CHAPTER SEVEN

The Knowledges

O

rn. Homage to the Buddha.

We have spoken of the ksāntis or Patiences (vi. 25d) and of the jñānas or Knowledges (vi. 26b), of samyagdṛṣṭi or Right Views (vi. 50c) and of samyagijñāna or Right Knowledge (vi. 76c). Are the Patiences actually Knowledges, and isn’t Right Knowledge identical to Right Views?

la. The pure Patiences are not a type of Knowledge.

The eight types of pure Patience which form part of the Path of Seeing (ābhīsamaññantika, vi. 25d-26c) are not, by their nature, knowledge; for, at the moment of patience, the defilement of doubt, which each Patience abandons, is not already abandoned. But Knowledge is certain: it is produced when doubt is abandoned. These eight types of Patience are Seeing, because, by their nature, they are examination. In opposition to the pure Patiences which are Seeing and are not Knowledge,

lb. The prajñā of destruction and of non-arising is not seeing.

The knowledge of destruction (ksayajñāna) and the knowledge of Non-Arising (anupadajñāna, vi. 67a-b)—when they constitute Bodhi—are not Seeing, because they do not include examination, and because the intention of inquiry is not in them.
lc. All other pure *prajñā* is both one and the other.

Besides the Patiences and the two Knowledges named above, pure *prajñā* is at one and the same time both seeing and knowledge, for it includes examination, and is therefore seeing; it is free from doubt, and is therefore knowledge. This refers to the eight *abhisamaya* knowledges (*duḥkhe jñāna*, etc., vi. 26) [and also to all *prajñā* of the pure Path of Meditation up to the Knowledge of Extinction].

Id. All other *prajñā* is knowledge.

All other *prajñā* which is not pure, but worldly or impure [i.e., *prajñā* associated with the five sense consciousnesses, etc., and *prajñā* associated with the mental consciousness].

le. Six are also seeing.

Six impure *prajñās* are at one and the same time knowledge and seeing, namely the mental *prajñā* associated with the five defilements which are views by nature (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*, etc., v7) and, sixth, good *prajñā*, which is right worldly views (*laukikī samyagdṛṣṭi*, i.41).

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How many knowledges are there? There are ten; but, in short there are only two:

2a. Knowledge is pure or impure.

All the Knowledges are subsumed into two types of knowledge,
impure or worldly knowledge, and pure or supermundane knowledge. Of these two knowledges,

2b. The first is called conventional.⁸

Impure Knowledge is called "knowledge conforming to worldly conventions."

Why?

Because from usage it bears on (ālambate) things which exist conventionally:⁹ a jug, clothing, male, female, etc. [We say "from usage," because it also bears on the real characteristics of things, unique characteristics and common characteristics, vii. 10b].

2c-d. Pure knowledge is of two types, a knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge.¹⁰

These two knowledges with the preceding make three knowledges: worldly, conventional knowledge, a knowledge of dharmas, and inferential knowledge. Among these,

3a. Conventional knowledge bears on all.¹¹

All the conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are the object of conventional knowledge.

3b-c. The knowledge of dharmas has for its object the Suffering, etc., of Kāmadhātu.

The knowledge of dharmas has Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinction of Suffering, and the Path leading to the Extinction of Suffering of Kāmadhātu for its object.
3c-d. Inferential knowledge bears on Suffering, etc., of the higher spheres.

Inferential knowledge has the Suffering, the Origin of Suffering... of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu for its object.

4a-b. When one takes into consideration the distinction of the Truths, these two knowledges, make up four knowledges.

Namely: the knowledge of Suffering (which includes the knowledge of the dharmas of Suffering and the inferential knowledge of Suffering), the knowledge of Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, and the knowledge of the Path, because these two knowledges have Suffering, its Origin, etc., for their object.

4b-c. These two knowledges, fourfold, are termed the knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.\textsuperscript{12}

The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge, which are as we have just seen fourfold by reason of their objects, are, among the Arhats, when they are not of the nature of Seeing,\textsuperscript{13} called the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

4d-5a. At the moment when they arise, they are inferential knowledges of Suffering and Origin.

The Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising, at the moment when they first arise are, by their nature, inferential knowledge of Suffering and of its Origin in the higher
spheres, because they have for their object the *skandhas* of Bhavāgra\(^{14}\) under the aspects of Suffering and Origin.\(^{15}\) These two knowledges therefore have the same object.

The Knowledge of Destruction follows Vajropamasamādhi (vi. 44d); and the Knowledge of Non-Arising follows the Knowledge of Destruction.

Does Vajropamasamādhi have the same object as these two knowledges at the moment of their arising?

When it has Suffering and Origin for its object, yes; when it has Extinction and the Path for its object, no.

5b. The knowledge of the mind of another follows from four.

The knowledge of the mind of another follows four knowledges, a knowledge of the *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.\(^{16}\)

5c-d. It does not know a mind in a higher sphere, faculties, personalities, nor the past and future.\(^{17}\)

A mind is superior either from the point of view of its *bhūmi*, from the point of view of its *indriyas*, or from the point of view of its personality.

The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower sphere does not know a mind in a higher sphere.

The knowledge of the mind of another of a saint with weak faculties, namely a Śraddhādhimukta or a Samayavimukta (vi. 31c), does not know the mind of a saint of strong faculties, namely a Drśṭīprāpta or a Asamayavimukta.

The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower saint does not know the mind of a higher saint: in order, Anāgāmin, Arhat,
Pratyekabuddha, Samyaksarīṇbuddha.¹⁸

When the mind of another is either past or future, the knowledge of a mind of another does not know it, for this knowledge has a present mind for its object.

Does the mind of another avoid being in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another in other cases as well?

6a-b. The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledges do not know one another.

The knowledge of the mind of another, when it is by its nature a knowledge of dharmas, is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature inferential knowledge; when it is inferential by nature, it is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature a series of dharmas.

Why?

Because these two knowledges have for their object the dharmas which are opposed to Kāmadhātu and to the higher spheres respectfully.

There is no knowledge of the mind of another in the Path of Seeing. That is to say, an ascetic, while he cultivates the Path of Seeing, is not endowed with the knowledge of the mind of another, because the duration of the Path of Seeing is much reduced, and because the Seeing of the Truths is rapid. But the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing can be the object of the knowledge of the mind of another.

When one desires to know, through the knowledge of the mind of another, the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing, one cultivates a preparatory exercise:
6b-d. The Śrāvaka knows two moment of Seeing; the Pratyekabuddha, three; the Buddha, without preparation, all.

When a Śrāvaka cultivates the knowledge of the mind of another in the desire to see the mind of an ascetic in the Path of Seeing, he obtains some knowing of the first two moments, the Patience of the Knowledge of the dharma of Suffering and the knowledge of dharma — but not the following moments (the Patience of the Inferential Knowledge of Suffering...) — because the knowledge of the inferential part (Suffering in the higher spheres) of the Path of Seeing supposes a different preparatory exercise. Thus, if this Śrāvaka then begins a new exercise in order to obtain the knowledge of the inferential part, the ascetic whom he examines has already arrived at the fifteenth moment when this new preparatory exercise [which lasts thirteen moments] is finished. The whole interval between the twelfth and the sixteenth moment therefore is not in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another of the Śrāvaka (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 515c7).

In the same circumstances, the Pratyekabuddha knows three moments, namely the first two and the eighth; because the required preparatory exercise, after the consciousness of the first two moments, for the knowledge of the inferential part, is, among the Pratyekabuddhas, weak.

According to other masters, he knows the first two moments and the fifteenth.

The Buddha, through simple desire, and without preparatory exercise, knows the mind of another in all the moments of the Path of Seeing.

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What are the characteristics of the Knowledge of Destruction
and of the Knowledge of Non-Arising?

7. The knowledge of destruction is, with respect to the Truths, the certitude that they are known, abandoned, etc.; the knowledge of non-arising is the certitude that they are no longer to be known, to be abandoned, etc.\textsuperscript{21}

According to the \textit{Mūlaśāstra},\textsuperscript{22} "What is the knowledge of extinction?\textsuperscript{23} When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me, its Origin is abandoned by me, its Extinction has been actualized by me, the Path has been cultivated by me,' then the knowledge which results from this (\textit{tad upādāya yaj jñānam}),\textsuperscript{24} the seeing, the knowing, the intuition, the intelligence, the discernment, the clarity, the insight,\textsuperscript{25} is what is called the Knowledge of Destruction." "What is the Knowledge of Non-Arising? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me and is no longer to be known... the Path is no longer to be cultivated', then this knowledge... is what is called the Knowledge of Non-Arising." [See the definition vii. 12a-b.]

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But how can one, through a pure knowledge, have such a knowledge?\textsuperscript{26}

The Masters of Kaśmīr explain: Two conventional knowledges are consecutive to two pure knowledges: "Suffering is known by me...; Suffering is known by me and is no longer to be known." It is by reason of the characteristic of these two conventional knowledges that the Śāstra defines the two pure knowledges. [This is why the Śāstra says: \textit{tad upādāya}...]\textsuperscript{27}

According to other masters,\textsuperscript{28} the ascetic knows, through a pure knowledge, that he knows Suffering, etc.
But we have said that the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising are not seeing, or views. How can the Śāstra define them as views?

The Śāstra employs the term “view” through stylistic habit, using again the formula employed in the definition of the other knowledges (the knowledge of Suffering, etc.). Or rather, by reason of their characteristic of being directly perceived, these two knowledges are qualified as seeing. It is by reason of this characteristic of being directly perceived that it says in the Śāstra, “Knowledge is seeing.”

There are ten knowledges: a knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, worldly, conventional knowledge, the knowledge of the mind of another, the knowledge of Suffering, the knowledge of Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, the knowledge of the Path, the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

How are they included in one another?

1. Conventional knowledge is made up of one knowledge, namely the conventional knowledge, and one part of another knowledge [namely the impure part of the knowledge of the mind of another].

2. A knowledge of dharmas is made up of one full knowledge and one part of seven other knowledges, namely the Kāmadhātu part of the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of extinction, and of the Path, the knowledge of the mind of another, the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

3. So too inferential knowledge, by replacing “the Kāmadhātu
part” with “the part relating to the two higher spheres (=Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu).”

4. The knowledge of suffering is made up of one knowledge and one part of four other knowledges—that part of the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising which have the Truth of Suffering for their objects.

5-6. The knowledge of origin and of extinction are explained according to the same principle.

7. A knowledge of the Path is made up of one knowledge and one part of five knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction, the knowledge of Non-Arising, and the knowledge of the mind of another.

8. The knowledge of the mind of another is made up of one knowledge and one part of four knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.

9. The Knowledge of Destruction is made up of one knowledge and one part of six knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of extinction, and of the Path.35

10. So too the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

How are the knowledges, which are twofold (pure and impure) distributed into ten knowledges?

8. The knowledges are ten in number; the distinction is established by reason of their nature, their opposition, their aspect, their aspect and their object, their preparatory exercises, the achievement of their task, and the extension of their cause.

1. By reason of its nature, there is conventional knowledge, because it is not absolute knowledge.36
2. By reason of their opposition, there is knowledge of the dharmas and inferential knowledge: the first is opposed to Kamadhātu, and the second is opposed to the higher spheres.\textsuperscript{37}

3. By reason of their aspect (ākārataś, vii.13), there is a knowledge of Suffering and a knowledge of Origin: these two knowledges have the same object (i.e., the pañcāpadānakandhas, vi. English trans. p. 898 and 908), but differ in their aspects.\textsuperscript{38}

4. By reason of their aspect and their object (ālambana), there is a knowledge of Extinction and a knowledge of the Path which differ in their aspects as well as in their objects.

5. By reason of their preparatory exercises, there is the knowledge of the mind of another. Without doubt this knowledge extends also to the mental states (caittās) of another, but the preparatory exercise bears on the mind (cittā); also, even though it may know the caittās, it is termed paracittājñāna (the knowledge of the mind of another) by reason of its preparatory exercise.

6. Because "that which should have been done has been done," there is the Knowledge of Destruction: this knowledge is the first knowledge to arise in a series in which "that which should have been done has been done." [The Knowledge of Non-Arising arises in a similar series, but later.]

7. By reason of the extension of its causes, there is the Knowledge of Non-Arising, for it has for its causes (=sabhāgābetu) all the pure knowledges, up to and including the Knowledge of Destruction.

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We have said that the knowledge of the dharmas [that is to say: a. bearing on the Four Truths, b. in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation] is opposed to all of Kāmadhātu [that is to say it "opposes" the five categories of defilements, those abandoned through the Seeing of the Four Truths and through Meditation, of Kāmadhātu]. Furthermore
9a-c. The knowledge of dharmas, in the Pathway of Meditation, when it bears on Extinction and the Path, is opposed to the three spheres.

A knowledge of dharmas with respect to Extinction and the Path, realized in the course of the Path of Meditation is opposed to the three spheres—that is to say, these two knowledges oppose the defilements of the higher spheres which are abandoned through Meditation.39

9d. Inferential knowledge is not opposed to Kāmadhātu.

In none of its branches (Suffering, etc.) is inferential knowledge opposed to the defilements of Kāmadhātu.

What are the aspects of the ten knowledges?

10a-b. A knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge have sixteen aspects.

The sixteen aspects which will be explained later (vii. 13a).

10b-c. Conventional knowledge is the same and otherwise.

Conventional knowledge has the sixteen aspects; it also takes up others, for it grasps unique characteristics, common characteristics, etc.40

10c-d. Four, because of the aspect of their Truth.41

A knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, and the Path, bearing on the aspects of their Truths, each have four aspects.

11a-b. So too, when it is pure, the knowledge of the mind of another.42
The knowledge of the mind of another, in its impure part (vii. 5b-6, note 16), bears on the aspects of its Truth; it therefore has four aspects. This part of the knowledge of the mind of another is, in fact, made up of the knowledge of the Path.

llb-c. When it is impure, it has for its aspects the unique characteristics of its object. When the knowledge of the mind of another is impure, it grasps the unique characteristics of its object (jñeya), namely the mind and the mental states of another. Its aspects are in conformity with these unique characteristics; therefore they are not included in the sixteen.

Pure or impure

lld. It has for its sphere an individual object. When it bears on a mind, it does not bear on a mental state (caitta); when it bears on a certain mental state (vedanā for example), it does not bear on any other one (samjñā, for example).

If this is the case, why did the Blessed One say, "He knows in truth the mind which is sarāga (possesses craving) as being sarāga", since the knowledge of the mind of another does not know minds and mental states (craving, etc.) at one and the same time, in the same way that one does not grasp the cloth and its stain at one and the same time?

The expression sarāga, possessing craving, has two meanings. A mind is sarāga because it is "mixed" with craving, or because it is "united" to craving.

The mind associated with craving (ii. 53c), that is to say, which is presently in the prey of craving, is sarāga for two reasons; it is mixed with craving, and it is united to craving.
Any other impure mind\textsuperscript{49} is solely \textit{sarāga} to the extent that it is united to craving.

Certain masters\textsuperscript{50} think that the Sūtra, by the expression \textit{sarāgacitta} solely designates a mind mixed with craving, that is to say, a mind associated with craving. As for the \textit{vigatarāga} mind, a mind without craving, this is, according to these masters, the mind opposed to craving. In fact, they say, if the mind not associated with craving were called \textit{vigatarāga}, the mind associated with the other defilements (hatred, etc.) would be also termed \textit{vigatarāga}, for they are not associated with craving.

Objection: In this hypothesis a non-defiled, indeterminate mind (ii. 71b) is not \textit{sarāga}, since it is not associated with craving; it is not \textit{vigatarāga}, since it is not opposed to craving. As a consequence we must admit that what the other masters (the Ābhidhārmikas) say, that the mind is \textit{sarāga} through the fact of being united to craving, without it necessarily being mixed with craving. In this same way we must explain the other expressions of the Sūtra up to “possessing delusion” (\textit{samoha}) and “not possessing delusion” (\textit{vigatamoha}). [See above, note 45.]

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[The Vaibhāṣikas say:] A good mind is called concentrated because it is not turned away from its object.\textsuperscript{51} A defiled mind is distracted, because it is associated with distraction.

The Westerners, or Masters of Gandhāra, say: A mind associated with laziness is concentrated;\textsuperscript{52} a distracted mind is any other defiled mind.

[The Vaibhāṣikas] do not admit this definition. They say: In this system, the same mind, namely a defiled mind associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted. Further, this system contradicts the \textit{Mūlaśāstra} (according to the Japanese editor, \textit{Jñānaprasthāna}, 15.9), which
says, "He knows in truth the concentrated (samkṣipta) mind, endowed with the four knowledges, a knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, worldly conventional knowledge, and a knowledge of the Path" (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 950c8). [See below, p. 1102 - 3.]

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A defiled mind is sunken down, because it is associated with indolence.⁵³

A good mind is "well in hand", because it is associated with correct effort.⁵⁴

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A defiled mind is called small, because it is beloved by small persons. A good mind is called large, because it is beloved by great persons.⁵⁵

Or rather the two minds, a defiled mind and a good mind, are called small and great because their roots, their worth, their followings, their entourage, and their forces, are respectively, small or great.

In fact, 1. a defiled mind is of small roots, having two roots, delusion, plus anger or greed: a good mind is always associated with three roots of good; 2. a defiled mind is of small worth, being obtained without effort: a good mind is of great worth, being realized at the cost of great effort; 3. a defiled mind has a small following, for a defiled mind is not accompanied by the acquisition of a future mind of the same type;⁵⁶ a good mind has a great following, being accompanied by the acquisition of future mind of the same type; 4. a defiled mind has a small following, being surrounded only by three skandhas, vedanā, samjñā, and saṃskāras; a good mind has a great following, for it always includes rūpa (dhyānānāsravasamvara, iv. 4a, 26); 5. a defiled mind is of small
force, for the roots of good, cut off, are reborn (ii. 36, English trans. p. 210 iv. 80c); a good mind is of great force, for the Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas concerned with Suffering definitively cuts off ten latent defilements (anusayas vi. English trans. p. 943).

This is why a defiled mind is called small, and a good mind, great.

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The defiled mind is sa-uttara, because it is associated with frivolity (auddhatya); the good mind is anuttara, because it is opposed to frivolity.58

Calm and not calm minds are explained in the same way.

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A defiled mind is non-absorbed, because it is associated with distraction; a good mind is absorbed, because it is opposed to distraction.

A defiled mind is uncultivated, because the two cultivations (vii. 27) are absent. A good mind is cultivated, for the contrary reason.

A defiled mind is undelivered, not being delivered in and of itself, nor delivered with regard to the series in which it arises.59 A good mind can be delivered in and of itself and from the point of view of the series in which it arises.

Such is the explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas.

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This explanation, [say the Sautrāntikas,] does not conform to the Sūtra and it does not take into account the meaning of the terms.
i. How does it not conform to the Sūtra?

The Sūtra says, "What is a mind internally concentrated? A mind which is accompanied by torpor and laziness, or a mind internally accompanied by calm but not insight."

"What is a mind externally distracted? A mind which is dispersed towards the five objects of pleasure, or which is externally accompanied by insight, but not by calm." [It results from this text that a mind associated with laziness can be concentrated.]

But, [the Vaibhāṣikas answer,] we have said (p. 1100, line 21) that if a mind associated with laziness is concentrated, a defiled (and consequently distracted) mind, when it is associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted.

Yes, you have said this, but it does not hold. In fact, we can only affirm that a defiled mind, when it is associated with laziness, is distracted.

But, [answer the Vaibhāṣikas,] your thesis contradicts the Śāstra!

It may. But it is better to contradict a Śāstra than a Sūtra.

ii. How does this explanation lack the proper meaning of the different terms?

Because it gives the characteristics of different minds—distracted, sunken-down, small, not calm, non-absorbed, uncultivated, and undelivered on the one hand, and concentrated, well in hand, etc., on the other hand—without noting their differences.

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer:] It is false that we do not indicate the special sense of the different terms. The quality of "defiled" of distracted minds, etc., is the same; but we explain the particular defects of these different defiled minds. In the same way we explain the particular qualities of the different good minds, in which their good qualities are not differentiated.

We answer that the meaning of the different terms is not correctly established because you fail to eliminate the objection of
contradiction with the Sūtra.\textsuperscript{64} [The Sūtra, in fact, says that a mind accompanied by torpor and laziness is concentrated. A mind united with laziness, and defiled through union with torpor, is concentrated, but it cannot be good, for torpor is a \textit{kleśamahābhūmika}.]

And if, [as the Vaibhāṣikas believe], the Sūtra designates, by the sunken-down mind,\textsuperscript{65} a small mind, it would not speak separately of a sunken-down mind and a small mind. Now it distinguishes them, for it says, "When the mind is sunken down, or fears becoming sunken down, this is not a proper time to cultivate the \textit{praśrabdhi}, \textit{samādhi}, and \textit{upekṣa} parts of Bodhi. When the mind is small or fears becoming small, this is not a fitting moment to cultivate the \textit{dharma-vaicāya}, \textit{vīrya}, and \textit{pṛiti} parts of Bodhi."\textsuperscript{66}

Objection [of the Vaibhāṣikas:] Is the cultivation of the parts of Bodhi partial in the case which concerns us?\textsuperscript{67} [Must we believe that at a certain moment one cultivates \textit{praśrabdhi}, \textit{samādhi}, \textit{upekṣa}, and at another moment \textit{dharma-vaicāya}, \textit{vīrya}, and \textit{pṛiti}?]\textsuperscript{68}

No. When the text says "cultivation", it does not signify the fact of actualizing, but the fact of fixing the attention on, or taking as an object.

[Answer of the Vaibhāṣikas:]\textsuperscript{69} The mind in which indolence dominates and in which frivolity is reduced is called "sunken down" (\textit{līna}). The mind in which frivolity dominates and in which indolence is reduced is called "small" (\textit{uddhata}). These two minds are therefore distinct, and the Sūtra can speak of them separately without contradicting our system. But, taking into consideration the fact that these two defilements, indolence and frivolity, coexist in a single mental heap, we say that the mind which is sunken down is small.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{71}We do not pretend to challenge a text of intentional meaning; but such is not the intention of the Sūtra [i.e., to designate a mind in which indolence dominates as sunken down...]

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In the thesis presented above (p. 1099, line 23) that all minds “united with craving” (rāgasamīyukta) “possess craving” (sarāga), what is the meaning of the expression rāgasamīyukta, united with craving?

1. If a mind is united with craving, and as a consequence possesses craving, because the possession of craving continues in the series in which this mind is produced, then the mind of an imperfect saint or Śaikṣa, even when it is pure, will be termed “possessing craving”, since the craving has not been completely expelled from the series of the Śaikṣa.\(^72\)

2. If a mind is both united with craving and possesses craving through the fact of being the object (ālambana) of the “active craving”\(^73\), then the impure mind of an Arhat will possess craving, since this mind can be the object of the craving of another person.\(^74\)

If you do not admit that the mind of an Arhat can be grasped as an object through the craving of another person, how can this mind be termed impure?

Would you say that it is impure, not because it is the object of the craving of another, but because it is the object of a “general defilement” (sāmānyaklesa, v. 12, namely of ignorance or delusion) of another? In this hypothesis, do not say that this mind is sarāga, that it “possesses craving”; say rather that it is samoha, that it “possesses moha,” since it is the object of the moha or ignorance of another.

But, we would say, none of these proposed explanations is valid. In fact the knowledge of the mind of another does not bear on the “possessions” which can be found in the series of another. Consequently when I know that the mind of another person possesses craving, this mind of another does not possess craving because it is “united with craving” in the sense that it is accompanied by the possession of craving, or in the sense that it is found in the series in which this possession has not been expelled.

The knowledge of the mind of another no longer knows the craving which would be the object of the mind of another.
Therefore a mind is not termed sarāga through the fact of rāgasammyoga, through the fact of being “united with rāga” in the proposed twofold sense.

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[Objection:] If this is the case, what is a sarāga mind?

[Vasubandhu:] One should determine the intention of the Sūtra. A sarāga mind or one “possessing craving” is not a rāgasammyukta mind, a mind “united to craving”, but a rāgasamprayukta mind, a mind “associated with craving,” a mind in which craving presently exists. Vigatarāga, “without craving” is a mind which is not associated with craving, even when this mind will be accompanied by the possession of craving.

[Objection:] The expression vigatarāga cannot have this meaning; for another Sūtra says that a mind which is without craving (vigatarāga), without anger (vigatadvesa), and without ignorance (vigatamoha), does not fall back into threefold existence. Now if this mind is accompanied by the possession of craving, etc., it will fall back again.

[Vasubandhu:] In this other Sūtra, “a mind without craving” (vigatarāga citta) signifies “a mind which is not accompanied by the possession of craving” (vigatarāgaprāpti citta).

[Objection:] Have you not refuted your own opinion? We said in fact (page 1100, line 5) that if one calls a mind without craving vigatarāga, that is, a mind in which craving is not presently active, then one should term all minds associated with another defilement vigatarāga. But one does not say that a mind associated with hatred is vigatarāga, “without craving.”

[Vasubandhu:] There is nothing wrong with saying that a mind without craving is vigatarāga. But one does not consider a mind without craving but associated with hatred as being vigatarāga, but rather as “possessing hatred” (sadvesa), distinguishing it through its specific characteristic which is one of being
"associated with hatred."

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When the knowledge of the mind of another attains its object, namely the mind of another person, does it attain this mind of another as this latter knows it?

No. When one knows the mind of another, one does not see the object of this mind; one does not see this mind as it itself knows something: one knows only that it is defiled, etc.; one does not know the object, color, etc., by reason of which it is defiled. If it were otherwise, the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on rūpa, etc., and would no longer be the knowledge of the mind of another; the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on itself: for the person whose mind I know can at the same moment know my mind.

The characteristics of the knowledge of the mind of another are set: it knows the individual characteristics of a thing (the dravya-svalakṣaṇa) but not its general, conventionally true characteristics (its sanvṛtisat-sāmānyalakṣaṇa); it knows mind and mental states but not physical matter, the present but not the past or future, of another but not of oneself, of the sphere of Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, but not of Ārūpyadhātu; or rather the pure mind and mental states, of the category to which he himself belongs: pure, he knows a pure mind and mental states; impure, he knows an impure mind and mental states. The knowledge of the mind of another is incompatible with the Path of Seeing and the Uninterrupted Path (ānantaryamārga), with the Samādhi of Emptiness and the Samādhi of No-Marks, and with the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising. Other conditions are not excluded: the knowledge of the mind of another is compatible with the Path of Meditation (the Path of Liberation, vipaścittimārga, and the Path of Distinction, viśesamārga), with the Uncommitted Samadhi (apraṇibitasamādhi), etc.

The teaching of the knowledge of the mind of another is ended.
12a-b. The other has fourteen aspects by excluding the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of non-self.

The "others" are the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

Both have fourteen aspects (vii. 13a), excluding the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of non-self. In fact, these two Knowledges, even though they are of the absolute level of truth, are also included in the conventional level of truth (vi. 4); they are therefore foreign to the aspects of emptiness and non-self. When an ascetic departs from the contemplation in which the knowledges of the absolute truth are realized, through the force of these knowledges, later knowledges are produced which are of the conventional level of truth: "my births are cut off, the religious life has been fully cultivated, I have done what should have been done, and I do not know of any more existences for me." The two knowledges, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising, therefore participate in the conventional level of truth, not in and of themselves or through definition, but through their outflowing.

Are there any pure aspects outside of these sixteen aspects?

12c. There are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.

The Masters of Kaśmīr say that there are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.

12d. Some others, according to the Śāstra, affirm that there are.
The Foreign Masters maintain the opposite opinion. [For the opinion of “the other masters,” see p. 1094, line 27].

The Mālaśāstra says,⁸⁰ "Can one distinguish the dharmas belonging to Kāmadr̥t̥u through a mind not included among the Dhūtus (that is to say, pure)? One can distinguish them as they are, as impermanent, suffering, empty, impersonal, cause, proximate cause, near cause, specifying cause; there is this characteristic (sthāna), there is this cause (vastu)."

One should thus consider the specific aspects through the expressions asty etat sthānam, asty etad vastu, as two pure aspects which are added to the eight aspects of suffering and origin.

According to the Masters of Kaśmir, the Śāstra does not teach the existence of these two additional aspects. One should understand, "... it is fitting (asty ayam yogah) that a pure mind distinguish these dharmas as impermanent..."

The Foreign Masters answer that this interpretation is not admissible. For, if the Śāstra employs the terms asty etat sthānam... without referring to the pure aspects, but only through simple phraseology, it would also employ them in a parallel passage, namely when it explains, "Can one distinguish the dharmas belonging to Kāmadr̥t̥u by a mind susceptible of being abandoned by Seeing the Truths? Yes, one can distinguish them, namely, one becomes attached to, one hates, one prides oneself, one errs, one erroneously distinguishes these dharmas as self, mine (kāya-dr̥ṣṭi), as eternal or perishable (antagr̥hadr̥ṣṭi), as non-cause, non-action, nonexistent (mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi), as supreme, excellent, distinguished, superior (dṛṣṭiparāmarsa), as purification, deliverance, salvation (śilavrataparāmarsa), with anxiety, disagreement, or doubt."⁸¹ This text should have the expressions asty etat sthānam..., if they solely signify asty ayam yogah, in the sense that it is fatal that a mind susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths considers the dharmas as self, mine...
How many things constitute the sixteen aspects?

13a. The aspects are sixteen things.\(^{82}\)

Certain masters said that the aspects, sixteen in name, are only seven in fact. The four aspects of the Truth of Suffering are in fact distinct from one another. The aspects of the other Truths, in their fourfold name, only constitute one thing for each Truth: \textit{hetu} (material cause), \textit{samudaya} (arising or origin), \textit{prabhava} (appearance), and \textit{pratyaya} (efficient condition) are synonyms and are only one aspect; in the same way that Śakra, Indra, and Purāṇḍara are different names for one and the same personage. Ascetics contemplate, separately, the four aspects of the Truth of Suffering, and any one of the aspects, material cause, etc., of the three other Truths.

But [the Vaibhāṣikas] maintain that the sixteen aspects exist in fact, [for they should be contemplated one by one].\(^{83}\)

I. For the Truth of Suffering:

1. Impermanence, because it arises dependent upon efficient causes.

2. Suffering, because it is painful by nature (vi. 3).

3. Empty, as it opposes the belief in the view of things pertaining to self.

4. No soul, as it opposes the belief in a self.

II. For the Truth of Origin:

1. Cause (\textit{betu}), because it has the characteristic of a seed (\textit{bijadharma}yogena). The \textit{betu} is a distant or material cause. The word \textit{yoga} signifies \textit{nyāya} or truth.

2. Arising, as it produces. This is the near cause, that from which a \textit{dharma} immediately arises or originates.

3. Successive appearance, which constitutes the series: seed,
4. Efficient conditions (*pratyaya*), as realizing an effect in joint causation; for example, the coming together of efficient conditions—earth, stick, wheel, twine, water, etc.—produces a jug (see ii. 64).

III. For the Truth of Extinction:

1. Extinction, by reason of the destruction of the [impure] *skandhas*.
2. Calm, by reason of the extinction of the three fires, craving, anger, and delusion (viii. 26c).
3. Excellent, by reason of the absence of all pain.
4. Salvation, because it is disassociated from all causes of pain.

IV. For the Truth of the Path:

1. Path, because one traverses it (towards Nirvāṇa.)
2. Truth, because it is *yogayukta*, that is to say, endowed with proofs, endowed with resources or means.
3. Obtaining, because it brings about correct obtaining, that is to say one obtains (Nirvāṇa through it.)
4. Definitive release, because it causes one to pass beyond in a definitive manner.

There is a second exegesis:

I. For the Truth of Suffering:

1. Impermanent (*anitya*), because it is not definitive (*anātyan-tika*).
2. Suffering, because it resembles a burden.
3. Empty, because it is empty of *purusā* (agent, etc.).
4. No-soul, because it does not obey the will.

II. For the Truth of Origin:
Chapter Seven

1. Cause (hetu), because it comes about from that (the root hi signifies gati; hetu signifies hinoty asmāt).

2. Arising (samudaya), because there is emergence: (the dharma emerges from the future).\(^8^6\)

3. Appearance (prabhava), as it is a procession (prasaraṇa).

4. Condition (pratyaya) or foundation, that is, the essential element from the action of generation.

III. For the Truth of Extinction:

1. Extinction, because of the cessation of the former suffering and of the non-continuation of subsequent suffering.  

2. Calm, because it is delivered from the three conditioned characteristics (samskritalaksanaś. ii. 45c).

3. Excellent, because it is absolutely good (pramārthaśubha, iv. 8c).

4. Salvation, because it supremely strengthens (9v. 8b).\(^8^7\)

IV. For the Truth of the Path:

1. Path, because it is opposed to the wrong path.

2. Truth, because it is opposed to non-truth.

3. Obtaining, because it is not in contradiction with the city of Nirvāṇa.\(^8^8\)

4. Definitive release, because it abandons existence in the Three Dhātus.

***

Since ancient explanations differ, we are permitted to present a third explanation:

I. For the Truth of Suffering:

1. Impermanent, because it arises and perishes.
2. Suffering, because it is repugnant to the mind of Āryans (vi. English trans. p. 898).

3. Empty, because no ātman is found in it.

4. No soul, because this is not an ātman.

II. For the Truth of Origin: the four aspects of the Second Truth, cause (hetu), arising (samudaya), appearance (prabhava), and condition (pratyaya), are explained according to the Sūtra, "The five upādānakandhas (impure skandhas, i. 8a) are chandamūlaka, chandasamudaya, chandajātiya, chandaprabhava," that is to say they have chanda (=desire=ṭṛṣṇā=thirst) for their root (mūla) or hetu, which brings about their arising (samudaya), for their condition (chandajātiya=chandapratyaya), for their appearance (prabhava). The only difference between the Sūtra and the Śāstra is that the latter places the condition (pratyaya) aspect in first place, and not the appearance (prabhava) aspect.

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What is the difference between these four types of "proces­sions"?

A. One should distinguish four states (avasthā) of desire (chanda): 1. the affection that one experiences for oneself when one thinks, "I am", without otherwise distinguishing an actual "self," without thinking of a past or future self; 2. the desire for re-existence without any other specification; 3. the desire for a certain re-existence; 4. the desire for reincarnation, a desire which makes one accomplish a certain action.

The first desire is the initial cause of suffering—as the seed is the initial cause of the fruit—; it is called ħetu.

The second desire is that which brings about re-existence—as the production of the shoot, stalk, etc., is a casual process or arising (samudaya) which brings about fruit; it is therefore called samudaya, a cause which brings forth.
The third desire is the cause which determines the quality of suffering,—as the field, the water, the fertiliser, etc., determine the virility, the ripening, the appearance of the fruit; it is therefore called *pratyaya*, or condition.\(^9^2\)

The fourth desire is the cause from whence the fruit appears—as the flower is the cause of the fruit; it is therefore called *prabhāva*, or appearance.

The fourth desire is the immediate or direct cause; the other three are the mediate or indirect causes.

B. And again, according to the Sūtra,\(^9^3\) there are two groups of five “modes of desire” (*trṣṇāvicāritas*), and two groups of four, which are, respectively, the four desires studied above. The first two desires are of five aspects, and the last two are of four.

a. When one thinks *asmi*, “I am,” general affection for one’s own person without determination is produced, which is fivefold: I am such; I am the same [as formerly]; I am different; I am something that is; I am something that is not.

b. When one thinks *bhavisyāmi*, “I shall be,” there is produced a general desire for re-existence without determination, which is also fivefold: “I shall be such, I shall be thus, I shall be different, I shall exist, and I shall not exist.”

c. There is produced particularized desire for re-existence, which is fourfold: “May I be; may I be such; may I be the same; may I be different.”

d. There is produced a desire for reincarnation, which is fourfold: “It is absolutely necessary that I may be, that I may be such, the same, different.\(^9^4\)

The first desires are the initial cause of suffering; they are therefore the *hetu*... The rest as above.

