is neutral, namely satkāyaḍṛśṭi . . . Why is satkāyaḍṛśti neutral? . . . . It is not bad because it does not absolutely destroy the āśaya (see above, iv.80d) and it does not destroy the āśaya because it is not associated with non-shame and non-respect . . . . it is neutral because it does not have retribution (vipāka). Vasumitra says: "because it does not produce gross actions of the body and voice" (compare iv.12d, p. 580 of the English translation).

72. On morally neutral things, see ii.66, iv.9d.

73. Kośa, ii.57, 71b.

74. Trṣṇā with respect to the dhyānas and the ārūpyas ("nonmaterial" absorptions) which are "tasteable" (viii.6), at the moment of its arising with respect to the heavenly dwellings, is, in the higher spheres, neutral. All avidyā of the higher spheres, and the two views of satkāya and antagrāba in Kāmadhātu, are neutral. Prajñā in Kāmadhātu (1) associated with these two views, or (2) associated with minds arisen from retribution, etc., is neutral, like all prajñā of the higher spheres associated with the kleśas, or which is also associated with the minds arisen from retribution, etc. (The content of "etc." varies according to the spheres, see ii.72
75. Hsüan-tsang translates Aparântakas as "masters of foreign countries." The term dhyâyn is taken in a pejorative sense, see Aryadeva, Catuhiatika, 176 (Mem. As. Soc. Bengal, iii.8, 1914, p. 473): kaicid dhyâyi citavibramam anuprâptah kapalam mama śrâsi lagnam iti ... Bad dhyâna, Majjhima, iii.14.

76. A tṛṣṇottaradhyâyn is a "meditator" who cultivates the "tasteable" dhyâna (āsvâdanasamprajâtadhyâna, viii.6): a dṛṣṭyuttaradhyâyn produces a dṛṣṭi of eternity, etc.; a māṇottaradhyâyn thinks: "I possess this dhyâna, others do not possess it." One who cultivates dhyâna with excessive tṛṣṇâ (tṛṣṇottaram, tṛṣṇoparikam), or who is dominated by tṛṣṇâ (tṛṣṇottarah, tṛṣṇâdhibhah, is called a tṛṣṇottaradhyâyn. The other two names are explained in the same way.

These are all different modes of kleśa within those who enter into meditation; they are the root, the cause of neutral dharmaṃs.

According to Hsüan-tsang: Why do the Aparântakas create these four neutral roots? Because the mahaṭpurusas cultivate the superior absorptions without passing beyond the point of departure which is made up of tṛṣṇâ, dṛṣṭi and māṇa ...

77. Samyutta, 32.1, 34.12; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 784b2. See De la Vallée Poussin’s Nirvâṇa (1924).

78. See Mahâvyutpatti, 86, according to Taishô no. 1536; Digha, iii.229, Aṅguttara, i.197, ii.46, Milinda, 144; Childers sub. voc. pañño. Five types of very different questions, Aṭṭhasalini, p. 55, Sumangalavilasini, 68.

For ekamisikâ dharmâ, anekamisikâ, see Digha, i.191.

79. The Tibetan has "This person;" see page 801.

80. Hsüan-tsang takes up the above paragraph immediately before explaining the Abhidhârmikas.

81. According to Hsüan-tsang: One should answer (vyâkaraṇa) by distinguishing this question. A general answer is not suitable, for even though the questioner knows in general that all does not arise, the problem has not been explained (na vyâkhyâtaṃ).

82. Vibhâṣâ, TD 27, p. 75b20. The Vyâkhyâ explains: saṭṭhādibbidharmapâthin.

83. Vibhâṣâ, TD 27, p. 75b29-c2: 'Why should one answer these questions categorically? These questions lead to great advantages, lead to good dharmaṃs, are favorable to brahmacarya, produce bodhi, and cause one to attain nirvâṇa. This is why one should respond to them in a categorical manner. Compare Digha, i.191.

84. The Tibetan has: cañ mi smra ba am / bdag ņid luṅ ston du bzhug ces bya ba’i tha tshig go.

85. Missing in the Tibetan.

86. According to Hsüan-tsang: When someone asks if purusa-samjñâ is identical or not identical to the atman, one should ask: "What atman are you referring to in asking this question?," and if he answers "I am referring to the gross self ... "

87. The Tibetan has de bzhin ons pa. The usual reading is de bzhin gshegs pa.

88. Svalaksana=kleśa = kleśa bearing on a determinate object; the object of râga and mâna is always agreeable; the object of pratigha is always disagreeable.

89. Kārikâs 25-27 continue the presentation and the criticism of the sarvâstivâda, "the doctrine of universal existence," as understood by the Sarvâstivâdin-Vibhâṣikas. This problem is studied in the Introduction. Our text has been translated by Th. Stcherbatsky,
Central Conception of Buddhism, 1923, Appendix, p. 76-91.

De la Valle'e Poussin translated the Chapter of DevaSarman's Vijñānakāya which treats of the existence of the past and future in an anniversary volume of the École française d'Extrême-Orient.

See Kosa, i.7-c-d, 34d, iv.35a-b, v.62; trans. i. page 70.

Kathāvatthu, i.7-8, note of Shwe Zan Aung, p. 375, 392 of the translation; ix.6-7; Milinda, 50-54; Visuddhimagga, 686 (If one abandons present, past, and future defilements; comp. Kathāvatthu, xix.1).

Āryadeva, Catuḥsatikā, 256-8 (Memoirs As. Soc. Bengal, iii.8, 1914, p. 491); Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, 579-580 (Traikalyavādin); Madhyamaka, xvii.14, xxii.11, xxxv.5; Wassilieff (on the Prāsaṅgikas), 365 (=331).

Remarks of A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 163-5. See also the bibliography below note 94.

90. The Chinese versions give: "The three time periods (literally 'worlds,' loka) exist;" but according to the Tibetan: "The Vaibhāṣikas do not maintain that conditioned things (saṃskṛtas), which have the characteristics of conditioned things, are eternal; but these masters maintain that they exist in all of the time periods" (duḥ maṃs kun tu yod pa ni gsal bar dam 'cha'o).

91. Samyuktaśāramama, TD 2, p. 20a11: rūpam anityam atītam anāgatam / kaḥ punar vādam pratyutpānasya / evamādārśī śrutānāryāraśāvāko 'tīte rūpe'nāpe-kṣo bhavatī / anāgatām rūpāṁ nābhinnandatī / pratyutpānasya rūpasya nirvīde virāgāya nirodhāya pratiṃpanno bhavatī / atītam ced bhikṣavo rūpāṁ nābhavisyvan na śrutānāryāraśāvāko...

Compare the quotation from the same Sūtra, Madhyamakavṛtti, xxii.11; Majjhima, iii.188.

92. Saṃyutta ii.72, etc.; Kosa, iii.32.

93. Paramārtha: "If a person says that all exists,—past, present, future, space, pratisamkhyānirūpā (=Nirvāṇa), and apratisamkhyānirūpā,—it is said that this person is of the Sarvāstivādin school. There are other persons who say, 'Present dharma exist; past actions, if they have not produced their result, exist; but when they have produced their result, they no longer exist, as do neither future dharma which are the results [of a past or present action].' Persons who say that the three time periods exist but who make these distinctions, are not Sarvāstivādins, but Viśhwājyavādins.

Vasumitra, on the Kāśyapiyas (Wassiliev, 283, fol 176b): "The action whose retribution has ripened, does not exist; the action whose retribution has not ripened, exists; the saṃskāras arise from past causes and not from future causes." This is the thesis of the Kassapikas, Kathāvatthu, i.8.

On the Viśhwājyavādins, above note 38.

94. The Vīyākhyā gives the terms bhāvānyathika, laksanānyathika, avasthañānyathika, anyathānyathika.

Bhāvānyathika = "one who maintains that the time periods differ (anyathā) through the fact of bhāva." But anyathānyathika is translated into Tibetan gzhan daṅ gzhan du gyur pa pa; and we have the gloss purīpaṃ apekṣayānyonya ucyate: "the time period is called reciprocally distinct (anyonya) by reason of what follows and precedes." gzhan daṅ gzhan = anyonya. The Chinese sources translate the name of the fourth master "who affirms that the difference of the time periods is related to their relationship (apekṣā)."

See Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 196 (translation of the work of Bhavya on the sects); Watters, Yuan Chwang, i.274. The author of the Yogasūtras, iii.13, iv.12, etc., relies on Sarvāstivādin sources, see "Notes bouddhiques," Bull. Acad. de Belgique, 1922, p. 522.

95. When dharmic activity is active (lakṣhāvatī), the dharma is endowed with this characteristic (sambhava).

Compare the quotation from the same Sūtra, Madhyamakavṛtti, xxii.11; Majjhima, iii.188.
characteristic, but it is not devoid of other characteristics, for in this hypothesis a certain future dharma could not later be this same present and past dharma.

96. The two commentators on Hsüan-tsang differ. According to Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 704a11, a19-23), the future is posited relative (apekṣa) to the past and the present; the past, relative to the present and the future; the present, relative the past and the future. This is also the opinion of Samghabhadra. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 311a6-8, a26-28), the future is posited relative to former things; the past, relative to later things; and the present relative to both: this is the system of the Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 396b18-23.

97. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 396a10: "The Sarvāstivādins have four great masters who differently establish the differences of the three time periods . . . 1. Vasumitra who says that they differ through their state (avastha); 2. Buddhadeva who says that they differ through their point of view (apekṣa); 3. the follower of difference with respect to bhāva, who says: a dharma, changing its time period, differs through its bhāva, not through its nature . . . ; a dharma, passing from the future into the present, abandons its future bhāva and acquires its present bhāva, yet neither loses nor acquires its nature . . . ; and 4. the follower of difference with respect to its lakṣaṇa." The Ekavyavahārika school (i-shuo pu 一說部) says that the three time periods are only speech, and that their nature does not exist. The Lokottaravādins posit the time period by reason (i) of the dharma: thus that which is worldly (laukika) relatively exists, whereas that which is transworldly (lokottara) really exists. For the school of the Sūtras (ching-pu 經部), and for the Mahāsāṃghikas (ta-chung-pu 大衆部), the past and the future do not exist; only the present exists.

98. The Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 396b18: refutes the theory of the difference of bhāva: "Outside of the characteristics of a dharma, what can indeed be its bhāva?" But a commentary says: The nature of a dharma in the three time periods is not transformed; there is only difference in the fact of its activity or non-activity, etc.: this is the bhāva of a dharma. But this transformation (parināma) is not similar to that of the Sāṅkhya: these latter say that the nature of the dharma is eternal and yet it transforms itself into the twenty-three tattvas. Now the nature of a conditioned dharma is not eternal. It is by reason of this modification,—activity, non-activity, etc.,—that we speak of transformation. The theories established by Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva are also irreproachable: they do not present any great difference from that of Vasumitra. Only Vasumitra gives a solid and simple explanation. Furthermore the Śāstra Master (Vasubandhu), in agreement with the Vibhāṣa, prefers it . . .

99. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 393c18: Sensation not yet experienced is future; while one experiences it, it is present; experienced, it is past . . .

100. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 394c5: Is activity the same thing as the nature of a dharma? Is it different? It is not possible to say that it is the same thing nor that it is different . . .

101. On the definition of abhātva bhāvaḥ, see the sources quoted Madhyamakavrtti, p. 263, Majjhima, iii.25, Sīkṣāsamuccaya, 248, Milinda, 52, etc.

102. svabhāvah sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityās ca neṣyate / na ca svabhāvad bhāvo'nyo vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam //

Quoted by Prajñākaramati, Bodhicaryāvatāra, p. 581, who utililzes (p. 579-582) the Kośa without citing his source.

That is: The self nature (svabhāva, svalakṣaṇa) of rūpa, etc., always exists; but the being, rūpa, etc. (rūpadibhāva), is not held to be eternal. Would it thus be different from its self nature? No, it is not different from its self nature. Purely arbitrary, this theory is an arbitrary action, which has no justification (nātra yuktiḥ asti).
103. *Samyukta*, 13.21 (TD 2, p. 92b15?).

104. According to Hsüan-tsang: "the word 'is' is applied to what exists, as well as to what does not exist." Bodhicaryāvatāra, 581.17: astiśabdasya nīpatatvāt kālatrayavṛttitvam. See ii.55d, page 245 of our translation.

105. Or, according to one variant: "on the subject of the Parīvrājākas..." This refers to the monks who assassinated Maudgalyāyana and who affirmed the non-existence of past action: yat karmābhyātām taṃ nāsti.

According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, this Sūtra is found in *Madhyama* 4.10; according to the *Vyākhyā*, in the *Samyuktakāgama*. Neither Jātaka 522, nor the *Dhammapada* commentary (x.7), which recounts the death of Maudgalyāyana, gives the name of the Parīvrājākas.


107. *Abhūd bhavisyati ca*: that which, in the present, has been or will be "visible," is the object.


110. *Lo rtsi ba pa rnam*, "troops in the rain." One should add this quotation to the two passages mentioned by Garbe, *Sāmkhya-Philosophie*, p. 36, *Yogabhāṣya*, iii.52 and *Sāmkhyatattvavākamudī*, ad 47. Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 634a5.


112. Hsüan-tsang: "The past and the future truly exist, as does the present. All those who, here, are not capable of explaining [gloss of the Japanese editor, "the objections of the Sautrāntikas"] and who desire their own good (Mahāvyutpatti, 245.1201), should know that 'The nature of things is very profound;' it is not of the sphere of reasoning. Do those who are not capable of explaining it have the right to deny it? (ch'i pu neng shib pien po wei wu 豈不能釋義為無).

Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 634c19-635a2) protests with vigor: "Do not attribute to the Vaibhāṣikas opinions which are not theirs!... What are the difficulties that I have not explained?"

I do not believe that Stcherbatski’s version, p. 91, is correct. dran ba = t'ung-shib 通釋 = mī = to explain. There is no reason to correct "undoubtedly" by bhiad pa which is not suggested either by Hsüan-tsang or by Samghabhadra, although MacGovern thinks so.

113. Added by Paramārtha.

114. Adhvasamgrhīvatvāt = adhvasvabhāvatvāt, i.7c.

115. *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 394b19: "When future conditioned (saṃskṛta) things arise, should
one say that they arise having already arisen, or that they arise not yet having arisen? What harm is there in admitting either of these hypotheses? Both of them are bad . . .

"Answer: One should say that the dharma, already arisen, arises by reason of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya): this means that all dharmas already possess their self natures, each one of them remains in its nature and, already possessing this nature, one says that it has arisen. But it has not arisen from causes and conditions: even though its nature is already arisen, one says that it arises because it is produced by a complex of causes and conditions. On the other hand, an unarisen dharma arises by reason of cause and conditions: that is, a future dharma is qualified as non-arisen because it presently arises from causes and conditions . . ."

116. Above note 112 and page 821; the Japanese editor glosses vastu as "having the nature of anusaya, etc."

117. The Vyākhyā defines tadviṣayaś as prabhānaprakāraviṣayaś.

118. Vastu glossed as above; the defilements, v.4.

119. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor: he continues to be bound to the Truth of Suffering (that is to say to the five upādānas and kārmanās considered as suffering).

120. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 449a25.

121. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 457 and following.

122. Anāya divaśa = anāya vartanyā.

123. See v.3, 17-18, 39.


125. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 313b15. See above note 21 and vi.58b.

126. For the calculation of the dravyas, "distinct things," see v.4-5a, 5b-c. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 243c20, p. 247b29.

127. See Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 248b11.

128. They are independent because they are associated with rāga, etc. (Vyākhyā).

129. See Atthasālini, 369, trans. 475. Avidyā is the root of other āśravas and of saṁsāra. It is said: avidyā hetuḥ samārāgaya . . . and yāḥ kāścana durgatayo . . . (Itivuttaka, Para. 40); see vi.3.

130. According to the author: vineyajanavanād drṣṭiyogah prthag uktah.

131. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 248a22: This name is not justified either by the aspect (ākāra) or by the object (alambana) of this upādāna . . . Whereas the defilements of Kāmadhātu take place (pravartate) by reason of the pleasure of lust, by reason of external objects, by reason of enjoyment (bhoga), and by reason of another, and are consequently called kāmopādāna, the defilements of the two higher spheres are of opposite character and are produced internally: thus they are called ātmavādopādāna.

132. Anaśātadībbhī: by means of starvation, by throwing oneself into water or fire (jalāṅgiprapatana), by silence (mauna), or by wearing rags (cirādāna).

133. Itivitiṣayaparivarjanenā: all types of ascetic practices: rasapariyātāga, bhūmiṣayyā, malapaṅkadhāraṇa, nagnacaryā, keśolluṅcana, etc. On the other ascetic practices, etc., see iv.64, 86 and v.7, 8.
134. The *Vibhāṣa* (*TD* 27, p. 248a4) contains an interesting text by Ghoṣaka.

135. The etymology of *upādāna* is *bhavam upādadāti* "who grasps *bhava*" (see above note 3). Now *avidyā* does not “grasp” (see above note 3). The *Vibhāṣa*, (*TD* 27, p. 247c7) gives several explanations.

136. The author, according to the *Vyākhya*. According to Hui-hui, the Sautrāntika says: "The *upādānas* have *ṛga* for their nature: *ṛga* with respect to the five enjoyments is *kāmopādāna*; with respect to the sixty-two *ṛṣīṣis*, it is *ṛṣṭyupādāna*; with respect to the *śilavratas*, it is *śilavrastopādāna*; and with respect to the *ātmavāda* of the three Dhātus, it is *ātmavadopādāna*.

137. Our Sūtra gives ten synonyms. The first three are mentioned in the *Vyākhya*. The list of *Anguttara*, ii.10, has eight terms: *kāmarāga*, *nandi*, *sneha*, *muccā*, *pīpāśā*, *parīlāha*, *jjhosāna*, and *tanha* (see also *Samyutta*, iv.188, *Vibhaṅga*, 374). The version of Hsüan-tsang has twelve terms.

138. Compare *Samyutta*, iii.101: *api ca yo tattha (pañcupādānakkhandhesu) chandaṅgo tam tattha upādānam ti* (see also iii.167, iv.89).

139. In other words, it is only *ṛga* which is *yoga* or *upādāna*.

140. The *Vibhāṣa*, *TD* 27, p. 257a23, gives only three explanations: 1. they are atomic; 2. they constitute *anusaya* (sui-tseng 随增); 3. *sui-fu* 随縛 which corresponds to *rjes su 'braṅ ba = anusambh*. Vasubandhu adds *sui-chu* which corresponds to *rjes 'brel = anusaj*.

P'u-kuang believes that "atomic" explains *ayya*, and that the other terms explain *anusa* (and this appears to be the thought of Vasubandhu); for Hui-k'ai, the four terms explain *anusaya* (and this is the thesis of Samghabhadra).

1) Before the defilements (*kleśa*) are manifested, their mode of existence (*pracāra, pravṛtti*) is difficult to know. They are thus subtle (*anusu*). This is why Ānanda says: "I do not know if I produce or if I do not produce a thought of pride (*māna*) with respect to my companions." He does not say that he does not produce a thought of pride because the mode of existence of the *anusaya* of pride is difficult to know. If Ānanda does not know of the existence or the non-existence of a prideful thought, how much less so *prthagjanas*. Such is also the case for the other *anusayas*.

According to another opinion, the *anusayas* are subtle, because they accomplish their *anusayana* in a very short (*anusu*) period of time (*ksana*).

2) They accomplish their *anusayana* (they become active or nourish themselves) in two ways: from the fact of their object (*ālambanatas*), and from the fact of their *samprayuktas* (*samprayogatas*). How is this? As we have explained, either (a) as an enemy (*sātvarat*) searching out a weak point (*chidrānvesin*) or as a serpent who poisons by his glance (*ṛṣṭīvasavat*); (b) as a ball of hot iron heats up water or as the serpent who poisons through contact (*sparśiḥvasavat*).

These two, the *ālambana* and the *samprayuktas*, are similar to the nourishment that *anusayana* creates for an infant: it causes the infant to grow and causes his talents to accumulate (*upacaya*) little by little; in the same way the *ālambana* and the *samprayuktas* make the series of the *kleśa* grow and accumulate.

3) They adhere: they produce the adhesion of the *prāptis* in a beginningless series.

4) They bind: for they are very difficult to put down, like quartan fever (Huber, *Sūtralāmākāra*, p. 177) or rat poison. According to another opinion, they bind, that is, they, their *prāptis* always follow after (*anusu*): like the water of the ocean . . .

For these reasons these two types of *kleśa* receive the name of *anusaya*.

ii. The Tibetan translates (a) *phra-rgyas* = "atomic-extended," because, says Candra Das, the *anusaya* "first comes into insignificant form and then assumes more important dimensions;" (b) *bag-la-nal; nal = "to lie down, sleep;" perhaps *bag la* signifies: "with
respect to;" the variant of Jaschke, bag-med-pa = "in the absence of fear" is probably not relevant here.

Chinese equivalents: sui-mien 隨眠 = "anu-sleep;" yin-mien 陰眠 = "darkness-sleep." iii. Non-technical use of anuseti, anusayitum, references of Morris, JPTS. 1886, p. 123: "to adhere closely to," "to continue, to endure." Samyutta, ii.65, anuseti = ceteti, pakappeti, "to will, imagine, consider."

141. Anusāṅga = rjes su 'brel, Mahāvyutpatti, 281.122. Vyākhyā: alambanāt samprayuktabhya vā svām samātinām vairbhayanantāḥ prāptibhir upacīvantaḥ: increasing their series, either by reason of their object, or by reason of their associated dharma, they fix it by means of the prāptis. Anubadhanātīti anukrāntoḥ cāturthakāryavaran mūṣikāvīsavaḥ ca: they bind, because they "follow" like the quartan fever or like the poison of a rat (Bodhīcaryāvatāra, ix.24).

142. Šukladvaśāna: kleṣakaṇapam akuśalamūlam āśravāntītī avidyābhavādṛśīkāmsāravās catvārāḥ.

143. According to Hsüan-tsang: The anupayas remove good (kuśala).

144. According to Hsüan-tsang: The anupayas bind beings. The Vyākhyā has a lacuna here. It gives kleśayanti—which corresponds to 'byor byed—which appears to be a copyist’s error for kleśayanti.

145. The Vyākhyā interprets these definitions: ogha comes from the root vah; haranti is thus the equivalent of vahanti. The anupayas are oghas because they transport the mental series into another existence, or from object to object (viśayāntara). They are yogas because they bind this series to another existence, or to an object. They are upādānas because they grasp this series and put it into a new existence, or into sense objects (kāma).

146. Explanation of the Saṃpratīnikas (Vyākhyā).

147. Samyukta TD 2, p. 128b29. Compare anusotagāmin and the paṭisotagāmin of Aṅguttara, i.5.


149. On these different categories, Mahāvyutpatti, 109.52 and following: saṃyojana, bandhana, anūṣaya, paryuttbhāna, upakleśa, paryavasthāna, paryavanadāba, āśrava, ogha, yoga, upādāna, grānta, nivaraṇa. Paryutthāna = kun nas lān ba; paryavasthāna (var. paryupasthāna) = kun nas dkrīs pa; paryavanadāba = yoǐs su dkrīs pa. On the nivaraṇas, Kośa, iv. trans. p.678, Dīgha, i.246.


151. One distinguishes three saṃyojanas that the Srotāpañña abandons (Kośa, vi.43c-d), discussed in Viśāṣa, TD 27, p. 236b19; nine saṃyojanas (Viśāṣa, p. 258a3); five saṃyojanas, namely rāga, pratīgha, māna, īryā, and mātsarya (Viśāṣa, p. 252a21).

The sword saṃyojana means "bond" (bīṣ-fu 緊縛), "connection with suffering," "nourishment mixed with poison." The Āryans are disgusted with even the best rebirths and with impure (āśrava) absorptions, such as the apramāṇas, vimokṣas, abhibhāyatanas, and kṛṣṇāyatanas (see Kośa, viii), as with a food mixed with poison.

Vasumitra explains why only five kleṣas are "bonds": "Only the defilements which embrace error (mī 迷) with respect to things (dravya) and which are svadakṣaṇakleṣas (v.23) bind the mind. Three defilements are of this type,—rāga, pratīgha, māna,—and are thus "bonds." The five views and doubt are saṃmāyakleṣas (v.23) which include error of
reasoning [and bear on non-existent things, such as the "self"]. Avidyā includes these two errors, but, more frequently, only the second one; thus it is not cut off like a "bond." Among the paryavasthāṇas, jealousy and egoism (īrṣyā, mātisārya) are bonds: error with respect to things, they trouble the two categories of persons (monks and laity), they trouble humans and gods, and do evil to many. The other paryavasthāṇas do not do this."

The Abhidhammasamgaha (Compendium, p. 172), numbers the samyojanas in the Suttas and Abhidhamma.

152. There exists a non-universal (asarvatraga) drṣṭisamyojana consisting of mithyādṛṣṭi, to be abandoned through the Truths of Nirodha and the Path; but its objects are the pure dhammas (v.18); it does not bear on the dhammas associated with the parāmarṣas.


154. Vyākyā: "The reason proposed does not raise any difficulty" (na bhavaty ayaṁ paribhāraḥ). What then is the reason given? On this point, Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 643b16):

"By reason of their intense activity, īrṣyā and mātisārya constitute separate samyojanas . . . " The Vyākyā reproduces the essentials of the text of Samghabhadra and gives some fragments of the Kārikā that this master adds to the Kārikās of Vasubandhu in the Samayapradīpa (Taishō no. 1563). Hsūn-tsang attributes the said Kārikā to Vasubandhu (TD 29, p. 108b25) and here (p. 108c18-24) places the following commentary in the Bhāṣyam: "When one admits the existence of the ten paryavasthāṇas, one should say: īrṣyā and mātisārtya constitute distinct samyojanas for four reasons: (1) by reason of their intense activity (abhikṣasamuddcdritvāt); (2) because they produce, in good realms of rebirth, lack of power and of goods (alpeidkhya, alpabhogakāraṇatvāt)—a just punishment for jealousy and greed; (3) because they indicate the totality of the klesas (sarvasūcaranāḥ), which are either sad (samātāpasabagata) or happy (āmodasabagata); (4) because they torment two categories of persons (dvipaksaklesamatvāc, ca; Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 259a28): the laity and the clergy (jealousy over goods, jealousy over spiritual attainments), gods and Asuras, gods and humans, oneself and others. Thus they have been set aside (mātisarayersye prṭhak kṛte).

[The Blessed One said: "gods and humans, Oh Kauśika, are bound by jealousy and greed": these are par excellence (ādbhikṣaṇa) the klesas of the good realms of rebirth.]

Paramārtha also attributes the following kārikā to Vasubandhu: . . . The reason proposed does not raise difficulties . . . The stanza says: "Because they are the causes of (rebirth in) a non-noble family and of poverty, because they involve all others, because they torment the two categories (of persons), jealousy and greed are separate samyojanas." The commentary says: "There are other masters who say that among the paryavasthāṇas, jealousy and greed present three defects. Through jealousy, one is reborn into a miserable family."

155. Madhyama TD 1, p. 778c15 (=Majjhima, i.432; Māluṇkāyaputra = man-t'ung-tze

156. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 252b25: "Why are these five called avarabhāgiya? What is the meaning of this expression? These five samyojanas manifest themselves (samudācāra) in the lower sphere, are abandoned in this same sphere, bind birth (i.e., being about rebirth) and produce outflowing and retributive results in this same sphere."

157. Apare, according to the Vyākyā, refers to the Yogacarins. Theory presented in Vibhāṣā, ibid.

158. Ekottara, TD 2, p. 630a8; Samyukta, TD 2, p. 264b24ff, p. 342b25. The Sūtra, according to the Vyākyā, begins: kiyatā bhadanta srotāpanno bhavati / yata ca Mahānāmaṁ āryaśrīvaka idam duḥkham āryasatyam . . . iyunā duḥkhanirodhagāmiṇi pratiṣṭad āryasatyam iti yathābhūtam prajānti triṁśi cāśya samyojanāṇi prabhāṇi bhavanti paripīṭāṇi tadyathā satkāyaḥdṛṣṭiḥ
159. "According to the School, there are three types of Klefas." This refers to Darśanaheya, v.4. Hsüan-tsang: "The true explanation is that, whereas the Srotāpānna abandons six klefas, it is said that he abandons three, because these three comprise . . ."

160. Apare, according to the Vyākyā, refers to the author.

161. Dirgha, TD 1, p. 51b12; Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 253c2: " . . . they cause one to rise, to turn towards the heights, and the series to be reborn above . . ."

162. Ekottara, TD 2, p. 589c20, Sāhyukta, TD 2, p. 227a11. Rāga is of three spheres as is moha (avidyā): "all rāga" and "all moha" mean rāga and moha in whichever sphere and of whichever type (mode of expulsion, v.5) they belong to. Dveṣa (pratīgha) exists only in Kāmadhātu: "all dveṣa" means dveṣa of whichever type.

The bandhanas do not figure in the lists of the Saṅgītisutta, etc.; but see Saṃyutta, iv.292.

163. See above note 5 and v.55a-b.

164. Vyākyā: There is rāga and dveṣa on the occasion of the sensation of indifference, but not in the same way that there is moha; this latter, being dull (apatu), more easily develops in the sensation of indifference which is dull. Or rather, one should understand that the rule refers to rāga, dveṣa, and moha relative to personal sensation. Others understand: Rāga and dveṣa do not exist in the same manner; that is, dveṣa enters into activity on the occasion of an agreeable sensation of an enemy taken as an object (ālambanatah); the same for rāga on the occasion of a disagreeable sensation of an enemy. Or rather, the rule extends to personal sensation: rāga in the agreeable sensation that one experiences oneself, because it is taken as an object through association; not in the agreeable sensation of an enemy. Compare Nettippakaraṇa, p. 32; āśūkhamasukhāya bi vedanāya avijjā anuseti. Compare Yogasūtra, ii.7-8: sukhānusayi rāgah / duḥkhānusayi dveṣah. See the theory of the svalaksanaklefas above, v.23.

165. Hsüan-tsang makes a pāda out of this, with a short commentary: "What are the anuṣayas? The kārikā says: "The anuṣayas have been mentioned." The Bhāṣyam says: "The anuṣayas are six, or seven, or ten, or ninety-eight, as has been explained. The anuṣayas having been explained, one asks concerning the upaklefas."

166. The Vyākyā quotes the Saṅstra: ye yāvat kleśā upakleśā api te syuh / upakleśā na kleśā.

The upakkilesa of Aṅguttara, ii.53, Atthasālini, 380, have nothing in common with the defilements or klefas.

167. The author excludes cetanā, etc. with the words "those which are enumerated in the Kṣudravastuka." The Vyākyā quotes the list of the Kṣudravastuka, with their unfortunately doubtful readings: aratī, vijṛmbbhikā (Aṅguttara i.3, Sānyutta v.64, Vibhanga, 33) cetaso līnatva, tandri (= jaḍata), bhakte'samāta (= bhattasammadā) [see below v.59b], nānātvasamāja (= ajoniso)manaskāra, kāyadaśṭhulya, ṣṛṅgi (=ṣinga, Vibhanga, 351; Aṅguttara, ii.26; Morris, 1885, p. 53), santiṭika ( ), MS. bhūṭṭirikā, Vibhanga, 351, Aṅguttara, v.149, santiṣa (= malla), anārjavata, amārdavata, asabhāgānuwartanā (anabhāgavutti), kāmaviṭṭhika (Madhūnīdāsa, p. 501), vyāpādaviṭṭhika, vihimsāviṭṭhika, jñātiviṭṭhika, janapadaviṭṭhika, amaraviṭṭhika (v.59b), apamanyānāpratisamāyukta viṭṭhika ( ) (MS.
acaranyanā; Mahānīddesa, etc.: parānuddayatā pratisamāyukta vitarka, sūkṣa dhūkṣa dāuraṃmanasya- upāyāsāh. See ii.27, English trans. 198; page 851.

Samghabhadra is content to indicate the number of upakleṣas, twenty-one, which confirms our list. Nine vitakkas in the Mahānīddesa.

168. Kleśo'pi hi paryavasthānāṁ kāmarāga-paryavasthānapratyayam duḥkham pratisamāv-dayata iti sūtravacanatā. See above p. 768.

169. There is "compression" of the mind in absorption (samāpatti); thus one adds: "which renders it incapable . . ." in order to be more precise.

170. Ami . . . sattvāḥ . . . vādyantam vā śrīyantam vā anayanāvyananam āpadyantām ityākārapravṛṣto vyāpādaḥ / sattvākaraṇāsanamātṛatā prajāndikārma-pravṛṣṭā vibhīmā / tāḥyām anyāḥ sattvāsattvayor āghaftaḥ krodhaḥ / tadyathā śīkṣākāmasya bhikṣoṣ citta-prakopah kaṭṭakādīśu ca prakopāḥ iti. Vyāpāda manifests itself through curses or maledicitions: "May they perish, may they go at a bad hour!;" vibhīmā, through bad treatment, threats, etc.; krodha differs from the preceding: this is an irritation against persons and things, the discontent of a bhikṣu who desires that one instruct him (?) with respect to obstacles, etc.


172. Jñātajñānānā. The Chinese understands: "Accordingly as this refers to persons who are ignorant or who know." The Vyākhya explains: rājādibhir jñātānām mṛkaṣavatām padgalānām mṛkaṣaḥ trṣṇānīyando mā me lābbasatkāro na bhaviṣyatīti / ajñātānām avidyānīśyandāḥ karmayakatām (?) aśraddadānas tadādyaṁ prachchādayati na parasyānike viṣuḍdhartham daśayati / One hides his faults, either because he fears some damage or some loss of esteem; or because he does not believe that he can "transcend his actions" (karmavyāsitikrama) and that he abstains from confessing in order to purify himself, as he should. Jñāta = yasassī, Majjhima, iii.38.

173. Not in Hsūn-tsang.

174. We have encountered the same expression iv.8a, where Hsūn-tsang translates: "in order to avoid the inquiries of Aśvajit." Here he translates here: "Or to falsely deny . . ." According to P. Cordier, iv.8a: "In order to utter a puff of words, to make one's own praise," that is, "To utter only vain words . . .," and v.49: "The crooked mind thanks to which, not recognizing reality as it truly is, one utters words that are obscure and empty of meaning." See page 846.

175. According to Paramārtha: kaustulyam iti katamo dharmāḥ / mithyādṛṣṭyādṛṣṭiḥ. See iv.59.

176. Svatantra na rāgadīparanantarāḥ, not dependent on rāga, etc.

177. Vitathātmasamāndarśanatayetyā vitathābyātmanabḥ sandarśanatayā mahābhrahmā āyuṣmantam aśvajitām vācyāyam pravṛṣṭā / kutremāṁ brahmaṇ mahābhūtāny aparīśam nirudhyanta iti prīṣo'prajāṇaṁ kṣepam akārṣit / abhām asmi brahmaḥ mahābhrahmā śivarāṃ kartāḥ nirmātā śrāṣṭaḥ [abhyaṣaḥ] pitṛbhūto bhūtyabhavyānām iti māyaya ekānte asthād ekānte sthitāś ca cedam uktavān / vidyāmāne tathāgata māṁ prāṣṭavānmanyase itidam asya śāthyaṁ dṛṣṭaye / svapiṣallajjayaḥ hy ātmīyam a[kusala]tām nigūhaṁ añāsa tathā kṛṣṭavāṁ iti /

The MSS has śrāṣṭā tyajah pāṛbhūśo; Dīgha, i.221: nimmātā setho sañjīta vasi pitā (on satijīta, O. Franke, p. 26); Dīgha (xxiii.9, 83): śrāṣṭā nimmātā asmi sattvānām pitā mātā (S. Le'vi).

178. See v.45d.
179. According to Hsüan-tsang: "Avidyā is associated with the first four indriyas, (sukha, saumanasya, duhkha, and daurmanasya), having the aspect of joy and despondency and belonging to the six vijñānas."

180. The Bhāṣyam explains manahsukha as saumanasya.

181. The Bhāṣyam gives a resume of these explanations: caturvijñānakāyikās caturvijñānakāyikās samprayuktabh.

182. Bhāṣyam: manobhumikā manobhumikā eva samprayuktabh: "the anusayas of the sphere of the manas are associated only with the indriyas of the sphere of the manas."

183. According to Hsüan-tsang: " . . . below, to saumanasyendriya. The upakleśas described above are all associated with upekṣendriya, for at the moment of the cutting off of the series (see page 848, line 17) all are found together with upekṣa, for there is a pratipad (vi.66) which is exclusively of the upekṣābhumī. In the same manner there is no restriction . . . ."

184. Saṁyukta, TD 2, p. 189c17; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 674a15; the Sūtra quoted iv.77, trans. note 358; Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 194c22, five nivaraṇas, and meaning of this term; p. 250c15, why they are enumerated in this order (opinion of Vasumitra, etc.).

According to the Abhidhammasaṅgāba, six nivaraṇas (by adding avidyā), see Compendium, 172 and note (nivaraṇa = obstacle to dhyāna); compare Kośa, iv. English trans., note 456, Atthasālīni, 377.


186. The sthāna of the Yogasūtra, i.30, is styāna.

187. This is the doctrine of the Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 250b27.

188. Saṁyukta 27. See above note 167; Saṁyutta, v.64, Aṅguttara, i.3. For alokasamjña, see Dīgha, iii.49, 223.

189. The Mahāmiddlesa (see above note 167) quotes these three vitarkas: preoccupation relating to one’s parents [Vibhāṣa: By reason of the parents who either thrive or decline, either separated or close by, one produces joy, sadness, and the mind gives rise to calculation or prevision], relating to one’s land, relating to the deathless ones [Vibhāṣa: By reason of the small number of years and of old age, to do good to another . . . , to produce joy or sadness]; see Vibhaṅga, p. 356 and Saundarananda xv. The fourth cause is the remembrance of former merry-making and companions: rgod rjes pa rga ba dga’ mgur yons su sphyod pa rjes su dran pa.

190. Cetaso vyupasamo in Aṅguttara, i.4.

191. Paramārtha omits the word "five."

192. Hsüan-tsang adds: "and consequently vimuktī and vimuktijñānadarsana cannot arise" (see vi.75c).

193. Apare. Hsüan-tsang: "If one explains the sense of the Sūtra thus, auddhatya-kaukṛtya should be listed before styāna-middha: for it is by reason of this absorption that discrimination arises, and the obstacles to this absorption should be listed before the obstacle to discrimination. For this reason, other masters say that these two nivaraṇas destroy in the order in which they are listed . . . ." [According to the Japanese editor, these other masters are the Sautrāntikas].

Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 250c19: Vasumitra says: "At the obtaining of an agreeable object, there is kāmacchanda; upon losing this object, there is pratigba; once this object is lost, the mind is depressed and weakened (lei-jo 龜弱 ) and one engenders styāna; then the mind is troubled (kweix 慣 : praduṣṭa?) and "overclouded" (men: 悶 durdina??); one the engenders middha; awakening from middha, one engenders auddhatya; after auddhatya,
there is kaukṛtya and finally vicikītsā. Such is the order of the five nīvaraṇas."

194. A quotation from the Sūtra, according to Hsüan-tsang.

195. According to the Japanese editor, the Sautrāntikas; former masters according to the Vyākhyā.

196. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 114b2. According to one opinion, the anuṣayas are abandoned in four ways: 1. through the abandoning of the object: these are the anuṣayas of an impure object (sāravālandana) abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path; 2. through the abandoning of the defilements which grasp them as their object: these are the anuṣayas which bear on another sphere. . . . According to Vasumitra, in five ways: 1. abandoning through seeing the object: these are the anuṣayas of a pure object and the universal anuṣayas in their own spheres; 2. abandoning through the abandoning of the object: these are the anuṣayas of an impure object abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path; 3. abandoning through the abandoning of the defilement which grasps them as its object: these are the universal anuṣayas which bear on a different sphere; 4. abandoning through the abandoning of the object and of the defilement which grasps them as its object (chǔ yuan tian ku tian 俱緣斷故斷): the non-universal anuṣayas abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and Arising; 5. abandoning through the acquisition of its opposite (pratipakṣa): these are the anuṣayas abandoned through Meditation. On the whole, Vasubandhu follows this opinion.

197. The visabhāgadhatuvatsaratragas are the object of the satkāyadrṣṭi group; they are destroyed through the destruction of this group.

198. Through the abandoning of the kleṣa of the mitbhādṛṣṭi group which are [abandoned through the Truth of Extinction, and the Truth of the Path (v.14),] and which are the object of the drṣṭiparāmarṣa group, the drṣṭiparāmarṣas, etc., which have an impure object, are abandoned.

199. This refers to the ushima, etc. (vi.17). This preparatory path only considers Suffering and its Arising.

200. These four paths are defined vi.65b-d.

201. Hsüan-tsang renders the ablative (alambanā) by sui 隨.; but he translated kutas as ts'ung bo 從何 (through separation from what?); in Samghabhadra’s work, ts'ung is used throughout.

202. Hsüan-tsang: It is not possible that the kleśa abandons its associated dharmas [citta-caittas of the nīkāyasabhāga]; it is only possible that it is separated from its object.

The Japanese editor quotes the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 113b25: “it is said that the anuṣayas should be abandoned with respect to (yū 於) their object, not with respect to the dharmas associated (sāmprayukta) with the mind. The force of their opposition causes the anuṣaya to not arise with respect to this object: it is in this way that the anuṣaya is abandoned, that is, in the same way that a man prevents his son from going back to a drinking house, to a house of debauchery, or to a gambling house. [It would be impossible for him to cause the . . . with the mind.] Consequently it is said that there is no abandoning with respect to the said dharmas.”

Hui-hui says: ‘The associated dharmas are the `mind and its mental states' of the existence (nīkāyasabhāga) under consideration. One cannot separate them from the defilements. If the defilements do not arise any more with respect to the object, this is what is called their abandoning. When one abandons the defilements, one solely abandons the personal defilements (svāsamāntika): how can one thus say that the defilements are abandoned with respect to the object . . . ’

Sūtrālāṃkāra, xvii.19: The defilement is declared to be the object, for it is said: "Through the abandoning of the bonds made of consciousness the object is annihilated"
"The defilements should be abandoned through separation from the object (ālambanāti klesāh prabhāsavyāh), for it is through the force of the "complete knowledge" (parijñāna) of the object that the defilements are abandoned. The object of the anusayās is twofold: saṃyogavastu or asaṃyogavastu. Possession (prāpti, ii.36) of the anusayās which have for their object (or sphere, visāya = ālambana) a saṃyogavastu, and also of the anusayās which do not have such an object but which are produced by the first anusayās, exists in the series which constitutes a being; even when this series is of non-defiled mind, this possession continues uninterruptedly, the effect and the cause of past and future defilements respectively. The same holds for possession of the anusayās which has for its object an asaṃyogavastu and for anusayās not having such an object and which becomes active immediately after the defilements which have such an object: presently existing possession is the cause of the production of the future defilement, and the outflowing effect of the former defilement.

But the possession of the anusayās is opposed (viruddha) by the presence (samavatibhāna) in the series of the possession which proceeds from a path of abandoning opposing the anusayās: for it is this possession of the anusayās which supports the present and the future defilements which are possessed thanks to it. It results from this—some defilements produced through a certain object setting into motion some defilements which have another object—that when [a good possession is produced], the outflowing of a path embracing the abandoning of this certain object, the possession of the defilements disappears, and the possessed defilements, even though they remain the same with respect to their object, nevertheless no longer have [the possession] which is their cause and their result; so one cannot say that they are abandoned. When the object is not "completely known," the possessions, effects and causes of past and future defilements, continue uninterruptedly as possessions of the defilements bearing on this object as well as the possessions of the defilements having another object but produced by the first. When the object is "completely known," the possession is interrupted. Thus the abandoning of the defilements takes place through separation from its object (ālambanāti)."

But, if one means to say that the defilements are abandoned through "the abandoning of their objects, etc.," why say that they are abandoned through the force of the "complete knowledge" of the object? They are in fact abandoned through the force of the "complete knowledge" of the Truth of Suffering, etc., existing when this latter is missing, and not existing when this latter is present. Those who say that the defilements are abandoned through the force of their opposition should admit that the defilements abandoned through Meditation are abandoned through the force of the complete knowledge of the Truth of Suffering, etc., which is their object. (Vyākyā).

204. According to Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 83a8; Prakaraṇa, TD, p. 26a6. For other removings, ii.67a, iv.7c, p. 571.

205. The Abhidharma says: dure dharmāḥ katame / atītānāgata dharmāḥ / antike dharmāḥ katame / prayutpannā dharmā asamkṛtām ca. Quoted by Aryadeva, Catuspatikā, 258, Memoires As. Soc. Bengal, iii.8 (1894, p. 492), argument concerning past and future. On distant and near rūpa, see i.20a-b (English trans. pp. 77 and following).

206. This is the explanation of the Sautrāntikas; according to the Vyākyā: evaṁ tu yuktāṁ syād iti svamatām ācāryāya.

207. de dag gi / bral ba'i thob pa yan dan yan / = [visaṃyogalābhah tebhyah punah punah ] One takes possession many times, and in a firmer and firmer manner, of the unconditioned dharma which is Nirvāṇa, the pratisamkhyānirodha or visaṃyoga of the defilements (i.6, ii.55d, 57d).
208. This refers to the five faculties (ii.2a-b, English trans. p. 155) (śraddhā, etc.) that the ascetic increases (vivṛddhā), makes evolve or transposes (sāmcāra), and makes sharp (tikṣṇa).

209. Hsüan-tsang introduces into his translation (TD 29, p. 112a1-16) the following commentary: "Let us consider the ascetic whose faculties are weak (mṛda): a. There six times when the acquisition of disconnection from the defilements of Kāmadhātu abandoned through Seeing the Truths takes place: 1. arising of the opposition, namely diverse dharmajñānās of Suffering, etc.; 2-5. the acquisition of the four results; and 6. at the moment when the moral faculties become strong (tikṣṇa).

The same for disconnection from the defilements of the two higher spheres abandoned through Seeing the first three Truths. (Here the opposition is anvayajñāna).

b. For the defilements of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātus abandoned through Seeing the fourth Truth, only five moments are counted, because the time of the arising of their opposition (namely mārgēnvayajñāna) is also the time of the acquisition of the first result (srotāśpattiśphala).

c. For the first five categories of defilement of Kāmadhātu abandoned through Meditation, only five moments are counted: for one should exclude the acquisition of the first result which is earlier than the abandoning of these first five categories.

d. For the sixth category of these same defilements, four moments: for the time of the arising of the opposition (namely the sixth vimuktiṁārga) is also the time of the acquisition of the second result (sakṛdāgāmipāṭha).

e. For the seventh and eighth categories of these same defilements, four moments are counted, since the acquisition of the first two results is earlier than the abandoning of these two categories.

f. For the ninth category of these same defilements, three moments are counted: (1) arising of the opposition (ninth vimuktiṁārga) which is confused with the acquisition of the third result (anāgāmipāṭha), (2) acquisition of the fruit of Arhat, and (3) perfecting of the āindriyas.

g. For the defilements of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātus abandoned through Meditation, with the exclusion of the ninth category of Bhavagra (naivasaṁjñānasamjñāyatana), three moments are counted, since the first three results have already been acquired.

h. For the ninth category of the defilements of Bhavagra, two moments are counted, because the arising of the opposition (ninth vimuktiṁārga) is confused with the acquisition of the result of Arhat.

When the ascetic has strong faculties, he should avert, in the eight cases, the moment of the perfecting of his faculties. [Thus, disconnection from the last category of defilements is obtained only once. If the author says: 'and, by reducing the number, down to two times,' this is because he has in view the case of repeated acquisitions (punārīlabha)].

The Ascetic who does not pass through all of the results (ii.16c-d, vi.33a) may reduce these numbers."

210. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 175a12-18: What is āsānaparijñā? Āśā, darśana, vidyā, bodhi, abhisamaya . . . What sort of āśā is called āsānaparijñā? According to some only pure āśā, because the definition employs the term abhisamaya (Kośa, vi.27): now lokasamvṛtiṣijñāna (Kośa, vii.2b) cannot be called abhisamaya.

What is prabhānaparijñā? The complete abandoning of rāga, the complete abandoning of pratisiṣṭha and vicikitsā, the complete abandoning of all the defilements, is called prabhānaparijñā. Perfectly knowing (pari-jñā) an object is called pariṣijñā. Now abandoning does not have an object and does not know. How can one speak of prabhānaparijñā "pariṣijñā which is abandoning?" But prabhāna, being the result of knowledge, also receives the name of pariṣijñā.

The Sautrantikas say that there are two pariṣijñā: 1. jñāpariṣijñā, which is jñāna by nature, and 2. prabhānapariṣijñā, which is prabhāna by nature.
211. In the *Jñānaprasthāṇa*, according to Takakusu, p. 89; the three “worldly” *parināma* (relating to nourishment) are in Childers and *Visuddhimagga*, 606, 692.

212. Hsüan-tsang comments on this first *pāda*: “all are the result of *anāgāmya*, because *anāgāmya* is the support for the abandoning of the defilements of the Three Dhātus abandoned through Seeing and Meditation.” On *anāgāmya*, the absorption preparatory to the First Dhyāna, see vi.47c-d, and viii.22a.

213. The second *pāda* shows that this refers to a *sāmantaka* of Āruṇīya-dhātā; for *anāgāmya* is *sāmantaka* to the First Dhyāna.

214. The pure path does not exist in the Fourth Āruṇīya.

215. *Vikalikrti*, “mutilation,” is the abandoning of one part of Bhavāgra, *bhavāgrapraśeda-prahāṇa*, the abandoning of a part of the defilements relative to the highest stage of existence.


217. Even though the category of *kleśas* abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering is abandoned, as long as the universal cause abandoned through the Seeing of Arising (and which bears on the first category) is not abandoned, there is no destruction of the two causes, and no *parijñā*. Even though the first eight categories of *kleśa* (strong-strong...weak-medium) of a sphere is abandoned, as long as the ninth (weak-weak) is not abandoned, the sphere is not transcended.

Hsüan-tsang adds: “There can be destruction of the two causes without there being ‘transgression of a sphere.’” Thus we establish the fourth alternative. In fact, the destruction of the two causes in the three *bhūmis* (three lower Dhyānas, three lower Āruṇīyas) do not constitute *parijñā* (the seventh and the eighth *parijñā* according to the case).

218. The sixteenth moment (*mārgena-vajñāna*) forms part of the Path of Meditation.

219. The Āryan who has obtained detachment from Kāmadhātu through the worldly path before entering into the “comprehension of the Truths” becomes an Anāgāmin in *mārgena-vajñāna* and possesses, from this *jñāna* onward, only *avṛbhi-prahāṇaparijñā*. However the *anupūrṇa* takes possession of this only later, when he becomes detached from Kāmadhātu (ii.16c-d; viii.6d).

220. The Anāgāmin is called *rupāsavāra*, “detached from Rūpa.”

221. Hsüan-tsang corrects some items.
Orn. Homage to the Buddha.

We have said (v.64) how the abandoning (prahāṇa) of the defilements receives the name of "perfect knowledge" (parijñā). As for abandoning,

1a-b. It has been said that the defilements are abandoned through Seeing the Truths and through Meditation.²

We have explained in detail that some of the defilements are to be abandoned through Seeing, and others through Meditation (v.3c-5a, etc.). Is the Path of Seeing and the Path of Meditation pure (anāsrava) or impure (sāsrava)?

1c-d. The Path of Meditation is of two types; the Path of Seeing is pure.³

The Path of Meditation is worldly or impure as well as transworldly or pure.

The Path of Seeing is opposed to the defilements of the Three Dhātus; it eliminates in one single stroke the nine categories (strong-strong, etc.) of the defilements to be abandoned through Seeing: it is thus exclusively transworldly; now such a power does not belong to a worldly path.
We have said (1b), "through Seeing the Truths." What are the Truths?

2a. The Four Truths have been mentioned.⁴

Where?

In the First Chapter. By saying "The pure dharmas are the Truth of the Path . . ." (i.5), we have designated the Truth of the Path by its name. By saying "Pratisamkhyānirodha is disconnection," (i.6) we have designated the Truth of Extinction. By saying "Suffering, origin, world . . .," we have designated the Truths of Suffering and Origin (i.8).

Is that the order of the Truths?

No. Rather:

2b-c. Namely suffering, origin, extinction, and path.

The word "namely" (tathā) indicates that the nature of the Truths is indeed as has been mentioned in the First Chapter.

2c-d. Their order is that in which they are understood.⁵

The Truth that is understood first is mentioned first. Otherwise there would be the occurrence of first mentioning the cause (Origin and Path) and then the result (Suffering and Extinction).

Sometimes dharmas are arranged in the order in which they arise: this is the case for the applications of mindfulness, the smṛtyupasthānas,⁶ and for the Dhyānas.

Sometimes they are arranged in an order favorable for teaching: this is the case for the right abandonings, the samyak-prahānas,⁷ --existent dharmas and the black dharmas are easier to
understand than non-arisen dharmas and the white dharmas,--for it is not a fixed rule that one should make an effort to abandon the existent dharmas before making an effort for the non-arising of non-arisen dharmas.

The Truths are mentioned in the order in which they are comprehended (abhisamaya).

Why are they comprehended in this order?

Because, in the period preparatory to the Path proper, that is, the period of examination,\(^8\) the ascetic first creates an idea of that to which he is attached, of that by which he is tormented, of that from which he seeks to be delivered, namely, suffering. Then he asks what is its cause, and he creates an idea of its origin. Then he asks what does extinction consist of, and he creates an idea of extinction. Then he asks what is the Path to extinction, and he creates an idea of the path. (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 404bll).

So too, having seen a disease, one searches out its origin, its disappearance, and its remedy. This illustration of the Truths is also given in the Sūtra.

In which Sūtra? In the Sūtra which says, "Endowed with the four qualities, the doctor . . . ".\(^9\)

In the order in which, in the course of the period of examination, he creates an idea of the Truths, in this same order, having reached the period of comprehension, he understands the Truths, because comprehension is projected by the preparatory exercises, the same way that a horse gallops without obstacle over familiar terrain.

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What is the meaning of the word abhisamaya (comprehension)? This word signifies abhisamābodha, "understanding, comprehension." The root i signifies "to understand."
Why is comprehension only pure? Because it is a knowledge (aya) turned towards (abhi) Nirvāṇa and the true (sam, samyak). Samyak means conforming to reality.\textsuperscript{10}

To the extent that they are a result, the five upādānakṣandhas (i.8a-b) are the Truth of Suffering, that which one should see in truth as being suffering. To the extent that they are a cause they are the Truth of Origin or arising, because suffering arises from them\textsuperscript{11} (i.8c). Consequently suffering and arising differ in name, but do not differ in fact, since they are the same upādānakṣandhas considered as result or as cause. But Extinction and the Path differ in fact as well as in name.

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The Sūtra gives the name of āryasatya, truth of the Āryans, to the Truths. What is the meaning of this expression?

They are truth for the Āryans, truths of the Āryans: this is why they are called āryasatya.\textsuperscript{12}

Does this mean that they are false for the non-Āryans? Not being erroneous (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 397a26), they are true for everyone. [But the Āryans see them as they are, that is to say, under sixteen aspects (vii.13): they see suffering, that is, the upādānakṣandhas as suffering, impermanent, etc. Others do not. Therefore, the Truths are called "truths of the Āryans" and not truths of others, because the seeing of these latter is incorrect. In fact, they see what is suffering as being not suffering.] As the stanza says,

"What the Āryans call happy (i.e., Nirvāṇa) others call painful; what others call happy, the Āryans call painful."\textsuperscript{13}

According to other masters,\textsuperscript{14} two are Āryan truths, and two are truths of both Āryans and others.
Since only a part of sensation (vedana) is painful by its nature (duhkha vedana, i.14). how can one say that all impure, conditioned things are suffering?

3. Impure dharmas, whether they are agreeable, disagreeable, or otherwise, are, without exception, suffering, by reason of the three types of suffering, each according to its type.15

There are three types of suffering: suffering which is suffering in and of itself (duhkhaduhkhata), suffering through the fact of being conditioned (samskaraduhkhata), and suffering which is change or transformation (parinamaduhkhata).

By reason of these three, all impure conditioned things, without exception, are suffering: agreeable things are suffering because they are subject to transformation; disagreeable things are suffering in and of themselves; and neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable things are suffering because they are conditioned. What are the agreeable, disagreeable, and neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable dharmas?

The three sensations, in this order; and, by reason of the three sensations, all the samskaras which result in agreeable sensation, etc., receive the name of agreeable, etc.

Agreeable sensation is suffering through transformation, as the Sutra says, "Agreeable sensation is agreeable when it arises, agreeable while it lasts, but suffering in its change."

Disagreeable sensation is suffering by nature, as the Sutra says, "Suffering sensation is suffering when it arises, and suffering while it lasts."

Neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable sensation is suffering
because it is so decreed by its causes, as the Sūtra says, "That which is impermanent is suffering."

The same holds true for the *samskāras* which result in these sensations as for these sensations themselves.\(^{16}\)

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According to other masters, the expressions *duḥkha-duḥkhatā*, etc., should be analysed: *duḥkham eva duḥkhatā* ("suffering is itself suffering"), *viparīnāma eva duḥkhatā* ("transformation is itself suffering"), and *samskāra eva duḥkhatā* ("conditioned things are themselves suffering"). The meaning is the same.

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Agreeable *dharmas* do not participate in suffering which is suffering in and of itself, nor do the disagreeable *dharmas* participate in suffering which is transformation: the second state of suffering belongs to the first ones, and the first to the second ones. But all conditioned things are suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being conditioned, and they are seen under this aspect only by the Āryans. Therefore it is said, "One does not feel a hair placed on the palm of the hand; but the same hair, in the eye, causes suffering and injury. So too the ignorant, resembling the hand, do not feel the hair which is suffering through the fact of being conditioned: but the Āryans, resembling the eye, are tortured by it."\(^{17}\)

The Āryans make of existence in the most sublime heaven (Bhavāgra) an idea more painful than do fools make of existence in the most dreadful hell (Avīci).

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But, one would say, the Path is conditioned; it should thus be suffering from the fact of suffering through the fact of being conditioned.\textsuperscript{18}

The Path is not suffering, because the definition of suffering is to be hateful. Now the Path is not hateful to the Āryans because it produces the extinction of all of the sufferings of arising; when they consider Nirvāṇa as peaceful, what they consider as peaceful is the extinction of what they consider as suffering [namely impure conditioned things, and not the extinction of the Path].

***

But, since the agreeable or happiness does exist, why is only suffering, and not the agreeable, a truth of the Āryans?

1. According to one explanation,\textsuperscript{19} it is because of the slightness of happiness. In the same way that one calls a pile in which some peas are to be found "a pile of beans," so too no one with any intelligence would consider a wound as agreeable because one experiences a very small agreeable sensation when one washes this wound.

2. And further, "Because it is a cause of suffering, because it is produced by many sufferings, because one desires it when one suffers (see p. 903), the agreeable, they conclude, is suffering."\textsuperscript{20}

3. But, even if accompanied by happiness,\textsuperscript{21} existence in its totality has the same flavor of suffering through the fact of being conditioned: Āryans thus consider it as suffering. This is why suffering and not happiness is an Āryan Truth.

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i. But how can Āryans regard sensations which are agreeable by nature as suffering?
They are hateful by reason of their impermanence in the same way that they consider the rūpas, samjñās, etc., as suffering, even though the rūpas, samjñās, etc., are not suffering in the same way as is disagreeable sensation.

ii. With regard to the proposed argument "The agreeable is suffering because it is a cause of suffering": (1) to be a cause of suffering is its aspect (ākāra) or origin (vii.13a); to see things as a cause of suffering is not to see them as suffering; (2) how could the Āryans born in Rūpadhātu and in Ārupyadhātu have an idea of suffering? For the skandhas of these spheres are not a cause of suffering; (3) why would the Sūtra mention suffering through the fact of being conditioned? If Āryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is a cause of suffering, then suffering through the fact of being conditioned [that is, "What is impermanent is suffering"] would be useless.

iii. But if Āryans see the agreeable as suffering because it is impermanent, then what is the difference between the aspects of suffering and of impermanence? There would be confusion between "seeing things as suffering" and "seeing things as impermanent."

One sees things as impermanent because their nature is to arise and perish; one sees them as suffering because they are hateful. When one has seen them as impermanent, they become hateful. The characteristic of impermanence implies the characteristic of suffering, but it is not subsumed in this characteristic.

iv. Certain masters deny any agreeable sensation, affirming that all is suffering. They prove this thesis by Scripture and by reasoning.

Scripture: The Blessed One said, "Suffering is to be found in any and all sensation"; "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as suffering"; and "It is an error to regard what is suffering as agreeable." 23

Reasoning: 1. Because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure. The things that one pretends to be causes of
pleasure,—food, drink, cold, warmth, etc.,—when they are grasped or experienced to excess or out of season become causes of suffering. Now it is inadmissible that a cause of pleasure, because it has increased, or presents itself at a different moment,—even if it remains completely the same,—would produce suffering. Consequently these pretended causes of pleasure are, from their origins, the causes of suffering and not the causes of pleasure: for later suffering will grow and become felt. The same holds for the four positions (īryāpatha), the position of lying down, sitting down, etc. (p. 907).

2. Because the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but sometime a remedy for suffering or a modification of suffering. (a) As long as a person is not tormented by sufferings which are caused by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, fatigue, or desire, he will not have any sensation which he will feel to be agreeable. Consequently the ignorant have the idea of pleasure, not with regard to true pleasure, but with regard to the relief of suffering. (b) Fools also have the idea of pleasure with regard to the modification of suffering: for example to pass a burden from one shoulder to another.24

Consequently agreeable things do not exist.

v. They exist, say the Ābhidhārmikas; and we would say, this is well proved.

1. We would ask him who denies the existence of pleasure, What is suffering? If he answers, "That which is painful,"25 we would then ask, "How is it painful?" If he answers, "Because it does evil," we would say that "that which does good" is agreeable. If he answers, "Because it is not desired," we would say that "that which is desired" is agreeable.26

2. But, one would say, this same "desire" is no longer cherished by the Āryans when they obtain detachment. Thus the quality of "desirable" is not proved.

This objection is useless, for if Āryans, once they become
detached, no longer cherish it, it is then from another point of view that it is undesirable to them.

The sensation which, in itself, is desirable, will never become, in itself, undesirable. Consequently, it is not from the point of view of its intrinsic nature, but from another point of view that Āryans do not cherish agreeable sensation. Rather, they hate it for its defects: it is the occasion for the loss of good dharmas, it is acquired only at great effort, it is directed toward suffering, and it is impermanent. If this sensation were undesirable in and of itself, who would ever be able to become attached to it? From the fact that, with a view to detaching themselves from it, Āryans consider it in its defects by placing themselves in a point of view distinct from that of its intrinsic nature, it then follows that agreeable sensation does exist in and of itself.

3. The meaning of the declaration of the Blessed One, "Suffering is to be found in any and all sensation" has been fixed by the Blessed One himself: "Oh Ānanda, it is with regard to impermanence, it is with regard to the transformation of the samskāras that I said that 'Suffering is to be found in any and all sensation.'" Consequently it is proved that this declaration was not made with regard to the suffering which is suffering in and of itself.

If all sensation were, by its nature, suffering, then the Ārya Ānanda would not have asked, "The Blessed One taught that there are three types of sensation, agreeable, suffering, and neither-suffering-nor-agreeable. The Blessed One taught that any and all sensation is suffering. With what intention, from what point of view did the Blessed One teach that any and all sensation is suffering?" Ānanda would have asked, "From what point of view did the Blessed One teach that there are three types of sensation?" And the Blessed One would have responded, "It was intentional, with a definite motive, that I taught that there are three types of sensation."

Therefore if the Blessed One said, "I have declared, with a definite motive, that any and all sensation is suffering," this is because, by its nature, sensation is of three types.
4. As for the declaration "Agreeable sensation should be regarded as suffering," agreeable sensation is, on the one hand, agreeable in and of itself, being pleasant; but on the other hand, it is in a certain sense suffering, since it changes and as such is impermanent. Persons not free from desire are bound to regard it as agreeable, because they savor its taste; Āryans are free from regarding it as agreeable, because they are free from desire with regard to it. This is why the Buddha enjoined one to regard agreeable sensation in a manner which would lead one to obtain deliverance.

How do we know that agreeable sensation is agreeable in and of itself? It is said, "The perfect, omniscient Buddha, knowing the impermanence and the transformation of the *samskāras*, declares that sensation is suffering." (*Samyukta, TD* 2, p. 121a8).

5. The declaration "It is an error to regard what is suffering as agreeable" (v.9a) is also made with a certain intention. The world attaches the idea of agreeable to agreeable sensation, to delectable objects, to existence. Now agreeable sensation is in a certain sense suffering: to consider it as absolutely agreeable is an error. Delectable objects contain much suffering, but little pleasure; to consider them as absolutely agreeable is an error. The same with regard to existence.

Consequently this text does not demonstrate the non-existence of agreeable sensation.

6. If all sensation is suffering in and of itself, how does one explain that the Buddha taught the existence of three types of sensation?

Perhaps the Buddha, in this teaching, is conforming to the views of the world.

This hypothesis is inadmissible: a. The Buddha said, "If I said that all sensation is suffering, then this is with a certain intention" (see above, p. 904).

b. The Buddha, on the subject of the three types of sensation (ii.7 and foll.), uses the expression, "conforming to reality." In fact,
after having said, "The organ of pleasure and the organ of satisfaction are agreeable sensation," he then said "He who, conforming to reality and through correct discernment sees the five organs [or sensations], abandons the three bonds . . . "  

28 c. Furthermore, how would the world arrive at the conclusion that sensation is of three types if it were exclusively suffering? Would you say that one has the idea or impression of agreeable sensation with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of neutral sensation with regard to a medium sensation of suffering, and the idea of a suffering sensation with regard to a strong sensation of suffering? But pleasure also presents three degrees, and it then follows that one would have the idea of great pleasure with regard to a weak sensation of suffering, the idea of medium pleasure with regard to a medium sensation of suffering, and the idea of little pleasure with regard to strong sensation of suffering.  

29 Furthermore, when one experiences pleasure arisen from some excellent smell, taste or tangible thing, what is then the weak suffering through a relationship to which the idea of pleasure is produced?  

30 [And if you maintain that the idea of pleasure is produced through a relationship with a weak sensation of suffering,] then this weak sensation of suffering has not arisen or when it has disappeared, one will all the more have the idea of pleasure, suffering having completely disappeared.  

The same for smells, etc., and the same for the pleasure of desire.  

Furthermore, in your system, a weak sensation of suffering is transmitted by a clear and strong sensation [of pleasure]; a sensation of medium force is transmitted by an indistinct sensation [a sensation neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable]: and this would appear to be inconsistent. So too the Sūtra teaches that the first three Dhyānas are accompanied by pleasure: there one will find, according to you, some weak suffering. The Sūtra teaches that, in
the Fourth Dhyāna and above, sensation is neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable: there one will find, according to you, medium suffering. Consequently your theory that agreeable sensation, etc., correspond to weak suffering, etc., is not admissible.

Finally, the Blessed One said, "Oh Mahānāman, if physical matter were exclusively suffering, not agreeable nor accompanied by pleasure, . . . there would be no reason why one would become attached to physical matter . . . "\(^3^1\) We are thus assured that agreeable sensation exists at least a little.

Consequently the alleged scriptural arguments do not hold.

7. The first logical reason presented by our adversary, "because the causes of pleasure are not always the causes of pleasure" is worthless. Our adversary does not take into account what is the cause of pleasure.

A given object is the cause of pleasure or suffering through the function of the state of the person who experiences it; it is not a cause of pleasure or suffering in an absolute manner. If a given object is a cause of pleasure when it is in a relationship with a body found in a certain state, then it will always be a cause of pleasure when it is again in a relationship with this body in the same state. A cause of pleasure is thus always a cause of pleasure.

A comparison: The same fire will give forth different results of cooking according to the state of the rice which one is cooking: the food will be edible or not. But when the rice is in a certain state, the fire will always produce the same result.

Furthermore, how can one dispute that, in the Dhyānas, the causes of pleasure are always causes of pleasure?

8. As for the argument that "the idea of pleasure has for its object, not a real pleasure, but a remedy of suffering or a modification of suffering," we would say:

i.a. When one experiences the pleasure of a smell, a taste, etc., what is the suffering whose remedy is the object of the idea of pleasure? b. Before this suffering has arisen or when it is
destroyed, in the absence of any remedy, one will all the more experience pleasure. c. The pleasure of the Dhyānas certainly cannot consist of a remedy of suffering, since suffering does not exist in the Dhyānas.

ii. When one moves a burden to another shoulder, this is truly a pleasure that arises from a new bodily state and which continues to arise as long as this bodily state does not disappear. If it were otherwise, then the idea or impression of pleasure would become stronger. 

The same explanation holds for the impression of pleasure brought about by the changing of bodily position which has caused fatigue.

9. You ask, "If suffering does not begin from its beginning, how could there be, at its end, an impression of suffering?"

We would answer: By reason of a certain transformation of the body [consecutive to the absorption of food, etc.: suffering will not appear while the state favorable to pleasure lasts]; so too, in the case of alcohol, etc., sweetness and tartness succeed one another.

It is thus proved that there is agreeable sensation, and that all impure conditioned things are suffering from the fact of the three types of suffering.

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This thesis of the Abhidharma that the Truth of Suffering is the Truth of Origin, that is, that the upādānasakandhas, which are suffering, are at the same time the origin of suffering (see above p. 898), comes from the teaching of the Sūtra. For, according to the Sūtra, it is only thirst or desire (ṭṛṣṇa) which is the origin of suffering.

The Sūtra says that desire is the origin by reason of the capital importance of desire. But all the other impure dharmas are also a cause or origin of suffering.

In fact, some other dharmas are named in other Sūtras.
The Blessed One said, "Action, desire and ignorance are the cause of future samskāras";\(^{35}\) he also said, "Five types of seeds, that is, the vijñāna associated with upādāna; the earth element, that is, the four vijñānasthitis."\(^{36}\)

Thus the definition of the Sūtra, "Desire is the origin of suffering", is conceived from a particular point of view (ābhiprāyi-ka),\(^{37}\) whereas the definition given in the Abhidharma is in strict conformity to the characteristics of the thing defined.

Furthermore, when the Buddha said, "It is desire which is the origin," he intended to define the cause of re-existence (abhinirvṛtti). When, in the stanza, he enumerates action, desire, and ignorance, he defined the cause of different births (upapatti) which is action; the cause of re-existence, namely desire; and the cause of births and of re-existence, namely ignorance. We shall continue the explanation of the meaning of these terms. In fact, the Sūtra says, "Action is the cause of births, and desire is the cause of re-existence"; and it teaches the successive order of causation: "The eye has action for its object; action has desire for its cause; desire has ignorance for its cause; and ignorance has incorrect judgment for its cause."\(^{38}\)

That consciousness and the other skandhas are the origin of suffering results again from the fact that the Sūtra declares that they are respectively seed and field.

What is birth (upapatti)? What is re-existence (abhinirvṛtti)? (iii.40, vi.39c).

Upapatti signifies a birth or an existence characterized by a certain sphere (Kāmadhātu, etc.), a certain realm of rebirth (god, human, etc.), a certain mode of birth (birth from a womb, from an egg, etc.), a certain gender, etc. Abhinirvṛtti signifies re-existence without qualification.

The cause of birth is action, and the cause of re-existence is desire: so too a seed is the cause of a shoot characterized as a rice-shoot, a wheat-shoot, etc.; whereas water is the cause of the simple germination of all the different species of shoots. How does
one prove that desire is the cause of re-existence?

From the fact that a person free from desire is not reborn. When a person endowed with desire and a person free from desire die, we know that the first is reborn and that the second is not reborn. Therefore since there is no rebirth where there is no desire, we know that desire is the cause of re-existence.

Again from the fact that the series is bent by desire. We state that the series of thoughts is unceasingly bent towards the object to which one has a desire. And the same holds for re-existence.

There is no defilement which adheres to the person (ātmabhāva, to existence) as much as desire, the same way that lentil paste, once it is dried, adheres to a limb. There is no cause which binds one to rebirth as much as the attachment to a self does. This reasoning proves that desire is the cause of re-existence.

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The Blessed One proclaimed the Four Noble Truths, but he also declared Two Truths, relative truth (samvrtisatya) and absolute truth (paramārthasatya). What are these Two Truths?

4. The idea of a jug ends when the jug is broken; the idea of water ends when, in the mind, one analyzes the water. The jug and the water, and all that resembles them, exist relatively. The rest exist absolutely.

If the idea of a thing disappears when this thing is broken into pieces, then this thing has relative existence (samvrtisat); for example, a jug: the idea of a jug disappears when it is reduced to pieces. If the idea of a thing disappears when this thing is dissipated, or broken to pieces, by the mind, then this thing should be regarded as having relative existence; for example, water. If we grasp and remember the dharmas, such as color, etc., in the water,
then the idea of water will disappear.

These things,—jug, clothes, etc., water, fire, etc.,—are given their different names from the relative point of view or conforming to conventional usage. Thus if one says, from the relative point of view, "There is a jug, there is water," one is speaking truly, and one is not speaking falsely. Consequently this is relatively true.

That which differs is absolute truth. If, when a thing is broken to pieces or dissipated by the mind, the idea of this thing continues, then this thing has absolute existence (paramārthasat); for example, physical matter: one can reduce physical matter into atoms, one can remember smell and other dharmas in the mind, but the idea of the unique nature of physical matter persists. The same holds for sensations, etc. And as this absolutely exists, it is absolutely true.

The ancient masters44 say: Things are absolutely true in the manner in which they are perceived, either by transworldly knowledge or by the worldly knowledge acquired after transworldly knowledge.45 They are relatively true in the manner in which they are perceived by any other defiled or non-defiled worldly knowledge.

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The Truths have been mentioned.46 We must now explain how they are seen. Consequently, beginning from the beginning, we would say:47

5a-b. Firm in his cultivation, endowed with teaching and reflection, he will be capable of giving himself up to meditation.48

Whoever desires to see the Truths should first of all keep the Precepts. Then he reads49 the teaching upon which his Seeing of
the Truths depends, or he hears their meaning. Having heard, he correctly reflects. Having reflected, he gives himself up to the cultivation of meditation. With the wisdom (prajñā, ii.24, i.2a) arisen from the teaching (srutamayī) for its support, there arises the wisdom arisen from reflection (cintāmaya); with this for its support, there arises the wisdom arisen from meditation (bhāvanāmaya).

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What are the characteristics of these three wisdoms?

5c-d. The wisdoms arisen from the teaching, etc., have respectively for their sphere name, name and the thing, and the thing.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, wisdom arisen from the teaching has name for its object; wisdom arisen from reflection has the name and the thing for its object: in fact, sometimes it grasps the thing by means of the name, and sometimes it grasps the name by means of the thing. Wisdom arisen from meditation has the thing for its object; it goes to the things as an abstraction made from its name. One can compare this to three persons who are crossing a river: one who does not know how to swim does not abandon even for one moment his swimming apparatus; one who knows how to swim a little sometimes holds on to it and sometimes lets go of it; and one who knows how to swim crosses the river without any support whatsoever (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 420a28, p. 217c6).

But, we would say, in this interpretation, wisdom arisen from reflection plays no role: in fact, when it has name for its object, it is wisdom arisen from the teaching, and when it has a thing for its object, it is the wisdom arisen from meditation. Thus the wisdom arisen from reflection does not exist. Rather, one should explain:
The wisdom arisen from the teaching is a certitude which arises from a means of correct knowledge (pramāṇa) termed "the word of a qualified person" (āptavacana); the wisdom arisen from reflection is a certitude born of rational examination; and the wisdom arisen from meditation is a certitude arisen from absorption. In this way the specific characteristics of the three wisdoms are proved in an irreproachable manner.  

[In the expressions srutamayī prajñā, etc., the suffix -maya, according to Pāṇini v.4.21 (tatprakṛtavacane mayat) indicates cause: srutamayī prajñā is prajñā which has śruta, that is, the word of a qualified person (āptavacana) for its cause (hetu). Or rather, according to Pāṇini iv.3.134 (tasya vikāraḥ), the suffix -maya forms a word which indicates "transformation of . . .": thus srutamayī prajñā is a transformation of the śruta. But this "transformation" should be understood metaphorically: this is how a transformation would be spoken of; other characteristics are considered, in fact, in taking this into consideration.] As one says, "The vital breaths are created by food, cows are created from grass" (annamayāḥprāṇāḥ, trṇamayāvah).  

How does one who thus applies himself to meditation succeed in it?  

6a. These are produced within one who is endowed with the two separations.  

When the ascetic is withdrawn with regard to his body and his mind by separating himself from promiscuity and bad thoughts, he succeeds.  

For whom are these two separations easy?  
For a contented person of few desires.  

6a-b. Not for one discontented and with many desires.
What should one understand by discontent and many desires?

6c-d. Discontent is desire for more than one now possesses; many desires is desire with regard to that which one does not possess.

The Ābhidhārmikas say: To desire more of the fine things, clothes, etc., which one possesses is discontent. To desire what one does not possess is many desires.

But is not the desire to have more also produced with respect to what one does not possess? What then is the difference between the two?

Discontent is the dissatisfaction that one experiences from the goods that one possesses, of poor or of small quantity. Many desires is the desire for goods, of excellent or in great quantity, that one does not possess.

7a. Their opposites are their oppositions.

The opposites of discontent and of many desires, namely contentment and few desires, are opposed to discontent and to many desires.

7b. They are of the three spheres or pure.

They belong to the Three Dhātus; they are also pure. But discontent and many desires only belong to Kāmadhātu. What is the nature of content and few desires?

7c. Non-desire.

They have for their nature [the root of good], non-desire.
7c. The lineages of the Āryans.  

Understand: "are non-desire." The four lineages of the Āryans, the āryavamsas, are so called because the Āryans arise from them. They are also non-desire in their nature.

7c-d. Among them, three are contentment.

The first three--to be content with clothing, to be content with food, to be content with bed and with seat--are contentment by nature.

The fourth āryavamsa is to take delight in Extinction and in the Path. It is not contentment. How is it non-desire? Because it turns its back on attachment to pleasure and attachment to existence (v.2).

What did the Blessed One teach by the four āryavamsas?

8a-b. By three is taught the regimen; by the last, activity.

The Blessed One, the Master of the Law (dharmasvāmi), established a certain regimen and a certain activity for his disciples who, having renounced their old regimen and their old activities, are engaged in searching out deliverance. He established the regimen in the first three āryavamsas; and he established activity in the fourth: "If, with this regimen, you do these actions, before long you will obtain deliverance."

Why did the Blessed One establish such a regimen and such an activity?

8b. In order to create an obstacle to the arising of desire.
The Sūtra\textsuperscript{68} establishes that the arising of desire is fourfold: "Oh monks, desire, arising, arises by reason of clothing, by reason of food, by reason of the bed and the seat; lasting, it lasts by reason . . . ; being attached, it is attached . . . Oh monks, desire, arising, arises by reason of such existence or non-existence . . . "\textsuperscript{69} It is in order to create an obstacle to it that the four āryavāṁsas are taught.

\textit{9c-d. In order to momentarily or definitively arrest the desire of the object of the idea of self and of things pertaining to self.}

This is another way of saying the same thing. The object of the idea of self is clothing. The object of the idea of self (ahāmkāra-vastu) is the ātmabhāva, the sensorial and mental complex. Desire (icchā) is thirst (trṣṇā).

The first three āryavāṁsas destroy for a time the desire for the things that one regards as pertaining to self. The fourth āryavāṁsa definitively arrests the twofold desire.

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We have explained the requisite qualities through which meditation can succeed.\textsuperscript{70} Being in this way a suitable receptacle, how would the ascetic enter into meditation?

\textit{9a-b. He enters therein, through visualization on the loathsome and through mindfulness of breathing (ānāpā-nasmṛta).}

\textit{Smṛta} is \textit{smṛti} (mindfulness). Who enters through visualization on the loathsome? Who enters through mindfulness of
breathing? Respectfively,

9c. Those in whom desire and imagination are predominant

(adhirāgavitarkānām).71

An adhirāga and an adhivitarka are those in whom rāga
(desire) and vitarka (imagining) are adhika (predominant). Those
in whom desire appears lively and appears on many occasions,
enter through the loathsome. Those who are imaginative enter
through mindfulness of breathing.

Certain masters say: Mindfulness of breathing, having an
unvaried object,—it bears on wind in which there are no difference
of color or shape,—has for its result the cutting off of the
imaginative process; whereas the loathsome, having a variety of
colors and shapes for its object, provokes imagination.

Some other masters say: Mindfulness of breathing cuts off
imagination because it is not turned towards externals, for it bears
on breathing. The loathsome is turned outwards, like visual
consciousness; it is not visual consciousness, but it is a contempla-
tion (upanidhyāna, viii.1 = nirāpana) of an object of the visual
consciousness.

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Craving (rāga) is fourfold: (1) craving for colors, (2) craving
for shapes, (3) craving for contact or for tangibles, and (4) craving
for honors.

The visualization of the loathsome that has a cadaver turning
blue, rotting, etc. for its object is opposed to the first craving.72
The loathsome visualization that has a cadaver wasted and torn to
pieces for its object is opposed to the second craving. The
loathsome visualization that has a cadaver eaten by worms and a
skeleton held together by its tendons for its object is opposed to
the third craving. And the loathsome visualization that has an immobile cadaver for its object is opposed to the fourth craving.

In a general way,

9d. The skeleton for all the categories of craving.

The fourfold object of craving,—color, shape, contact, and honors,—is lacking in the chain of bones. Thus the loathsome visualization which has bones for its object is opposed to all of the cravings.

The loathsome visualization does not have the abandoning of the defilements for its result, but only an arresting of the defilements, for it is an act of attention bearing not on reality but on a voluntary representation; and bearing not on the totality of things, but only on one part of the visible of Kāmadhātu.

The ascetic (yogācāra) who cultivates the loathsome visualization is either "a beginner" or "a master" or "an absolute master of the act of attention."

10a-b. The beginner, by enlarging the visualization of the bones up to the sea, and by reducing it.

The ascetic who desires to cultivate a visualization of the loathsome, first of all fixes his mind on a part of his body, either the toe, or the forehead, or on any other part of his choosing; then he "purifies" the bone, that is, he removes the flesh from it by supposing that the flesh rots and falls off; he then progressively enlarges his visualization and finally sees his entire body reduced to a skeleton. In this same way, in order to increase his power of visualization (adhimukti), he creates the same idea of a second individual, of the individuals of the Vihāra, of the Ārāma, of the village, of the country, up to the earth surrounded by the ocean, as full of skeletons. Then he reduces his visualization, in order to
strengthen his power of visualization,\textsuperscript{77} to the point where he only sees his own body as a skeleton. Then the visualization of the loathsome is complete; and from this time onward the ascetic is a beginner.

10c-d. The "master" by removing the toe, etc., until half of the skull.

In order to strengthen this power of reduced visualization,\textsuperscript{78} the ascetic makes an abstraction of the bones of the foot, and considers the others; and so on, always reducing, to the point when, removing one half of the skull, he visualizes nothing more than its other half: the ascetic is then a master; he possesses mastery in the act of attention which constitutes visualization.

lla-b. Holding his thought between his two eyebrows, he is "an absolute master in the act of attention."

He again makes an abstraction of the half of the skull and holds his thought between its two eyebrows. He is then an ascetic "in whom the act of the visualization of the loathsome has been achieved."

The loathsome can be small through the smallness of its object, without being small through the mastery of the ascetic. Therefore there are four alternatives: (1) The ascetic is a master of the act of attention which constitutes visualization and considers only his own body; (2) the ascetic is not a master of the act of attention, but considers the earth as filled with skeletons; (3) the ascetic is not a master of the act of attention and considers his own body; (4) the ascetic is a master of the act of attention and considers the earth as filled with skeletons.

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What is the nature of the loathsome? To how many spheres does it belong? What is its object? By whom is it produced?

Ilc-d. The loathsome is non-desire; it is in ten spheres; it has the visible of Kāmadhātu for its object; it is generated by humans.79

Its nature is non-desire.80

The ten spheres in which the ascetic can be found in order to produce them are the Four Dhyānas, the four sāmantakas (preparatory stages or thresholds of the Four Dhyānas, viii.22), dhyānāntara and Kāmadhātu.

Its object is the visibles of the sphere of Kāmadhātu. "Visible" signifies color and shape. This means that it has a "thing" and not a "name" for its object.

Only humans generate it;81 not beings of the other realms of rebirth, nor much less beings of the higher spheres. Also, among humans, the inhabitants of Uttarakuru do not produce it.

As its name, "the loathsome" (asubhā), indicates, it is a visualization of a repulsive or unclean thing: thus it has the repulsive for its "aspect". [It does not have the aspect of impermanence, etc.: it contemplates a visible thing as horrible and not as impermanent, etc.]

In the past, it had a past object; in the present, it has a present object; and in the future, it will have a future object: in other words, its object is contemporaneous to it. When it is not destined to arise, its object is tritemporal.

Since it is an act of attention on an imaginary object, it is impure.82

Accordingly as it has been, or not, cultivated in a previous existence, it is obtained through detachment or through cultivation (vii.41d, 44b).
Such are the characteristics of the loathsome.

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12a-c. Mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasmṛti) is praṇā, belonging to the five spheres, having wind for its object, and it is cultivated by beings in Kāmadhātu.83

Āna is in-breathing, the entry of wind; apāna is out-breathing, the leaving of the wind. The mindfulness (smṛti) that bears on both of these is ānāpānasmṛti.84

[Mindfulness of breathing is by nature praṇā, a knowledge bearing on in-breathing and out-breathing.] This praṇā is called mindfulness, smṛti, the same as the applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthānas), because this knowledge of in-breathing and out-breathing, ānāpānapraṇā, is provoked by the force of mindfulness.85

It can be cultivated in five spheres, namely the first three sāmantakas, dhyānāntara, and Kāmadhātu, because it is associated with indifference (see viii.7, 23, etc.).86 In fact, says the School, agreeable and painful sensations [in Kāmadhātu] are favorable to imagining: thus mindfulness of breathing, which is the opposite of imagining, cannot be associated with happiness or with suffering. On the other hand, the two agreeable sensations [of the Dhyānas] form an obstacle to the application of the mind to any object, and mindfulness of breathing can only be realized by this application.

But according to the masters who believe that the fundamental Dhyānas include the sensation of indifference (Vibhaṣā, TD 27, p. 134bII), mindfulness of breathing can exist in eight spheres, by adding the first three Dhyānas: higher spheres are no longer spheres in which one breathes (see viii.7).

The object of the mindfulness of breathing is wind.

Its support is Kāmadhātu, that is, it is cultivated by humans
and by the gods of Kāmadhātu, because imagination abounds there. It is obtained either by detachment or by cultivation. It is attention bearing on a real thing (tattvamanasikāra). It belongs only to the Buddhists.

12c. Not to outsiders.

In fact, on the one hand, the teaching of mindfulness of breathing is absent among them; and on the other hand, they are incapable of discovering the subtle dharmas by themselves.

12d. It has six aspects, counting, etc.

It is perfect when it is endowed with six operations: counting, following, fixing, observing, modifying, and purifying.

i. Counting. One fixes the mind on in-breathing and out-breathing, without effort or contention; one lets the body and mind be as they are; and one counts from one to ten only in the mind. One does not count to less than ten, nor to more than ten, for fear of contention and of mental distraction.

There are three faults to avoid: a. to omit counting, by taking two for one; b. counting too high, by taking one for two; c. counting in a confused manner, by taking in-breathing for out-breathing, and vice versa. The counting that avoids these faults is correct. If, in the course of this cultivation the mind becomes distracted, then one should count anew from the beginning until absorption (samādhi) is attained.

ii. Following. Without contention, follow the progress of the air which enters and leaves until it goes into two senses: does the air breathed in occupy all of the body or does it go into only one part of the body? The ascetic follows the air breathed in into the throat, the heart, the navel, the kidneys, the thigh, and so on to the two feet; the ascetic follows the air breathed out to a distance of a
hand and a cubit.

According to other masters, he follows the air breathed out to the "circle of air" (vāyumanḍala) which holds up the universe and to the Vairambha Winds.

This opinion is not admissible, for mindfulness of breathing is an attention to things as they really are (tattvamanasīkāra).

iii. Fixing. Fix the attention on the tip of the nose, or between the eyebrows, or in another area all the way down to the toes; fix the mind; see the breath held in the body like the thread of a pearl necklace; state that it is cold or hot, unfavorable or favorable (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 135a15).

iv. Observing. Observe that "These breaths are not only air, but the four primary elements, and again physical matter derived from these four; and the mind with its mental dharmas rests on them": in this way the ascetic discovers the five skandhas through analysis.

v. Modifying. The ascetic modifies the mind that had the air as its object and now directs his mind to better and better dharmas [for example, to the smṛtyupasthānas, vi.14, and the uṣmagatas, vi.17, etc.] up to and including the transworldly dharmas (vi.19b).

vi. Purifying. The ascetic enters the Path of Seeing (vi.26) and the Path of Meditation.

According to some other masters (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 135a27), modification is progressive elevation from the foundations of mindfulness (the smṛtyupasthānas) up to Vajropamasamādhi (vi.44c). Purifying is the Knowledge of Extinction (ksayajñāna), the Knowledge of Non-Arising (anutpādajñāna) and the Right Views of the Arhat (aśaikṣī samyagdṛṣṭi, vi.50c).

There is a summarizing stanza: "One teaches that the mindfulness of breathing has six aspects: counting, following, fixing, observing, modifying, and purifying."

13a. In-breathing and out-breathing are like the body.
The two breaths, being part of the body, belong to the same sphere as does the body.

In-breathing and out-breathing do not exist among beings in Ārūpyadhatu, among embryonic beings, among non-conscious (acitta) beings, and among beings who have entered into the Fourth Dhyāna: their existence therefore presupposes a body [and bodies do not exist in Ārūpyadhātu], a certain body [a body has cavities, which embryonic beings do not have], a mind [which is absent among non-conscious beings], and a certain type of mind [which is absent in the Fourth Dhyāna]. When the body has cavities in it, and when the mind belongs to a sphere in which there is breathing, then there is in-breathing and out-breathing (Vibbāṣā, TD 27, p. 132bl).

There is in-breathing at birth and at the moment when one leaves the Fourth Dhyāna. There is out-breathing at death and at the moment when one enters the Fourth Dhyāna.

13b. It belongs to living beings.

It belongs to living beings, and not to non-living beings (i.10b).

13b. It is not taken up.

It does not form part of any sense organ (i.34c-d).

13c. It is an outflowing.97

It diminishes when the body increases; cut off, it recovers: therefore it is not an increase (aupacayika, i.37), and it does not arise from retribution. In fact, the physical matter arisen from retribution does not recover after having been cut off (i. English translation note 156).
13c-d. It is not observed by an inferior mind.\(^{98}\)

In-breathing and out-breathing is observed by a mind of its own sphere or by a mind in a higher sphere; but not by an airyāpathika mind, nor by a nairṃāṇika mind of a lower sphere.

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We have spoken of the two teachings, the visualization of loathsome things, and mindfulness of breathing. Having attained absorption (samādhi) by these two portals, now, with a view to realizing insight (vipaśyanā),

14a-b. Having realized stilling, he will cultivate the foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthānas).\(^{99}\)

How is this?

14c-d. By considering the twofold characteristics of the body, sensation, the mind, and the dharmas.

By considering the unique characteristics (svaḷaṅkaṇa) and the general characteristics (sāmāṅyaḷaṅkaṇa)\(^{100}\) of the body, sensation, the mind, and the dharmas.

"The unique characteristics" means its self nature (svabhāva).

"The general characteristics" signifies the fact that "All conditioned things are impermanent; all impure dharmas are suffering; and that all the dharmas are empty (śunya) and not-self (anātmaka)."

What is the unique nature of the body? The primary elements and physical matter derived from these primary elements (i.12,
"Dharmas" means the dharmas which are neither the body, nor sensation, nor the mind. (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 937a18).

According to the School, foundation of mindfulness of the body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna) is realized when, being absorbed (samāhita), one sees the atoms and the successive moments (ksana) of the body.

***

What is the nature of the foundations of mindfulness?

Foundation of mindfulness is threefold: foundation of mindfulness in and of itself (svabhāva), foundation of mindfulness through connection, and foundation of mindfulness in the quality of being an object.

Foundation of mindfulness in and of itself is

15a. Prajñā.\textsuperscript{101}

What is prajñā?

15a. Proceeding from hearing, etc.

Prajñā proceeds from hearing, from reflection, and from meditation. The foundations of mindfulness are likewise threefold, proceeding from hearing, reflection, and meditation.

15b. The others, through connection and as object.

The other dharmas which are not prajñā, are, when they are dharmas coexistent with prajñā, foundations of mindfulness
through connection; when they are the object of praśnā and of the dharmas coexistent with praśnā [in other words, when they are the object of the foundation of mindfulness in and of itself and of the foundation of mindfulness through connection], they are a foundation of mindfulness as object.

***

How do we know that the foundation of mindfulness in and of itself is praśnā?

Because it is said in the Sūtra, "His attention is set having the body for its object" (kāye [var. kāme] kāyānupāśyanā smṛtyupasthānam). 102

What is anupāśya? It is praśnā. In fact, through praśnā, one who is endowed with praśnā becomes an anupāśya. 103 Therefore the Sūtra further says, "He dwells in attention to the body, the internal body" (madhyātmaṁ kāye kāyānupāśyī viharati). The word kāyānupāśyin is explained as follows: one who possesses anupāśya or darsana 104 is called an anupāśyin; and one who is an anupāśyin with respect to the body is called a kāyānupāśyin.

***

What is praśnā?

The Blessed One said that it is the foundation of mindfulness.

[Why give the name of foundation of mindfulness to praśnā?]

The Vaibhāṣikas say: By reason of the preponderant role of attention, [which presents the object to praśnā]; as a wedge (kīla) contributes to the splitting of wood; 105 it is due to the force of mindfulness that praśnā is active with respect to the object. 106

But the best explanation is the following: Mindfulness is applied (upatiṣṭhate) 107 by it; thus the praśnā is a foundation of
mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna = smṛter upasthānam); in fact, as the object is seen by the prajñā, so too it is expressed, that is to say, grasped by the attention. Therefore the Blessed One said, "He dwells having an exact notion of the body with respect to the body (kāye kāyaṁupāsyī vibarati): his attention is set and fixed having the body for its object" (Samyutta, v.294). And the Blessed One said, "He dwells with his attention fixed having his body for its object; his attention is applied, unexhausted" (see Samyutta, v.331).

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Objection: Nevertheless the Sūtra says, "Oh monks, how is the origin, how is the disappearance of the foundations of mindfulness? Through the origin of food, there is the origin of the body; through the disappearance of food, there is the disappearance of the body; through the origin of contact, there is the origin of sensation . . . ; through the origin of nāmarūpa . . . ; through the origin of manasikāra . . . " (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 171a27). Therefore foundation of mindfulness is the body, etc.

Answer: In this Sūtra we are not dealing with a foundation of mindfulness in and of itself, but a foundation of mindfulness in the quality of being an object: the attention is applied to it, and therefore it is a foundation of mindfulness. The name differs according to the object.

***

Each foundation of mindfulness is threefold accordingly as it is considered as oneself, as another, or as oneself and another. [The ascetic has in view his own body, the body of another . . . ]

15b-c. The order is that of their production.
Why are they produced in this order? According to the Vaibhāṣikas, because one first sees that which is the coarsest. Or rather: the body (1) is the support of sensual attachment which has its origin in the desire for sensation (2); this desire takes place because (3) the mind is not calmed; and the mind is not calmed because (4) the defilements are not abandoned.

15c-d. Four, oppositions to errors.¹⁰⁸

The foundations of mindfulness are taught in this order as oppositions to the four errors, belief in purity, happiness, permanence, and self (v.9). They are therefore four, no more and no less.

Of the four foundations of mindfulness, three have an unmixed object; the fourth is of two types: when it bears only on the dharmas, its object is not mixed; when it bears on two, or three, or four things at one and the same time, its object is mixed [or universal, samastā].

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Having thus cultivated the foundations of mindfulness having the body, etc., for their objects

16. Placed in the foundation of mindfulness having the dharmas as its universal object, he sees that the dharmas are impermanent, suffering, empty, and not-self.¹⁰⁹

Placed in the foundation of mindfulness having the dharmas as its mixed object, placing together the body, sensation, etc., he sees them under the fourfold aspect of impermanence, suffering, empty, and not-self.
17a. From this there arises the Heat.\textsuperscript{110}

From this cultivation of the foundation of mindfulness having the \textit{dharmas} as its object, there finally\textsuperscript{111} arises a root of good called \textit{Uṣmagata} ("Heat attained"), because it is similar to heat (\textit{usma}), being the first indication or the anticipation of the Noble Path, a fire which burns the fuel which are the defilements.

17b. Which has the Four Truths for its object.

Since it is prolonged for a certain period of time, \textit{Uṣmagata}, the Heat, has the Four Truths for its object.

17c. Which has sixteen aspects.

The seeing of suffering as suffering, impermanent, empty, and not-self; seeing arising or origin as arising, appearance, cause, and condition; seeing extinction as extinction, calm, excellent, and definitive salvation; and the seeing of the Path as path, truth, obtaining, and definitive release. We shall define these different aspects later (see vii.13).

17c-d. From Heat, the Summits.

The Heat develops, weak, medium, and strong; there finally arises the Summits (\textit{mürdhan}).

17d. Which are similar to it.
Like Heat, the Summits have the Four Truths for their object and include the sixteen aspects: they receive another name by reason of their excellence.

They are called Summits (or “Heads”), because they are the most elevated or the head of the unfixed roots of good, that is, those from which one can fall away; or one can fall away from the Summits; or one goes beyond them by penetrating into a Patience (kṣānti).

18a. It is through dharma that these two imprint.

It is through the foundation of mindfulness that has the dharmas for its object that Heat and the Summits imprint. What does “imprint” mean? This refers to the first application of the different aspects of the Truths.

18b. They grow through the others also.

Heat and the Summits grow by means of the four foundations of mindfulness together. The progressing ascetic does not manifest the previously acquired roots of good, because he does not esteem them very much.

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The Summits have grown by passing through weak, medium, and strong states:

18c. From that, Patience.

Patience (kṣānti) is so-called because in this stage, the Truths please (kṣamate) extremely much. In the Heat they please weakly,
and in the Summits, medium,--as one sees from the fact that one cannot fall away from Patience, but can from the first two stages.

Patience is threefold, weak, medium, strong:

18c. Two are as above.

Weak and medium Patience (Divya, 271) are like the Heads, in that they imprint first, like the Heads, by the foundation of mindfulness having the dharmas as its object. But they differ from the Heads in respect to their increase.

18d. Three grow totally through the dharmas.

Weak, medium, strong, they grow only through the foundation of mindfulness which has the dharmas for its object; not by the other foundations of mindfulness.\(^{117}\)

19a-b. Strong, it has the suffering of Kāmadhātu for its object.

Strong Patience, contiguous with the highest dharmas, has only the suffering of Kāmadhātu for its object.

A similar restriction is not formulated concerning the preceding stages; thus they have the suffering, arising, etc., of the three spheres for their objects.\(^{118}\)

Medium Patience lasts from the moment when the ascetic ceases to consider the sixteenth aspect [=definitive release] bearing on the two higher spheres, but continues to successively eliminate the higher aspects and spheres, until the moment when, in two moments of thought, he is impressed with only two aspects [=impermanence and suffering] of the suffering of Kāmadhātu.

Strong Patience exists when the ascetic considers, in a single
thought, only one aspect [=impermanence] applied to the sufferings of Kāmadhātu. Such is the explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas.

19b. It is of a moment.

It is momentary; it does not form a series.

19c. So too, the Supreme Dharmas.

These, exactly like strong Patience, bear on the suffering of Kāmadhātu and are momentary.

They are termed Supreme Worldly Dharmas (laukika agradharmas): because they are worldly, being impure; because they are supreme dharmas; and because they are supreme among the worldly dharmas. They are Supreme Worldly Dharmas because, in the absence of any similar cause (sabhāgābetu), by their own power, they manifest the Path of Seeing the Truths.¹¹⁹

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The four roots of good, Heat, etc., are by their nature foundations of mindfulness; they are thus prajñā. However

19c. All include the five skandhas.¹²⁰

Considering the root of good, Heat, etc., with their attendants, they include the five skandhas.

19d. With the exclusion of the possessions.¹²¹
The possessions (prāptis),—that is to say, the prāptis of Heat, etc.,—are not included within Heat, etc., for it is inadmissible for Āryans to manifest Heat, etc., anew, which would be the case if they were to manifest its prāptis.

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i. When the Heat begins and when it has three Truths for its object, a foundation of mindfulness that has the dharmas for its object is present; the four foundations of mindfulness of the future, are possessed [One of the aspects is presently seen; four of the future are possessed]. When it has the Truth of Extinction for its object, the same foundation of mindfulness which has the dharma for its object which is present is also the only one which is possessed in the future. The aspects, in all cases, are those of the Truth presently considered [One does not acquire, in the future, the aspects of the Truths which are not present].

In the period of increase, when the Heat has the three Truths for its object, any of the foundations of mindfulness may be present; the four of the future are possessed. When it has the Truth of Extinction for its object, the fourth foundation of mindfulness is present; four of the future are possessed. All the aspects of the future are possessed, because the gotras have been acquired.¹²²

ii. In the Summits, having for their object the Four Truths at their beginning, and having for their object extinction in the period of growth, the last foundation of mindfulness is present; four of the future are possessed; all the aspects of the future are possessed. Having for its object the three other Truths in the period of increase, any of the foundations of mindfulness are present; four of the future are possessed; and so too all of the aspects.

iii. In Patience, in the beginning and in the period of increase whichever of the Truths is considered, the last foundation of
mindfulness is present; four of the future are possessed; and so too all of the aspects.

iv. In the Supreme Worldly Dharmas, the last foundation of mindfulness is present; four of the future are possessed—those which are not destined to arise; four aspects only, those of the Truth of Suffering—for the aspects of the other Truths do not belong to the Supreme Worldly Dharmas; for the Supreme Worldly Dharmas are similar to the Path of Seeing,\textsuperscript{123} in which one acquires only in the future the four aspects of the Truth that one considers under one aspect.