III. For the Truth of Extinction:

1. Extinction, because it cuts off transmigration.\(^9^5\)

2. Calm, because it is cessation of all suffering; thus it is said,
"All the *samskāras*, Oh Bhikṣus, are suffering; only *Nirvāṇa* alone is absolute calm."\(^{96}\)

3. Excellent, because it is the highest.

4. Definitive salvation, because it is without returning.

IV. For the Truth of the Path:

1. Path, because it resembles the right path.

2. Truth, because it is true.

3. Obtaining, because it is determined; that is to say one arrives by this path and not by another, as it is said, "This path leads to purity, other systems do not lead to it."

4. Definitive release, because it is definitive separation from threefold existence.

[Fourth explanation.]\(^{97}\)

[I. For the Truth of Suffering:]

Furthermore, it is in order to cure persons who nourish views of permanence, bliss, of things pertaining to the self, and a soul that the aspects of impermanence, suffering, empty, and no-soul are established.\(^{98}\)

[II. For the Truth of Arising:]

1. The cause aspect is opposed to the view, "There is only one cause" (*nāsti hetuḥ*, v. 7, English trans. p. 777).

2. The arising aspect is opposed to the view, "There is only one cause"—be it Ṣiva, or *pradhāna* (ii. 64). Cause is a complex.

3. The appearance aspect is opposed to the idea of evolution (*parināmadṛṣṭi*), the theory that *bhāva*, or existence, existing initially, transforms itself: rather, *bhāva* begins.\(^{99}\)

4. The condition aspect is opposed to the view that the world is created by an intelligent being (*buddhipūrvakṛtadṛṣṭi*, iv. 1): things arise from a multiplicity of causes.\(^{100}\)
[III. For the Truth of Extinction:]

1. The extinction aspect is opposed to the view that there is no deliverance.

2. The calm aspect is opposed to the view that deliverance is suffering.

3. The excellent aspect is opposed to the view that the happiness of the dhyānas and samapāttis is excellent (v. 7, English trans. p. 777).

4. The definitive release aspect is opposed to the view that deliverance is subject to falling, that it is not definitive.

[IV. For the Truth of the Path.]

The Path, truth, cultivation, and definitive release aspects oppose, respectively, the views that there is no path, that a false path is the Path, that there is another path, and that the Path is subject to falling.

13b. The aspects are prajñā.¹⁰¹

The aspects are by their nature mental prajñā or discernment. (ii. 24).

But, we would say, if this is so, then prajñā, the knowledge that discerns the dharmas, will not be endowed with the aspects, for prajñā cannot be associated (samprayukta) with prajñā. It is therefore correct to say [—with the Sautrāntikas—] that “aspect” is a mode of perceiving (grahana) objects by the mind and mental states.¹⁰²

Is it solely prajñā which perceives the different, unique characteristics (viśeṣa, i. 14c) of objects?

13b-c. Everything that has an object perceives.
Prajñā and all the other dharmas which have an object (sālamba) perceive.

13d. Everything that exists is the object of perception.

Everything that exists is perceived by the dharmas which have an object.

We have therefore three more or less large categories: 1. prajñā is aspect, subject, and object; 2. the other minds and mental states, which are associated with prajñā, are subject and object; and 3. all the other dharmas, conditioned or unconditioned, are only object.

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We have explained the aspects of the ten knowledges; we must now explain their natures, the sphere which serves as their support (bhumi), and the person (aśraya) in whom they arise.

14a. The first is of three natures; the others are good.

"The first" is worldly, conventional knowledge, because this knowledge is named first in the Kārika (vii. 2b), and is of three types, good, bad, or neutral. The nine other knowledges are only good.

14b. The first exists in all spheres.

It exists in all spheres, from Kāmadhātu up to Bhavāgra (=naivasamājñānāmājñāyatana).

14c. In six, the knowledge named dharma.
A knowledge of the *dharmas* is obtained in or through the Four Dhyānas, and in Anāgamya and Dhyānāntara.

14c-d. In nine, that which is called *anvaya* (inferential).

Inferential knowledge is obtained in the six spheres which have been mentioned, and furthermore, in three Ārūpyas.

14d. So too six *jñānas*.

When one considers them together, some six knowledges,—the knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, the Path, Destruction, and Non-Arising—are obtained in nine spheres; when they form part of the knowledge of *dharmas*, they are obtained in six spheres; when they form part of inferential knowledge, they are obtained in nine spheres.

15a. The knowledge of the mind of another exists in the Four Dhyānas.

The knowledge of the mind of another is only obtained in the Four Dhyānas, and nowhere else.

15b. It has for its support a person either in Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu.

Beings in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu realize the knowledge of the mind of another.

15c. The knowledge of *dharmas*, a person in Kāmadhātu.\(^{106}\)

The knowledge of *dharmas* can only be realized by a person in Kāmadhātu, and not by a person in either Rūpadhātu or Ārūpyadhātu.

15d. Others, in persons of the three spheres.
What are the other knowledges?

They are the eight knowledges with the exception of the knowledge of the mind of another and the knowledge of dharmas.

***

We have explained the spheres in which one acquires the knowledges, and the sphere to which the persons who can acquire the knowledges belong. Let us explain the relationship of the knowledges with the four applications of mindfulness (vi. 15).

16a. The knowledge of Extinction is an application of mindfulness.

The knowledge of Extinction is an application of mindfulness which relates to a dharma.

16b. The knowledge of the mind of another is threefold.

The knowledge of the mind of another, related to the mind of another, necessarily relates to vedanā, samjñā, and the samskāras.

16c. The others, four.

By excluding the knowledge of Extinction and the knowledge of the mind of another, the other eight knowledges have the four applications of mindfulness for their nature [The knowledge of Suffering, in fact, sometimes relates to the body...; the knowledge of the Path, when it has pure discipline\textsuperscript{107} for its object, is an application of mindfulness related to the body].

***
The different knowledges are the object of how many other knowledges?

16d. Nine knowledges are the object of a knowledge of dharmas.

Excluding inferential knowledge.

17a. Nine are the object of inferential knowledge and knowledge of the Path.

Excluding the knowledge of dharmas in inferential knowledge; by excluding worldly conventional knowledge in the knowledge of the Path, because it does not form part of the Path.

17b. Two are the object of the knowledge of Suffering and Origin.

Worldly conventional knowledge and the part of the knowledge of the mind of another which is impure, are the object of a knowledge of Suffering and of Origin.

17c. Ten, of four.

Ten knowledges are the object of worldly conventional knowledge, a knowledge of the mind of another, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

17c. None are the object of one.

No knowledge is the object of the knowledge of Extinction whose only object is Extinction obtained through conscious effort (pratisamkhyānirodha).
How many dharmas constitute in their totality the object of the ten knowledges? How many dharmas constitute the object of each knowledge? 108

17d. The totality of their object is ten dharmas. 109

What are these ten dharmas?

18a-b. Dharmas of the Three Dhātus, pure dharmas, unconditioned, each category being twofold.

The conditioned dharmas are divided into eight classes: dharmas of Kāmadhātu, of Rūpadhātu, of Āruṇyadhātu, plus the pure dharmas, all being either associated with the mind or not (samprayuktā, viprayuktā, ii. 22).

The unconditioned dharmas are divided into two classes, good and neutral. 110

Which of these two classes of dharmas are the object of the ten knowledges?

1. Worldly conventional knowledge is related to ten dharmas; 2. a knowledge of dharmas is related to five: two dharmas of Kāmadhātu, associated or not with the mind; 111 and a good unconditioned dharma; 3. inferential knowledge is related to seven: two of Rūpadhātu, two of Āruṇyadhātu, and two pure, which make six, and a good unconditioned dharma; 4-5. the knowledge of Suffering and of Origin are related to only good unconditioned dharmas; 7. a knowledge of the Path is related to the two pure dharmas; 8. a knowledge of the mind of another is related to three; the dharmas associated with the mind which are of Kāmadhātu, and of the Rūpadhātu, and pure; 9-10. the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising are related to nine dharmas, with the exception of neutral unconditioned dharmas.
Can one, through a single knowledge, know all of the dharmas?

No.

Yet

18c-d. One conventional knowledge, with the exception of its own complex, knows the rest as non-self.

When a moment of conventional knowledge knows all the dharmas as not being a self, this is with the exception, in the totality of the dharmas, of 1. itself, this same moment of conventional knowledge, for the subject of knowledge cannot be its own object; 2. the mental dharmas which are associated with it, for they have the same object as it does; and 3. the dharmas disassociated from the mind but which accompany it, for example, its characteristics (ii. 45c), for they are too close.

This conventional knowledge of universal consciousness belongs only to Kāmadhātu, being prajñā of hearing or reflection (srutamayī, cintamayī, vi. English trans. p. 913), not prajñā of absorption (bhāvanāmayī, iv. 123c), for the conventional knowledge which is of this third type of prajñā always has a determined sphere for its object. If it were otherwise one could obtain at one and the same time detachment with respect to all of the spheres.

***

The different categories of humans are endowed with how many knowledges?

A common person possesses only worldly conventional knowledge; when he is detached [from Kāmadhātu], he also possesses a knowledge of the mind of another.
As for the Āryan,

19a-b. Not detached, in the first pure moment, he possesses one knowledge.

An Āryan who is not detached through a worldly path before entering the Path, in the moment in which the Patience which is the knowledge of the dharmas related to Suffering (duḥkhe dharmaṁ jñānaksāti, vi. 25c) arises, possesses a single knowledge, namely worldly conventional knowledge, because this Patience is not a knowledge (vii. 1).

19c. In the second moment, he possesses three knowledges.

At the moment of the knowledge of dharmas related to Suffering, he possesses worldly conventional knowledge, a knowledge of dharmas, and a knowledge of Suffering.

19c-d. Beyond, in four moments, each time adding a knowledge.

A knowledge is added in each of four subsequent moments; at the fourth moment (the inferential knowledge of suffering) there is inferential knowledge; at the sixth moment (a knowledge of dharmas related to Origin) there is the knowledge of origin; at the tenth moment (the knowledge of the dharmas as they relate to Extinction), there is the knowledge of Extinction; and at the fourteenth moment (the knowledge of the dharmas as related to the Path), there is the knowledge of the Path.

Consequently, having attained the knowledge of the dharmas related to the Path, the ascetic possesses seven knowledges.¹¹⁵

For an Āryan who, before entering into the Pure Path (the Path of Seeing), has obtained detachment through a worldly path,
we must add the knowledge of the mind of another. A samayavimukta Arhat (vi.50, 56) possesses nine knowledges, by adding the Knowledge of Extinction; an asamayavimukta Arhat in addition possesses the Knowledge of Non-Arising (vi. 50).116

How many knowledges does the ascetic cultivate (acquire)117 at one and the same time in different stages, the Path of Seeing the Truths, and in the Path of Meditation, etc.?

With respect to the fifteen minds (vi.28c-d) of the Path of Seeing:

20a-c. In Seeing, future patiences and knowledges exist to the extent to which they are produced.118

Those which are produced are acquired or cultivated. For example, when an ascetic produces the Patience of the knowledge of the dharma related to Suffering, he cultivates future Patience of this same type, and he takes possession of future Patience of this same type. [And so on to the Patience of the inferential knowledge of the Path].119 The four aspects of this Patience (impermanence, etc.) are also acquired when any one of the aspects is produced.

Why, in the Path of Seeing, is there only acquisition of the knowledge and the aspects of the type of knowledge and the aspects produced?120

When the Patience of the knowledge of the dharma related to Suffering is produced, the gotra,—that is to say, the seed or the cause—of this Patience, and the gotras of its four aspects, are grasped,121 whereas the gotras of the knowledge of dharma related to Suffering, etc., are not grasped. As for the aspects, we see that the four aspects of each Truth are of the same type, for they have the same object. When one of them is produced, the gotras of the others are grasped.

20c-d. In the Path of Seeing one also acquires conventional knowledge at the moment of the three inferential knowledges.122

The ascetic takes possession of future conventional knowledge
at the moment of the three inferential knowledges of Suffering, Origin, and Extinction (moments 4, 8, and 12 of the Path of Seeing, vi. 26b): not at the moment of the knowledge of the dharmas, because, in the knowledge of the dharmas, each Truth has not been understood in its totality, but only relating to Kāmadhātu.

21a. This conventional knowledge is termed "the end of abhisamaya." 123

It is termed abhisamayāntika jñāna, because it is cultivated (=acquired) at the end of the comprehension of each Truth.

Why does an ascetic not take possession of it at the moment of inferential knowledge of the Path (sixteenth moment of comprehension or abhisamaya, the first moment of the Path of Meditation)?

a. Because the Path has not been understood (abhisamita) formerly, through a worldly path, under its aspects of Path, Truth, etc. (above p. 1111). 124

b. Because the Path is not susceptible of being understood in its entirety. Suffering, its Origin, and its Extinction can be respectively known, abandoned, realized, in their entirety; but the Path cannot be practiced (= actualized) in its entirety. Without doubt one cannot say of a person who is in the Path of Seeing, that, at the end of his comprehension of the Truths of Origin and Extinction, he has complete abandoning of Origin, and complete realization of Extinction; 125 yet a time will come when this abandoning and this realization will be complete. But the same does not hold for the Path, given the diversity of families (gotra) of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Buddha.

Some say: Because conventional knowledge accompanies the Path of Seeing. Now the sixteenth moment of this "comprehension" (the inferential knowledge of the Path) forms part of the Path of Meditation. 126 Thus one does not acquire "the end of comprehension" in the sixteenth moment.

We would say that this argument does not hold, for one should
not regard the fact that conventional knowledge does not accompany the Path of Meditation as a proof.\textsuperscript{127}

21b. It is not destined to arise.

At no moment is there the possibility for it to arise.

This knowledge does not arise when the ascetic is in contemplation, nor when the ascetic has left his contemplation (=Seeing of the Truths). On the one hand this knowledge is incompatible with his contemplation (see above p. 1122); on the other hand the mind, outside of its contemplation, is too coarse.\textsuperscript{128}

If this is so, how can one say that one takes possession of conventional knowledge, and that conventional knowledge is "cultivated."

[The Sarvāstivādin answer:] Formerly it was not acquired, but now it is acquired.

How can it be acquired, since it is not produced?

[The Sarvāstivādin answer:] It is termed acquired because it is acquired [and not because it should be produced].

"Acquired because it is acquired," is an unprecedented manner of speaking. You do not thus explain how conventional knowledge is cultivated. This point should be understood in the same way as the Former Masters [the Sautrāntikas] understood it. According to these Masters, one acquires conventional knowledge through the power of the Āryamārga (=the Path of Seeing). After one has left the contemplation of the Āryamārga, a conventional knowledge bearing on the Truths is realized, and it is much more distinguished than that which precedes the obtaining of the Āryamārga itself. When one says that an ascetic acquired this conventional knowledge through the Path of Seeing, one means to speak of the acquisition of a personality (af\textsuperscript{r}aya) capable of realizing of this conventional knowledge,\textsuperscript{129} as the acquisition of a mineral containing gold is called the acquisition of gold itself.\textsuperscript{130}
The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this manner of seeing things. They hold that the so-called *abhīṣamayāntika* conventional knowledge is an unarisen *dharma*.

21c. From the sphere or from a lower sphere.\textsuperscript{131}

When one realizes the Path of Seeing of a certain sphere (*bhūmi*), one acquires, in the future, the conventional knowledge of this sphere or of a lower sphere. This means that if one realizes the Path of Seeing in the state of *Anāgāmya*, one acquires, in the future, the Path of Seeing of a single sphere (i.e., *Anāgāmya*), and one acquires, in the future, the conventional knowledge of two spheres (*Anāgāmya* and *Kāmadhātu*): and so on until: if one realizes the Path of Seeing in the Fourth Dhyāna, one acquires, in the future, the Path of Seeing of six spheres (*Anāgāmya, Dhyānāntara*, and the Four Dhyānas), and one acquires, in the future, the conventional knowledge of seven spheres (the same, plus *Kāmadhātu*).

21c. In Extinction, the last.

If one cultivates conventional knowledge at the end of Suffering and Origin,—that is to say in the moments of the inferential knowledge of Suffering and the inferential knowledge of Origin,—conventional knowledge is by nature the four foundations of mindfulness (vi. 14).

If one cultivates at the end of Extinction,—that is, in the moment of the inferential knowledge of Extinction,—it is only the last foundation of mindfulness, namely the foundation of mindfulness related to *dharman*.

21d. It has the aspects of its Truth.
When one cultivates conventional knowledge at the end of the comprehension of a certain truth, the conventional knowledge takes on the aspects of this Truth and has this Truth for its object.

21d. It proceeds from effort.

Being acquired through the power of the Path of Seeing, it is exclusively obtained through effort; it does not arise from detachment.

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The knowledges are so called because knowledge is the major element in them; if one takes into consideration their followings, they make up four *skandhas* in Kāmadhātu, and five *skandhas* in Rūpadhātu (by adding *dhyānasamvaralakṣaṇarūpa*, iv. 13c).

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132 How many knowledges does one cultivate in the different states of the Path of Meditation?

22a. In the sixteenth, six, through non-detachment.

One should add "are cultivated" (*bhavyante*, according to vii. 20a). In the sixteenth moment (the inferential knowledge of the Path), the ascetic who is not detached from Kāmadhātu cultivates (i.e., takes possession of and actualizes) two knowledges in the present;¹³³ he cultivates (takes possession of) six knowledges in the future: namely the knowledge of *dharmas*, inferential knowledge, and knowledges of the Four Truths.¹³⁴

22b. Through detachment, seven.
With respect to the ascetic already detached from Kāmadhātu, at the moment when he attains inferential knowledge of the Path, one should add the cultivation of the knowledge of the mind of another, the seventh.

22c-d. Above, in the Path of Meditation associated with sensual desire, there is the cultivation of seven.

Beyond the sixteenth moment, that is, in the rest of the Path of Meditation, as long as one has not obtained detachment, in the preparatory paths, the uninterrupted paths, the paths of deliverance, and in the excellent paths,—there is cultivation of seven knowledges, namely a knowledge of the dharmas, inferential knowledge, the knowledges of the Four Truths, and worldly, conventional knowledge.

If one cultivates a worldly path, one also, in the present, cultivates worldly conventional knowledge. If one cultivates a transworldly path, one also, in the present, cultivates one of the four knowledges of the dharmas. One will cultivate the other six knowledges in the future.

23a-d. In the uninterrupted paths of the victory over seven spheres, of the acquisition of the supernormal knowledges, and of the quality of Immovability, of mixed meditation. And also in the eight paths of higher deliverance.

Based on the preceding, add "there is cultivation of seven knowledges."

One cultivates seven knowledges, the same as above, in the uninterrupted paths (paths of the expulsion of the defilements and the obstacles) which make up:

1. victory over seven spheres, that is to say detachment from the Four Dhyānas and the three Ārūpyas: these spheres are "vanquished" when one is detached from them;
2. the acquisition of five supernormal knowledges, with the exception of the sixth (vii. 42);

3. entry into Immovability (vi. 57, 60c, English trans. p. 1002);

4. the mixed meditation (vi. 42) of the Šaikṣa.

If the ascetic cultivates these paths through a worldly path, he cultivates, in the present, conventional knowledge; if he follows a transworldly path, he cultivates in the present one of the four inferential knowledges, and one of the two knowledges of dharmas (Extinction and the Path).

In the acquisition of the quality of Immovability, he does not cultivate conventional knowledge; for this latter is not opposed to Bhavāgra. Here the Knowledge of the Destruction is the seventh knowledge.

Above the detachment from the seven spheres, in the first eight paths of deliverance of Bhavāgra, the ascetic cultivates, in the future, seven knowledges, namely the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the knowledges of the Four Truths, and the knowledge of the mind of another; he does not cultivate conventional knowledge, because this knowledge is not opposed to Bhavāgra.

He cultivates, in the present, one of the four inferential knowledges or one of the two knowledges of dharmas (Extinction and the Path).

24a-b. The Šaikṣa, in the path of deliverance of the perfectioning of the faculties, cultivates six or seven knowledges.

The Šaikṣa (in opposition to the Ašaikṣa who enters the state of Immovability) in the path of deliverance (third stage) of the perfectioning of his faculties (vi. 60c), cultivates six knowledges
when he is not detached (i.e., when he is not an Anāgāmin). When he is detached, he cultivates seven knowledges, the knowledge of the mind of another being the seventh.

Some other masters say that conventional knowledge is cultivated by one who is not detached as well as by one who is detached.\(^\text{139}\)

In the preparatory path (*prayogamārga*, first stage), both of them cultivate this knowledge.

24c. In the uninterrupted path, he cultivates six knowledges.

Detached or non-detached, he cultivates six knowledges,\(^\text{140}\) as above, in the uninterrupted path (second stage) of the perfectioning of his faculties. He does not cultivate conventional knowledge, because the perfectioning of the faculties resembles the Path of Seeing; he does not cultivate the knowledge of the mind of another because this knowledge is absent from the uninterrupted path: in fact this knowledge does not oppose the defilements.

24d. The same in the victory over Bhavāgra.

In the uninterrupted paths of detachment from Bhavāgra, the Śaikṣa cultivates six knowledges.

25a. At the moment of the knowledge of destruction, nine knowledges.

The ninth path of deliverance of detachment from Bhavāgra is called the Knowledge of Destruction (vi. 44d). [The first eight have been discussed vii. 23c-d]. The ascetic then cultivates nine
knowledges, with the exception of the Knowledge of Non-Arising.

25b. An Immovable One cultivates ten knowledges.

The saint who is from the beginning an Immovable One (vi. 57c) cultivates ten knowledges at the moment when he produces the Knowledge of Destruction, for at this moment he obtains the Knowledge of Non-Arising (vi. 50a).

25c. Ten knowledges also in the last deliverance in the passage to the state of Immovability.

The ascetic who obtains the state of Immovability through the perfectioning of his faculties also cultivates ten knowledges in the last path (the ninth path of deliverance) of this perfectioning (vi. 60c).

25d. In the cases not mentioned, there is cultivation of eight knowledges.

What are the cases not mentioned?

1. The ninth path of deliverance from detachment to Kāma-dhātu (excluded from the definition 22c-d);

2. the paths of deliverance from detachment to the seven spheres, to the five supernormal knowledges, to mixed meditation of the Śaikṣa (excluded from the definitions 23a-c);

3. the first eight paths of deliverance of the perfectioning of the faculties leading to the state of Immovability (excluded from the definition 25c); and

4. the preparatory path and the excellent path (prayogamārga and višeṣamārga) of one who is detached (or an Anāgāmin).
In all these paths, there is cultivation of eight future knowledges, with the exception of the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising. This is the case for the Śaikṣa.

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The Āśaikṣa, in the preparatory path, the path of deliverance, and the excellent path of the five supernormal knowledges and of mixed meditation, cultivates nine knowledges (with the exception of the Knowledge of Non-Arising) or ten knowledges, depending on whether the Āśaikṣa is a samayavimukta or an asamayavimukta. In the uninterrupted paths of the same (five supernormal knowledges and mixed meditation), he cultivates either eight or nine knowledges, with the exception of the knowledge of the mind of another in both cases.

Nevertheless, in the path of deliverance of the two supernormal knowledges which are neutral (the divine eye and divine hearing), —this path being itself morally neutral—there is no cultivation of any future knowledge.141

As for the Prthagjana,—in the ninth path of deliverance of detachment from Kāmadhātu and the three Dhyānas; in the preparatory paths; in the paths of deliverance of the three supernormal knowledges; in the realizations of the spiritual qualities, Apramāṇas, Vimokṣas, etc.:142 all these paths being cultivated in the Dhyānas (and not in the sāmantakas), —he cultivates, in the future, conventional knowledge and the knowledge of the mind of another; but not in the nirvedbabhāgīyas because three constitute the following of the Path of Seeing.

In the other cases, obtaining a path not previously obtained, he cultivates solely, in the future, conventional knowledge.

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To which sphere does the knowledge belong which is cultivated in the worldly and transworldly paths?

A knowledge of the mind of another, a future cultivation, belongs to the sphere which serves as the support of the Path, or rather to the sphere which one obtains through the Path.\textsuperscript{143}

It is not a rule that pure knowledge, cultivated in the future, will belong to the sphere which serves as the support for its arising.

26a-b. The knowledge that one cultivates in the future belongs to the sphere from which one is detached, to the sphere acquired, or to a lower sphere.

When, in order to become detached from one sphere an ascetic cultivates the paths (\textit{prayoga}, etc.) of the two classes, pure or impure, he cultivates pure knowledges which are either of the sphere which he obtains for the first time by these paths, of the sphere which is the support of the path, or of a lower sphere.\textsuperscript{144}

26c. In the knowledge of destruction, the pure is also of all spheres.\textsuperscript{145}

At the moment when a knowledge of the destruction of the cankers arises (vi. 44d), there is cultivated the qualities of all the spheres, including the impure ones,\textsuperscript{146} namely the Apramāṇas, the Vimokṣas, etc. In fact, Vajropamasamādhi cuts off these ties which are the possessions of the defilements; all the qualities will be found in a series freed from the defilements; one can thus say that they "breathe" (or that they open, that they inflate), in the manner of a sack when one cuts the ropes that bind it.\textsuperscript{147} The Arhat has obtained rule over his mind: all the good \textit{dharmas} come towards him, as vassals come to present their homage\textsuperscript{148} to a prince who accedes to supreme kingship.\textsuperscript{149}
Is everything that has been previously obtained also cultivated?

26d. That which has been obtained previously is not cultivated.

What is cultivated is what has not been obtained. That which, having been obtained and lost is obtained anew—that is to say, is newly realized or actualized—is not cultivated, that is, the ascetic does not take possession of it for the future. Because this has been acquired and rejected in the past.150

Does the term “cultivation” (bhāvanā) only designate acquisition?

No. Cultivation is of four types: 1. acquisition, 2. practice, 3. opposition, and 4. expulsion.

27. Cultivation of good conditioned dharmas is acquisition and practice; there is cultivation of opposition and expulsion with respect to impure dharmas.151

There is cultivation of acquisition152 and practice with respect to the good conditioned dharmas, acquisition with respect to the future and acquisition and practice with respect to the present. These two cultivations rest on the first two efforts, effort for the arising of what has not yet arisen, and effort for the growth of what has already arisen.

There is cultivation of opposition153 and expulsion154 with respect to impure dharmas; they rest on the last two efforts, effort for the non-arising of what has not arisen, and effort for the destruction of what has already arisen.155

Thus the good but impure dharmas are susceptible of four
types of cultivation; the pure dharmas are susceptible of the first two; the defiled and neutral dharmas of the last two.

The Vaibhāṣikas of the West say that there are six types of cultivation: four as above, plus the cultivation of constraint (saṃvarabhāvanā), and the cultivation of inspection (vibhāvanāb- hāvanā).

The first is the cultivation of the organs,\textsuperscript{156} the eye, etc.; the second is the cultivation of the body, as it says in the Sūtra, "These six organs well subdued, well guarded..."\textsuperscript{157} and, "There is in the body the beard, hair, etc."\textsuperscript{158}

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr however think that these two cultivations should be included within the cultivation of opposition and expulsion.\textsuperscript{159}

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We have explained the knowledges. Now we must explain the spiritual qualities (gunas), which are made up of the knowledges.\textsuperscript{160} Among these qualities, there are first those which are uniquely proper to the Buddha,\textsuperscript{161} which the Bodhisattva acquires at the moment of the Knowledge of Destruction (vi. 45) in becoming an Arhat and, at the same time, a Buddha.

These qualities are eighteen in number.

28a-b. The dharmas unique to the Buddha are eighteen, the powers, etc.

The ten powers, the four absences of fear, the three foundations of mindfulness, and great compassion:\textsuperscript{162} this group constitutes the eighteen dharmas unique to the Buddha, so called because others do not acquire them by becoming Arhats.
We shall examine first the nature of the powers.\textsuperscript{163}

28c-29. There are ten knowledges in \textit{sthānāsthāna}; [eight in \textit{karmaphala}; nine in the \textit{dhyānas}, etc., in the Indriyas, in the Abhimokṣas, in the Dhātus; nine or ten in the paths; two are conventional knowledge; and extinction is made up of six or ten knowledges.\textsuperscript{164}

The power which consists of the knowledge of what is possible and what is impossible (\textit{sthānāsthāna}, vii. 30c) is made up of ten knowledges.\textsuperscript{165}

28d. Eight in \textit{karmaphala};

The power which consists of the knowledge of the retribution of actions is made up of eight knowledges, with the exception of the knowledge of the Path and Extinction.\textsuperscript{166}

29a. Nine in the Dhyānas, etc., in the Indriyas, in the Abhimokṣas, in the Dhātus;

The power of the knowledge of the Dhyānas, Vimokṣas, Samādhis and Samāpattis;\textsuperscript{167} the power of the knowledge of the degree of the moral faculties of beings;\textsuperscript{168} the power of the knowledge of the different aspirations of beings;\textsuperscript{169} and the power of the knowledge of the different acquired dispositions of beings\textsuperscript{170}—these four powers are made up of nine knowledges, excluding the knowledge of extinction.

29b. Nine or ten in the paths;
The power of the knowledge of the paths which lead to the different realms of rebirth and to Nirvāṇa, is made up of either nine knowledges or ten knowledges. If one understands "the Path with its result," this power then includes the knowledge of extinction (which is the result of the Path); but if one understands "the Path without its result," then this power is made up of nine knowledges.

29c. Two are conventional knowledges;

The power of the knowledge of former abodes and the power of the knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings are both conventional knowledges.

29d. Destruction is made up of six or ten knowledges.

The power of the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers is made up of six or ten knowledges. One can consider the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers in and of itself as the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers which is made up of the knowledge of the dharmas, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of extinction, the Knowledge of Destruction, the Knowledge of Non-Arising, and conventional knowledge; or one can understand the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers as the knowledge which is produced in a series where the cankers have been expelled: the ten knowledges exist in such a series.

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As for the spheres which serve as the support for the powers:

30a-c. The power of former abodes and the power of death-rebirth lie in the Dhyānas; the others in all the spheres.
The knowledge of former abodes and the knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings have the Dhyānas for their spheres; the other powers are of all the spheres, Kāmadhātu, Anāgamya, the Four Dhyānas, Dhyānāntara, and the Four Ārūpyas.

They arise in a male body in Jambudvīpa, that is to say in the Buddha, for Buddhas do not appear outside of Jambudvīpa.\(^{172}\)

In others this tenfold knowledge is not called a power: it is only in the series of the Buddha that it is called a power, because, elsewhere, it is shackled.

30c-d. Why? Because its power does not know any obstacle.

The knowledge which knows all the objects of knowledge without any obstacle is called a power. This is why the ten powers exist only in the Buddha, because the Buddha, having expelled all the cankers and all the traces (vāsanā, see vii. 32d) of ignorance, knows all objects of his own accord. It is not the same for the knowledges of others, and as a consequence these knowledges are not called powers.

According to tradition, Śāriputra refused a person who asked for admission to the Order;\(^{173}\) he was not capable of seeing the number of the previous and subsequent births of a pigeon chased by a hawk (?).\(^{174}\)

The Buddha’s knowledge is exercised without obstacle, the power of his mind is infinite and envelopes all objects (see p. 1146).

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If such is the power of his mind, what is the power of his body?

31a. Nārāyaṇa power in his body; [according to others, in his parts; this is a power the seventh term of a series which
begins with the elephant and in which each term is worth ten times the preceding; it consists of a tangible.\textsuperscript{175}

Nārāyāna is the name of a power and also the name of one who possesses this power, namely the god Nārāyāna: the same for Cāṇūra and Mahānagna. The power of the body of the Buddha is equal to that of Nārāyāna.

31b. According to others, in his parts;

According to others, each part of his body (saṃdhi) possesses this power.

The Bhadanta, [the Dārśtāntika Master], says that his physical power is like his mental power, that is, infinite; for, if it were otherwise, the body of the Blessed One would not be able to support infinite knowledge.\textsuperscript{176}

The Buddhas have nagāgranṭhi power in their body parts, Pratyekabuddhas have saṃkalā power, and Cakravartins have saṅku power.\textsuperscript{177}

What is the extent of Nārāyāna power?

31c. This is a power the seventh term of a series which begins with the elephant and in which each term is worth ten times the preceding;

There is a series: prākṛtabastin, gandhabastin, mahānagna,\textsuperscript{178} praskandin, varāṅga, cāṇūra, and nārāyaṇa.\textsuperscript{179} The power of each term is worth ten times the power of the preceding term: ten prākṛtabastins make one gandhabastin and so on.\textsuperscript{180}

According to others, this is the case for the first six terms; but ten cāṇūras are equal to a half-nārāyaṇa, and two half-nārāyaṇas are equal to one nārāyaṇa.
According to the author of this book, among the definitions of the physical power of the Buddha, that one is true which makes this power the greatest.\textsuperscript{181}

31d. It consists of a tangible.

The physical power of the Buddha is, by its nature, a tangible (\textit{spra\bhatv\bhy\b\_ayatana}). It consists of primary elements of a special nature.

According to others, however, it is a \textit{r\b\_pa} derived from the primary elements, but a derived \textit{r\b\_pa} different from the seven derived tangibles, \textit{\b\_laks\b\_natva}, etc. (i. 10d).\textsuperscript{182}

As for the four assurances (\textit{vais\b\_\_aradya}),\textsuperscript{183}

32a-c. Assurance is fourfold

The Buddha possesses four assurances which are explained in the S\b\_utra.

32c. Resembling the first, the tenth, the second, and the seventh power.

1. The first assurance, the assurance that he has attained supreme comprehension with respect to all the \textit{dharma}s, resembles the first power (the power of the knowledge of what is possible and what is impossible); it consists of ten knowledges, and can exist (lit. "be supported") in all of the spheres.

2. The second assurance, the assurance that he has the knowledge of the destruction of all the defilements, resembles the tenth power, the power of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements: it consists of ten knowledges, and can exist in six spheres.
3. The third assurance, the assurance that he can fully explain the dharmas, resembles the second power, the power of the knowledge of the retribution of actions: it consists of eight knowledges, and can exist in all of the spheres.

4. The fourth assurance, the assurance that he can explain the Path leading to definitive deliverance, resembles the seventh power, the power of the knowledge of the paths which lead to the different realms of rebirth and to Nirvāṇa: it consists of ten or nine knowledges, and can exist in all of the spheres.

How can the knowledges be called assurances (vaiśāradya)?

The word vaiśāradya signifies “absence of fear” (nirbhayatā). By reason of the fact that he knows that he has understood all the dharmas, destroyed all the defilements, etc., the Buddha is free from fear in the assemblies. Thus vaiśāradya is knowledge.

[In our opinion] the assurances, being a result of knowledge, are not knowledge by nature.

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What are the three applications of mindfulness of the Buddha?

32d. Three are mindfulness and awareness (prajñā).

The Sūtra explains at length the three applications of mindfulness of the Buddha: 1. When his disciples, unanimous, respectfully listen, accept and practice his teaching, he experiences neither joy nor satisfaction, but he remains indifferent, in full mindfulness and awareness. 2. When his disciples, unanimous, do not hear, do not accept and do not practice his teaching, he does not experience displeasure nor impatience, but he remains indifferent, in full mindfulness and awareness. 3. When some of his disciples hear, accept and practice his teaching, while others, not hearing, do not accept and do not practice his teaching, he does
not experience joy and displeasure, but remains indifferent in full mindfulness and awareness. These three applications of mindfulness are, by their nature, mindfulness and awareness.