20a-b. This is the fourfold \textit{nirvedhabhāgiya}.\textsuperscript{124}

These four—Heat, Summits, Patience, and the Supreme Worldly Dharmas—are the roots of good called \textit{nirvedhabhāgiyas} ("parts pertaining to the Path").

The first two, being non-fixed since one can fall away from them, are weak \textit{nirvedhabhāgiyas}; the Patiences are medium \textit{nirvedhabhāgiyas}; and the Supreme Worldly Dharmas are strong \textit{nirvedhabhāgiyas}.

What does \textit{nirvedhabhāgiya} mean? 1. \textit{Nirvedha} signifies \textit{niścita vedha} ("definitely known"), the Noble Path. Through it doubt is abandoned: it is thus \textit{niścita} ("definitive"), and the Truths are distinguished (\textit{vedha}):\textsuperscript{125} "This is suffering..., this is the Path"; 2. the Path of Seeing is one part (\textit{bhāga}) of the Path; thus \textit{nirvedhabhāga}.

The \textit{dharmas} useful to one part of the Path are \textit{nirvedhabhāgīya} (with the suffix \textit{chaṇ}) because they lead to it.

\textit{All these four nirvedhabhāgīyas}

20b. Arise from absorption.
Not from hearing or reflection.

20c-d. Their sphere is *anāgāmya*, the intermediate state, and the Dhyānas.

Their sphere are *anāgāmya* (viii.22c), *dhyānāntara* (viii.22d), and the Four Dhyānas: one can obtain them only in these six states of absorption. They do not exist above, in the Ārūpyas, because they constitute the attendants of the Path of Seeing. They do not exist in the Ārūpyas, because they bear on Kāmadhātu, for the ascetic should first of all perfectly know and abandon Kāmadhātu as suffering and origin.

The retribution [of the *nirvedhabhāgīyas*] consists of the five *skandhas* of Rūpadhātu. They are actions of the completing class, and not of the projecting class (iv.95a-b), for they hate existence.

20d. Or rather, two are also of the lower sphere.

The expression "or rather" indicates another opinion. According to the Bhadanta Ghosaka, the first two *nirvedhabhāgīyas* are of seven spheres, with the addition of Kāmadhātu.

All four

21a. Belong to the beings of Kāmadhātu.

Three can be produced only by human beings of the three Dvīpas. Once produced, they can be manifested among the gods. The fourth can be produced by the gods.

Three, acquired by men and women, can be found in a male or female body.

21a-b. Women obtain the Supreme Worldly Dharmas
destined to be found in female and male bodies.

Acquired by a female, the Supreme Worldly Dharmas will be found in a female body [=their present body] and in a male body [=the body that the female will necessarily produce in a new existence]; acquired by a male, it will only be found in a male body,--for there is, from the fact of the Supreme Worldly Dharmas, destruction (apratisamkhyānirodha, ii.55d) of the quality of female.

***

How are the nirvedhabhāgīyas lost?

21c-d. The Āryan loses them by losing the sphere.¹²⁹

When the Āryan loses the sphere in which he has obtained the nirvedhabhāgīyas, he loses the nirvedhabhāgīyas. He does not lose them in any other way, through death or through falling. One sphere is lost by passing into another sphere, [and not through detachment from the said sphere].

21d. The non-Āryan, through death.¹³⁰

The Prthagjana, whether or not he has passed to another sphere, loses them by abandoning the nikāyasabhāga.

22a. He also loses the first two through falling away.

The Prthagjana loses the first two through death and through falling away. The Āryan does not fall from out of the first two, and the Prthagjana does not fall from out of the last two.
22b. When they belong to the fundamental Dhyanas, the Seeing of the Truths arises from this seeing. 131

He who has produced the nirvedhabhāgiyas by cultivating the fundamental Dhyanas, shall certainly see the Truths in this very same life, because his disgust with existence is very strong.

22c. Lost, they are acquired anew.

When the nirvedhabhāgiyas have been lost and are acquired anew, one acquires them afresh, like the Pratimokṣa discipline (iv.38); one does not acquired the nirvedhabhāgiyas previously abandoned. 132 Because they have not been habitually cultivated, they are not obtained through detachment; and because they are realized through effort, they are not regained once they are lost.

If the ascetic meets a master possessing knowledge resulting from resolution (prānidhiṣṭāna, vii.37), 133 he produced the nirvedhabhāgiyas beginning from the one which, having been acquired, had been lost. If he does not meet him, he should produce the nirvedhabhāgiyas from the beginning.

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We have seen that the Āryan discards the nirvedhabhāgiyas, whereas the Prthagjana loses them through falling. One distinguished loss (vihāni) and loss through falling (parihāni): these are two types of loss, hāni. What do they consist of?

22d. The two losses are non-possession. 134

Loss through falling necessarily results from the defilements; but not unqualified loss (vihāni), which can result from a quality,
for example, the loss of the quality of Prthagjana at the production of the Path, etc.\textsuperscript{135}

***

Even though he may lose it through falling, whoever obtains Heat is destined to attain Nirvāṇa.

But what is the distinction between Heat and the mokṣabhāgīyas (iv.125c-d, vi.24, vii.30)?

Whoever plants a root of good which should end in Nirvāṇa (nirvāṇabhāgīya) will obtain Nirvāṇa. If there is no obstacle, Heat is quite close to the Seeing of the Truths.

23a. He who has attained the Summits does not cut off the roots.

Even though he may lose them by falling, he who has obtained the Summits does not cut off the roots of good (iv.79); but he can go to the painful realms of rebirth and commit mortal transgressions (iv.96).

23b. He who obtains the Patience does not go to the painful realms of rebirth.

He who loses the Patience through simple loss, vihāni, does not go to the painful realms of rebirth, because he is removed from the actions and the defilements which lead to them.

When one obtains Patience, and enters into the conditions not to be produced,\textsuperscript{136} there are certain realms of rebirth, wombs, rebirths, bodily forms, existences and defilements that no longer arise for him: the painful realms of rebirth, the womb of an egg, or moisture; rebirth among the Asamjñīsattvas, the Uttarakurus, or
the Mahābrahmas: bodies of the two types of eunuchs, and androgynous bodies; the eighth, ninth rebirth, etc.; and those defilements which are abandoned by the Seeing of the Truths (Vibbhsā, TD 27, p. 165b6).

The abandoning is in relation to the degree of the Patience: through weak Patience, the painful realms of rebirth enter into the condition of not arising; . . . through strong Patience, all of the bad dharma mentioned above.

***

The nirvedhabhāgīyas are of three types by reason of the distinction of the three gotras or families. The ascetic belongs to the family of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas or Buddhas; and Heat, the Summits, etc., are of the family of the ascetic who cultivates them.

23c-d. One can attain two nirvedhabhāgīyas of the Śrāvaka family, and become a Buddha.

It is possible for a person who belongs to the Śrāvaka family to attain in this family the Heat and the Summits, and to become a Buddha. But once Patience is acquired, this is no longer possible (Vibbhsā, TD 27, p. 352a14), because the future painful rebirths are destroyed by the possession of the Patience. Now the Bodhisattvas, with the intention of being useful to their fellow creatures, go to the painful realms of rebirth. Such is the explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas.

We say however that a person of the Śrāvaka family, once he acquires Patience, cannot become a Buddha, because the Śrāvaka family, once penetrated and confirmed by the Patience, can no longer be modified.
23d. One can attain three, and become the other.\textsuperscript{142}

"The other" in relation to the Buddha, is the Pratyekabuddha. A person of the Śrāvaka family can attain for a second time from this family the first three \textit{nirvedhabhāgīyas} and become a Pratyekabuddha.\textsuperscript{143}

The \textit{nirvedhabhāgīyas} of the Buddha family and of the Pratyekabuddha family are not susceptible of being attained a second time.

24a-b. The Master and the Rhinoceros go as far as Bodhi in one sitting, by relying on the last Dhyāna.\textsuperscript{144}

"The Master" is the Buddha. "The Rhinoceros" is one who resembles a rhinoceros, that is, the Pratyekabuddha. Both abide in the Fourth Dhyāna because this Dhyāna is an absorption free from all agitation and sharpness.\textsuperscript{145} "In one sitting", without rising from it, they go from the \textit{nirvedhabhāgīyas} to the arising of Bodhi.\textsuperscript{146}

We shall see later (iv.67) that Bodhi is the knowledge of extinction (\textit{kṣayajñāna}) and the knowledge of non-arising (\textit{anutpādajñāna}).

According to others (\textit{Vibhāṣā, TD} 27, p. 352a17), the sitting begins with the visualization of loathsome things. For the Ābhidhārmikas who admit the existence of Pratyekabuddhas different from those likened to a rhinoceros,\textsuperscript{147} nothing prevents these other Pratyekabuddhas from changing their family.\textsuperscript{148}

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Does the preparation for the \textit{nirvedhabhāgīyas} and the production of the \textit{nirvedhabhāgīyas} take place in the same existence?
This is not possible. Of necessity, one must produce

24c. First, the \textit{mokṣabhāgīyas}.\textsuperscript{149}

Of them all

24d. The most rapid obtains deliverance in three existences.\textsuperscript{150}

The planting of the seed, the growth of the plant, and the production of the fruit: three different stages. In this same way, in Religion,\textsuperscript{151} the series gradually enters, matures, and is delivered: first existence, to plant the so-called \textit{mokṣabhāgīya} roots of good; second, to produce the \textit{nirvedhabhāgīyas}; and third, to produce the \textit{Path}.\textsuperscript{152}

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The School admits (\textit{Vibhāṣā, TD 27}, p. 35a12) that the \textit{mokṣabhāgīyas}

25a. Arise from hearing and reflection.\textsuperscript{153}

But not from absorption or meditation. How many types of actions can be \textit{mokṣabhāgīya}?

25a. The three actions.

But primarily mental action. Bodily action and vocal action are also \textit{mokṣabhāgīya} when they are embraced by the resolution (\textit{prāṇidhāna}) for deliverance; this resolution is a type of volition (\textit{cetanā, ii.24}): by giving alms, a bodily action, by obliging oneself
to observe a rule, a vocal action, or by studying a stanza of four pādas, one projects a mokṣabhāgīya, when the force of the desire for deliverance comes to qualify these actions.

25b. Projected among humans.

Only persons of the three Dvīpas project or plant the mokṣabhāgīyas. In fact, disgust, or intelligence (prajñā), or disgust and intelligence are absent among the gods, among beings in hell, and among the inhabitants of Uttarakuru.

***

We have only incidentally treated of the mokṣabhāgīyas; but we have to explain the progressive order of the comprehension of the Truths (satyābhisamaya) and we have followed this order to the Supreme Worldly Dharmas. We must now teach the rest.

25c-d. From out of the Supreme Worldly Dharmas there proceeds one Patience, a Patience having the dharmas for its object, which is pure.

Exactly one Patience having Dharma Knowledge for its aspect (dharmajñānaksānti) immediately follows the Supreme Worldly Dharmas. What is its object?

26a. Bearing on the suffering of Kāmadhātu.

Its object is the suffering of Kāmadhātu. Therefore it is called Duḥkhe Dharmajñānaksānti, the Patience that has the Dharma Knowledge of Suffering for its object.

In order to indicate that it is pure, it is qualified by its
outflowing result (*nisyaṇa*, ii.26c-d) which is a Dharma Knowl-
edge (*dharmaṇāna*). The expression *dharmaṇānakṣaṇti*
therefore signifies: a *ksaṇti* or Patience which produces a
*dharmaṇāna* (Dharma Knowledge), which has for its intention
and result a Dharma Knowledge. In the same way that a tree
which bears flowers or fruit is called a *puspavrksa* or a *phalavrksa*.

This Patience is the entry into *niyāma*, for it is the entry into
the certitude (*niyama*) of the acquisition of absolute good or
*samyaktva*. What is *samyaktva*? The Sūtra says that it is Nirvā-
ṇa. *Niyama* or absolute determination with regard to the
*samyaktva* is called *niyāma*, and also *niyama*.

Entering into this absolute determination of the acquisition of
*samyaktva* is the arriving, the taking possession of (*praṃpti*). Once
this possession arises, the ascetic is an Āryan.

It is in a future state, that is, in its arising state, that this
Patience brings about the cessation of the quality of Prthagjana; for it is admitted that in a future state it possesses this efficacy,
which does not belong to any other *dharma*; in the same way that
a future lamp destroys darkness, and in the same way that a future
arising lakṣana (ii.45c-d) causes arising.

According to other masters, the Supreme Worldly Dharmas
bring about the cessation of the quality of Prthagjana.

An inadmissible opinion, since these *dharmas* are Prthagjana
*dharmas*.

This objection does not hold, for these *dharmas* are in
contradiction to the quality of Prthagjana: this is as if someone
climbed onto the shoulders of his enemy and killed him.

According to others, the quality of Prthagjana ceases both by
the Supreme Worldly Dharmas, which take the place of the
Irresistible Path (*ānantaryamārga*), and by the Patience which
takes the place of the Path of Deliverance (*vimuktimārga*,
vi.28a-b). By the first, the quality of Prthagjana is in the process of
being abandoned (*prabhīyate*), and by the second, it is abandoned
26a-b. From this, a Dharma Knowledge having the same object.

Immediately after the Patience that has the Dharma Knowledge of Suffering for its object there arises a Dharma Knowledge having for its object the suffering of Kāmadhātu. It is called the Dharma Knowledge of Suffering.

The qualification of “pure” applied to the first Patience holds for all of the following Patiences. The knowledge in question is therefore pure.

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In this same way there arises one Patience that has the Dharma Knowledge for its object and a Dharma Knowledge relating to the suffering of Kāmadhātu.

26b-c. In the same way, relating to the rest of suffering, one consecutive Patience and a Knowledge.

Immediately following the Dharma Knowledge of Suffering, there arises one Patience of Consecutive Knowledge, having a composite object, bearing on the Suffering of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu. It is called duḥkhe'nvayajñānaksānti (the Patience which consists of Consecutive Knowledge of Suffering). From this Patience there arises a consecutive Knowledge which receives the name of Consecutive Knowledge of Suffering.

Dharma Knowledge, or Knowledge of the Dharmas (dharmanā) is so-called because it is the first knowledge which the ascetic obtains, since the origin of time, on the nature of the dharmas, suffering, etc. Consecutive Knowledge (anvayajñāna) is so-called
because it has the Dharma Knowledge for its cause (\textit{tadanvaya} = \textit{taddhetuka}), and because it knows the Truth in question as does Dharma Knowledge.

***

In the same way that, relating to the Truth of Suffering, four \textit{dharmas} have arisen, two Patiences and two Knowledges,

26d. In that same way, relating to the three other Truths.

When, immediately after the Consecutive Knowledge of Suffering, there has arise a Patience of Dharma Knowledge bearing on origin in Kāmadhātu, from this Patience there arises a Dharma Knowledge of Origin; in the same way, by the immediate succession of arising, there arises a Patience of Consecutive Knowledge, bearing on the rest of origin, and a Consecutive Knowledge of Origin. There arises one Patience of Dharma Knowledge, bearing on the extinction of suffering in Kāmadhātu, and the Dharma Knowledge of Extinction. There then arises one Patience of Consecutive Knowledge, bearing on the rest of extinction, and the Consecutive Knowledge of Extinction.

There then arises one Patience of Dharma Knowledge bearing on the path which is opposed to the suffering of Kāmadhātu, and the Dharma Knowledge of the Path. There then arises one Patience of Consecutive Knowledge bearing on the rest of the Path, and the Consecutive Knowledge of the Path.

27a-b. In this way, the comprehension of the Truths consists of sixteen mental states.\textsuperscript{168}

In this order, the comprehension of the Truths (\textit{satyābhīṣama-}
\textit{maya}) is made up of sixteen mental states.
According to other schools, the comprehension of the Truths is single, “unique.” One should examine what is their point of view. For it is without making any distinctions that we have spoken of this comprehension [by saying that it is made up of sixteen mental states]. If one were to distinguish,

27b. It is threefold: insight, application, and result.

Insight comprehension (dārśanābhisamaya) is the comprehension of the Truths by one pure prajñā.

Application comprehension (ālambanābhisamaya) is the comprehension of the Truths by this prajñā and also by the dharmas associated with this prajñā.

Resultant comprehension (kāryābhisamaya) is the comprehension of the Truths by this prajñā, by the dharmas which are associated with it, and also by the dharmas not associated with it but which accompany it, for example, morality, the arising laksāṇā (ii.45c), etc.

When the ascetic sees suffering, the three comprehensions take place relative to suffering; the third comprehension takes place relative to the other Truths, for origin is abandoned, extinction is experienced, and the path cultivated.

Stated in this way, if the partisan of a single, unique comprehension intends to speak of comprehension which consists of the seeing of the Truths, his thesis is inadmissible, by reason of the varity of the aspects (vii.10c): one does not see origin, etc., under the aspects of suffering.

But, he would say, one sees all the Truths under the aspect of non-self.

If this were the case, then one would not see the Truths under the aspects of suffering, etc.; and this hypothesis contradicts the Sūtra which says, “The Śrāvaka, when he judges suffering as suffering, or origin as origin, or extinction as extinction, or path as
path, there is then for him discernment of the *dharmas* associated with these pure judgments . . .”

[But, would he not say that this declaration of the Sūtra refers to the preparatory period, before comprehension?

This is inadmissible, for there is no pure judgment in this period.]

But, he would say, does this declaration refer to the Path of Meditation, to the period during which one meditates on, and cultivates the Truths already seen?

This is inadmissible, for one cultivates the Truths in the same manner in which one has seen them.

If the partisans of a single, unique comprehension pretend that this comprehension is unique because the ascetic who sees one Truth obtains mastery with respect to the others, this is to say that, through the seeing of the Truth of Suffering, the ascetic obtains the capacity of experiencing the seeing of the other Truths without any new preparatory exercise,—and this we approve. Nevertheless, one should examine whether there is produced, or not, in the interval, a departing from the comprehension.

But if the partisans of a single comprehension affirm the unity of comprehension because suffering is perfectly known, origin is abandoned, extinction realized, and the path cultivated, then this we approve, for we have said that when one Truth is seen, there is resultant comprehension with regard to the three others.

Objection: If you approve this opinion, you contradict the Sūtra which teaches gradual (*kramena*) comprehension. It is with reference to insight comprehension that the Sūtra teaches the gradual comprehension of the Truths, “Oh householder, comprehension is not unique, but gradual (*anupūrva*) . . .” and the rest; in all there are three Sūtras accompanied by examples.

But, one would say, the Sūtra says that “one who is free from perplexity and doubt with regard to suffering is also free from perplexity and doubt with regard to the Buddha.” Therefore
comprehension is not gradual, but single and unique.\textsuperscript{181}

This objection does not hold: for this Sūtra means to say that when suffering is understood, the perplexity and the doubt relative to the Buddha does not become active and will necessarily be abandoned.

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We have seen that comprehension consists of sixteen mental states.

27d. It is of the same sphere as the Supreme Worldly Dharmas.\textsuperscript{182}

These sixteen mental states are of the same sphere as the Supreme Worldly Dharmas. We have seen that these can be of six spheres (20c-d).

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Why are there necessarily Patiences and Knowledges?

28a-b. The Patiences and Knowledges are, in this order, the Irresistible Path and the Path of Deliverance.\textsuperscript{183}

The Patiences cannot be hindered (antarayitum asakyatvāt) in their cutting off of the possession of the defilements; they are therefore, according to Pāṇini, iii.3.171-2, the Irresistible Path (ānantaryamārga).

The Knowledges arise among the persons who are thus delivered from the possession of the defilements, at the same time as does possession of disconnection from the defilements
(visamīyoga, i.6a, ii.55d): they are therefore the Path of Deliverance (vimuktimārga).

As a consequence there is Patience and Knowledge, in the same way that there are two actions: expelling the thief, and closing the door.

If the possession of disconnection takes place only with the second Patience or second Irresistible Path [=the Patience that has the Consecutive Knowledge of Suffering as its object], then the Knowledge,—which is free from doubt (vii.1)—will not arise having the same object of the first Irresistible Path, namely the suffering of Kāmadhātu.

But if the defilements are abandoned by means of the Patiences (v.6), is there not a contradiction with the text of the Śāstra, “There are nine categories of bonds”? No, for the Patiences are the attendants of the Knowledges; the Śāstra attributes the very same work of the Patiences to the Knowledges, in the way that one says that the king does that which is done by his men.

***

From the fact that they all see the Truths, does it follow that the sixteen mental states of comprehension are the Path of Seeing?

28c-d. Because they are produced within anyone who sees that which has not been seen, fifteen moments are the Path of Seeing.

Fifteen moments, from the Patience that has the Dharma Knowledge of Suffering for its object to the Patience of Consecutive Knowledge that has the Path for its object, constitute the Path of Seeing. Why? Because the seeing of what has not been seen
continues.\(^1\)\(^8\)\(^9\)

In the sixteenth moment there is nothing more to see which has not been seen. This moment meditates on the Truth as it has been seen,\(^1\)\(^9\)\(^0\) and so forms part of the Path of Meditation.

But, one would say, the sixteenth moment sees the fifteenth moment, the Patience that has the Consecutive Knowledge of the Path as its object, which has not been seen previously.\(^1\)\(^9\)\(^1\)

Without doubt; but that to which it refers is the knowledge as to whether the Truth [of the Path] has been seen or not, not whether a moment [of the said Truth] has been seen or not. The fact that a moment has not been seen does not create the fact that the Truth has not been seen, in the same way that a field is not unharvested because one stalk remains to be cut.\(^1\)\(^9\)\(^2\)

Furthermore, the sixteenth moment, the Consecutive Knowledge of the Path forms part of the Path of Meditation: a. because it constitutes a result, a śrāmānyaphala (vi.51); b. because it embraces meditation, the possession or acquisition of the eight Knowledges and the sixteen aspects, [in contrast to the Path of Seeing, vii.21]; c. because it embraces the abandoning of a Path, the path of a follower; and d. because it belongs to a series.\(^1\)\(^9\)\(^3\)

Objection: The sixteenth moment should be considered as forming part of the Path of Seeing, because it is certainly free from falling away. And its non-falling away results from the fact that it supports or confirms the abandoning of the defilements abandoned through the Path of Seeing.

If you maintain that, for this reason, the sixteenth moment is of the Path of Seeing, this then leads to absurd consequences: the sixteenth moment and the following, and also the seeing of the Truths the second day and following, will be the Path of Seeing, for they also confirm the abandoning of the defilements abandoned through the Path of Seeing.

How is it that the first seven Knowledges are of the Path of Seeing and not the eighth? In fact, all eight see what has been seen
through the Patience which precedes.

Because the seeing of the Truths has not been finished: it is completed in the fifteenth moment. The first seven Knowledges are of the Path of Seeing because, the seeing of the Truths not being finished, they are produced in the interval, that is, either in the course of the Path of Seeing, or between two Patiences.

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We have explained how the Path of Seeing and the Path of Meditation arise. We should now define the persons (pudgala) in whom the Noble Path arises. In the course of the fifteen moments which are the nature of the Path of Seeing,

29a-b. In these moments, the ascetics of weak and sharp faculties are respectively Śraddhāṇusārīn and Dharmāṇusārīn.\(^{194}\)

Placed in these moments, the ascetic with weak faculties is called a Śraddhāṇusārīn; the ascetic with sharp faculties is called a Dharmāṇusārīn. Here the word "faculties" (indriyas) signifies the faculties of faith, absorption, etc.\(^{195}\)

The term Śraddhāṇusārīn is explained etymologically: śraddbhayā anusāraḥ = śraddhāṇusāraḥ, "pursuit by reason of faith"; one in whom there is this pursuit, or in whom the habit is to pursue by reason of faith, is called a Śraddhāṇusārīn, because, first,\(^{196}\) he has pursued the Truth [that is to say: to become conscious of the Truths] under the impulse of another, through confidence in another (see vi.63).

Dharmāṇusārīn is explained in the same way: dharmair anusāraḥ = dharmāṇusāraḥ, "pursuit by means of the dharmas... It is by himself, by means of the dharmas, that is, by means of the twelvefold Scripture, Sūtra, etc. (see vi.63a-c), that this ascetic has
first pursued the Truth.

These two ascetics,

29c-d. If they have not abandoned the defilements to be abandoned through Meditation, they are candidates for the first result.197

"The first result", that is, the first of the results, the state of Srotāpañña which is in fact the first resultant state in the order of acquisition.

If the Śraddhānusārin and the Dharmānusārin have not previously abandoned, by the worldly path (vi.49), any category of the defilements to be abandoned through Meditation, and as a consequence are found to be "bound by all the bonds" (sakalabandhana, ii. English translation, note 184), they are candidates for the state of Srotāpañña from the time in which they entered the Path of Seeing.

30a. Up to the abandoning of the five categories.

If they have, through the worldly path, abandoned the first, second, third, fourth or fifth category of the defilements of Kāmadhātu to be abandoned through Meditation, once having entered the Path of Seeing, they are the same candidates for the first state.

30b. Candidates for the second, until the abandoning of the ninth category.

But if they have previously abandoned the sixth, seventh, or eighth category, they are candidates for the second state, that is, for the state of Sakṛdāgāmin.
30c-d. Candidates for the third, through detachment either with respect to Kāmadhātu, or with respect to higher spheres.

In the case (1) where they are detached from Kāmadhātu through the abandoning of the ninth category of defilements of Kāmadhātu to be abandoned through Meditation, (2) or they are detached with respect to the higher spheres up to and including Ākiñcanyāyatana, they are candidates for the third state, that is, for the state of Anāgāmin. (See ii.16c, English translation, p. 177-178, vi, p. 985).

31a-b. In the sixteenth moment, the ascetic becomes an abider in the state for which he was a candidate.

In the sixteenth moment, these two ascetics no longer bear the name of Śraddhanusārin or Dharmānusārin; they no longer bear the name of candidates. They are "abiders in a result": candidates for the state of Srotāpanna, Sakṛdāgāmin, or Anāgāmin, now become Srotāpannas, Sakṛdāgāmins, or Anāgāmins.

The quality of Arhat cannot be acquired directly, that is to say without the state of Anāgāmin first being acquired—for, on the one hand, the defilements abandoned through meditation cannot be abandoned through the Path of Seeing (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 265c13) and, on the other hand, there cannot have been detachment by a worldly path previous to Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana. (See v. English translation note 27, and above p. 951).

31c-d. At this moment, the ascetics with weak and sharp faculties become respectively Śraddhādhimukta or Drṣṭi-prāpta.¹⁹⁸

The ascetic with weak faculties, who was a Śraddhānusārin,
now takes the name of Šraddhâdhimukta (vi.56, 63). The ascetic with sharp faculties, who was a Dharmânusârin, now takes the name of Drśtiprâpta. When faith (sraddhâ) predominates [in the ascetic with weak faculties], the ascetic is informed by his aspiration (adhimokṣa): he is therefore called a Šraddhâ-adhimukta. When prajñâ predominates [in the ascetic with sharp faculties] the ascetic is informed by speculative views (drśṭi): he is therefore called a Drśtiprâpta. (vi.57, 61, 63a-c)

By what reason does the ascetic who has abandoned the first categories [from one to five] of the defilements of Kāmadhâtu abandoned through meditation, become, in the sixteenth moment, a Srotaāpanna and not a candidate for the state of Sakṛdāgāmin? The same question is posed for the ascetic who has abandoned the sixth, seventh, and eighth categories, and who in the sixteenth moment, becomes a Sakṛdāgāmin and not a candidate for the state of Anāgāmin; and also for the ascetic who has abandoned the higher categories of the defilements, and who, in the sixteenth moment, becomes an Anāgāmin and not a candidate for the state of Arhat.

32. At the moment of the acquisition of a result, the ascetic does not acquire the path of a higher result; consequently the abider in a result does not exert himself with a view to a higher progress, and he is not a candidate for a result.

Upon the acquisition of a result, one does not acquire a path higher than this state (vi.65b-d), for example, upon the acquisition of Srotaāpanna, one does not obtain the path of Sakṛdāgāmin: such is this principle. As a consequence, the abider in a result, as long as he does not exert himself with a view to a higher progress for the acquisition of a new state, that is, as long as he does not cultivate the preparatory exercises which have for their result the abandoning of the defilements not yet abandoned and which is the cause of the acquisition of a new state, this resident is not a candidate for this new state.
Nevertheless, the ascetic who, [previously] detached from the Third Dhyāna [by a worldly path], enters into niyāma (vi.26a) or the Path of Seeing in a sphere lower than this Dhyāna [that is, in anāgamyā, the First or Second Dhyāna, or an intermediate state], certainly realizes a path higher than the result. If it were otherwise, then if he were reborn in a higher sphere [the Fourth Dhyāna or the Ārūpyas], he would not be in possession of the faculty of happiness (sukhendriya. viii.9).199 (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 464b8; Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 947a5).

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We have defined the persons who enter into niyāma, either by their being bhūyovitarāga, that is, detached from the sixth, seventh, and eighth categories of defilements of Kāmadhātu, or by their being kāmavitarāga, that is, completely detached from Kāmadhātu (ii.16c, English translation, p. 178).

We must now study the ascetic who proceeds gradually. To this end, the following point should be established.

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As the defilements of Kāmadhātu are divided into nine categories,

33a-b. Each sphere has nine categories of vices.

Each sphere, up to and including Naivasamjñānāsaṁjñāyatana. As each sphere has nine categories of vices,

33b. So too there are nine categories of qualities.
Each sphere has nine categories of qualities which are as many as the paths, the Irresistible Paths and the Paths of Deliverance, opposed to these said vices. How is this?

33c-d. By distinguishing weak, etc., in the categories of weak, medium, and strong.200

There are three fundamental categories, weak, medium, and strong. Each one of these is divided into weak, medium, and strong; this gives us nine categories: weak-weak, weak-medium, weak-strong, medium-weak, medium-medium, medium-strong, strong-weak, strong-medium, and strong-strong.

The weak-weak path has the power to bring about the abandoning of the strong-strong defilement; and so on to: the strong-strong path has the power to bring about the abandoning of the weak-weak defilement. For it is impossible for the strong-strong path to be produced from the very beginning; and it is impossible that there would be a strong-strong defilement when there is a strong-strong path.

In the same way, when one washes a piece of cloth, the greater stains are washed out first and only lastly the subtle stains; so too a great darkness is vanquished by a small light, whereas a great light is required to get rid of a small amount of darkness. Such are the types of examples that one can supply.201

An Āryan path, although momentary and weak, is capable of uprooting the defilements which have accrued through a succession of their causes in eternal transmigration--his path cuts off the possessions of the defilements which are similar to roots—for the white dharmas are powerful, whereas the black dharmas are weak.202 In this same way, the vices of wind, the bile, etc., accumulated over a long period of time, are gotten rid of by one grain of powder of the triṃṭ root (trimṛṭkarṣa); so too a great darkness is broken up by a small, momentary light.
There are therefore nine categories of defilements abandoned through meditation.

34a-b. The abider in a result who has not destroyed that which one should abandon through meditation is a Sap-takṛtparamah.²⁰³

The abider in a result who has not even abandoned one category of the defilements abandoned through meditation is a Srotāpanna; as he can be reborn seven times but no more, he is an "at the most seven times." As it is not an absolute rule that he will be reborn seven times, one says, "at the most." The expression of the Sūtra, saptakṛtvah paramah, signifies "there is rebirth for him seven times at the most." The word paramah is understood as prakārṣena ("at a maximum").

Srotāpanna: the river or stream (srotas), the stream of Nirvāṇa, the path, for one goes by means of a stream. The ascetic who has entered into it, who has arrived at it and who has attained it, is called "one who has entered into the stream" (srota-āpan-ṇa).²⁰⁴

Objection: How can one enter it? Would one say that it is by the obtaining of the first path? Then the eighth saint²⁰⁵ would be a Srotāpanna. Would one say that it is by the obtaining of the first state? Then the bhūyovītarāga and the kāmavītarāga, when they acquire the first state which they acquire, would be Srotāpannas; but you have said that they are, respectively, Sakṛdāgāmins and Anāgāmins (vi.30b-d).

We would answer: The ascetic enters into the stream by the obtaining of the first state; but this does not refer to the state that a certain saint can acquire first, but to the state that one acquires first when one passes through all of the states.
But why is not the eighth saint a Srotaāpanna, for he has entered into the stream of the Noble Path?

Because it is at the sixteenth moment, that of the Consecutive Knowledge of the Path, that one possesses (1) both the path of the candidate, consisting of fifteen moments, and the path of the state, (2) and the Path of Seeing and the Path of Meditation; (3) because then one comprehends the "stream," that is, the Path in its entirety, up to and including the fifteenth moment.

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The Vaibhāṣikas say: Independently of the present existence, the Srotaāpanna again takes up birth among humans, seven existences properly so-called, and seven intermediate existences (antarābhava, iii.10); and in this same way, he again takes up birth among the gods. That is, he takes up birth up to twenty-eight existences. Yet, as he has everywhere the series of seven existences, the ascetic is said to be "reborn at the most seven times"; the same way that a Bhikṣu is called "wise in seven things" (saptasthānakusāla) when he knows the "groups of seven"; so too a tree is termed "having seven leaves" (saptaparna) because its buds produce some seven leaves.

Objection: But the Sūtra says, "It is absolutely impossible for a saint (pudgalā) possession views (dṛṣṭisampanna) to produce an eighth existence." And this text is in contradiction to the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas.

No, they answer, for this text should be understood: "He does not produce an eighth existence in the same realm of rebirth." Or, if one wants to hold to the letter of the Sūtra: "Having transmigrated, having passed seven times both among the gods and among humans, he will realize the end of suffering," one should conclude that the heavenly and human rebirths are not preceded by any intermediate existences (antarābhava), since the Sūtra speaks only of gods and humans.
Taking up the objection again, if one should understand: "He does not produce an eighth existence in the same realm of rebirth," how does it happen that an Ùrdhvasrotas of the Bhavägraparama class (vi.38b)\(^{212}\) is reborn eight times in the same realm of its rebirth?

The Vaibhäsikas answer that the text which denies an eighth rebirth refers only to an eighth rebirth in Kāmadhātu.

But what text and what reasoning prove that this text refers only to Kāmadhātu? And what proves that the saint transmigrates seven times, among the gods on the one hand, and among humans on the other, and not seven times in all among both? The text has, in fact, "Having transmigrated seven times among gods and among humans."

The Kāsyapīyas read, "Having transmigrated seven times among gods, and seven times among humans (saptakṛtvā devān saptakṛtvā manusyaṁ)." There is therefore no reason to attach any importance to the preceding question.\(^{213}\)

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He who becomes a Srotāpanna as a human will return to be among humans in order to obtain Nirvāṇa; he who becomes a Srotāpanna as a god will return to be among the gods in order to obtain Nirvāṇa.

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Why is a Srotāpanna not reborn an eighth time? Because, in this limit of time, in the course of seven existences, his series is necessarily matured. Such is the nature of the Path: so too, such is the nature of the venom of the "seven-footed serpent" that a person bitten dies after having walked only seven paces; such is the
nature of this illness that the four-day fever returns during each of
the four days (see note 210).

214 He does not obtain Nirvāṇa in less time because some seven
bonds remain, two of the avarabhāgīya or lower class, namely
sensual desire (kāmacchanda) and anger (vyāpāda), and five of the
ūrdhvabhāgīya or higher class, namely two cravings (rāga) [in
Rūpadhātu and Ārupyadhātu], dissipation (audbhhatya), pride
(mana), and delusion (moha) (v.43). Because, even though he
realizes the Noble Path [of Sakṛdāgāmin or Anāgāmin], he does
not obtain Nirvāṇa in the interval by reason of the force of the
actions which should be rewarded in the course of the seven
existences.

If a Buddha has not arisen in the period when one should
obtain Nirvāṇa, it is as a householder that he will obtain the
quality of Arhat, but he does not then remain as a householder: by
the force of dharmatā, that is, by the force of the Path of the Arhat
or the Aśaikṣa, he is endowed with the marks of a Bhikṣu;215
according to other masters, with the marks of a non-Buddhist
Bhikṣu.

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Why is the Srotaāpanna declared to be an avinipātadharman,
"one incapable of falling into a painful realm of rebirth" (apāya)?216

Because he does not accumulate actions which cause him to fall
into it; because, by the actions of this type which have already been
previously accumulated, his mind has become refractory to the
maturation of these actions, being perfumed by the powerful roots
of good by reason of the purity of his behavior, and by reason of
the purity of his sentiments with regard to the Three Jewels.217

A person who has accumulated an action which should
necessarily mature in a painful realm of rebirth cannot even
produce Patience (vi.18), much less the pure Path.218
There is a stanza, "The ignorant, if they have committed only a small transgression, go below; the wise, if they have committed a great transgression, avoid painful rebirth. A small mass of iron, in a mass, sinks; the same iron, in a greater mass but fashioned into a bowl, floats." The Sūtra employs the expression, "The Srotāpanna . . . puts an end to suffering (duḥkhasyantam karoti)." What does "the end of suffering" mean? Suffering beyond which there is no more suffering. This means that the saint causes suffering to no more arise. Or rather the end of suffering is Nirvāṇa. How can one "make" Nirvāṇa? By clearing away the obstacles to Nirvāṇa; [these obstacles are the possession of defilements or upadhi]. In the same way that one says, "Make some space! Make the house fall down!" (ākāśam kuru maṇḍapam pātaya). There are persons other than the Srotaāpanna who will be reborn seven times at the most: the Prthagjana whose mind is matured. But there is no fixed principle here: this Prthagjana can obtain Nirvāṇa in this life, or in an intermediate existence, etc. Consequently we do not speak of this here.

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The abider in a state within whom no category of the defilements abandoned through meditation is destroyed is, as we have seen, a Saptakṛtvaḥparama.

34c-d. Delivered from three or four categories, destined for two or three rebirths, he is a Kulaṁkula.

The Srotaāpanna becomes a Kulaṁkula, "one who goes from family to family," (1) from the point of view of the abandoning of the defilements, through the abandoning of three or four categories of defilements of Kamadhatu; (2) from the point of view of the indriyas or moral faculties, through the acquisition of pure faculties opposed to these defilements; or (3) from the point of view of existences, because there remain only two or three
more rebirths for him.\textsuperscript{222}

In the Kārikā only two of these causes are mentioned. For, from the fact that the Srotāpañna abandons the defilements after the acquisition of his state, one concludes, without one having to say so, that he acquires the pure faculties opposed to these defilements. But the number of rebirths is indicated: in fact, after having acquired the state of Srotāpañna, the saint is capable of obtaining the quality of Sakṛḍāgāmin, Anāgāmin, or Arhat, and the number of his rebirths will be found, from this fact, to be either more or less.

Why does the Srotāpañna who abandons the fifth category not become a Kulamkula?

Because, when the fifth category is abandoned, the sixth is also certainly abandoned, and the saint therefore becomes a Sakṛḍāgāmin. In fact here one category of defilement is not capable of creating an obstacle to the acquisition of a state, as in the case of one who is separated by only one more rebirth from Nirvāṇa (an Ekavīcika, vi.36a-c): the reason is that here the saint, by acquiring a new state, does not pass into another sphere of existence or Dhātu.\textsuperscript{223}

A Kulamkula is of two types:\textsuperscript{224} (1) a Devakulaṁkula, the saint who, having transmigrated to two or three families among the gods, attains Nirvāṇa in the same heaven or in another;\textsuperscript{225} and (2) a Manuṣyakulaṁkula, the saint who, having transmigrated to two or three families among humans, attains Nirvāṇa in this Dvīpa or in another.

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The same abider

35a-b. Who has conquered up to five categories, is a candidate for the second.
The abider who has abandoned from one to five categories of defilements is a candidate for the second state.

35c-d. Having destroyed the sixth category, he is a Sakṛdāgāmin.

He obtains the second state. The Sakṛdāgāmin, "the once-returner," having gone to be among the gods, returns to be among humans, and has then no further rebirth: whence his name. The Sūtra says that one becomes a Sakṛdāgāmin "by reason of the weakness of lust, anger, and delusion," because only the three weak categories of these defilements remain. 226

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This abider in the state of Sakṛdāgāmin,

36a-c. Having destroyed seven or eight categories, and destined for one rebirth, is an Ekavīcīka; he is also a candidate for the third state. 227

This Sakṛdāgāmin becomes an Ekavīcīka for three reasons, (1) because he abandons seven or eight categories of defilements; (2) because he acquires the faculties opposed to these defilements; and (3) because he has to be reborn only one more time.

Why does the only category that remains to him, the ninth, create an obstacle to the acquisition of later states? Because the acquisition of this state involves passage to another sphere [to Rūpadhātu]. We have seen (iv.107) that actions create obstacles in three circumstances: they hinder the acquisition of the Patience, the quality of Anāgāmin, and the quality of Arhat. Now this holds here for the defilements as for actions, for they refer to going
beyond the sphere where they should be manifested as the results of retribution—with respect to actions—and of outflowing—with respect to the defilements (ii.56).

Vict signifies interval, separation. Nirvāṇa is separated from this saint by one rebirth; the state of Anāgāmin is separated from this saint by one category of defilement: he is therefore termed an Ekavīcika.

Having abandoned seven or eight categories of defilements, he is a candidate for the third state.

He who—previously freed, through the worldly path, from three or four categories of defilements, or from seven or eight categories of defilements [of Kāmadhātu]--, obtains a result [the state of Srotāpañna or Sakṛdāgāmin according to his case], is not a Kulaṅkula and is not an Ekavicika as long as he does not realize a path superior to the state acquired: in fact as long as the pure faculties, opposed to these categories of defilements, are absent in him (vi.32b-c).

36d. He is an Anāgāmin by the destruction of the ninth category.

This abider in a result, through the abandoning of the ninth category of the defilements of Kāmadhātu—the weak-weak defilements,—becomes an Anāgāmin, because he is no longer reborn in Kāmadhātu. The Sūtra says that one becomes an Anāgāmin through the abandoning of the five so-called avarabhāg-īya bonds (v.65a-c): we get the number five by adding all the bonds that the Anāgāmin is found to have abandoned (v.70a-b); according to his situation he has, in the first stage, abandoned two or three bonds.228

37a-c. He is a saint who "obtains Nirvāṇa in the interval," "by arising," "with effort," "without effort," and "by going higher."229
"One who obtains Nirvāṇa in the interval" \( (antisparinir-
vāyin) \) signifies one who attains Nirvāṇa in the intermediate existence (iii.10, 12). The other terms are explained in the same way: one who attains Nirvāṇa by being born (\( upapadyaparinir-
vāyin \)),\(^{230}\) and one [one who makes an effort] (\( sābhisaṃskārapari-
nirvāyin \)),\(^{231}\) and one who does not make any effort (\( anabhi-
irvāyin \)).

There are five types of Anāgāmins: an Antarāparinirvāyin, an Upapadyaparinirvāyin, a Sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin, an Anabhisamkāraparinirvāyin, and an Īrdhvasrotas.

The first one, who obtains Nirvāṇa in the intermediate existence, is one who attains Nirvāṇa in an intermediate existence, by attaining it in Rūpadhātu.

The second one obtains Nirvāṇa\(^{232}\) as soon as he is reborn, soon,\(^{233}\) through \( sopadhiṣeṣa \) Nirvāṇa, Nirvāṇa with remnant;\(^{234}\) and because he is energetic and because the path is spontaneous, he realizes it by himself.

According to other masters, he obtains \( nirupadhiṣeṣa \) Nirvāṇa, Nirvāṇa without remnant, exactly like the first Anāgāmin, that is, having obtained the quality of Arhat, he obtains Nirvāṇa without achieving his portion (=end) of life.

This opinion is false, for this second Anāgāmin does not possess mastery relative to the abandoning of life, and this because this mastery does not belong to one who possesses \( prāntakopicaturthaḥhyāna \) (99.10a, vii.41a-c); this type of Dhyāna exists only among humans of the three Dvīpas; and this Anāgāmin is born in Rūpadhātu.\(^{235}\)

The third one, the Anāgāmin who obtains Nirvāṇa with effort, obtains Nirvāṇa after having been born, without relaxing his exercises, for he is energetic; with effort, for the Path is not spontaneous. The fourth one, who obtains Nirvāṇa without effort, obtains Nirvāṇa without effort, for he is not energetic, and the
The Path is not spontaneous. Such are the definitions of these two saints according to the Vaibhāsikas.\textsuperscript{236}

According to another opinion, the difference between the third and the fourth is that the former obtains Nirvāṇa by a path having for its object conditioned things, namely suffering, its origin, and the Path; and the latter, by a path having for its object unconditioned things, namely Extinction or the Third Noble Truth.

This opinion is not justified by reason of the consequences that it implies: the distinction would hold for the first two types of Anāgāmins also.

In the Sūtra (\textit{Samyukta}, \textit{TD} 2, p. 197a26), the Anāgāmin who obtains Nirvāṇa without effort is listed before the Anāgāmin who obtains it with effort. This order is justified.\textsuperscript{237} In fact, for the first, the path is realized without \textit{abhisamāskāra}, being obtained without effort; it is thus "spontaneous." But, for the second, the path is realized by \textit{abhisamāskāra}, being obtained with effort; therefore it is unspontaneous.

For the Anāgāmin who obtains Nirvāṇa through birth, the path is even more spontaneous, even stronger, and the latent defilements (\textit{anusayas}) are even weaker.

The fifth, the Ūrdhvasrotas,\textsuperscript{238} is the saint "for whom there is \textit{srotas}, that is to say, \textit{gati} or movement, to the height." \textit{Srotas} and \textit{gati} have the same meaning. He does not obtain Nirvāṇa where he is reborn upon leaving Kāmadhātu, but he goes higher.

\textbf{37c-d.} When he combines his Dhyāna, he is an Akaniṣṭha-ga.\textsuperscript{239}

There are two types of Ūrdhvasrotas: either he combines his Dhyāna and, as a consequence, he rises up to Akaniṣṭha Heaven and obtains Nirvāṇa there; or he does not combine his Dhyāna and, as a consequence, rises up to Naivasaṃjñānasamjñāyatana, Bhavāgra.\textsuperscript{240}
38a-b. The Akaniṣṭhaga is either a Jumper, a Half-Jumper, or One who Dies Everywhere.²⁴¹

The saint who rises up to Akaniṣṭha in order to obtain Nirvāṇa there is of three types: he is a Jumper (*pluta*), a Half-Jumper (*ardhapluta*), or One who Dies Everywhere (*sarvacyuta*).

A Jumper is one who has, down here, combined his Dhyānas; he has tasted the First Dhyāna (viii.6) and, as a consequence, having fallen from the three higher Dhyānas, is reborn among the Brahmakāyikas. There, by the force of his previous enthusiasm, he combines the Fourth Dhyāna: also, dying from among the Brahmakāyikas, he is reborn among the Akaniṣṭhas. As he does not immerse himself in any of the fourteen intermediate heavens between the first heaven of Rūpadhātu (=the Brahmakāyikas) and the last one (Akaniṣṭha), he is called a Jumper.

A Half-Jumper is the saint who, passing beyond any one place,²⁴² enters the Akaniṣṭhas after having been reborn among the Śuddhāvāsas (vi.43a-b).

An Āryan is never reborn among the Mahābrahmās, because this heaven is a place of heresy: one considers Mahābrahmā as the creator there;²⁴³ and because only one leader can be found there: an Āryan would be superior to Mahābrahmā there.²⁴⁴

One who Dies Everywhere transmigrates through all of the other heavens, with the exception of the Mahābrahmās, before he enters into Akaniṣṭha.

An Anāgāmin never takes up two existences in the same place of rebirth, because he goes in successive order. Therefore his quality of Anāgāmin, "a non-returner", is perfect: he is never reborn, either in a place lower than where he was once born, or in this same place.

Such is the Urdhvasrotas who has combined his Dhyāna, namely an Akaniṣṭhaga.
38b. The other is a Bhavāgraga.

The Ārdhvasrotas who has not combined his Dhyāna goes up to Naivasāṃjñānāsāṃjñāyatana, or Bhavāgra. Tasting the other concentrations (samāpatti), he is reborn in all other places, but he does not enter the Suddhāvāsas; traversing the Ārūpyas he arrives at Bhavāgra and there he obtains Nirvāṇa. In fact this saint is essentially dedicated to absorption, whereas the Akaniṣṭhagā is essentially dedicated to insight.

We think—even though the authors of the Śāstras have not decided this point—that the two types of Ārdhvasrotas can obtain Nirvāṇa "in the course of the way," before arriving at Akaniṣṭha or Bhavāgra. The quality of Akaniṣṭhaparama and Bhavāgraparama only imply the non-production of a new existence after the saint has obtained Akaniṣṭha Heaven or Bhavāgra, not a birth in these same heavens; the same way that the Srotaapannā, destined to be reborn at the most seven times (saptakrtvahparama), can be reborn less than seven times.245

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There are five types of Anāgāmins who go to Rūpadhātu and attain Nirvāṇa there: an Antarāparinirvāyin, and Upapadyaparinirvāyin, a Sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin, an Anabhisāmaskāraparinirvāyin, and an Ārdhvasrotas.

38c. Another, who goes to Ārūpyadhātu, is of four types.

There is another Anāgāmin, the Ārūpyopaga, "one who goes to Ārūpyadhātu and who attains Nirvāṇa there." Being detached from Rūpadhātu, and dying here, he is reborn among beings in Ārūpyadhātu. This Anāgāmin is only of four types, Upapadyapari-
nirvāṇa, etc., for the intermediate state (and the Antarāparinirvāṇin) does not exist in the births of Ārupyaḍhātu.

Therefore there are six Anāgāmins, the five named above and the Ārupyaga, not taking into account the different types of Ārupyaga.

38d. Another, who obtains Nirvāṇa here.

Another obtains Nirvāṇa right here, the saint who obtains Nirvāṇa in this existence (vi.41a). This is the seventh Anāgāmin.

39a-b. It is said that there are nine saints going to Rūpadhātu, by making a threefold distinction among the three.

Three Anāgāmins, each divided into three categories, make nine Anāgāmins, because they go to Rūpadhātu.

What are these three? The Antarāparinirvāyn, the Upapadyaparinirvāyn and the Urdhvasrotas.

How are the three categories distinguished? 1. According to the comparisons of the Sūtra, there are three Antarāparinirvāyns who obtain Nirvāṇa, the first, quickly, the second, not quickly, and the third, after a long time; 2. with respect to the Upapadyaparinirvāyn, one should distinguish the Upapadyaparinirvāyn properly so called, the Sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyn, and the Anabhisamāskāraparinirvāyn: all three, obtaining Nirvāṇa after having been reborn, are Upapadyaparinirvāyns; 3. with respect to the Urdhvasrotas, one should distinguish the Jumper, the Half-Jumper, and the One who Dies Everywhere.

Or rather one can say that these three Anāgāmins are each divided into three categories accordingly as Nirvāṇa is acquired by them quickly, not quickly, or after a long time.
39c-d. Their differences are due to the difference of actions, faculties, and defilements.