But a Śrāvaka who is free from the cankers, whose disciples are either respectful or not respectful, or respectful and not respectful, experiences neither joy nor displeasure, nor either joy or displeasure. Why consider the three applications of mindfulness as dharmas unique to a Buddha?

Because the Buddha has abandoned joy and displeasure along with their traces. Or rather because the disciples are the disciples of the Buddha: it is admirable that the Buddha does not experience either joy or displeasure from their respect or disrespect; but the disciples are not the disciples of the Śrāvakas from whom they receive the teaching: there is nothing admirable in the fact that these Śrāvakas do not experience joy or displeasure.

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33a. Great compassion is a conventional mental state; [it is great through its factors, its aspects, its object, its equality, and its excellence; it differs from (ordinary) compassion in eight ways.]

Great compassion is, by its nature, conventional knowledge (vii. 2b). In the contrary case, it would be, in its nature, absence of hatred as is ordinary compassion (viii. 29); like ordinary compassion, it would not embrace all beings of the Three Dhātus, it would not envision the three types of suffering.

Why is the compassion of the Blessed One termed “great”?  

33b. It is great through its factors, its aspects, its object, its equality, and its excellence.
1. By reason of its factors (*sambhāra*); it is produced in fact by a great provisioning (*sambhāra*) of merit (*puṇya*) and knowledge (*jñāna*).\textsuperscript{189}

2. By reason of its aspects, of the modality under which it grasps things: it considers things as painful by reason of the threefold suffering, the suffering inherent in suffering itself, the suffering inherent in change, and the suffering inherent in the *samskāras* (vi. 3),\textsuperscript{190} whereas ordinary compassion only envisions the suffering inherent in suffering itself.

3. By reason of the object, for it has for its object all beings in the Three Dhātus.

4. By reason of its equality, for it is equally concerned with the happiness and benefit of all being.

5. By reason of its excellence, for no other compassion which has arisen surpasses it.\textsuperscript{191}

How does great compassion differ from ordinary compassion?

33c. It differs from ordinary compassion in eight ways.

1. With respect to its nature: ordinary compassion is absence of hatred, whereas great compassion is absence of ignorance.

2. With respect to its aspect: ordinary compassion takes on the form of one suffering, whereas great compassion takes on the form of threefold suffering.

3. With respect to its object: ordinary compassion is concerned with the beings of one Dhātu, whereas great compassion is concerned with the Three Dhātus.

4. With respect to its sphere: ordinary compassion is of the sphere of the Four Dhyānas,\textsuperscript{192} whereas great compassion is of the sphere of the Fourth Dhyāna.

5. With respect to the personality which serves as its support: ordinary compassion arises in the series of the Śrāvakas, etc.,\textsuperscript{193}
whereas great compassion arises in the series of the Buddhas.

6. With respect to its acquisition: ordinary compassion is obtained through detachment from Kāmadhātu, whereas great compassion is obtained through detachment from Bhavāgra.

7. With respect to its protection: ordinary compassion does not protect, whereas great compassion protects.

8. With respect to compassion: ordinary compassion is an unequal compassion, for it sympathizes only with beings who are suffering, whereas great compassion is an equal compassion, turned towards all beings equally.

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We have explained the qualities which belong only to the Buddhas and which distinguish them from other beings. Do the Buddhas resemble one another among themselves?

Under certain conditions, yes; under other conditions, no.

34. In saṁbhāra, dharma-kāya and their service to beings, the Buddhas are identical; not in their duration of life, their caste, their stature, etc.

The Buddhas are identical in that they have, in their previous existences, equally accumulated merit and knowledge, in that they have realized the same dharma-kāya; and in that they equally carry out service to others.

But the Buddhas differ through the difference in the duration of their lives, their caste, their gotra, the dimensions of their bodies, etc. According to the period in which they appear, their life is long or short, they are Kṣatriyas or Brahmins, they belong to the Gautamagotra or to the Kāśyapagotra, and their bodies are great or small. The word et cetera indicates that the Dharma of the
Buddhas lasts a long or short period of time, accordingly as, at the moment of their appearance, the beings to be converted are straight or crooked.\textsuperscript{197}

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All intelligent persons who reflect on the threefold perfection\textsuperscript{198} of the Tathāgatas necessarily produce a profound affection, a profound respect with respect to them. This threefold perfection is the perfection of their causes which consists of the provisions of merit and knowledge; the perfection of the result which consists of the \textit{dharmakāya}; and the perfection of benefit which consists of service to all beings.

i. The perfection of cause is fourfold: 1. Cultivation of the accumulation of all qualities and all knowledge;\textsuperscript{199} 2. prolonged cultivation;\textsuperscript{200} 3. uninterrupted cultivation; and 4. zealous cultivation.

ii. The perfection of the result is fourfold, for the realization of the \textit{dharmakāya} includes four perfections, that of knowledge, of abandoning, of power and of material body.

a. The perfection of knowledge is fourfold: 1. untaught knowledge; 2. universal knowledge (that is to say knowledge of all individual characteristics); 3. omniform knowledge,\textsuperscript{201} (that is to say knowledge of all manners of being); and 4. spontaneous knowledge (knowledge through the simple desire to know).

b. The perfection of abandoning is fourfold: 1. abandoning of all the defilements; 2. definitive abandoning (not susceptible of falling away); 3. abandoning of the defilements with their traces (because no bond remains); and 4. abandoning of the obstacles to \textit{samādhi} and \textit{samāpatti} [of such a sort that the Buddha is doubly delivered (vi. 64a)].\textsuperscript{202}

c. The perfection of power is fourfold: 1. perfection in the mastery of creating, transforming, and maintaining an external
object;\textsuperscript{203} 2. perfection in the mastery of abandoning and prolonging life;\textsuperscript{204} 3. perfection in the mastery of movement through resistant bodies, through space, to very distant location, of great speed, and mastery in the reduction of a large body to a small volume;\textsuperscript{205} and 4. perfection of marvellous qualities, multiple and natural.\textsuperscript{206}

\textbf{d. The perfection of the material body is fourfold:} 1. perfection in marks (\textit{laksana}); 2. perfection in secondary marks (\textit{anuvyān-jana}); 3. perfection in power (that is to say possession of Nārāyaṇa's power, vii. 31); and (with respect to internal events) perfection of the body whose bones are like diamonds; and (with respect to external events) emissions of rays of light (which exceed one hundred thousand suns.)

\textbf{iii. The perfection of service is fourfold:} 1-3. to deliver definitively (\textit{atyanta}) from the suffering of the three painful realms of rebirth; 4. to deliver from the suffering of transmigration; or rather: 1-3. to install into the three vehicles; 4. to install into good realms of rebirth.

Such are, in short, the perfections of the Buddhas. There would be no end of our discussion if we were to speak of them in great detail. Only the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, if they were to prolong their existence for numbers of \textit{asamkhyaeyakalpas}, would be capable of knowing and speaking of their grandeur. It is enough to know that the Buddhas, endowed with qualities, knowledges, powers, and infinite and extraordinary benefits, are like mines of jewels.

Nevertheless fools (\textit{bāla} = \textit{prthagjana}), themselves poor in qualities—and judging based upon themselves—have no spiritual aspirations: they understand in vain the extolling of the merits of the Buddha and they do not conceive affection either for the Buddha or his Dharma.

The wise, on the contrary, understand the explanation of the qualities of the Buddha, conceiving, with respect to the Buddha and his Dharma, a mind of faith which penetrates to the marrow of
their bones. These persons, through this single mind of faith, they surmount an infinite mass of actions of unnecessary retribution; they obtain excellent human and divine rebirths; and, finally, they arrive at Nirvana. This is why the Tathagatas are said to be a supreme field of merit; for this field gives forth fruits which are certain, agreeable, abundant, rapid, (experienced in this life), and of excellent issue. The Blessed One, in fact, has proclaimed, "If anyone plants a small root of good in the field of merit which are the Buddhas, he will first possess heavenly realms of rebirth and then he will obtain the Deathless (Ekottara, 24.15). We have explained the eighteen qualities unique to the Buddhas.

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35a. There are other qualities which the Buddhas have in common with Saikśas

The Buddhas possess innumerable qualities which they have in common either with Śrāvakas

35b. And Pṛthagjanas

Or with ordinary persons.

35c. Absence of Contention, Knowledge Resulting from Resolution, the Unhindered Knowledges, the Supernormal Knowledges, etc.

These are: the Samādhi Absence of Contention, the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution, the Four Unhindered Knowledges, the Supernormal Knowledges, the Dhyānas, the Ārūpyas, the Eight Samāpattis, the Three Samādhis, the Four Apramāṇas, the Eight Vimokṣas, the Eight Abhibhvāyatanas, the Ten Kṛtṣnāyatanas, etc.
The first three are common to both the Buddhas and the Āryans; the Supernormal Knowledges, the Dhyānas, etc., can also belong to ordinary persons.

***

Āraṇā [is the power to hinder the arising of another's defilements]. The Arhats know that the sufferings of beings are produced through their defilements; they know that they themselves are the most worthy field of merit (iv. 103, 117a); they fear that others might generate defilements with respect to them [which would be particularly injurious to them]; thus they generate a knowledge of such a nature that no other person will produce, with respect to them, lust, hatred, pride, etc. This knowledge puts an end, in beings, to raṇa, or contention, which is a defilement, a cause of torment: it is thus called āraṇā or absence of contention.

What are the characteristics of the so-called Āraṇā Samādhi, the Absorption Absence of Contention?

36a. Absence of Contention is conventional knowledge;

By nature it is conventional knowledge, as it results from its object.

36b. It is of the sphere of the Fourth Dhyāna;

It exists in ("has for its support") the Fourth Dhyāna, which is the best of the easy paths (vi. 66).

36c. It is produced by a person who is Immovable.
It is produced by Immovable Arhats (*akopyadharman*, vi. 56) and not by others: for others are not capable of radically cutting off their own defilements (they are in fact subject to falling) and so they cannot arrest the defilements of others.

36d. It is produced by humans.

It is produced by humans, for it is only a being in the human realm of rebirth who can cultivate it in the Three Dvīpas.

36e. It relates to the defilements of Kāmadhātu, is future, and has a real object.

It bears on the defilements of others, in Kāmadhātu, in the future, and "has a real object" (*savastuka*), "May no defilements arise in others with respect to me!" The *savastuka* defilements are craving, anger, etc., which are abandoned through Meditation (vi. 58).

The *avastuka* defilements of others (vi. 58), which are abandoned through Seeing, are not susceptible of being arrested, for the universal (*sarvatraga*) defilements (v. 12), which exist in the totality of their sphere, also exist in the series of another.²¹²

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As is the Samādhi Absence of Contention,

37a-b. So too the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution; [but it has all for its object].²¹³

Like the Samādhi Absence of Contention, the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution is, by nature, conventional knowledge; like Absence of Contention, it exists in the Fourth Dhyāna, it is produced in the series of an Immovable One, and it is meditated upon by a being in the human realm of rebirth.
37b. But it has all for its object.

But, unlike the Samādhi Absence of Contention, it bears on all the dharma.

Yet the Vaibhāṣikas say that the dharma of Ārūpyadhatu are not known by a direct seeing through the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution—being of the Fourth Dhyāna, this knowledge does not bear on a higher sphere. These dharma are known through inference (anumāna). In fact, one knows 1. the outflowing of Ārūpyadhatu, namely the extreme calm which follows, in a subsequent existence, from a former existence in Ārūpyadhatu; 2. the conduct of Ārūpyadhatu, that is to say the practice of the Ārūpya Samāpattis which will produce an existence in Ārūpyadhatu,—and one can infer from a cause to its result and from a result to its cause. As the farmer knows a seed from its fruit and a fruit from its seed, seeing a calm person, one concludes, "He is reborn falling from Ārūpyadhatu, but he will be reborn in Ārūpyadhatu." Such is the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas.

Others believe however that the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution bears on Ārūpyadhatu, for there is nothing that is not within the mental range of the Buddhas.

One who would produce the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution begins by forming a resolution, holding a certain object in his consciousness; he enters into the Fourth prāntakotika Dhyāna (viii. 41a): this is the preparatory exercise. As soon as he leaves this absorption, he produces an exact consciousness in conformity with his resolution the sphere of which varies according to the power of his absorption.

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37c-d. So too the Unhindered Knowledges of dharma, of objects, of etymological explanations, and of eloquence.

There are Four Unhindered Knowledges: the Unhindered
Knowledge of dharmas, the Unhindered Knowledge of things (artha), the Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanations (nirukta), and the Unhindered Knowledge of eloquence (prati-bhāna). They are like the Samādhi Absence of Contention in that they belong solely to the Immovable Ones who are humans. But they differ from it with respect to their object, the sphere in which they are acquired, and their nature.

38a-b. The first three are unhindered knowledges bearing, in this order, on name, the thing, speech.218

Infallible (avivartya) knowledge of names, phrases, and syllables (ii.47a) is the Unhindered Knowledge of dharmas.219

Infallible knowledge of the thing is the Unhindered Knowledge of things.

Infallible knowledge of speech is the Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanation.

38c-d. The fourth is the knowledge of exact and facile expression, and of mastery with respect to the Path.220

Infallible knowledge which confers the capacity to express oneself in an exact and facile221 manner and which also confers never failing attention on a person who is a master in absorption is the Unhindered Knowledge of eloquence.222

39a-b. Its object is speech and the Path; [it is made up of nine knowledges.]223

Speech and the Path are the object of this Unhindered Knowledge.
39b. It is made up of nine knowledges.

Which, in its nature, is made up of nine knowledges with the exception of the knowledge of extinction.

39c. It is of all the spheres.

It can arise in an ascetic who exists in any of the spheres, from Kāmadhātu to Bhavāgra, since it has for its object either speech or the Path.

39c. Unhindered Knowledge of things (artha) is made up of ten or six.

Artha or thing signifies "all the dharmas": in which case the Unhindered Knowledge of things is, by its nature, the ten knowledges; but if artha signifies Nirvāṇa, then it is made up of six knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of extinction, the Knowledge of Destruction, the Knowledge of Non-Arising and conventional knowledge.

39d. It arises everywhere.

That is to say it can exist in any sphere.

39d. The others are conventional knowledge.

Two Unhindered Knowledges (of the dharmas and of etymological explanation) are conventional knowledge, for they have names, phrases, and syllables, etc., and speech, for their object.
40a. The Unhindered Knowledge of *dharmas* exists in Kāmadhātu and the Dhyānas.

It therefore exists in five spheres. Above them, names are absent [and so too phrases and syllables].

40b. The Unhindered Knowledge of speech exists in Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna.

The Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanation exists only in Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna, because *vitarka* is absent above them.

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According to the *Prajñaptipāda*, the Unhindered Knowledges are in the following order: 1. the infallible knowledge of name, phrase, and syllable; 2. the knowledge of the thing (*artha*) expressed by its name, etc.; 3. the knowledge of the expression of the characteristics of the thing, its number (singular, dual, or plural), its gender (feminine, masculine, or neuter), the time, etc.; 4. the knowledge of what is not possible (*asaktatā*) [=which produced the *asaktatā*] either of the expression, or of phrases and syllables. In this way the order of the Unhindered Knowledges is justified.

According to others, *nirukti* is an etymological explanation (*nirvacanam*), for example: *rūpyate tasmād rūpam* (it is physical matter because it can be crushed), *vijñātīti vijñānam* (it is consciousness because it knows or distinguishes), *cinōtīti cittam* (it is mind because it accumulates); *pratibhāna* is the rejoinder.

According to the School, the preparatory exercises of the Four Unhindered Knowledges are, in this order, the study of calculation,
the word of the Buddha, the study of sounds (sabdavidyā), and the study of causes (hetuvidyā),\textsuperscript{228} for a person who has not cultivated these four disciplines is not capable of producing the Four Unhindered Knowledges. But, in fact,\textsuperscript{229} the study of the word of the Buddha alone suffices to achieve the four preparatory exercises.

40c. One only obtains them together.

If a person obtains one Unhindered Knowledge, he obtains the others; if he does not obtain them all, he does not obtain any of them.

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The six qualities described above, Absence of Contention, etc.

40d. These six are prāntakoṭika.

They receive this name because they are obtained through the power of the Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna (vii. 41a-c).

41a. It is sixfold.

The Fourth Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna is made up of six things: it consists of 1. Absence of Contention, 2. the Knowledge Resulting from Resolution, 3-5. three Unhindered Knowledges (with the exception of the Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanation), and 6. the Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna itself.\textsuperscript{230}

Even though the Unhindered Knowledge of etymological explanation may be obtained through the power of a Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna, it does not arise in the Fourth Dhyāna, for it has Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna for its sphere; consequently it is not included within the Fourth Prāntakoṭika Dhyāna.
What is the Prāntakoṭīka Dhyāna?

It is the last *dhyāna* in the Fourth Dhyāna.\(^{231}\)

\(41b-c\). It is the last *dhyāna*, in a series with all the spheres and carried to its maximum.\(^{232}\)

a. The Fourth Dhyāna is “in a series with all the spheres” when one cultivates it in the following manner: from a good mind of Kāmadhātu, one enters into the First Dhyāna; from the First Dhyāna, into the Second, and so on up to *naivasāṁjñānāsāmāṁjñāyataṇa* (= the Fourth Dhyāna); then, one redescends to a good mind of Kāmadhātu; finally, from this mind, one ascends again to the Fourth Dhyāna.

b. One cultivates the Fourth Dhyāna; after having cultivated in an inferior manner, one cultivates in a medium manner; after having cultivated in a medium manner, one cultivates in a superior manner. Each one of these three categories is divided into three. The Fourth Dhyāna is therefore made up of nine categories. The highest category of the Fourth Dhyāna is called “carried to the maximum” (*vrddhiḥkāstāgata*). The Dhyāna which possesses these two qualities is called *prāntakoṭīka*, because its end (*koṭi*) has been traversed (*pragatā*) to the extreme (*antam*).\(^{233}\)

*Koṭi* signifies both “type” (*prakāra*) and “summit, apex,” as one says: *cātuṣkoṭīka praśna*, that is, a fourfold question; or as one says: *bhūta koṭi*, “the limit of existence.”\(^{234}\)

These qualities of the Buddha are

\(41d\). With the exception of the Buddha, acquired through effort.

With the exception of the Buddha, the other Āryans acquire these six qualities, the Samādhi Absence of Contention, etc., only through effort, and not through detachment, since all do not
possess them. The Buddha alone acquires them through detachment, for the Buddha obtains all his qualities in a single stroke, from the beginning, at the moment of the Knowledge of Destruction, through detachment. Later, he actualizes them at his will, without effort; for the Buddha is the master of all the dharmas that he possesses.

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We have explained the three categories, Absence of Contention, Knowledge Resulting from Resolution, the Unhindered Knowledges, which are common to the Æryans. Among the qualities which also belong to ordinary persons (prthagjanas) we must explain the Supernormal Knowledges.

42a-d. Realization of the knowledge of supernormal power, of ear, of the mind, of past existences, of death and rebirth, of the destruction of the cankers; this is the sixfold supernormal knowledge.

There are six supernormal knowledges: 1. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the sphere of śuddhi or supernormal power (that is to say, displacement and creation); 2. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of divine hearing; 3. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge or consciousness of the mind of another; 4. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the memory of past existences; 5. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of divine sight (of the death and birth of all beings); and 6. the supernormal knowledge which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers.

Even though the sixth supernormal knowledge belongs only to
the Āryans, since the first five are also possessed by ordinary persons, and by reason of the characteristics of the greatest number of supernormal knowledges, here all of the supernormal knowledges are considered as common to the Āryans and to ordinary persons.\textsuperscript{246}

42d. They are \textit{prajñā} of deliverance.\textsuperscript{247}

They are by their nature the \textit{prajñā} of the Path of Deliverance, like the results of the religious life.\textsuperscript{248}

43a. Four are conventional knowledge.\textsuperscript{249}

Four, with the exception of the supernormal knowledge of the minds of others and the supernormal knowledge of the destruction of the cankers, are conventional knowledges (vii.2).

43b. The knowledge of the mind of another is made up of five knowledges.

The fifth supernormal knowledge is by nature the knowledge of \textit{dharmas}, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, conventional knowledge, and the knowledge of the mind of another.\textsuperscript{250}

43c. The supernormal knowledge of the destruction of the cankers is similar to the power.\textsuperscript{251}

Exactly like the power of the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers, this supernormal knowledge is made up of six or ten knowledges. So too, it can exist in all of the spheres and relates to all objects.
43d. Five exist in the Four Dhyānas.252

The first five supernormal knowledges exist in the Four Dhyānas, that is to say, they are obtained by an ascetic in any of these Dhyānas.

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Why do they not exist in the non-material absorptions, the Ārūpyas?

a. The first three have rūpa for their object (see p. 1162, line 14). Thus one cannot produce them in the Ārūpyas.

b. The knowledge of the mind of another is prepared through the gate of physical matter (rūpa), that is to say through a path which has color and shape for its object.253 Now the non-material absorptions do not have physical matter for their object.

c. As for the memory of previous existences, the ascetic prepares for this by going over again and again the course of successive states (anupūrvavasthāantarasmaranāt);254 now the non-material absorptions do not have the dharma of Kāmadhātu for their object, and when a memory of past existences is actualized, it bears, as the Sūtra says, on the place, the gotra, etc., and on material dharmas.255

d. In fact the ascetic who wishes to know the mind of another first considers, in his own series, the characteristics of his body and mind, "Such is my body, such is my mind." As he has considered his own body and mind, in this same way, envisioning the series of another, he takes into consideration the characteristic of the body and mind of another: thus he knows the mind of another and the supernormal knowledge arises. When the supernormal knowledge is realized, the ascetic no longer considers the rūpa of the body; he directly knows the mind.256

e. The ascetic who wishes to remember his past existences, begins by grasping the characteristic of the mind which has just perished; from this mind, he again considers the states which it immediately succeeds in the present existence up to the mind at
members one moment of mind of his antarābhava), this supernormal knowledge for him to remember the previous preliminary exercise is the same.

Beginner in the practice of this supernormal existences only in their chronological ce is acquired, he remembers them by existences.

ly that which has been experienced

ow can there be remembrance of the do not return here, the ascetic does not ad he has not experienced them in their ons are not born in this heaven.

because he has experienced them through who remembers them understands, “The s are such.” The experience, in fact, is nd hearing.

om Ārūpyadhātu, arise here produce this y means of the series of another.

which consists of the memory of past re of a Dhyāna, and one cannot, through ind which is in Ārūpyadhātu.

on by means of their own series.258

the first three supernormal knowledgknowledge of the sphere of pādhi, of divine ght,—consists of the observation of t.259 When this preparation is achieved, in each case.

e supernormal knowledges do not exist vyadhātu.260
44a. They have their own sphere or a lower sphere for their domain.\(^{261}\)

Through the Supernormal Knowledge of magical power of a certain sphere, acquired in a certain *dhyāna* (vii. 43d), one possesses the powers of displacement and creation (vii. 48) in this sphere or in a lower sphere, but not in a higher sphere.

So too, through the Supernormal Knowledge of divine hearing, one understands the sounds of the sphere to which the Supernormal Knowledge belongs, or the sounds of a lower sphere, but not the sounds of a higher sphere.

Through the Supernormal Knowledge of the mind of another, one does not know the mind of another when it is of a sphere higher than that of the Supernormal Knowledge.

Through the Supernormal Knowledge of the memory of past existences, one does not obtain the memory of existences in a sphere higher than that of the Supernormal Knowledge.

Consequently, a mind in Ārūpyadhātu cannot be attained either through the Supernormal Knowledge of the knowledge of the mind of another, nor through the Supernormal Knowledge of the memory of past existences, because this mind in Ārūpyadhātu is of a sphere higher than that of the Supernormal Knowledges.\(^{262}\)

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How are the Supernormal Knowledges acquired?

If they have not been acquired in a past life, they are acquired only through effort.

44b. Already cultivated, they are acquired through detachment.
When they have been cultivated in a past life, they are acquired through detachment. [The ascetic takes possession of them through the sole fact that he detaches himself from Kāmadhātu and enters a Dhyāna]. Nevertheless, intense, they are acquired only through effort. Their manifestation always supposes an effort, except in the case of the Buddha, who acquires any of the Supernormal Knowledges through simple detachment, and actualized them at will (ii. 44a, vii. 41d).

44c. The third is made up of three applications of mindfulness.\textsuperscript{263}

The supernormal knowledge of the mind of another contains three applications of mindfulness,—\textit{vedanā}, \textit{citta}, and \textit{dharma} (vi. 14)—because it has the mind and its mental states for its object.

44d. Supernormal power, hearing, and sight make up the first application of mindfulness.\textsuperscript{264}

The supernormal knowledges of supernormal power, divine hearing, and divine sight, make up the first application of mindfulness, that is, the body as an application of mindfulness, for they have \textit{rupa}, color and shape, for their object. The supernormal knowledge of supernormal power has four external \textit{āyatanas}, with the exception of sound, for its sphere.\textsuperscript{265} And divine hearing and divine sight have both sound and \textit{rupa} for their domain.

If this is the case, how can the Supernormal Knowledge of the divine sight know, as the Sūtra explains,\textsuperscript{266} that "These beings endowed with bad physical actions, with bad vocal actions, deniers (\textit{apavādaka}) of the Āryans, produce false views, attach themselves to views and to wrong actions, because of which, at the end of their lives, they fall into bad realms of rebirth..."?

The Supernormal Knowledge of divine sight does not know
that a being is endowed with a mental action, that a being has conceived a false view, etc. But there is another knowledge which accompanies the Supernormal Knowledge of divine sight, which arises in the series of the Aryan, and which knows mental action, etc. As this knowledge is produced through the power of the Supernormal Knowledges of divine sight, it receives, together with this Supernormal Knowledge, the name of "Knowledge of death and rebirth."

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As their natures are not determined in the Kārikā, it follows in and of itself that the two Supernormal Knowledges of memory of past existences and the destruction of the cankers have for their nature the four applications of mindfulness.

45a-b. The Supernormal Knowledges of hearing and sight are neutral; the others are good.

The Supernormal Knowledges of divine hearing and divine sight are morally neutral, for, by nature, they are praṇā associated with auditory and visual consciousness.

If this is the case, how can one say that they are of the sphere of the Four Dhyānas? In fact, there is no visual or auditory consciousness in the Second Dhyāna and above (1.46).

There is no contradiction here, for we express ourselves in this way by consideration of the organs. The organs, the ears and eyes, which are the support of the Supernormal Knowledges, are produced through the power of the Four Dhyānas and belong to their sphere: they therefore exist in the four spheres. The Supernormal Knowledge, being supported on the organ, is therefore said to be supported on (= exist in) the Four Dhyānas.

Or rather, we express ourselves in this way because we consider
the ānantaryamārga (or preparation, above p. 1160, line 25) of the Supernormal Knowledge; in fact the ānantaryamārga of the Supernormal Knowledge of divine hearing and divine sight is supported on four spheres, the Four Dhyānas.  

The other supernormal knowledges are good.

If this is the case, why does the Prakaraṇapāda say, "What is supernormal knowledge? It is good prajñā"?

This definition refers to the greater number of cases (bāhulika) or to the essential (prādhānika). The supernormal knowledges are, in the greater number of cases, good; and the good supernormal knowledges are the most essential.

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According to the Śūtra, there are three Aśaikṣa Wisdoms (vidyā). To which supernormal knowledges do these wisdoms correspond?

45c-d. Three supernormal knowledges are wisdom, [because they bring about the cessation of non-wisdom relative to the past, etc.]

The three wisdoms,—the Aśaikṣa wisdom which consists of the realization of the knowledge of past lives, the Aśaikṣa wisdom which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the death and birth of all beings, and the Aśaikṣa wisdom which consists of the realization of the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers,—are, in the order of the Śūtra, the fifth, the second, and the sixth supernormal knowledges.

Why are these three supernormal knowledges called wisdoms (vidyā)?
45d. Because they bring about the cessation of non-wisdom (ignorance) relating to the past, etc.

It is because the memory of past existences (=the fourth supernormal knowledge) brings about the cessation of error relating to the past, the knowledge of death and birth (=the fifth supernormal knowledge) brings about the cessation of error relating to the future, and the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers (=the sixth supernormal knowledge) brings about the cessation of error relating to the present.\(^{273}\)

Which of these three supernormal knowledges really belongs to the Aśaikṣas?

46a. The last belongs to the Aśaikṣas.

The knowledge of the destruction of the cankers belongs only to the Arhat.

46a-b. The two others are said to belong to the Aśaikṣas when they arise in the series of an Aśaikṣa.\(^{274}\)

The other two supernormal knowledges are said to belong to an Aśaikṣa when they arise in the series of an Aśaikṣa: by nature however, they are neither-Śaikṣa-nor-Aśaikṣa. (ii. 38a)

If this is so, why not admit that these two supernormal knowledges are, when they are produced in a Śaikṣa, the wisdom of a Śaikṣa.

46c-d. We admit that they exist in the Śaikṣa, but then they are not called wisdoms because the series of the Śaikṣa is associated with non-wisdom.\(^{275}\)
In fact the Buddha did not say that these two supernormal knowledges are Śaikṣa dharmas.

Why?

When a series is associated with non-wisdom (avidyā, ignorance) it is not correct to give the name of wisdom (vidyā) to the supernormal knowledge which is produced in this series, for the supernormal knowledge is obscured by the non-wisdom.²⁷⁶

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The Sūtra says that there are three methods of conversion.²⁷⁷ To which supernormal knowledges do they correspond?

47a-b. The first, the third and the sixth are the methods of conversion.²⁷⁸

The supernormal knowledges of rddhi, of the knowledge of the mind of another, and of the destruction of the cankers, are, in this order the three methods of conversion (prātibhārya): "to carry off" (har), that is, to convert, through miracles (rddhiprātibhārya), through reading the mind of someone (ādesanāprātibhārya), and through the Teaching (anusāsanāprātibhārya).

The prefix pra- signifies ādikarman (initial action), and the prefix ati-signifies bhṛsam (forceful): these three supernormal knowledges are called prātibhārya because, thanks to them, the work of conversion (harana) is begun (pra-) and done in an intense manner (ati-).

Through them, one carries away (haranti) the mind of persons to be converted, from the very first (āditas) and very forcefully (ati bhṛsam).

Or rather, they receive the name of prātibhārya, for through
them one first or forcefully makes oneself a master of persons who hate (pratibata) the Good Law, or of those who are indifferent.\textsuperscript{279}

Through them, one makes persons of hostile, unbelieving, or non-zealous mind, produce a mind of refuge, a mind of faith, or a mind of practice.\textsuperscript{280}

\textbf{47b. Conversion through the Teaching is the best.}\textsuperscript{281}

Among the three methods of conversion, conversion through the Teaching is the best.

\textbf{47c-d.} Because it does not exist without supernormal knowledge, and because it confers the fruits of salvation and of well-being.

Conversion through miracles and conversion through reading someone's mind can be produced by means of wisdom.\textsuperscript{282} There is a wisdom called Gāndhārī:\textsuperscript{283} the person who possesses it can fly through space. There is also a wisdom called Īkṣaṇikā:\textsuperscript{284} the person who possesses it can read the mind of others. Conversion through the Teaching cannot be realized by such means, and as a consequence, since it is never separated from the supernormal knowledge of the destruction of the cankers,\textsuperscript{285} it is superior to the other two.

Further, the first two methods of conversion are only capable of captivating the mind of another for a short period of time, and they do not produce any important results. But the third method of conversion causes others to produce beneficial results; for by means of this method of conversion, the preacher teaches, in truth, the means to salvation and to well-being.

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What is ṛddhi?

48a. ṛddhi is absorption.²⁸⁶

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the word ṛddhi designates absorption or samādhi. The absorption is so named, for it is due to it that the work succeeds (sarinṛdhyaṁ).

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What does ṛddhi consist of?

48a-b. From it, there arises displacement and fictive creation.²⁸⁷

Displacement (gati) is of three types: transport displacement, displacement through adhimokṣa (intention), and rapid displacement like the mind.²⁸⁸

48c-d. Rapid displacement like the mind is unique to the Master.²⁸⁹

This displacement goes very quickly, like the mind; from whence its name of manojava. Only the Buddha possesses it, not other beings. The body arrives at a great distance even in the time it takes to think of arriving there. This is why the Buddha said that the sphere of the Buddha is incomprehensible.²⁹⁰ The Master also possesses the other two displacements.

48c-d. The others possess displacement of transport and of adhimokṣa.
Srāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas elevate their bodies and move, as a bird gradually raises his body and moves. As for the displacement of adhimokṣa, when one does it, through the power of intention (adhimokṣa), what is distant becomes close: through this adhimokṣa the object comes quickly.

49a-c. Fictive creation in Kāmadhātu is made up of four external āyatanas; [it is of two types; fictive creation of the sphere of Rūpadhātu is made up of two āyatanas.]

Fictive creation (nirmita) is of two types, of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, and of the sphere of Rūpadhātu. The first consists of the creation of physical matter, odor, taste, tangibles which are external, with the exception of sound. The second consists of the creation of physical matter and tangibles only, because odors and tastes do not exist in Rūpadhātu.

49b. It is of two types.

Fictive creation in Kāmadhātu is twofold, accordingly as it is connected with the body of the ascetic himself or with another: for example an ascetic transforms himself into a tiger, or he creates, apart from himself, a tiger.

49c. Fictive creation of the sphere of Rūpadhātu is made up of two āyatanas.

The same holds true of fictive creations in Rūpadhātu. A person who is in Kāmadhātu and one who is in Rūpadhātu are each capable of four types of fictive creations, so creation is eightfold.

But when a person in Rūpadhātu produces a fictive creation in Kāmadhātu, is it not found to possess odor and taste?
No, there is no possession, no more so than a person does not possess clothing or attire, even though they are bound to his body, because these things, not being living organisms (asattvasamkhyaata, i. 10b), are not bound to the sense organs.

Yet certain masters say that a person in Rupadhatu can only create two ayatanas, physical matter and tangibles, for they fear that if this person creates odors, etc., he will be found to possess odors, etc.

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Is it through the supernormal knowledge of creation itself that the ascetic creates fictive, created objects (nirmita)?

No.

How is this?

It is created as a result of supernormal knowledge (abhijnaphala, ii. 72b. English trans. p. 314).

What is this dharma that you term the result of supernormal knowledge?

49c-d. It is through a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nirmanacitta) that one creates. They are fourteen in number.

A result of supernormal knowledge are minds capable of creating fictive, created objects. These minds are fourteen in number.

50a-b. They are the results of the Dhyanas, from the number of two up to five, in this order.
These minds are fourteen in number, being differentiated by their Dhyāna (fundamental Dhyāna, mūladhyāna) which serves as their support.

Two minds are the results of the First Dhyāna: the first of the sphere of Kāmadhātu, and the second of the sphere of the First Dhyāna.298

Three minds are the results of the Second Dhyāna: two of the two lower spheres (Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna) and one of the same sphere as the Dhyāna of which it is the result, so therefore of the Second Dhyāna.

In the same way four and five minds are the results of the Third and Fourth Dhyānas. The mind capable of creating fictive objects, the result of a certain Dhyāna, is of the sphere of this Dhyāna or of a lower sphere.

50b. They do not arise from a lower Dhyāna.299

The Dhyāna mind of a lower sphere does not produce a mind capable of creating fictive beings (that is, a result of a Dhyāna) of a higher sphere, because its power is too small.