The distinction of these three Anāgāmins and of these nine Anāgāmins, is due to the differences of their actions, their moral faculties, and their defilements.

i. The three Anāgāmins differ (a) from the point of view of their accumulated actions (iv.120) which should be rewarded either in an intermediate existence or in the existence immediately to come: [after having been reborn], or later (iv.50b); (b) from the point of view of the activity of their defilements, which are, in this order, weak, medium, or strong; and (c) from the point of view of their moral faculties, which are strong, medium, or weak.

ii. Each of the three Anāgāmins is of three categories: (a) from the point of view of their defilements, as above (weak-weak, weak-medium, weak-strong for the three categories of Antarāparinirvāyin, etc.), (b) from the point of view of their faculties (which are strong-strong, etc.); and (c) from the point of view of their actions also with respect to the three Ěrdhvasrotas: the actions "to be rewarded later" differ among the Jumper, the Half-Jumper, and the One who Dies Everywhere.

There are therefore nine categories of Anāgāmin by reason of the differences of their actions, their defilements and their faculties.

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How does the Sūtra teach that there are seven realms of rebirth for good persons (satpuruṣagati)?
Chapter Six

40a-b. In not establishing any distinction among the Īrūdhvāsrotas, there are seven realms of rebirth for the good.\(^\text{247}\)

An Īrūdhvāsrotas is a saint who has the characteristic of "flowing" towards the heights.

This Sūtra, the Gatisūtra (iii.12), by not distinguishing the categories of Jumper, Half-Jumper, and One who Dies Everywhere, teaches seven realms of rebirth for good persons, namely three Antarāparinirvāyins, three Upapadyaparinirvāyins,---in all six realms of rebirth,---and the realm of Īrūdhvāsrotas, the seventh.

Why are only these the realms of rebirth for good persons? Why not consider the other realms of rebirth of the Saikṣas, such as the realms of the Srotāpanna and the Sakṛdāgāmin, as such?\(^\text{248}\)

Those who are in the seven realms of rebirth did only good and did not do evil; having arrived at these realms of rebirth, there is no turning back. Now three characteristics do not exist among the other Saikṣas:

40c-d. By reason of the cultivation of good and the non-cultivation of evil, and of the non-returning from whence they have come.\(^\text{249}\)

Only these seven realms of rebirth are the realms of rebirth for good persons.

It is true that the Sūtra says, "What is a good person (satpurūṣa)? One who is endowed with the Right Views of a Saikṣa..."\(^\text{250}\) It expresses itself in this manner because the Srotāpanna and the Sakṛdāgāmin are in fact good persons from a certain point of view: 1. They have acquired the discipline that makes impossible (iv.33a-b) the committing of the five types of transgressions, [killing, stealing, forbidden sexuality, lying, and alcohol];\(^\text{251}\) 2. they
have abandoned, in a general manner, their bad defilements, that is, the defilements of Kāmadhātu (v.19, 52). But here the Sūtra of the Saptasatpurusagati refers to the saints who are absolutely good persons.

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It happens that an Āryan, who became an Āryan in the first birth through the acquisition of the state of Srotaāpanna or Sakṛdāgāmin, obtains in his following existence the state of Anāgāmin. This Anāgāmin is called a parivṛttajanmā anāgāmin ("one who becomes an Anāgāmin by rebirth [in Kāmadhātu]"). The question is posed whether this Anāgāmin is of the five types, Antarāparinirvāyin, etc.

41a-b. The Āryan who obtains the state of Anāgāmin after having been reborn in Kāmadhātu, does not go to another sphere.

This Āryan, once he has obtained the state of Anāgāmin, obtains Nirvana in this same existence (vi.38b), [by reason of the intensity of his disgust at the extreme suffering of Kāmadhātu]. But the Āryan who obtains the state of Anāgāmin after having been reborn in Rūpadhātu, goes sometimes to Ārūpyadhātu as a Bhavāgraparana Īrduhvasrota.

Objection: But Śakra expresses himself thus: "If at the end I should fall, may I be reborn among the well-known gods under the name of Akaniṣṭhas!" This contradicts your thesis.

The Vaibhāṣikas answer: Śakra expresses himself in this way because he does not know the Dharma. And, if the Blessed One does not correct him, it is with the intention of encouraging him.
41c-d. This Āryan and one who is born in a higher sphere, are incapable of modifying their faculties, and are incapable of falling away.\textsuperscript{258}

The Āryan who has become an Anāgāmin by being reborn in Kāmadhātu and one who is born in a higher sphere are not even capable of modifying their faculties; how could they fall away (parihāṇī)?

Why not admit a modification of faculties and a falling away in the case of the Āryan who has entered into Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu?

Because neither a modification of faculties nor a falling away occur in the case of these saints.

Why is this?

Because, from the fact of their stay in two existences, their faculties (prajñā, etc.) have acquired an advanced state of maturity;\textsuperscript{259} and because the saint has acquired a personality favorable to the Path.

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Why is not a Śaikṣa not detached from Kāmadhātu, that is a Srotāpanna and a Sakṛdāgāmin, an Antarāparinirvāyin? That is, why does he not obtain Nirvāṇa in the intermediate existence which follows his death?

Since he has not mastered the Path, this saint cannot manifest it; and because these latent defilements (anusaya) are not extremely weak. Such is our answer.

The Vaibhāṣikas answer: Because it is very difficult to leave Kāmadhātu. In fact, in order to obtain Nirvāṇa, the Śaikṣaṁ question should do many things: 1. abandon the bad defilements,
that is to say, the defilements of Kāmadhātu; 2. abandon the neutral defilements, that is, those of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu (v.19); 3. acquire three results in the case of the Srotāpānna, two results in the case of the Sakṛdāgāmin;—whereas a detached being, that is, an Anāgāmin only has to obtain one more result; and 4. pass beyond the three Dhātus. Now a saint, in his intermediate existence, is not capable of doing this.\textsuperscript{260}

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We have seen that “combining his Dhyānas, he is an Akanis-ṭha” (vi.37d). What Dhyāna is first combined?\textsuperscript{261}

42a. First, combination of the Fourth Dhyāna.

Because it is the most powerful of the absorptions and the best of the easy paths (\textit{sukhā pratipad}, vi.66a). This is how one proceeds.

[According to the Vaibhāṣikas,] the Arhat or the Anāgāmin enters the Fourth Dhyāna, pure\textsuperscript{262} and prolonged, that is, constituting a series of thoughts.\textsuperscript{263} He leaves it, and returns to the same Fourth Dhyāna, but impure and prolonged. He continues in this way, diminishing gradually the number of thoughts of each pure, impure, and pure Dhyāna, until, having entered a pure Dhyāna of two thoughts, he leaves it in order to enter an impure Dhyāna of two thoughts, which will be followed by a pure Dhyāna of two thoughts. This constitutes the preparatory stage for the combination.

42b. The combination is achieved through the combining of moments.

The Vaibhāṣikas say: When, following a pure thought, an
impure thought is called up, and, following this impure thought, a pure thought is called up: then, through the combining of an impure thought and two pure thoughts, the combination of the Dhyāna is achieved. The first two moments are similar to the Irresistible Path (vi.28a), the third to the Path of Deliverance.

Having thus combined the Fourth Dhyāna, by the force of this combined Dhyāna, the saint also combines the other Dhyānas.

The combination takes place first in Kāmaddhātu; later, in the case of falling away, the saint combines these in Rūpadhātu (see above, p. 968).

In our opinion, the combination of a single, unique impure moment with two pure moments, is impossible to everyone, with the exception of the Buddha. Consequently the combination of a Dhyāna is achieved when one enters, for the period of time that one wants, into three prolonged Dhyānas, pure, impure, and pure.


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To what end does the saint combine his Dhyānas?

42c-d. With a view to arising, to bliss and also through fear of the defilements.

It is for three reasons that the saint combines his Dhyānas: (1) the Anāgāmin of sharp faculties, with a view to a rebirth among the Śuddhāvāsas and with a view to happiness in this life;264 the Anāgāmin of weak faculties, also through fear of the defilements, so that he may avoid falling away by holding the absorption of disgust at a distance (viii.6); (2) the Arhat of sharp faculties, with a view to happiness here below; the Arhat of weak faculties, also through fear of the defilements, so that he may avoid falling away.
Why are there five types of birth among the Śuddhāvāsas?²⁶⁵

The cultivation of the combination of the Fourth Dhyāna, described above,

43a-b. As it is fivefold, there are five births or types of existence among the Śuddhāvāsas.

The cultivation of the combination is fivefold, weak, medium, strong, stronger, and strongest.

In the weak cultivation, one calls up three thoughts,²⁶⁶ one pure, one impure, and one pure; in the second cultivation, six thoughts;²⁶⁷ in the third, the fourth, and the fifth cultivations, nine, twelve, and fifteen thoughts.

The five births are, in this order, the result of these five cultivations. They are produced by the force of the impure moments included in these cultivations.

According to others,²⁶⁸ the five births take place by reason of the predominance of the different faculties: Āvṛhas, by the predominance of faith . . . Akaniṣṭhas by the predominance of prajñā.

43c-d. The Anāgāmin who has acquired extinction is considered a Kāyasākṣin.²⁶⁹

One who is in possession of the absorption of extinction (samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti) is called one who has acquired extinction.

As the Anāgāmin, whichever one he may be, has acquired extinction—as he has, in his body, seen the absence of thought and immediately experienced (sāksātkaroti) a dharma similar to
Nirvāṇa, namely the Absorption of Extinction—he is called a Kāyasākṣin, a bodily witness.

How does he immediately experience by the body alone?

Because, in the absence of thought, this immediate perception takes place dependent on the body. [Such is the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas.]

But this is how the Sautrāntikas would explain this. When the saint leaves the Absorption of Extinction, from the moment when he thinks, "Oh! This absorption of extinction is calm like Nirvāṇa!", he acquires a calmness of his conscious body [that is, of the body in which the consciousness has arisen again] never previously acquired. In this way, he directly perceives by the body the calmness [of extinction], and this by two acts of perception: in the first, during the absorption there is the acquisition (prāpti) of a body conforming to the extinction, and in the second, upon leaving the absorption, there is a consciousness which becomes conscious of the state of the body. Perception or experience, sāksātkriya, is the fact of making present (pratyakṣākara). There is sāksātkriya when one ascertains the calmness of the body which has again become conscious; and, from this ascertaining, it results that this calmness has been acquired while the body was non-conscious.  

According to the Sūtra, there are eighteen Saiksas. Why is not the Kāyasākṣin mentioned as one of the types of Saikṣa?

Because the quality of Kāyasākṣin is not one of the causes of the quality of Saikṣa.

What are the causes of this second quality?

They are the three siksas, learnings or disciplines, adhisīlam, adhicittam, and adhiprajñām, which constitute the Path, and the result of these three siksas, namely disconnection (i.6a, ii.55d). It is by reason of the diversity of the siksas and of their result that one distinguishes the Saiksas. Now the Absorption of Extinction is not a siksā, not being a path of abandoning, nor a result of siksā, not being disconnection. Consequently a saint, merely by virtue
of the fact that he possesses the Absorption of Extinction, is not called a type of Śāikṣa.

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We have roughly enumerated the Anāgāmins: "There are five who go to Rūpadhātu," "another, who goes to Ārūpyadhātu, is of four types; another obtains Nirvāṇa here" (vi.38c-d); but, in greater detail, one arrives at a higher number as an examination of one type of Anāgāmin, the first type, the Anāgāmin who obtains Nirvāṇa in the intermediate state (Antarāparinirvāyin) will show.

The Antarāparinirvāyin is (1) from the point of view of his faculties, of three types, of sharp, medium, and weak faculties; (2) from the point of view of his sphere (bhūmi), of four types, accordingly as he has for his support a certain Dhyāna [this refers to an Anāgāmin who goes to Rūpadhātu]; (3) from the point of view of his family (gotra), of six types: a Parihāṇadharman (one who can fall away), a Cetanādharman (one who can, at will, put an end to his existence), a Anurakṣaṇādharman (one who can preserve himself), a Sthitākampya (one who cherishes deliverance), a Prativedhanādharman (one who can penetrate the state of Arhat at will), and an Akopyadharman (one who has immovable deliverance of mind) (vi.57c-d); (4) from the point of view of place, of six types: the places towards which he shall enter as an intermediate being, are the sixteen heavens, from the Brahmākāyikas to the Akanisthas; (5) from the point of view of his detachment from the different spheres, of thirty-six types: the Antarāparinirvāyin can be 1. bound by all the bonds of Rūpadhātu; 2-9. he can be detached from one category . . . from eight categories of defilements of the First Dhyāna; 10. he can be bound by all the bonds of the Second Dhyāna . . . We thus have four groups of nine Antarāparinirvāyins.

We do not count the saint delivered from the ninth category of defilements of the Fourth Dhyāna, who is bound by all the bonds of Ārūpyadhātu: since this refers to the Antarāparinirvāyin, and so
to an Anāgāmin “who goes to Rūpadhātu,” since intermediate existence does not exist above Rūpadhātu.

Therefore, by taking into consideration the different distinctions of place, gotras, detachment, and faculties, one obtains the total of 2,592 types of Antarāparinirvāyins.

For each place [for example Brahmapurohita], there are six gotras. For each of these gotras, there are nine saints: one who is bound by all the bonds . . . and one who is detached from the bonds with respect to the eight categories of defilements: this makes six groups of nines, or fifty-four. If one multiplies this number by the number of places, that is, by sixteen, then we have eight hundred and sixty-four. By taking into consideration the difference in their faculties, that is, three times eight hundred and sixty-four, we then have two thousand five hundred and ninty-two.

With a view to obtaining a uniform distribution of nine saints through Dhyāna, the saint who is detached from the ninth category of a lower Dhyāna is considered to be bound by all the bonds of a higher Dhyāna.

As for the Antarāparinirvāyin, so too for the others, the Upapadyaparinirvāyin . . . and the Ürdhvasrotas. We have therefore, for the Anāgāmins who go to Rūpadhātu, five times two thousand five hundred and ninty-two for a total of twelve thousand nine hundred and sixty. In this same way one could calculate the number of types of Anāgāmins who go to Ārūpyadhātu.

44a-b. Up to the moment when he destroys the eighth part of Bhavāgra, he is a candidate for the quality of Arhat.

We are speaking of the Anāgāmin. From the moment when he is detached from the first category of the defilements of the First Dhyāna, up to the moment when he abandons the eighth category of the defilements of Bhavāgra (=Naivasamjñānasamjñāyatana), the Anāgāmin is a candidate for the state of Arhat.
44c. Also in the ninth path of abandoning.

In the path of abandoning (=the Irresistible Path, iv.28a) which brings about the abandoning of the ninth category of defilements of Bhavāgra, he is again a candidate for the state of Arhat.

44d. This path is similar to a diamond.275

This ninth path, which breaks all of the latent defilements (anusāyas) is called the absorption similar to a diamond (Vajropamāsamādhi). In truth, it does not break all of the latent defilements because many are already broken: but it has the power to break all of them, being the most powerful of all the paths of abandoning (=the Irresistible Path).

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There are many types of Vajropamāsamādhi.

The ascetic can produce it by entering into the different states of absorption in any one of the nine stages, anāgamya, dhyānāntara, the Four Dhyānas, or three Ārūpyas.

i. Produced in anāgamya,276 there are eight Vajropamāsamādhis associated with each of the four aspects of the Consecutive Knowledge of suffering and with each of the four aspects of the Consecutive Knowledge of origin, these Consecutive Knowledges bearing respectively on suffering and origin in Bhavāgra (vii.13a).

Eight Vajropamāsamādhis are associated with each of the four aspects of the Dharma Knowledge of extinction, and with each of the four aspects of the Dharma Knowledge of the Path. [According to the principle elucidated in vii.9].

Four Vajropamāsamādhis associated with each of the four
aspects of the Consecutive Knowledge of Extinction bear on the First Dhyāna; and so on until: four Vajropamasamādhis associated with each of the four aspects of the Consecutive Knowledge of Extinction bear on Bhavāgra.

Four Vajropamasamādhis are associated with each of the four aspects of the Consecutive Knowledge of the Path, because the Consecutive Knowledge of the Path has a universal sphere. [There is no reason to distinguish the spheres, as in the case for the Consecutive Knowledge of Extinction].

We have therefore, in the sphere of anāgamanī, fifty-two Vajropamasamādhis by reason of the distinction of the aspects and the objects of the Knowledges and the Consecutive Knowledges.

ii. The same calculation holds with respect to the Vajropamasamādhis produced in the other spheres up to and including the Fourth Dhyāna.

iii. For the Vajropamasamādhis produced in the first three Ārūpyas, we have, in this order, twenty-eight, twenty-four, and twenty.

1. Dharma Knowledge is absent there; 2. the Consecutive Knowledge having the extinction of a lower sphere for its object is also absent there (viii.21); 3. the Consecutive Knowledge exists there having for its object the Path which is opposed to a lower sphere, by reason of the quality of cause which the paths have among themselves (ii.52c).

[Certain Abhidhārmikas maintain that] the Consecutive Knowledge of the Path does not bear on all the spheres at one and the same time, but that one must distinguish the different spheres, as for the Consecutive Knowledge of Extinction: in this theory, one must add twenty-eight to the calculation of the Vajropamasamādhis which are produced in anāgamanī, etc. For the Ārūpyas, we have forty, thirty-two and twenty-four.

By taking into consideration the families (gotras, vi.58c) and the faculties, we obtain even higher figures.277
We have seen that the ninth category of Bhavāgra is abandoned by Vajropamasamādhi.

44d-45a. With the acquisition of the destruction of this category, there is the knowledge of destruction.\(^{278}\)

At the moment when the saint acquires the destruction of the ninth category, there arises the knowledge of destruction (kṣayajñāna). Immediately after Vajropamasamādhi, the last path of abandoning (=the Irresistible Path), there arises the last Path of Deliverance. This is why this Path of Deliverance, arising at the same time as the acquisition of the destruction of all the vices (āsravas), is the first knowledge of the destruction which arises; it is thus called the kṣayajñāna [by eliminating the middle word: kṣayapratamajñāna].

45b. Then the saint is an Āsaikṣa, an Arhat.\(^{279}\)

When this knowledge has arisen, the candidate for the quality of Arhat has acquired the state of Āsaikṣa, the state of Arhat: he no longer has to apply himself (śikṣā) with a view to another state; he is therefore an Āsaikṣa. For the same reason, having achieved his task with respect to himself, he is worthy (arhattva) to do good for others; he is worthy to receive offerings from all beings who are still subject to desire.

From the fact that one defines an Arhat as an Āsaikṣa, it results that the seven other saints, four candidates and three abiders, are Śaikṣas.

Why are they Śaikṣas? Because it is their nature to be always applying themselves to the three śikṣās\(^{280}\) with a view to the
destruction of their vices. These three śikṣās, namely adhiśīlam śikṣā, adhicittam śikṣā, and adhiprajñām śikṣā are by their nature morality, absorption (samādhi), and speculative knowledge (prajñā).

But, according to this definition, can a Prthagjana be a Śaikṣa?

No, because he does not exactly discern the Truths; and because he is susceptible to completely losing the śikṣās that he has acquired.

This is why, with a view to affirming that he who exclusively applies himself is a Śaikṣa, and to deny that he who abandons the śikṣā is a Śaikṣa, the Sūtra repeats [the words of the Blessed One], "Oh Śivaka, he who applies himself to that to which he should apply himself, him alone do I call a Śaikṣa."

But how can one say that the Āryan, when he finds himself in a normal state and not in absorption, has it for his nature to apply himself?

By reason of his intention; as the traveller who stops for a moment is nevertheless still a traveller. Or because the possessions of morality, absorption and prajñā, remain attached to him even when he is in a normal state.

What are the dharmas that are called Śaikṣa?

The pure conditioned dharmas of the Śaikṣa. So too the dharmas that are called asaikṣa are the pure conditioned dharmas of the AŚaikṣa.

Why is not Nirvāṇa, the unconditioned, a śaikṣa?

Because both the AŚaikṣa and the Prthagjana are endowed with it. The Prthagjana is endowed with a Nirvāṇa obtained through a worldly path.

Why is not Nirvāṇa asaikṣa?

Because both the Śaikṣa and the Prthagjana are endowed with it.
The four candidates and the four abiders are the eight saints, or āryapudgala: from "one who is in the progress of realizing the state of Srotāpañna", and Srotāpañna, up to "one who is in the progress of realizing the state of Arhat," and the Arhat.

Eight in considering their names, but in fact, only five, namely the first candidate, that is to say, the person who is in the Path of the Seeing of the Truths, and the four abiders. In fact, the last three candidates are confused with the first three abiders.

This should be understood of the case in which the ascetic obtains the four states in sequential order. In fact, the bhūyovitarāga and the kāmavitarāga, who have respectively abandoned six and nine categories of defilements of Kāmadhātu before entering into the Path of Seeing, are, within the Path of Seeing, candidates for the states of Sakṛdāgāmin and Anāgāmin, without being Srotāpañnas and Sakṛdāgāmins. Here the candidate for a higher state is not confused with the abider in a lower state (vi.30).

We have said that the Path of Meditation is of two types, worldly or impure, transworldly or pure (vi.1c-d). Through what type of Path of Meditation does the Śaikṣa detach himself from the different spheres?

45c-d. Detachment from Bhavāgra is through the transworldly path.²⁹⁰

And not through the worldly path. In fact, (1) there is no worldly path higher than Bhavāgra [one detaches oneself from a sphere by the worldly path of a higher sphere; now Bhavāgra is the highest sphere]; (2) the worldly path of a certain sphere cannot be opposed to this same sphere, because the defilements of this
sphere attach themselves to this path.

Since it is a given that one defilement attached itself to a path, this defilement cannot be expelled by this same path; and since it is a given also that a path is opposed to a defilement, it is certain that this defilement does not attach itself to this path.

45d. There is detachment from the other spheres in two ways.

One detaches oneself from the eight other spheres, with the exception of Bhavāgra, either through the worldly path or through the transworldly path.

46a-b. For the Āryan who detaches himself through the worldly path, his acquisitions of the disconnections are of two types. 291

The Āryan who detaches himself from the first eight spheres [Kāmadhātu, the Four Dhyānas, and three Ārūpyas] obtains disconnection from the defilements of these spheres through the worldly path; in other words, he acquires the prāpti or possession of the pratisamkhyāniruddha of these defilements (ii.55a).

This possession is worldly and transworldly.

46c. According to other masters, he becomes detached through the transworldly path, in the same way.

Some other masters say that in the case also where the Āryan becomes detached through the transworldly path, his acquisition of disconnection is twofold.

Why is this?
46d. For, even when pure disconnection is lost, the Āryan is not filled with the defilements.  

Let us admit an instance, [say these other masters,] when the Āryan becomes detached through the transworldly or Āryan Path; he then does not have worldly possession of disconnection. In this hypothesis, there may be an Āryan who, through the Āryan Path, becomes detached from Ākiñcanyāyatana; who then, in a Dhyāna (according to vi.61c-d), transforms, that is, sharpens (samcarati) his faculties (indriya). This Āryan--by the fact that he abandons the paths previously acquired, [namely, the paths of Ārūpya in relation to his weak faculties], by the fact that he only possesses the path of the state of Anāgāmin, in relation to his sharp faculties--will no longer be in possession of disconnection from the defilements of Ārūpyadhātu; and, having lost this disconnection, he will be filled with these defilements.  

47a-b. But, if he is not filled with these defilements, he is like a saint half delivered from Bhavāgra, like a person who is reborn above.  

This Āryan does not have worldly acquisition of disconnection; nevertheless this Āryan is not filled with the said defilements.  

So too, the saint who is delivered from half of the categories of defilements of Bhavāgra, certainly does not possess a worldly acquisition of disconnection from these categories, since only the transworldly or Āryan Path destroys the defilements of Bhavāgra. Let us suppose that this saint, sharpening his faculties in a Dhyāna, abandons the transworldly acquisition of disconnection from these defilements of Bhavāgra: you yourself recognize, nevertheless, that he is not filled with these defilements.  

So too, a Prthagjana is born above the First Dhyāna, in the Second Dhyāna, etc. By the fact that he passes into the Second
Dhyāna (changing his bhūmi, bhūmisamcāra, vi.21c), he loses the acquisition of disconnection from the defilements of Kāmadihatu; nevertheless you admit that he is not filled with these defilements.\textsuperscript{293}

[Therefore the argument of the other masters is not demonstrative.]\textsuperscript{294}

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By means of what spheres does one obtain detachment from the different spheres?

47c-d. One becomes detached from all the spheres by means of pure anāgamya.\textsuperscript{295}

From all the spheres up to Bhavāgra.\textsuperscript{296}

When the ascetic becomes detached from a lower sphere in a sāmantaka (viii.22), should one admit that all of the Paths of Deliverance arise from the sāmantaka, as is the case for the Irresistible Paths?\textsuperscript{297}

No.

Why is this?

48a-b. At the detachment from the Three Dhātus, the last Path of Deliverance arises either from the Dhyāna, or from a sāmantaka.

There are nine spheres of arising: Kāmadihatu, the Four Dhyānas and the Four Ārūpyas (viii.1).

When one triumphs over the Three Dhātus,--that is, when one becomes detached from Kāmadihatu, from the First Dhyāna, or
from the Second Dhyāna,--it is with a ninth Path of Deliverance which arises either from a sāmantaka or from the Dhyāna itself.

48c. Above, it does not arise from a sāmantaka.298

With respect to the higher spheres, the last Path of Deliverance always arises from the fundamental absorption (samāpatti), never from the preliminary stage or threshold of this absorption. In fact, after the Fourth Dhyāna, the fundamental absorption and the preliminary absorption have the same sensation, the sensation of indifference. In the spheres of the first Dhyānas, the two sensations differ: ascetics with weak faculties are not capable of entering, in the ninth Path of Deliverance, the fundamental absorption, for the transformation of their sensation is difficult.299 Therefore the ninth Path of Deliverance of detachment from the first three spheres arises from preliminary absorption.300

We have seen that the ascetic can detach himself from all the spheres through the pure paths practiced in anāgāmya (vi.47c). It is not said that the same power belongs to the pure paths cultivated in spheres other than anāgāmya.

48c-d. Through the eight pure paths, he triumphs over his sphere, and over a higher sphere.301

Through the pure path cultivated in eight spheres,--the Dhyānas, dhyānāntara, and three Ārūyas,--the ascetic detaches himself from the sphere in which he finds himself and from higher spheres; but not from a lower sphere because he is already detached from it.

***

It is established that the transworldly paths, the Irresistible
Path as well as the Path of Deliverance, proceed from aspects of the Truths (*satyākāra-pravṛtti*, vii.13a), that is to say, from seeing the *dharmas* as impermanent, suffering, etc.

49a-c. The worldly paths, paths of deliverance and paths of abandoning, have respectively the aspects of calm, etc.; coarse, etc.

The worldly paths of deliverance (the Path of Deliverance) have the aspects of calm, etc., that is, seeing their objects as calm, etc. The worldly paths of abandoning (the Irresistible Path) have the aspect of coarse, etc.

Respectively,

49d. They have for their objects the higher sphere, and the lower sphere.

The paths of deliverance can see the higher spheres (or higher places, *sthāna*) as calm, excellent, and as definitive liberation. The paths of abandoning see the lower spheres as coarse, bad, as a thick wall: as coarse, because it is not calm, entailing a great effort; as bad, because it is not excellent, because it is odious as well as presenting the greatest incapacity to the body and the mind; and as a thick wall, because, by means of this lower sphere, it is impossible to escape from this sphere, as if it were a wall.

The aspects of calm, excellent, definitive liberation, are the opposite.

***

Having terminated this accessory question, let us return to our subject.
What arises immediately after the Knowledge of Destruction?

50a-b. When he is Immovable, after his Knowledge of Destruction, there is the consciousness of non-arising.

If the Arhat is of the class of the Immovable Ones (akopyadharman, vi.56), immediately after his Knowledge of Destruction (ksayajñana, vi.45a) there arises the consciousness of the future non-arising of the vices or āsravas (anutpādajñana, vi.67a, viii.lb, 4c).

50b-c. In the contrary case, there is either the Knowledge of Destruction or the “seeing of the Āsaikṣas.”

If the Arhat is not of this class, then after his Knowledge of Destruction there arises either the same Knowledge of Destruction, or the Right Views of the Āsaikṣas; but not the Knowledge of Non-Arising: for, as the ascetic who is not immovable can fall away (vi.56), he cannot produce the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

***

Is this to say that the Immovable Arhat does not possess the Views of the Āsaikṣa?

50d. These Views belong to all the Arhats.

In the Immovable Arhat, sometimes the Knowledge of Non-Arising succeeds Knowledge of Non-Arising, sometimes the Right Views of the Āsaikṣa. 

***
We have spoken of the four states or results. Of what are they the results?

They are the results of śrāmaṇya or "the religious life."\(^{307}\)

What is śrāmaṇya?

51a. Śrāmaṇya is the immaculate path.

Śrāmaṇya is the pure path. By this path, by śrāmaṇya, one becomes a Śramaṇa, that is to say a person who calms or who makes cease (saṃayati) the defilements. (Dhammapada, 265).

Therefore it is said in the Sūtra (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 725c4), "He is called a Śramaṇa because he calms all of the types of dharma of transgression, bad, favorable to transmigration, producing rebirth . . . old age and death."

The Prthagjana is not a true Śramaṇa (paramārthaśramaṇa) because he does not calm the defilements in an absolute manner.

51b. His result is both conditioned and unconditioned.\(^{308}\)

The results of śrāmaṇya are conditioned and unconditioned dharma.\(^{309}\) The Sūtra says that these results are four in number.\(^{310}\) On the other hand,

51c. There are eighty-nine.

What are these eighty-nine?

51d. The paths of deliverance with their destructions.

We have eight Irresistible Paths, followed by eight Paths of Deliverance, for the abandoning of the defilement to be abandoned
through seeing (=the sixteen moments of comprehension, vi.27a). We have eighty-one Irresistible Paths for the abandoning of the defilements abandoned through meditation, namely nine paths through which one abandons the nine categories of defilements of each of the nine spheres (Kāmadhātu . . . Bhavāgra), and also as many for the Paths of Deliverance.

The eighty-nine Irresistible Paths constitute śrāmaṇya.

The eighty-nine Paths of Deliverance are the conditioned results of śrāmaṇya, being outflowing results (niṣyandaphala, ii.56c-d) and virile results (puruṣakārāphala, ii.56d) of śrāmaṇya.

The abandoning or pratisamkhyanirodha of the eighty-nine categories of defilements is the unconditioned result of śrāmaṇya, being the virile result of śrāmaṇya (ii.55d, p. 278).\(^{311}\)

We have therefore eighty-nine results of śrāmaṇya.

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But, if this theory is correct, is there not reason to complete the teaching of the Buddha?\(^{312}\)

No. The results are indeed eighty-nine in number;

52a-b. But four results are established for five reasons which are encountered therein.

The Blessed One defined as results the stages (avasthā) of the path of abandoning in which some five causes are encountered. Such is the opinion of the School. What are these five causes?

52c-53b. In a result, there is the abandoning of a previous path, the acquisition of another path, the addition of destructions, the acquisition of a group of eight knowledges, and the acquisition of sixteen aspects.
That is to say: (1-2) there is the abandoning of the path of the candidate, and the acquisition of the path of the result; (3) the acquisition of a single possession of abandoning in its entirety\(^{313}\) (v.70); (4) the acquisition at one and the same time of eight Knowledges, the fourfold Dharma Knowledge, and the fourfold Consecutive Knowledge (vi.26, vii.3); and (5) the acquisition of the sixteen aspects, impermanence, etc. (On acquisition, see vii.22.)

These characteristics exist in each of the four results.

***

But if only the pure path receives the name of śrāmaṇya, how can the two states, those of Sakṛdāgāmin and Anāgāmin, when they are obtained by a worldly path, be the results of śrāmaṇya\(^{314}\)?

53c-d. (The abandoning) obtained by a worldly path is a result, because it is combined, and because it is supported by pure possession.

The state of Sakṛdāgāmin and the state of Anāgāmin, even if they were acquired by a worldly path, are not only abandonings resulting from a worldly Path of Meditation: in fact, they also include an abandoning result of the Path of Seeing; this second abandoning is not separable from the first abandoning; for there is inherent in the results of Sakṛdāgāmin and Anāgāmin the single possession of abandoning in its entirety, on the one hand, of defilements abandoned by Seeing, and on the other hand, of defilements abandoned by the worldly Path of Meditation.

This is why the Sūtra says, "What is the result of Sakṛdāgāmin? The abandoning of the three bonds (satkāyadrṣṭi, clinging to rule and ritual, and doubt)---which are abandoned through Seeing---and the reduction of lust, anger, and delusion." "What is the result of Anāgāmin? The abandoning of the five bonds here below (avarabhāgīya)."\(^{315}\)
Furthermore, the abandoning which results from the worldly path (abandoning of the six categories of defilements in the case of the Sakṛdāgāmin, etc.) is supported, confirmed (samdhāryate) by the pure possession of disconnection (according to vi.46a-b), as it results from the fact that, by virtue of this pure possession, the Sakṛdāgāmin and the Anāgāmin cannot die in a state of falling away: they can lose their qualities, but they take them up again before dying (vi.60).

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Srāmāṇya or the religious life

54a-b. Is brāhmaṇya; it is brahmacakra.\(^{316}\)

It is brahmacakra because it expells the defilements;\(^{317}\) it is brahmacakra, the Wheel of Brahmā,

54b. Because it is set into motion by Brahmā.

The Blessed One, possessing supreme brāhmaṇya, is Brahmā. In fact, the Sūtra says, "This Blessed One is Brahmā";\(^{318}\) it says that the Blessed One is calm and pacified.

This cakra belongs to him; this cakra is therefore of Brahmā, because he sets it into motion.

54c. The Wheel of the Dharma is the Path of Seeing.\(^{319}\)

It is termed wheel, cakra, because it moves (caṇḍramanat).\(^{320}\)

The Path of Seeing, being of the nature of a wheel (a Jewel of a Wheel, cakraratna), is called the Wheel of the Dharma.
How is the Path of Seeing of the nature of a wheel?

54d. Because it goes quickly, etc.; because it has spokes, etc.\textsuperscript{321}

1. Because it goes quickly, for it comprehends the Truths in fifteen moments of thought; 2. because it leaves one spot and occupies another, leaving the Irresistible Path and occupying the Path of Deliverance; 3. because it subdues the unsubdued and rules over those subdued, triumphing over the defilements through the Irresistible Path by cutting off the possession of these defilements; ruling over the vanquished defilements by the Path of Deliverance by obtaining possession of disconnection from these defilements; (4) because it rises and descends, either because it is alternatively the Irresistible Path and the Path of Deliverance, or because it successively takes as its object Kāmadhātu and the higher spheres.

The Bhadanta Ghoşaka says: The Noble Eightfold Path is a wheel, because its parts are in the nature of spokes, etc.: Right Views, Right Thought, Right Effort, and Right Mindfulness are similar to spokes; Right Speech, Right Actions, and Right Livelihood are similar to the axle; and Right Concentration is similar to the rim.\textsuperscript{322}

On what rests the doctrine that the Wheel of the Dharma is the Path of Seeing the Truths?

On the Āgama which says that, at the moment when this Path arose within the Āryan Kaundinya, [the gods] declared that the Wheel of the Dharma had been set into motion.\textsuperscript{323}

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How is this Path of threefold revolution\textsuperscript{324} and of twelve aspects?

The Vaibhāṣikas say: The three revolutions are 1. "this is the
Noble Truth of Suffering”; 2. “It should be perfectly known”; and 3. “It is perfectly known.” At each revolution there arises sight (cakṣus), knowledge (jñāna), knowing (vidyā), and intelligence (buddhi). Thus we have twelve aspects.\textsuperscript{325}

The same holds true for the other Truths: “This is the Origin of Suffering,” etc.

Since the revolutions and the aspects are the same for each Truth, the Wheel of the Dharma is of three revolutions and twelve aspects; not of twelve revolutions and forty-eight aspects. So too “the teaching of two things” is the teaching of a great number of things which go by twos (eye and physical matter, etc.); in the same way a person “skillful in seven things”, is skillful in a great number of seven things.\textsuperscript{326}

The three revolutions correspond, in this order, to the Path of Seeing, the Path of Meditation, and the Path of the Arhat or Asaikṣa.

Such is the explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas (\textit{Vibhāṣā, TD} 27, p. 411a18).

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But if this is the case,\textsuperscript{327} then the Path of Seeing would not have three revolutions and twelve aspects. Therefore how would the Wheel of the Dharma be the Path of Seeing? Consequently one should understand that the Wheel of the Dharma is this sermon itself (\textit{dharma\textsuperscript{paryāya}}, the Sermon of Benares, which sets into motion (\textit{pravartana}) the Wheel of the Dharma, which includes three revolutions and twelve aspects: three revolutions, because it causes the Truths to be turned some three times;\textsuperscript{328} and twelve aspects, because it considers each Truth under a threefold aspect.\textsuperscript{329}

Through the setting into motion of this sermon, one should understand that it goes, that it is cast into the intelligence of another; it goes towards the intelligence of another, in that it
comes to be known by another.\textsuperscript{330}

Or rather,\textsuperscript{331} the entirety of the Noble Path, the Path of Seeing, the Path of Meditation, and the Path of the Aśaikṣa, is the Wheel of the Dharma, because it penetrates into the intelligence of those to be disciplined (\textit{vineya}).\textsuperscript{332} If the Sūtra says that the Wheel was set into motion (\textit{pravartita}) when Kauṇḍinya realized the Path of Seeing, this is because the prefix \textit{pra} indicates the beginning of action: \textit{pravartita} signifies what begins to be \textit{vartita}. When the Path of Seeing is produced in the intelligence of another, in the intelligence of Kauṇḍinya, the Wheel of the Dharma begins to be set into motion, begins to be cast into the intelligence of another.\textsuperscript{333}

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How can one obtain the results within each sphere?

55a. Three are acquired in Kāmadhātu.

Three can only be acquired in Kāmadhātu, not elsewhere. [Let us understand: by beings born in Kāmadhātu].

55a-b. The last, in the three Dhātus.

The last state of \textit{srāmanya}, or the quality of Arhat, can be acquired in the Three Dhātus.

We can understand why the first two states, which suppose that the ascetic is not detached from Kāmadhātu, cannot be acquired in the higher spheres; but why does the same hold for the third?

55b. Higher, the Path of the Seeing of the Truths is absent.
Above Kāmadhātu, the Path of Seeing is absent. In its absence, a person detached from Kāmadhātu and reborn in a higher heaven cannot obtain the state of Anāgāmin.\textsuperscript{334}

Why is the Path of Seeing absent there?

With respect to Ārūpyadhātu, because hearing is absent there;\textsuperscript{335} and because the Path of Seeing bears on Kāmadhātu.\textsuperscript{336}

With respect to Rūpadhātu,

\begin{quote}
55c-d. Disgust is absent there, because the Sūtra says, "Here one undertakes, and there one achieves."\textsuperscript{337}
\end{quote}

Pṛthagjanas, reborn in Rūpadhātu, are totally given over to the bliss of absorption: all suffering sensation is absent in them; therefore disgust is impossible there, and one cannot enter the Noble Path except through disgust.

Furthermore the Sūtra says, "Five persons, the Antarāparinirvāyin being the first and the Ėrdhvasrotas being the fifth, undertake here and achieve there."

"Undertake", \textit{vidhā}, means to establish the Path, because it is the means (\textit{upāya}) to Nirvāṇa.

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We have seen that: "If the Arhat is Immovable, then after his Knowledge of Destruction there arises the Knowledge of Non-Arising"; is this to say that there are differences among the Arhats?

56a. Six types of Arhat are known.
The Sūtra\textsuperscript{338} says that there are six types of Arhats: Parihāṇadharmaṇs (those who can fall away), Cetanādharmaṇs (those who can at will put an end to their existences), Anurakṣaṇādharmaṇs (those who can preserve themselves), Sthitākampyas (those who cherish deliverance), Prativedhanādharmaṇs (those who can penetrate the state of Arhat at will), and Akopyadharmans (those who have immovable deliverance of mind). They will be defined on p. 1002, 1007.

56a-b. Five arise from the Śraddhādhimuktas ("those liberated through faith").

Five, with the exception of the Immovable Ones (the Akopyadharmans) have been Śraddhādhimuktas (vi.32).

56c. Their deliverance is occasional.\textsuperscript{339}

It should be known that the deliverance of mind (cetomivukti) of these five types of Arhats is occasional (sāmayikī) and dear,\textsuperscript{340} for it should be constantly guarded. Consequently these Arhats are called samayavimukta. Depending (apeksā) on the occasion (samaya), they are delivered (vimukta): this compound is made by omitting the middle term (= apeksā). We have thus samayavimukta, delivered by reason of the occasion, like ghṛtaghaṭa, a pot full of butter, a pot for butter.\textsuperscript{341}

For them, the realization of absorption depends on samaya, on circumstances: possession of a number of material goods, the absence of illness, a certain place.

56d. For an Immovable One, it is immovable.

The deliverance of an Immovable One cannot be moved because he cannot fall away from this deliverance; consequently it
is immovable.

57a. Thus he is not occasionally delivered.\textsuperscript{342}

It follows that an Immovable One is not occasionally delivered \textit{(asamayavimukta)}. As he realizes absorption of his own accord, he is delivered independently or circumstances \textit{(samaya)}. Or rather \textit{samaya} signifies “time”: the first five Arhats are susceptible of falling away from their deliverance, they are thus delivered for a time, and so are \textit{samayavimukta}; the sixth Arhat is not susceptible of falling away from his deliverance, he is thus definitively delivered, and so he is an \textit{asamayavimukta}.

57b. He proceeds from Drśtiprāpta.

The Immovable One has been a Drśtiprāpta (vi.32).

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Do these six Arhats belong, from the beginning of their religious careers, to the family \textit{(gotra)}\textsuperscript{343} [that is to say, to the family of Parihāṇadharman, one who can fall away, etc.] to which, as Arhats, they belong? Or rather have they acquired this family later?

57c-d. Some Arhats are of their present families from the very beginning; some become part of their present families through purification or perfectioning.\textsuperscript{344}

Certain Arhats are, from the very beginning, Cetanādharmans; other Arhats, after having been Parihāṇadharmans, become Cetanādharmans through the purification of their faculties and so on.\textsuperscript{345}
1. A Parihānadharmān is an Arhat who is susceptible of falling away and who is not a Cetanādharmān . . . nor a Prativedhanādharman.\textsuperscript{346}

2. A Cetanādharmān is an Arhat who is capable of putting an end to his existence at will,\textsuperscript{347} without being an Anurakṣāṇādharman, etc.

3. An Anurakṣāṇādharman is an Arhat who is capable of preserving himself from falling away.\textsuperscript{348}

4. A Sthitākampya is an Arhat who when strong causes of falling away are absent, even without preserving himself, is not capable of being budged, that is to say, who dwells in his result; but, not falling away, in the absence of any effort, he is not susceptible of progressing.

5. A Prativedhanādharman is an Arhat who is capable of penetrating without effort the Immovable Ones.

6. An Akopyadharman or an Immovable One is an Arhat who is not capable of falling away.\textsuperscript{349}

When they were Śaikṣas, the first two lacked continual cultivation and intensive cultivation; the third only cultivated continual practices; the fourth cultivated only intensive practices; the fifth cultivated these two practices, but with weak faculties; and the sixth cultivated these two practices with sharp faculties.

The Parihānadharmān does not necessarily fall away; and so on: the Prativedhanādharman does not necessarily penetrate. These persons receive their different names because it can happen that they fall away, etc. Having admitted this principle (Vibhāsa, TD 27, p. 319c14), one then concludes that the six types of Arhats can exist within the Three Dhātus.

But, in the hypothesis where the Parihānadharmān necessarily falls away . . . where the Prativedhanādharman necessarily penetrates, the situation changes: 1. there are six types of Arhats in Kāmadhātu; 2. two types, namely the Sthitākampya and the Akopyadharman, exist in the higher spheres: for, in these spheres,
there is 1. neither falling away (vi.41c-d), therefore there is no Parihāṇadharman nor an Anurakṣaṇādharman there, since there is no reason to guard oneself from falling away; 2. nor is there any volitional thought, cetanā,\textsuperscript{350} therefore the Cetanādharman is absent; 3. nor any perfectioning of the faculties (vi.41c-d), therefore the Prativedhanādharman is absent, for a Prativedhanādharman should make his faculties sharp through penetrating, in order to become an Akopyadharman.

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Among the first five Arhats, how many can fall away from their families (gotra), and how many can fall away from their results?

58a-b. Four fall from their families, and five fall from their states.\textsuperscript{351}

Four, the Cetanādharman, etc., can fall away from their families; the Parihāṇadharman cannot fall away from his family.\textsuperscript{352} Five, the Parihāṇadharman, etc., can also fall away from their states. (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 315bll).

58b. But one does not fall away from the first family nor from the first state.\textsuperscript{353}

1. The Arhat does not fall away from his first family, from the family which he obtained before he became an Arhat, for this family has been made firm by the Path of the Śaikṣa and the Aśaikṣa. The Śaikṣa does not fall away from his first family, for this family has been made firm by the worldly path and the transworldly path. But one can fall away from the family which one has obtained by the perfecting of his faculties.\textsuperscript{354}
2. The ascetic does not fall away from the first state which he has obtained, but he can fall away from the others. Therefore he does not fall away from the state of Srotāpañña.

It results that from these two principles, (1) three cases are possible with respect to the Parihanadharman: the Parihanadharman either obtains Nirvāṇa by staying in his family, or by perfecting his faculties, or by falling away and again becoming a Saikṣa; (2) four cases are possible with respect to the Cetanādharman: three as above, plus: or by falling away and becoming a Parihanadharman; (3) and so on: five, six, seven cases for the Anurakṣanādharman, the Sthitākampya and the Prativedhanādharman (by adding: or by becoming a Cetanādharman . . . ) (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 320a22).

When an Arhat again becomes a Saikṣa, he dwells in the same family that was his first family. Otherwise, in the hypothesis that he would obtain a better family, he would progress, and he would not fall away.

Why does one not fall away from the first state? Because the defilements abandoned through Seeing have no support (avastūka = anadhiṣṭhāna, vii.36): in fact, having satkāyadṛṣṭī (v.7) for their root, they exist with the ātman for their support; now there is no ātman.356

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Do you pretend that these defilements have for their object (ālambana) a thing that does not exist (abhaiva)?

No. They have the Truths for their object, [they consist of considering the upādānaskandhas as permanent, etc.]; therefore they do not have a thing that does not exist for their object, but they are mistaken with respect to this object.

How do the defilements which are abandoned through Seeing differ from those which are abandoned through Meditation? These
defilements are also mistaken with respect to their objects.

They differ from those which are abandoned through Seeing. One indeed sees that the idea of self (ātmādṛśṭi) falsely attributes to real things, physical matter, etc., which are not "self" the quality of "self" under the aspect of a being which acts, a being which feels, or of Īśvara. And the other views, the view of clinging to extremes (antāgrāhādṛśṭi), etc. (v.7) exist having as their support this same "quality of self" (ātmātva); as a consequence their support is non-existent, they have no support. But the defilements which are abandoned through Meditation, namely desire, hatred, pride, and ignorance, have for their nature attachment, antipathy, satisfaction, and confusion with respect to physical matter, etc.: they are therefore, speaking absolutely, a support and in this respect differ from the defilements which are abandoned through Seeing. For the agreeable, the painful, etc., is real with respect to what exists, whereas there is not a trace of self, of things pertaining to self, of Īśvara, etc.

Another explanation: The defilements which are abandoned through Meditation have a determined support, characterized as agreeable, painful, etc. But, for the defilements which are abandoned through Seeing, there is no determined support which is characterized as self or as a thing pertaining to self; consequently they do not have a support.

Another point: Among the Āryans (= the Saiksas) who do not reflect, the defilements which are abandoned by Meditation can arise by reason of the weakness of mindfulness; these defilements do not arise among the Āryans who reflect. In the same way that one thinks a rope is a snake if one does not observe it carefully (Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 36a20); [so too when one’s attention is lacking, one forgets its metaphysical characteristics, the impermanence of the pleasant, etc.] but the error of personalism (ātmādṛśṭi) cannot arise among Āryans who do not reflect, because this error is a product of reflection.

Consequently, the saint cannot fall away from the abandoning of the defilements which have been abandoned through Seeing.
Chapter Six

The Sautrōntikas say that one can no longer fall away from the quality of Arhat. And their opinion is correct, as one can demonstrate by scripture and by reasoning.

i. Scriptural arguments.

1. It is said, "What, Oh Bhiksus, is abandoned is abandoned by aryā prajñā."  

2. It is said, "I declare that the Šaikṣa should cultivate vigilance." The Blessed One did not proscribe vigilance to the Arhat.

3. Without doubt, the Blessed One said, "Ānanda, I declare that, even for the Arhat, property and honors are a cause of obstacle." Yet the Sūtra specifies that, if the Arhat can fall away, it is only from the "blisses": With respect to immovable deliverance of mind (vi.76c), which is actualized physically (viii.35b), I declare that one absolutely cannot fall away from it.

But the Vaibhāṣikas answer: The Blessed One specifies that one cannot fall away from deliverance of the mind when it is immovable; therefore one can fall away from it when it is occasional (sāmayikī).

We are indeed in agreement: One can fall away from the so-called occasional deliverance of mind. But what is this deliverance? Is it, as you think, the quality of Arhat? Should one not believe rather that the Blessed One designates the worldly Dhyānas by "occasional deliverance"?

Since the absorption which consists of the fundamental Dhyānas is realized under certain circumstances--for example in a place free from noise, etc.,--it is termed "occasional (or circumstantial) deliverance"; it is also called "cherished deliverance," because, each time that it is lost, one desires it anew with a view to enjoying the "blisses."
According to another master, [the Bhadanta Rāma, a Sautrāntika], this absorption is called "cherished deliverance" because, being impure, it is "delectable" (viii.5). (See above, p. 1000.)

But the deliverance which constitutes the quality of Arhat is not "occasional" since it is possessed in a permanent manner; it is no longer "cherished," because one does not have to search it out anew. If it were possible for one to fall away from the quality of Arhat, why did the Blessed One say that the Arhat could only fall away from the "blisses of absorption"?

Consequently immovable deliverance of the mind belongs to all the Arhats.

As for the "blisses," a certain Arhat can fall away from them, when, being distracted by property and honors, he loses his mastery in absorption: this is an Arhat whose faculties are weak. A certain Arhat does not fall away from them: this is an Arhat whose faculties are sharp. The Arhat who falls away from the "blisses" is a Parihāṇadharman; one who does not fall away is an Aparihiṇadharman. One should explain the Cetanādharman, etc., in the same way.365

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What difference is there between an Aparihiṇadharman, a Sthitākampya and an Akopyadharman?366

The first has not perfected his faculties: they have been sharp from the very beginning; the third has perfected his faculties: neither of them fall away from the absorptions that they are able to produce. The second does not fall away from the qualities in which he is found: rather, he does not produce any other qualities, which, if he were to produce them, he could be moved with respect to them. Such is the difference between these three saints.

4. But did not the Venerable Godhika [var. Gautika] fall away from the quality of Arhat?367
The Venerable Godhika, being a Saïkṣa, by reason of the excess of his enjoyment (viii.6) and the weak character of his faculties, fell away many times from "occasional deliverance": in his disgust, he struck himself with a dagger. By reason of his indifference with respect to his body and life, he obtained the quality of Arhat at the very moment of his death, and Nirvāṇa. Therefore he did not fall away from the quality of Arhat.

5. The Daśottara teaches, "There is a dharma which one should produce, namely occasional, cherished deliverance. There is a dharma that one should actualize, namely the immovable deliverance of the mind." If occasional and cherished deliverance were the quality of an Arhat, and so if the quality of Arhat were of two types, why does the Daśottara, alone among the Sūtras, speak twice, under two distinct names, of the quality of Arhat? Moreover, no part of the Scripture employs the expression "to produce the quality of Arhat"; it always says that one should actualize this quality.

Would you say that the quality of Arhat, to the extent that it is associated with weak faculties, is to be produced? What do you mean by that? That it can be "produced"? But then the quality of Arhat associated with sharp faculties, itself, can be produced. That it merits being produced? All the more reason the second quality of Arhat merits being produced.

Therefore occasional deliverance is not a quality of Arhat.

6. But, if this is the case, why does the Scripture speak of the "occasionally delivered" Arhat?

Such is an Arhat who, because of the weakness of his faculties depends on certain circumstances in order to actualize the absorption. An Arhat who is opposed to this is one who is "not occasionally delivered."

7. According to the Abhidharma, it is by reason of three causes that sensual desire arises: 1. the latent defilement (anusāya) of sensual desire has not been completely known, has not been
abandoned; 2. some dharmas present themselves as favorable to the increase of sensual desire; and 3. there is erroneous judgment. [Now the totality of these three causes is impossible in the case of the Arhat.]

Would one say that the Abhidharma speaks of sensual desire which is produced by the totality of its causes, [but that sensual desire can arise having incomplete causes, by the sole force of the external object, the viśaya]? But what dharma can arise without its causes being complete?372

ii. Let us pass on to arguments from reason.

In the Arhat there are arisen dharmas which are opposed to the defilements and which are of such a nature that the defilements are reduced to the condition of absolutely not being able to arise, anutpattidharman. How then could the Arhat fall away?

Would you say that such dharmas are not arisen in the Arhat, that the defilements exist within him in the state of a seed, that which constitutes the seed of the defilements not having been uprooted?373 In this hypothesis, how can one say of the Arhat that he is ksīnāsrava, a person whose vices (āsrava) are cut off (ksīna)? And if he is not a ksīnāsrava, how can one say that he is an Arhat?374

iii. But [answer the Vaibhāṣikas], the theory of the non-falling away of the Arhat is contradicted by the Āṅgāraκarṣūpama.375

This Sūtra says,376 "A wise Āryan Śrāvaka who follows this rule of life, who passes his time in this way (evam carata evam vibharatas),377--it happens sometimes,378 through weakness of mindfulness, that he produced bad thoughts." Now this Āryan Śrāvaka is not a Śaikṣa, but an Arhat, for the Sūtra says later, "For a long period of time his mind is inclined towards distant separation from the defilements ... his mind is turned towards Nirvāṇa." And we know further379 that these qualities, "having the mind inclined towards separation," etc., are some of the powers of the Arhat, which power is yet determined by the words, "his mind is cold, purged with respect to all the dharmas in which the vices
have their abode.”

We would answer: Yes, such are the texts. But the Angāra-karṣūpama refers to a Śaikṣa and not to an Arhat. In fact it is only of a Śaikṣa that one can say that "as long as the actions of a Bhikṣu are not ‘well understood,’ even when he thus cultivates these actions, the defilements will sometimes arise within him."

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The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that one can also fall away from the quality of Arhat.

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Are the Arhats the only ones who are divided into six families (gotra)? Is this also the case for others?

58c. The Śaiksas and the non-Āryans are also of six families.

Śaiksas and Pṛthagjanas are also of six families: the families of the Arhats have their antecedents in these families.

58d. In the Path of Seeing, there is no perfecting.

One can perfect his faculties outside of the Path of Seeing the Truths, but not while one traverses this Path, for, in view of its rapidity [in all fifteen moments, vi.28], one cannot accomplish the preparatory practices required for perfecting.

Some perfect their faculties as Pṛthagjanas; some, as Śraddhādhimuktas.
The Sūtra quoted above (p. 1006) says, "I declare that one can fall away from any one of the four blisses of absorption which one has acquired; but, with respect to the immovable deliverance of mind which is physically actualized, I declare that one absolutely cannot fall away from it."

How can it be that an Immovable Arhat can fall away from the blisses?

59a-b. There are three types of falling away: from that which is acquired, from that which has not yet been acquired, and from fruition. 386

Whoever falls away from the possession of a spiritual quality, falls away from what has been acquired.

Whoever does not acquire a spiritual quality that is to be acquired, falls away from that which has not yet been acquired.

Whoever does not actualize a spiritual quality that he possesses, falls away from his fruition (upabhoga).

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Among these falling aways,

59c-d. The last, with respect to the Master; the second also, with respect to an Immovable One; all three, with respect to others. 387

1. The Buddha falls away only from fruition: [occupied with the good of his followers, he ceases his enjoyment of the blisses]. 2.
The Immovable One (the Akopyadharman) falls away from both his fruition and from what has not yet been acquired: for he has not necessarily acquired the *dharmas* proper to very distinguished persons.\(^{388}\) The Arhats who are not immovable also fall away from what they have acquired.

Consequently the fact that an Immovable One falls away from his fruition is not in contradiction with the above Sūtra.

The masters who deny any falling away (*apariḥāṇivādin*) say, "The pure deliverance of any Arhat is immovable: but an Immovable One is to be defined as we have said; consequently one cannot object: how does an Immovable One fall away from the blisses?"\(^{389}\)

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Does the saint who falls away from the state of Arhat take up a new existence?

60a. He does not die having fallen away from his result.\(^{390}\)

He never dies in the state of having fallen away from his result. In fact the Sūtra says, "Oh Bhikṣus, it happens that the wise Āryan Śrāvaka experiences weakness of mindfulness, that his mindfulness becomes slow. But he quickly rejects, he makes disappear, destroys, annihilates [this weakness of mindfulness]."\(^{391}\)

If it were otherwise, if a person, having become an Arhat, falls away from the state of Arhat, and could continue to transmigrate, the religious life (*brahmacarya*) would not inspire confidence.\(^{392}\)

A person fallen away from a state does not do that which a person who resides in this state cannot do:

60b. He does not do what should not be done.\(^{393}\)
Even though fallen, he does not do that which is in contradic-
tion with his state (for example, *abrahmacaryā*). In the same way a
hero can be moved, but he does not fall.

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How many Irresistible Paths and Paths of Deliverance are
included in the transformation or perfecting of the faculties?

60c-d. For the Immovable One, there are nine paths of two
types. 394

The Prativedhanādharman who perfects his faculties and
penetrates the family of the Immovable Ones, should produce nine
Irresistible Paths, nine Paths of Deliverance, exactly like the
Śaikṣa, in order to obtain the quality of Arhat [in detaching himself
from Bhavāgra].

Why is this?

60d. By reason of his intense cultivation. 395

The Prativedhanādharman has intensely cultivated the family
of weak faculties; consequently this family cannot be transformed
without a great effort: it has, in fact, been made firm both by the
Path of the Śaikṣa and by the Path of the Āśaikṣa.

61a. For the Dṛṣṭiprāpta, one of each type.

For the transformation of the faculties by which a Śraddhād-
himukta [=Śaikṣa of weak faculties] becomes a Dṛṣṭiprāpta [=a
Śaikṣa of sharp faculties], there must be an Irresistible Path and a
Path of Deliverance.

In the two cases (60c-d and 61a), there is a preparatory path (prayogamārga).

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These Irresistible Paths and Paths of Deliverance are

61b. Pure paths

For the faculties of Āryans cannot be transformed by impure paths.

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Where can the faculties be transformed?

61b. There is transformation among humans.

Only humans can transform their faculties; there is no transformation elsewhere, for elsewhere falling away is impossible.\(^{396}\)

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In what sphere do the Aśaikṣas and the Śaikṣas exist in order to transform their faculties?

61c. The Aśaikṣas in nine spheres.\(^{397}\)

Namely in anāgāmya, dhyānāntara, the Four Dhyānas and
three Ārūpyas, [for the same state of Arhat can be obtained in these spheres].

61d. The Śaikṣa, in six.

With the exception of the three Ārūpyas. Why is this?

61d-62b. Because the Śaikṣa who increases his faculties by abandoning his state and his progress, obtains the state.398

When the Śaikṣa perfects his faculties, he loses a state (=Sakṛdāgāmiphala), a state that he had acquired by the path of weak faculties; he loses his visēṣa, that is, the progress that he had made--preparatory paths, Irresistible Path, Path of Deliverance, and Path of Excellence,—in the detachment of the Dhyānas, a progress realized with his weak faculties.399 He obtains only a state belonging to the family of sharp faculties, a state forming part of the detachment of Kāmadhātu, not the state of Anāgāmin which is of Ārūpyadhātu.400

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The Arhats, by reason of their difference of faculties, are nine in number.

62c-d. Two Buddhas and seven Śrāvakas, the Arhats have nine classes of faculties.401

The Śrāvakas are seven in number, the five the first of which is the Parihāṇadharman, plus the Immovable One (=the Akopyadhārman) which is divided into two, depending on whether he was from his beginnings of the immovable family, or whether he has obtained this family through the perfecting of his faculties.402
The two Buddhas,—the Pratyekabuddha and the Buddha,—are varieties of Immovable Ones.

These make nine persons whose faculties are respectively weak-weak, etc.\textsuperscript{403}

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In general, the Āryans are seven in number: 1. the Śraddhānusarin, 2. the Dharmaṇusarin, 3. the Śraddhādhimukta, 4. the Dṛṣṭiprāpta, 5. the Kāyasākṣin, 6. the Prajñāvimukta, and 7. the Udbhayatobhāgāvimukta.\textsuperscript{404}

63a-c. Seven \textit{pudgalas}, by reason of their cultivation, their faculties, absorption, deliverance, of two.\textsuperscript{405}

1. By reason of their cultivation (\textit{prayoga}), there exists the Śraddhānusarin and the Dharmaṇusarin (vi.29a-b). In the beginning, in the state of Prthagjana, it is by reason of faith (śraddhā) that the first, under the impulse of another [that is, learning the foundations of mindfulness, etc., from another] applied himself (\textit{prayoga}) to things,\textsuperscript{406} that is, he devoted himself to reflection and meditation. The second applied himself in the same way, but by following (\textit{anusara}) the dharmas, that is, the twelfe-fold Scriptures, and by pursuing (\textit{anusarati}) the dharmas, that is, the parts of Bodhi (bodhipāksikas) by himself.

2. By reason of their faculties, there exists the Śraddhādhimukta and the Dṛṣṭiprāpta (vi.31c-d). Their faculties are respectively weak and sharp by reason of the predominance, among the first, of intention proceeding from faith (śraddaya adhimokṣah), and, among the second, of wisdom (prajñā).

3. By reason of absorption (\textit{samāpatti}), there exists the Kāyasākṣin (vi.43c-d), because he has realized the Absorption of Extinction (vi.43c, viii.33a).
4. By reason of deliverance, there exists the Prajñāvimukta (vi.64a-b).

5. By reason of absorption and deliverance, there exists the Ubhayatobhāgavimukta (vi.64a-b).

Thus, from the point of view of their enumeration, there are seven.

63c. They are six.

These seven, from the point of view of substantial entities, are six.

63d. Two exist in each of the three paths.

In the Path of Seeing, there exists two pudgalas or persons, the Śraddhānusarīn and the Dharmānusarīn; who, in the Path of Meditation, become a Śraddhādhimukta and a Drṣṭiprāpta, and, in the Path of the Arhat (=the Aśaikṣamārga), a Samayavimukta and an Asamayavimukta.

The Śraddhānusarīn, (1) from the point of view of his faculties, is of three types: his faculties are weak by definition; but they can be either weak-weak, weak-medium, or weak-strong; (2) from the point of view of his family, of five types: of the family of the Parihāṇadharman, etc. (vi.56); (3) from the point of view of the Path, of fifteen types: accordingly as he is in one of the eight Patiences or in one of the seven Knowledges (vi.26-27); (4) from the point of view of detachment, of seventy-three types: 1. bound by all of the bonds of Kāmadhātu, 2-10. detached from one . . . from nine categories of bonds of Kāmadhātu; 11-19. detached from one . . . from nine categories of bonds of the First Dhyāna, and so on up to and including Ākiñcanyāyatana. Eight times nine--detachment from Kāmadhātu, from the Four Dhyānas, and from three Ārūpyas,--make seventy-two, plus all the bonds of Kāmadhātu,
seventy-three; (5) from the point of view of the physical person (āśraya), of nine types: born in one of the three Dvipas. [with the exception of Uttarakuru], born in one of the six heavens of Kāmadhātu. Higher, the Path of Seeing is absent.

By taking into account all of these differences, there are some 147,825 types of Śraddhānusarin. The calculation relative to other saints is established according to the same elements, with the differences of title.407

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Who is the saint that is called an Ubhayatobhāgavimukta, ("one who is doubly delivered")? Who is the saint that is called a Prajñāvimukta ("one who is delivered through prajñā")?

64a-b. He who possesses extinction is doubly delivered; the other is delivered through prajñā.408

One who has entered the Absorption of Extinction (vi.43c-d), that is to say, one who is endowed with extinction, is called "doubly delivered", because, by the power of prajñā and absorption, he is delivered from the hindrance of the defilements and from the hindrance that opposes the arising of the eight liberations.409

The other is "one who is delivered through prajñā," because, by the power of prajñā, he is delivered from the hindrance of the defilements.

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The Blessed One said, "One who has abandoned the five defilements here below and who is not subject to falling away is a complete Śāikṣa."410 How is a Śāikṣa completed?
64c-d. It is from the point of view of absorption, of faculties, and of result that a Śaikṣa is said to be complete.\footnote{411}

The complete Śaikṣa is of three types, complete by his result, his faculties, and his absorption. The Anāgāmin of the Śraddhādhimukta class (vi.31c) who is not a Kāyasākṣin (vi.43) is complete from the point of view of only his result.

The saint of the Drṣṭiprāpta class (vi.32) who is not detached from Kāmadhātu is complete from the point of view of only his faculties.

The Anāgāmin of the Drṣṭiprāpta class who is not a Kāyasākṣin is complete from the point of view of his result and his faculties.

The Anāgāmin of the Śraddhādhimukta class who is a Kāyasākṣin is complete from the point of view of his result and his absorption.

The Anāgāmin of the Drṣṭiprāpta class who is a Kāyasākṣin is complete from the point of view of his result, his faculties, and his absorption.

A Śaikṣa cannot be complete from the point of view of only his absorption, for the Absorption of Extinction supposes the state of Anāgāmin, and consequently fullness or perfection from the point of view of result. In the same way a Śaikṣa cannot be complete only from the point of view of his faculties and his absorption.

65a. The Aśaikṣa is complete from two points of view.

From the point of view of his faculties and his absorption. There is no Aśaikṣa in fact who is not complete from the point of view of his state: consequently perfection from the point of view of state is counted as a perfection.
The Prajñāvimukta (vi.64) who is an Asamayavimukta (vi.56) is complete from the point of view of his faculties.

The Udbhayatobhāgavimukta who is a Samayavimukta is complete from the point of view of his absorption. The Udbhaya­

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Numerous types of paths have been named: the worldly path and the transworldly path; the Paths of Seeing, Meditation and of the Aśaikṣa; the Preparatory Path, the Irresistible Path, the Path of Deliverance, and the Path of Excellence. In short, how many types of paths are there?

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65b-d. In short, the path is of four types, Preparatory, Irresistible, Deliverance, and Excellence.

Prayogamārga, the Path of Application or of Preparatory Cultivation, is the path by which and following upon which there arises the Irresistible Path.412

Ānantaryamārga, the Irresistible Path (vi.28b), is the path by which an obstacle is abandoned (vi.64a-b, 77).413

Vimuktimārga, the Path of Deliverance, is the first path which arises free from the obstacle abandoned by means of the Irresistible Path.414

Vīśeṣamārga, the Path of Excellence, is the path differing from the preceding paths.415

What is the meaning of the word mārga, path?416
The path is the path to Nirvāṇa because it goes from here; or rather, because it is through it that Nirvāṇa is searched out.\textsuperscript{417}

But how are the Path of Deliverance and the Path of Excellence paths? In fact, it is on the Preparatory Path and the Irresistible Path that the acquisition of Nirvāṇa depends.

Because the Path of Deliverance and the Path of Excellence are parallel to the paths of abandoning (Prahāṇamārga = the Irresistible Path \textit{par excellence}) from the point of view of their object (the Truths), their aspects (sixteen aspects, impermanence, etc.), and their purity; they are distinguished by being superior, for they have for their causes all the causes of the paths of abandoning plus the paths of abandoning themselves. And moreover because, by means of these two paths, one obtains higher and higher paths: (the Path of Deliverance is necessary for the acquisition of a new Irresistible Path). Or rather because, by these two paths, one enters into \textit{nirupadhisēṣa} Nirvāṇa, Nirvāṇa without remnant.\textsuperscript{418}

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The path is also called \textit{pratipad}, route, because, by it, one arrives at Nirvāṇa.\textsuperscript{419}

There are four routes: routes difficult for slow and quick intelligences, and routes easy for slow and quick intelligences.\textsuperscript{420}

66a. The path belonging to the Dhyānas is the easy route.

The path (the Preparatory Path, etc.), cultivated in the Dhyānas, that is to say, while one is in Dhyāna, is the easy route. For the Dhyānas are endowed with parts (viii.1,10) and present a perfect balance of calm (\textit{samatha}) and insight (\textit{vipaśyanā}): it results from this that, in the Dhyānas, the route flows on effortlessly.\textsuperscript{421}
66b. The difficult routes belong to other spheres.

The path in anāgamya, dhyānāntara, and the Ārūpyas, is the difficult route, for these absorptions are not endowed with parts, and calm and insight are not in balance. In anāgamya and dhyānāntara, the power of insight, which is great, outweighs calm, which is small. But the opposite holds true in the Ārūpyas.

***

These two routes,

66c-d. When intelligence is weak, a route for slow intelligence; in the contrary case, a route for a quick intelligence.

Whether the route is easy or difficult, when the faculties are weak, the route is for slow intelligences (dhandhābhijñā); when the faculties are sharp, the route is for quick intelligences.

The route is termed for slow intelligences when intelligence (abhijñā) is slow (dhandha) in it. Abhijñā is the equivalent of prajñā, and dhandha the equivalent of manda. So too, the route is for quick intelligences when abhijñā is rapid in it, that is to say, when prajñā is sharp in it. Or rather one can explain: the abhijñā of a person of weak mind, is slow . . . ; the abhijñā of a person with a sharp mind, is quick.

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The Path receives the name of bodhipāksika, "containing the adjutants of Bodhi." There are thirty-seven adjutants of Bodhi, namely the four foundations of mindfulness, the four right exertions, the four supernormal powers (ṛddhipādas), the five
faculties, the five powers, the seven parts of Bodhi (bodhyaṅgas), and the Noble Eightfold Path.\textsuperscript{424}

67a-b. The Knowledge of Destruction with the Knowledge of Non-Arising is Bodhi.\textsuperscript{425}

The Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising are Bodhi which, by reason of the differences of the saints who obtain it, is threefold: Śrāvaka Bodhi, Pratyekabuddha Bodhi, and Unsurpassed, Perfect Bodhi. In fact, by these two Knowledges, one completely abandons ignorance;\textsuperscript{426} by the first, one knows in all truth that the task is accomplished; and by the second, that there is nothing more to be accomplished in the task.\textsuperscript{427}

67b-c. Because they are favorable to it, thirty-seven dharmas are its adjutants.

Because they are favorable (anuloma) to Bodhi, thirty-seven dharmas are adjutants of Bodhi (bodhipaksya).\textsuperscript{428}

67d. Thirty-seven from the point of view of name, but ten substantial entities.\textsuperscript{429}

What are these ten entities?

68a-c. Faith, energy, mindfulness, āpajñā, absorption, joy, indifference, resolution, morality, and aptitude.\textsuperscript{430}

How is that?

68d-69b. Foundation of mindfulness is praṇā; energy receives the name of right exertion; the supernatural
powers are samādhis.

The foundations of mindfulness, the right exertions (samyak-pradhānās), and the supernormal powers are, by their nature, prajña, energy, and samādhi.

i. We have therefore at first five items, faith, energy, mindfulness, samādhi, and prajña, which, under their own names, make up five faculties and five powers.

Among these five items, prajña is made up of: a. the four foundations of mindfulness,431 b. one of the parts of Bodhi, the investigation into the dharmas (dharma-pravicaya), and c. one of the parts of the Noble Eightfold Path, Right Views.

Energy is made up of: a. the four right exertions; b. one of the parts of Bodhi, energy; and c. one of the parts of the Noble Eightfold Path, Right Effort.

Samādhi is made up of: a. the four supernormal powers; b. one of the parts of Bodhi, samādhi; and c. one of the parts of the Noble Eightfold Path, Right Concentration.

Mindfulness is made up of: a. one of the parts of Bodhi, mindfulness; b. one of the parts of the Noble Eightfold Path, Right Mindfulness.

ii. What do we have in addition that are not these first five items? Among the parts of Bodhi, joy, resolution (ii.25, English translation, p. 192), indifference; among the parts of the Noble Eightfold Path, Right Thoughts and the three parts of morality--Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood--which are counted as being one item, morality,

We have five plus five items; therefore the adjutants of Bodhi are made up of ten items.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, there are eleven items; Right Speech and Right Actions together form one item, and Right
Livelihood is another item (see iv.85c-d). Therefore morality (śīla) counts for two items added to the nine preceding items.\(^432\)

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We have said that the foundations of mindfulness, the right exertions, and the supernormal powers are by their nature prajñā, energy, and samādhi.

69c-d. A definition according to their essentials; they are also all the qualities that arise from cultivation.

The preceding definitions refer to the principal elements of the foundations of mindfulness, etc.; but all these adjutants of Bodhi are also a collection of qualities, pure or impure, which have arisen from preparatory cultivation (prāyogika, ii.71b), from hearing, reflection, or meditation.\(^433\)

***

Why is energy termed right exertion?

Because the body, speech, and mind are, through energy, correctly placed into action.

Why is samādhi termed a supernormal power (rddhipāda)?\(^434\)

Because samādhi is the foundation (pāda = pratiṣṭhā) of rddhi, that is to say, of the "success" of all spiritual qualities.

But certain masters, [the Vaibhāṣikas], maintain that supernormal power is samādhi, and that the four,--desire, mind, energy, and examination,--are the "feet", pādas, of this supernormal power: they should therefore say that the adjutants of Bodhi are thirteen in number by adding desire and mind to their list of
eleven. Furthermore, to affirm that supernormal power is *samādhi* is to contradict the Sūtra which defines supernormal power, "What is supernormal power? The ascetic accomplishes different works of miraculous power; being one, he becomes many," and so on.\(^436\)

Why are faith, energy, etc., termed faculties and powers?

Accordingly as they are weak or strong, for the faculties and the powers cannot be broken or crushed.\(^437\) (*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 726b16).

How is the order of the faculties explained?

In order to obtain the result in which one believes (*śraddhā*), one makes an effort (*vīryam arabhate*). When one forces onself, there is a setting up of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthiti*). When mindfulness is set up, one fixes the mind (*samādhi*) in order to avoid distraction. When the mind is fixed, there arises a consciousness which conforms to the object (*prajñā*).

***

In which stages are the different adjutants of Bodhi placed? In which are they the important factors?

The Vaibhāṣikas say,

70. They form seven groups which are distributed, in order, between the beginning stage, the *nirvedhabhāgīyas*, Meditation, and Seeing.\(^438\)

In the beginning stage, there are the foundations of mindfulness, because, in this stage, one examines the body, etc.\(^439\)

In the Heats (*Uśmagata*), there are the right exertions (*samyakpradbāna*), for, in this stage one increases his energy, an increase which is the principle of progress.
In the Summits (Mūrdhan), there are the supernormal powers, for, due to them, one obtains the condition in which the roots of good cannot be lost.\(^{440}\)

The faculties are in the Patiences, for faith, energy, etc., become predominant (ādhipatyaprāpta, see ii.2a-b) in this stage from the fact that, in the Patiences, one is no longer capable of falling away (vi.23b).

The powers are in the Supreme Worldly Dharmas, for, in this stage, faith, energy, etc., can no longer be crushed either by the defilements—for these are not activated—nor by any other worldly dharmas.

The parts of Bodhi are in the Path of Meditation, for this Path is close to Bodhi, that is to say, to the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising in which the Path of Seeing is separated by the Path of Meditation.

The parts of the Noble Eightfold Path are in the Path of Seeing, for this Path is characterized by progress: for one goes quickly.\(^{441}\)

[But, one would say, the Path of Seeing proceeds from out of the Path of Meditation. Why not respect this order?] The Sūtra lists the parts of Bodhi (=the Path of Meditation) first, and the parts of the Noble Eightfold Path (=the Path of Seeing) second, with an end to having an order corresponding to the number of parts, at first seven, and then eight. Investigation into the dharmas (dharmapravicaya) is at one and the same time Bodhi and a part of Bodhi, and Right Views is both the Path and a part of the Noble Eightfold Path. (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 726c4.)

Such is the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas.

***

Other masters justify the order of the adjutants of Bodhi without disturbing the regular succession, by placing, as it suits
them, the Path of Seeing first, and then the Path of Meditation.

There is first 1. the foundations of mindfulness, which exist with a view to curbing thoughts (buddhi) which disperse themselves naturally, distracted as they are by the variety of objects. The four foundations of mindfulness bind the mind, for it is said in the Sūtra, "... with a view to expelling the idea of desire which have their support in thirst..." (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 758b5).

2. Energy (vīrya) increases through the power of the foundations of mindfulness, through the control and the exertion (pradhāna) of the mind through the accomplishment of the fourfold tasks: abandoning the bad dharmas which have been produced, the non-production of bad dharmas which have not been produced... these are the four right exertions.

3. Then, by reason of the purification of absorption (samādhi), the supernormal powers arise and are cultivated.

4. Supported by absorption, there arise faith, energy, etc., which are predominant among the transworldly dharmas (lokottara-dharmas) since they lead to them: they are the faculties, indriyas.

5. The same faith, energy, etc., when they triumph over the growth of their opponents, are the powers, balas.

6. The parts of Bodhi arise in the Path of Seeing, because, for the first time, the ascetic understands the true nature of the dharmas. [Bodhi signifies pure prajñā.]

7. The parts of Bodhi arise in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation. In fact, it is said, "The Noble Eightfold Path goes thus to fullness through meditation, the four foundations of mindfulness go to their fullness through meditation... the seven parts of Bodhi go to their fullness through meditation." [Therefore the Noble Eightfold Path also exists in the Path of Meditation, for this Path, in the Path of Seeing, does not obtain its fullness through meditation.]
It is further said, "Oh Bhikṣus, to say 'words conforming to the truth' is an expression that says the Four Truths; Oh Bhikṣus, to say 'to advance by the Path' is an expression that speaks of the Noble Eightfold Path."

Therefore, since the Noble Eightfold Path exists both in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation, the order which places the parts of Bodhi first, and the parts of the Noble Eightfold Path second, is justified.

***

Among the adjutants of Bodhi, how many are impure, and how many are pure?

71a-b. The parts of Bodhi and the parts of the Path are pure.

They are only pure, for they are placed in the Path of Seeing and the Path of Meditation. Without doubt, there are worldly right views, etc., but they are not called the parts of the Noble Eightfold Path.

71b. The others are of two types.

The other adjutants of Bodhi are either impure or pure.

***

How many exist in the different spheres? (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 497b26.)

71c. All exist in the First Dhyāna.
In all, thirty-seven.

71d. In anāgāmya, with the exception of joy.\textsuperscript{447}

Why is joy (a part of Bodhi) absent from anāgāmya?

Because the thresholds of absorption (sāmantakas) are realized only through force,\textsuperscript{448} and again, because they include the fear of falling into a lower sphere.

72a. In the Second, with the exception of thoughts.\textsuperscript{449}

In the Second Dhyāna, thoughts (a part of the Eightfold Path) are absent, but the other thirty-six adjutants of Bodhi remain. Thought is absent since vicāra is also absent.

72b. In two, with the exception of the one and the other.

In the Third and the Fourth Dhyānas, there is absent both joy and thought, but the other thirty-five adjutants of Bodhi remain.

72c. Also, in dhyānāntara.

There one finds thirty-five adjutants of Bodhi with the exception of these same two.

72c-d. In three Ārūpyas, with the exception of the preceding and the parts of morality.\textsuperscript{450}

In the three Ārūpyas there is also absent Right Speech, Right actions, and Right Livelihood, but thirty-two adjutants of Bodhi
remain.

73a-c. In Kāmadhātu and in Bhavāgra, the parts of Bodhi and the parts of the Path are absent.\(^451\)

In fact, the Pure Path is absent from these two places. Therefore some twenty-two adjutants of Bodhi remain.\(^452\)

***

At what moment does the person who cultivates the adjutants of Bodhi obtain the *avetyaprasādas*, that is, the four types of faith [and purity] which accompany intelligence?\(^453\)

73c-74. When one sees three Truths, one obtains the morality and the *avetyaprasāda* relating to the Dharma: when one comprehends the Path, also the *avetyaprasāda* relating to the Buddha and his Saṅgha.\(^454\)

At the comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the first three Truths (vi.27), there is acquisition of the *avetyaprasāda* relating to the Dharma, and to the pure precepts, dear to the Āryans.\(^455\)

At the comprehension of the Truth of the Path, dear to the Āryans, there is an acquisition of the *avetyaprasāda* relating to the Buddha and to his Śrāvaka-Saṅgha.\(^456\)

The word "also" (*api*) is there in order to mark that there is also an acquisition of the *avetyaprasāda* relating to the Dharma and the precepts.

The *prasāda* relating to the Buddha is a *prasāda* relating to the Aśaikṣa *dhammas* which make up a Buddha; so too one should understand by Saṅgha the Śaikṣa and Aśaikṣa *dhammas* which make up the Saṅgha (iv.32).
What is understood by Dharma in the expression “avetyaprasāda relating to the Dharma”?

74c-75a. The Dharma is the three Truths and the Path of the Pratyekabuddha and the Bodhisattva. Consequentely, when one understands the Four Noble Truths, one obtains the avetyaprasāda relating to the Dharma.

Therefore we have, seen from the differences of the object of prasāda, four prasādas distinguished from the point of view of their names.

75a-c. From the point of view of substantial entities, these four are two things, faith and morality.

The avetyaprasāda relating to the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, are, by their nature, faith (śraddhā). The precepts dear to the Āryans, are, by their nature, morality (śīla). Therefore they are two things.

Are these two things pure or impure?

The avetyaprasādas are exclusively
What is the meaning of the term *avetyaprasāda*?
A faith consecutive to the exact comprehension of the Truths.

The *avetyaprasādas* are arranged in the order in which, upon leaving the contemplation of the Truths, they are actualized.

How does one actualize them upon leaving this contemplation?

"Oh! the Blessed One is a perfect Buddha! Well preached is his Dharma-Vinaya! Well cultivating is his Śrāvaka-Saṅgha!": it is thus that one actualizes them, for the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha are, in this order, the doctor, the remedy, and the patient.

As the *prasāda* of morality⁴⁵⁹ results from the *prasāda* of the mind,⁴⁶⁰ it is placed fourth, at the end: it is when the mind is thus believing (*prasanna*) that one acquires the precepts dear to the Āryans. Or rather, the *prasāda* of the precepts is placed at the end, because the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha are the doctor, the remedy, and the patient, and the *prasāda* of the precepts corresponds to health (*ārogya*). Or rather because the Buddha is the guide, the Dharma is the path, the Saṅgha is one's travelling companions, and the precepts dear to the Āryans are the vehicle (*yāna*).
namely the same eight parts of the Noble Eightfold Path termed "pertaining to the Aśaikṣa": aśaikṣi samyagdṛṣṭi . . . , plus aśaikṣi samyagvimukti and aśaikṣa samyagjñāna, the perfect deliverance proper to Arhats and the knowledge of the acquisition of this deliverance (on samyagvimuktijñāna, see vi.76d).461

Why does not the Sūtra attribute both perfect deliverance and the knowledge of this perfect deliverance to the Śaikṣa?

75c-d. Because he is bound, deliverance is not said to be a part of a Śaikṣa.

A Śaikṣa is bound by the bonds of the defilements. How could one consider him delivered? The person who is partially bound is not called released. Deliverance is absent from him, and he cannot possess the knowledge of the acquisition of deliverance (vim-ukto'smīti jñānadarśanam, Mahāvyutpatti, 81.9).

An Aśaikṣa, on the contrary, is completely liberated from all the bonds: he is thus characterized, magnified both by his deliverance from the defilements and by the direct knowledge of his deliverance: therefore it is of the Aśaikṣa alone that one can say that perfect deliverance and the knowledge of this perfect deliverance are his parts.

***

What is deliverance?

75d. Deliverance is twofold.462

It is conditioned and unconditioned. (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 147a6.)
76a-c. Victory over the defilements is unconditioned deliverance; \textit{adhimokṣa} is conditioned deliverance.

The abandoning (\textit{prabāṇa}, that is, \textit{pratisamkhyānirodha}, ii. English translation, p. 280-281) of the defilements is unconditioned deliverance. The intention of the \textit{Aṣaikṣa} is conditioned deliverance.  

76b-c. This last is a part.

It is conditioned deliverance which is called a "part pertaining to an \textit{Aṣaikṣa}"; for the other parts, Right Views, etc., are conditioned.

76c. It is two deliverances.  

This same conditioned deliverance is described, in the Sūtra (\textit{Samyukta, TD} 2, p. 16c24), as being double, mental deliverance and deliverance through \textit{prajñā}. [Mental deliverance comes about through the liberation from desire, and deliverance through \textit{prajñā} comes about through liberation from ignorance;] it therefore constitutes what is called the \textit{skandha} of deliverance, the \textit{vimuktiskandha}.

But, according to another opinion, if the \textit{skandha} of deliverance is only intention, how do we explain the Sūtra? The Sūtra says, "Oh Vyāghrabodhāyanas! What is the essential factor of the purification of deliverance? The mind of a Bhikṣu is detached, delivered from craving; the mind of this Bhikṣu is detached, delivered from hatred and ignorance. In this way, either with a view to the fullness of the \textit{skandha} of deliverance which is not complete, or with a view to maintaining the \textit{skandha} of deliverance which is complete, all desire, all energy . . . this is the essential factor."
It results from this Sūtra that intention does not constitute deliverance: this is the purity of the mind resulting from the abandoning of the defilements, craving, etc. which are expelled by correct knowledge.\textsuperscript{468}

Perfect deliverance has been explained.

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What is the perfect or Right Knowledge (\textit{samyagjñāna}) which is distinct from Right Views (\textit{samyagdrṣṭi})?

76d. Bodhi, as described above, is knowledge.

Bodhi, as we have described above, is the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising (vi.67a-b), and these constitutes Right Knowledge, the tenth part of the Aśaikṣa.

***

Which mind--past, present, or future--is delivered?

77a-b. The Aśaikṣa mind, arising, is delivered from its obstacles.\textsuperscript{469}

The Śāstra (\textit{Jñānapraśṭhāna, TD} 26, p. 1000b9) says, "The future Aśaikṣa mind is delivered from its obstacle."\textsuperscript{470} What is this obstacle?

The possession of the defilements [=ninth category of the defilements of Bhavāgra], which in fact creates an obstacle to the arising of an Aśaikṣa mind. At the moment of Vajropamasamādhi (vi.44c-d), this possession is abandoned, and an Aśaikṣa mind arises and is delivered. When this possession has been abandoned,
the Āśaikṣa mind has arisen and has been delivered.

But what would you say of the Āśaikṣa mind which has not arisen at the moment of Vajropamasamādhi, or of the worldly mind which is produced within an Āśaikṣa?

These two minds are also delivered; but it is of the future Āśaikṣa mind in the process of arising that the Śastra says is delivered.

From what is the worldly mind of an Āśaikṣa delivered?

From the same possession of the defilements, an obstacle to its arising.

But is not this same worldly mind produced within a Śaikṣa, and have you not said that it is delivered?

The worldly mind of a Śaikṣa is not similar to that of an Āśaikṣa, for the latter is not accompanied by the possession of the defilements.

***

What is the Path—past, present, or future,—by which the obstacle to the arising of the Āśaikṣa mind is abandoned?

77c-d. It is while perishing that the Path causes the abandoning of the obstacle.

Perishing, that is to say, in the present.

***

The Śastra and the present work defined unconditioned deliverance (vi.76a). On the other hand, the Sūtra471 and the Śastra speak of three dhātus ("spheres"), namely prahāṇadhātu ("the
sphere of abandoning"), *virāgadḥātu* ("the sphere of the absence of craving"), and *nirodhadḥātu* ("the sphere of extinction"). What is the relationship between unconditioned deliverance and these three spheres?

78a. Unconditioned deliverance receives the name of *dhātu*.

This deliverance is the three *dhātus*.

78b. The destruction of craving is detachment.\footnote{472}

The abandoning of craving (*rāga*) is *virāgadḥātu*, the sphere of the absence of craving.

78c. The destruction of the others is abandoning.

The abandoning of the defilements other than craving is *prahāṇadḥātu*, the sphere of abandoning.

78d. The destruction of the object is called *nirodhadḥātu*, the sphere of extinction.\footnote{473}

The abandoning of the object, impure physical matter, etc., with the exception of the abandoning of the defilements, is the realm of extinction.

***

Does one become disgusted by means of the same *dharmas* through which one obtains detachment?

There are four alternatives.
What are they?

79a-b. Disgust arises by means of the Patiences and the Knowledges of Suffering and Origin.

It is only by means of the Patiences and the Knowledges of the Truths of Suffering and Origin (vi.25d) that one obtains disgust, and not by means of the other Patiences and Knowledges.

79b-c. Detachment arises through all the *dharmas* by means of which there is abandoning.

The Patiences (=the Path of Seeing) and the Knowledges (=the Path of Meditation) (vi. p. 949) of Suffering, of Origin, of Extinction and of the Path, through which one abandons the defilements, are also the means for acquiring detachment.

79d. There are therefore four alternatives.

1. If the ascetic does not abandon the defilements through the Patiences and Knowledges of Suffering and Origin, he only acquires disgust: these Patiences and these Knowledges have only the causes of disgust for their sphere.

2. If the ascetic abandons his defilements through the Patience and Knowledges of Extinction and the Path, he only acquires detachment: these Patiences and these Knowledges have only the causes of joy for their sphere.

3. If the ascetic abandons the defilements through the Patiences and the Knowledges of Suffering and Origin, he acquires detachment and disgust.

4. If the ascetic does not abandon the defilements through the Patiences and the Knowledges of Extinction and the Path, he acquires neither detachment nor disgust.
Let us remark, with respect to the first and the fourth alternative, that the ascetic who, already detached from craving, enters the Path of Seeing, does not abandon defilements through the Path of the Dharma Knowledge and the Dharma Knowledges. Furthermore, one does not abandon them through the Knowledges which form part of the Preparatory Path, the Path of Deliverance, as the Path of Excellence (vi.65b).
1. At the beginning of this volume we give a summary of the theory of the Path according to the Kośa: preliminary path; pure, impure path, etc.

2. We should not translate "by Seeing and Meditation on the Truths." Worldly or impure Meditation does not bear on the Truths.

On the different meanings of the word bhāvana, bhāvana, iv.122c-d, vi.5. vii.27. Asthasālīni, 163: a. acquisition, taking possession of (pratilambha); b. cultivation, repetition (nīsevana, nīsevā, abhyāsa); c. absorption (samādhi).

3. Darsānamārga, i.40a-b, vi.25-28; bhāvanāmārga, pure and impure, vi.29-50. Different mārgas, vi.65b.

4. The Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 267a28 presents thirty opinions on the two paths: the Path of Seeing is an active path; once it is realized, at one stroke it cuts off nine catetories of defilements; the Path of Meditation is not active, it is cultivated on many occasions and it cuts off nine catetories of defilements over a long period of time: such as a sharp dagger and a dull dagger . . .; the defilements abandoned through Seeing are abandoned as a stone is smashed; the defilements abandoned through Meditation are abandoned as a lotus stalk is broken.

The Path of the Seeing of the Truths, first pure view of the truths, cuts off the defilements, satkāyadṛṣṭi, etc., to which it is opposed (pratipraksā) in fifteen moments; the Path of Meditation, pure or impure, opposes one by one each of the nine catetories of defilements (strong-strong rāga, etc.) of each the nine spheres (Kāmadr̥tu, the Four Dhyānas, and the four arūpas) (vi.33).

5. According to Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 404b11.

6. vi.14; 67.

7. vi.67; Mahāvyutpatti, 39: to make an effort for the disappearance of the black dharmas, etc.

8. vyavacāraṇa = parikṣa = pratirūpaṇa; this is the period of the nirvedhābhāgyas, vi.17.

9. According to the version of Hsūn-tsang this is the Sūtra of the Good Doctor; according to Paramārtha, the Sūtra of the Simile of the Doctor (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 105a2b, p. 120a25).

Vyāhbyā: sūtre py esa satyānāṃ drṣṭaṃ iti vyādhyādisūtre / katam/ caturbhir aṅgaib samanvāgato bhiṣakā śalyāpabhārtā rājārha ca bhavati rājyagosā ca rājāṅgate ca samkhyaṃ gacchati / katamaïf caturbhibh / abādbhakṣūalo bhavati / ābādbhasamuttānakuśūalo bhavati abādbhāpabhānakuśulab phramayaya cābādbhasayatyām anuttādakusulab / evam eva caturbhir aṅgaib samanvāgaṇas tathāgato r̥ban samyaksambuddho nuttero bhiṣakā śalyāpabhartety ucyate / katamaïf caturbhibh / iba bhikṣavas tathāgato . . . idam duḥkhham āryasatyam īti yathābhūtaṃ prajāṇati . . .

Kern, Manual, p. 47 (Yogasūtra, ii.15; Lalita, p. 448, 458); bhisakka in the Index of the Anguttara; Milinda, trans. II, 8, note: Śikṣāsamuccaya, 148.5, 243.4, 295.2; Bodhicaryavatāra, ii.57, vii.22. etc. See Taishō 17, no. 793.

10. On abhisamaya, below, vi.27a. Atthasālīni, 22 (57) distinguishes worldly and transworldly abhisamaya; but the Pāli sources most frequently understand abhisamaya in the same sense as does the Abhidharma: comprehension of the Truths through arjyā praṇā.

11. This theory is not that of all the sources; see p. 908. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 397a26: What is the nature of the Four Truths? The masters of the Abhidharma say: 1. the Truth of Suffering consists of the five upādānasandhas; 2. the Truth of Origin is the cause of the impure dharmas; 3. the Truth of the Extinction is their pratisamkhyānirodha (ii.55d); 4. the Truth of the Path is the dharmas which create the Saints (śaikṣa and atśaikṣa dharmas). The Dārṣṭāntikas say: 1. the Truth of Suffering is nāmarūpa; 2. the Truth of Arising is karman and kleśa; 3. the Truth of Extinction is the annihilation (ksaya) of karman and of kleśa; 4.
the Truth of the Path is calm and insight (śamatha and vipaśyanā). The Vibhajyavādins (see v. English trans. p. 782, 808,) say: 1. that which has the eight characteristics of duḥkha is duḥkha and duḥkhasatya; the other impure (sārava) dharmas are duḥkha, but not duḥkhasatya [compare the Pāli sources quoted below, note 15]; 2. the tṛṣṇā which produces later existence is samudaya and samudayasatya; all other tṛṣṇā and the other causes of impure (sāravabhetu) dharmas is samudaya, but not samudayasatya; 3. the extinction of this tṛṣṇā is nirodha and nirodhasatya; the extinction of all other tṛṣṇā and of the other causes of impure dharmas is nirodha, but not nirodhasatya; 4. the eight-part Śāikṣa path is mṛdga and mṛdgasatya; the other dharmas of the Śāikṣa and all the dharmas of the Aśāikṣa are mārga, but not mārgasatya. But, in this system, the Arhats only possess the Truths of duḥkha and nirodha, and not the Truths of samudaya and mṛdga. Samgitiidstra, TD 26, p. 392a16; sāravabhetu is the Truth of Origin; pratisamkhyānirodha is the Truth of Extinction; the dharmas of the Śāikṣa and the Aśāikṣa are the path.

12. Visuddhimagga, 495: yasmi paṇa etāni buddhādayo ariyā paṭivijjhantī tasmā ariyasaccānī tu vuccantī ... ariyānī tiṭṭhāni avitathāni avismāvadākānīti attho.

The Aryan is defined, Kośa, iii.44c; same etymology in Anguttara, iv.145. Majjhima, i.280. etc. In Atthasālīmi, 349: the Āryans are the Buddhhas, the Pratyekas, and the Śrāvakas; or rather the Buddhhas alone are Āryans: compare Samyutta, v.455 (tathāgata-ariya).


It also quotes the last pāda of the Saundarananda, xii.22: loke'sminn dlaydrdme nwrtau durlabhā ratih / vyāthante hy apunarbhdvdt prapdtdd iva baits ah // In fact, what the Āryans call sukhā is Nirvāṇa or extinction.


b. On the three types of duḥkha, Dīgha, iii.216 (Buddhaghosa, if the summary in Dialogues, iii.210, is correct, deviates from Vasubandhu); Samyutta, iv.259, v.56; Visuddhimagga, 499; Madhyamakavṛtti, chap. xxiv (p. 227, 475), which depends on the Kośa; Bodhicaryāvatāra, 346; Rockhill, Life, 189; Yogasūtra, ii.15 (parināma, tāpa and samkāra-duḥkha). Nāmasamgiti, 85: duḥkham saṁsāraṇaḥ skandhāḥ.

c. According to the Yamaka, i.174, painful sensation (of the body and mind) is duḥkha; the rest is duḥkhasatya, but not duḥkha. Painful sensation is anubhavānudduḥkha (the duḥkha-duḥkha of the Abhidharma): the rest is duḥkha because it is dangerous sappāsiḥbhyayathena. (According to Ledi Sayadaw, JPTS, 1914, 133).

Kathavatthu, xvii.5: the Hetuvādins maintains that all conditioned dharmas, with the exception of the Path but including the cause of suffering, are suffering.

16. Some agreeable dharmas possess vipariṇāmena duḥkhatā, the characteristic of suffering, because they do not last. The Vyākyā quotes the verse of Aśvaghoha, Saundarananda, xi.50: hā caistaraṭha hā vāpi hā mandākini hā priye / ity ārtam vilapanto gāmī śrāvantu dinaukasab // (Compare Divya, 194).

Let us note here that Vasubandhu, iv.86, quotes the same poem: gṛhaṃśṭhena bi duḥṣodhā dṛṣṭir vividhadrṣṭāna / ājīvo bhikṣunā caiva paresv ayatvāvrttīna. (Correct the note p. 189.)
The disagreeable dharmas are suffering by their suffering, painful nature (duhkhasvabhâvena, upaghâtasvabhâvena). But can they to some extent be happy through transformation, in that they pass away (viparinâmasukha)? Without doubt, but these definitions (upadeśa) have for their purpose depreciating, disliking these things (vidusandrtha): in the same way we hold agreeable sensation that arises and lasts to be suffering.

All things are suffering through saṁskāraduhkhata: saṁskāreṇaiva duḥkhateti saṁskāreṇaiva jananenaivety arthah / yad anityam tad duḥkham yan na niyatābhītam tad duḥkham yaj jāyate vinayayati ca tad duḥkham ity arthah / tenoktam / pratyayābhīsamksaranaā iti pratyayair abhīsamksrayate yasmāt tasmāt tad duḥkham iti /

Samyutta, iv.207: sukham dukkhato ... dukkham sallato ... adukkhamasukham aniccato.

17. Quoted in Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 476; compare Jacob, Third Handful of Popular Maxims (Bombay, 1911). p. 103: aksipātannyāya.

18. The point of view of the Theravadins, Kathāvatthu, xvii.5.

19. Vibhāṣā (TD 27, p. 402c10). The Sūtra says: "The Path depends on its preparation (saṁbbāra), Nirvāṇa depends on the Path; through the pleasure (sukha) of the Path, one obtains the pleasure of Nirvāṇa. How can one say that there is no pleasure in the skandhas? There is found therein a little pleasure . . . nevertheless the skandhas are one mass of suffering, the same if one were to pour a drop of honey into a vase filled with poison . . . ; in this same way are the skandhas: little pleasure and much suffering. They are thus solely called duḥkhasatya. There are some who say: In the skandhas, there is absolutely no pleasure: therefore it is called duḥkhasatya.

20. This is a stanza by Kumarālābha (a Sautrāntika).

21. Sābha tu sukhena: tu announces the refutation of the purvapakṣa represented by a theory of the Sarvāstivādins ("According to one explanation . . .") and by a theory of the Sautrāntikas.

Hsüan-tsang: "The true explanation . . ." The Japanese editor: "The author presents the correct explanation of the Sarvāstivādins."

22. Vibbāṣā, TD 27, p. 402c. According to the Vyākhyā, the Bhadanta Śrīlābha, etc. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, the Sautrāntikas, the Mahāsāṃghikas, etc. Saṁghabhadra, Nyāyānusāra: "The Sthaviras hold that sensation is only suffering."

Compare Kathāvatthu, ii.8, where the Theravāda condemn the Gokulikas (=Kukkulikas, Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 151).

23. These Sūtras are discussed p. 904.


25. Vibbāṣā, TD 27, p. 399a23. Pārśva says that piṇḍana (affliction, pain) is the characteristic of duḥkha; Vasumitra says that pravṛtti (or saṁśāra, saṁcāra, liu-ch’uan 流轉) is the characteristic of duḥkha; etc.

26. According to Hsüan-tsang: If he answers: "Affliction" (bādh), then, since there is contentment, the existence of pleasure is proved. If he answers: "That which harms," then, since there is usefulness (anugrāhaka) in this, the existence of pleasure is proved. If he answers: "That which displeases (aratījanya)," then, since there is something pleasing, the existence of pleasure is proved. According to Paramārtha: If he answers: "That which afflicts is called suffering," how does pleasure afflict? If he answers: "That which harms," how would it harm since pleasure is useful? If he answers: "That which displeases," how could it be suffering since pleasure pleases?

27. The Vyākhyā explains: idam atra duḥkhasya laksanam ity arthah.

The same Sūtra in Samyutta, iv.216, but the questioner of the Bhagavat is "a certain Bhikṣu": tissam idā bhikkhu vedānā vuttā mayā . . . / vuttam kho panetam bhikkhu mayā yaṁ
kiṃ viṇṇā sādhu duḥkhasmin tu / tvaṃ kho ṭhānaṃ bhikkhu mayā saṁkhaṛāmam yeva
aniccatam saṁbhāya bhāsitam...

viparīṇāma = anyathāvā.