A fictive being,—that is to say, a magical being,—of a lower sphere, but which is the result of the Second Dhyāna, prevails over, from the standpoint of its going and coming, a being of a higher sphere, which is a result of the First Dhyāna.300 The same for the following Dhyānas.

50c. One obtains them like a Dhyāna301

One obtains a mind capable of creating fictive beings, a result of a mūladhyāna, as one obtains the Dhyāna, that is to say, through detachment, for the result is obtained at the same time as its support.
50c-d. A mind capable of creating fictive beings proceeds from a pure Dhyāna and from itself; [it produces the two.]³⁰²

Its result, a mind capable of creating fictive beings, is produced from a Dhyāna. This mind does not lead to a departure from contemplation.

50d. It produces the two.

A first mind capable of creating fictive beings arises from a pure (suddhaka, viii. 6) Dhyāna. Then successive minds capable of creating fictive beings arise from a mind of their same type, that is to say, of the first, of the second... mind capable of creating fictive beings: the former mind of this series thus produces a subsequent mind capable of creating fictive beings. The last mind is followed by a pure Dhyāna. Therefore the mind capable of creating fictive beings comes from two minds (a pure Dhyāna and a mind capable of creating fictive beings) and produces these same two. This is to suppose that the person who has a mind which is capable of creating fictive beings—the result of an absorption, and morally neutral—does not again enter a Dhyāna, that he would not depart from this Dhyāna, in the same way that one enters through a door and leaves through this same door.

51a. One creation takes place through one mind of its sphere.

All the fictive, created (nirmita) things are created by a mind of their sphere, for a mind capable of creating fictive beings of a certain sphere does not produce a being belonging to another sphere.
51b. But speech also takes place through a mind of a lower sphere.³⁰³

Speech uttered by fictive (nirmīta) being also depends, in certain cases, on a mind of a lower sphere.

Speech uttered by a fictive being in Kāmadhātu or of the First Dhyāna takes place by virtue of a mind of the sphere of this created being. But a fictive being of a higher sphere, of the Second Dhyāna, etc., speaks by virtue of a mind of the First Dhyāna: for in the higher spheres a mind endowed with vitarka and vicāra (ii. 33, English trans. p. 203) and capable of producing vijñāpti (iv. 7d) does not exist.

51c. With the creator, except in the case of the Master.

When the nirmātar, the person who produces fictive beings (nirmīta), produces a number of fictive beings, all speak when their creator speaks, because their vāgvijñāpti (iv. 3d) or vocal action, is common to all. This is why the stanza says, “When one speaks, namely the creator, all his creatures speak; when one remains silent, all remain silent.”³⁰⁴

This rule does not refer to the Buddha, for he possesses a perfect mastery in absorption: at his will, fictive beings speak one after the other; they question the Buddha and the Buddha answers; the Buddha questions them and they respond.

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But, one would say, when the mind which produces the voice arises, the mind capable of creating fictive beings no longer exists: therefore at this moment the fictive being does not exist; thus how does a fictive being speak?
51d. The fictive being speaks, because its creator sets speech into motion through another mind, after having empowered the fictive being.

Through the power of a mind previous to its entry into contemplation and creation, the creator empowers (adhitisthati) the fictive being, "May it last!" By means of another mind, he causes it to speak. Therefore, even though the fictive being speaks, the two minds,—that which creates it and that which causes it to speak,—are not simultaneous, and yet the vocal action takes place with the fictive being for its support.

52a. Empowerment continues after death.305

It is not only for the duration of his own life that the creator is capable of empowering a thing in such a manner that it endures; his empowerment can also make the thing last after his own death.

It is thus, through his own empowerment that Kāśyapa the Great made his bones last until the advent of Maitreya.306

52a. But not with respect to that which is not hard.

It is only a hard thing which is susceptible of being empowered for a long period of time. This is why Kāśyapa the Great did not empower his flesh.

52b. Some other masters say no.

The body protected by the power of empowerment is not capable of lasting beyond death. If the bones of Kāśyapa last, it is through the protection of the gods.307

52c-d. From the beginning, the ascetic creates a single creation through numerous minds capable of creating
fictive beings; the contrary, when his practice is purified.\textsuperscript{308}

A beginner, by means of numerous minds capable of creating fictive beings, produces a single fictive being; later, when his practice is complete, the ascetic produces at his own will, by means of a single such mind, many or few creatures.

53a. Produced through meditation, it is neutral.

The mind capable of creating fictive beings, when it is acquired through meditation (that is, when it is the result of a Dhyāna, or of a supernormal knowledge), is morally neutral: the result of a supernormal knowledge is in fact one of the classes of neutral items (ii. 71b).

53b. Innate, it is threefold.

But when it is innate, it can be good, bad, or neutral: for example gods, nāgas, etc., who have been created with a view to aiding or harming.

Also capable of being created, among the ten material (\textit{rūpin}) āyatanas, are nine āyatanas, with the exclusion of sound, namely, the eye, visible things, the ear, the organ of smell, etc.\textsuperscript{309}

[But if nine āyatanas are capable of being created, there can therefore be creation of organs (indriya): there can therefore be an apperition of a new being (sattva), for the organs are of \textit{rūpa} (color and shape) which belong to living beings.]\textsuperscript{310}

The organ is not capable of being created. Yet one can say without being incorrect that "creation consists of nine āyatanas," for creation—whether it refers to the transformation of the body of the creator or to the creation of a distinct body—consists of four āyatanas, physical matter (\textit{rūpa}) odors, tastes, and tangible things, and does not exist independently of the five organs.
Rddhi is, we have said, of two types: produced through meditation (or Dhyāna), and innate.

It is also of three other types:

Rddhi is also produced through mantras, plants, and actions; in all five types.

It is produced through meditation (bhāvanāja), or innate (upapattilābhika), or created through mantras (mantrakṛta), created through the use of drugs or medicines (oṣadhikṛta) or produced through karma (karmaja).

Examples of the fifth type (produced through karma) are the rddhi of Māndhātar, etc., and the rddhi of beings in intermediate existence (iii. 14d).

Are divine sight and the divine hearing called “divine” in the proper sense of the word, because they are of the nature of the organs of the gods, or rather figuratively so, because they are as if they were divine?

They are “as divine” in the case of the Bodhisattvas, Cakravartins, and Gṛhapatiratnas.

When they are divine in the proper sense of the word

Divine sight and divine hearing are of pure rūpa of the sphere of the Dhyānas.

By reason of a preparatory exercise consisting of meditation on
light and sound—the ascetic is in the Dhyānas, and in the eyes and ears of the ascetic—eyes and ears which are in Kāmadhātu—there is found to be attracted (ii. 10a, English trans. p. 166) a pure rūpa, a matter derived from the primary elements of the sphere of the Dhyāna in which it exists, subtle and excellent. This rūpa constitutes his eyes and ears; it sees and understands; it constitutes what is called divine sight and divine hearing. Arising by reason of physical matter (rūpa) of the sphere of the Dhyānas, the organs are therefore divine in the proper sense of the word.

54c-d. They are always active, non-deficient; they bear on the distant, the subtle, etc.

Divine sight and divine hearing of this category, obtained through meditation,\(^{318}\) are never tatsabhāga (i. 42), but are always accompanied by visual or auditory consciousness.

They are never deficient; for they come in pairs, and are in a good state (lit. “not seized by squinting”), as are the organs of beings born in Rūpadhātu.

They grasp what is obscured, subtle, distant, etc. On this point, there is a stanza, “The eye of flesh does not see rūpa which is distant, obscured, or subtle; it does not see in all directions. Divine sight, the contrary.”\(^{319}\)

\(^{320}\)When one sees the rūpas by means of divine sight, are the objects of sight near or far away?

The objects are near or far away according to the person and according to the eye. If they desire to see, but make no effort to do so, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas see, respectively, a Sāhasra, a Dvisāhasra, or a Trisāhasra universe (iii. 73). If they make an effort,

55a-b. The Arhat, the Rhinoceros and the Master see a Dvisāhasra, a Trisāhasra, infinite universes.\(^{321}\)
If a Śrāvaka, desiring to see by divine sight, makes a great effort, he will see a Dvisāhasra Madhyama Lokadhātu. A Pratyekabuddha will see a Trisāhasra Mahāsāhasra Lokadhātu. And the Buddha the Blessed One, will see the Asamkhya Lokadhātu: he sees according as he desires.

Why is this?

As his knowledge extends to all the dharmas, so too his divine sight extends to all the rūpas.

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Is only rddhi innate, or can other supernatural powers be innate?

55c. The others are also innate. Four powers,—divine hearing, divine sight, memory of past existences, and knowledge of the mind of another,—are also innate. But the innate powers are not called supernormal knowledges.

55c-d. Divine sight, when it is innate, does not see intermediary beings.

It is not capable of seeing the color and shape of intermediate beings which are seen only by the divine sight of supernormal knowledge. For the rest, innate divine sight is similar to the divine sight of supernormal knowledge.

56a. This knowledge of the mind of another is of three types.
This knowledge signifies the knowledge of the mind of another when it is innate. It can be three types: good, bad, or neutral.

56b. Also when it is produced through reflection (tarka) or through formulas (vidyā).

When it is produced through reflection or through formulas, the knowledge of the mind of another can be morally good, bad, or neutral. A person, through the study of the Ikṣaṇikaśāstra, is capable of interpreting signs: his knowledge of the mind of another is produced through reflection; so too one can know the mind of another through mantras. But, produced by meditation or Dhyāna, this knowledge is only good.

A knowledge of the mind of another, and memory of past existences are innate in the beings in hell. Through these two knowledges,

56c. The beings in hell know from the very beginning.

From their birth and as long as they are not crushed by their sufferings, they know the minds of others and remember their past existences (see iv. 80d).

Beings in the other realms of rebirth where a knowledge of the mind of another and a memory of past existences are innate always know because their sufferings do not overwhelm them.

56d. Among humans, not innate.

Among humans, the five powers, ārdṛhi, etc., described above, are not innate.

If this is so, how do certain persons, the Bodhisattvas, naturally
possess a remembranace of past existences?

The remembrance of past existences that they possess by nature is not innate among them, that is, acquired by the mere fact of their human birth; it results from certain actions.

How is this?

A knowledge of the memory of past existences is of three types: a result of meditation (the supernormal knowledge described above), innate (as among the gods), or realized through action (as is the case with the Bodhisattvas).
1. This Chapter is divided into two parts. The first deals with 1. the distinction between patience (ksānti), knowledge (jñāna), and seeing (dṛṣṭi) (Kārikā 1); 2. the characteristics of the ten knowledges (2-9); 3. the aspects of the ten knowledges (10-13b); 4. different questions, praśnaṇiṇīdaśa (13c-27); and the second deals with the qualities (guna) which consist of knowledge (jñānamaya) (28-55). (This is according to the gloss of the Japanese editor, Kyokuga Saeki.)

Among Vasubandhu’s sources, the Prakārana-pūdana, xiii. 10, fol.14: definition of the ten jñānas; darsaṇa which is not jñāna; object of the jñānas (14b11); reciprocal inclusion (15a3); why? (15a8); which jñāna is sārrava, anārava, sāsravapratyaya, samāskṛta, etc. Pāli sources, Samyutta, ii.57, Dīgha iii.226-227. Paṭisaṁbhādāmagga, Vibhanga, 306-344, especially 328.

2. On jñānadarsaṇa, see vii. 27c. Prajñā (that is to say the caitta described in ii.24 which accompanies all minds) is either pure (anāsṛava) or impure (sāsṛava).

i. Pure, prajñā is "knowledge" (jñāna) or "patience" (ksānti).

a. "Knowledge" signifies a consciousness of certitude, free from doubt (niicita; jñānam niicitarupena utpadyate).

Knowledge can be "pure contemplation" (paratva-vēksanāmāvra; below note 6); such as kṣṣyajñāna and anutpūţdajñāna (vi.67a-b).

It can be accompanied by samāśrana, by parimārgapāśa; in other words, it can be an upanidhyānarpāvaka manasiṣkāra (i.41c- d): in this case it is darsaṇa a "view" or seeing. This knowledge includes the desire to instruct itself; it is preceded by reflection; let us say then that it is "consideration" or examination. Nevertherless the Western equivalents are insufficient, for they do not refer to a "discursive" consciousness, but to a consciousness which can last only one moment, which is produced in the states of absorption free from vitarka and vicāra.

b. Patience is not free from doubt, since it has for its end the production of knowledge through the expulsion of doubt. It does not arise as certitude (niicayata), but as "consent" (ksamanarūpeṇa). Perhaps we can render this nuance by saying that the ascetic, in the state of patience, thinks, "The dharmas are doubtless transitory ...," and, in the state of knowledge, "The dharmas are transitory ..." The pure patiences are thus śāikṣa samyagdrṣṭi (i.4a). They are produced in fact in the course of the Path of Seeing and as a consequence they belong to the Śāikṣa. And they are darsaṇa.

ii. Impure, prajñā is associated either with the five sense consciousnesses (eye consciousness, etc.), or with the mental consciousness (manovijñāna).

In the first case, it is knowledge (jñāna); it is never "seeing."

In the second case, it is knowledge (samvrtijñāna, vii.2b); and it is "seeing": a. when it is bound to bad opinions (satkhyāḍṛṣṭi, etc., i.41a), b. when it is good (kuśala), that is to say associated with right views (samyagdrṣṭi). However it happens that it is, improperly, termed "patience": the third nirvedhabbaṅgīya (vi.18c) is in fact a "knowledge", even though it is termed "patience."

3. Prakārana (xxiii.10, 10b3) quoted in the Vyākhyā ad vii.7.

4. samtiratmaṇakatvāt = upanidhyānansvabhāvatvāt (Kośa i.41; below note 6 and viii.1).

The impure ksāntis (for example vi.18c are jñāna, or more precisely samvṛti jñāna (vii. note 40). Vyākhyā: amala eva ksāntayo na jñānam ity avadhāraṇat sāsravāḥ ksāntayo jñānam ity uktam bhavati.

5. See vii.4b. Dhī = prajñā, dṛṣṭi = dṛṣṭi = darsaṇa. The prajñā or consciousness which consists of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements (ksayajñāna), of the knowledge of no new arising of the defilements (anutpūdajñāna), is not dṛṣṭi, or darsaṇa.

6. As long as the ascetic has not done what he should do (kṛtakṛtya), he reflects


(dhyāyati), he inquires (parimārgayati) into the subject of the Truths. When he has done that which he should have done, he only contemplates (pratyaveksanamātra) the Suffering which is known, etc., and he no longer inquires. [Compare Samantapācādikā, 168, Milinda 338 (note trans. ii. p. 240), paccavekkhaṇāṇāna].

7. Hsūan-tsang here enumerates the ten jñānas: samvṛti, dharma, anvaya, duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, mārga, paracicca, ksaya, and anupādajñāna; an enumeration which, in the original, is given later on page 12. This is not the order of the Sūtra, below note 32.

8. See vii.3a, 7a, 8, 10b, 12a-b, 18c, 20c-21. Vāyākyā: samvṛtau bhavanā sāmunvatam, and below: svabhāvatah samvṛti jñānam samvṛtau vā jñānam samvṛtijñānam.


The Mādhyanikas distinguish between lokasamvṛtijñāna and yogisamvṛtijñāna (see for example Bodhicarīyavatāra i.x.2). The latter corresponds to the laukika jñāna pṛṣṭhālabdh, Kośa, vi. trans. p. 141-2; and vii.12a-b (pṛṣṭhāja), 20c.

9. Samvṛtisadavastu, vi.4; Sātrālamkāra, i.12, Kathāvatthu, v.6.

10. Pure jñāna is the consciousness of the general characteristics of the dharmas; it is called dharma jñāna when it bears on the dharmas of Kāmadhātu, anvayajñāna when it bears on the dharmas of the two higher Dhātus, vi.26.

11. The Andhakas (Kathāvatthu, v.6) say: saṁmuti jñānam pi saccārammaṇan eva: Conventional knowledge has for its object only the Truths (according to Aung and Rhys-Davids).

12. See vi.44d, 50a, vii.1, 7, 12a-b.

13. Paramārtha: "when they are not by nature aśāikṣi samyagdṛṣṭi." We have seen (vi.50d) that all the Arhats possess "correct view proper to the Aśāikṣas"; this samyagdṛṣṭi is by its nature darśana; it consists of dharma jñāna and anvayajñāna.

14. Kṣayajñāna and anupādajñāna necessarily have Bhāvāgra from whence the Arhat is about to deliver himself for their object. When a person dies from a poisoned wound, the poison, after having spread over all the body, concentrates itself, at the moment of death, in the wound; in this same way the ascetic's jñāna concentrates itself on the object to be abandoned, namely the skandhas of Bhāvāgra; it bears on Suffering (yena pīḍyate) and its Arising.


16. The consciousness of another's mind, in principle, is conventional knowledge, samvṛtijñāna. But when another's mind is a pure mind, that is to say a mind forming part of the pure path (darśanamārga or bhavānamārga), the consciousness which I have of this mind should be pure; it embraces mārgajñāna, pure knowledge relative to the Path; the following mārgajñāna which is relative to Kāmadhātu or to the higher spheres is either a dharma jñāna or an anvayajñāna. Therefore the knowledge of the mind of another (paracittavid) contains four jñānas.

17. See vii.11a-d and the Balas, Abhijñās, etc.

18. The text has: Paracittajñāna by the lower does not know the higher: it does not know, by the Anāgāmin path, the path of the Arhat . . .

19. He begins the preparatory cultivations from the time that he sees that the ascetic is about to enter into darśanamārga; this cultivation is accomplished when he sees the mind of another occupied in the duḥkha of Kāmadhātu, in duḥkha as part of dharma jñāna.
20. On the paracittajñāna of the Pratyekabuddhas, see Vibhāṣā TD 27, p. 515a18, p. 515c7, and elsewhere. Four opinions according to Saṃghabhadra, namely the two opinions mentioned by Vasubandhu, and also: "The Pratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 8, 14", "The Pratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 11 and 12." The third opinion is the correct one: for if he knows moment 8, it is because his preparatory cultivation with its consciousness as part of anvayajñāna lasts only 5 moments; thus during moments 9-13 he could prepare himself for the consciousness of moment 14.


22. Paramārtha, "According to the Abhidharma." This is the text of the Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 694a8 (Hsüan-tsang’s translation); see also Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 1021c.

23. Omitted by Paramārtha; given by the Prakaraṇa and Hsüan-tsang.

24. The Vyākhyā explains tad upādāya as tat puraskṛtya. See p. 1108.

25. We have, Nettippakarana, 54: cakkhu, vijjā, buddhi, bhūri, medhā, āloka. Compare Kośa, vi.54d.

26. In fact pure jñāna bears on duḥkha, on the dharmas and their general characteristics, and not on a "self" knowing the duḥkha, a self which implies the formula duḥkham me pariṇāmatam. All knowledge which envisions a "self" is saṁvr̥ti jñāna, conventional, impure knowledge.

27. The specific (viṣeṣa) characteristic of the two pure jñānas, which are nirvikalpa, is known by inference (anumāyate) by reason of the two saṁvr̥ti jñānas which are their outflowing (nisyanda). Below vii.12a-b.

28. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor: pāscātyasramaṇasautrāntikādayah. According to these masters, there are some pure aspects outside of the sixteen recognized by the Vaibhāṣikas (see below vii.12c).


30. The Śāstra is quoted in the Vyākhyā: yat tāvaj jñānam darśanam api tat/ syāt tu darśanam na jñānam asūtī abhisamayantikāḥ kṣāntayāḥ. According to the note of the Japanese, the Jñānaprasthāna, TD 26, p. 957c2, and the Prakaraṇapada, TD 26, p. 694c5.

31. Paramartha adds: "Furthermore, in order to indicate that the darśanas here differ from the drṣṭis discussed above."

32. Same order in the Prakaraṇapada, TD 26, p. 693c22. The order differs in Hsüan-tsang (above note 7) and Mahāvyutpatti, 57.

33. This question is absent in Paramārtha and in the original. The original has tatra . . . = "Among these jñānas, saṁvr̥ti jñāna constitutes . . ."

34. Vyākhyā: saṁvr̥ti jñānam saṁvr̥ti jñānam eva svabhāvasamgrahataḥ/ ekasya ca paracittajñānasya bhāga ekadeśaḥ/.

35. The part which presents the aspect "Duḥkha is known by me . . ."
37. Definition of the Śāstra, quoted in the *Vyākyā* and which corresponds to Prakaraṇa, TD 26, p. 693c23:

*dharmajñānāṁ katamat/ kāmapratisamyukteṣu saṁskāreṣu yad anāsravam jñānam/ kāmapratisamyukteṣu saṁskāreṣu yad anāsravam jñānam/ kāmapratisamyukteṣu saṁskāreṣu nirodhe yad anāsravam jñānam/ kāmapratisamyukteṣu saṁskāreṣu nirodhe yad anāsravam jñānam/ kāmapratisamyukteṣu saṁskāreṣu prabhāṇya mārge yad anāsravam jñānam idam ucye dharmaṇāṇām/ api khalu dharmajñāṇe dharmajñānabhūnau ca yad anāsravam jñānam idam ucye dharmajñāṇam. anvayajñāṇam katamat/ rūpāpyapratisamyukteṣu saṁskāreṣu yad anāsravam jñānam . . . See vi.26, anuveryity anvayajñāna.

38. Correct sāstravābeteva vi., note 11, line 11.

39. *Vyākyā*: nirodhamārgau bhv adhātyapitau/ tāv adharāv api na hīnau vyavasthāpyete/ duḥkhasamudayaṣaye tv adharabhāṁike nibhe/ na taddālamānaḥ dharmajñāṇān rūpāperyapardhāyapritipakṣaḥ āy avagāntavyam. Nirodhaḥ and mārga do not form part of the Dhātus. To consider nirodha with respect to Kāmadhātu (nirodhe dharmajñāna) is to also combat the kleśas of the higher spheres.

In the state of dāśāmārga, it is the anvayadharmaṃśāntī which expell the anuśayas of the higher spheres.

40. *Vyākyā*: sūdaksākāraṁ uṣmagatadīśu/ svasāmānyalakṣaṇādīgraḥaṇādaḥ iti svalaṅkṣaṅgraḥaṇē ca/ adiśabdena bhūmkṣa tīṣṭha gacchety evamākāraṁ ca/ ma bhv ete svalaṅkṣaṅkāraḥ kām tarhy evamākāraḥ eva.

In the uṣmagatasya etc. (vi.17c), samvṛtijñāna grasps the sixteen aspects of the Truths. Samvṛtijñāna grasps their general characteristics (for example, impermanence), their unique characteristics (for example, the specific characteristic of rūpa); and it also grasps the aspect which is expressed by the words “Eat! Go! . . .”: such a samvṛtijñāna does not have for its aspect a unique characteristic, and one can only say that it is evamākāra, “of such an aspect.”

41. According to Paramārtha: svasvasatyākārataś catusṭayam.

42. Paramārtha: paramanuyānām api tathāmālam. Cetopariyāye ṃāṅa or parice ṃāṅa (=paracittajñāna) is not sammatiyānā (Vibhaṅga, 330). The Andhakas think that it bears solely on the mind, Kathāvatthu, v.7, and wrongly maintain that a Śrāvaka can, through this ṃāṅa, know when others attain a result, v.10.

43. See note 42.

44. See note 42.

45. The *Vyākyā* quotes the Sūtra: sarāgām cittam sarāgām cittam iti yathābhyutam praṣāṇīśī / vigaratāgām cittam vigaratāgām cittam iti yathābhyutam praṣāṇīśī / yathā sarāgām vigaratāgām evam sadvesaṁ vigatadvesaṁ samoham vigatamoham saṁsāśiptam vikṣiṇāṁ līnām pragrāḥ samahdham anuddhahdam avyupāśāntaṁ, avyupāśāntaṁ asamābhitam abhāvitaṁ bhāvitaṁ avimuktaṁ vimuktaṁ iti yathābhyutam praṣāṇīśī.

According to the glosses of the Bhāṣya, one should add the two pairs amahadgata and mabagdga, sa-uttara and anuttara before avyupasānta: in all twelve pairs. However these two pairs are missing in the Sūtra quoted in the Vijñānakāya (TD 26, p. 534a1-a5) and in the edition of the Sūtra quoted by the *Vyākyā* below vii.42a-d.

According to Saeki, the list of the Ekoṭṭara (TD 2, p. 776b20) includes some eleven parts, that of the Madhyama (TD 1, p. 553b19) has ten, by omitting uddhata-anuddhata and avyupasānta-avyupasānta, and by adding sadoṣa-adosa; that of the Sāṃyuktā (TD 2, p. 150a6) has ten pairs.

Pāli sources, for example Samyutta, v. 265, Āṅguttara, iv.32, Vibhaṅga, 329, Visudhimagga, 410 (whose explanation diverge from those of the Abhidharma). We have
only eight pairs: sarāga-vitarāga, sadosa-vitadosa, samoha-vitamoha, saṅkhitta-vikkhitta, mahaggata-amahaggata, sautara-anutara, asamāhi-samāhi, and avimutta-vimutta.

46. Vyākhyā: yathā yadda vastram iti paricchinnākāram vijñānam utpadayate na tadā malam ghṛnāti and vice versa. See i, trans. p. 67.

47. That is to say "associated with rāga, rāgasamprayuktā. All this paragraph is according to Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 950a24, quoted by Saeki, xxvi.8a.

48. These two explanations will be commented upon and refuted above page 1105 and following.

49. That is to say any mind defiled (kliṣṭa) but not associated with rāga; any neutral mind; any good (kuśala) worldly (laukika) mind. The supramundane mind, a mind forming part of the Path, is not sārava. See page 1105 line 14.

50. There are three opinions.
   First masters: A mind associated with rāga is sarāga; a mind opposed to rāga is vigatarāga.
   Second masters: A mind united with rāga, which can be understood in two ways, as above note 49, is sarāga.
   Third masters: A mind associated with rāga is sarāga; a mind not associated with rāga is vigatarāga.
   According to the Vibhāṣa (TD 27, p. 950a24 and following), the second opinion is the best one. Vasubandhu adopts the third opinion.

51. Paramārtha: "because its object is small."

52. In the Vibhāṣa (TD 27, p. 950c8), lüeb 略 （"abbreviated, reduced"), in Hsüan-tsang, chü 聚 （"concentrated").

53. Ibid. an atilina mind is kosajjasahagata, kosajjasampayutta.

54. Ibid. The atipaggabita mind is uddhaccasahagata uddhaccasampayutta. In Divya, pragrbīta = "elevated, high" (as a mountain palace, etc.).

55. The "great person" par excellence is the Buddha. This paragraph is according to the Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 950c20: The defiled mind is small because it is cultivated (sevita) by a svalpajana (?hsiao-sheng, 小生 "a small person"); the good mind is great because it is cultivated by a mahājana.

   Objection: Do we not see that an immeasurable number of beings cultivates the bad, that a small number of beings cultivates the good? How can one say that the defiled mind is cultivated by svalpajana?

   We do not say "small" because the category is small in number; that which has few pure dharmas is called small.

56. Bhāvanā = pratilambha, acquisition. According to the principle: kuśalasāṁskṛta dharmanā bhāvayitaśyāḥ (iv.127c). "These are the good sāṁskṛta dharmas which one acquires in a future state." See below vii.25d.

57. Paramārtha: "past and future".


59. It is not released when it is good-impure (kuśalasārava) and when it arises in a series where the klesas have not been cut off. On deliverance of the mind, see vi.76c.

60. For samksipta, Paramārtha has lüeb 略 Hsüan-tsang, chü 聚 ; sammirodha, Paramārtha: she 撮 (=samgraha), ch'ib 持 (dhar), Hsüan-tsang: ch'ib 止 (samatha).
Saeki observes that, according to the Sautrantikas, vipaiyana and samatha are excluded.

Sautra, v.279: katama ca bhikkhave ajihattam samkhitaṃ cittam/ yam bhikkhave cittam thinamiddhasahagatam thinamiddhasampayuttam/ idam vuccati.../ katama ca... baiddhā vikkhitaṃ cittam/ yam... cittam baiddhā pañca gane arabbha anuvikkhittam anuvisatam/ idam vuccati...

61. Hsuan-tsang translates: "In fact we do not admit (pu-hsu 不許 = na pratijñāyate) that a defiled mind, associated with langour, is distracted." The same for Paramārtha: "We do not establish (pu-li 不立 )...

Vyākhyā: kim iti kirtvā viśiśṭatvam atra na pratijñāyate/ kim middhasahagatam citte viśiśṭatvam nāsti na pratijñāyate abhīvīd viyāmānam api viśiśṭatvam samśiśṭatvanāvasthāpayitvān na pratijñāyate/ ubhavatīpi vyācakṣate/ kecid vyācakṣate/ middhasahagatāt kliṣṭād yad yat anat kliṣṭām tad viśiśṭam pratijñāyate middhasahagataṃ tu kliṣṭāṃ akliṣṭāṃ vāvasena samūḥśītaṃ eveti/ apane punar vyācakṣate/ yan middhasamuyuktām tat akṣiptam eva na viśiśṭam/ yat tu viśayeṣu viśītam tad eva viśiśṭam ity ato'tra middhasamuyuktē citte [viśiśṭatvām] na pratijñāyate.

62. Vyākhyā: abuddhokyaṃ abhidharmaśāstram ity abhiprayaḥ. Compare Kośa, i.3, iii.32.

63. The defilement, kliṣṭa, of the first minds is not differentiated: it consists of association, samprayoga, with the kleśas which are found in all defiled minds; the goodness, kuśala, of the second minds consists of association with the dharmaśas which are found in all good minds, ii.25, 26.

Vyākhyā: sarvatāṃ tāṃ kliṣṭāṃ uktānīti/ kliṣṭatvalaṅkanaṃ eṣāṃ viśiśṭatādānāvamuktiṇāṇam/ Kliṣṭatvam punah kuśalamābhūmikaiḥ samprayogāḥ/ saṃ kṣiptaprajñābhiānāṃ cābhinnalakṣāṇavacanānāṃ nārthaviśeṣa uktō bhavati.../ kuśalatvam eṣām abhinnaṃ/ kim punah kuśalatvam/ kuśalamābhūmikaiḥ samprayogāḥ.

64. Vyākhyā: stūre hi stūrānmidhasahagatam saṃkṣiptam uktāṃ/ stūrayogena yāt kliṣṭāṃ middhasamuyuktāṃ tat saṃkṣiptaṃ na kuśalāṃ stūyānāya kuśalamābhūmikatvāt.

65. The Vaibhāṣikas are of the opinion that: yad eva līnaṃ tad evoddatam, "a līna mind is an uddhata mind." We draw this conclusion from their definition: līnaṃ cittam kliṣṭāṃ kauśīdayasamprayogāt; uddatam cittam kliṣṭaṃ auddhatyasamprayogāt. (Below note 70, for another version).

66. If līna and uddhata were identical, the Sūtra would say: "When the mind is līna it is not the time to cultivate praśrabdhi... priti. When the mind is uddhata it is not the time to cultivate praśrabdhi... priti." Or rather: "When the mind is līna or uddhata it is not the time to cultivate praśrabdhi... priti."

67. The cultivation of the seven parts of Bodhi is simultaneous.

68. With regard to smṛti, the Blessed one said: smṛtiṃ khalv abāṃ sarvātṛagataṃ vataṃ.

69. Hsüan-tsang: "But we are not in contradiction with the Sūtra! Even though a defiled mind is both līna and uddhata, the mind in which kauśīdaya predominates is termed līna in the Sūtra; the one in which auddhatya predominates is called uddhata in the Sūtra. But, considering their constant association, I say that they are one in nature."

70. A defiled mind is līna through association with kauśīdaya; a defiled mind is uddhata through association with auddhatya. Compare ii, trans. p. 194.

71. Vyākhyā: Ācārya abha nābbhiprayikam yāvat stūre tu nāyaṃ abhipraya iti.

72. A Śākṣa has, at the present time, a pure mind, for example the thought of impermanence; but there remains in him the possession of the rāga of Kāmadhātu if he is not an Anāgāmin...  

73. Anuśayānarāgālambanatvāt, see v.17.
74. The thoughts of the Arhat which form part of the Arhat are never impure, for these thoughts are pure by definition and are not the object of the "active" defilements of another, v.18a-b; but these conventional thoughts (smārtijñāṇa), like his body, are impure (sāsrava) in the sense that the defilements of another can become active with respect to them (1.4b). See viii.25c.

We observe that Paramārtha translates very clearly: "If a thought is sarāga by the fact that it grasps rāga as its object; ... yuan yú wei ching chieh 緣欲為境界
75. The second masters, above note 50.
76. "Even though they have a real thing for their object."
77. See above page 1094 line 19.
78. See above page 1094 line 11.
79. "Arising is extinguished by me": that is to say: arising is abandoned; this is to see the Truth of Arising under four aspects (vii.13a); "The religious life is cultivated": four aspects of the Path; "That which should be done is done": four aspects of Extinction; "I do not see any further existence": two aspects of the Truth of Suffering, impermanence and suffering. Among the commentaries on this fourfold formula, Samantapāśadikā, i.168. Some remarks, of which I should like to be more confident, in Nirvana (1925), p. 60.
80. The Vyākhyā explains: asty etat stbānam ity asty etal lakṣaṇam ity arthah/ asty etad vastv ity ayam hetur ity arthah/ yogavibhītato vijāniyād ity avipātītato vijāniyād ity arthah/.

According to Saeki, this is an excerpt from the Vijnānakāya, TD 26, p. 559c29 and p. 565a16. This formula and the formula of wrong views (page 1109 line 20) are repeated to repletion (with some variants) in the Vijnānakāya, on the subject of the multiple types of thoughts: "Does a thought belonging to Kāmadhātu know 1. the dharma of Kāmadhātu, 2. the dharma of Rūpadhātu, 3. the dharma of Ārupadhātu, 4. the dharma not included in the Dhātus, 5. the dharma of Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu ...?" This thought is good, bad, neutral, to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. The way in which a thought sees these different dharmas depends on its nature and on the nature of these dharmas.

I do not find the passage where the Vijnānakāya explains the manner in which a thought "not included in the Dhātus" sees the dharmas of Kāmadhātu. But it explains itself with respect to the thoughts of the Śaikṣa and the Āśaikṣa (which are two types of thoughts not included in the Dhātus), p. 565a16. Its text is identical to that quoted by Vasubandhu, with the difference that the formula asty etat stbānam asty etad vastu is preceded by the words asty eso hetuh (?), asty esa utpada (?).

The mind of the Śaikṣa or Āśaikṣa only knows the dharmas of Kāmadhātu under the aspects of the first two truths (anitya ... pratayatatas); a good mind of Kāmadhātu however knows the dharmas under the aspects that Vasubandhu has specified (vi.49d) as characteristics of the "worldly path": advārikatas, duḥkhlitās, āvaranātās, and even sālyatas, etc.
81. The Seeing of the Truths at least partially dispells rāga, dveṣa, māna, and moha. A thought to be abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths would contain rāga, etc.; the text therefore says rajyeta, etc. This thought is not free of satkāyadrṣṭi, so it considers the dharmas as atman and ātmiya; it is not free of antaghrbhadṛṣṭi, and so considers the dharmas as destined to perish (uccheda) or as eternal (sāsvata) . . . We have this formula throughout the Vijnānakāya, TD 26, p. 559c29, p. 563b20, p. 578b8, and elsewhere.
The specification of the ākāras of the Abhidharma are not found in the Abhidhamma (see for example Paṭisambhidāmagga, i.107, 118, 241, Visuddhi, 494); it is not canonical: Anguttara, i.38 (list of saṁñās), and iv.422 where the ascetic considers the Amatadvātā as sānta, pañita, etc., and the things of his stage as dukkha, roga, gaṇda, etc. We have seen (vi.49), the ākāras of the worldly path: we have to observe that Vasubandhu gets his inspiration from the Vijñānakāya, fol. 59b, line 18 and elsewhere.

83. It results from this that abhisamaya is anupūrva, vi.27.

84. On the meaning of mārga and pratipad, vi.65b-d, 66a, vii.28c.

85. See Sānyutta, iii.66, for variants.

86. Compare v.27, trans. p. 820.

87. Compare vi.60a.


89. These explanations are according to the glosses and the context. Vyākhyā: chandamālakā iti chandahetukā ity arthaḥ. tṛṣṇāparyāya ita cha Chandah. chandasamutkṣamā (?) ity arthaḥ (read samuṭṭhānā?). chandajātiḥ iti chanda-pratayā ity arthaḥ.

Paramārtha translates jātiśya by sheng 生, "to arise," and prabhava by yu 有, bhava, "existence"; Hsüan-tsang has respectivly lei 項, "species," and sheng 生, "to arise."

Sānyutta, iii.100, Majjhima, i.16: pañcupādānakkhandhā kīṃmālaka... chandamālaka.

In another context, Anguttara iv.400: tāṇbāmālaka.

We have Paṭisambhidāmagga, ii.111: jāramaraṇam kīṃnīdānam kīṃsanudayaṁ kīṃjātiṁ kīṃṭhpabhavām.

90. Vyākhyā: prabhavaśabdaḥ kevalam paścāt patibhavyaḥ/ abhidhārmikair iti vākhyādhyābhārah/ sātrānusaraṇam bhī kārtavyam ity abhiprāyāḥ. The Abhidhārmikas, in the list of the aspects of this Truth, should place the prabhava aspect after the pratraya aspect, for one should be guided by the Sutra.

91. The five upādānakhandhas are thus said to have this type of chanda for their mūla or hetu.

92. On virya, vipāka and prabhāva of a fruit from the earth as food, or of a drug, Sarvadār tantrasaṁgraha, 16.22, Kandali, 130, Sūtruta, i.1 and 40.

93. Paramārtha: "According to the Sūtra of the tṛṣṇāvācicaritas, there are two groups of five, and two groups of four." All that follows to page 1114 line 30 is omitted.

Our text is closely related to Anguttara, ii.212, on the eighteen tāṇbāvācicaritas, where the readings are uncertain, and to Vibhaṅga 392-400, where they are more certain but remain difficult to interpret (Mrs. Rhys Davids had the kindness to communicate to me the text of the Sammohavinodani and the Manorathapurani; see the following note).

We can compare the list: "Did I exist in the past? ...," Kośa, iii.22c, Majjhima, i.8, i.111, Visuddhimagga, 599, Madhyamakavrtti, 593.

According to chapter ii trans. p. 282, chanda is relative to the future.

94. The Vibhaṅga, in place of saḍ asmiḥ and arat asmiḥ has 1. as'asmī (=nicco'smi ...) and 2. saṭ'asmī or sat'asmi (=ucchissāmi na bhavissāmi). The commentary says: atthiti asa/nicca's'tetam adhivacanam. Mrs Rhys Davids remarks: as = asa = asan = asanto = "bad," Jataka, iv.43: satam vā asan (accusitive singular). We would have: "I am bad, I am good." The Manorathapurani explains sata by sidati in the sense of anicca: this is the explanation that we have encountered for satkāyā, Kośa, v. p. 873. The commentary of the Vibhaṅga understands syām as "Shall I be?"
95. On pravṛtti, ii.6. Perhaps vaṭṭiṇapaccheda = vartmopaccheda that I think we must read in Mahāvastu, ii.285, iii.200, quoted in Kośa, ii. trans. note 395.

96. According to Saeki, Samyukta 17.16; see also TD 2, p. 66b14.

97. In his shorter treatise, Saṅghabhadra takes into consideration this explanation in order to prove that the "aspects" are indeed sixteen in number.

98. Vyākhya: nityam sukham atmiyam atmeti ca dṛṣṭiḥ caritam eṣāṁ ta ime nityasukhāṁ-śītādṛṣṭīcaritāḥ.

99. See v.26, trans. note 98; iii.50a.

100. The meaning of prayāya is discussed in Kośa, iii.28.

101. 13b-d. On ākāra, see ii.34b-d, trans. note 173.

102. This explanation is satisfactory, for we indeed conceive that prajñā—the discerning consciousness (ii.24)—grasps the "aspects", that is to say grasps things (ālambana) in a certain manner (as impermanent, etc.). Furthermore this explanation takes into account the word ākāra:

One takes the sound ā from ālambana, the final kāra from prakāra, and one has ākāra by cancelling -lambanagrahaṇapra-.

103. On the dharma "which have an object", Kośa, ii.34b. Kathāvatthu, ix.3-7; Vibhaṅga, 428, Dhammasaṅgani, 1185, 1508. The Madhyamakavṛtti, 84, quotes the Agama: sālambaṇā dharmāḥ katame/ sarve cittacaittāḥ.

104. Vibhaṅga, TD 27, p. 408c25: There are three systems: 1. Prajñā is ākāra, grābaka, and grhyā; the cittacaittas associated with prajñā are grābaka and grhyā; what is concomitant (sahabhū) with prajñā and what is cittaviprayukta is grhyā. 2. All cittacaitta is ākāra, grābaka, grhyā; all other dharmas are grhyā. 3. All dharmas are ākāra; but the samprayukta dharmanas are ākāra, grābaka and grhyā and the viprayuktadharmanas are ākāra and grhyā (The meaning of ākāra is quite different here).

105. In the Śāstra, dharmaṁśāna begins the list.

106. We can understand why a being in Āruṇyadhatu cannot manifest the dharmaṁśāna which has for its object suffering, its arising, etc. of the sphere of Kāmadhatu, but why are beings in Rūpadhatu incapable of it? We have seen that a person manifests this jñāna by entering into the dhyānas (which are Rūpadhatu) (vii.14c). Some say: "Dharmanā has for its end the detesting (vīdūṇaṇā) of Kāmadhatu; now a person in Rūpadhatu has abandoned Kāmadhatu by the very fact that he has transmigrated to a sphere of detachment [from Kāmadhatu]; therefore the dharmaṁśāna does not have to arise. The case of a person detached from Kāmadhatu [and who has entered into a dhyāna due to this detachment] is different: he can manifest the dharmaṁśāna because his existence in Kāmadhatu is not exhausted."

Saṅghabhadra explains differently why dharmaṁśāna can only be manifested by beings in Kāmadhatu: tasmādātivartābhāpivaitiśāyaṁ kāmadhātāvaḥ eva sadbhavāt/ anuparivaṁśākitvā kāśrayābhāvād vā/ dharmaṁśānamuparivaṁśākatvāya hi śīlaṁ kāmāvacarānāṁ eva bhūyāṁ āśrayā daunḍśīlasyasamuttpādaṁ uṣṇapraṇapītyaṁ viśēṣāṁ brahmacarāyaṁ eva "Because it is only in Kāmadhatu that the thoughts of departing from the absorption [in which one realizes dharmaṁśāna] is possible; or rather because, in the two higher spheres, the elements (bhūyāṁ) which can serve as the support (āśraya) of the type of morality (śīla) which necessarily accompanies dharmaṁśāna are missing. This morality is opposed to the klesas which produce immorality (daunḍśīla); immorality exists only in Kāmadhatu; the elements susceptible of supporting morality which are opposed to this therefore exist only in Kāmadhatu.
107. See iv.13c.

108. This preamble is missing in Paramārtha.

109. According to Hsüan-tsang, Paramārtha literally translates his original which is rendered in Tibetan by: chos bcu dag ni stbyar bar bya: "Ten dharmas should be placed in relationship", and he adds the Bhāṣya: "In order to determine the object of the jñānas, one should establish the relationship of the ten jñānas with the ten types of dharma. What are these ten types of dharman? . . ."

110. On one hand pratīsamkhyaṇinrodha or Nirvāṇa, on the other hand apratisamkhyaṇinrodha and ākāśa.

111. Mārga dharma jñāṇa bears on the Path; the morality which is anāsravasamvara, that is to say rūpa (iv.13c) forms part of the Path.

112. Hsiian-tsang: Is there a moment of knowledge which grasps all the dharmas for its object?

This appears to be the beginning of the discussion of Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 43a2, quoted by Saeki: "Is there a jñāna which knows all the dharmas? No. What is it that the jñāna, which knows that all the dharmas are not an ātman, does not know? It does not know itself; it does not know the dharmas which are associated with it or which coexist with it. By saying that it does not know itself, one refutes the thesis of the Mahāsāṃghikas; by saying that it does not know the dharmas associated with it, one refutes the thesis of the Dharmaguptas (fa-mi-pu); by saying that it does not know the dharmas which coexist with it, one refutes the thesis of the Mahīśāsakas; by saying that jñāna knows, one refutes the thesis of the Vātsiputriyas [which attribute consciousness to the Pudgala?]."

Compare Kathāvāttābha, v.9, where the Andhakas quote a text: sabbasamkhārentu aniccate dītthesu tam ti nānan ti aniccate dīttham hoti. The Vyākhyā quotes the Sūtra: ihāṃkāraṁ bho gautama upasthānāsālāyāṁ samniṣṭhānāṁ samniṣṭpātānāṁ evamrūpoṇatarākhyā samudāharkoḍhutē / śramanāṃ gautamā kilaivāma abā / nāti sa kaścīc chramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yah sakṛt sarvam jātyāt sarvam paśyed iti / tathāyam idām bho gautama/.

113. Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.18: na cchinati yathāmānam asidhāra tathā maṇah. This is a common position in Indian philosophy; nevertheless the Saurāntikā-Vijñānāvādins say that the lamp illumines itself. By a curious contradiction, the Vaibhāṣikas who deny that the mind knows itself, admit that sensation (vedāṇa) is felt not by another sensation, but by the very fact that it is present (iv.49).

114. Paramārtha omits the last phrase ("If it were otherwise . . .") and translates: "When it is a jñāna in Kāmadhātu it is a prajñā of hearing and reflection; when it is a jñāna in Rūpadhātu, it is only a prajñā of hearing, not of meditation, for this last type of prajñā always has a determined sphere for its object."

Vasubandhu follows the Sāntyuktabhīdharma-bṛdaya, TD 28, p. 953c21: "This jñāna is a prajñā of hearing, and reflection, but not of meditation; for the prajñā of absorption has a delimited object."

Vyākhyā: tasya vyavacchinnabhūmyālambanatvād iti/ yasmād bhāvanāmayam rūpāvacaram samvṛtījñānam vyavacchinnām eva bhūmim ālambate/ kāmadhātum vā prathamam vā dhyānām yāvad bhavāgraḥ vā/ kim kāranam/ ānantaryavimuktīmārgaḥ anādharottarabhūmyālambavād vā yathoktaṁ yathākramam sāntādyudārayākārā uttarādharāgocara iti vacanā (vi.49) yadi ca tat sarvabhūmyālambanāṁ syāt sarvato yuyapad vairāgyam syāt/ pravṛttiśāmārgaḥ yathāsambhavam kā ca eva bhūmir ālambanam/ katham/ nirvedhabhāgyaprayogamārgasamgrhītasya bhaya yasā kāmadhātur ālambanam na tasyetara dhaṭāḥ/ yasyetaraḥ dhaṭāḥ na tasya kāmadhātur ālambanam/ aśabhāpramāpabhi bhūvyātanādvidāsanaścīṣṭamārgaḥ māgrhītasya kāmadhātur evālambanam netarau dhaṭāḥ.

According to Yaśomitra, a faithful interpreter of Vasubandhu who is, on this point,
approved of by Saṃghabhadra, it is solely through a prajñā of meditation (bhāvanā) that one obtains detachment (vairāgya). The prajñā of hearing and reflection, which is in Kāmadhātu, cannot bear on the dharma of all the spheres: it is not enough to become disgusted with it: the prajñā of bhāvanā is more powerful (iv.123c). Based on this, Vasubandhu concludes that the universal consciousness of "the absence of self" of the dharma belongs to Kāmadhātu, for if it belonged to Rūpadhātu (that is to say arising from bhāvanā, and being obtained in the dhyānas) it would produce detachment from all of the spheres. Saṃghabhadra contests this reasoning, for the prajñā cultivated in dhyānas (impure prajñā, since it is a samvṛtiṣṭhāna) never includes disgust for the higher sphere to which it wishes to deliver itself (vi.49)

Let us note here that Hsüan-tsang translates the two pādas 18c-d (TD 29, p. 138a22) by three pādas: "Samvṛtiṣṭhāna, by excluding its group, together has all the dharma for its object, by comprehending them under the aspect of non-self", and he adds a fourth pāda: "it arises from hearing and reflection."

Saṃghabhadra, in his second treatise, the Prakaranaśasana (TD 29, p. 952a10) corrects the kārikās where Vasubandhu departs from correct Vaibhāṣika doctrine; the version of Hsüan-tsang (p. 138a23) gives, in the fourth pāda: "It arises from hearing, reflection and meditation." Saṃghabhadra thinks in fact (in his first treatise, the Nyāyānusāra, TD 29, p. 742c18 and following): "This jñāna is only in Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu, but not in Ārūpyadhātu . . . It is a prajñā of hearing, reflection, and meditation (bhāvanā): for these three prajñās are capable of having all the dharma for their object with the exclusion of themselves and their group. It is true that the Sautrāntika (=Vasubandhu) says: 'This jñāna is not a prajñā of meditation . . .' But this is false. In our system the prajñā of meditation of the sphere of the dhyāna takes for its object the sphere in which it is found, namely, the higher sphere; it produces disgust with respect to the lower sphere, and joy with respect to the higher sphere: thus it does not produce detachment with respect to the higher sphere. The argument of the Sautrāntika is therefore null and void."

It appears that, according to what Yaśomitra says here, we should consider as viśeṣamārga (vi.65) the disgust (vidūṣaṇa) which includes [the qualities, guṇa, namely] asubha (vi.9), the apramāna (viii.29) and the abbibrovyaṭana (viii.35a). All these qualities are viśeṣa (v.10a, trans. p. 785); they are acquired through prayoga, ānantarya, vimuktimārga, and are prolonged in viśeṣamārga (vi.65); see vii.25d.

115. Hsüan-tsang: In the states or moments which do not include any augmentation of the number of jñānas (3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th moments of abhisamaya), he possesses the jñānas of the last previous moment which does include augmentation. Therefore, at the beginning of bhāvanāmārga (16th moment), he necessarily possesses seven jñānas.

116. This last phrase has been added by Hsüan-tsang.


"Cultivation" is understood here as the acquisition or taking possession, and manifestation. (See vii.27).

118. Yathotpannāni bhāvyante = yāni yāny utpannāni tāni tāni bhāvyante (bhāvyante = bhāvanām gacchanti). Bhāvyante signifies "are acquired", since it refers to future ksāntis and jñānas.

119. The ksānti or jñāna produced are sabhāgabete (ii.52a)—a cause whose result resembles it—of a future ksānti and jñāna of the same species.

120. The question does not refer to the ksāntis because there are no ksāntis in
bhāvanāmārga.

Vyākyā: bhāvanāmārga tu puṇah sarvesāṁ jñānānāṁ sabbāga visabbāgaṁ
tadākāraṁ ca sammukhi bhavat sarvesāṁ hetavo labdhā bhavantī
tadaviśśā jñānākāra bhāvanām gacchanty anāgataḥ/.

121. Above page 1135.

122. Darsanāmārga is all pure (anāsrava) and the ascetic who cultivates it does not produce
a samvṛtijñāna in the course of his practice. But he takes possession in moments 4, 8, and 12
of the samvṛtijñāna relative to each Truth: leaving the Path of Seeing, he possesses, and will
be able to manifest, a conventional, worldly (sāmytta, laukika) consciousness of the Truths,
which is called prabhālabdha, see vii.2b.

123. We have seen above (vii.7, note 25) that the "patiences" produced in the course of
abhissamaya are called abhisamayāntika.

Mahāvyutpatti, 54.20 (Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 188c9): abhisamayāntikaṁ kusalamālam
(translated into Tibetan as mnon par rtogs pa' i lam mtha' las 'byun ba and mnon par rtogs
pa' i 'jug pa las 'byun ba = abhisamayamārga-anta-udbhava, abhisamaya-avatāra-udbhava),
followed by 54.21: kṣayajñānalabhikam kusalamālam = roots of good (or qualities) obtained
at the moment of kṣayajñāna (vii.26c); and 245, 486.

124. But all persons, in the course of samsāra, have understood Suffering, its Arising and its
Extinction by the worldly path (Vyākyā).

125. In fact Arising should again be abandoned by the Seeing of Extinction and the Path,
and again by the Path of Meditation, whereas all Suffering is perfectly known (parijñāta) by
the Seeing of Suffering. But the Arising which should be abandoned by the Seeing of Arising
is found to be already abandoned. (Paramārtha's translation).

126. The Vaibhāsikas think that the sixteenth moment belongs to bhāvanāmārga (vi.28c);
some other schools include it in darsanāmārga.

127. Vyākyā: vayam hi bhāvanāmārgagraipāriṇāro'pi tad iti brūmaḥ.

128. This paragraph is missing in Hsuan-tsang. The Vyākyā furnishes a different
explanation: darsanāmārgalabhyaṁ tat tasya kathaṁ bhāvanāmārga sammukhi bhavat
bhavisyati/ darsanāmārga ceśṭṣya navakāso'isyāti iti tad anupattidharmakam iti
varnayanti Vaibhāsikāḥ.


130. Vyākyā: gotraṁ taduṭpādane samartho hetubh/ tatra bhavam gautrikam samvṛtijñā-
nam. On gotra in the sense that we have it here (sabhāgabeta), see i. p. 78, vii. p. 1124.


132. From Kārikā 22 to Kārikā 26c Hsuan-tsang departs from the original (which
Paramārtha faithfully translates) both for the Kārikā and the Bāhyam.

133. Namely anvayajñāna and mārgajñāna, because mārgē'nvayajñāna is, by its nature, these
two jñānas.

134. Not samvṛtijñāna, because it has been acquired formerly (labdhpūrvaṁ); see vii.27.
Not paracittajñāna, because the ascetic is not vītarāga.

135. Therefore in the four types of paths of the eight stages of bhāvanāmārga where one
abandons the first eight categories of klesas of Kāmadhāru, and also as long as one has not
abandoned the ninth. On these four types of paths, see v.61, vi.65b, (46d, 61d), vii.18c, 25d.

136. Namely the sāntādyutārādyākāro bhāvanāmārga, see vi.49.
137. See vi.61b.
138. See vii.5c.
139. Everyone agrees that samvrtijñāna is not cultivated in the ānantaryāmārgas of the perfecting of the faculties (vii.24c).
140. Of dharma, anvaya, and the Four Truths.
141. Vyākhya: dvayos tv abhijñāvimuktimārgayor iti/ divyafrotraṇāvacaśurabhijñāvimuktimārgayor avyākṛte frotacakraṇabhijñē iti vacanat (vii.42) tadvimuktimārgāv avyākṛta/na cāvyākṛtasya dharmasyānāgataḥbhavānāsti. See above note 56.

We understand by this that, by realizing these Abhijñās, one does not take possession of the same future Abhiñāas.
142. The three Abhijñās are ṛddhi, pūrvenivāsa and cetaparyāya.
143. An ascetic detaches himself from Kāmādhūtu by a worldly path which has for its support (sāmnisrayena, that is to say "is cultivated in") anāgāmya (introductory stage of the First Dhyāna) and, through this detachment, he obtains the First Dhyāna; at the moment of the ninth vimuktimārga of this detachment, he cultivates a samvrtijñāna of the sphere of the anāgāmya or of the sphere of the First Dhyāna; and so on until: he detaches himself from ābhīṣcayāyatana through the worldly path practiced in the sāmantaka (preparatory stage of naivassāmījñānasamījñāyatana, he obtains a samvrtijñāna of the sphere of the sāmantaka or of the sphere of the naivassāmījñānasamījñāyatana. Samvrtijñāna is cultivated under the same conditions when the ascetic detaches himself from Kāmādhūtu through the path cultivated in pure (anāsrava) anāgāmya.

But if the ascetic obtains the first pure dhyāna by practicing the pure path in the First Dhyāna, the samvrtijñāna that he obtains is of the sphere of the sāmantaka of the Second Dhyāna which is opposed to the first . . . to the ninth category of the defilements (kleśas) of the First Dhyāna—for this is the first time that this ascetic obtains the first pure dhyāna. And, in the ninth vimuktimārga of the path by which he obtains the first pure dhyāna, he cultivates, in the future, a samvrtijñāna of the second dhyāna (Vyākhya).
144. An ascetic takes his support from the second pure dhyāna and, in this manner, detaches himself in the Third Dhyāna: the pure jñāna which is cultivated is of the sphere of the Path, that is to say of the Second Dhyāna; it is moreover in the ninth vimuktimārga of detachment, of the sphere in which he detaches himself, namely the Third Dhyāna; it is also of a lower sphere, namely of the First Dhyāna, of anāgāmya. For it happens that the preparatory path is of a lower sphere: the jñāna of a lower sphere will therefore be able to be cultivated.

But when an ascetic detaches himself from the Second Dhyāna by taking as his support the sāmantaka of the Third Dhyāna, neither in the ānāntarya nor in the vimukti paths can a pure jñāna of the sphere of the sāmantaka be cultivated: in fact there is no pure jñāna in this sāmantaka (viii.22a). The cultivated jñāna will be inferior to the Path: of the Second Dhyāna, of dhyānāntara, of the First Dhyāna, or of anāgāmya.
145. Hsüan-tsang: "Only in the first kṣayajñāna does he cultivate all of the impure qualities of the nine spheres." With the gloss: "In the first kṣayajñāna, that is to say in the ninth vimuktimārga of detachment from Bhavāgra, and in the ninth vimuktimārga of the five perfecting of the faculties" (TD 29, p. 139c25).
146. Et cetera refers to abhibhāvatana, kṛṣṇāyatana, etc.
147. Pedā, Divya, 251.4, 365.8, a bag holding jewels or alamkāras; phelā, ibid. 503.24, Mahāvastu, ii.465 (phelā, phelikā); Bloch, Marathe, 370; classical, peta, peta, peti; Pali: pelā.

Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha: "as, when their bonds are cut, beings who were bound and strangling, now breathe."
The meaning is that, at the moment of ksaya-jñāna, there is produced the possession of all the qualities to a great degree of excellence.

148. Compare the first Cakravartin King, Kōsa, iii. 96c.

149. Hsüan-tsang (p. 139c16) adds a pāda: "Arisen above he does not cultivate the lower"; a thesis developed in the Vṛkṣa-āyuḥya: When one obtains the quality of Arhat (that is to say ksaya-jñāna) in Kāmadhatu, the asubhas, etc., of the Three Dhatus are "cultivated" (bhāvanām gacchanti); when one obtains the quality of Arhat in Rūpadhatu, or in Ārūpyadhatu, the same qualities are cultivated with respect to the different bhāmis of these Dhatus; one who obtains the quality of Arhat in naivasamjña-samjña-yatana cultivates only the qualities belonging to this bhāmi.

150. a. Vṛkṣa-āyuḥya: yaḥ vīśīmam punar labhyate sammukhikriyate samsārocitaṁ na tad anāgatam bhāvyate bhāvitaṁ prastatvāt samsāre/ yad evātra dhyānāpramāṇādy anucitaṁ samsāre viśiṣṭam anāsravānuṣṭaṁ tattvamukhikībhāve tajjātyam evānāgatāṁ viśiṣṭam bhāvyata ity acārya darsāyati. It is some vulgar qualities, encountered in the course of transmigration, that one manifests, and that one abandons. These qualities are not the object of "cultivation," that is to say "are not possessed in a future state." But when one actualizes the distinguished qualities, the Dhyānas, the Apramāṇas, etc., rare in the course of transmigration, and which are favorable to the acquisition of pure qualities, one takes possession of them for the future. This is what Vasubandhu intends to say.

This explanation depends on Vasumitra's thesis that there is cultivation of some distinguished qualities, samsārānucatvāt, but not of others.

b. Hsüan-tsang: "The dharma previously acquired and then lost, and now acquired anew, is not 'cultivated' because of this, because one reacquired it without effort. One manifests the dharma not previously acquired with effort, and it is thus 'cultivated' in the future, because its force is great. Produced after having been acquired, it is not cultivated in the future, because its force is small, being produced without much effort." This version is based on the explanation of Saṃghabhadra.

c. Saṃghabhadra (in his Nyāyānusāra, TD 29, p. 745b18; see also his Prakaraṇātisāna, TD 29, p. 954c9, which does not exactly correspond) is quoted by the Vṛkṣa-āyuḥya: acaśaya-saṁghabhadras tv etam evārtham vyācīṣte/ labhadhāpūrvam na bhāvyate/ yat pratilabdhaśīmam punar labhyate na tad bhāvyate/ arthād gamyate yad labhadhāpūrvam labhyate tad bhāvyate/ yatānābhimukhikaranaṁ/ apratiprśrābho hi margo yataṁ nābhi-mukhikriyata iti tadavedhabalavatvād anāgato bhāvanāṁ gacchati/ pratilabdhaśīvam tv ayatnaṁ sammuḥkībhavati bhāvitaṁ pratisṛṣṭadbhavati kṛtakṛtya-dattaphalatvād ca vegābina iti tattvamukhikībhāve anāgato na bhāvyata iti/ yo'nāgato yatnena janyate sa bhāvyata ity abhūpyāb.

The Vṛkṣa-āyuḥya continues: tad evam satī yad uktam saṃvṛti-jñānam tāvad iti vistareṇa tad āryasamātānupatitam eva gṛhyate.

That is to say: if this is the case, what is said of the cultivation of saṃvṛti-jñāna should also be understood of the saṃvṛti-jñāna of the Āryan. The Vṛkṣa-āyuḥya then mentions the opinion of Vasumitra, and the objection of the Vaiśeṣikas: samsārānucatvāt iti ācāryavasumītenaśātra likhitam/ atra kila vaibhāṣikā abhū/ naitad evam/ kutāh/ yasmād alabdham eva tad bhavati tyakṣyatvāt tasmād bhāvītotsṛṣṭasyāpi punarlābe bhavate eva bhāveneti/ katham tad apūrvaṁ bhavati yāvatālabhadhāpūrvam iti/ na hy evaṁvidhim loke prasiddham iti/.

Finally, one can understand "what has not been obtained" (alabdhaśīvam) as what has not been obtained in this life: āpare punar vyācākṣate ekam janmedam abhiḥkṛtyoktam na janmāntaram/ yad vīśīmaṁ asmin eva janmanī punar labhyate na tad bhāvyate bhāvītotsṛṣṭatvāt/ janmāntare tu yāl labhyate tad bhāvyate.

151. See Kōsa, vi. 1, note 2; vii, p. 1104, Atthasālinī, 163.
152. Bhāvanā which consists of taking possession of a future dharma. In the same way nīsevanabhaṇānā consists of nīsevana.

153. Pratīpaksabhāvanā signifies the bhāvanā which consists of pratīpaka, "opposition": pratīpaka mārga yathoktaṁ sūtre bhāvitaṁ bhāvitasātaṁ iti bhāvitaṁ yacitapratīpakaṁ ity arthaḥ/ kāyapratīpaksah punaṁ caturdhvānaṁ avairigyāyaṁ yo margaḥ/ tathāḥ hy uktam bhāvitaṁ bhāvitaṁ bhāvitaṁ bhāvitaṁ/ kathāṁ bhāvitaṁ bhavati/ kāyāṁ vigatoṁ vigatoṁ vigatoṁ vigatoṁ vigatopāso vigatopremā vigataniyantih (?)/ atha vā yo' sau rūparāgakṣayāntaryamārgaḥ/ so'nena vigatoṁ bhavatītī āgamaṁ. Samyutta, iii.7, 11, 190, iv.111; Anguttara, iii.106; Majjhima, i.237.

How the mind is termed bhāvita, above vii.p. 1102.

154. Vinirdhāvanabhāvana is the cutting off of possession of the defilements, kleśapraśpiccheda.

155. The order of the pra(d)hānas differs in the Mahāvyutpatti, 39; see vi.2c, 67. Hsūian-tsang omits this reference to the prādhānas.

156. Indriyabhāvana, Majjhima, iii.298; indriyasamvara, Samyutta, i.54, Aṅguttara, iii.360, Majjhima, i.269, 346, etc.

157. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 76b2: saḍ imāṇāndriyāni [susamvrātāni subbhāvītāni . . .] Indriyasamvara or samvarabhāvana is, by its nature, memory and attention: sa punar indriyasamvarah smṛtisamprajñānasubbhāva uktah.

158. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 647a3 (a paraphrase), Majjhima, iii.90; Samyutta, iv.111; Śikṣāsamuccaya, 228, Madhyamakavrtti, 57, etc.

159. Vidhāvānabhāvāna, or kāyabhāvāna is nothing other than the expulsion (vinirdhāvāna) of the defilements of which the body is the object.

160. According to Hsūian-tsang. The original has: We have explained in general that the Arhats, whoever they are, take possession of the "qualities" at the moment when they produce the "consciousness of the destruction of the ārasas." (vii.26c) There are eighteen qualities which belong to the Buddha . . . Kathavatthu, iii.1-2: the "forces" do not belong to the Buddha (thesis of the Andhakas).

Patisambhidamagga, i.7, sixty-three ānapas which six belong to the Buddha; Milinda, 285.

161. On āvenika, the definition of avidyā āvenikī (Vyākyā, ad v.12, 14, ii.29) which is quoted and translated by Burnouf, Lotus 648: samparko venir ity ucyate/ na venir avenih prthbagbhāva ity arthaḥ/ evam hy uktam avenih bhagavān avenih bhikṣusamgha iti prthbh bhagavān prthbh bhikṣusamgha ity abhiprāyah/ avenih ca paty āvenikī nānānāyavasasabacāriṇyā arthaḥ. Aṅguttara, v. 74. The Saṅgha does not divide . . . na āveni kammāni karonti no āveni pātimokkhām uddisanti (=na prthbh karmāni . . .)

There are five qualities which belong exclusively to women (āveniya and āvenika), Divya, 2.3, 98.22, etc.; Burnouf, Introduction, 169.

The good that I have done is my āveniya riches, Jātaka, iv.358.

162. a. This is the list of Divya, 182.20, 268.4.

b. Yaśomitra says: Such is the doctrine of the Vaibhāṣikas. Some other masters admit eighteen āvenikas distinct from these, namely: nāsti tathāgatayya skhalitam, nāsti ravitam (=sabasā kriyā), nāsti dravata (=kṛiddābhiprāyatā), nāsti nānātvasamjñā (=sukhadhābhādābhāsukṣheṣu visyaṃśau rāgadeveṣu mahatā nānātvasamjñā), nāstī avyākṛtamānams, nāstī apratisamkhyāyopekṣā, nāstī atīṣaḥ pratibatam jñānādāśanam, nāstī anāgataḥ prabhātam jñānādāśanam, nāstī pratyuppanneṣu pratibatam jñānādāśanam, nāstī kāyakarma jñānānuparivartī, nāstī vākṣaṁ jñānānuparivartī, nāstī manahkarma jñānānuparivartī, nāstī chandahānī, nāstī vyahānī, nāstī smṛtibhānī, nāstī samādhībānī,
nāsti prajñāhāniḥ, nāsti vimitiṣṭāhānādīrtaḥanābānīḥ. This contradicts iv.12, vi.59.

This list, with some close variants, is found in Mahāvyutpatti, 9 (an extract, according to Wogihara, from the Tsa-chi 雑集 of Sthiramati) which is quoted here by the Japanese editor of the Kośa. We will find in Madhyamakāvatāra (vi.213, p. 322-337) a commentary extracted from the Dāranīśvaraparipṛcchā. Very close too are the lists of Mahāvāstu, i.160 (see the note p. 505) and the Pāṇi sources, Abhidhānapadipikā and Jīnālakāra (Burnouf, Lotus, 649, Kern, Geschiedenis, i. 272, Milinda, 285).

The particularity of Yaśomitra's list is in the first terms: nāsti skhalitam nāsti ravītam nāsti dravatā; the Mahāvastu and the Mahāvyutpatti have: nāsti (s)khalitam nāsti ravītam nāsti musitasmṛtīr; the Jīnālakāra gives: . . . nāthi davā (commented upon as kiccābhibbājānī kiriyā, a bad reading for khetābhibbājānī), nāthi rava (commented upon as sabāsā kiriyā). Note the close relationship with the glosses of Yaśomitra: dravatā = kriyāyāpyatā, a = sabāsā kiriyā (= Tibetan co co, "outcry" = Chinese: "defect of the voice"). For dravatā, Mahāvastu-Mahāvyutpatti have, we would say musitasmṛtīr (which has, perhaps a double use with the ninth declension: nāsti smṛte hanyā).

Apratisamkhyāupekṣa is an upekṣa or indifference, which does not result from the consciousness, due, we would say, to apathy, not to wisdom (see vii.8).

c. The Bodhisattvabāmhi (iii.114) admits 140 añeṇikas (see Muséeon, 1911, 170): 32 and 80 marks, 4 "omniform" (sarvākāra) purities, 10 balas, 4 vaitaradāyas, 3 smṛtyupābhasās, 3 ārākṣasās (compare the 4 ārākṣyas of Mahāvyutpatti, 12), mahākaranā, āstamātā, āsāmātā, vāsanāsāmaduddhāta, sarvākāravarajñāna (compare sarvatābājñāna, Kośa, vii. p. 1146).

d. The añeṇikas of the Bodhisattva, Mahāvyutpatti, 29, and Madhyamakāvatāra, vi.212.

163. Lotus, 343, 781, Spence Hardy, Manual, 380 and other works quoted in Dharmasamgraha, p. 51; Mahāvyutpatti, 7 (according to the Yogāśtra).

Pāṇi list in the Jīnālakāra of Buddharaṇī: the ancient "Sanskrit" source is the Mahāvāstu, i.159 (a valuable commentary by the editor, p. 502-505); on the other hand, Paśīsamibdā, ii.174, Vibhaṅga, 335.

The Buddha is dasābala, Mahāvagga, i.2.13.; "Dasabala" is the title of a vagga of the Saṁyutta; see however the observations of Rhys Davids, Milinda, ii. 134. the ten balas of the Bodhisattva, Mahāvyutpatti, 26.

The balas are explained, according to the Dhāranīśvaraparipṛcchā in the Madhyamakāvatāra, Tibetan translation, p. 369-395.

If the balas belong to the Śrāvakas; if the first nine balas are pure or āryan "knowledges", Kathavatthu", iii.1-2.