The commentary of the Nāmasaṁgīti, viii.9: yat kiṃ cit kāye veditam idam atra
duḥkham.

28. Yathābhūtām: conforming to reality, without adding or subtracting (adhyāropāpavā-
dābhāvā).

29. The Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 402c17 and foll., continues: "When one experiences the
suffering of the damned, one has the idea of pleasure with respect to the suffering of
animals... When one experiences the suffering of mankind, one has the idea of pleasure
with respect to the sufferings of the gods.

30. Viśāhyā: aduḥkhaṁ antaram sukhābhimānam paśyant ābu / yadā gandharasaspaśa-
vyaviśeṣajam iti / madhyam hi duḥkham aduḥkhaṁ bhavatām na mrudpakāram ato
vaktavyam tadā katamad duḥkhān mṛdudbhūtam yatrasya sukhābuddhār bhavati
viṣayabalād eva hi tat sukham utpadyate mṛdudbhūksam anantarapratyayabalaṃ
adbhātaduḥkhasamanantarapratyayabalaṃ ve ṭī /

Paramārtha: 'When a person experiences the pleasure arisen from some excellent
smell, taste, etc., then what suffering does he experience? He experiences a weak suffering,
and with respect to this weak suffering, he produces the idea of pleasure. If this is the case,
when this weak suffering has disappeared...'

31. Compare Saṁyutta, ii.173: If the earth element were absolutely agreeable..., absolutely
suffering...

32. Hsūn-tsang adds: "since suffering diminishes little by little."

If the displacement of the burden does not provoke a pleasure and is only a diminution
of suffering, this diminution would take place gradually: the impression of pleasure would
thus grow from the moment when the burden had been displaced.

33. Utsūtra. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 403a4: "All the impure (sārava) dharmas are cause and as a
consequence the Truth of Origin. Why does the Blessed One say that thirst is the Truth of
Origin? There are thirty explanations..."

The Yamaka, i.174, ii.250, demonstrates that thirst is the origin, not ignorance (Ledi
Sayadaw, JPTS., 1914, p. 135).

34. Mahāvagga, i.6.20. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 468b27c19: samudayaśayam katamat / yāsa
trṣṇā nandarāgasabagata tatra tatrābhinnadīni. According to the Sautrāntikas, four
trṣṇās are samudayaśayaya: 1. desire for present existence, the desire for present results: 2. desire for
later existences, the desire for future results; 3. desire accompanied by nandī; and 4. desire
tatra tatra abhinandinī.

35. A non-metrical version in the Tanjūra: las duñ sred pa duñ mi rig pa / phyi ma'i tshe la
'du byed rnam kyi rgya.Three pādas of five syllables in Paramārtha: "Action, thirst,
ignorance, these three in the future are the cause of all existence." Hsūn-tsang has four
pādas: "Action, thirst and ignorance are the cause which produces the future saṁskāras
which creates the series of existence called pudgala": this is a gāthā taken from Saṁyukta,

The Viśāhyā also attests that this quotation is a stanza:... gāthāyām esa nirdeṣaḥ
dharmas ārthāḥ saṁskārāṇām ca kṣetram eva abhisamāparāye.

36. Saṁyukta, TD 2, p. 224c16: yataś ca bhikṣavah pañca bijajātyān (compare Cosmologie
boudhique, p. 220) akhaṇḍaṃ accidrāṇy apūṇiṃ avatārṇaḥ nibhāv (?) sāraṇi
suksmāyāti pṛti-viruddhātuṣ ca bhavati abhānūṣ ca / evam tān bhījāni viruddhim
vipulatām āpadyanta iti hi bhikṣava upameyam yēva yāvad evāsārthasya vijñaptaya iti
drṣṭāntam upanyasyedam uktram /pañca bijajātāṁśi bhikṣavaḥ sopādānasya vijnānasyaitad aḍhivacanam / prthividhātār iti catasṛṇāṁ vijnānasthiṣṇāṁ etad adhivacanam. Compare Samyutta, iii.54: seyyathā... paṭhāvāḥātū evam catasso vijnāṇaṭṭhitīyo... seyyathā pañcabijajātāṁ evam vijnānam sāhāram daṭṭhabbam. On the vijnānasthiṣṇa, see Kośa, iii.5.

37. Vyākhyā: abhiprāyika ity abhiprāye bhavaḥ / abhiprāyena vā divyatū abhiprāyikāḥ sūtre nirdeśaḥ / tṛṣṇādbikām pudgalam adhikṛta krtā ity abhiprāyah / lākṣaṇikas tv abhidharme / lākṣaṇe bhavo lākṣaṇiko nirdeśaḥ / ... sāsrasvasya skandhapañcakasya samudayasyaṭṭha laksanayogāt.

38. In the Vyākhyā tīṣṭa Śūtra is called the sahetusapratya-saniddnasūtra (see the fragment quoted in Kośa, iii, Cosmologie); but in the Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 452: pratityasamutpāda-sūtra.

39. See iii.30, Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 544.

40. Like the limb which has been smeared with a dried paste of masāra. In the way that the limb is grasped (āgṛbīta) by this anointing, in that same way the ātmabhāva is grasped by desire.

41. According to the Japanese editor, Ekottarāgama (TD 2, p. 740a-741b).

42. The Vyākhyā quotes the Madhyamaka kārikā, xxiv.8: dve satye samuपāśritya buddhānāṁ dharmadesanā lokasamuṣṭiyaṁ ca satyaṁ ca paramārthabhaṁ // Compare the stanza quoted in the commentary to the Kathāvasthu, p.22: dve saccāṁ akkāhiṁ samuddhaṁ vadatāṁ varo / sammutāṁ paramattbhāṁ ca sattvam nupalabhbhā // tatthā samkātavacanam saccāṁ lokasammutuṣṭhānāṁ / paramattbhavacanam saccāṁ dbhāmmānāṁ tathālakṣāṇāṁ // (The edition has tatthā lakṣāṇam.)

See the translation of the Kathāvasthu, p. 63, 180, 371; Ledi Sayadaw, "Some points in Buddhist doctrine," JPTS., 1914. 129.

The problem of the single truth (Suttanipāta, 884), of the two truths and of the four truths—which implies the question of the real existence of Nirvāṇa (see Aṅguttara, ii.161)—is discussed in Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 399b10 and following, and in the Nyāyānusāra of Saṅghabhadra (TD 29, p. 665a27). These document have been translated in the Introduction.

43. Vyākhyā: The two examples indicate the two modes of bheda or breaking: pots, etc., are broken by a blow (upakrama) whereas water, etc., is broken by mental analysis (buddhi); for by breaking one cannot take away the taste, etc. from water. Or rather, that which exists conventionally (saṁvṛtis) is of two types: 1. conventionally depending on another thing (saṁvṛtyantaravāyaprāṣṭraya), and 2. depending of a real thing (dravya): of the first, there is at one and the same time breaking (bheda) and analysis (anyāpoba) [for example, the pot]; of the second, there is only analysis: one cannot disassociate an atom which is made up of eight things (Kośa, ii.22) ... saṁvṛtisat=saṁvṛyavābhārena sat. paramārthaṁ sat. svalaksāṇena sat.

Paramārtha, in the Bhāṣya, departs from the original:
"First if the idea of a thing no longer arises when this thing has been broken, then this thing exists conventionally (saṁvṛtisat). When the pot is reduced to baked earth, the idea of pot does not rise with this baked earth. Therefore things like "a pot" exist only as a metaphorical designation (prajñāpti) of shape (hsīng-hsīang 形相 =ākṛti, samstbāna). Secondly, if the idea of a thing does not arise when, by the mind, one takes away from this thing other given things (dharmas), then this thing exists conventionally; for example, water. If one mentally takes away the color, taste, and the primary elements, etc.,
from water, then the idea of water is no longer produced. Thus things such as water exist as the metaphorical designations of a combination (chü-chi 聚集, samavāya?). Thirdly, one expresses paramārtha, the real thing, by words, phrases, and syllables (Kośa, ii.47); it is by reason of words that a knowledge relative to paramārtha is produced. But when one enters absorption, consciousness does not bear on words (Kośa, vi.5c-d) and, when it has left absorption, the consciousness no longer bears on paramārtha: thus the words and the consciousness referred to here exist only as metaphorical designations of the thing expressed (ḥsien-chih 顯示, udbhāvāna?). Why are these three types of dharmas samvṛti? What is only made up of words does not have a nature in and of itself, and is samvṛti. To say, in conformity with the usage of the world, that “there is a pot, there is water, there are words,” is true and not false. Therefore this is samvṛtisatya. What differs from these three types of dharmas is called paramārthasatya. If the idea of a thing arises as before when this thing is destroyed, or when one has separated it from other dharmas by the mind, or when one makes an abstraction of it from words, then this thing or dharma really exists, for example, rūpa. One can cut rūpa, one can subtract different dharmas from it, its taste, etc.: but the idea which bears on rūpa remains the same. The same for vedana, etc. According to other masters, the dharmas which are the object of supermundane (lokottara) knowledge or of the knowledge acquired consecutively to it are also called paramārthasatya: the dhūtas (ching-chieh 境界), the result, and the Path are paramārtha. What differs from these three is samvṛtisatya.

44. According to Hui-hui, the Sautrāntikas. The Vyākyā explains: paramasya jñānasyārthab paramārthab ca sa satyam ca tad iti paramārthasatya. It adds: trividhām bi yo gacchānām sat paramārthasat samvṛtisat dravyasat/sad dravyasat. The older masters are thus the Yogācārinis (see iv.4a, note 25). Compare the doctrine of the Bodhisattvavṛtti, I.iv, fol. 18a, Muséeson, 1906, p. 220 and following; four types of tattvārtha or tattva: 1. the reality recognized in popular usage (laukikaprasiddha); 2. the reality established by reason (yuktiñaprasiddha); 3. the reality that the Śrāvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas cognize through a pure or worldly knowledge, this leading to the pure knowledge consecutive to the pure knowledge (anāsravane anāsravaṇapṛṣṭhalabdhaṇa ca laukikena jñānena): this reality is the Truths; and 4. the reality which is the sphere of knowledge purified of any hindrance to cognizable objects (jñeyavaraparipussudhajñānagocara): this is tathāta. (Compare Sūtrakārī-kāra, xi.31).

45. This worldly knowledge is samvṛtijñāna, vii.2.21.

46. Paramārtha: “The truths have been spoken of in summary. If one asks for a long presentation, one should see how it is spoken of in the Treatise of the Six Higher Knowledges (abhiñā) 雙勝智論 (TD 29, p. 269a3).

47. Paramārtha: “One must tell by which cultivation of which means one enters into the Seeing of the Truths. Thus, beginning from the first step, one must tell of its progression.” (TD 29, p. 269a4). Hsüan-tsang: “One must tell by which cultivation of which means one arrives at darśanamārga (TD 29, p. 116b27).

48. a. Here bbāvana is the equivalent of samādhi or absorption (iv.123c-d).

b. Vṛttas or vṛttis (vi.8a) is almost synonymous to śīla, as we can see in the Saundarananda, xiii.10, xvi.31; it is the perfect śīla of the Bhikṣu to be content with the clothing of a monk, etc. (vi.7c-d).

49. Udgrhṇāti, glossed by paṭṭhati.

50. Satyadarśanānuloma = satyadarśanadbhikārika.

51. On the three paññās, Dīgha, iii.219; Vibhaṅga, 324, Visuddhimagga, 439 (in the order: cintā, suta, bbāvana).
52. *Vibhāṣā*, *TD* 27, p. 940c25. Vasubandhu does not admit this theory; this is why he says: "According to the Vaibhāṣikas ..."

53. "This thing corresponds to this name; this is the name of this thing."

54. According to Saṅghhabhadra (*TD* 29, p. 669c5), the opinion of the Sautrāntikas.

55. To what sphere do the *prajñās* belong, *Vibhāṣā* (*TD* 27, p. 218a23). (See vii.18c-d).


Mode of acquisition: 1st opinion, the three obtained through *prayoga* (exercise) and through vairāgya (detachment); 2nd opinion, and also at birth (anupapatti); and further the śrūtāmayi of Rūpadhātu at birth and through *prayoga*, the śrūtāmayi of Kāmadhātu through *prayoga*; the cintāmayi through *prayoga*; and the bhāvanāmayi in the three manners.

56. These grammatical explanations are omitted by the Tibetan translator. The two Chinese translators omit the explanation by *Pāṇini* iv.3.134, but however give the example.

57. Hsüan-tsang: "How would he who desires to apply himself (*prayuj*) to bhāvanā purify his own person (*āṣrayabhājana*) so that bhāvanā will be successful?" (*TD* 29, p. 116c23).

58. The first "separation" is to separate the organs from the objects of sense. Fire shoots forth from fuel, defilement from the *viṣayas* (*Saundarananda*, xiii.30); but, as wind is necessary for fire, so too *parikalpa* or *vitarka* is necessary to the fire of the defilements: thus there should thus be a second "separation," separation from bad thoughts (*Saundarananda*, xiii.49). Bad thoughts or *akuśāvitarka* (*Kośa*, v.46, 59), with their opposites, are explained in *Saundarananda*, xv.21 (*vyāpāda-vibhimsā* and *maitrikārunya*, kāmavitarka, jñātāvitarka, 30-41, janapadavitarka, 42-51, amarāṇa or *amaravitarka*). One gets rid of these *vitarkas* by anāpānasamśṛi (vi.9). vi.58 (Hsüan-tsang *TD* 29, p. 130a13.)

On aranyā, in which one cultivates "separation from the body," see *Visuddhimagga*, 71.

59. On alpecchatā and samūṣṭī, see *Aṅguttara*, v.219, i.38, *Visuddhimagga*, 81, *Divya*, 61, 96, etc.

60. *Vibhāṣā*, *TD* 27, p. 214a17 and foll. Vasubandhu does not admit this explanation.


63. See *Dīgha*, iii.224-5; *Visuddhimagga*, 59, 93, 627. *Vibhāṣā*, *TD* 27, p. 907b11 and foll., discusses the name, the nature, etc. of the *vamśas*. and how the first three exist in the higher spheres.

64. *Prabhāṇabhāvanārāmatā* = nirodhamārgārāmatā; affection or willingness with respect to Nirvāṇa and to the Path leading to Nirvāṇa. *Vibhāṣā*, *TD* 27, p. 909a15, four expasions. *Dīgha*, iii.225: ... pabhānārāmo boti pabhānārato bhāvanārāmo boti bhāvanārato... yā ti tattha dakkha... ayam tuvaśi... porāṇe aggaṁhe ariyavamise phito.

65. *Vṛtti* = jīvika or food, drink, etc.; *karmānta* = work, labor; on *samyagājīva*, see iv.86a, vi.68, *samyakkarmānta*, vi.68.

66. Hsüan-tsang: "who, having renounced the worldly regimen and popular activity, have left the world by taking refuge in the Buddha in order to search out deliverance." (*TD* 29, p. 117a20) Paramārtha: "who leave the world buddham adhibhṛtya, and search out deliverance" (p. 269b21).
67. Hsiian-tsang: He establishes a regimen, an activity auxiliary to the Path.

68. Mahāsaṃghīti = Dīgha, iii.228. Anguttara, ii.10, 248, on the four arisings of desire or thirst, tanhuppāda. The fourth itibbavābhavahetu tanhā uppajjajāmāna uppajjati in our text, corresponds, to itibbavābhavahetos trṣṇā.

69. Hsiian-tsang omits iti which Paramārtha translates. Vyākhya: The word iti indicates the different types of bhava and vibhava (bhavavibhvaparakārahādyotaka). Desire for a certain type of existence: "May I be Indra! May I be a Cakravartin!"; desire or vibhava or vināsa, nonexistence: "May I be annihilated! May I not exist after death!" (aho batocchidyeyam na bhaveyam param maranād ātyādi). See Kośa, v.10c, v.19.

70. Literally: "In what sort of a person will bhāvana be successful?"

Hsiian-tsang: "... what receptacle (bhājana) can be the support of bhāvana?"

71. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 662c8. According to the Abhisamayālaṁkāruloka, one is vitarkacarita because of rāgavikalpābhulya. Sūtrālaṁkāra (Huber) Para. 42: One teaches asubhā to the old washerman, prāṇāyāma to the old blacksmith.

How one arrests the vitarkas, Majjhima, i.118, Vitakkasamthānasutta.
Rāgacarita, trṣṇācarita, iv.80a, 100a; opposed to drṣṭicarita.

72. On asubhābhāvana, Mahāvyutpatti, 52; the Sūtra on the vimuktyāyatanas quoted in Vyākhya, p. 57 (ad I.27) has a slightly different list which ends: vikṣiptaṁ vā asthi vā asthisamkaliko vā. Dīgha, ii.296 (āṭhisamkalikā); Dhammasaṅgani, 264; Atthasālinī, 298; Visuddhimagga, 178; Psalms of the Brethren, p. 125; Przyluski, Açoka, 386; Maitri-upa-niṣad. i.3.

See Kośa, viii.29, 32, 35b-d.

73. rgyus paś brañ bren du sbrel ba'i ken rus. Paramārtha: bones attached to red nerves. Hsiian-tsang has only viṣpaḍumakā.


75. The Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 205b13 and foll., presents four opinions on these three categories of ascetics.

76. In the preparatory exercise (prayogakāle) one should avoid all occasions of desire; thus the ascetic will not consider even one part of a feminine body.

77. Tibetan: "in order to reduce or concentrate his mind.

78. Tibetan: "In order that the mind is even more concentrated."

79. Quoted in Vyākhya ad viii.32. Hsiian-tsang puts all the characteristics mentioned in the Bhāṣyam in the kārikā: "Non-desire, of the ten spheres, having for their object visible things of Kāmadhātu, produced by humans, loathsome, having an object of its own time period, acquired in two ways."

80. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 206c11, gives three opinions. Vasubandhu adopts the third.

81. Particularly Śāriputra and Aniruddha, who were capable of meditating on asubhā with respect to the Buddha and to goddesses (Vibhāṣa).

82. See p. 918. Asubha does not cut off the defilements; it is thus impure; only the meditations which include seeing of the sixteen aspects (suffering, impermanence, etc.) cut off the defilements.

83. Visuddhimagga, 111, 197, 266-293; according to Saṁyutta, v.321, etc. Saundarananda,
Footnotes

xv.64. On prāṇāyāma, etc., Hopkins, "Yoga-Technique in the Great Epic," JAOS, xxii.333.

84. According to Hsüan-tsang (TD 29, p. 118a8), an explanation from a Sūtra (glossed as Saṁyukta 29.2, TD 2, p. 205c25); Vibhāṣā (TD 27, p. 134a25) quotes the Prajñāptiśāstra.

85. See p. 926.

86. There is upeksā in the Fourth Dhyāna, but inbreathing and outbreathing are absent there.

87. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 423a2, gives divergent opinions: it is also adhimuktī-manaskārasam-prayuktā.

88. Non-Buddhists possess the teaching (upadeśa) of prāṇāyāma, but not that of añāpanasmṛti.

89. Mahāvyutpatti, Para. 53; Dīgha, ii.291 (Warren, p. 354; Sp. Hardy, Eastern Monachism, p. 267); Majjhima, i.425.

90. Vyākhyā: adhyupeksya = anāsahya.

91. Not mentioned in the Vibhāṣā.

92. Kośa, iii.45c-d.

93. Divya, 105, vairambha and vairambhaka; Saṁyutta, ii.231, verambhavātakhiṭṭa (var. veramba2) sakuna; Jātaka, translation, iii.164, 287, 288.

94. See Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 135a15. Paramārtha: Either between the eyebrows, or on the point of the nose, in the desired place and as far as the toes, hold mindfulness in the center like a thread which holds pearls together. Tibetan: Like a manisūtra placed at the end of the nose to the tips of the toes, ascertain if the breaths (āstāsapravāsā) are favorable or unfavorable, cold or hot. Vyākhyā: kim anuprābhakā ēte āyav uṣṇā ēti sīhāpanī (?) veyam draśṭavyā kāyapradēva evaṃuprābhakādiśivēsasthāpanaḥ.

95. Manisūtravat. Compare Eastern Monachisms, 269, Dīgha, i.76.

96. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 133a5: Some say that it belongs to the sphere to which the body belongs. In a being of Kāmadhātu, when he has a mind of Kāmadhātu, it a Kāmadhātu mind which precedes inbreathing-outbreathing; when there is a mind of the First Dhyāna, it is with a mind of the First Dhyāna . . . Others say that it belongs to the sphere to which the mind belongs . . . As inbreathing-outbreathing is a part of the body, the first opinion is the best one.

97. See ii.57c.

98. Paramārtha: "No object of a lower mind nor of another mind." Commentary: "A mind of their sphere or of a higher sphere can take these two breaths as its object, but not a lower mind, nor an airyāpatika or nairmāṇika mind."

Vyākhyā: nādharenairyāpathikanairmāṇikena iti / airyāpathikām nairmāṇikam ca cīttaṃ adharabbhāmikām samumkhibhavati yāvac caturthadhyānōnopapannayet uta āsaṅkyocaye nādharabbhāmikābhyām ātibhyām upalāksanam. See ii. English trans. p. 315


The nirvedabbāghyas (vi.17) are smṛtyupasthāna; the Path of the Seeing of the Truths is, by nature, dharmasmrtyupasthāna; but here the author examines impure (sāsrava) smṛtyupasthāna, the exercises preparatory to entrance to the Path. Smṛtyupasthāna is the first of the bodhipākṣikas, vi.67. See Kośa, vi.18a, 19d, 67 and following, vii.15, etc. Aṅguttara, i.43, Dīgha, ii.290, Majjhima, i.56, Saṁyutta, v.141; Visuddhimagga, 239-266;
Chapter Six

Fragments of *Idikutsari* (Pischel, Ac. de Berlin, 28 July 1904, p. 1143), with *cităanupasyatā* for *anupasyanā*.


In the Vijñānavāda school, a consideration of characteristics leads to the consideration of the absence of characteristics, as we see in the *Bodhisattvabhāmi*, I.xvii, fol. 100b: *kathaṁ ca bodhisattvavo mahāyānanāyena saptatrimaṁ bodhiprakāśyan dharmāṁ yathābhūtam praṇāti / iha bodhisattvaṁ kāye kāyānudāriṁ viharan naiva kāyam kāyabhāvato vikalpayati nāpi sarveṇa sarvam abhāvataḥ / tāṁ ca kāyāni labhītaṁ yasvabhāvadhammattāṁ praṇāti / iyam asya pāramārtthakā yākeśāyānupasyanāṁ smṛtyupasthānam saṁvṛtinayenā punar bodhisattvavyāpāramāṇaṁyavasthānanayajñanāṇāṁ gatam kāyākāyānupasyanāṁ smṛtyupasthānam vedātayam / . . . sa naiva kāyādīn dharmāṁ duḥkhāto vā vikalpayati samudaya vā nāpi tatprahāṇāṁ mūrodhātaḥ kalpayati nāpi tatprāptihetum mārgataḥ kalpayati / nirabhālīpaṁ yasvatavabhāvadhammatayā ca duḥkhoddharmatāṁ . . . praṇāti.

101. See i.2a, ii.24, vii.1.

102. *Madhyama*, TD 1, p. 554c21 and following; compare *Sānyutta*, v.331.

103. The forms of the *anupasyanā* type are criticized in *Bhāmaṅi*, ii.32, and elsewhere.


105. *Vyākhyā*: *yadi hi smṛtir ālambanam dhārayaty evam praṇāḥ praṇāṇātī / tad evam smṛtyopatiṣṭhata iti smṛtyupasthānam praṇāḥ*.

Hsüan-tsang: As an axe (=praṇāḥ) cuts wood (=body, sensation, etc.) sustained by the force of the axe-handle (= mindfulness).

106. *Praṇāḥ* is called *smṛtyupasthāna* because it is applied (*upatiṣṭhate*) thanks to mindfulness (*smṛtyā*)

107. Where is it applied (*kva punar upatiṣṭhate*)? To the body . . . to the *dharmaṁ*.

108. The *smṛtyupasthānas* are innumerable; why only count four? *Vibhāṣā*, TD 27, p. 938a13.

109. These are the four aspects of the Truth of Suffering, vii.13a.


*Vyākhyā*: uṣmagato ity uṣmaprakāśam kṣalamālam.


From the gloss in *Sūtraśāmākāra*, xiv.26, trans. p. 166, note, one can conclude that *uṣmagata=āloka=dharmanidhyānakṣāntī*.

The editor mentions *Majjhīma*, i.175.

Sarad Candra Das, *Dict.* 658; *Bodhipathapradīpa*, stanza 69; *Nyāyabindu* of Vinitadeva, p. 47.

111. Hsüan-tsang: The *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna*, cultivated many times and carried to its highest state, gives rise . . .

112. This *dharmaṁ* is the best among the non-fixed roots of good (that is to say among the *uṣmagata* and the *mūrdhānas*), as the head of a man; this is why it is called "head" or rather, this *dharmaṁ* is the line of drawing back or of advancing, like the summit of a mountain; this is why it is called "summit."

*mūrdhaśabdo'yam prakārṣaṁyantavacī / tathā hi loke vaktāro bhavanti mūrdhaṅgātā khalu asya ārīr iti / . . . ebhyo hi pāto' tikramo vety mūrdhabhyāṁ pāṭaṁ parībāṁ atikramo vā kṣāntisammukhībhāvo vā . . .
113. Hsiian-tsang: first placing of the foot; Paramārtha: to place the aspect (TD 29, p. 271c3).

114. It is through dharmasmṛtyupasthāna, by considering the dharmas, that the ascetic, at the beginning of the states of “heat” and “head,” sees the upādānakṣandhas as impermanent, suffering, etc. He impresses on the Truths—that is to say on the upādānakṣandhas as effects (duḥkha), on the upādānakṣandhas as causes (samudaya), on extinction (niruddha = Nirvāṇa), and on the Path (mārga)—the characteristics or aspects (ākāra) which are suitable to them. This is the vinyasana or ākaraṇa of the aspects.

115. Compare uttāpanā, vi.57c.

116. See note 124.

This “patience” differs from patience, a virtue of the Bodhisattva, iv.111c-d; it is connected to the pure “patiences” which form part of the Path of the Seeing of the Truths (vi.25d), but it is impure, worldly, and, as a consequence, is a jñāna contrary to the pure patiences (vii.1).

Kṣānti in the sense of agreement, acquiescence—mentioned by Kern according to the Lalita—is known from Pāli sources: Suttanipāta, 897; Majjhima, i.487, ii.43: aṭṭhaditthika aṭṭhakathakika aṭṭhoraucika (non-Buddhist monks of another opinion); Samyutta, ii.115: aṭṭhātra saddhāya aṭṭhātra ruciyā...aṭṭhātra diṭṭhinijjhanabhāntiyā aham etan jānāmi...jātipaccaya jāramarāpan ti: it is not by faith, agreement, or view-reflection-acquiescence, that I know that old age proceeds from birth. Viṁhaṅga, 245, 325, etc. In Gauḍapāda, iv.92, kṣānti is understood in the Buddhist sense, as agreement.

We need not occupy ourselves with the dharmesu samyak-samātiranakṣānti of the Bodhisattvabhiṁśi, nor with the kṣāntis of the Mahāyāna, Lalita, 36.16 (Rājendralāl), Lotus, Burnouf, 380; Sākhāvatīvyūha, Para. 55; Prajñāpāramitā, 331, 451, 517, Daśabhūmika, Chap. vi; Sūtra-āṅkāra, xi.52, xix.36. For dharmānityanakṣānti, see above note 110.

117. In fact the Path of Seeing (darśanāmārga) consists of dharmasmṛtyupasthāna; thus the agradharmanas are also dharmasmṛtyupasthāna since they adjoin darśanāmārga. And kṣānti adjoins the agradharmanas.

118. Weak patience thus bears on the Four Truths of the three spheres seen under the sixteen aspects.

119. Darśanāmārga is pure (anāsrava); it is not a sabbhāgabedu (ii.52a), a cause similar to itself, since up to now, no pure dharma has appeared in the series of the ascetic. It therefore solely depends on the agradharmanas of which it is the puruṣakāraṇabhā, ii.56d.

According to the Sūtra-āṅkāra (xiv.23), laukikagraddharmavasthā ānantaryasamādhi. The supreme worldly dharmanas immediately produce the pure Path, destroying the quality of Prthagajana: see vi.25c-d at the end and note 123.

120. The ascetic necessarily possesses samvara or discipline (iv.17b), which is rūpa.

For Ghosaka (Viśvaśā, TD 27, p. 29 c 8), the nirvedhahāgīyas are either of Kāmadhatu (uṣmagata and mūrdhaṇas): four skandhas; for in Kāmadhatu rūpa does not accompany the mind (anuparivartin, iv.17a); or of Rūpadhatu (kṣānti, agradharmanas): five skandhas.

See below vi.20d.

121. We fail to see how this agrees with vi.21c.

122. One has already acquired possession of the four types (jāti) of smṛtyupasthāna bearing on the Four Truths. Hsūān-tsang, TD 29, p. 157a11.

123. This resemblance is in the identity of the sphere of absorption (bhūmi), and in the identity of the object (suffering of Kāmadhatu). It also results from the fact that the agradharmanas are the ānantaryamārga of the first pure kṣānti in the destruction of the state of Prthagajana. (vi.25c-d).
124. Nirvedhabhāgīya in the Pāli sources (same meaning as in Kośa, viii.17, opposed to bānabhāgīya, etc.), see iv. 125c-d and notes and also Dīgha iii.277, Aṅguttara, iii.2, 327, Vibhāṣa, 330.

Gotrībhū, Puggalapaṇñatti, p. 12, corresponds to the possessor of the laukikāgradhar-mas.

The four nirvedhabhāgīyas, Wassilieff (very good), 150 (139), 271 (246); Mahāvyutpatti, 55; Dharmaśāstra; Divya 80.1 (where mūrdhagatāni is a mistake for asmagnātāni, where we have satyānulomāh kṣāntayath which can be the kṣāntis of the Kośa, vi.25d), 166, etc.; Bodhicaryavatāra, ix.41; Sūtrālankāra, xiv.23; Bodhisattvabhumi.

125. The Tibetan omits the grammatical explanation of which the Vṛyāṣhā gives the beginning: vidha vibhāga iti. We should have vedha according to Pāṇini, iii.3.15.

126. Darśanamārgaparāśritvāt, that is, because they are the preparation, the exercise preparatory (prayoga) to darśanamārga.

127. See iv. English trans p. 679. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 33c17: In what body are the four nirvedhabhāgīyas produced? In a masculine or feminine body. Does the woman who produces usma possess it in a masculine body? ... In short the woman who obtains the first three possesses them in the future in a feminine or masculine body; in the same way, a man possesses them, in the future, in a feminine or masculine body.

128. The man who has acquired one of the first three nirvedhabhāgīyas can be reborn as a woman.

129. This conforms to the principles presented in iv.40. "Passage into another sphere" means "birth into another sphere."

130. This means that the non-Āryan loses the nirvedhabhāgīyas by death, even when he is reborn into the sphere where he has acquired them (see iv. English trans. p. 616). The Vṛyāṣhā presents the views of Vasumitra, which are incorrect (he admits that, in the case of a Prthagjana, the loss is sometimes caused only by death, sometimes by death and the change of sphere). But Saṅghabhadra has demonstrated that it is solely through death that a Prthagjana loses the nirvedhabhāgīyas.

131. We have seen (vi.20c-d) that an ascetic can produce the nirvedhabhāgīyas in states of absorption distinct from the Four Dhyānas properly so called.

132. This means that the ascetic who has newly realized the nirvedhabhāgīyas does not again take up the possession of the nirvedhabhāgīyas which he has lost.

133. Vṛyāṣhā: sati [.. lacuna ..] pratisīmā nāma maryādā / tasyā daiśiko desayīta pranidbijānālabhī.

Hsüan-tsang: "If one meets a dharmācārya who speaks well and who knows the avasthās (liao fen wei 了分位 )...

134. Non-possession (apurīpti, asamanvāgama, asamanvaya) is explained ii.36c and following.

All pariśāni is vibhāni, but the reverse is not true.

135. Here the Chinese translators differ. Hsüan-tsang (TD 29, p. 120b21):

What are the advantages of the acquisition of these roots of good?
Heat will certainly obtain Nirvāṇa.

If, among the four nirvedhabhāgīyas, one obtains heat, even though one falls, even though one cuts off the roots of good, even though one commits mortal sins (ānantaryā, iv.96), and even though one falls into the painful realms of rebirth, one will not transmigrate for a long time, for one will necessarily obtain Nirvāṇa. If this is so, what
difference is there between Heat and \textit{moksabhāgīya}? If there is no obstacle, Heat is close to the Seeing of the Truths, because, like it, it includes the Seeing of the [sixteen] aspects of the Truths.

One who obtains the Summit...

Paramārtha (\textit{TD} 29, p. 272c7): One who has obtained Heat, Even though one loses it through falling, is still destined for Nirvāṇa (\textit{nirvāṇadharman}). If this is so, what difference is there between Heat and \textit{moksabhāgīya}? Because if there is no obstacle, this is a state close to the seeing of the Four Truths. Furthermore, the stanza says: One who has obtained Heat, and who falls from it, will not take up a false teaching (\textit{hsieh chiao} 非敎 \textit{Mahāvyutpatti}, 179.12 \textit{hsieh chiao t'u} = \textit{pāṣaṇḍika}) in this state. If one does not take up a false teaching, in what way does one differ from one who has obtained the Summit?

He who obtains the Summit...

136. In other words, he has obtained the \textit{aprasāmikhyānirodha} of certain realms of rebirth, etc. See ii.55d.

137. See iv.96, note 439.

138. He will obtain Nirvāṇa in his seventh rebirth.

139. Here the Chinese translators add a \textit{pāda}. Hsūn-tsang (p 120b24):

The supreme \textit{dharmas} enter into \textit{nyāma}.

He who has obtained the supreme \textit{dharmas}, even though he is in the condition of a Prthagjana, is nevertheless capable of entering into \textit{samyaktvanyāma}. Even though the stanza does not say that these \textit{dharmas} are abandoned at death, yet from the fact that, by these \textit{dharmas}, one immediately enters into \textit{samyaktvanyāma}, it results implicitly that they are not abandoned at death. Why is only the possessor of the supreme \textit{dharmas} capable of entering into \textit{nyāma}? Because he has already obtained the extinction-through-absence-of-causes (\textit{aprasāmikhyānirodha}) of the quality of Prthagjana; because the supreme \textit{dharmas} are capable, like \textit{ānanta-yardamarga} (vi.28) of expelling the quality of Prthagjana (p. 944).

Paramārtha (p. 272c20):

The supreme \textit{dharmas} abandon the quality of Prthagjana.

He who has obtained the root of good supreme \textit{dharmas} does not lose this root through falling or through death; then he has already obtained extinction-through-absence-of-causes (\textit{aprasāmikhyānirodha}) of the quality of Prthagjana: he will not again fall into this quality. Why? Because, without any effort, he will see the Truth of Suffering in the moment which immediately follows the supreme \textit{dharmas}.

140. \textit{Vibhāsā}, \textit{TD} 27, p. 33b4. From another point of view, the \textit{nirvedhābāgīyas} are the six types described below (vi.56a): \textit{paribhāṇadharman}, \textit{cetanādharmar}, etc. The ascetic can pass from one to the other.


142. According to the \textit{Vibhāsā}, the Śrāvaka (a person of the family of the Śrāvakas), in the state of \textit{usma} and \textit{mūrđban}, can pass to the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddhas and the Buddhhas; in the state of \textit{kṣāmī}, he can pass to the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddhas; but in the state of \textit{lokkottara}, he cannot change. The Pratyekabuddha (a) "who cultivates in a group" (\textit{vargacārin}), the first two states, can pass into the vehicle of the Buddha; the last two cannot change; the Pratyekabuddha (b) who is likened to a rhinoceros (\textit{khadgavisāṇakalpa}), cannot change, regardless of which state is acquired. Vasubandhu, iii.95, admits that the
vargacārīn had formerly been a Śrāvaka: but the Vibbāṣā does not authorize the opinion that the person of the family of the Śrāvakas, having obtained a result (=having become a Śrāvaka), can become a Pratyekabuddha: this is in conformity with the thesis that this person, once he has acquired lokottara, cannot change.

P'u-kuang justifies the position of Vasubandhu.

143. Paramārtha continues:

The pratyekabuddhagotra cannot be revoked. Why? The stanza says:

23ε-f. Because he does not search out the good of others; to otherwise change the gotra is not denied.

If the ascetic has initially formed the resolution to become a Pratyekabuddha, and later cultivates Heat and the Summit, these two roots of good cannot be turned into a Bodhisattva's roots of good. Why? Because he has not formed his resolution with a view to realizing the good of others... It is not forbidden for the Pratyekabuddha to pass to the gotra of the Śrāvakas. Furthermore the stanza says: 24a-b...

144. On the Rhinoceros, see Suttanipāta, 35, Visuddhimagga, 234.

145. See iv.46, viii.11.

146. This duration, for the Bodhisattva, is made up of 34 thoughts or moments: 16 of the Seeing of the Truths (darṣanamārga), 18 of detachment from the last Ārūpya (see ii.44, p. 227 of the English translation); according to P'u-kuang, for the Pratyekabuddha, 160 thoughts—probably 16 of darṣanamārga and 144 (8 x 18) for detachment from the Four Ārūpas and from the Four ārūpas.

147. These Pratyekabuddhas are vargacārins. Vyākhyā: utpādita-nirvedhabhāgīyamātro'pi vargacāri pratyekabuddha ity abhipṛtyāb.

148. Hsūn-tsang: After having produced the first two nirvedhabhāgīyas, he can change to another vehicle.

149. iii.44c-d, iv.124, vii.30, 34. Mokṣabhāga = mokṣasya prāptib, the acquisition of deliverance; that which leads to this acquisition is called mokṣabhāgīya.

150. Vibbāṣā, TD 27, p. 525b15, p. 895a16, etc., a great variety of opinions; duration of the career of the Pratyekabuddhas, etc.

151. asyām dharmatāyām, that is to say in pravacanadharmatā, according to Scripture; Hsūn-tsang (TD 29, p. 121a13) understands: “in this same way entering into dharma, maturation, deliverance, three conditions do not take place together.” Paramārtha (TD 29, p. 273a28): “Why this succession? In this dharma, correct reasoning (yukti) and teaching (āgama), it holds that the series enters, matures, and is delivered.”

152. When the production of the nirvedhabhāgīyas takes place in the existence which immediately follows the planting of the moksabhāgīyas, the Path cannot be produced in the same existence as the nirvedhabhāgīyas. “But he who has taken possesssion of the moksabhāgīyas in a former existence, can, in that same existence, produce the nirvedhabhāgīyas and the Path.” (Vyākhyā).

153. According to others they proceed also from absorption (bhāvana).

154. Add: “by studying a stanza of four pādas.”


156. Hsūn-tsang adds: One plants the moksabhāgīyas due to an encounter with a Buddha; according to others (Vibbāṣā, TD 27, p. 35a19), due also to the encounter with a Pratyekabuddha (See iv.125, English trans. p. 707).
157. He who says "pure" speaks of being freed of all āsrava, desire, ignorance, etc.

158. The kārikā has dharmaksānti for dharmajñānaksānti as one says Datta for Devadatta, "Given" for "Given by God."

159. The ascetic solely considers the upādānakandhas of Kāmadhātu under the aspects of Suffering, etc.

160. Bearing on the Suffering of the higher spheres, the same pure ksānti is an anvayajñānaksānti, vi.26b-c.

161. Dharmajñāna is defined vi.26b, vii.2 and following. Samyutta, ii.58, Vibhaṅga, 293, 329, dharmaññāna, duḥkhe nāyaṇa, dukkhasamudaye nāyaṇa... Dhamme nāyaṇa is the prajñā bearing on the four paths and the four results, on the Four Truths applied to the twelve parts of pratītyasamutpāda; anvaye nāyaṇa differs from anvaye jñāna.

The relationship between of dharmaksānti and dharmajñāna is specified vi.28, 49, vii.1. Pure ksānti or dharmaksānti expells all elements of doubt (vīcikītā); therefore doubt is not abandoned when it is produced; thus it is not jñāna. Ksānti expells a certain defilement: it is thus ānantaryamārga or prabhānāmārga, the path of the expulsion or abandoning (iv.87); it gives rise to a jñāna which includes the acquisition of disconnection from this defilement, in other words, of the pratisamkhyānirodha of this defilement (ii.55d): the jñāna is therefore vimuktismārga, the path of deliverance.

162. On samyakta, mithyātva, iii.44c-d, iv.80d.

163. Vyākyā: tatra samyaktve niyama ekāntibhavo niyama iti. aptu niyama iti. Vyākyā: yamāḥ samupanivisu cet (iii.3.63) appratyayasya vibhāsītatvāt.

164. a. Three different words, Mahāvyutpatti, 245.98-101, niyama (mi gyur ba: non-transformation), niyama (nes par gyur ba = determination), nyāma (skon med pa: absence of defect), nyāmavakrānti (entry into the absence of defect); ibid. 48.16, niyāmapratipanna.

Wogihara (Asanga’s Bodhisattvabhūmi, Leipzig, 1908, p. 31) has given a summary of the five opinions of the Vibhaṅga on niyāma-nyāma, and has diligently brought together the Pāli and Sanskrit references.

Niyāma and sammataniyāmavakkantī, Samyutta, i.196, Suttanipāta 55, 371, Samyutta, iii.225. Add Āṅguttara, i.121, Kathāvatthu, v.4, vi.1, xiii.4 and the note of Shwe Zan Aung, translation, p. 383 (on niyāma, p. 275, note).

Niyāma and nyāma, Lalita, 31.20, 34.10, Āśṭasāhasrikā, 33.18, 322.5, 331.10, 337.5, Bodhisattvabhūmi.

Niyāma = skon med pa, in the treatise of Vasumitra on the sects; the Chinese li-sheng

離生 (Hṣiin-tsang) should not be understood as "abandoning of arising," but "abandoning of that which is raw," ni-āma, a fantastic etymology of nyāma = niyāma which is a grammatical variant of niyama.

b. Vibhaṅga, TD 27, p. 12a13. Many opinions. Furthermore, the defilements to be abandoned by Seeing cause beings to fall into the painful realms of rebirth and to there suffer vivid sufferings, exactly like a raw or non-digested food (sheng-shih 生食 ) which remains for a long time in the body producing various types of sharp sufferings. Consequently these defilements are called āma (non-digested). The Path of Seeing that destroys them is called niyāma (that which brings about the abandoning of non-digestion). Furthermore, satkāyadrṣṭī is very resistant (kang 剛, hard) and violent, as difficult to put down as a savage beast: it is thus called āma (sheng 生 : in a natural state, not tamed). The Path of Seeing that destroys them is called niyāma. Furthermore, the term āma here designates the quality of Pṛthagjana.
c. Hsiian-tsang (TD 29, p. 121b4): This Patience is called "entry into samyaktvanyāma" and also "entry into samyaktvaniyama," for, by it, one enters for the first time into samyaktvanyāma and also into samyaktvaniyama. The Sūtra says that samyaktvā is Nirvāṇa, or rather the word samyaktvā designates the Path. Āma (rendered in Chinese by sheng 生, to arise, raw, natural), signifies klesa or crudity of the roots of good, of the faculties (indriyās). The Path is capable of causing one to pass from out of this, and so is ni-āma. Because it is capable of making certain the attainment of Nirvāṇa, or because it determines the consciousness of the characteristics of the truths, the Path is called niyama. To obtain this state is called "to enter."

Paramārtha (p. 272b15): This Patience is called "entry into samyaktvaniyama." Why? By reason of this Patience, the ascetic enters into samyaktvaniyama. What dharma is samyaktvā? In the Sūtra, Nirvāṇa is called samyaktvā. Niyama with respect to it, that is to say ekāntībhāva, is absolute determination, non-alternative. To obtain this niyama is called "to enter."


165. See ii.40b-c, p. 215 and following of the English translation. Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 12a13: The laukīkāgradharmas are the immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya, ii.62) of the abandoning of the quality of Pṛthajjana, of the acquisition of the quality of Āryan, of the abandoning of the mūthyaṣīva, and of the acquisition of samyaktvā. As they are capable of entering into samyaktvaniyāma, they are called laukīkāgradharmas, or "superior worldly dharmas." "Abandoning of the quality of Pṛthajjana": the mind-and-mental states (citta-caitītas) which constitute the superior or higher worldly dharmas bring about the abandoning of the quality of Pṛthajjana. Question: "What is it that, at the present time, brings about the abandoning of this quality? . . . " Certain masters answer that this power belongs at the present time to the higher worldly dharmas. Question: "These dharmas are dharmas of the Pṛthajjana: how do they, being such, bring about the abandoning of the quality of Pṛthajjana?" Answer: There is no contradiction. An elephant-driver on an elephant controls this same elephant; a rider controls his horse; a pilot directs the ship; the charioteer drives the chariot . . . the woodcutter climbs the tree and cuts the tree: in this same way the higher worldly dharmas . . . Other masters say that the duśkhe dharmajñānakṣānti (first pure moment), at the present time, brings about the abandoning of the quality of Pṛthajjana: in its arising state, this Patience expels the said quality; in its perishing state, it brings about the abandoning of the ten types of anusaya which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering of Kāmadhātu . . . Other masters say that the quality of Pṛthajjana is due to the higher worldly dharmas and to the duśkhe dharmajñānakṣānti aiding one another: the higher worldly dharmas are indeed in contradiction to the quality of Pṛthajjana, but they are weak and are not capable, by themselves, of expelling it. However these dharmas lead to the arising of duśkhe dharmajñānakṣānti, and the quality of Pṛthajjana is abandoned by the combined force of both of these.

Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 231b20. Some pretend that the quality of Pṛthajjana is the ten anusayas abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering of Kāmadhātu; these are the Vatsiputrīyas according to whom the quality of Pṛthajjana is of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, defiled (kliṣṭa)
in its nature, and to be abandoned by Seeing... Others say that the quality of Prthagjana is not a thing in and of itself: these are the Dārṣṭāntikas (see ii. English trans. p. 215 and following). In order to refute these opinions and to show that the quality of Prthagjana is a thing in and of itself... the masters of the Abhidharma say: "It is called quality of Prthagjana because it arises separately (sheng fen ku 生分故), and because it is the nature of the Prthagjana (i-sheng t'i 異生體).

166. First opinion of the Vibhāṣā. See above note 119, note 123, and note 139.

167. Third opinion of the Vibhāṣā.

168. The word abhisamaya has been explained above p. 897.

169. According to the Vyākyāya, the Dharmaguptakas, etc. According to P'u-kuang, the Mahāsāṅghikas, etc. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 533a22: There are some masters according to whom the abhisamaya of the Four Truths takes place at once, namely the Vibhajyavādins who base themselves on the Sūtra: "The Blessed One said: If, with respect to dukkhasatya, there is no doubt, perplexity, there is no longer any doubt, perplexity, with respect to the other three Truths." Since doubt and perplexity relative to the Four Truths disappears at the same time, the abhisamaya certainly takes place at one and the same time, and not successively. In order to refute this opinion, in order to show that abhisamaya takes place successively and not at one time, it is said: "If it were otherwise, this would be in contradiction to the Sūtra which says: "Anāthaṇḍāda approached the Buddha, saluted him, and said: 'Oh Blessed One, does the yogācāra successively penetrate (abhi-sami) the Four Truths as one gradually climbs...?'" (see p. 948).

The Theravāda denies successive comprehension (anupārvābhīsamaya) against the Andhakas, Sabathivādins, Saṃnimitiyas and Bhadravānīkas, Kathavatthu, i.4 and ii.9 (compare p. 382); see the opinion of the "Elders," Visuddhimagga, p. 690 and following, and the Sūtras referred to, among which Samyutta, v.436: yo dukkham passati dukkhasamudayam pi so passati... that Buddhaghosa explains as does Vasubandhu: iti... ekam saccam ārammaṇam katvā katāpi kiccanipphattivasena pi vuttam.

170. Hsüan-tsang: yugapat = at one and the same time, at once; Paramārtha: "According to another school, the comprehension of the Truths is only one thought."

171. Kyokuga Saeki here quotes the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 405a27. The succession (krama) of the comprehension of the Truths is explained: Question: In the comprehension (abhisamaya = hsien-kuan 現觀) of the Truths, does one see the unique characteristics or the common characteristics [of the Truths]? Answer: One sees (kuan 観) their common characteristics. Question: If this is the case, why does not the comprehension of all the Truths take place at one and the same time? [If, seeing suffering, one sees one of its common characteristics, for example the characteristic of being produced by causes, one evidently sees the Truth of Origin at the same time as the Truth of Suffering.] Answer: Even though, in the comprehension of the Truths, one sees their common characteristics, one does not understand all their common characteristics but only one part of them... What difference is there in the view that one takes of Kāmadhātu and of the higher spheres? The difference between coarse and subtle. Why does one see at the same time the truth relating to the two higher spheres? Because both of them belong to the sphere of absorption. If the person who has entered the comprehension of the Truths has not yet understood the suffering of the two higher spheres, how can one say that he understands? Comprehension is of two types: 1. the comprehension of "grasping" (cbih-shou 執受; grāba?), and 2. the comprehension of purification (li-jan 離染; parisuddhi). The person who enters comprehension possesses this twofold comprehension with respect to the suffering of Kāmadhātu, and he only possesses the
Chapter Six

172. For example, the *vedanā* associated with *prajñā* which is applied (*ālambate*) to the Truths, has them for its object, grasps (*grihnāt*) them.

173. The result of the comprehension of the Truths is the perfect or complete consciousness (*parijñāna*) of suffering, the abandoning of arising, etc. This result takes place (*bhaṇati*) also by reason of the *dharmas* not associated with the mind, for example the *anāsravasamīvara* (*iv.13c*) of the ascetic who sees the Truths.

174. It is seen through *prajñā*: it is the object of the sensation which accompanies this *prajñā*; the result (i.e., the complete consciousness of suffering) is acquired due to all the non-associated *dharmas*.

175. In fact, the Seeing of Suffering implies the abandoning of the *klesas* to be abandoned through the seeing of suffering, thus the "abandoning of the arising" occurs through the cutting off of the *prāpti* of the *klesas*; "actualizing extinction" through the arising of the *prāpti* of extinction, an arising which results from the "cultivation of the Path."

176. *āryasrāvakasya duḥkhāṃ vā duḥkhato manasikurvataḥ ... anāsravena manasikāreṇa sampratayuktā dharmāṅgāṃ vicayāḥ* (a paraphrase of *Samyutta, TD* 2, p. 106a5?).

177. The Mahāsāṃghikas, etc., admit that there is *vyuttbhāna*, the leaving from contemplation, in the course of *abhisamaya*. Many masters of the *Vibhāṣā* deny this.