164. A different list in the smaller Vyutpatti, 5 (Minayev, 1887). The Vyākhyā quotes the Sūtra: dasāyuṣmantas tathāgataḥ abalāni/ katamāni dasa/ ibyuṣmantas tathāgataḥ sthānam ca sthānam yathābhubāt prajñātā/ asthānām cāsthānataḥ/ idam prathamaṁ tathāgatābalāni yena balena samanvāgatas tathāgatoḥ samyakṣamabuddha udāraṁ ārṣabhaṁ sthānam prajñānātī brāhmaṁ cakram pravartayati parisadā samyakṣimānādānaṁ nadati// psnar apararm āyuṣmantas tathāgatoḥ tītanagatapratyutpanmāni karmadharmaṁ sadānāṁ sthānato hetvato vastuto vipakataḥ ca yathābhūtāṁ prajñānātī yad āyuṣmantas tathāgataḥ pūrvaved yavad vipakataḥ ca yathābhūtāṁ prajñānātī idam dvitiyam tathāgatābalāṇi yena balena . . . / Psnar apararm āyuṣmantas tathāgatoḥ dhyaṇavimokṣasamādhasamapatiṁ samkleśayāvādanaṃvastubhāvaddhim yathābhūtāṁ prajñānātī yad āyuṣmantas . . . 3.//. . . Parapudgalaṇāṁ indriyaparāparatām yathābhūtāṁ prajñānātī . . . 4.//. . . nānādibimuktiṁ lokam anekādhibimuktikām yathābhūtāṁ prajñānātī . . . 5.//. . . nānādibhātukāṁ lokam anekadibhātukāṁ . . . 6.//. . . sarvatragaṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśiṁśi
165. This first jñānabala is by nature ten jñānas. Sthānasthāna is divided into 1. saṁskṛta, which is eightfold; 2. saṁprayukta (associated with the mind), of four types—Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu, Arupyadhatu, and anāsra; 3. viprayukta (disassociated from the mind), the same; and 4. asaṁskṛta, which is either morally good or neutral.

Sthānasthānabala as saṁvrījñāna bears on these ten things; as dharmajñāna on five; as anvayajñāna on seven...

How are these ten things sthānasthāna? See the Sutras: "There is the sthāna (possibility, saṁbhava) that a male realizes Buddhahood (buddhatvam kāryayati); there is the asthāna (impossibility, asaṁbhava) that a female...; there is the possibility that a male becomes Brahma (brahmatvam kāryayati); there is the possibility of the destruction of suffering...

Definition of this bala, Vibhaṅga, p. 335.

166. Action and its result are in fact included within the Truths of Suffering and Arising, not in the Truths of Extinction or the Path.

167. We have Four Dhyānas (viii.1), Eight Vimoksas (viii.32), Three Samādhis (śūnyata, etc., viii.24), Two Samāpattis (asaṁśī and nirodha, ii.42) and Nine anupūrvavibhārasamāpattis (ḍhāṇas, ṛūpās, nirodha). The same in Vibhaṅga, 339.

168. That is indriyaparopāya, Vibhaṅga, 340, Papisambhidamagga, i.121. Indriya is rendered in the stanza by aksa; the Buddha knows if the faculties of beings (faith, etc.) are weak, etc, (parāpara). (Vibhaṅga is more developed).

169. Adhimukti = adhmokṣa - ruci (i.20); the Buddha knows the aspirations of beings, their likes.

170. Saṁghabhadra explains: pūrvābhyāsavāsanāsamudāgata āśaya dbātur iti; the Buddha knows the mental states which result from former habits and practices. On vāsanā, vii.30c, 32d; on āśaya, iv. note 375, and p. 663, vi.34, Vibhaṅga, 340. The Vibhaṅga differs and places the consciousness of āśaya, anāśaya, etc., in the seventh bala.

171. The knowledge relative to nirodha is only included in the knowledge of the Path (pratipad) if one understands pratipad as pratipadhala; in fact pratipad is not the cause of nirodha even though it is the cause of the realms of rebirth.

The Vibhaṅga (p. 339) does not envision the pratipad of nirodha; the Paṭisambhidāmagga takes it into consideration.

172. On the expression jambuṣapādagata, see iii.41 at the end.

173. This is the story recounted in the Sūtraṇāṃkāra of Asvaghosa, trans. Huber, p. 283. Saeki refers to the Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish, TD 4, no. 202) where the story is much
more detailed, see TD 4, p. 376b2-p. 380a10; Dsanglun of Schmidt, 107-128. See also Zapiski, vii.281, 286, and Histoire des Religions, 1903, i.323. According to a note by P. Pelliot, the hero is called Śrīvṛddhi. Saeki also mentions Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 530c19 and following.

The Vyākhyā explains: Śāriputra searches in vain to see in the series of this person a root of good "which could produce deliverance" (mokṣabāgiya, i.iii.44c, iv.124, vi.24c, vii.34), and as a consequence refused to admit this person into the Saṁgha. But the Bhagavat saw this root of good and conferred pravrajyā upon him. On this occasion the Bhagavat, questioned by the Bhikṣus, said: "He did an action so that he obtained the state of Arhat. For actions do not mature in water . . . and the rest." And it says: Mokṣabijam abham hy asya susūkṣmam upalakṣaye/ dhātuṣpāṣānānivivare nilinam iva kañcanam// (Quoted in Vyākhyā, i. p. 5; translated by Burnouf, Lotus, p. 340).

174. Paramārtha: "It is related also of the pigeon chased by the hawk that Śāriputra was not capable of knowing the beginning and the end of his rebirths [as a bird]."

The Vyākhyā has: upapattayādiparyantājñānam ceti/ adiśabdana cyutiparyantājñānam, that is to say: [There was also ignorance on the part of Śāriputra] concerning the limit of births and deaths [of the pigeon . . .].

175. Yogasūtra, iii.24, on the acquisition of the power of an elephant, etc.

176. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 155a8: As the Sūtra says, the body of the Bodhisattva has the force of Nārāyaṇa. What is the measure of this force? There are those who say, "The force of nineteen bulls is equal to the force of one hao-niu 豪牛 (Couvrier: a bull which has long hair down to the joints of his legs) . . ." There are some who say: "This measure is too small. In the body of the Bodhisattva, there are eighteen great joints: each has the force of Nārāyaṇa . . ." The Mahābhādanta says: "This measure is too small. In the same way that the force of the mind is infinite, so too the force of the body. How do we know this? . . . When the Bodhisattva undertakes the resolution: "I shall not get up before I have attained Bodhi . . .," the great chiliocosm moved in some six different ways, but the very hairs of the Bodhisattva did not stir . . ."

177. This is an explanation of the opinion of others. Vyākhyā: saṁdhīsu anya ity uktam/ asthisamdhiveṣopayanyāḥ/ nāgarantarhīti vistarāḥ/ nāgaranthamāṁdhatyo buddhāḥ/ nāgapāśo nāgarantarhiḥ/ saṁkalasamāṁdhayaḥ pratyekebudhāḥ/ saṅkusamāṁdhaśa cakravartinah.


179. In Mahāvyutpatti, 252 (which relays on the Kośa), varāṅga precedes prakṣandin.

180. Paramārtha replaces ten with one hundred.

181. The original has yathā tu babutaram tathā yujyate. Paramārtha adds: "Why? Because the force of the Buddha is without measure." The Vyākhyā says: "The author defends the first opinion, for the reason that, otherwise, the body of the Buddha would not be able to support the force of infinite knowledge."

182. Five opinions in Vibhāṣā (see TD, p. 154b8 where the discussion begins; the theories are given p. 154c24-p. 155a7), and four in Saṁghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra (TD 29, p. 748b12-b20).

183. The Sūtra (Ekottara, TD 2, p. 645b27), quoted in the Vyākhyā, is very close to Aṅguttara ii.8 (vesārajja): catavārimāni fāriputra tathāgatasya vaśāradyānāya vaśāradyāh samanvāgaṭas tathāgato'vat saṁyaksaṁbuddha udāram ārṣaṁbhām sthānānī pratiṣṭhāni brāhmaṁ cakram (Kośa, vi.54) pravartayati pārṣadī samyak simhanādam nādāti/ katamāni catvāri saṁyaksaṁbuddhasya vata me sāta imē dharmā anabhissambuddhā ity atra mām
kaicic chramano vā brahmaṇo vā saba dharmena codayet smārayet/ tatrābham nimittamaṇi
na samanupajyami evam cāhān nimittam asamanupajyam kṣemaprāptaś ca vibharāmi
abhayaaprāptaś ca vaisāradyaprāptaś ca udāram ārṣabham . . . Same text quoted in the
Vijñānakāya, TD 26, p. 544a6, which has: chramano vā brahmaṇo vā devo vā māro vā
brahmaṇ vā . . .

In Majjhima, i. 501, the vesārājjas are attributed to all Arhats; compare Mahāvagga,
i.6.32. In a fragment of the Samyukta, JRAS, 1907, p. 377, the Householder Śrōṇa is
vaisāradyaprāpta (an epithet of the Srotāpanna).

The young lion (kīfōra) possesses vaisāradya, Bodhicarya, vii.55.
The vaisāradyas of the Bodhisattva, Mahāvyutpatti, 28, Daśabhūmi, viii, Madhamakāvatāra, 320.

Etymology of the word vaisāradya, Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhūmi (Leipzig, 1908), p. 41.

184. The readings of Mahāvyutpatti, 8, differ a little: . . . 3. antarāyikadharmanaryatvāniṣcitārṇa-karaṇa . . . 4. sarvasampadadvigamāya nairgyānikartripatīpattāhāva vaisāradya.

185. Paramārtha differs: As these absences of fear are realized by jñāna, the jñāna is called vaisāradya. What is the reason for the four vaisāradyas? They are useful to oneself and to others. The first two are useful to the Buddha himself; the last two are useful to others. Or rather the four are useful to others, for they expel all defilement both in the speaker and in his discourse.

186. The Vibhāṣā remarks: These three smṛtyupāsthānas are included within sthānāsthānajñānabala, and within the six satatavisūtras (see iii.35d, at the end).

187. When the disciples have the contrary attitude, tathāgatasya nāgbhāto bhavati nāksāntir nāpratayo na cetasō nābbhirāddhib.

Compare Majjhima, iii.221 (very close) and i.379; Mahāvyutpatti, 11.

For utplāvitatvam, see Bodhicaryāvatāra, p. 13, note 3; manasa utplavāḥ in Śikṣāsāmacaya, 183.6.

188. See Asaṅga, Sūtrālamkāra, xvii.43; Divya, 359 (the kṛpa of the Śrāvaka); compare the stanzas in Divya, 96, 125 and Huber, Sūtrālamkāra, p. 284.

189. The paramitās of giving, the precepts, and patience are the provisions of merit; the paramitā of prajñā is the provision of knowledge.

The paramitā of absorption or dhyāna gives rise to merit, as it is the cultivation of the Four Apramāṇas (viii.29), and it gives rise to knowledge as it is the cultivation of the thirty-seven "adjuncts of Bodhi" (vi. p. 1022).

The paramitā of energy or vīrya is also doubly useful: na hi vinā vīryeṇa dānam dīyate
saṁmaṇḍitā kṣaṇitā bhavaty iti puṇyam abhāṛabhāgyām vīryam bhavati tathā
nāṁtareṇa vīryam prajñā bhavati . . .

Same doctrine in the Mahāyāna (where it is explained that the paramitās are paramitās by the fact of prajñā), in Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.1.

When and how the Bodhisattva practices the paramitās, Kośa, iv.111.

190. On ākaraṇa, ii.34b, vi.18a.

191. An excellence which results notably from samāskāradvāhkhatākāra and prajñāsvabhāvatā.

192. In this formula, one undertakes, along with the First Dhyāna, Anāgamya and Dhyānāntara. Compassion is of the six bhāmis.

193. “Śrāvakas, etc.” refer to the Pratyekabuddhas and Prthagjanas.

194. By karunā, the Śrāvakas have simply compassion (karunāyante); they experience commiseration, affliction; they do not protect one from the fear of samsāra. But the
Bhagavat, having compassion along with mahākaruṇā, protects one from the great terror of saṁsāra.

195. a. Differences between Buddhas, Kośa, iv. 102, trans. p. 685, Bodhisattvabhūmi, I.vii, Musdo 1911, 173 (life, name, gotra, body); Wassilieff, 286 (314). Kathāvatthu, xxii.5: the Theravāda admits differences, vemattatā, for the body (sarīra), the length of life and light (pabbā); the Andhakas admit other differences. Milinda, 283 (differences between Bodhisattvas, family, time period, length of life, stature). Below note 197.

b. Vasubandhu groups together, vii.28-34, the elements of a Buddhology. Interesting from this point of view are the following passages of the Kośa:

i.1. Difference of the wisdom of the Buddha and that of other saints; omniscience (also Kośa, ix). The Buddha and the Bodhisattvas are Bhagavats.

ii.10. Abandoning of the āyusamśākāras; victory over the Four Māras.

ii.44, vii.41d, 44b. All the qualities (guna) acquired through detachment and actualized at his will.

ii.44, vi.24a. The conquest of Bodhi in thirty-four moments.

ii.62. Knowledge of the future.

iii.94. Time period of the appearance of Buddhas.


iv.32. The cult of the Buddha.

iv.32. The Dharmakāya, refuge; the Rūpakāya.

iv.73. Accepts the gifts made to Stūpas. iv.102. Retribution of his former actions.

iv.102. Schism.

iv.109. The marks of the Bodhisattvas, the objects of their minds.

iv.109, vii.30, 37, 42. The memory of the Buddha.

iv.121. The cult of Caityas.

vi.59. Falling away from the joys of the absorptions.

viii.28. Conquest of Bodhi through the Fourth Dhyāna.

c. On the Bodhisattva, and in particular, the future Buddha Ākyamuni.

iii.94, iv.108-112. Origin, vows, and practice of the pāramitās (iv.117), duration of his career (because the Bodhisattva is naturally charitable, iii. 94a), development of the marks.

iv.106. Death of the Bodhisattva.

vi.23. Change of vehicle, animal births of the Bodhisattva.

Last birth, iii.9, āryāyuja and why (relics); 13a, in the form of an elephant; 17a, conscious at conception, etc.; 41, a Pṛthagjana until sitting under the Bodhi Tree; 53d, the Vajrāsana; 85a, free from premature death. [According to the Kāraṇaprajñāpāti, Cosmologie, p. 327, explanation of the marks; 331, rain of flowers; 332, 334, life in the womb; 333, miracles at his birth; 335, why he has a son, why he is of good family, why he is not born in such a continent, etc. On the mother of the Bodhisattva, death on the seventh day, 331,337; when pregnant, sheltered by fire, etc.].

196. Vyākhya: anāsravadharmasamātāno dharmakāyāh/ āṣrayaparivṛttir vā: “The Dharmakāya is a series of pure dharmas (Kośa, iv.32) or a renewing of the psycho-physical organism, the personality (āṣraya).” Some examples of the renewing of the personality, iv.56, trans. p. 631; see viii.34d.On the dharmakāya of the mother of the Buddha, of an Upāsaka who has entered the Path, see Huber, Sūtrālaṁkāra, 217, 390.

Dīgha, iii.84 (Ajaññasautta): Tatbāgatassa hetam Vāsettha adhibacanam dharmakāyo iti pi brahmakāyo iti pi dhammabhūto iti pi brahmabhūto iti pi piti (Fragment of the commentary in Dialogues, iii.81).

Frequently dharmakāya = the body of scriptures = the second ratna, Divya, 396, Przyluski, Aṣoka, 359, etc.; Bodhicaryāvatāra, i.1.

For the Mahāyāna, we quote only the Abhisamayālaṁkāra, vi.2 - 11; JRAS, 1906, 943; Burnouf, Introduction, 224; Si-yu-ki (= Hsi-yu-chi), end of book iv.
197. The word ādi is not in the Sanskrit or Tibetan Kārikās. Paramārtha: "the word et cetera indicates the duration of the Law, the destruction or the non-destruction of relics, etc. Such are the differences due to the time period when the Buddhas appear."

The time of the seven Buddhas, their cast, gotra, length of life, tree, etc., in Mahāpadānasutattana, Dīgha, ii.1 and Dīgha, TD 1, p. 1c19. The Law of Kāśyapa lasts eight days; that of Śākyamuni lasts one thousand years (see viii.39). Kośa, iii.93a.

198. "Perfection" is a term more useful than exact. The Kośa's presentation is frequently clarified by the theories of the Mahāyāna which we find notably in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (for example First Part, Chap. V, on prabhāva, Muséon, 1911, p. 155).

199. Sarvagunajñānasamabhārābhyaśa: the qualities (guna) are by their nature five paramitā; the knowledges (jñāna) are the prajñāparamitā. Abhyāsa, exercise = punah punah prayogah.

200. Dirghakālābhyaśa: tribhir asamkhyeyair mahākalpaih (Doctrine summarized, iv. p. 691-2). Ānanda thinks that to become a Buddha through meditation for six years is to become a Buddha quite easily ... (Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, ii.100).

201. Vyākhyā: sarvathā jñānam iti sarvaprakārāvabodhanāthena.

However, according the the gloss of the Japanese editor who follows Fa-pao, sarvatra jñāna is to be understood as the consciousness of common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), impermanence, etc.: from this point of view any Arhat knows all thing (see Vyākhyā, i.15, p. 73: no salvation for one who does not know all dharmas); and sarvathā jñāna is the consciousness of self characteristics, which is āvenika, proper to the Buddha (see the stanza on the tail of the peacock, Vyākhyā, i. p. 6, and Kośa, Chapter IX, trans. Hsüan-tsang, TD 29, p. 157c25; compare p. 155a1).

The Vīhbāṣā, TD 27, p. 382c23, teaches that the Buddha possesses both sarvatra jñāna and sarvathā jñāna relative to the twelve āyatanas; whereas Śāriputra possesses only the First Dhyāna, which he owes to the teaching of the Master.


203. We have: apūrvabāhyavisayotpādana = nīrmāṇa; aśmādīśnām suvarṇādibhāvāpādana = pariṇāma; dirghakālavasthāna = adhiṣṭhāna. On nīrmāṇa and adhiṣṭhāna, see vii. 49 and following.

204. See Kośa, ii. trans. p. 165.

Ekottara, TD 2, p. 639a14: The Buddha asked Śāriputra, "Why do you not remain a kalpa or more?" Śāriputra answered, "I hold that the life of the Bhagavat himself is very short. The longest life does not go beyond one hundred years; and as the life of beings is short, the life of the Tathāgata is also short. If the Tathāgata continues to live a kalpa, I too shall continue to live a kalpa. ..." How can Śāriputra speak thusly? Beings are not capable of knowing whether the life of the Tathāgata is long or short. Śāriputra should know that there are four incomprehensible things about the Tathāgata. (Compare the four acinteyyas of Aṅguttara, ii.80, Sumanāgalavilāsini, i.22).

205. Compare the power of samkhsepaprathana, a Mahāyāna text, JRAS, 1908, 45; also Dīgha, ii.109

206. a. Vividhanāścaryadharmanasampad. This is the saha āprabhāva of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, Muséon, 1911, 161.

The Vyākhyā quotes the Sūtra: dharmataṣaiś buddhānām bhagavatām yat teṣām gaccatām nīmnasthalaṁ ca samibhavati yad uccaiṁ tan nīcibhavati yan nīcaṁ tad uccībha va itahāś ca dṛṣṭim pratilabhante badhirāḥ śrotarāṃ unmatāḥ smṛtīm ... .

These are, almost identically, the citrāny aścaryāni abhutadvaram of Divya, 250-251. Compare the quotation in Milinda, 179.
b. Hsüan-tsang adds here: "Or rather conversion of those difficult to convert; the solution of difficult questions; the teaching that leads to salvation; to defeat Mara, Tīrthikas, etc."

207. On adhigama, see viii.39a.

208. Actions involving necessary retribution (iv.50) are alaṅghaniya, "insurmountable."

209. According to Hsüan-tsang. Paramārtha: "Anyone who, having come into this world, plants a small amount of merit in the Buddha, after having taken up heavenly births, certainly obtains an immortal dwelling." But the Vyākhyā has: kārān īty upakārān pājādiśān. Therefore Vasubandhu quotes here the stanza of the Divya, p. 166: ye'lpam api jine kārān karisyanti vinayake/ vicitram svargam āgamaṃ lapsyante'mṛtam ātman. (On Divya, xii, Lévi, 'Toung Pao, 1907, p. 107).

210.  

211. He who kills an Arhat commits a "mortal sin," even if he does not know that this is an Arhat, iv.103; the monk who insults a junior monk who is an Arhat is reborn five hundred times as a slave.

212. An Arhat causes another person to have no hatred with respect to himself, without however rooting out hatred in another; he can only cause another person to not have satkāyasatī, "the idea of a personality," with respect to himself; for if another person has satkāyasatī, he has satkāyasatī with respect to all persons.

213. Abhisamayālaṃkāra, vii.8: anābhogam anāsāṅgam avyāghatam sadā sthitam/ sarvapraṇāpanud bauddham pranidhiṇānām isyate// On pranidhiṇāna, see ii.62a, p. 300, vi.22c, p. 938, Chap. IX (Hsüan-tsang, xxix.9a); Mahāvyūhapratisambuddha, 1164.

214. I interpret the Bhāṣya according to the Vyākhyā, which says simply: ārūpyas tu na sāksat pranidhiṇānena jāyante/ nisyandacaritaviśeṣāt tu/ kārṣakaniḍḍhānaṁ cātreti vaibhāṣikāḥ.

215. Vibhaṣa, TD 27, p. 897b24: Does pranidhiṇāna know the future? Some say that by reason of the past and of the present he infers (pi-chib 比知: to compare, to know)
the future; the same way that a person infers with certainty from fields or seeds that there will be a certain fruit. Some say that, if this is the case, pranidhijnāna is an anumāna, an inferential reasoning, not a pratyakṣa or direct perception. We say that pranidhijnāna does not know a result through its present cause, nor a cause through its present result: it is therefore pratyakṣa and not anumāna. (Compare Kośa, ii.62, p. 300).

Aṅguttara, iv.402, on the fact that the Bhagavat knows that Devadatta is destined for hell; on the omniscience of the Bhagavat, see Patisambhidāmagga, ii.194-195.


Kathāvatha, v.8 (on consciousness or knowledge of the future: Andhakas).

216. Yāvāṁs tatsamādhivisāya iti: that is, as a Śrāvaka, the ascetic knows what is of the sphere of the Śrāvaka . . . (vii.55 and elsewhere).

217. The four Pratisamvids are, it appears, the consciousnesses which make an excellent preacher. Burnouf, Lotus, 838-842 (pratisamvid = distinct consciousness); Childers, 366; Spence Hardy, Manual 499; a valuable note in the Appendix of the translation of the Kathāvatha, p. 377-382.

Patisambhidā is to be understood in the very general sense of exact consciousness, for example: Patisambhidāmagga.

The four paitisambhidās, Patisambhidāmagga i.119, Vibhaṅga, 293, 331, Niddesa, 234 (interesting), Visuddhimagga, 440-443; the four pratisamvids, Daśabhūmaka, ninth sphere (very different definitions); Bodhisattvabhūmi, Third Part; Dharmasangraha, 51, Mahāvyutpatti, 13, Sūtrakārama, xviii.34-37, xx.47 (the third is the gift of languages of different countries).

Artha and dharma are explained vii.39c-d . . . teso dharmesv arthapratisamvedi bhavati dharmapratisamvedi . . . Vyākhyā, i. p. 56; Diṅga, iii.241. dharmānusārin, Kośa vi.29a-b.

218. a. The Chinese render pratisamvid by wu ai chieh 無礙解 or wu ai chib 無礙解 通 unhindered understanding,” “unhindered knowledge.”

The Vyākhyā (ad 37c-d) has a gloss: avivartī ity afakyaḥ vivartayitum.

The Bodhisattvabhūmi (below) has asaktam avivartyam.

The meaning of asaktam jñānam is fixed by the definition of Bodhi in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. Bodhi is pure (śuddha) knowledge, universal (sarvajñāna) and immediate (asangajñāna): a knowledge obtained “by a simple bending of the mind,” abhogamātreṇa, without this bending being repeated, na punah punar abhogam kurvataḥ (Bodhisattvabhūmi, i. vii. Muse’on 1911, p. 170).

b. Bodhisattvabhūmi, fol. 100a (I.xvii.7): yat sarvadharmānām sarvaparyāyasya yāsvadbhāvikatayā yathāvadbhāvikatayā ca (See vi. note 326) bhāvānāmayam asaktaḥ avivartyam jñānam iyam esām [bodhisattvānām] dharmapratisamvit/ yat punah sarvadharmānām sarvalakṣaṇesu . . . iyam esām artha-pratisamvit/ yat punah sarvadharma-mānām eva sarvanirvacanesu . . . iyam esām niruktipratisamvit/ yat punah sarvadharmānām eva sarvapraκārapadaprabhedaḥ . . . iyam esām prabhānapratīsāmatvam/ By reason of these four, skandhakausālam, dhātvāyatanakausālam, pratītyasamutpāda-sthānāstbhānakausālam, the dharmas are well known and well preached.

219. Here the dharma is deśanā, the teaching (deśanādharmā), as it is said: “I shall teach you the Dharma, propitious in the beginning, propitious in the middle, propitious in the end, of good meaning, of good syllables; the single complete, pure, purified brahmacarya, I shall promulgate it to you.” [We have pratipatidharma in the text: “What is the Dharma? The Eightfold Path.” We have phaladharma = nirvāṇa, in the text: “Take refuge in the Dharma.” See iv.31, vi.73c.]

But the word of the Buddha is nāman or vac, see Kośa, i.25, trans. p. 86.
220. The expression yuttamuttapatibhdna in Anguttara, ii.135; explained in Puggalapaññatti: the yuttapatibhdna person, when questioned, answers well, but not quickly; the muttapatibhdna person answers quickly, but not well; the yuttamuttapatibhdna person answers quickly and well. The preacher of Divya, 329,493 is yuktamuktapratibhdna; of Avadanaśataka, ii.81, yuktamuktapratibhdnin and yuktamuktavidbhdnajñā. [Compare the asamsaktākṣarapada of the Mahābhārata, xviii.6.21, Hopkins, Great Epic, 364?].

I translate mukta by "easy," "without difficulty" according to the Pāli; Paramārtha has li chang shih 離障失, free from the defect of any obstacle.

221. Above page 1154 line 16.

222. On the meaning of pratibhdna see Mahāvastu, i.511, Avadanaśataka, i.48.10, ii.50.12, 81.

223. When it has voice for its object (vāgālambanā) it is, by nature, duḥkha, samudaya, dharma, anvaya, kṣaya, anutpāda, and samvṛtiṣjñānas.

When it has the Path for its object, it is mārga, dharma, anvaya, kṣaya, anutpāda, paracitta, and samvṛtiṣjñānas.

224. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 904a25: Three opinions. First opinion: it is of Kāmadrītā and the First Dhyāna; second opinion: it is of Kāmadrītā and the Four Dhyānas; third opinion: it is of Kāmadrītā and Anāgāmya, Dhyānānātara and the Four Dhyānas. P'u-kuang observes that the first opinion supposes that nāman is bound to the voice, and that the other two opinions suppose that nāman is bound to the body. Fa-pao does not agree.

225. The Sūtra says: vitarkya vicārya vacan bhāṣate (ii.33, p. 203).

226. The word ādi includes kāla, kāraka, etc.

227. According to Paramārtha: "Pratibhāna is to speak victorious words of demonstration and refutation"; according to Hsüan-tsang: "A flow of words without a dike."

228. Mahāvyutpatti, 76.12.

229. Paramārtha: "But, according to other masters . . ." Hsüan-tsang: "In fact, only the study . . ."

230. Kim cit tadvyatiriktaṃ kevalam praṇtakoṣṭikam iti: "There is a praṇtakoṣṭika, distinct from the preceding ones, called simply praṇtakoṣṭika." According to the gloss of Saeki, this refers to the praṇtakoṣṭika upon which the Saint supports himself in order to reject his life . . . (See Kośa, ii.10a, trans. p. 168; vi.59, note 389).

231. For the Sarvāstivādins, only the Fourth Dhyāna can be praṇtakoṣṭika; according to Sthiramati (Tra-Chi, 9.9), all Four Dhyānas and all four ārūpyas are praṇtakoṣṭika. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 895c6.

232. Mahāvyutpatti, 67.5 and Dharmasaṅgītā.

233. Hsüan-tsang adds: "Prānta signifies 'not passing beyond'; this absorption is called praṇa because another cannot pass beyond it." Hsüan-tsang translates praṇta = pien-chi 邊際 (limit-end), Paramārtha, yuon-chi 遠際 (distant-end).

Compare Yogasūtra, ii.27, praṇatibhūmi.

234. Mahāvyutpatti, 94.2, bhūtakoti, shib-chi 實際 , chen shib chi 真實際 , yan day par mtha' (which appears to signify "the true limit"). Burnouf, Lotus, 309, observes that bhūtakoti is not the equivalent of Bhavāgra, "the highest stage of existence," since, in the Lankavatār, bhūtakoti signifies śūnyatā or emptiness.

The gloss of Kyokuga Saeki, "bhūta = all the dharmas" appears to be very good. The Madhyamakavatāra (Tibetan trans. p. 344) says clearly that nirodhasamāpatti = bhūtakotiṣamāpatti. (It belongs to the Bodhisattva stage of Dūrāṅgamā). The ascetic who
has attained Bhavāgra can penetrate into nirodhasamādpatti (ii.44d. p. 229), which is "the true end," "the absolute end of existence."

The use of bhūta-koti ś in Mahāyāna writings does not interest us here; let us mention however Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.2.38, Śīkṣāsamuccaya, 257, Madhyāntavibhāga, i.15; Commentary on the Nāmasamgīti, vi.6: aviparyāsārthena bhūta-koti ś; Madhyamakāvatāra. 340.

235. vi. trans. p. 1012.

236. At the moment when he becomes a Buddha by becoming an Arhat, by detaching himself from Bhavāgra, ii. p. 227.

237. If the Tīrthikas possess the five abhi-jñās, yes, according to the Haimavatas, Sarvāstivādins, and Vātsiputriyas; no, according to the Mahiśasakas, and Dharmaguptakas (according to Vasumitra and Bhavya).

Pūrṇa, who is only a praṇāvimukta (and not a abhayatobhāgavimukta, vi.64a), is not able to exercise supernormal powers (ṛddhi) "in common with the Tīrthikas"; but he quickly obtains the six abhi-jñās (Divya, 44).

238. By reading upapadda for upapadda (?).

The bibliography on the abhi-jñās is infinite. Majjhima, i.34, ii.238, Dīgha, i.8, iii.110; Aṅguttara, iii.245; Visuddhimagga, 202, 373, 406; Compendium, 209 and above all the Introduction, p. 61 and following; Mahāvyutpatti, 14, Dharmasamgraha, 20; Daśabhumī, iii. (trans. Madhyamakāvatāra, p. 57, Museon 1907); Sutrālaṁkāra, vii.1.9; Śīkṣāsamuccaya, 243, Bodhicaryā, ix.41.


For the primitive sense of the word, see Burnouf, Lotus, 820; Kern, Lotus, 131; Rhys Davids, Milinda, ii.231, Dialogues, i.62, 157; Windisch, Geburt, 9.62. Abhi-jñā is spoken of with reference to a knowledge of the Truths, vi.54c, 66, ix. (HSUAN-TSANG XXIX.14b), etc.

239. On ṛddhi, iv.117d ("an ornament of the mind"). vi.69 (ṛddhipāda), vii.47 (ṛddhiprāśibhāra), 48 (gamanā and nirmāṇa), 53 different types of ṛddhi; viii.35b (aryā ṛddhi).

a. We have: ṛddhiḥ samādhīḥ/ ṛddhiṣṭaye jñāṇam/ tasya sākṣāt-śrīṣamābhīṣbhāvah (Vyākhyā).

For the definition ṛddhi = samādhī, vi.69, p. 1024, vii. 48a; Paṭisambhidāmagga, ii.205-206.

Mahāvyutpatti: ṛddhiṣṭaye jñāṇa: Pāli: iddhiṣṭivā, iddhiṣṭaprabhāda; prabhāda can be understood as in praṇāṣprabhāda, viii.27c.

The Pāli sources occasionally include ṛddhi in the category of the "knowledges"; yamakapāṭibhīre nāṇa is the knowledge having the miracle of the water and the fire for its object; iddhiṣṭe nāṇa (Paṭisambhidāmagga, ii.125, i.111); paṭicābhīnāṇāṇa and attasamāpattiniṇāṇa (Mahāmiddesā, 106).

b. The Sūtra of the Ṛddhyabhi-jñā is quoted in the Vyākhyā, vi. 69; it presents some variants to the Pāli edition (Dīgha, i.77, Majjhima, i.34, Aṅguttara, i.280; commentaries in Paṭisambhidāmagga, i.207, Visuddhimagga, 373-406), and also to the text of the Mahāvyutpattī, 15 (according to the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra): anekakāvāma ṛddhiṣṭayam pratyānapaḥvata/ eko bhuṭvā babudhā bhavati/ babudhā bhuvatā eko bhavati/ avirbhavati tirobhavām api anubhavati/ tīrha kudayam tīrha pārakāram [tīrha parvatam] asajjamāṇaḥ kāye (?) gacchati tadyathākāse/ prthivyām unmayjananimajjanam karoti tadyathodake/ adake bhidyamāṇena srotaś gacchati tadyathā prthivyām/ ākāśe paryankena kramati tadyathā sākunīṣa pākṣi/ imau vā pūnaḥ sāryacandramasāy evam maharābhikāv evam mahāyuvāvān pānīna ṛṣmiti parimāṇaḥ yāvad brahma-lokaṁ kāyaṁ vāse varyaṁ (see note 293) iti yāyam ucayā ṛddhiḥ.

Pāli edition: ... sa evam samābhe citte ānejjappate iddhiṣṭivāyā cittam abhinibhārati abhininnāmeti/ so anekakāvāma iddhiṣṭivāma paccanubboti/ eko pi hutvā ... Anekakābham
iddhividham corresponds to anekavidham rddhivisayam. Yaśomitra explains rddhivisaya as "the operation of magical power, the object of the consciousness which realizes the miracle" and employs the expression rddhivisaye jñânam as in the Paṭisambhidâmagga, i.111: iddhividhe jñânam. Rhys Davids-Stede mention Vinaya, iii.67 (Pārājikā, ii.47): "There is no sin in this magical operation(iddhivisaye) for those who possess iddhi," and Nettippakanaga, 23: "...impossible to resist at death, if not through the operation of magic (anhitra iddhivisaya)." [The version "extent of psychic power" is not admissible].

Pratyānubbhaviati-paccanubbhoti, Lotus, 838 (on Divya, 204); we have ṛddyānubbhava in Avadānaśataka ii.129 (=ṛdhi); ānubbhava = "supernatural power" (Childers).

c. According to Paṭisambhidâmagga (ii.207), the miracles of the Sūtra of the Rādhyābhiṣṇa (above b) are one of the ten iddhis, adhiṣṭhāna iddhi [The same Compendium]. See Kośa, vii.52a; on different manifestations of ṛdhi, vii.38 and following.

Prabhāva is not to be confused with ṛdhi (above page 81). Occasionally we have ṛdhiprabbhāva as ṛdhisāmpad, ṛdhibhāṣā, or ṛdhyāśivarya.

240. The Sūtra continues with a description of divyacakṣus and pūrvanivānasūnyam.

241. The fifth abhiṣṇa in the Sūtra.

242. Abhiṣṇas four, five, and six are the three "knowledges" acquired by the Bodhisattva on the night of Bodhi; on the three knowledges, see vi.45.c.


Commentary in the Samantapadaśikā, i.158.

This abhiṣṇa is not to be confused with jātisaritā which is one of the "natural powers" of the Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, vii.55, iv.109, notes 493 and 494 (the limits of the consciousness of the past).

244. This is the third abhiṣṇa in the Sūtra. It has two names: Hsüan-tsang calls it divyacakṣus, Paramârtha, cyutypiṭādajñāna. Mahâvyutpattipati has cyutypiṭādajñāna, the Sūtraśāmakāra, cyutypiṭādajñāna.

Kośa, viii.27c, Suttanipāta, 1112, 1136, Samyutta, iii.213.