178. Above note 172; see Buddhaghosa quoted note 169.

179. The *Vākyāya* quotes the three *sadṛṣṭāntāni sūtrāṇi* which are found in the *Samyuktakāgama*: the Śūtra of the kūṭāgāra (*Samyutta*, v.45a). Our text distinguishes *mūlapada*, *bhitti*, *talaka*, and *chadana*; 2. the Śūtra of the four flights of stairs, or of the four bodies (*catuskādevarasopāṇa*); 3. the Śūtra of the four degrees of stairs (*catuspadikā niśrenī*). Questioners: Anāthapindāda, and a Bhikṣu, Ānanda.

sadṛṣṭāntāni trīṇi sūtrāṇi Samyuktaṅkāgama paṭṭhante / katham Anāthaṅkenāda āha / kim nu bhaddanta caturnāṃ āryasatyānāṃ anupūrvavibhīsamayaḥ / ābosvīd ekābhīsamaya iti / caturnāṃ grhaṇāte āryasatyānāṃ anupūrvavibhīsamaya na tu ekābhīsamayaḥ / yo grhaṇate evam vaded abham duḥkham āryasatyam anabhisametya samudayaṃ āryasatyam abhisameyam vistareṇa yāvad duḥkhanirodhaṁminīni pratipadam āryasatyan abhisameteyamīti maivam voca iti syād vacaniyam tat kasya betoh / asthānam anavakāso yad duḥkham āryasatyam anabhisametya samudayaṃ āryasatyan abhisameteyati ... tadyathā grhaṇate ya evam vaded abham kūṭāgāroṣa vā kūṭāgāroṣālayā vā mūlapadam apratiṣṭhāpya bhūtīṃ pratiṣṭhāpayiṣyāmi / bhūtīṃ apratiṣṭhāpya talakāṃ pratiṣṭhāpayiṣyāmi / talakāṃ apratiṣṭhāpya cchadanaṃ pratiṣṭhāpayiṣyāmi maivam voca iti syād vacaniyam / tat kasya betoh ... (*Samyukta*, 16.14).

athānayato bhikṣur āha / kim nu bhaddanta caturnāṃ āryasatyānāṃ anupūrvavibhīsamayaḥ / ābosvīd ekābhīsamaya iti / bhagavān āha / caturnāṃ āryasatyānāṃ iti pūrvavād yāvat tadyathā bhikṣo ya evam vaded abham catubkaḍevarasāṃ sopāṇaya prathamasopānakādevaram anabhiruhya dvitiyām abhiroṣyāmi / dvitiyām anabhiruhya ... maivam voca iti syād vacaniyam / tat kasya betoh / asthānam anavakāso yac catubkaḍevarasāṃ sopāṇaya prathamasopānakādevaram anabhiruhya dvitiyakādevaram abhiroṣyati ... / evam ibhāpi nedam sthānam vidyate yad duḥkhasatyam adṛṣṭvā samudāyasatyam drākṣyati ... tathā Aṛyaṅnāda āha / kim nu bhaddanta caturnāṃ āryasatyānāṃ anupūrvavibhīsamayaḥ / ... pūrvavāturavād yāvat / tadyatbāṇānda ya evam vaded abham catuspadikāya niḥśrenyāḥ niḥśrenipādam anabhiruhya prāśadamb abhīroṣyāmi ... Authenticity of these Śūtras, Sarhghahadra in "Nirvāṇa" (1924), p. 24.

181. kāñksā = vicikitsā; or kāñksā = niścayābhilāsa and vicikitsā = vimati.

182. According to the Mahāyāna, excluding dhyānāntara.


The Suttanipāta, 226, knows an ānantarikasamādhi; the Aṅguttara has adanda ānantarika which destroys the defilements; Visuddhimagga 675 explains: "because the good transworldly dharman ripen without interval (ānantaravipāka)."

According to the Abhisamayālamkārikā, dārsanamārga ends at the first moment of the Pramuditā sphere (above, note 164d). There then comes bhāvanāmārga which ends with the ānantarya called Vajropama: tato'nye dvitiyādayāḥ kṣaṇā yāvad vajropamākhya ānantaryamārgo yasmād ānantaram samanta-prabhā buddhabhūmir avāpyate...

184. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 465c11: The ānantaryamārga cuts off the defilements, because it cuts off the possession of the defilements in such a manner that they no longer continue; he also realizes extinction (nirodha) because he acquires possession of visamīyoga in such a manner that it springs forth. Vinmuktimārga realizes extinction because it arises at the same time as does the possession of visamīyoga.

185. There is cutting off of the prāpti of the defilements, expulsion of the thief by the first path; by the second, prāpti of "disconnection," the closing of the door. On the acquisition and the loss of the prāptis, ii.40.

186. The eight samyojananikāyas to be abandoned by each of the eight jñānas (duhkhabharmajñāna, duhkhe'nvayajñāna, samudaye dharma-jñāna, ... marge'nvayajñāna) and that to be abandoned through bhāvanā.

The Sūtra also says: iti hi bhikṣavo jñānavadhyāḥ kṣetāḥ / vidyudupamam cittam.

187. As for the category "to be abandoned through bhāvanā," it is abandoned through the jñānas: in the path which follows the path of seeing, there is no longer any place for the ksāntis. Ānantaryamārga, like vinmuktimārga, is jñānas.

Here we can understand v.6, English trans. p.775 and 861.

In dārsanamārga, the defilements are expelled by the ksāntis; in pure bhāvanāmārga, which is only a new seeing of the Truths and in which the ksāntis no longer have any place, the defilements are expelled by the jñānas.

Only Twenty-eight anusayas are expelled in a definitive manner by dārsanamārga, and are thus expelled by the ksāntis. The other ten are expelled by a bhāvanamārga which is either pure (in the case of the Āryan) or impure (in the case of the Prthagjana); in these two cases they are expelled by jñānas (vii.9).

[Nevertheless, it is solely through a pure bhāvanamārga that the anusayas of bhavāgra are expelled.]

188. Atthasalini, 43: "The path of Srotāpanna is called dassana because it is the seeing of Nirvāṇa for the first time ... The paths that follow do not see anything that has not been seen previously (adīṭṭhapubbam kim ci na passati) and are thus called bhāvanā."

189. The first jñāna sees the duḥkha of Kāmadhātu which has already been seen by the first ksānti; but it belongs to a pudgala qualified as adṛṣṭadṛṣṭi "seeing that which has not been seen," for the adṛṣṭadarśana, "seeing of non-view" continues (pravartate) with respect to samudaya, etc.

190. According to the Tibetan: yathādṛṣṭabhāvanāt. Paramārtha: "As he cultivates anew that which has been seen ..." Hsūan-tsang: "As it is similar to the cultivation of what has been seen ..."

191. The fifteenth moment sees all the mārga, with the exception of itself: it forms part of the mārga and it is seen by the sixteenth moment. Thus this belongs to someone who sees that which has not been seen before.
192. Luṅga and kedāra (neuter) are lexically interesting.

193. That is to say: the seventeenth moment is only the repetition of the sixteenth, etc.

194. Viśā, TD 27, p. 279a21: Why is he called a sādhanusārī? ... See vi.63a-c. These two Saints are free from premature death, ii.45a-b, English trans. p. 236, iii.85c.

The definitions of the Abhidhamma (sādhanusārī -sādhamānusārī -diṭṭhībuddha) correspond (for example Puggalapaṁṇati, p. 15); see also Visuddhimagga, 659.

195. ii.2a-b; p. 155 of the English translation.

196. That is to say in the state of Prthagjana.

197. On the abandoning of the defilements by a worldly path, the sakalabandhana (ii.36c, English trans. p. 207, vi.63d), the bhūyovitarāga, the vitarāga, the ānupārvaka, see ii.16c-d, English trans. p. 177; Pāli references. ii, note 84.

198. The Abhidhamma reads sādhamānusārī. On adhimokṣa, Kośa, ii.72, vi.7c.6; viii.30.

Vyākhya: sādhanāprajñābhāvitakenādhimokṣadṛṣṭiprabhāvītatvād iti / sādhamānusārīprajñābhāvītitāvāc cchādhamānusārītā / sādhamānusārī muktāḥ sādhamānusārītā iti kṛtvā / na tu tasya prajñā naivāsti / tāyā na tu prabhāvīsa iti na tānāma labhate / prajñābhāvitokṣā dṛṣṭiprabhāvītatvād dṛṣṭiprabhāpaḥ / na tu tasya sādhamā nāstīti pūrva-adhāv vācyam / aperse tu ūnāri naivātām vidhīm ālambā vyāāksate / sādhamānusārīpya dārṣṭa-nāheeyēhāyo muktāḥ sādhamānusārītā / dṛṣṭyādhipatayena pūrpaḥ dṛṣṭiprabhāpaḥ iti /.

199. Viśā, TD 27, p. 464b8; Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 947a5. It is certain that this ascetic acquires, by means of the Path of Seeing, a pure sukhen-driya of the sphere of the Third Dhyāna; for, reborn into the Fourth Dhyāna or above, he possesses sukhen-driya (According to the principle: sukhen-driyena caturdbhāvānāyānāyānāyānāyānāyaṃ prthagjano na samanvāgataḥ / āryaṃ tu samanvāgataḥ); for, if his sukhen-driya were impure (as was the Third Dhyāna that he possessed before entering into the Path of Seeing), he would have lost it by being reborn into another sphere (Fourth Dhyāna). Now, if he acquires, through the Path of Seeing, a pure sukhen-driya of the Third Dhyāna, he is found to possess a path higher than his result, which is a result of Anāgāmin of the domain of the sphere where he has entered in order to practice the Path of Seeing. This theory is written in the Viśā (asty esa Vibhāṣyaṃ tathābhiḥ pakkāḥ); but it is not a theory to which one should cling (sa tu na sthāpanāpako laksyate): in fact, the Viśā continuously: "Others say" (apare ābub). These other say that the possessor of a Dhyāna who enters into the Path of Seeing depending on a sphere lower than this Dhyāna obtains at the sixteenth moment a result of Anāgāmin of the sphere of the Dhyāna that he possesses and also of the domain of all the lower spheres.

200. The Bhāṣya of 33c-d is quoted in the Abhisamayālamkārāloka.

201. esa drṣṭāntayogah. That is to say: drṣṭāntayuktir drṣṭāntayogah / drṣṭāntaparākāra ity aperse / tadevaṃ anāya yuktā anena vā prakārenānāy pari drṣṭānto va kāvya iti sūcayati / anyathāḥ bhESA drṣṭānta ity eva bhāṣā. The Tibetan translates: esa drṣṭāntaparākāra. Hsüan-tsang: "Such is the relationship of the defilements and the qualities."


203. Mahāvyutpatti, 46.2: de līr thogs pa (or na) srid pa lan bdun pa = saptakṛdabhavaparamāḥ.

The expression of the Sūtra: saptakṛtvanā ṣaṇyam paramāḥ is translated in our Bhāṣya: mchog tu thogs na lan bdun pa; the Kārikā has de līr thogs na . . .

On the sattakṛhateṣu paramāḥ, see Aṅguttara, i.233, iv.381; Visuddhimagga, 709; Nettippakarana, 168, 189; below note 210.
204. Hsüan-tsang: āpanna signifies he-who-obtains-for-the-first-time. Paramārtha: If a person has attained a river, he is called srotaâpanna.

205. The "eighth," aśṭamaka. P’u-kuang mentions two explanations: 1. the srotaâpannâlapratipannaka, and 2. the person in possession of duḥkha dharmanakṣāṃti.

Mahāvastu, i.120.9, 159.8 (aśṭamakâdikâ pudgalâ jñâvad arhatpuḍgalâ.)

Discussions on aṭṭhamakâ, Kathāvatsalu, iii.5-6.

206. The Mahiśasakas think that a Srotaâpanna is reborn (at the most) a total of seven times; the Ch’eng-shib lun 彌沙塞部 (TD 32, number 1646) admits fourteen births, not recognizing the intermediate existences. According to the Sarvâstivâdins and the Mahâyâna, twenty-eight existences.

The Uttarakathakas think that a Srotaâpanna is necessarily reborn seven times, Kathâvatsalu, xii.5.

207. The same for the other four skandhas: however one only counts seven "skills" and not thirty-five. One can compare, sufficiently distant, Saṁyutta, iii.160-1.

208. See below vi.54d.


Vibhâsâ, TD 27, p. 240c11. Why does the Srotaâpanna live only seven more existences . . . no more, no less? Pârśva says: If more, if less, one would produce doubt; that he is born in seven existences does not contradict the dharmalaksana, that is to say the nature of things and is not censurable . . . Furthermore, by the force of action, he takes up seven existences; by the force of the Path he does not take up an eighth. The same way that a person is bitten by a seven-legged-snake, made seven by the force of the primary elements and, by the force of the poison, not made eight. Furthermore, if he takes up eight existences, he would not possess the Path in his eighth birth, for the nature of the Path is such that it cannot be supported in an eighth body of Kâmadhâtu.


212. This is also the case for the Úrdhvasrotas of the Akanîṣṭhaga class, vi.37b.

213. It is also evident that the text refers to Kâmadhâtu, since it makes mention of the human realms of rebirth. I observe that Ānanda, by his agreement with the Bhagavat, becomes the king of the gods seven times, and a king in Jambudvîpa seven times, Âṅguttara, i.228; but he is not a Srotaâpanna.

214. An argument which is not in the Vibhâsâ (note of the Japanese editor) and one which Saṅghabhadra does not accept (Vyākhyā).

215. Not mentioned in the Vibhâsâ (note of the Japanese editor). Let us understand that this Saint probably becomes a Rishi (istipabbajâ).

Wassiliâff, 248, followed by Minayef, Recherches, 220, has poorly understood Vasumitra: "According to the Sarvâstivâdins, one cannot say that the four results are obtained only in the robes of a monk . . . " One should translate: "It is not an absolute rule that the four results of the religious life are obtained one after the other. He who, detached by a worldly path, enters into nyâma, becomes a Sakrâgâmin or an Anâgâmin according to the nature of his detachment." (As explained vi.30b-d).

On the laity and the obtaining of the results see Kośa iv. English trans. note 115: Rhys Davids, Dialogues, iii.5 (bibliography).

216. Dīgha iii.107: ayam puggalo yathânuṣīṭham tatthâ paṭipajjamāno tīṇam saṁyojan-
ānaṃ parikkhaya sotāpanno bhavissati avinipātthammo niyato bodhiparyayano ti. i.233: so tiṇṇham samyojanānaṃ parikkhaya sattakkhattuparamo hoti sattakkhattuparamaṃ deve ca manuse ca sandhavītuṃ samsāritvā dukkhassa antam karoti. Elsewhere dukkhassantakaro hoti (Puggalapāññatti).

According to the Vyākhyā, the Sanskrit Sūtra has: srotāpañño bhavaty avinipātthambarā niyataṃ sambodhiparyayanaḥ / saptakṛtvā paramah saptakṛtvā devāṃ ca manusyāṃ ca sandhāvyaṃ samsṛtiya dukkhasyāntam karoti.

The purity of conduct (prayoga): the rules of morality (śīlāni) dear to the Āryans; purity of sentiments (āsāya): avetypārasāda (vi.73b).

218. We can also understand kṣānti = citta, in opposition to prayoga.

219. See the note ad iv.50. Analogous comparison in Milinda; in Aṅguttara, i.250; a bit of salt defiles a small amount of water, but does not defile the Ganges.

220. Vībhāṣa, TD 27, p. 147b7. It is called Nirvāṇa (1) because it is extinction of the defilements (kleśanirōdhāḥ); (2) because of the calming (bī!息) = nirvāṇa, uparama) of the three fires (rāga, dvesa, mohāgni); (3) because there is extinction of the three characteristics (doubtless the three characteristics of "conditioned things," Kośa, ii.45); (4) because there is disjunction (li離!: viyoga, visamyo) from the defilements (mala); (5) because there is disjunction from the realms of rebirth (gaśī); (6) because vana = thick forest, nis = leaving, nirvāṇa = leaving the thick forest of the skandhas... (7) because vana = all the sufferings of transmigration, nis = to pass beyond (astikrama), nirvāṇa = to pass beyond all the sufferings of transmigration. And six other explanations.

Etymology of the word Nirvāṇa, E. Senart, Nirvāṇa (Album Kern, 1903, p. 101); Pāṇini, viii.2.50 (Goldstucker, 226); Dhammapada, 283, 344; Visuddhimagga, 293; Compendium, 168.

221. According to one variant: dvitrajanaṃ, which conforms to Pāṇini, ii.2.25, v.4.73.

On kolankola, Aṅguttara, i.233, iv.381. Puggalapāññatti, 16 (tiṇṇham samyojanānaṃ parikkhaya kolankolo hoti dve va tiṇṇi va kulani samadhavītur... .). According to Nettippakarana, 189, the kolankola is in the Path of Seeing. Visuddhimagga, 709 (mediocre penetration and faculties).

222. According to the Vyākhyā: What does the Srotāpañna become who is delivered from one or two categories? Some answer that he becomes a kulamkula. The Kārikā says: "Delivered from three or four categories," by way of an example, or rather in order to indicate the limit, by excluding the abandoning of the fifth category. Others answer that he becomes a saint for five or six births.

223. The ekavicika who has abandoned the eighth category of defilements does not necessarily abandon the ninth, which would include the result of Anāgāmin and "passage beyond Kāmadhātu," (dhātuṣṭikrama). The ninth category is capable of being an obstacle to the acquisition of the result, phalam vighnayitum samartha. But the same does not hold for the sixth category, because the Sakrādāgāmin, like the Srotāpañna, exists within Kāmadhātu.

224. These two types are mentioned in Dhammasamgraha, Para. 103.

225. That is to say: "having seen the Truths when he was the god Trāyastriṃśa, having transmigrated (samsṛtiya) within two or three families, he obtains Nirvāṇa among the Trāyastriṃśas, or among the Four Great Kings, etc."

226. Saṃyukta, TD 2, p. 205c3: trayāṇaṃ saṃyojanānāṃ prahāṇād rāga-dveṣa-mohānāṃ ca tanuttā sarādāgāmi bhavati (Compare Aṅguttara, i.233, iv.380. Puggalapāññatti, 16). Sūtra quoted below vi.53c-d. Abandoning of saṅkāyadrṣṭi, sīlavrata and vicikitsā through the Seeing of the Truths; reduction of the defilements to be abandoned through Meditation.
227. The ekavicika is the ekabijin of the Pāli lists, who is inferior to a Sakadāgāmin. *Visuddhimagga*, 709 (lively penetration and faculties).

228. The ascetic who successively acquires all the results (*ānupārvika*) becomes a Srotaṇapanna by abandoning three bonds, *satkāyadrṣṭi*, *śilavrataparamāraśta*, and *vicikitsā*, through the Path of Seeing; then abandoning *kāmacchanda* and *vyāpāda* through the Path of Meditation, he becomes an Anāgāmin. The ascetic who is qualified as a *kāmavitarāga*, that is to say who, before entering onto the Path of Seeing, has abandoned *kāmacchanda* and *vyāpāda* through the worldly path of meditation, becomes an Anāgāmin by abandoning *satkāyadrṣṭi*, *śilavrataparamāraśta* and *vicikitsā* through the Path of Seeing.


To the Sanskrit *upapadyaparinirvāyin (=upannaparinirvṛṣṭi of our Kārikā) there corresponds *upabacca, upapajjaparinibbāyin*; see *Kathāvatthu*, iv.2, *Cosmologie bouddhique*, 235.

230. Utpannasyetī. Yāsomitra contests this reading by reason of the rule *anyapadārthe bahuvrihih*. The scribe has omitted the letter e (lekhakenaikdṛtrā vināśīdā): it should read: *utpanne'sya*. We would have: *utpanne janmani parinirvṛṣṭi asyety utpannaparinirvṛṣib*. There follows a rather long discussion.

231. Absent in the Tibetan, but given by Paramārtha.

232. "Obtains Nirvāṇa," *parinirvāti*, that is to say, "brings about the extinction of all the vices" (*sarvāśrauvaśayam karoti*). *Vyākhyā*.

233. Paramārtha and Hsuan-tsang have: "not a long time" = quickly = *na cirāt*; but the Tibetan has, *mī 'chi bar* = "without dying."

234. *Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 167c13, definition of *sopadhisesanirvāna*: "If of an Arhat, of a person in whom the vices are completely destroyed, the life continues (shou ming yu ts'un wun fu) ...: "the limit of life is still preserved"), the series of the primary elements and of derived matter is not cut off, the series of thoughts continue one after the other by reason of a body endowed with the five organs: as there remains a support (*i = upādhi*), the destruction of the bonds that this Arhat obtains, touches, or realizes, is what is called *sopadhisesanirvānadhātu*.” On the two Nirvānas, vi.64a-b (*Anguttara*, iv.77), vi.65d, vi.78. We have attempted to sort out some references in our “Nirvāṇa,” *Paris*, 1924 (Beauchesne), p. 171.

235. The first Anāgāmin also does not possess this mastery; but the action which makes intermediary existence last differs from the action that makes the second Anāgāmin last: this is why the Nirvāna of the first is *anupadhiṣesya*.

236. *Anguttara*, ii.155, defines (1-2) the *sasamkāraperariparibbāyin*, who obtains Nirvāṇa with *samākāras*, either in this life, or after death (3-4), the *asamkāraperariparibbāyin* who obtains Nirvāṇa without *samākāras*, either in this life, or after death. Saints 1 and 3 are of strong faculties, 2 and 4 of weak faculties. Saints 3 and 4 cultivate the Dhyānas; saints 1 and 2 are described, without any mention of Dhyāna, *as aubhānapassi ... āhāre pratikālasaṃsair saṃbhāloke anabhīratasaṃsāri sabbasaṃkāhēso aniccānapassi* and having the thought of death. *samākāra = pubbapayoga, Visuddhi*, 453.

237. Opinion of the Sautrāntikas. The Anāgāmins are evidently placed in a decreasing order of merit, in an increasing order of the length of their lives in Rūpadhātu.

238. One says *ūrdvamśrotas*, as one says *ūrdhvamāṇdamika, ārdhvamāṇdahika* or even *cirantana*.

239. We also have *akanīṣṭhaparāma* (below note 245).
On the mixing of Dhyanas vi.42. On the heaven of the Akaniṣṭhas, iii.72c, vi.43a. This is the summit of Rūpadhatu, the eighth heaven of the Śuddhāvāsas. The *Compendium* has the Anāgāmin who has cultivated the Fifth Dhyāna rise to the Śuddhāvāsas; it stops below those who have practiced the first four (see p. 69, 149).

240. One would call him bhavāgraga or bhavāgaparama. The naivasamjñānāsajñāṇa is the Fourth Ārūpya, thus "the summit of existence."


242. ekam āpi sthānāntaram vilāṇghya. Paramārtha: "From the First Dhyāna (=Brahmakāyika), he is born among the Śuddhāvāsas and, going beyond 'another' place, he is born among the Akaniṣṭhas." Hsüan-tsang: "From there, successively, he is reborn among the lower Śuddhāvāsas, and, in the interval, goes beyond one place, he is born among the Akaniṣṭhas."

243. Saṃyukta, TD 2, p. 423c18; Madhyama, TD 1, p. 547a9 (Vibbāsā, TD 27, p. 272b15): A Brahma-deva thinks: "This place is eternal, not subject to change ... one has never seen that one arrives here; even more one does not go beyond this place ...": compare Dīgha, i.17 and see iv.44b-d, iv. 96 (English trans. note 439).

244. Consequently the Kāśmīrians only count two heavens in the First Dhyāna (ii.41d, iii.2d).

245. The terms akaniṣṭhaparama and bhavāgaparama are given as traditional (nanu cākanisthaparama ... ity uktam).

246. On abhinirvṛtti distinct from upapatti, iii.40c, vi.3, p. 909. It appears that the doctrine of action retributable in intermediary existence is in contradiction to the thesis of iv.53d (which I have perhaps poorly understood).


248. Since, Hsüan-tsang adds, the other Śaikṣas, cultivating the good, do not differ [from the Anāgāmins].

249. Vyākhya: yāsu gatiṣāpapannas tatra tatra caisām atyantam anāgamanam.


251. But they can practice incontinence (which supposes an akusala mind). The Srotaāpanna observes the śīlas, Huber, Sūrālāṅkāra, 221.

252. "In general" (prāyena): in fact, they are disengaged from the defilements expelled by seeing, and from a part of the defilements expelled by Meditation.

253. The true sattupuras have acquired the discipline which prevents all transgressions (sarvapāpa); they have abandoned all of the bad defilements to be abandoned through seeing (darśana) (like the other Śaikṣas) and also the nine categories of defilements of Kāmadhātu to be abandoned by Meditation (bhāvanā).

254. The Bhāṣya has: kim punah pariṣṭittajanmanopāya anāgāmina esa bheda'sti. I have added the definition based on the Vyākhya.

255. The Vyākhya quotes the Śūtra: "Dying here and reborn among humans, if having obtained the quality of Arhat I do not obtain Nirvāṇa, falling from the quality of Arhat at
the end of this human life (ante mama hiyamāṇasya), I shall be reborn (upapatrīt bhavīṣyati) among the esteemed gods under the name of Akanṭhas (ye te deva akenisthā iti viśrutā)." Śakra is srotāṇamāṇa: he foresees that he will be reborn among humans and will obtain the quality of Arhat, first that of Anāgāmin: he will thus be a pariṣvattajanman anāgāmin. Therefore, according to vi.41a-b, he cannot become Akanistha, that is to say "go into another sphere."

256. According to the Tibetan, dbarmānabhijñāvatā; according to the Vṛkṣhyā: dharmalakṣaṇānabhijñāvatā; according to Hsüan-tsang: "because he does not know the Abhidharma."

257. sambarsaniyatvāt; that is to say: kāmadukkhaparimittavāti saṁbāsaniyā ity abhiprāyab. According to Saṃghabhadra: cyutanimittopapattidubkbọdvinayasya sambarāṇi- yatvāt.

258. On the moral faculties (faith, etc.), see vi.57c, 58d, 60 and following.

259. praṇādānāṁindriyaṁ nisyanupapattapuṣṭivīṣad ity arthaḥ. That is to say: because the indriyas are not extremely developed by the results, similar to them, upon which they bear.

260. A different doctrine in the Saṃmukhyākāraśāstra.

261. The mixture consists of "mixing the pure Dhyāna with two impure Dhyānas" (Vṛkṣhyā), to intercalate one or many moments of impure Dhyāna between two moments or two series of moments of pure Dhyāna. In the Dharmaśāstra (Stonner, Ac. de Berlin, 1904, 1282), vyavakirnābhāvanāvidhāni (bbāvanāvidha, Visuddhimagga, 122).

262. On pure and impure Dhyāna, see vii.6.

263. Aṅguttara, i.38, knows a Dhyāna which lasts only a moment and a prolonged Dhyāna. Above vi.17b, 28c.

264. On the dṛṣṭadharmanukhavibhāras, see especially Dīgha, iii.113, 222, Aṅguttara, v.10, iv.362; Kośa, ii.4, vi.58b, viii.27. Nirvāṇa, 1924, p. 80.

265. The first three Dhyānas each produces three types of gods of Rūpadhātu; the fourth produces eight types of gods: Anabhrikas, Puṇyaprasavas, Vṛhatphalas, and the five Sudhāvāsikas: Avrhas, Ātapas, Sudrśas, Sudarśanas and Akanisthas (iii.2c-d).

266. taśya pūdgalasya tavati śaktiḥ (Vṛkṣhyā). Such a person cannot do so any longer.

267. "Pure, impure, pure: three thoughts; then: pure, impure, pure, three other thoughts" (Vṛkṣhyā), and so on.


269. But the order of words, according to Paramārtha, is indeed the order that the Tibetan gives: according to the Bhāṣya: nirodhalābhya anāgāmi kāyasākyati.

On nirodhasamāpatti, in addition to the references indicated, ii.43 (English trans. p. 225 and following), add iv.54, vi.63, 64a, viii.35a and Visuddhimagga, 702-709: "One cannot say that this absorption is sampicētra or asampicētra, conditioned or unconditioned, laukika or lokottara, worldly or transworldly because it does not exist in and of itself (sabhāvato n'atthitāya)." This absorption, according to the Uttarāpathakas and the Andhakas, is "unconditioned" (Kattāvatthu, vi.5). note 273.

On the kāyasakēhin, Aṅguttara, iv.451 (necessarily an Arhat), Puggalapaññātatti, 14, Visuddhimagga, 93, 659 (interesting).

270. Hsüan-tsang: This saint, in leaving nirodhasamāpatti, obtains a calmness of body [becoming again] conscious, such as he had not acquired before this samāpatti; and he thinks: "This nirodhasamāpatti is very calm and totally similar to Nirvāṇa." In this way he
immediately perceives (sāksātkaroti) the calmness of the body [leaving samāpatti] and he is thus called a kāyasākṣin, for, by reason of the possession [of the calmness of the body, in the course of the samāpatti], and by reason of the consciousness [of the calmness of the body, once he has left the samāpatti], he immediately perceives the calmness of body.

271. On the Saikṣa and the Śikṣās, see p. 983.

272. Mahāvyutpatti, 36, trīṇi śīkṣāni, adhisilam, adhicittam, adhiprajña; Dharmasamgraha, 140, tisrāḥ śīkṣāḥ, adhicittasāktā, adhisīlasāktā, adhiprajñaśāktā ca; Diṅga, iii.219, tisso sikkhā, adhisila, adhicitta, adhipaññasikkhā; Āṅguttara, i.235, ii.194, iii.441. The Visuddhimagga is only a commentary on the Saṃyutta, i.13: sīla paṭṭhāya . . . cittam paññānaṃ ca bhāvayam . . . (p. 4: sīla adhisīlasikkhā pañāsītā hoti, samādhi adhicittasikkhā, paññāya adhipaññāsikkhā); Childers, sikkhāttaya; Schiefner, Melanges Asiatiques, viii.572.

See Kośa, vi.45b. viii.1. The correct readings are adhisilam śīkṣā, adhicittam śīkṣā, adhiprajñaṃ śīkṣā, as we can be assured vi. p. 983-4 and Dharmasamgraha quoted in Śikṣāsāmuccaya, 119.14.

273. The Canon is undecided on the place of nirodhasamāpatti in the Path, on its usefulness for the extinction of the cankers (āsava): Majjhima, i.465, iii.28, Diṅga, i.184, Āṅguttara, iv.426. We know that it is added, in ninth position, to the Dhyānas and Arūyas (Mahāvyutpatti, 68.7: navānupūravivārasamāpattiḥ, Diṅga, iii.266: nava anupubbanirodhā); it is the eighth vimokṣa.

274. The Vaibhāṣikas deny that Mahābrahma-loka is a separate heaven (iii.2d); the Bahirdeśakas, the Non-Kāśmirians, recognize it as a separate heaven, but admit that the Āryans do not enter it (vi.38a-b).

275. Paramārtha: "It is called Vajra absorption."

Vajropamasamādhi, Mahāvyutpatti, 21.55; Kośa, iii.53b-d, vi.77, viii.28; Sutrālamkāra, xiv.45; Pañcakrama, i.60, 67, vi.26. In Puggalapaññatti, 30, the saint who destroys the defilements is vajropamacittā: "In the same way that there is no gem or stone which the diamond does not crush . . ." One can also mention the āṇavajāra of Netti, 112. Vajrasamādhi, Religieux éminents, p. 153. We know of the abuse that Buddhism makes of the vajra.

276. Māsulām dhyānam anāgāmya apraviśya utpadyata ity anāgāmyam (Vyākhyā). See vi.47c; viii.22c; v.66.

277. Hsüan-tsang adds: According to other masters, the vajropamasamādhis obtained in anāgāmya, by reason of the distinction of their aspects and the objects of the jñānas, are one hundred and sixty-four in number. In fact, the anavajñāna of nirodha bears on the nirodha of eight spheres both in general and in particular; and one should take into consideration the four aspects. One should thus add one hundred and twelve to the calculation of the first masters. The same for dhyānāntara and the Dhyānas. For the Arūyas, we have fifty-two, thirty-six, and twenty-four.

A long discussion in the Vyākhyā.

278. Paramārtha: Through the acquisition of the nirodha of the ninth, consciousness of kṣaya.

On kṣayajñāna, vii.4, 7, 12, 43; constitutes Bodhi together with anutpādajñāna, vi.67; confused with the samyagvimuktijñāna, vi.75, 76, with āśravakṣayābbhijñā, vii.42, viii.20.


280. Nītyaṃ śīkasānasilāḥ. Śikṣā śilam esām iti śaikṣāḥ, according to Pāṇini, iv.4,62.

281. In fact, he observes the rules (śiṣṭā) of the Vinaya. Mahāvagga, i.36.8.
Sūryadeva, a teacher of Mahayana Buddhism, quotes the Sūtra: *adhiprajñām śikṣā katama / idam duḥkham iti yathābhūtāṃ prajñātāt.* (Compare *Samyutta*, vi.229, *Āṅguttara*, i.235; *Kosa*, viii.1. “That, Oh Bhikṣus, is seen which is the pure prajñā.”

### Footnotes

282. See viii.1.

283. The *Vyākhyā* quotes the Sūtra: *adhiprajñām śikṣā katama / idam duḥkham iti yathābhūtāṃ prajñātāt.* (Compare *Samyutta*, vi.229, *Āṅguttara*, i.235; *Kosa*, viii.1. “That, Oh Bhikṣus, is seen which is the pure prajñā.”

284. *Punar apāsikṣapāt = yatra śikṣitaḥ śādūṣisatu tatra punar apāsikṣapāt:* the Prthagjana can lose the Pratimokṣa discipline (iv.16), Heat (vi.17), etc. The Āryan, the Śaikṣa can lose certain dharmas, but he cannot lack the three śikṣās.

285. Paramārtha transcribes Śivaka; Hsüan-tsang translates this as *tan-p'a* 偈怕; the Tibetan translates this as *zhe byed*.

286. According to the version of Hsüan-tsang; Paramārtha: “He who applies himself to the three śikṣās, because he applies himself to the three śikṣās, is called a Śaikṣa.” The Tibetan: “Because he applies himself to the śikṣās, he is called a Śaikṣa.”

287. *Dhammasaṅgāṇi*, 1015.

288. The Nirvāṇa acquired (prāpta) by a Śaikṣa is not called *śaikṣa:* only the *saṁskṛtas* (ii.38a) are *śaikṣa.* *Dhammasaṅgāṇi*, 1017.

289. [Except when he is *sakalabandhana,* encumbered with all of the bonds. It appears that one could better translate: “Because the Prthagjana can be endowed with Nirāṇa.”]

290. v.6a-c, viii.20.

291. See ii.38b, English trans. note 200.

292. See vi.61d-62b.

293. The Prthagjana is taken as an example, because the Āryan has acquired worldly and transwordly prāpti through disconnection from Kāmadhātu. When he is reborn into the Second Dhyāna, the first disappears, but not the second.

294. Hsüan-tsang adds: As it has been said of the Āryan, who becoming detached through the two paths from the defilements of the eight spheres to be abandoned through bhāvana, obtains the two types of prāptis of disconnection from these defilements—it follows that the Prthagjana, who only employs the impure path, only acquires an impure prāpti; it also follows that the Āryan, -- it being a given that only the pure path permits him to become detached from the defilements to be abandoned through darśana and from the defilements of the ninth sphere to be abandoned through bhāvana, -- obtains only a pure prāpti of disconnection from these defilements.

295. *Sarvatas* = of all the spheres = of the sphere where the ascetic is found, of a lower sphere, of a higher sphere.

*Anāgamiya*, viii.22a. The fundamental (maula) absorptions, namely the four absorptions of Rūpadhātu or Four Dhyānas and the Four Ārūpas, have a preliminary or prefatory absorption, sāmantaka. The sāmantaka of the First Dhyāna is called *anāgamiya.* See above note 276.

Pure *anāgamiya* = the *anāgamiya* in which the ascetic produces a thought, a path free from the āsravas, satkāyadṛśti, etc. = a pure path produced in *anāgamiya*.

The former Abhidhamma teaches that the ascetic destroys the defilements (āsavas), that is, becomes detached from all of the spheres, by being firmly supported (that is, by producing the eliminating prajñā of the defilements) in seven absorptions (Four Dhyānas and Three Ārūpas). *Āṅguttara*, iv.422 to be corrected according to iv.426 (the
Fourth Āruṇya is excluded as in Kośa, below, note 301).

The theory of anāgamya and its use in “detachment” (vairāgya) rests on the idea that an ascetic cannot enter Dhyāna without being free from the defilement of a lower sphere, and that he cannot, in this same lower sphere, become free from the said defilements: hence the necessity of a preliminary absorption.

296. Hsüan-tsang combines Kārikā 47c-d (two pādas) and 48d (one pāda) into one Kārika, and adds a fourth pāda:

"By the pure Anāgamya path, there is detachment from all the spheres; through the other eight, detachment from his sphere and from a higher sphere: through the impure path, there is detachment from the immediately lower sphere.” [Bhāṣya of the last pāda.]

Bhāṣya: By supporting oneself on the sāmantakas, one becomes detached from the lower spheres. In the same way that the ānantaryamārgas support themselves on the sāmantakas, is this the case for the vimuktiṃārgas?

Adding a first pāda, he makes the following Kārikā out of 48a-c.

Kārikā. The sāmantakas detach one from the lower spheres; the last vimuktiṃārga of the three arises from the mūla or from the sāmantaka; for the higher spheres, from the mūla only.

Bhāṣya. There are eight sāmantakas which can serve as the support of the Path. There are nine spheres from which one should become detached. The first three sāmantakas detach one from the three spheres which are respectively lower than them (that is to say: The first three sāmantakas serve as the support of a path which detaches one from the three spheres ... ). The ascetic before realizing the ninth vimuktiṃārga, either enters the mūla dhyāna, or remains in the sāmantaka. The five higher sāmantakas detach one from the spheres which are, respectively, lower than it. Before realizing the ninth vimuktiṃārga, the ascetic necessarily enters the mūla and does not remain in the sāmantaka; for, whereas, for these five sāmantakas, the mūla and the sāmantaka are equally upeksendriya, the mūla and the sāmantaka have a different vedanendriya in the first three Dhyānas. Some ascetics are not capable of entering into the mūla because the transformation of the vedanendriyas is difficult. [One necessarily enters it when one is capable of this transformation] because, at the moment when one becomes detached from it, one is joyous [: thus, at the ninth vimuktiṃārga, one passes, when possible, from the sāmantaka (upeksendriya) to the mūla (sukhendriya, saumanasyendriya).]

297. Remember that detachment (vairāgya) from one sphere—that is to say the abandoning of the nine categories (strong-strong, etc.) of defilements of Kāmadhatu, of the First Dhyāna, etc.—include nine pairs of paths: a path of abandoning (prabhānamārga or ānantaryamārga) and a path of deliverance (vimuktiṃārga). The ascetic who detaches himself from Kāmadhatu by meditating in the state of absorption called anāgamya produces in this state the first eight paths of abandoning and the first eight paths of deliverance; he also produces in this state the ninth path of abandoning. The question is asked whether, in order to produce the ninth path of deliverance, he remains in anāgamya or passes into the First Dhyāna. Same question for the other sāmantakas and the “fundamental” absorption which they precede.

298. The last vimuktiṃārga does not arise from out of higher sāmantakas.

299. All sāmantakas contain the sensation of indifference; the first three Dhyānas, contain the sensations of sukha or saumanasya, vii.7; therefore in order to pass from the sāmantaka into the fundamental absorption, the ascetic should transform his sensation.

300. Add: “when the ascetic is not capable of transforming his sensation; when he is capable of doing so, the last vimuktiṃārga arises from the fundamental Dhyāna, vitarāgabhūmsībhumanyāt.”

301. One cannot produce the pure path in the absorption of the Fourth Āruṇya or
Bhavāgra; the ascetic, in order to be delivered from the defilements relating to this state, should avail himself of a pure path (vi.45c-d); thus employing a pure path practiced in the Third Ārūpya: same doctrine in *Visuddhimagga*, 708, and also apparently in *Aṅguttara*, iv.422, 426.

302. *Sambhavatas*. When one sees the lower sphere as "coarse" one sees the higher sphere as "calm," and so on. According to another explanation, one sees the higher sphere under one of these three aspects, "calm," etc., and not necessarily under the three aspects. Here we have three of the aspects of Nirvāṇa, vii.13a.


304. Hsüan-tsang: "because it can be surmounted only with great effort."

305. The dṛṣṭi of the Āsaikṣas: to see things as they really are, to truly know the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of the dhammas, impermanence, etc.

306. Hsüan-tsang: "The āsākṣi samyagdṛṣṭi arises among the Immovable Ones, even though one does not say so formally, for all the Arhats possess it . . . ."


308. The Abhidharma reconciles the thesis of the Theravādins with that of the Pubbaseliyas, *Kathāvatthu*, xix.3.

309. Hsüan-tsang: "they have the vimuktimārgas (samskrta) and pratisamkhyānirodha for their natures."

310. Paramārtha enumerates the four results, srotāpañnapātha, etc., and quotes the Sūtra.

311. *Puruṣacakrāphala* is that which arises (jayate) and also that which is attained (prāpyate) through the special power of a dharma: the path of deliverance arises from śrāmāṇya, and abandoning or pratisamkhyānirodha is attained by the power of śrāmāṇya.

312. As one can supplement the work (pravacana) of Pāṇini, as omniscient as he is, he is a Prthagajana.

313. When the ascetic obtains the result of Srotāpañna, there is acquisition of the total abandoning of the defilements to be abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths (darsanabeyaklesas), acquisition inherent (samgrhiṣa) in a single path of meditation (ekabdhavanāmarga), namely in the sixteenth moment; when the ascetic obtains the fruit of Sakṛdgaṁin, there is acquisition of the totality of the abandoning of the darsanabeyas and of the abandoning of the first six categories of defilements to be abandoned through meditation, acquisition inherent to the path which is the fruit of Sakṛdgaṁin; and so on.

314. When an ordinary person (prthagajana), bound by all the bonds (sakalabandhana), enters the Path of Seeing the Truths and becomes Srotāpañna through the abandoning of the defilements which one abandons by this Path, he can then either expell the first six categories of defilements of Kāmadhātu through the Path of Meditation on the Truths (pure path): he obtains the result of Sakṛdgaṁin through the pure or transworldly path,—or expell the same six categories through the worldly path of meditation (as described vi.49c): he obtains the same result through the worldly path. But an ordinary person can become free from the same six categories of defilements through the worldly path before entering into the Path of Seeing: when he achieves this Path, he acquires the result of Sakṛdgaṁin. The result results from the worldly path.
315. See above vi.35c.


318. Eṣa bi bhagavāṁ brahmaṇy etad udāharaṇam Śivakenoktaṁ (See note 285; var. Jivaka). Madh., 34.12; Majjh., i.341, 368, Sam., ii.27: ... tathāgato ... brahmacakkaṁ pavatteti. The Tathāgata is dharmakāya brahmakāya dharmabhūta brahmabhūta in Dīgha, iii.84; gloss of Buddhaghosa (The word brahma is used in the sense of excellent, setṛthathena) in Dialogues, iii.81. brahmabhūta = identified with Brahman, see Bodhisattvabhūmi, fol. 142b: brahmas, cakram pravartayāṣṭīty ucyate / tat kasya hetobh / tathāgatasayitaś adhivacanām yad uta brahmā ity api sāntaḥ stībhūta ity api / tena tatprerītān tatprathamatas tadanyāḥ punas tadanyāṣām / evam pāramāṇṛyena brahmaṇprerītāṃ sarvasattvaniṅkāye bhramati tasmād brāhmaṇ cakram ity ucyate. Nirvāṇa, (1925), pp. 72-73.

319. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 104a15. It is moreover certain that the Wheel of the Law, which the Bhagavat set into motion, and which Śāriputra sets into motion after the Bhagavat (Samyutta, i.191), is the teaching.

320. Kramaṇaḥ cakram, see below note 332.

321. The Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 912a4, mentions ten reasons.

322. On the parts of the Path, vi.67, 71.

323. Tatadṛṣṭau pravartitaṁ iti sūtre vacanat. Vyākhyā: tad evam ārāṣyā Kaunḍinīṣya ṅaṃsūbhādarmāḥ utpanne devatābhūr uktām bhagavatā pravartitaṁ dharmacakram iti sūtravaṇanāt. The Vyākhyā quotes a Sūtra which corresponds (with variants) to the Mahāvagga, i.6, 23-30. Lotus, p. 69, line 12.

Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 934c8): The divinities do not say: "the Wheel of the Law has been set into motion," under the Bodhi tree, but rather in Benares. Thus the setting into motion is to cause one to penetrate into another. Some say that teaching itself (the sermon at Benares) is the Wheel of the Law: but this teaching is only the means, not the true Wheel.

324. See Nettippakarana, 60.

325. Vyākhyā: tatra pratyakṣārthatvād anāsravā prajñā caḥṣub / niḥsamatayatvāj jñānam / bhūtārthatvād vidyā / viśuddhātvaḥ buddhiḥ / viśuddhā dhīr buddhīr iti nirokṣeh // punar bābyākārān satyesu darsanāṁ kudṛṣṭvisvikitsāsāvidyānāṁ apratipakṣāḥ sāsravāṁ ca / tato viṣeṣaṇārthatvāḥ cakṣurādgṛhaṇān / punas trīṣu prāyavatvāḥ prathamanāḥ darsanānāḥ cakṣur yathādṛṣṭavyacāraṇān / jñānam yāvad [...] bhāvīkatām upādāya / vidyā yāvad vidyamāṇaṅgraḥṛṇān yathāvaḥbhāvīkatām upādāya / buddhīr yathābuddhārthavabodhāḥ // punar ananuṛṣteṣu dharmesu ānumāni kāññānapraśītāḥ brahmāḥ cakṣur ity āba / adhimoksikajñāṇānapraśītāḥ brahmāḥ jñānam iti / ābhimānājñāṇānapraśītāḥ brahmāḥ vidyet // sāravājñāṇānapraśītāḥ brahmāḥ buddhiḥ iti /

Pure prajñā --is called eye, because its object is immediately perceived: knowledge (jñāna), because it is free from doubt (vii.1); science, because its object is real; intelligence, because it is pure: in fact the etymology of buddhi is viśuddhā dhī, "pure mind." Furthermore, the view that the non-Buddhists have of the Truths (suffering, etc.) is not opposed either to bad opinions, nor doubt, nor ignorance, and it is impure (cāṣṭava): in order to show the contrast with the seeing that the saints have of the Truths, this seeing is called eye, etc.... Furthermore, the Sūtra says "eye" in order to avoid the idea that it refers to a consciousness arrived at through induction; "knowledge," because it does not refer to a knowledge arrived at through imagination (compare ii. English trans. p.320; vi.9); "science," because it does not refer to a supposed knowledge; "intelligence," because it does not refer to an impure knowledge.
According to the Vibhāṣā, jñāna is the dharmajñāna, vidyā, is the anvayākṣānti, buddhi is the anvayajñāna (vi.25-26). Another theory is presented in Kṣaṭa, vii.7.

326. The Sutra on "Skillfulnes in Seven Things," has been quoted above, note 207. For dvayaḍeśana: . . . teta hi bhikṣo dvayaṁ te deśayasyāmi tac chṛṣu sādhu ca manasi kuru bhāṣīṣye / dvayaṁ katiṣṭam / caksṛ ṛūpāni yāvan mano dharmāḥ ca.

327. Vyākhyā: atra acārya ābha . . . We have here, according to the Japanese editor, the opinion of the Sautrāntikas.

328. a. This is suffering, its origin, its extinction, the path; b. this should be known . . . ; c. this is known, abandoned, realized, cultivated.

329. Tridhākarana: a. the nature of the truths (satyasvarūpa), b. the operation to be done; and c. the achievement of the operation.


331. According to the Japanese editor, the opinion of Vasubandhu. Nyāyānusara, TD 29, p. 709a28: The opinion of the masters of the Vibhāṣā (Vaibhāsikas) is, in general, that the whole of the holy path (ārya mārga) is called the Dharmacakra . . . but there are some divergent opinions: according to some, it is the Path of Seeing that is called Dharmacakra; according to others, it is the sermon at Benares. Notes of the Japanese editor: According to the commentaries, the first opinion is now the third, the second is that presented in the Kārikā; and the third is now the second. According to Saṁghabhadrā, the third is the basic opinion of the Sarvāstivādins . . . P'u-kuang says that the second and the third are those of the Sautrāntikas and of Vasubandhu.

332. Vyākhyā: kramāḥ ca cakram iti kṛtvā.

333. In the same way that one says prabhukta odanaḥ.

334. This person is detached from Kāmadhātu through the worldly path, as for example Brahmā; he should cultivate the Path of Seeing in order to obtain the result of Anāgāmin. For the Āryan the fact that he is reborn into Rūpadhātu proves that he is already an Anāgāmin.

335. Since one does not become a Buddha or a Pratyekabuddha in this sphere, the only bodhi that one can obtain there is the bodhi of the Śrāvakas; now a Śrāvaka only obtains comprehension of the truths (abhisamaya) due to the words of another, parato ghoṣa.

336. The principle presented in viii.29a-b opposes the teaching that there is a darsānamārga in Ārūpyadhātu.
337. Vyākhyā: vidhānāṁ vidhā upāya ity arthaḥ.

338. Madhyama, TD 2, p. 616a10, Samyukta, TD 2, p. 235c7. See in the Puggalapaññatī, p. 12, the definition of the samayavimutta, samayavimutta, kuppadhamma, akuppadhamma, parībhānaḥadhamma, aparībhānaḥadhamma, cetanābhābba, anurakkhanābhābba. The akopyadharman Arhat distinct from the Saikṣa, Mahāvastu, iii.200.

339. Paramārtha: “Their deliverance is occasional and dear.” Anguttara, iii.173. See p. 1006. cetovimukti and prajñāvimukti, vi.76c.

340. p. 1006. In the world, that which is dear (kanta) should be guarded (anurakṣya). The Sūtra says: tadyathā nāmaikākyāsya puruṣasya jñātaya ekam aṣiśā sadhu ca suṣṭhu ca naurakṣitavyam manye na māṣyā śītaṁ māṣyāṃ māṣyā rajonīvaśāvā ca kṣuṣuśā nipateyur māṣyā yaḥ api ekam kṣuṣuśā avinaśtām tadbapi vināśyad u/t evam eva samayavimuktyārḥato...

341. In the same way samayavimukta = samayāpekṣa ca vimuktaś ca.

342. Different meanings of samaya, Samantapāśādīka, i.107.

343. What does gotra, or family, mean? (1) The gotra is the roots of good (kuśalamūla): certain persons have such roots of good that they are parībhānaḥdarman, etc.; (2) gotra consists of the characteristics of the faculties, more or less sharp, from the stage of Prthagjana onward; (3) the Saṭrāntikas say that gotra is the seed, the power (sāmarthya) of the mind. The Prthagjana and the Saikṣa are “of the family of the parībhānaḥdarman” when they bear the seed of the parībhānaḥdarman Arhat; the Asaikṣa or Arhat is a parībhānaḥdarman because this seed is actualized in their result (tadbijavṛttīlabhā).

344. Uttarāpana, uttāpanā = uttāpikarana, vi.18b, synonym samācāra, transposition, vi.4lc-d.

345. Consequently vi.57b should be understood as follows: The person who, by his nature, is of sharp faculties, becomes a drṣṭiprāpta in the sixteenth moment (this is the case seen previously vi.57b). But the person who, having already become a Saikṣa, and perfects his faculties, obtains the quality of drṣṭiprāpta after having a been śraddhābhīmukta.

346. Arhats 2-5 are also susceptible of falling away; Arhat number 1 is characterized by the absence of the qualities of Arhats 2-5. In this same way Arhats 3-5 are cetanāḥdarman and so on.

347. Cetanāḥdarman = māraṇāḥdarman: ātmānāṁ cetayate, below notes 350 and 367. Paramārtha: “to kill-harm his body” (sha-hai tzu shen杀害自身) or “to kill oneself” (tzu-hai 自害).

The explanation of the Puggalapaññatī, p. 12, differs.

348. Hsian-tsang: The parībhānaḥdarman, meeting weak causes of falling, falls away from that which he has acquired; but not the cetanāāḥdarman. The cetanāḥdarman, fearing falling away, always thinks of putting an end to his existence. The anurakṣanāḥdarman guards that which he has acquired. Diṅgha, iii.226, on the anurakṣanāḥdarman.


Anguttara, iii.173 (compare Kathāvatthu, i.2, trans. p. 64) has two lists of five dharmas: pañcime dharmāṁ samayavimuttassa bhikkhunī parībhāṇaya samvattati: kammārāma, bhassarāma, nidārāma, saṅghasamārāma, yathāvimuttam ca citam na paccekkhāti. The second lists replaces the last two terms by indriyesu aguttadvārat, bhojane amuttaṇṇutā.

350. In the higher spheres, there is neither ātmasaṅcetanā nor parasaṅcetanā, see Kośa,
351. Paramärtha: Four persons fall away from the gotra; five fall away from the result.

352. This family, in fact, is akrtrima.

353. On the falling away of the Arhat and the problems connected with it, Āng., i.96, iii.173, Kathavatthu, i.2, ii.2, etc.; Points of Controversy, p. xliii; our note: The five points of Mahādeva, JRAS., 1910, p. 413. According to Buddhaghosa, the Saṁmitiyas, Vajjiputtiyas, Sabbatthivādins and some of the Mahasāṁghikas admit the falling away of an Arhat. Vasumitra, in Wassilieff, p. 262, 263, 282: the Mahāsāṁghikas admit the falling away (paribhāññadharman) of a Srotaāpanna, but deny the falling away of an Arhat; 272; the Sarvāstivādins deny the falling away of a Srotaāpanna, but admit the falling away of an Arhat. Confirmed by the Chinese sources: Sarvāstivādins: No falling away from the first result; falling away from the other three. Mahāsāṁghikas, Maḥīśāsaka, etc.: No falling away from the quality of Arhat; falling away from the first three results. Sautrāntika, Mahāyāna: No falling away from the results; falling away from the drīṣṭadharmanukhaṇḍhabhāvas. Opinion of the Vibhajyavādins, Vibbāṣa, TD 27, p. 312b9, below note 374.

354. An anonymous objection (atra kaścid āha): (1) A cetanādharman, the cetanādharman family which has been made firm by the saikṣa and asaikṣa paths, can perfect his faculties, and so acquire a new gotra: therefore he falls away from his gotra. The reason given by Vasubandhu does not hold. (2) If one does not fall away from a family which has been rendered firm by the worldly and transworldly paths, one will fall away from the result of Srotaāpanna, which is never rendered firm by the two paths. Response of Yāsomitra. (1) Vasubandhu means to say that the cetanādharman, falling away from the result of Arhat, will not merely because of this fall away from his gotra if this has been made firm by the Saikṣa and Aṣaikṣa paths. (2) The second remark is made with respect to a person who does not reflect: here it refers to his family (gotra), not to his result. In fact, no result is at one and the same time (yugapad) obtained by a worldly and a transworldly path; but the family can be made firm by these two paths.

355. One does not fall away from the result of Srotaāpanna, because, when one obtains this result, it is always the first result that he obtains. One can fall away from the result of Sakṛdāgāmin when one obtains this result after having obtained that of Srotaāpanna; but not when one becomes a Sakṛdāgāmin without passing through the stage of Srotaāpanna (the case of the bhūyovītārga, ii.16c, vi.30b, 45b); the same for the result of Anāgāmin.

356. Vibbāṣa, TD 29, p. 316b28. Why can one fall from the three higher results, and not from the result of Srotaāpanna? Because the defilements abandoned through seeing are produced with respect to non-existence (avastu); one does not fall away from the abandoning of these defilements. How can one say that they are produced with respect to non-existence? ... Furthermore the result of Srotaāpanna is established by the abandoning of the defilements abandoned by the view of the truths in their totality, bearing on the three spheres.

357. smṛtisāṃśpramōṣṭ = kliśtasmṛtiyogāt (see ii. English trans. p.190, 194).

358. There is no falling away from the anāsrava result; with respect to the first five Arhats, there is falling away from the "blisses of this world," which are sārava.

359. According to the Japanese gloss, Madhyamāgama, TD 1, p. 574c19?, which according to Anesaki is Saṁyutta ii.50 (Kalārasutta). The first and the last result can only be obtained by the pure path (=āryaprajñā), vi.45c.

360. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 752a24, Saṁyuktā, TD 2, p. 53c9; Saṁyutta, iv.25.
361. Madhyamagama, 49.21; Samyutta, ii.239. Tatra bhagavan auyusmantam Anandam anantrayate sma / arhato 'py abham Ananda labhasakaram antarayakaram vadami / auyusman Ananda abha / tat kasmad bhagavan evam abha / arhato 'py abham Ananda labhasakaram antarayakaram vadami / bhagavan abha / na hi anvanda aprajatasya praptaye anadbhati abbigamayasa asakatikrtasya sakatikrayayai / api tu ye ne na catvara abhicaitasikā drṣṭadharmanuskhavibhāra abhigataś tato 'ham asyānyatamasāmāt parihiṇāṃ vadāmi / tāc cākṛṣṇasa vibharata / yā tu anenaikākām vyapāśtenāparyam tapatiṇā prabhītanamā vīharata akopya ceto-vimuktiḥ kāyaṇa sakatikrta tato 'yāham na kena cit paryāyena parihiṇāṃ vadāmi / tasmāt tarby Anandaivaṇi te śikṣātāvayām yā labhasakaram abhīhabhavāyamo na cotpannair labhasakāraś cittam paryādāya sthārayati / evam te Ananda śikṣātāvayam. See below note 363 and p. 1010.


Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 157a10. Because they reside (viharanti) in the four types of bliss, they are said to have obtained four drṣṭadharmanuskhavibhāras: 1. pravravyāsukha, 2. vivekasukha (yu-an-li lo jümy&), 3. samathasukha (chi-ching lo Wt&^k), and 4. bodhisukha.

But this refers to the Dhyānas in general.

Samyutta, ii.278, Anguttara, iii.131, v.10, Dīgha, iii.113, 222: eso kho bhikkhave bhikkhu catunnam jhnānam abhicetasikānam diṣṭhādharmamuskhavibhāram nikāmalābhi; Anguttara, iv.362: arahanto ... diṣṭhādharmamuskhavibhāram yeva anuyuttā.

The four blisses are abhicaitasika (=adhi cetasi bhava), that is to say they belong to the sphere of the four basic Dhyānas. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 418a2: The four types of abhicaitasika are the Four Dhyānas.

The Bodhisattvabhumi distinguishes the brahmavibhāras (=apramāṇa, Kosā, viii.29), and the āryavibhāras (=vimokṣaṁukha, viii.24), and the divyavibhāras (=dhyānas and ārupyas).

363. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 316a4. The Sūtra says: “Ananda, of the four blisses (abhicaitasika drṣṭadharmanuskhavibhāra) acquired by the Tathāgata, I say that there is a successive (chân-ch’uan 展轉 ) falling away, as in the case of the Śrāvaka on the occasion of worldly encounters. As for the immovable deliverance of the mind (described as above: kāyaṇa tāksāt kṛtā . .. ), I say that there is no falling away.” It follows from this text that, even in the case of the Buddha, there is a falling away from “fruition” (upabhoga, Kosā, vi. 59) The Sautrāntikas conclude from this text that dear and occasional deliverance (sāmaikē kāntā vimukti) is the four blisses. Question: By falling away, does the Sūtra understand the falling away from that which is acquired, or the falling away from a resultant state? In the first hypothesis, there would be no falling away from the blisses, for these are dharmar that one continues to possess (prāpti) even when one does not enjoy them; in the second hypothesis, there would be falling away from immovable deliverance, for this deliverance is not always present (saṁmukhābhiṇa...) . Response: With respect to deliverance, the essential thing is possession: for, when one possesses deliverance, one no longer has anything more to obtain; therefore, even though it is always present, one says that the saint does not fall away from it. With respect to the blisses, the essential thing is their presence; one says then that the saint has fallen away from them when he is not enjoying them. Vibhāṣa TD 27, p. 417c21 and following: When one of the sukhabhāras is present, one says that the others have fallen away.

364. In opposition to the sāmantakas, thresholds to the Dhyānas properly so called.

365. 1) yah parihīyate drṣṭadharmanuskhavibhāre bhyaḥ sa parihāna-dharmaḥ; 2) yo na parihīyate tata eva sa’parihāna-dharmaḥ; 3) yah samādibhāraṁ sahaḥ atmānaṁ cetayate (ii. English trans. p. 236) sa cetanādharmaḥ; 4) yo’vraṇaḥ see haḥ medio gñāviṣeṣaṁ so’nurāṣaṅadbhāraḥ; 5) yo yasmin eva gupe śīhas tasmād anurāṣaṅaṁ api na kampate sa sthitakampyaḥ; 6) yah pareṇa prativedhiṣyati (gñāviṣeṣaṁ upadāyati arthaḥ) sa prativedhanubhavyaḥ; 7) yo na kupyati (utpannebhyaḥ na parihīyate) so’kopya-dharmaḥ.
By adding *prajñāvimukta* and *ubhayatobhāgavimukta* (vi.64), we have the nine Aaiksas.

366. Vasubandhu asks the question and answers it.

367. The Vaibhāṣika objects: *nanv āyuṣmān Godhiko’rhattvāt paribhṣaṇā.*

Paramārtha here adds a *pāda:* “Godhika was a *samayavimukta.*”

On Godhika, a good example of a saint of the *cetanādharman* class, see *Samyutta*, i.120; *Comm. on the Dhammapada*, 55; *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 28ba3, which differs. *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 312b22; *Ekottara*, TD 2, p. 642c1 (Vakkali).

368. Maranākāla evārhatvām prāptāḥ: he attained the quality of Arhat at the very moment of death, that is to say in a moment later than the application of the dagger (*śastraḥbhāna*); *parinivrṣṭa ca:* and he obtained *parinirvāṇa* by the same stroke of the dagger (*tenaiva sāstraprabhāreṇa*).


370. *Utpāda*, which can be explained according to iii.3.172 or iii.3.169.

371. *Prakarana-pāda*, TD 26, p. 702b17; *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 313b15; see *Kosa*, v.34.

The Tibetan and Hsüan-tsang have: "It is by reason of three causes that the *anuśaya* of *kāmarāga* arises."


373. *tadbijadharmatdydm anapoddhrtdydm,* which is to be understood as *klesābhiṣavabhāve* nunmālīte.

374. *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 312b9. The Vibhajyavadins deny the falling away of the Arhat, in the sense of the production of defilements (*klesa*), and support this with examples. When a pot is broken, there only remains the pieces of baked earth which no longer make up the pot. The same for the Arhat: Vajropamasamādhī (vi.44) breaks the defilements; thus the Arhat will not produce any more defilements and he will not fall away. When a tree is burnt, only its ashes remain ... the defilements have been burnt by pure knowledge (*anāśrava jñāna*) ... But, to affirm that the Arhat does not fall away is to contradict the Sūtra which distinguishes two types of Arhats, one who is movable and one who is immovable (*kopya, akopyadharman*). Yet how does one explain the examples of the Vibhajyavadins? There is no reason to explain them: they are neither Sūtra, nor Vinaya, nor Abhidharma ...  

375. Paramārtha adds a *pāda:* “There is falling away of the Arhat, by reason of Aṅgārakasūpama.”

376. *Samyutta*, iv.190, *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 314b6; the following portion of the text quoted here is quoted above vi.60a.

We know the Pāli redaction: *tassa ce bhikkhave bhikkhuno evam carato evam viharato kadāci karabaci satissammosa uppajjantī pāpakā ākusalā dharmā sarasankappā samyojanā / danado bhikkhave satuppādo / atha kho naṁ bhikkhā eva pājahatī vinodetivyantikoroti anabhāvam gameti.*

377. The Vaibhāṣika understands *evam carataḥ* as *smṛtimataś carataḥ,* “who does all of the actions of a Bhikṣu (*carataḥ*) with his mindfulness always attentive,” because the word *smṛti* immediately follows (*anantaram smṛtiśvacanāt*); but see *Samyutta*, iv.189. line 8.

378. The Chinese translators: *astim samayāṇ, asty avakaṣo yat ...* But according to the *Vyākhyā: kadācit smṛtiśanampramōṣad utpadyante pāpakā ākusalā vitarkāḥ.*

Chapter Six

380. But these texts can be understood of the Śāikṣa. The mind of the Śāikṣa is “inclined towards isolation,” etc.; but the Aśāikṣa possesses all these qualities to their maximum (prakārṣena). The Śāikṣa is “cooled” with regard to the dharma, in which the āśrava lodge, and which belong to Kāmadhātu.

381. The Sūtra has: yāvat tu cāro na supratividdhah. According to the Vyākhyā, pindapāticḍraḥ. In Samyutta, iv.189, line 7, cāro ca vibhāro ca anubuddho hoti. Cāra, the quest, is anubuddha, supratividdha, when the monk is not attached to agreeable objects, etc.

382. There are, therefore, six categories of mokṣabhaṅgaḥ and nirvēdbhaṅgaḥ (vi.24, 17c).

383. Therefore a Prthagjana who enters, with weak faculties, the Path of Seeing, necessarily becomes a Śāikṣa with weak faculties and protects his family, gotra.

384. Through the path which has the aspects of impermanence, etc. (anityādyākārṣapatita mārga, vii.13) (the transworldly path), and through that which has coarse aspects, etc., and of calm, etc. (vi.49c), we do not become fixed to things up above. Yet we believe that the Prthagjana perfects his faculties in these two manners, for, later, Vasubandhu declares that the Āryans do not perfect their faculties by an impure (āśrava) path (vi.6lb). Thus the Prthagjana cultivates by desiring: “May my faculties become sharp!”, and, cultivating (abhisaṃyka) either the worldly path or the transworldly path, he obtains perfectioning of his faculties by means of ānantaṃra and vimukti-mārga.

385. vi.36c. It is not a questinn here of Prthagjanas and of Śāikṣas. The Arhat also perfects his faculties.

386. We can compare Anguttara, v. 169: anadhigatam nddhigacchati / adhigatd parihdyati...

We have seen that there is an upabhoga of Nirvāṇa, ii. English trans p. 159.

387. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 318b11 and following. Two opinions: 1. The three fallings for the Samayavimukta, the last two for the Akopyadharman and the Pratyekabuddha, the third for the Buddha; 2. the three fallings for the Samayavimukta, the last for the Akopyadharman and the Pratyekabuddhas, none for the Buddha. Vasubandhu adopts the theory of the first masters; the second ones are followed by the Mahāyāna.

Compare Kosa, iv.12c, vi. p. 1006; Majjhima, i.249.

388. The Immovable Ones have not acquired the dharma proper to the Great Disciples, the Mahāśravakas, such as Śāriputra or Maudgalyāyana; for example, they lack pṛṇtaṅkoṭiḥ (vii.41). And the Mahāśravakas themselves do not now possess nor will they possess the dharma special to the Buddhas or Svayamabhūs. See i.1, English trans. p.55, and vii.30.

389. Two interpretations are possible:

a) The Sautrāntikas affirm that the deliverance of the six Arhats is immovable. The Vaibhāṣika would object: “If the pure deliverance of any Arhat is immovable, why is only the ‘non-occasionally delivered one’ (asamayavimukta) defined or recognized as Immovable (akopyadharman)?” The Sautrāntikas answer: “It is certain that the pure deliverance of every Arhat is immovable; but the definition of an Immovable One is as we have said
Footnotes

1077

(p. 1007, line 12), namely: "Some, by reason of the distraction caused by their virtues and their honors, fall away from the blisses by losing their mastery in absorption: these are the Arhats with weak faculties; others do not fall away, and these are the Arhats with sharp faculties." The latter are recognized as Immovable Ones. As the Arhat with weak faculties falls away from the blisses by reason of distraction, whereas the Arhat with sharp faculties does not fall away (that is to say, does not lose possession of them), it follows that the Vaibhāṣikas cannot advantageously object: "How does an Immovable One fall away from the blisses?"

b) It has been said above that an Immovable One does not fall away from the blisses, and the Sūtra declares that there is falling away from the blisses for the same person for whom deliverance is immovable. In the presence of this declaration formulated in general terms, one says: "The deliverance of any Arhat is immovable," that is to say: "an Immovable One is not sufficiently characterized by the possession of this deliverance." One therefore adds: "For an Immovable One, it is defined as we have said." Therefore one cannot object: "How...

390. Here the importance of the theory of the falling away of the Arhat sensibly diminishes. Saṅghabhadrā (TD 29, p. 722a13): When the amount of life approaches its exhaustion, there is no falling away, because there is no weakening of mindfulness; if life still remains to him, falling away is impossible... Who falls away? Who does not fall away? He who has entered the Path after āsūbhā meditation can fall away; but he who has entered it after ānāpānasmoṭi does not fall away. It depends on whether alo bhā or amoha has been accumulated. In what sphere, in what realm of rebirth is there falling away? In Kāmadhātu, persons of the three continents. As for the six gods of Kāmadhātu... (see note 396).

391. See above note 376. The Tibetan: "...experiences small weakness of mindfulness..."; but the Tibetan text presents a lacuna, as results from the version of Paramārtha. "Small," according to the Vāyākyā, is dhanā, with the sense of manda.

392. The Vyākhyā defines confidence by quoting the stanza:

sucirnabrahmacarye\'smin mārge cāpī subhāvite

tuṣṭa āyukṣaye bhōti rogasyāpaganem yathā //

which is quoted below by Vasubandhu.

393. iv.33a, vi.40c.

394. On the nature of these paths of "transforming the faculties," above note 384. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 349a and following; the opinions differ.

a. Nirvedabhāgaṭīya: in the fourth, no perfectioning; in the first three, perfectioning through 9 ānantarya and 9 vimuktis (1st opinion), through 1 ānantarya and 1 vimukti (2nd opinion), through 1 prayoga (3rd opinion).

b. Darśanamārga, no perfectioning.

c. Aśaikṣas, 1 prayoga, 9 ānantarya, 9 vimuktis (adopted by Vasubandhu), 1 prayoga, 1 ānantarya, 1 vimukti (2nd opinion).

Śaikṣas, 1 prayoga, 1 ānantarya, 1 vimukti (adopted by Vasubandhu), 1 prayoga, 9 ānantarya, 9 vimuktis (2nd opinion).

395. Paramārtha: "By reason of long cultivation."

396. Now it is through fear of falling away that the ascetic sharpens his faculties. We have seen above that the Āryans and persons arisen in the higher spheres cannot transform their faculties (vi.4lc-d).

Persons born among the six classes of gods of Kāmadhātu cannot fall away. They certainly possess sharp faculties, since they are disgusted with the heavenly joys from the point of view of the Truths: ye pūrvaṃ atyudārebbho viṣayebbho saṃvijanto yatāḥ (?) satyāṃ paśyanti te kathām tān ālambya paribhāṣyante / avaṣyāṁ hi te tiksṇendriya bhavantīya abhiprayaḥ.
397. The Aśaikṣa perfects his faculties as he has obtained the result of Arhat; since he obtains this result in nine spheres, so too there is perfecting of the faculties.

The Śaikṣa perfects his faculties as he has obtained the results of Śaikṣa; as he does not obtain these results in the Ārupyas, so too there is the perfecting of the faculties. The first two results of Śaikṣa are obtained in anāgāmya; the third in six spheres. (But opinions differ).

398. See vi.33, 46d.


Paramārtha: The person who cultivates the transformation of his faculties abandons the result and the path of weak faculties higher than the result (phalam phalaviṣṭām ca mṛdvindriyakam mārgam).

Hsüan-tsang: He abandons phala and phalaviṣṭamārga.

400. Vyākhyā: phalamārgam eva pratilabhate / kāmadhātuvarāgyamātrasamgrḥitam / na cānāgāmiphalam ārupyasamgrḥitam iti / pañcānām avarabhāgyānām prabhānād anāgāmīti sātre vacanat / dārāsanāmārge ca tatrābhāvād tadabhāvah kāmadhātvānālambanād iti vyākhyātam etat.

Paramārtha: He obtains, in the family of sharp faculties, both result and Path; not the result of Anāgāmin included in Ārupya. This is because the Śaikṣa does not transform his faculties in Ārupya.

Hsüan-tsang: What he obtains is only a result, and not the path, of candidate: therefore it is not a result of Śaikṣa included in Ārupya. This is why the Śaikṣa transforms his faculties in only six spheres.

One should here study the commentaries on Hsüan-tsang.

401. Paramārtha: Two Buddhas and seven Śrāvakas are nine by reason of their nine faculties.

402. Yuan-hui says: The Immovable One is of two types, the first is called aparibhāṇadharman because his faculties are sharp in origin; the second is called Immovable because there is a perfectioning of his faculties.

403. Buddha: strong-strong faculties; Pratyekabuddha: strong-medium; Immovable: strong-weak . . .

404. The two types of Buddhas are included in the seventh class.

405. Paramārtha: By reason of prayoga . . . they make seven.

406. See vii.39c.

407. For the Dharmānusārīn, 3 types of faculties, a single gotra, 15 paths, 73 types of detachment, 9 physical persons, for a total of 29,565.

For the Śraddhādhimukta, considering his sixteenth moment (of the acquisition of fruit, vi.31), we have 3 types of faculties, 5 gotras, 1 path, 73 detachments, 9 physical persons = 9,855.

Vyākhyā: Bhagavadviśeṣa remarks: "There are twelve types of Śraddhādhimukta from the point of view of the Path, because he is to be found in the path of bhāvanā." We do not understand with what intention he expresses himself thus . . .

The Vyākhyā examines the different types of Śraddhādhimukta in his career up to the quality of Arhat (35,235); of a Drṣṭiprāpta to the acquisition of the result (1,971: no difference for the gotra), in his career up to the quality of Arhat (7,047); of a Kāyasākṣin (who is either a Śraddhādhimukta or a Drṣṭiprāpta), of a Prajñāvimukta, of a ubhayatobhāgavimukta. The Vyākhyā discusses the calculations of Bhagavadviśeṣa.

The Buddha said to Śāriputra: Of these five hundred Bhikṣus, ninety obtained the three 
vidyās (Kosā, vii.45c), ninety the twofold deliverance; the others are Prajñāvimuktas
(compare Samyutta, i.191). Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 319b11?: The vidyās with the eight
vimokṣas, is the twofold deliverance. See also Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 733a28 and following.

409. Kleśāvarana is the obstacle or bond made up of the defilements. Vīmokṣāvarana is the obstacle--namely bodily and mental powerlessness (akarmanyatā)–which is opposed to the production of the eight vimokṣas (vii.32a).

410. Paramārtha follows this text. Hsian-tsang follows a reading abhāryadharma’paripūr-
naśaikṣh, and translates: "Even having abandoned five kleśas, and being immovable, he is not called a complete Śāṅkṣa." Gloss of the editor: "Even though he is complete in his faculties and the result, he has not obtained nirodhasamāpatti."

411. On the parupūra and aparipūra Bhikṣu, see Anguttara, iv.314.

412. Consequently the "Supreme Worldly Dharmas," laukikāgradhrmās (vi.19b-c), are prayogamārga. The path that the kṣāntis constitute (vi.18c) is also prayogamārga, but extended (viprakṛṣṭa) prayogamārga (Vyākhya). It is by way of example that Vasubandhu speaks here of the "near preparatory path."

413. In the "perfecting of the faculties" (indriyasamcāra, vi.60c-d) and elsewhere, ānantaryamārga is not the abandoning of āvarana.

414. Vīmuktimārga is the moment of thought which immediately follows the abandoning of the āvarana: the moments which follow vīmuktimārga can be similar to it: "I am delivered!" and are, like it, "liberated paths"; but they are called viśeṣamārga.

415. On viśeṣamārga, vi.32c-d, 61d-62b, vii.18c. The moments of thought that follow the sixteenth moment (vimuktijñāna) of abhisamaya, and which are similar to it (taṣṭaṁya); also all "continuation" of a vimuktijñāna; prolonged kṣayajñāna (vi.45a). So too the path which has for its object the "blisses" (sukhavibhāra) or the taking possession of certain spiritual qualities (vaśesikaguṇābhinirvikāra), see viii.27c.

Paramārtha translates by a gloss: "Viśeṣamārga is the other paths which arise following vīmuktimārga, that is to say, the paths of samādhi, abhiṣikā, indriyasamcāra, etc."

416. Below note 419.

417. esa hi nirvāṇasya panthās tena tadgamanād iti / loke yena gamyate sa mārga iti
pratītiḥ / anena ca nirvāṇam gamyate prāpyate tasmān mārga iti deśayati / mārgayanty anena vetti mārga anvēṣaṇa iti dhātub paṭhyate (10.302) / yena nirvāṇam anviṣyate sa mārgab.

418. This second phrase is glossed: yasmād vā tāhāyām nirupadhisēgan nirvāṇam praviṣati yad[ṛ]utpattan nirupadhisēganvānapravesaḥ. On the two Nirvāṇas, above p. 966.

Others translate: Because, by means of these paths, due to the acquisition of higher and higher paths, one enters nirupadhisēga.

419. Magga distinct from paṭipadā, Ang. ii.79, Majjh. i.147.

420. Dharmaśāntika, TD 26, p. 463a22, Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 482a26-486a5. Digha, iii.228, 229 (two groups of four), Vibhanga, 331 (speaks of samādhi without any other details), Nettipakaraṇa, 113, Visuddhi, 85 (catubbhidbo [samādhi] dukkhāpaṭipadādandhābhiṃnādi-vi-
asena).

Four different paṭipadās, Childers, 364b.

421. For the Vyākhya, these are the dhyānas (dhyānāni) which “flow without any effort being necessary” (ayatnavāni). For Paramārtha: “the paths are, in the dhyānas, realized without effort.” ’bad mi ’dgos par raṅ gis naṅ gis ’byun ba’i phyir = “because, without any
effort being necessary, [the paths] easily arise of themselves.” See vi.71d, viii.23a.

422. On the history of this expression and its first use, see the remarks of E. Hardy, Preface to the Nettipakarana, and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Preface to the Vibhanga. Samyutta, v.227, the bodhapakkhiyas are the indriyas; Vibhanga, 249, the bodhipakkhiyas are the “limbs of Bodhi”; Visuddhimagga, 678, classical list; Patissambhidā, ii.160.

The thirty-seven, without being isolated from other good dharmas, form a group in Ānguttara, i.39 and following.

Classical list of thirty-seven, Dīgha, ii.120; Lotus, 430; Childers, 92; Spence Hardy, Manual, 497; Kern, Manual; Milinda, trans. ii.207; Lalita (Rajendralal), 8, 218; Dharmaśāngraha, 43; Mahāvyutpatti, 38-44; Dharmaśārika, the short edition from Turkestan, Stünner, Ac. de Berlin, 1904, p. 1282 (bodhipākṣika). The thirty-seven are maggabhāvanā, Vinaya, iii.93, iv.126. They include the preparatory path, etc.; see Kota, vi.70.

Variant lists. The Vibhajyāvādins (Vibhhā, TD 27, p. 499a14) have a list of 41, adding the four āryaavāśas (Kota, vi.7). Netti, 112, admits 43 bodhipakkhiyas, placing, says the commentary, six samjñās before the “mindfulness”: anicca, dukkha, anatta, paṭāna, virāga, nirodhasaññā (see Ānguttara, i.41). Buddhaghoṣa (Ānguttara, i. ed. of 1883, p. 98) mentions a list that includes 3 satis, 3 padhānas, 3 īdhipādas, 6 indriyas, 6 balas, 8 bodhyāngas, 9 maggaṅgas; on the other hand Ānguttara, i.53, has six bodhyaṅgas (mindfulness being omitted); and Bhavya tells us that certain masters place the brahmavihāras (compassion, etc.) among the bodhyaṅgas.

The “Bodbhikṣo (vrksa ?)” of Taishō 14, no. 472, is perhaps the Bodhipākṣaṇi deśa of Mahāvyutpatti, 65.57 and of Kanjur, Mdo, 16.

423. Reading of the Vyākhyā. Hsüan-tsang has tsuan 斷 = to cut off = praṇāna; but Paramārtha exactly translates ch‘in 努 = effort = prayatna, utsāha, virya, vyavasāya. The Tibetan version has spon ba = praṇāna. All the Sanskrit sources (Lalita, p. 33, etc.) give praṇāna.

424. Hsüan-tsang digresses from the original. He has:

The path is also called bodhipākṣikāḥ dharmāḥ. How many are they and what is the meaning of this word? The Kārikā says:

The bodhipākṣikās are thirty-seven, namely the four smṛtyupasthānas, etc.; Bodhi is kṣaya and anūtpada; as they are favorable to it, they are called bodhipākṣikās.

The Bhāṣyam says: The Sūtra teaches that there are thirty-seven bodhipākṣikās: four smṛtyupasthānas . . . eight mārgāṅgas. The two consciousnesses of kṣaya and of anūtpada are called Bodhi. There are three types of Bodhi: śrāvakabodhi, pratyekabodhi, and anuttara bodhi. These two consciousnesses are called Bodhi because the anusayas are completely destroyed, because the saints know in truth that he has done that which should have been done and that he has nothing more to do. The thirty-seven dharmas are favorable to Bodhi and are as a consequence called bodhipākṣikās. Are each of these thirty-seven different in their nature? No. The stanza says: . . .

425. On these two jñānas, vi.50, vii.1, 4b, 7.

426. The prajñā of a Prthagjana or of a Śākṣa is not called bodhi because it is not delivered from the totality of ignorance relative to the Three Dhātus.

427. The task is accomplished: duḥkhītaṁ me pariñātam; there will be nothing more to accomplish: duḥkhītaṁ me pariñātam na punaḥ prabhāvayam.

The two jñānas suppose sharp faculties. [Let us correct: the second jñāna supposes . . .]

428. Vibbhā, TD 27, p. 496b18: Why are they called bodhipākṣikās? . . . Kṣaya and anupādajñāna are called Bodhi because they include the complete intelligence (budh) of the Four Truths. If a dharma is favorable to this complete intelligence . . . it is called bodhipākṣika.
Definition of Bodhi in the Yogacara sources, Bodhisattvabhumi, I, vii. Cambridge MSS, fol. 37 (analyzed in Museon, 1911, p. 170). Samantapada, i, 139, explains the different uses of the word, arhatimargabhadana, sabbannutana, etc.

Buddha is understood to be the Sravakas, the Pratyekabuddhas and the Anuttarasamyaksambuddhas (Deva, Catuplatin, 498): all three possess Bodhi as Vasubandhu defines it here. Kośa, i, 1, English trans. p. 55.

Bodhi = pure prajña, p. 1028.

429. Vibhosa, TD 27, p. 496a23, three opinions, ten, eleven, twelve things, see p. 178-179. Mahâyana, nine things, because samyasamkalpa is prajña.

Samikalpa is closely connected to vâc, karmânta, âjiva, p. 1025 See the definition in Dîgha, ii, 312: sammasanikappa = nekkhamma, avyâpa, avibhiṣaṇasaṇikappa. p. 1028, 1030.

430. Paramârtha has a different order: sraddhâ vîrya smrîti samâdhi prajñâ priti upâksa and prasrâbdhi âsila samkalpa, which can give us: sraddhâ vîryam smrîtih sântih (?) prajñâ pritiir upâksanam (?) / prasrâbdhibh âsila samkalpa.

431. This has been explained above p. 927.

432. From the "intentional" point of view (abhiprayavasat), there is nothing wrong in therefore dividing morality into two. But if one takes into consideration the things themselves (mukhyavritya), one will have sixteen things, morality counting for seven (avijnapti, etc.).

433. For example the smrtyupasthânas are principally prajñâ, but they are also vîrya, etc. Prajñâ is the principal element in this, the essential factor, because the other qualities are present by its force.

Qualities arise from cultivation, not "innate" qualities (upapattilabhya).

434. Vyakhya: sarvagunasampattilakaṇñâ rddhis tasmin samâdhu pratiṣṭhitâ, thus samâdhi = rddheb pâdab = rddheb pratisthâ.

On the rddhisphâdas, Majjhima, i,103, Saṁyutta, v,254, Âṅguttara, iv,309 (survives in Kośa, ii,10a, English trans. p. 168); Vibhaṅga, 216; Sûtrâlaṁkâra, svii,51; Madhyamakâvatâra, iv,1 (trans. in Museon), Mahâvyutpatti, 40, Dharmasamgraha, 46.

The formula is classical (Dîgha, iii,221 = Mahâvyutpatti, 40) chandasamâdhisphâpañcikaśarasamanvâyata rddhipâda... [The Pâli has padhâna and vimâna.] The Sûtra says: chandaṁ cāpi bhikṣavo bhikṣur adhipatim kṛtva labbhe samâdhiṁ so’sya bhavati cchanda-samâdhiḥ / citam... vîryam... mîmâṁsâ cāpi bhikṣavo bhikṣur adhipatim kṛtva labbhe samâdhiṁ so’sya bhavati mîmâṁsāsamâdhiḥ. Childers, p. 364b, 390b.

For Vasubandhu rddhipâdaḥ = rddhisphâto; the absorptions are the causes of rddhi; and the absorptions themselves proceed from chanda, vîrya, etc. On rddhi, Kośa, vii,42.

435. See vii,42. anekavidham rddhisphâtyaṁ prayatnabhavati / eko bhûtvâ babudhâ bhavati. .. brahmalokam kâyena vaše vartayata iti ityam ucchaya rddhiḥ / (Mahâvyutpatti, 15, Âṅguttara, iii,280, Dîgha, i,77) rddhipâdaḥ katame / chandasamâdhisphâpaṇcikaśara-samâdhiḥ / mîmâṁsâsamâdhiḥ / ima ucchanta rddhipâdaṁ iti. Hsiian-tsang gives the essentials of this Sûtra (of which Vasubandhu copies only the first words), and concludes: "The Buddha says here that rddhi is the result of absorption and that its 'feet' are the samâdhis arising from out of chanda, etc."


Here the Saṅtrântika (=Vasubandhu) says: There are some other masters who say that rddhi is samâdhi; that the feet of rddhi are chanda, etc. These masters should admit that the bodhiyâksikas are, in their nature, thirteen things, by adding chanda and citta. Furthermore, they contradict the Sûtra which says: "I explain to you the rddhisphâdas. Rddhi, that is to say: he 'experiences' different rddhisphâyas...; the pâda, that is to say, the four samâdhis of
The Buddha says that the result of *samādhi* is *rddhi*, and that the *samādhi* engendered by *chanda*, etc., is *pdda*. The criticism [formulated by Vasubandhu] does not hold. For the masters in question maintain that *samādhi* is *rddhi* and that it is also *rddhipdda*. If *chanda*, *citta*, etc., are called *pdda*, this is in order to indicate the four types of *samādhi* of which they are the cause: one designates the *samādhi*, effect, from the name of its cause, *chanda*, etc. *Samādhi* is of two types: that which dominates (*pradhdnibhavatt*) in the stage preparatory to the roots of good; and that which dominates in the state of fullness (*nispatti*) of the said roots. The first is called *rddhipāda*, the second *rddhi*. This is why the Sūtra says: "*Samādhi* is called *chandasamādhi* when the Bhikṣu obtains it under the predominating influence (*adhipatim krtvd*) of *chanda*": this refers to the *samādhi* of the preparatory stage. The Sūtra then says: "He produces *chanda* . . . he masters, he fixes his mind for the non-production of bad dharmas . . . " (Anguttara, i.39): this refers to the *samādhi* of the stage of fullness of the roots of good. The expression *cittam pragrhndti* indicates *prajñā*, the expression *cittam pranidadhdti* indicates *samādhi*, for this is the characteristic of the *samādhi* of mastering and fixing. The Sūtra says moreover: . . .

437. *Vyākhyā*: *tadvipakṣabhātaitar antarā samudācārād indriyānya avamṛdyante / na tv evam balāni.*

*Aśrāddhāya* is opposed to *śraddhā*; *kaśuddhvā* to *virya*; *muṣṭitvā* to *smṛti*; *vikṣepa* to *samādhi*; *asamprajanya* to *prajñā*.

*Vibhāṣa, TD* 27, p. 726b16. *Indriyas*, because they produce good dharmas; *balas*, because they break up bad dharmas; *indriyas*, because they can be moved, etc.

*Atthasālīni*, 124: *akampiyatphena balam veditabbam . . . assaddhiye na kampatiti . . .* (The list and the explanations do not agree, moreover, with the Abhidharma).

438. *Vyākhyā*: *ādiikārmikanirvedhabhāgīyasy iti pañcārthāṃ ima uktāḥ / bhāvane darśane ceti dve avasthe iti saptasv avasthāsu sapta vargā yathākramam prabhāvyante vyavasthāpyante pradhānākhyānte vā.*

If we were to follow the version of Paramārtha word for word, we would have *ādiikprabhāvitāḥ (?) bhāvanāyāṃ ca dṛṣṭi ca saptavargā yathākramam //*

439. According to Hsian-tsang: "The *smṛtyupasthānas* exists in the beginning state, because *prajñā*, capable of knowing the body, etc., is essential to it."

440. After the Head, one no longer cuts off the roots of good (vi.23a). The *samādbis*, when one is in this state, become the support of success (*samādbher āśrayābhavanti*). This is why the *rddhipādas* are placed in the Head.

441. *Mārga* in the world consists (*prabhāvita*) of progress: *mārga*, "because one goes by means of the *mārga*": or rather "because it goes." As one says: this path (*pantham*) goes to Pāṭaliputra. *Dāśanamārga* is more characterized (*prabhāvita*) by progress than is *bhāvanāmārga*, because it goes quickly (*tasyāśamatvāt*). One who possesses it (*tadvān*) also goes quickly by means of it: one goes by the *bhāvanāmārga* during a long period of time, for it prolongs itself from sphere to sphere.

*Vibhāṣa, TD* 27, p. 497a4. The meaning of "part of the Path" is "searching out" (*mārga*) and "to progress." The Path of Seeing, rapid, without which the mind is interrupted, has the sense of "joyful progress." The parts of the Path are thus essential to it. The meaning of "part of Bodhi" is "to understand." These parts are thus the essential parts of the Path of Meditation which, by its nine stages, repeatedly understands.

442. We can understand either *kāmasaṃkalpa*, or *anubhātavisayasmṛtisamkalpa*. Gardhāśrīta = *trśnāśrīta*; Mahāvyutpatti, 245.1145 has *gredha*.

443. The *satiptaśṭhānas*, *Dīgha*, i.290, *Majjhima*, i.56: *sattānam visuddhiyā . . . ; Dīgha,*
Footnotes

1083

iii.141, diṭṭhinissayasamānaṃ pahānāya; Anguttara, iv.457, sikkhādubbaññasamānaṃ pahānāya.

444. bhāvanāparipūri = bhāvanāyā paripūriḥ.
   Compare, rather distant, Majjhima, iii.85.

445. Kośa, i.4la-b. We know through Vasumitra that the schools are not in agreement whether "worldly" samyagdṛṣṭi exists or not.

446. Patissambhidāmagga, ii.160.

447. viii.22.

448. For, says the Vyākhya, sukhābhigamyam cittam pṛṇāti netarat.


450. Paramārtha: "Excepting morality and the preceding two, in three Ārūpyas."

451. This line is quoted in the Abhisamayālārikārāloka which observes: "This rule concerns the Śrāvakas who are lacking upāyakausalya; but the Bodhisattvas cultivate bhāvanāmārga in Kāmadhātu."

452. Yaśomitra examines how kāyasmrtyupasthāna is possible in Bhavāgra, a problem neglected, he says, by all the commentators (vyākhyākara). The mind of a being in Bhavāgra can, he says, take for its object the anāsravasamvara (iv.13c) of a lower sphere, which is rūpa.

453. We see p. 1033 the meaning of the expression avetyaprasāda.

Vyākhya: "There are four anitya-prasādas: the avetyaprasāda relating to the Buddha, those relating to the Dharma and the Sāṁgha, and the precepts dear to the Saints" (buddhe avetyaprasādo dhamme samgha ca āryakāntai ca śilāmi).

These are the four anīgas of the Śaikṣa (see p. 1033), Dīgha, iii.227, Aṅguttara, iv.106, etc.:... buddhe avcjācappasādana samannāgato boti... dhamme... samgha...; āryakāntebhi śilebi samannāgato boti... [Variant with the usage of laymen, Saṁyutta, iv.304, where the fourth point becomes: "moral and virtuous (śilavanta and kalyānadhamma) we shall give all that we have of things to give (deyyadhamma)."] Hsüan-tsang: "The Sūtra says that there are four avetyaprasādas: relating to the Buddha, the Dharma, the Sāṁgha, and the āryaśīla."

Childers; Majjhima, i.37, Saṁyutta, i.232, v.384, Petavatthu, 48; Avadānaśataka, ii.92, Āṭṭāsābhasirikā, 60; Dharmasakāndha, iii. (Takakusu, JPTS, 1905, p. 112); Mahāvuttpatti, 245, 419; Madhyamakavrtti, 487. Wogihara quotes the expression buddhasasāne avjccappasanna, and the gloss of Haribhadra (ad Āṭṭāsābhasirikā, 59): avetyaprasādāh = avagamyagunāsambhāvanāpurvakāh prasādāh.

454. Hsüan-tsang says: "The Sūtra says that there are four avetyaprasādas: relating to the Buddha, the Dharma, the Sāṁgha, and āryaśīla." One can say that there is avetyaprasāda relating to morality, śīla, for prasāda = purity (see below note 459). But Paramārtha and the Tibetan show that our Kārikā should not be understood: "... obtaining of avetyaprasāda relating to the precepts and the Dharma..."

455. These three truths are Dharma; they are neither Buddha, nor Sāṁgha; therefore the Seeing of these Truths does not confer the two other prasādas.

456. The Truth of the Path is Buddha and Sāṁgha.

Prasāda in the Buddha is to recognize that he is the Tathāgata, Arhat, the Sāmyaksambuddha vidyācaranāsampādana...

The Buddha does not form part of the Sāṁgha (see note ad vii.28); the Bodhisattva and the Pratyekabuddhas do not form part of the Sāṁgha: for they are above leaving the world in solitude; there needs be four persons in order to make up a Sāṁgha. (According to the Sung-chu of Yuan-hui).

Here Dharma is the first three Truths; the pure path of the Bodhisattva in the state of Saikṣa; the path of the Pratyekabuddha in the states of Saikṣa and Aṣaikṣa. The paths of the Buddha and the śrāvakas (Sarhga) are not included under the term Dharma, for, when one understands these paths, what is obtained is prasāda with respect to the Buddha and the Sarhga.

Hsuan-tsang translates: The Dharma, the object of prasāda, is twofold: having a general sense, and a special sense. In the general sense, Dharma is the Four Truths; in the special sense, Dharma is three Truths plus the paths of the Pratyekabuddha and the Bodhisattva. Therefore when one sees the Four Truths, one obtains prasāda relating to the Dharma. The precepts dear to the Āryans come with the Seeing of the Truths.

458. In fact, when one understands the Truth of the Path, one understands that part of the Dharma which consists of the paths of Pratyeka and of Bodhisattva.

459. Here prasāda signifies “purity,” and not “faith.”

460. The prasāda of the mind is threefold: samyaksambuddha vata bhagavān / svākyāto’sya dharmavinayaḥ / supratipanno’sya śrāvakasāṁghaḥ /

461. Samgūṭiparyāya, section of the ten dharmas. This is the list of the asekhiya dharmas of Aṅguttara, v.222 (alluded to in Samgutta, iii.83), where samyagjñāna precedes samyagvinmuktī. The samyagjñāna of Mahāvyutpatti, 199.64 is not a cause.

462. Compare Paśisambhidāmagga, ii.143.


For Vasubandhu, adhimokṣa is not deliverance, but is chanda, virya, etc., which is discussed below note 467.

On adhimokṣa, Kosā, ii.24 (English trans. p. 189, where adhimukti is a mistake), viii.30.

464. The two vimukti, Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 486a28, Samyukta, TD 2, p. 16c24; Puggalapaññatti, 27, 35, 62; Mahāvastu, ii.139.6.

On prajñāvimukta, above vi.64a.

465. The Vyākhyā enumerates the five skandhas which correspond to the dhammakkhandhas of Dīgbo, iii.229, 279, Itivuttaka, 104: sīla, saṃādhi, paññā, vimutti, vimuttiduddhādassana. These are the lokottaraskandhas of Dharmasamgraha, 23, the asamasamāḥ skandhāḥ of Mahāvyutpatti, 4 (to which according to the Buddhabhūmisūtra there is added the expression dharmadhūtiavinmukti), which are also called anāsravaskandhas; the jinaskandhas (rgyal-ba’i phun-po) of the Triglotte.

466. Opinion of Vasubandhu (Vyākhyā).

467. The Sūtra (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 148c17) begins thusly: “Oh Vyāghrabodhāyanas! There are four essential factors of purification: the essential factor of the purification of morality, the essential factor of the purification of absorption ... of views, ... of deliverance.”
pradhanam / iba bhikso ragac cittam viraktaṁ bhavati vimuktam dveṣam mohaṁ viraktaṁ bhavati vimuktam ity aparipūrṇasya va vimuktiskandhasya paripūraye paripūrṇasya vānugrahāya yaś chando viryam ...

Three questions, three responses: (1) vimukti is liberation from rāga, etc.; (2) vimuktiparisuddhi is the paripūra and the anugraha of vimukti; (3) vimuktiparisuddhipradhāna is chanda, etc.

Anguttara, ii.194, where Ānanda explains to the Vyagghapajjas the pārisuddhipadhāniyāgam, presents some variations.

Same text quoted Kośa, viii.1.

468. And the purity of the mind does not differ from the mind, ghṛtamanḍasvaccatāvat.

469. The 'arising' mind is of the future. On āvarama, āvri, Kośa, ii. English trans. p. 223, vi.64a-b, 65b-d.

470. a. Nyāyāmasā (TD 29, p. 733a8, utilizing Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 140b25, and quoted by Saeki, Kośa, xxv, 18a): The Śāstracaryas (=the masters of the Abhidharma) say: "It is the detached (virakta) mind which obtains deliverance." The Vibhajyavadins say: "It is the non-detached (sārāga) mind which obtains deliverance. As one takes away the impurities from a dirty (samala) vase, and as crystal takes up different colors by reason of the diversity of the colors of the body which it covers, so too the pure mind, soiled by craving (rāga), etc., is called 'endowed with craving' (sārāga) and later becomes again liberated (bos huant chieh-tuo)". Scripture (āryadesanā) says that the mind, in its original nature, is pure (hsin pen hsing ching); sometimes it is defiled by adventitious dust (āgāntuka)." This opinion is not correct, for the dharmas perish from moment to moment. One does not get rid of the impurities of a vase, for the impurities, along with the vase, arise from moment to moment.

The Andhakas of the Kathavatthu, iii.3, are of the same opinion as the Vibhajyavadins: it is the defiled mind which is delivered from defilement. "As a dirty piece of clothing, being washed, is freed from the dirt, so to the mind endowed with craving is liberated from this craving" (sārāgarag cittam sārāga [frequently rāgato] vimuccati.

b. Compare Anguttara, i.10 (i.255, 257, iii.16): pabbassaram idam bhikkhave cittam tam ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesebi upakkiliṣṭham ... pabbassaram idam bhikkhave cittam tam ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesebi vippmuttam. This can be understood: The mind is pure in and of itself; sometimes it is defiled by adventitious defilements, and sometimes it is freed from these defilements. The Mahāsāṅghikas (Ekavyavahārikas), according to Vasumitra, affirm the existence of a "pure mind"; according to the Tibetan version (from which the Chinese translators deviate, Taisho 49, no. 2032), they make this their ninth asamskrta (Correct, on this point, the notes on p. 65, 186, of my Nirvāṇa). Kośa, v. English trans. p. 768. Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.106.

Buddhaghosa (Atthasālīni, 140) says that the mind is pure (parisuddhatthena pandaram) to the extent that it is the bhaganga, that is to say the "subconscious life-continuum" of Mrs. Rhys Davids. Any mind, even bad, is pure because it leaves (nīkkanta) bhavaṅga. On bhavaṅga, Visuddhimagga, passim, Compendium, 9, 266, Nettipakarana, 91, Milinda, 300, sources mentioned and criticized by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Quest Review, 1917, Oct. p. 16, Buddhist Psychology, 171, 178 (1914), 233 (1924), trans. of Dhammasaṅgāyi, 3, 132, 134. Nirvāṇa (1925), 39, 66.

There is a close relationship between the "pure mind" of the Anguttara and the tathāgataragharba of the Lāṅka, which is pure, similar to a jewel covered by impurities, and which transmigrates, whereas the manas does not transmigrate.


472. When one wishes to distinguish; but virāga signifies "abandoning," bhedavivākṣyāṁ evam ucyate / abhedavivākṣyāṁ tu yo virāgas tat prabhānam apy ucyate.

Opinions differ (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 149b18). For example, for Ghoṣaka, prabhānapadhātu
is abandoning of the defilements, \textit{virāgadbātu} is disconnection from objects, and \textit{nirodhadbātu} is the putting down of the burden. For some others, we have, in this order, abandoning of sensation which is disagreeable, agreeable, and indifferent. Or abandoning, in this order, of the three sufferings (vi.3), of the Three Dhātus, of the defilements of the past-present-future. Pārśva understands \textit{nirodhadbātu} as the \textit{nirodha} of the series.

This chapter of the \textit{Vibhāṣā} quotes the Sūtra where Ānanda asks what are the \textit{dharmas} that the monk should practice in his meditations in order to be termed a Sthavira. Two \textit{dharmas}, \textit{samatha}, calm, and \textit{vipaśyanā}, insight or intelligence; for the mind perfumed by \textit{samatha} can obtain \textit{vimukti} by means of \textit{vipaśyanā}. An explanation of the Three Dhātus follows.

473. See v.60 and following, ii. English trans. p. 281.

474. What he obtains is not abandoning, which has already been realized by a worldly path, but \textit{anāsravā visāmyogaprāpti}, the pure possession of disconnection (vi.46). But the "detached" ascetic necessarily abandons by means of \textit{anvayajñānaksāntis} and \textit{anvayajñānas}, since no worldly path bears on Bhavāgra (vi.45c).

475. Nor any longer by means of the \textit{ānantaryamārgas} of the perfectioning of the faculties, etc. (vi.61).