245. See Paṭisambhidâmagga, i.115, the explanation of āsavakkhaya as a function of the three pure indriyas (Kośa, ii.4) and of the results (Srotâpâna, etc.) [Curious description of bhavāśava].

246. See page 1164 line 5.

248. *Vyākhya*: In the same way that the results of the religious life (vi.51), as conditioned dharmas, are by nature vimuktimārga. See Below note 257, note 270.

249. Sarvaghadhara: According to the Westerners, six jñānas: for example dharma, anvaya, duḥkha, samudaya and mārgajñānas, and knowing samvṛtā things of the past.

250. What is under consideration here is the consciousness of the mind of another, which is pure (four of the five jñānas enumerated, with the exception of samvṛtijñāna) and impure (samvṛtijñāna and paracittajñāna).

251. See vii.28c.

252. According to the Compendium, 61, the fifth dhyāna is adhiṣṭhānapādagajñāna, that is to say the dhyāna which serves as the support for the process of volitions which creates the manifestation of the abbijñā. But Paṭisambhidāmagga, ii.205 considers the Four Dhyānas the four bhūmis of ṛddhi.

253. Same doctrine in Paṭisambhidāmagga, i.113: "Such rūpa has its origin in saumanasyendriya . . ."

254. *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 518c25: Does the preparatory exercise (prayoga) take place through a memory of "moments" (ksana) or of successive "states" (avastha)? Evidently by a memory of states, not of moments. If the ascetic proceeds by reviewing moment to moment, death would come before he had reviewed one half of his life. How does one complete the prayoga exercise? . . . P'u-kuang: There are three explanations; the second is the best, because the word "to complete" (in "to complete the prayoga exercises") should not be understood in a narrow sense (fei pi chü 非必局), Couvreur, 1904, p. 244).

255. According to the Sūtra quoted above: . . . sākāram soddeṣam . . . (above note 243).

256. According to Paramārtha; Hsüan-tsang: "he no longer considers svacittarūpa."

257. According to Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang: "...and up to his remembering the moment before antarābhava. [Gloss of the Japanese editor: "that is to say, the last thought of his former existence"]). Then the prayoga or preparatory exercise of pūrvanivāsa [anusmṛti] is achieved." Prayoga is ānantaryāmārga; abbijñā is vimuktimārga.

258. *Vyākhya*: parasamātudyādhiṣṭhānenaṃ upasthānam iti/ dhyānasamgrhītaṃ pūrvanivāsanusmṛtiṣṭhānam/ tena cāryāyavacaram cit cītām na gṛhṛṣṭīti/ kathāṃ ca punah parasamātudyādhiṣṭhānenaṃ upasthānam/ samanantarvaniruddhān manovijñānāt parakhyān nimittām udghṛetya vistarāḥ (see page 1159 line 25)/ anyesāṃ iti ya ārūpyebhyo na prayutās teṣām svasamātudyādhiṣṭhānenaṃ upasthānam pūrvanivāsanumṣṭhānāsya sukṛatvāt.

259. The discipline by which the ascetic obtains divine sight (or jñānadarśana) is defined in Paṭisambhidāmagga, i.114. One should cultivate alokasaṃñāṇa day and night (Dīgha, iii.223). How the ascetic produces trembling of the earth, Dīgha, ii.108. "Lightness," i.10d, 12c.

260. Hsüan-tsang adds: "Furthermore, in the Ārūpyas, vipaśyanā is deficient, samatha is in excess: now the five abbijñās should be in a sphere where vipaśyanā and samatha are in equilibrium. By this very fact, Anāgāmya, etc., are also out of the question."

261. Quoted in *Vyākhya ad vii.36.*

262. According to Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang is briefer, and places a note here on the extension of the power of the other abbijñā of different saints, a note which Vasubandhu places above, page 1177.

263. Paramārtha: the abbijñā of the mind of another is included in three smṛtyupasthānas.

264. Paramārtha: ṛddhi, ear and eye are the first [smṛtyupasthāna].
265. See vii.49.
266. Compare Majjhima, i.22, Sān̄yutta, ii.214.
267. There is another knowledge, abhijñāparivārajñāna.

268. Hsüan-tsang’s version of the Kārikā has: “The other [abhijñās] are four [smṛtyupasthānas],” and the Bhāṣya: “The other abhijñās are included in the four smṛtyupasthānas, because they have the five skandhas for their object.”

269. See vii.25d, page 1133.

270. All acquisition includes two paths, the path which removes the obstacle, and the path of deliverance. We have seen that the abhijñās are “prajñā of the path of deliverance” (vii.42d). According to the opinion presented here an ascetic depends on any of the Dhyānas for everything that is necessary for the obtaining of the abhijñā of divine sight; but the obtaining itself is of the First Dhyāna.

271. These are the three knowledges of Majjhima, i.22,246 (acquired in the three watches of the night of Bodhi); see viii.27c; Aṅguttara, vi.211, Dīgha, iii.220, 275.

272. Compare iii.25, 31. In certain sources, we have a list of eight vijjās among which are six abhiñnaas, Childers, 571, Visuddhimagga,202.

The Vyākhyā quoted the Sūtra: tripiṭo bhavati trividya iti. Compare tevijja, tevijjaka.

273. Bhagavadviśeṣa and others explain the formula “in order,” yathākramam, as follows: One destroys error relative to the past by the remembrance of former existences; error relative to the present by the consciousness of death and rebirth; and error relative to the future through the consciousness of the destruction of the āsravas (for one says nāparam asmād bhavam prajānāmi). In fact, the order of the time periods is past, present, and future.

But Saṅghabhadra (in his Nyāyānusāra, TD, p. 754a14) explains: Remembrance of former existences puts an end to error relative to the past; the consciousness of death and rebirth puts an end to error relative to the future; and the consciousness of the destruction of the āsravas puts an end to error relative to the present. This is why these three abhijñās are vidyās. By the first, one sees the suffering of self and others; by the second, the suffering of others, and one experiences samvega or disgust; thus disgusted, one produces the third, and one sees the happiness of Nirvāṇa. This is why these three abhijñās are vidyā.

Yaśomitra shows that the thought of Vasubandhu is correctly interpreted by Saṅghabhadra.

274. Paramārtha: "Two have the same name, having arisen in its series."

275. Paramārtha: “In the Saikṣa, they are not called vidyā because the series is accompanied by avidyā.” Hsüan-tsang has only one pāda: “In the Saikṣa, there is obscurity, not vidyā.”

In Sān̄yutta, ii.58, the ascetic in possession of purified dhamma-ñāṇa and anvaya-ñāṇa is called a diṭṭhisampanna, and sekha āṇāna and sekha vijjā are attributed to him.

276. According to Paramārtha.

According to Hsüan-tsang, “There is error-obscurity in the Saikṣa. Thus, even though the first two abhijñās exist in him, they are not called vidyā, and even though, for a certain time, they conquer and destroy obscurity, they are again obscure: therefore they are not called vidyā.”

277. We have pāṭibhirya, pāṭibhārika, pāṭibera, and pāṭibhira, Senart Kacchāyana, 536; Childers, 361; Kern, Manual 60; Geiger, Pāḷi Grammar 51.

Pāṭibhira = a miracle; yamakapāṭibhira in Paṭisambhidāmagga, ii.125.

Miśinda 309, miracles produced on the tomb of one who has attained Nirvāṇa through their former adhiṭṭhāna (see Kośa, vii.51), by the adhiṭṭhāna of the gods or of believers.
Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang translate *tao* 導; in *Mahāyutpatti*, pien-hua 變化 to change-convert, *shen-pien* 神變 *rddhi-change.*


The *prāśibhāṣyā* are means (*upāya*) of seduction (*āvarjana*), *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, i.6.

279. This phrase is not in Paramārtha. *Mahāvutpatti*, 146.7, *pratihata-citta*.

280. Hsüan-tsang: "These three *abhijñās*, in this order, cause one to take refuge in the *Buddhadharma*, to believe in it, and to cultivate it (in the sense of *adhibhāma*)."

281. *Rddhiprāśibhāṣya* is inferior because one can produce *rddhi* by formulas: Vasubandhu here records an old opinion, *Dīgha*, i.213 (below note 283). [But the Buddha cultivates *iddhiprāśibhāriya*, *Dīgha*, iii.9, and elsewhere. We should mention *Culla*, v.8.2 (the story of Pindola): one who manifests his *utterimansadhānma iddhiprāśibhāriya* to householders is guilty of a *dukkha* [or better: "he who manifests his magical powers"] [See the remarks of Rhys Davids on the period of the usage of the term *dukkha*, *Dialogues*, iii.3]; compare *Divya*, 275, and Przyluski, *Aṣoka*, 80.

*Dīgha*, iii.112, says that *iddhi* which is "holy, free from āsava and from upadhi" is equanimity (*upekkhā*), and that the *iddhi* of miracles (*eko pi bhuṭvā*, etc.) is *iddhi* which is "not holy (na ariyā), possessing āsava and upadhi." See viii.35b.

*Aṅguttara* opposes *dhamma-iddhi* and āmisa-iddhi (i.93); Devadatta only obtained *puthujjanikā iddhi* (*Culla* vii.1.5. and commentary to *Dhammapada* 17).

The *anuṃsaṇavidhās* of *Dīgha*, iii.107, have nothing in common with *anuṃśasānī*.

282. Paramārtha translates *vidyāśāhāna*; Hsüan-tsang has the expression that Eitel translates "magic incantation" in the words of the *Atharva Veda*.

The four *ādesanavidhās*, *Dīgha*, iii.103.

283. See *Divya*, p. 636 at the bottom.

*Dīgha*, i.213: *atthi kho bho gandhārī nāma vijjā/ tāya so bhikkhu anekavahitam iddhiprāśibhāriya paṭcannabhoti/ eko pi bhuṭvā ... / imam kho aham iddhiprāśibhāriye adinavam sampassamāno iddhiprāśibhāriyena ... jīgucchāmi ...*

[Dialouges, i.278: in *Jātaka*, iv.498, this *vijjā* is a charm for making one invisible].

Gandhārī-Gandhāri is a *vidyādevī* (Hemacandra).

It is by the *Gndhṛsramaṇa* that the hero of Ralston-Schiefner, *Tibetan Tales*, p. 288 (Kanjur iv.171) obtains the fruits of the mountain Gandhamadana.


*atthi maniko* (manikā) nāma vijjā/ tṣya ... parasaṭṭhānam ... cittām pi ādatisati cetasikām pi ādatisati ... /jīgucchāmi/ katamām ca kevaddhā anuṃsaṇaprāśibhāriyam ...

[Dialouges, i.278, Buddhaghosa identifies the "jewel charm" with *cintāmaṇi vijjā*; Rhys Davids refers to *Jātaka*, iii.504, *Samāngalavilāsinī*, 265, 267, 271.]

285. Hsüan-tsang: "Anuṃsaṇaprāśibhāṣya can only be realized through āsravakṣayābhijñā, thus it is *avayabhićarīrin*." According to the editor, we should understand: "thus it necessarily has the results of salvation and happiness."

286. See above note 239.


For the limits of the power of *iddhi*, see *Kathāvatthu*, xxi.4.

*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, i.5 (Muséeon, 111, p. 156-164).

Sanātyutta, v.282, is interesting.

288. "Displacement of adhimokṣa," originating from adhimokṣa, ādhipokṣika. "Rapid displacement like the mind." We have, in Divya, 52-53, the narration of the journey of the Buddha and Maudgalyāyana through the Marīcika universe. They go by means of Maudgalyāyana’s rddhi, by using Sumeru as a spring-board: the journey takes seven days; but they return instantly through the rddhi of the Buddha: “What is the name of this rddhi? Manojavā.” Ibid, p. 636 at the bottom, a manojavā vidyā. Rhys Davids-Stede mentions manojavā as an epithet of horses, Vimānavatthu.

289. See above page 1146-7.

290. Compare Anguttara, ii.80, Divya, 53.

291. Pākkhi sakuno. See the explanations of Visuddhi, p. 396.

292. Prthapagjanas possess this first gamana (Hsüan-tsang).

293. The Patisambhidā quoted in Visuddhi, 401: . . . brahma-lokaṁ gantukāmo . . . dūre pi suṇāte adhiṣṭhāti suṇāte boṣi ti suṇāte boṣi: Desiring to go to Brahmaloka, he creates adhiṣṭhāna that this may be near or far: “May this be near!” and this becomes near. [This is the explanation of the Sūtra kāyena vasam vatteti, above note 239b.

294. Four āyatanas, not sound; see page 1173 and vii.51b.

295. Bāhya, external, in the sense of anupāta, not constituting a sense organ in the service of the mind, Kośa, i.34c.

296. As we have seen i.30b-d.

297. Compare the definitions of the three magical iddbis in Compendium, Introduction, p. 61 and Visuddhi, 405.

298. That is to say, a mind of the sphere of Kāmabhūtu through which one creates rūpa of Kāmabhūtu, and a mind of the sphere of the First Dhyāna through which one creates rūpa of the First Dhyāna. vii.51a-b.

299. Paramārtha: "Not higher"; Bhāṣya: "The mind that is capable of creating fictive beings of a higher sphere is not the result of a mind of a lower dhyāna." Hsüan-tsang does not translate this pāda in the Kārikā, but in the Bhāṣya: “[The mind that is capable of creating fictive beings] does not depend on a lower sphere.”

300. A fictive being created in Kāmabhūtu by a mind capable of creating fictive beings of the Second Dhyāna, even though it is of the sphere of Kāmabhūtu, can appear in the heaven of the Second Dhyāna. A fictive being created in the heaven of the First Dhyāna by a mind capable of creating fictive beings of the First Dhyāna does not have access to the heaven of the Second Dhyāna.

301. One obtains the dhyānas through detachment (vairāgya). By becoming detached from Kāmabhūtu one obtains the First Dhyāna. At the same time, one “takes possession” of the minds capable of creating fictive beings which can exist in this dhyāna.

302. Is there a falling away (vyutthāna) from contemplation at the end of nirmāṇacitta? No. 50c-d. It proceeds from pure dhyāna and from itself; it is followed by the two. After suddhaka dhyāna there succeeds an abhiṣṭā of fictive creation. After this abhiṣṭā of fictive creation there succeeds nirmāṇacitta, the result of this abhiṣṭā. After this nirmāṇacitta there succeeds innumerable nirmāṇacittas, which do not arise from another citta. Finally after the last nirmāṇacitta there succeeds an abhiṣṭā of fictive creation. After this there succeeds a
fuddbakaabhya_a or a nirmancitta. How is this? If the person who is in the samadhiphala
(samadhiphalasthitasya = nirmancitasthitasya) does not return to the muladyana, there
will be no falling away (vyuttbhana) from the samadhiphala.

303. Quoted in Vaykhy, ii.71b.

304. This stanza is commented on in Vaykhy, i. p. 27 (Petrograd 1918). See Divya, 166,
closely related to the Kosa: yam khalu sravako nirmatam abhinirmimite yadi sravako
bhasate nirmito`pi bhasate/ sravake tu`snihbute nirmito`pi tu`snihbavati/ ekasya
bhasamannya sarve bhasanti nirmityah/ ekasya tu`snihbutsa sarve tu`snihbavanti te//
bhagavan nirmitam prasnam prcchati bhagavavan vyakaroti (Read rather: bhagavantam
nirmitah prashnam prcchati/ bhagavan vyakaroti/ nirmitam bhagavan prasnam prcchati/

On the nirmitas, Karanaprajapti, xi. Madhyamakavrtti, p. 45.

305. a. We encounter many times adhishbana, adhishthati, in the sense of "making last"
(Adhishthanikis dddhi, iii.9; below note 306; ii. page 165, ayuhasamskaran adhishthati
(stapayati) = adhishbanavasita; vii. p. adhishthanaaprabhava.

b. Numerous uses in a little or non-technical sense, for example Bodhicaryavatara, ii.45:
"The preacher is adhishthita (=atmasthanika by the messengers of Yama"; Mahavastu, iii.376;
Siksaadumcaya, 314: "Being who do not understand the speech of the Bodhisattvas are
possessed (adhishtha) by Mara." Siksaadumcaya 356: "All good actions are presided over
(adhishtha) by diligence"; ibid. 285: "The Bodhisattva makes his dispositions (adhi) well
guarded, purified, taken in hand (svadhiphita)"; Samyutta, v.278: suggaha svadhiphita;
Samyutta, iii.10, 135 (adhishthanabhinivesa of the defilements in the mind).

c. Adhishthiti = "To exercise a certain action on a thing, a person, oneself, by means of
adhimoksha, volition, will," applied to this thing, etc."

This general sense is specialized, in the Kosa, into the sense of "making last"; [in the
vocabulary of the Patisambhidamagga, ii.207, it refers to the miracles of multiplication, etc.;
ii.207; see also Atthasalini, trans. p. 121 and Compendium]. But it is through rupadhisphan-
abala (Siksaadumcaya, 330.11) that flowers place themselves around the head of
Dparhkara (Divya, 251.1); the Buddhas convert through adhishbhana (= anubha),
Bodhicaryavatara, i.5.

d. Burnouf translates "benediction" from byin kyi rlabs. It is, he says, through the
benediction of a Thera that a person travels in the Thupavamsa; it is through a benediction
of the Buddhas that the Bodhisattvas form vows to become Buddhas. (See the two
abhisephas, of which the second is a consecration, abhiseka, of the
Lankavatara, Nanjo, p. 100). The eighth bhumi is the adhishthanabhumi (a great variety of Chinese equivalents):
this bhumi is so called because it cannot be shaken (paravikapanavat).

e. Compare Gu, iv.6: prakriti svam adhishthaya sambhavamy atmamayaya, and Lotus,
xxv.3: atmamad abhishthabhami sarvam ca saivam ... nirvahnabhimim cupadarayami ... na
capi nirvamy abu tsum kae.

306. Divya, 61. maitreyah ... kasyapasya bhikshor avikopitam asthisamghatam dakshinena
papan grhita ... On all the legends relative to Kasyapa, Przyluski, J.As 1914, ii.524, and
Acoka, 169, 331; Fa-hien (=Fa-hsien), chap. xxxiiii.

Kosa iii.9d examines why the Bodhisattva is born from a womb, and not through an
apparitional birth. It is with an end to being able to leave his relics, for the bodies of
apparitional beings disappear at their death. This explanation is given by the masters who
deny the adhishthanikis dddhi of the Bhagavat.

307. Dreams provoked by the adhishbhana of the gods, Vinitadeva ad Nyayabindu, p. 47
(Tibetan translation in Bibl. Indica).

308. Commentary in Anguttara, i.209.
309. *Manāyatana* and *dharmāyatana* are not capable of being created, because the fictive being (*nirmita*) is devoid of mind, as results from the Śāstra: *nirmitah acintiko vakṣavyah*. . . *nirmatūś cittavasesa varate* (Vyākhya). This Śāstra is the *Kāraṇaprajñāptīśāstra*, analyzed in *Cosmologie bouddhique*, p. 340-341.

310. See i.10b. It has been said above, page 1169, that "creation" consists of external āyatanas.

311. Hsiian-tsang puts *Kārikā 54* before *Kārikā 53c-d*.

312. The *ṛddhi* that certain beings possess because they belong to a certain category of beings.

Examples of innate *ṛddhi*, *Mahāvagga*, i.15.2, vi.15.8, *Culla* vii.1.4; 2.1. The four *iddhis* (beauty, long life, absence of sickness and good digestion, popularity) of the king of the *Mahāsudassanasutta* have something of the supernatural about them; but when Ajātasattu promises to destroy the Vaijayas, however great their *ṛddhi* may be, however great their *ānubhāva* may be (*Mahāparinibbāna*), the sense of these expressions remains doubtful. His minister Vassakara is without doubt a good magician.

313. *Rddhi* produced by "magic," through the power of formulas or herbs.

314. For example, the *ṛddhi* that certain persons possess from birth, such as Māndhātā, not because they are humans, but by reason of certain actions; differing thus from innate *ṛddhi* (see below note 328).

315. These persons possess eyes and ears "arisen from karma."

316. Hsiian-tsang: What do the expressions "divine sight," "divine hearing" designate? If they refer to *prajñā*, consciousness, the expression "eye", "ear" is improper. If they refer to the material organs (*rūpinḍriya*), how are the organs Abhijñās? The *Kārikā* says: "Divine sight and divine hearing are of pure *rāpa* . . ."

317. "Pure *rāpa*" is *rāpaprasāda*, *Kośa*, i.9c; the organs are *bhautika*, "derived matter," i. trans. p. 100.

Compare *Kathāvatthu*, iii.7-8.

318. In opposition to divine sight which is innate in the gods.

The divine sight of the gods is defiled by eleven *apakṣālas*, iii.14a; see vii.55d.

319. According to Hsiian-tsang: "Divine sight sees without omission." It sees in all directions, before, behind (*prṣṭhatas*), on the side (*pārśvatās*), during the day, during the night, in light, in darkness (see i. p. 90).

320. In the version of Hsiian-tsang, *Kārikā 55a-b* is placed after *Kārikā 43*. And the *Bhāṣya* is modified: "In respect to the activity of the Five Abhijñās, extended or narrow, in the universes (*lokadhātu*) which are their domain, all the Āryans are not similar. The Śrāvakas, the Pratyekabuddhas and the Buddhas, when they do not make an extreme act of attention, produce the activity of their mastery in movement (*gamana*) and in creation (*nirmāṇa*), the first in a *mahāsāhasra* universe, the second in a *dvisāhasra* universe, and the third in a *trisāhasra* universe. When they make an extreme act of attention, in a *dvisāhasra* universe, in a *trisāhasra* universe, and in infinite universes."

321. Quoted in a commentary to the *Nāmasāṃgiti* (ad vi.18, asaṅgadṛk).

322. On the chiliocosms, see iii.73.

323. The gods of Kāmadhātu and the Anāgāmins in Rūpadhātu possess, by the fact of their births, these four powers. These powers are absent in Ārūpyadhātu.

324. This is explained iii.14a; above note 318.
325. The treatise of the *iṣṭaṇikas* (*Manu*, ix.258, etc.). Above note 284.


327. The five powers (*śraddhyādika*) are, for humans, either *vairāgyalābbika* (*abhijñāphala*) or *tarkavidyāsadbakarmakṛta*, not *upapattilābbika*.

328. *Upapattilābbikam hi nāma yad upapattikāla eva sarvesām nisargato labhyate/ na tu yat kasya cād evopapattikālaḥ ārdhvam/ yathā paksinām ākāśagamanam.*
Orn. Homage to the Buddha.

We have studied the qualities (guna) of the knowledges (the prajñāpāramitā, the abhiṣekhā, etc.). Let us now study the natures of the Dhyānas, etc. We shall speak first of their supports (āsraya), that is, the mental states in which these qualities are produced.

1a. The Dhyānas are twofold; (the Dhyānas are four in number; the Dhyānas as existence have been defined. The concentrations are the applications of pure minds on a single object; with their concomitants, they are the five skandhas.)

(We shall first study the Dhyānas, since they are,—with the exception of the Ārūpyas or “non-material concentrations”,,—the support of all qualities, either common or specific, pure or impure.)

Each of these Dhyānas is of two types: samāpatti, absorption or concentration, and upapatti or existence.

lb. The Dhyānas are four in number.

There are four Dhyānas, the First to the Fourth.

lc. The Dhyānas as existence have been defined.
The Dhyanas as existence have been defined in the Third Chapter of this book. How are they defined? It says, "The first Three are threefold and the Fourth is eightfold."3 (iii.2)

1d. Concentration is the application of a pure mind on a single object;

In general, Dhyāna as absorption is defined as an application of a pure mind on a single object,4 for the Dhyānas have samādhi or concentration (ii, p. 190) for their nature.

le. With their concomitents, they are the five skandhas.

If one considers samādhi with its following, Dhyāna as absorption has the five skandhas for its nature.5

***

What is "application on a single object"?

The fact that minds have a single object.6 [The Sautrāntikas object]: If this is the case, then what is designated by the word samādhi are the minds themselves which have a single object. There is no reason to admit the existence of a separate thing, a certain mental dharma, as samādhi.7

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer:] What is called samādhi is a certain dharma by which the minds are concentrated, applied on a single object. The concentrated minds are not samādhi.8

Here many difficulties present themselves:

1. Since minds are momentary, each of them has a single object. What then is the role of samādhi?

2. Samādhi causes the second mind to not be distracted or
turned aside from the object of the first mind. But if this is the case, then the samādhi does not exercise any action with regard to the first mind which you consider as associated with samādhi.

3. Why imagine samādhi in and of itself? Why not admit that the minds are applied to a single object by reason of the causes that you assign to samādhi?

4. Finally, you have defined samādhi as a universal dharma (mahābhūmika, ii.24): hence all minds should possess the characteristic of being concentrated.

[The Vaibhāṣīkas answer this last objection:] No, because of the weakness of the samādhi.9

The Sautrāntikas say that the minds which have the same object constitute samādhi: samādhi does not exist separately. For it is said in the Sūtra that the Four Dhyānas are adhicitta śikṣa, the “higher mental learning”; another says that the Four Dhyānas are the primary element in the purification of the mind (cittaparīṣud-dhipradhāna).10

What is the meaning of the word dhyāna?

By reason of dhyāna the ascetic is “concentrated” and capable of upanidhyāna.12 Upanidhyai signifies “to know truly”, as it is said in the Sūtra, “He who is concentrated knows truly”.13 (The root dhyai is used in the sense of upanidhyāna.)

In the School [of the Sarvāstivādins], all dhyāna is prajñā [whereas in some other schools, dhyāna is cinta or reflection].14

***

If the Dhyānas are absorptions or samādhis, then are all absorptions,—good, bad, or neutral,—Dhyāna?

No. Only absorptions filled with certain excellences are called Dhyānas. So too in the world, it is the sun that is called “the light maker” (bhāskara) (and not the firefly).
What are the excellences?

Samādhi is in fact excellent: it is an absorption filled with "parts" (anīgasamāyukta, viii.10), which goes by the means of the yoke of calmness (samatha) and insight (vipaśyana) [that is to say, in which calmness and insight are in equilibrium],¹⁵ that is termed in the Sūtra "happiness in this world" (dṛṣṭadharmasukhavibhāra, viii.27) and "the easy path" (sukhapratipad, vi.66), the path by which one knows better and easily. It is thus the excellent absorptions which are called dhyāna.

But if dhyāna is an absorption filled with parts, how can a defiled absorption be called dhyāna?

Because it is bad upanidhyāna.

But this entails false conclusions. [In fact, one cultivates bad upanidhyāna with a mind controlled by sensual desire, and this state cannot be a dhyāna.]

No. We give the name of dhyāna to the defiled state that resembles true dhyāna, as, in the world, one calls a thing that resembles a grain, although incapable of germinating, "rotten grain", and not a pebble, etc. [In the same way one speaks of a pārājika Bhikṣu, iv.39c-d.] And the Blessed One speaks of bad dhyāna.¹⁶

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What are the characteristics of the First to the Fourth Dhyāna?

2a. The First is filled with vicāra, prīti, and sukha, (parts that the following [Dhyānas] successively abandon).¹⁷

The First Dhyāna is a good concentration filled with vicāra, prīti, and sukha [that is to say, associated with a vicāra filled or associated with prīti and sukha]. This also says implicitly, "filled
with *vitarka,* for *vitarka* necessarily accompanies *vicāra,* as smoke accompanies fire. It does not happen that *vicāra* is associated with *prīti* and *sukha* without at the same time being associated with *vitarka.*

2b. Parts that the following (Dhyānas) successively abandon.

The Second, Third, and Fourth Dhyāna are characterized by the successive abandoning of each of these three parts; eliminating *vicāra,* the Second Dhyāna is only filled with *prīti* and *sukha;* eliminating *prīti,* the Third Dhyāna is only filled with *sukha;* and by eliminating *sukha,* these three parts are absent from the Fourth Dhyāna.

***

We have described the Dhyānas. What are the Ārūpyas?

2c. So too, the Ārūpyas (which are made up of four *skandhas*).

a. The Ārūpyas, that is, the absorptions of, and the rebirths in Ārūpyadhatu are like the Dhyānas in their number and nature.

There are four Ārūpyas and each Ārūpya is twofold, existence and concentration. [The existences have been defined in the Third Chapter, iii.3]. The concentrations of Ārūpya, in their nature and in general, are applications of pure minds on a single object.

By reason of this double similarity, the stanza says "So too, the Ārūpyas" (are like the Dhyānas).

2d. They are made up of four *skandhas.*
b. The Dhyanas are accompanied by five *skandhas*, but the Ārūpyas are accompanied by only four *skandhas*, for no *rupa* or physical matter accompanies it.

2e. It arises out of separation from lower spheres.\(^{20}\)

All the Ārūpyas are concentration; but there are four Ārūpyas because the concentration that constitutes each Ārūpya proceeds from separation from a lower sphere. Ākāśānanyayatana is the absorption that proceeds from separation from the Fourth Dhyāna; and so on to Naivasanjñānāsaṁjñāyatana (or Bhavāgra) which proceeds from separation from Ākīṁcanyāyatana.

What is separation?

The paths (Ānantaryamārga and Vimuktimārga) by which the ascetic is delivered from the lower spheres, because these paths have turned him away from them.

3a-b. They are called *vibhūtarūpasanjñā* together with three *samantakas*.\(^{21}\)

[The basic or *maula* Ārūpyas, with the preparatory stages or thresholds, the *samantakas* of the three higher Ārūpyas are defined as abodes of “those who have conquered the idea of physical matter.”]

The first *samantaka*, the threshold of Ākāśānanyāyatana is not called a *samantaka* because it has the Fourth Dhyāna for its object, and so the idea of physical matter is not completely transcended in it.

The Ārūpyas are so called because there is no *rupa* or physical matter in them: they are made up of the four *skandhas* as mentioned above.
This should be proved, say some Schools, for we maintain that there is some physical matter, rūpa, in the Ārūpyas.

But then why are the ārūpyas called ārūpyas, "absences of physical matter"?

They are called this because their rūpa is reduced, in the same way that a little red (iṣatpīṅgala) is called "reddish" (āpīṅgala, "absence of red") (i.17, English trans. p. 75).

So be it; but what type of physical matter is in Ārūpyadhātu?

i. If you say that this physical matter is neither the body nor the voice, but merely the physical matter that constitutes bodily and vocal discipline (kāyavāksanvaramātra, the rūpa that forms part of the dharmāyatana, iv. p. 561), then how can this discipline exist in the absence of body and voice? And how can a rūpa derived from the primary elements (bhautika), namely discipline, exist in the absence of these same primary elements (mahābhūtas)? If you answer that bodily and vocal discipline exists in Ārūpyadhātu without the cooperation of primary physical matter, in the same way that pure discipline exists without primary elements of their same, i.e., pure, nature, then this answer does not hold, for pure discipline has impure primary elements for its support, elements in the sphere in which the Āryan is born (iv.6).

This proof for the absence of physical matter does not hold only for existence in Ārūpyadhātu, but also for the absorption of Ārūpyadhātu,²² [in which saṃvara or discipline, which is rūpa, is also absent].

ii. If you attribute material organs (rūpindriya) to the beings in Ārūpyadhātu, how can you say that the physical matter of Ārūpyadhātu is subtle?

Because their dimensions are very small; the beings are therefore of reduced rūpa (iṣadrūpa), so the beings are then
"without physical matter."

But if you reason in this way, then the tiny and invisible aquatic animals [of which the Vinaya speaks] would also be "without rūpa."

Would you say that the physical matter of Ārūpyadhātu is transparent (accha, ii. English trans. p. 173)? But intermediate beings and the beings in Rūpadhātu also possess transparent physical matter.23

Would you say that the physical matter of Ārūpyadhātu is more transparent and so merits being called "absence of physical matter"? But then you should only call the highest stage of Ārūpyadhātu "absence of physical matter," for bodies will be all the more transparent the more distinguished is the absorption of the stage to which they belong.24

Furthermore, the physical matter of Rūpadhātu (or of the Dhyānas) cannot be perceived by an eye in a lower sphere, since it is too transparent. How does this differ from the physical matter that you attribute to Ārūpyadhātu?

Finally it is a gratuitous affirmation to maintain that the name of the first two Dhātus (i.e., Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu) correspond to their objects (anvarthasamjñā),25 but that this is not so in the case of Ārūpyadhātu.

iii. It is maintained that physical matter exists in Ārūpyadhātu. There are four arguments in favor of this position:

1. It is said that life and warmth are interconnected (saṁsṛṣṭa).26

2. It is said that nāman (i.e., the four nonmaterial skandhas) and physical matter support one another, like two bunches of roses.27

3. It is said that nāmarūpa (both the material and nonmaterial skandhas) are caused by the consciousness (vijnāna).28

4. It is said that consciousness does not come or go independently of physical matter, sensation, ideas, or the samskāras.29
These texts are not decisive, for there is reason to interpret them:

1. The Sūtra says that life (āyus) is associated with warmth, which is physical matter. But does this refer to all types of life or only to life in Kāmadhātu?\(^{30}\)

2. The Sūtra says that nāman and rūpa (the nonmaterial and the material skandhas) support one another. But does this refer to all of the Dhātus or only to Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu?

3. The Sūtra says "vijñānapratyayam nāmarūpam" ("the nonmaterial and material skandhas are conditioned by the consciousness").\(^{31}\) But does this text teach that all consciousness—either a consciousness caused by the samāskāras of Kāmadhātu or Rūpadhātu, or a consciousness caused by the samāskāras of Ārūpyadhātu, (that is, a consciousness caused by actions retributable by an existence in Kāmadhātu . . . )—is a cause of the material and nonmaterial skandhas? Rather, it teaches that all material and nonmaterial skandhas have consciousness for their cause.\(^{32}\)

4. The Sūtra denies that consciousness comes and goes independently of the four "abodes of consciousness" (vijñānasthiti, iii.7), that is, independently of rūpa, vedanā, samjñā, and the samāskāras. But should this Sūtra be understood as meaning "independently of all of these abodes together"?

We would say that the Sūtra expresses itself in a general manner: we do not have to interpret it, and we do not have the right to think that it refers to Kāmadhātu, etc.

The answer does not hold, for to hold to the letter of the Sūtra, one would come to absurd conclusions:

1. Life would necessarily accompany all warmth, even if it be external warmth.

2. External physical matter would be supported by the nonmaterial skandhas.

3. External physical matter would be caused by consciousness.
4. There would be material food (lit.: "food taken by the mouthfuls") in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu, for the Sūtra says, in a general way, that there are four types of food (iii.40), in the same way that it says in a general way that there are four "abodes of consciousness": from whence you conclude that the "abode of physical matter" exists in Ārūpyadhātu.

No, for the Sūtra, while expressing itself in a general way concerning the four types of food, formulates exceptions to the rule: it speaks of a being "who surpasses the gods who nourish themselves with material food"; and it speaks of beings "who nourish themselves with joy".

Very well, but does not the Sūtra also say, and categorically so, that there is no physical matter in Ārūpyadhātu? It says, 1) "One departs from the rūpas through the Ārūyas"; 2) "These states of calm deliverance, beyond the rūpas, namely the Ārūyas . . ."; 3) "There are existences without physical matter, absolutely passing beyond the ideas of physical matter": now, if physical matter were to exist in the existences or the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu, beings who are in Ārūpyadhātu would have ideas of their own physical matter. And the Sūtra would not say that an ascetic obtains these existences and absorptions by passing beyond all ideas of physical matter.

Our opponent answers that the Sūtra, in these different passages, intends to speak not of physical matter in general, but of gross physical matter of a lower sphere.

We answer that, in this hypothesis, 1. one should understand in the same sense the text relative to material food, which would exist, albeit subtly, in Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu; 2. one should say that an ascetic leaves the rūpas through the Dhyānas, and that the Dhyānas belong to Ārūpyadhātu, for the Dhyānas are beyond the coarse rūpas of a lower sphere, namely Kāmadhātu; 3. one should say that, through the Ārūyas, the ascetic leaves sensation (vedanā), etc., for the Ārūyas are beyond the sensations of lower spheres, and one should call them "without sensation," etc. But the
Sūtra does not express itself in this way. We then assume that the Ārūpyas are beyond any and all physical matter.

[Objection.] How can the Ārūpyas be the “leaving” of the rūpas? The Blessed One, in fact, denies that existence (bhava) can be the leaving of existence: “I say that one cannot leave bhava through bhava.” The Blessed One expresses himself in this manner with reason, for one cannot leave a certain existence (or mode of existence, bhava) by means of this same existence, and one can neither leave all of the existences nor definitively leave any existence by means of any existence whatsoever.

Finally the Blessed One says that there is rūpa, vedanā, samjñā, the samāskāras, and vijnāna in the Dhyānas, and that there is vedanā . . . and vijnāna in the Ārūpyas. If there were truly rūpa in the Ārūpyas, why did not the Blessed One say that there is rūpa in them, as he did for the Dhyānas?

Hence,

3c. There is no rūpa in the Ārūpyas.

[From the two arguments given above, it follows that there is no physical matter in Ārūpyadhātu. The masters who maintain the existence of physical matter in Ārūpyadhātu maintain a thesis that is false and in contradiction to reason.]

If this is the case, then when a being obtains an existence in Ārūpyadhātu, his series of physical matter is cut off for numerous cosmic periods (iii.81). When this being is finally reborn in a lower sphere, where does his physical matter come from?

3d. Physical matter arises from the mind (citta).

A cause was formerly produced—a certain action, etc.,—which should ripen in physical matter; a trace (vāsanā) of this cause
remains in the mind: its efficacy now matures;[39] the physical matter that now arises arises from the mind.

But how can a mind in Ārūpyadhātu exist without being supported by physical matter, rūpa?

Why could it not exist without physical matter?

Because it never happens here below that a mind exists without a body.

But, by virtue of this same reasoning, you should deny that beings in Rūpadhātu live on material food. Moreover we have already explained[40] how a mind in Ārūpyadhātu has nikāya ("genre") and jīvita ("life") as its support.

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Do the Ārūpyas receive their different names,—Ākāśānantya, etc.,—from the fact that they have space (ākāśa) etc., for their objects?

No. The first three,

4a-c. Ākāśānantya, Vijnānānantya, and Ākimcanya are named after their preparatory exercises.

The three lower Ārūpyas receive their names from the fact that, in their preparatory exercises, one considers space, etc.[41]

4c-d. Because of its weakness, the (next) absorption is called Neither-Ideas-Nor-Absence of Ideas (nasamjñānāpyasamjñānakāh).[42]

The Fourth Ārūpya receives its name from the fact that samjñā, "ideas," is very weak in it. Ideas are not active in it, but neither is it completely without ideas.
Without doubt, one prepares himself for this Ārūpya by considering, "Ideas are a sickness! Ideas are an ulcer! Ideas are an arrow! The absence of ideas (āsamjñīka, compare ii.41b) is stupidity (sammoha)! This is calmness, this is excellent, the Faculty of Neither-Ideas-Nor-Absence of Ideas!" But it is not by reason of this preparatory exercise that the Fourth Ārūpya receives its name.

And why is the Fourth Ārūpya conceived of, by the ascetic who finds himself in the preparatory absorptions, as Neither-Ideas-Nor-Absence of Ideas? It is because of the slightness of the ideas in it. This is the explanation of its name.

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5a. There are then eight things that are basic absorptions;

The Four Dhyānas and the Four Ārūpyas are the eight basic absorptions.

5b. The (first) seven are threefold.

The first seven of these eight are threefold.

5c. Enjoyment, pure, and free from the defilements.

They are associated with enjoyment, are pure, and are free from the defilements.

5d. The eighth is twofold.

Bhavāgra is associated with enjoyment and is pure, but it is not
free from the defilements.

6a. The absorption of enjoyment is associated with thirst; (a pure absorption is of a worldly order of good; it is the object of enjoyment of the first; the absorption free from the defilements is transworldly.)

For enjoyment is itself thirst (=desire).

6b. A pure absorption is of a worldly order of good;

Worldly good is also termed "good," because it arises in conjunction with the pure dharma, such as non-desire, etc. (iv.9a).

6c. It is the object of enjoyment.

Pure absorption is the object enjoyed by the absorption of enjoyment. As soon as the pure absorption disappears, the absorption of enjoyment that enjoys it arises. (The ascetic has then left the pure absorption that he is enjoying; but he is concentrated by virtue of the fact of the absorption of enjoyment which he enjoys).

6d. The absorption free from the defilements is transworldly.

The absorption free from the defilements is transworldly. (It cannot be the cause of or the object of desire; hence it is not enjoyed).
The Dhyānas are filled with "parts" or items, but not the Āruṇyas (because calmness and insight are in equal measure in them; below, note 77).

How many parts are there in each Dhyāna?

7-8. There are five parts in the First: [vitarka, vicāra, joy [prīti], happiness [sukha], and samādhi; four in the Second: faith and joy, etc.; five in the Third: equanimity, mindfulness, awareness (samprajñāna), happiness, and samādhi; and four in the last: mindfulness, equanimity, the sensation of neither suffering nor happiness [adukhāsukha], and samādhi].

There are five parts or items in the First Dhyāna.

7b. Vitarka, vicāra, joy, happiness, and samādhi.

The teaching of the School is that samādhi or concentration is at one and the same time both Dhyāna and a part of this Dhyāna, whereas the other parts are only parts of Dhyāna, but not Dhyāna itself.

But in our opinion, it is the same for the five-part Dhyāna as for a four-part army, which does not exist apart from its parts.

7c. Four in the Second: faith and joy, etc.

The Second Dhyāna contains four parts: joy, happiness, concentration of the mind on a single object (cittākāgratā), and internal purity of faith (adhyātmasamprasadā).

8a. Five in the Third: equanimity, mindfulness, awareness, happiness, and stability (=samādhi).
The Third Dhyāna possesses five parts: 1) equanimity (not vedanopēkṣa, the sensation of indifference, but saṃskāropekṣa), joy which is free from movement towards any object (anābhogalakṣaṇa); 2) mindfulness (that is, not losing sight of the motive or reason [nimitta] for this equanimity, upekṣanimittasampramōṣa); 3) saṃprajñānam (consciousness or awareness relating to this mindfulness); 4) happiness; and 5) samādhi: sthiti or stability is a synonym for samādhi, as the Śutra says, "What is right samādhi? It is stability of the mind."

8b. And four in the last: mindfulness, equanimity, the sensation of neither suffering nor happiness, and samādhi.

The Fourth Dhyāna possesses four parts: 1) the sensation of indifference (lit.: the sensation of neither suffering nor happiness), 2) pure equanimity (upekṣaparipūrṇa), 3) pure mindfulness, and 4) samādhi.

These are the eighteen parts of the Dhyānas: the First and the Third Dhyānas have five parts each, and the Second and the Fourth Dhyānas have four parts each. In respect to their names, there are eighteen parts. (But how many of these eighteen are distinct things?)

9a. Regarded as things, there are eleven parts.56

Regarded as things or substances (dravya), there are eleven parts.

There are five in the First Dhyāna, plus 1) internal purity or faith in the Second Dhyāna; 3-5) equanimity, mindfulness, awareness and happiness in the Third Dhyāna; and 6) the sensation of neither suffering nor happiness in the Fourth Dhyāna.

There are then some parts of the First Dhyāna that are not
parts of the Second Dhyāna. There are four alternatives: 1) parts of the First Dhyāna that are not parts of the Second Dhyāna, namely *vitarka* and *vicāra*; 2) part of the Second Dhyāna that is not part of the First Dhyāna, namely faith; 3) parts common to the First and the Second Dhyānas, namely joy, happiness, and concentration of the mind on a single object (*cittākāgratā*); and 4) parts that do not belong to either of the First or the Second Dhyānas, namely all of the other parts.

The correspondence of the parts of the other Dhyānas is established according to the same principles.

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Why do you say that the happiness of the Third Dhyāna constitutes a separate thing?

Because the happiness of the Third Dhyāna is agreeable sensation (*sukhā vedanā*), whereas

9b. In the first two Dhyānas, happiness (*sukha*) signifies well-being (*prasrabdhi*).

In the First and Second Dhyāna, *prasrabdhi* (= *karmaṇyatā*, "aptitude" or well-being," ii, English trans. p. 191) is called happiness: here we have *prasrabdhisukha*, happiness which consists of *prasrabdhi*. In the Third Dhyāna, there is only the sensation of happiness (*sukhā vedanā*).

In fact, in the first two Dhyānas, there can be no faculty of happiness (*sukhendriya*).

The reason for this is: 1) the happiness attributed to these Dhyānas cannot be bodily happiness, in light of the fact that the five sense consciousnesses are absent in a person who has entered into contemplation; 60  

2. the happiness attributed to these Dhyānas cannot be mental
happiness because these Dhyānas possess joy. Now joy is "satisfaction" (saumanasya) and it is inadmissible for joy and happiness, even happiness of sensation, to coexist; they cannot even succeed one another, for the First Dhyāna possesses five parts, and the Second, only four.

[Thesis of the Dārṣṭāntikas:]

i. In the first three Dhyānas, there is no mental sensation of happiness, but only a bodily sensation of happiness, which constitutes the part called "happiness" of these Dhyānas (and is activated in the course of the absorption).

Objection: In this hypothesis you should explain how the Sūtra could say, "What is the faculty of happiness (sukhendriya)? The bodily and mental sensation of happiness produced by reason of an agreeable contact is what is called the faculty of happiness."

This reasoning is not authentic, answer the Dārṣṭāntikas, as the word "mental" (caitasika) has been added. In all the sects the text merely reads "bodily happiness."

Further, they continue, regarding the part of the Third Dhyāna called happiness, the Sūtra says in its own words that, in this Dhyāna the ascetic "experiences happiness through his body" (sukham...kāyena sampravedayate). Would one maintain that the word "through the body" (kāyena) signifies "through the body of the mind" (manahkāyena = manahsamudāyena, "through the accumulation which is the mind"), and that one should translate, "the ascetic experiences happiness through this complex which is the manas"?

ii. [The explanation of the Vaibhāṣikas,] that the happiness part of the first two Dhyānas is well-being (prasrabdhi, karmaṇyatā) is untenable, for the well-being of the Fourth Dhyāna is certainly greater than the well-being of the first two Dhyānas, and the Sūtra does not attribute a happiness part to the Fourth Dhyāna.

[If the Vaibhāṣikas answer,] "The well-being of the first two
Dhyānas is called happiness because it is favorable to the sensation of happiness, whereas the well-being of the Fourth Dhyāna does not have this character,” [then the Dārśtāntikas will answer,] “The well-being of the Third Dhyāna, like that of the first two, is favorable to the sensation of happiness; why do the Vaibhāṣikas not attribute prasrabdhisukha, happiness which consists of well-being, to the Third Dhyāna, but rather a happiness consisting of an agreeable mental sensation (vedanāsukha)?”

[If the Vaibhāṣikas answer,] “In the Third Dhyāna, well-being whose character is karmayatā or aptitude (ii, English trans. p. 91) is opposed by equanimity, whose character is akarmayatā,” [the Dārśtāntikas will deny the truth of this assertion:] for them well-being is accumulated through equanimity, since it results from the fact that the well-being of the Third Dhyāna is greater than the well-being of the first two Dhyānas.

Finally, the Sūtra says,65” “When the Noble Śrāvaka, having realized the joy born of separation, abides in absorption, then five dharmas have been abandoned by him, and he has achieved the cultivation of five dharmas, namely joy, well-being, happiness, prajñā, and samādhi.” In this Sūtra, well-being is listed separately from happiness; it should be distinct from happiness in order for the list of the five dharmas to be complete. Thus, in the first two Dhyānas, happiness is not well-being.66

iii. [Objection of the Vaibhāṣikas:] In order for the happiness of the first two Dhyānas to be agreeable bodily sensation, it is necessary for the person in absorption to produce a consciousness of touch (kāyavijñāna). And this is not possible. [Answer of the Dārśtāntikas:] In the state of absorption, the body is penetrated by a wind born of excellent mental concentration (samādhi); this wind is a tangible which is agreeably felt (sukhavedaniya) and is called well-being. Hence there is produced a consciousness of touch (together with the agreeable sensation associated with this consciousness).

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] When this consciousness is produced, there is “a distraction of the mind towards an external object”: hence the
ascetic would fall away from his *samādhi*.

Answer of the Dārśṭāntikas:] No, for agreeable or happy bodily sensation which arises from *samādhi*, being internal, is favorable to *samādhi*.\(^{67}\)

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] But would the ascetic fall away from the *samādhi* when he produces the consciousness of touch?

[Answer of the Dārśṭāntikas:] No, and for this same reason: this consciousness is favorable to *samādhi*. Immediately after the appearance of this consciousness, the *samādhi* is taken up again.\(^{68}\)

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] How can the body (*kāyendriya*), which is in Kāmadhātu, give rise to a touch consciousness (i.e., *prasrābdhi*), which is, according to you, a type of wind in Rūpadhātu (i.47c)?

[The Dārśṭāntikas:] This criticism does not hold, for this consciousness of touch is produced by reason of well-being.\(^{69}\)

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] There is a difficulty in regarding well-being as a tangible.\(^{70}\) Let us suppose that the ascetic is in possession of transworldly, undefiled Dhyāna: the tangible (well-being) and the consciousness of touch (*kāyavijñāna*) which he has will be undefiled, for some of the parts of defiled Dhyāna cannot be undefiled, while the others are defiled. [Now the Sūtra says that "All eyes . . . all tangibles are defiled"][.]

[The Dārśṭāntikas:] There is no contradiction here. In fact physical well-being (*kāyasya karmanyaṭā*) is defined as "a part of Bodhi."\(^{71}\) If the Vaibhāṣikas answer, "Even though it is not a part of Bodhi, it is so defined because it is favorable to the part of Bodhi called well-being and which is mental well-being," we would say that, for the same reason, one can consider bodily well-being as undefiled. [If the Vaibhāṣikas answer,] "Bodily well-being cannot be undefiled, for the Sūtra declares that all tangible things are defiled,"\(^{72}\) we would say that this Sūtra is of intentional meaning and refers to all tangible things with the exception of physical well-being, to the consciousnesses of touch with the exception of the consciousness of touch which cognizes well-being.
[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Do you admit that certain parts of undefiled dhyāna are undefiled, and that certain parts are not undefiled?

[The Dārṣṭāntikas:] The undefiled part is not simultaneous to the non-undefiled part; we know indeed that (bodily) happiness does not exist at the same time as (mental) joy.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] Then the First Dhyāna will not have five parts, and the Second Dhyāna will not have four parts.

[The Dārṣṭāntikas:] If Scripture attributes the parts of happiness and joy to the first two Dhyānas, this is because these Dhyānas are susceptible, successively, to happiness and joy; in the same way Scripture attributes vitarka and vicāra—which can only exist successively—to the First Dhyāna.

[The Vaibhāṣikas:] We affirm that vitarka and vicāra coexist; but the example that you cite to prove the non-coexistence of the parts is not proved.

[The Dārṣṭāntikas:] This example is proved; for vitarka, which is a coarse mental state, and vicāra, which is a subtle mental state, are contradictory and cannot coexist.73 And you did not say what harm there is in their not coexisting.74

Let us consider the theory of the “parts”: one determines the specific features of the Second Dhyāna and of those following by eliminating two, three, or four parts: it is for this reason that the First Dhyāna is said to contain five parts, because the other Dhyānas are defined by the elimination, successively and in order, of the first four of these parts. This is why ideas (samjñā) and the other dharmas of the First Dhyāna are not considered as parts, for they are not cut off in the following Dhyānas. If you do not accept this explanation, then why does the First Dhyāna have only five parts?

But, [say the Vaibhāṣikas,] the five parts are only called parts because they are useful to the Dhyāna. No, this cannot be the case, [answer the Dārṣṭāntikas] since mindfulness and prajñā are more
useful to the Dhyāna than are *vitarka* and *vicāra*.

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A certain school\(^75\) maintains the system that has been presented, but the ancient masters (pūrvācāryas) are not in agreement on this.\(^76\) Consequently the point should be further examined.\(^77\)

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What is the *dharma* called "internal purity (or faith)" (adhyātmasamprāsāda)?\(^78\)

When the agitation of *vitarka* and *vicāra* has come to an end, the series flows calmly and clearly: this is what is called internal purity. As a river agitated by waves, so too the series, by reason of the agitation of *vitarka* and *vicāra*, is not calm or clear. [This is the explanation of the Sautrāntikas.]

But if we admit this explanation, then internal purity is not a thing in and of itself. Thus there will not be eleven things in the Dhyānas. Then one must say

9c. Purity is faith.\(^79\)

Purity (*prasāda*) is a thing in and of itself, namely faith (*śraddhā*). When the ascetic acquires the Second Dhyāna, he produces a profound faith: he admits that the spheres of absorption themselves can be abandoned. This faith is called internal purity. Faith, having purity (*prasāda*, vi.75) for its characteristic, is called purity. Having abandoned externals, it flows equally and so *prasāda* is internal and equal; hence it is termed "internal purity" or *adhyātmasamprāsāda*.\(^80\)

According to other masters [the Sautrāntikas], *vitarka*, *vicāra*,
samādhi, and internal purity are not separate things.

[The Sarvāstivādins:] If these are not separate things, how can one say that they are mental dharmas?

[The Sautrāntikas:] Some special states of mind receive the name of mental states because they arise in the mind.81

But the system of the Abhidharma does not admit this theory.82

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[Objection of the Sautrāntikas:] You have said that joy is satisfaction (saumanasya), a happy or agreeable mental sensation. How would you establish this definition?

If joy is not satisfaction, then what is the dharma that is called joy?

We follow another school.83 According to this school, there exists a dharma distinct from satisfaction, a mental state called joy. The happiness of the three Dhyānas is satisfaction; hence joy, which is distinguished from happiness, is distinct from satisfaction. It is not admissible that happiness, in the Dhyānas, is satisfaction.

9c-d. Joy is satisfaction. This is proved by two texts.84

The Blessed One says in the Viparītasūtra,85 “In the Third Dhyāna the faculty of satisfaction (saumanasyendriya) which has previously arisen is destroyed without remnant; in the Fourth Dhyāna, the faculty of happiness (sukhendriya) is destroyed without remnant.”

He says in another Sūtra,86 “By reason of the abandoning of the faculty of happiness and the faculty of suffering, and by reason of the previous disappearance of the faculty of dissatisfaction (daurmanayendriya) and the faculty of satisfaction.”
These two texts prove that there is no faculty of satisfaction in the Third Dhyāna. Hence joy is satisfaction, and not happiness.

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Does defiled dhyāna possess the parts that we have just studied?

No.

What are the parts that are absent in each defiled dhyāna?

10a-c. In the defiled Dhyānas there is no joy, happiness, faith, sampradhiḥ (=awareness, samprajanya), mindfulness, pure equanimity nor pure mindfulness.

When it is defiled, the First Dhyāna does not contain joy and happiness "arisen from separation", because it is not separated from the defilements of Kāmadhātu (see Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 814a23).

The Second Dhyāna does not contain internal purity (=faith), because it is troubled by the defilements; the defilements cause it to be unclear.

The Third Dhyāna does not contain mindfulness and awareness, because it is confused by a defiled happiness.

The Fourth Dhyāna does not contain the purity of equanimity or the purity of mindfulness, because it is soiled by the defilements.

That is what some say.

10d. According to some, (there is no) well-being and equanimity.

According to others, there is no 1) well-being in the first two
The Absorptions

Dhyānas, and 2) no equanimity in the last two, because well-being and equanimity are dharmas that are only found in a pure mind (kusalamahābhūmika, ii.25).

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The Blessed One teaches that three Dhyānas are "disturbed" (sa-injita) because of "faults" (apakṣālas).\(^7\)

lla-b. As it is free from the eight faults, the Fourth is undisturbed.

What are the eight faults?

llc-d. Vitarka and vicāra, the two breaths, and the four of which happiness is the first.

The eight faults are vitarka, vicāra, happiness, suffering, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, inbreathing, and outbreathing. None of these eight is found in the Fourth Dhyāna: this is why it alone is termed "undisturbed." It is true that the Sūtra says that the Fourth Dhyāna is undisturbed because it is not agitated by vitarka and vicāra, by joy and happiness.\(^8\) (But the intention of this passage is not to attribute the breaths, etc., to the Fourth Dhyāna; the Sūtra is merely noting its difference from the other Dhyānas.)

According to others, the Fourth Dhyāna is "undisturbed" (anēñjyam) because it is like a lamp which, in a sealed place, is not agitated by the wind.

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Do the arisings of dhyāna existences (dhyānopapattayah) or existences in Rūpadhātu, possess the same sensations (vedanās) as
do the absorption of the Dhyānas?

No, they do not.

Why is this?

12. In the dhyāna existences, there is satisfaction, happiness, and equanimity; equanimity and sumanaskatā (=samanasya, satisfaction); happiness and equanimity; and equanimity.\(^{89}\)

a. In the First Dhyāna existence, there are three sensations: 1) the sensation of happiness (sukhavedanā) associated with three consciousnesses (eye, ear, and body consciousness); 2) the sensation of satisfaction of the sphere of the mind consciousness (manovijñāna); and 3) the sensation of equanimity associated with four consciousnesses (eye, ear, body, and manas).

b. In the Second Dhyāna existence, there are two sensations, namely satisfaction and equanimity, both of the sphere of the manas. There is no happiness here, because the five sense consciousnesses are absent.\(^{90}\)

c. In the Third Dhyāna existence, there are two sensations, namely happiness\(^{91}\) and equanimity, both of the sphere of the manas.

d. In the Fourth Dhyāna existence, there is a single sensation, the sensation of equanimity.

Such is, with respect to the sensations, the differences between the Dhyāna existences and the absorptions of dhyāna.

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If, from the Second Dhyāna on, three consciousnesses (eye, ear, and body consciousness) are absent, as well as vitarka and vicāra, how can beings born in the three higher Dhyānas see, hear, and
touch? How can they produce the bodily or vocal act of informing (vijñāptikarman, iv.7d; see also i.46 and following)?

We do not say that beings who are born in these Dhyānas lack visual consciousness, etc. They possess these consciousnesses, but not in the Second, the Third or the Fourth Dhyānas:

13a-c. In the Second Dhyāna and above, the body, eye, and ear consciousnesses, and the consciousness that sets the act of informing into motion belong to the sphere of the First Dhyāna.⁹²

The eye consciousness, etc., and the consciousness that sets into motion the act of informing do not exist in the Second Dhyāna and above.⁹³ But the beings of these Dhyānas manifest these consciousnesses, in the same way as they manifest a fictive mind of creation (nirmāṇacitta) of a lower sphere,⁹⁴ and, by means of these consciousnesses, they see, hear, touch, and produce the action of informing.

13d. These consciousnesses are undefiled-neutral.

The four dhyānas which beings in the Second Dhyāna and above manifest, belong to the sphere of the First Dhyāna. Hence they are not defiled, because these beings are detached from the lower spheres; but they are not good, because the good of a lower sphere is less good.⁹⁵

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How does the acquisition of the absorptions of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu take place accordingly as they are pure, undefiled, or defiled? (see viii.5).
14a-b. One who does not possess them acquires them, pure, through detachment or through birth.

One who does not possess these absorptions obtains them by detaching oneself from a lower sphere or by taking up birth in a lower sphere (adhibhūmyupapattitas), with the exception of the fourth absorption of Ārūpyadhātu, or Bhavāgra, which one acquires solely by detaching oneself from the third absorption.

What is the meaning of the expression, “He who does not possess them”?

This signifies “One who has not acquired them or who has lost them.” In fact a person who possesses these pure absorptions of the falling (hanabhāgīya) class, etc. (viii.17) can, through cultivation, obtain pure absorptions of a higher class (i.e., of penetration, nirvedhabhāgīya); one who possesses pure absorptions of the duration (sthitibhāgīya) class can, through falling, obtain pure absorptions of the falling class.

The Vibhāṣa also says, “Can one acquire a pure dhyāna through detachment? Can one abandon a pure dhyāna through detachment? Can one acquire a pure dhyāna through falling? Can one abandon a pure dhyāna through falling? Can one acquire a pure dhyāna through birth? Can one abandon a pure dhyāna through birth? Yes, in the case of the First Dhyāna of the falling class.”

In fact, 1) one obtains this dhyāna through detachment from Kāmadhātu; 2) one loses it through detachment from Brahmaloka (: by passing through the Second Dhyāna); 3) one obtains it by falling from detachment in Brahmaloka; 4) one loses it by falling from detachment in Kāmadhātu; 5) one obtains it by rebirth from here up to Brahmaloka; and 6) one loses it by rebirth into Kāmadhātu. [Hsüan-tsang: The same for the absorptions of the other spheres].

14c. One acquires them, undefiled, through detachment.
That is, "one who does not possess them." The Āryan who detaches himself from a lower sphere acquires the undefiled absorption of a higher sphere. This rule only refers to the ascetic who has completely abandoned the absorption in question.

One who already possesses an absorption acquires this same absorption of undefiled quality under other conditions. Through the knowledge of extinction (kṣayajñāna, vi.44d), one acquires the undefiled absorption of an Aśaikṣa; through the perfectioning of his faculties (indriyasamcāra, vi.60), one acquires an undefiled absorption of a Śaikṣa or an Aśaikṣa, according to the case. [Hsüan-tsang: The undefiled absorption, already possessed, is again acquired through cultivation or through falling, as explained above.]

But cannot one say that the ascetic, through entry into the certitude of the acquisition of absolute good (samyaktyāyāma, vi.26a), acquires undefiled absorption for the first time? 98

No, for the ascetic who, before pursuing the acquisition of the result of the state of Sakṛdāgāmin, has obtained the result of the state of Srotaāpanna (an ānupūrvana, ii.16c) can enter into this certitude in the state of Anāgamya (viii.22c); he does not necessarily acquire the basic absorption. [Hsüan-tsang: Now the Treatise only examines the case that necessarily includes the acquisition of the absorptions.]

14d. One acquires them, defiled, through falling and through birth.

One who falls from the detachment of a sphere acquires the defiled absorption of this sphere. One who, dying in a higher sphere and reborn in a lower sphere, acquires the defiled absorption of this second sphere.
How many types of absorptions arises after how many types of absorptions?

1. Six absorptions can arise after the first undefiled dhyanā: 1-2) pure and undefiled absorption of the same sphere; and 3-6) pure and undefiled absorption of the Second and Third Dhyānas.

2. Seven absorptions can arise after undefiled Ākimcanyāyatana: 1-2) pure and undefiled absorption of the same sphere; 3-6) pure and undefiled absorption of Vijñānānautyāyatana and Ākāśānautyāyatana; and 7) pure absorption of Naivasamjñānasamjñayatana, because this āyatana does not contain any undefiled absorption.

3. Eight absorptions can arise after the Second undefiled Dhyāna: 1-2) pure and undefiled absorption of the same sphere; and 3-8) pure and undefiled absorption of the Third, Fourth, and First Dhyāna.

4. Nine absorptions can arise after undefiled Vijñānānautyāyatana: 1-2) two of the same sphere; 3-6) four, namely two of Ākāśānautyāyatana and two of the Fourth Dhyāna; and 7-9) three, two of Ākimcanyāyatana and one of Naivasamjñānasamjñayatana.

5. According to these same principles, one will see that ten absorptions can arise after the dhyanā and ārūpya absorptions not specified above.

The rule is formulated briefly:

15a-c. After the undefiled, up to the third sphere above or below, there arises the good.

[The word “good” designates the pure absorption and the undefiled absorption, for both are morally good (iv.8).]

After an undefiled absorption, we have: 1) either two types of absorption of the same sphere as this undefiled absorption, namely
pure and undefiled; or 2) two types of absorption, pure or undefiled, of a higher sphere or of a lower sphere until the third in either direction. In fact, by reason of its too great distance, the ascetic is not capable of jumping over two spheres.

After inferential knowledge (anvayajñāna, vii.3c), one can enter into the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu, but not after the knowledge of the dharmas (dharmaśajñāna), because this has a lower sphere for its object.

We have seen which absorptions arise after the undefiled absorptions.

15c-d. The same after the pure, by adding the defiled of its sphere.

A defiled absorption of the same sphere can arise after any pure absorption. The rest as for the undefiled absorption. A defiled absorption cannot arise after an undefiled absorption.

16a. After the defiled, the pure and the defiled of its sphere.

A pure or a defiled absorption of the same sphere can arise after a defiled absorption.

16b. And the pure of a lower sphere.

Wearied of the defilements of the sphere in which one finds oneself,—defilements belonging to the defiled absorption of a higher sphere,—the ascetic produces an esteem for the pure absorption of a lower sphere. Therefore, after the defiled absorption of a higher sphere (the Second Dhyāna), a pure absorption of a lower sphere (the First Dhyāna) can arise.

There is a difficulty. If an ascetic were in a position to distinctly
know a defiled absorption and a pure absorption, he would be able to pass from the higher defiled absorption to the lower pure absorption. But, being defiled, he is not capable of this distinct knowledge; how then can he, after a defiled absorption, produce a pure absorption?

By the force of a previous resolution (pranidhāna). He made the resolution, "May I be able to obtain a lower pure absorption! What have I to do with a higher defiled absorption?" The "series" develops of itself by reason of this resolution, and, as a consequence, the lower absorption arises after the higher defiled absorption, in the same way as a person forms the resolution to sleep until a certain time, falls asleep, and then wakes up at that fixed time.

***

The undefiled absorptions, of whichever sphere, never arise after a defiled absorption. [There is no reciprocal generation between these two types, whereas a pure absorption is in reciprocal generation with both the undefiled and defiled absorptions.]

We have said that the defiled absorption that succeeds the pure or defiled absorption is always of the sphere of the absorption which it follows. This rule should be understood of life in the course of the absorption; but

16c-d. At death, after the pure, the defiled of any type can arise.  

At death, a defiled mind of any sphere can arise following a pure absorption obtained through birth.

16d. After the defiled, nothing higher.
At death, only a defiled mind of the same sphere or a lower sphere can follow Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu.

***

We have seen that the undefiled absorption can follow the pure absorptions; but it cannot follow all types of pure absorptions.

17a-b. The pure absorption is of four types, of falling, etc.

The pure (suddhaka) absorption is of four types: of falling (hānabhāgīya), of duration (sthitibhāgīya), of progress (vīseṣabhāgīya), and of penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya). Nevertheless, the pure absorption of Naivasaṃjñānaśaṃjñāyatana is only of three types, excluding the category of the pure absorption of progress, because it has no higher sphere.¹⁰⁴

What are these four types?

17b-d. In order, they are suitable to the arising of the defilements, to its own sphere, to a higher sphere, to the undefiled.

When the pure absorption is of such a nature that it tends to lead to the arising of the defilements, it is called an absorption “of falling.”

When the pure absorption tends to lead to its own sphere, it is called an absorption “of duration.”

When the pure absorption tends to lead to a higher sphere, it is called an absorption “of progress.”

When the pure absorption tends to lead to the undefiled absorption, it is called an absorption “of penetration” (vi.20a).
Therefore it is from this last category of pure absorptions that the undefiled absorption arises.

***

What is the reciprocal generation of these four categories of absorption?

18a-b. After the absorption of falling, etc., two, three, three, one.

After the absorption of falling, there can arise absorptions of falling and duration.105

After the absorption of duration, three can arise, with the exception of the absorption of penetration.

After the absorption of progress, three can arise, with the exception of the absorption of falling.

After the absorption of penetration, only an absorption of penetration can arise.

We have seen (viii.15a-c) that immediately after a pure absorption or an undefiled absorption of a certain sphere, there can arise a pure absorption of an undefiled absorption of the third sphere above or below. When this is produced, the ascetic passes over a sphere and changes the characteristics of his absorption: he cultivates what is called the “transitional absorption” (vyutkrānta-kasamāpatti). How is this absorption actualized?

18c-19b. Going and coming in two ways over the eight spheres, in immediate succession, by passing over one sphere, going to the third sphere of a different type, is called “transitional absorption”.106
"Going and coming": "to go" is to take up the absorptions in ascending order; "to come" is to take up the absorptions in descending (or reverse) order.

"In two ways" refers to undefiled absorption and defiled absorption. This refers to the pure absorptions, not to the defiled absorptions.

"The eight spheres" means the Four Dhyāna absorptions, and the Four Ārūpya absorptions.

"In immediate succession" signifies by degrees.

"By passing over one sphere" means by skipping a sphere.

The preparatory exercise (prayoga) includes four successive disciplines: 1) cultivation of the eight defiled absorptions in ascending and descending order; 2) when this cultivation is assured, there is cultivation of the seven undefiled absorptions in ascending and descending order; 3) when this cultivation is assured, then the ascetic, in order to gain mastery in absorption, passes from the first defiled dhyāna into the third dhyāna of this same quality; from this he passes into Ākāśānantyāyatana, from this into Ākimcanyāyatana; and he then descends in the same way, since all of the absorptions are defiled; 4) when this cultivation is assured, there is cultivation in the same way, and in the two ways, of the undefiled absorptions.

When the ascetic is capable of passing from the first defiled dhyāna into the third undefiled dhyāna, from this into defiled Ākāśānantyāyatana, from this into undefiled Ākimcanyāyatana, and to return in the same way, then he has realized the entry into the third absorption of a different quality and has returned from this absorption: the transitional absorption has been achieved.

It is impossible to skip over two spheres and enter into a fourth, because a fourth sphere is too distant.

The transitional absorption is cultivated only by humans of the Three Dvīpas; by Arhats who are non-circumstantially delivered, that is, those who realize absorption of their own accord, those
who are delivered independently of circumstances (the *asamaya-vimukta* Arhats, vi.57) because they possess mastery in absorption. The Drśtiprāptas (vi.31c), that is, the ascetics in whom *prajñā* dominates, (who are informed by speculative views, *drṣṭi*), are of keen faculties and possess mastery in absorption; but they lack the first condition. Arhats whose liberation is occasional and circumstantial (the *samayavimukta* Arhats, vi.56c) have destroyed the defilements, but the second condition is absent. Both are therefore incapable of cultivating the transitional absorption.

***

How many *dhyāna* and *ārūpya* absorptions can be actualized by beings in different spheres?

19c-d. The *dhyāna* and *ārūpya* absorptions have for their support (*āśraya*) beings of their own spheres or of a lower sphere.

A being in Bhavāgra (=Naivasamjñanāsamjñāyatana) can actualize the absorption of Bhavāgra. Beings in lower spheres down to Kāmadhātu can actualize it also. In the same way the absorptions of the other spheres can be actualized by beings who are in the sphere of these absorptions or in lower spheres. But a being reborn in a higher sphere cannot actualize the absorption of a lower sphere:

19d. A lower absorption has no usefulness.

An absorption of a lower sphere does not have even the smallest amount of usefulness for a being born in a higher sphere, because this absorption is, by comparison, mediocre.\(^{108}\)

Such is the general rule, which admits of one exception:
20a-b. But, in Bhavāgra, it is by entering the Āryan absorption of Ākimcanya that one destroys the defilements.

A being born in Bhavāgra realizes the Āryan, that is, the undefiled absorption of Ākimcanyāyatana in order to destroy the defilements relating to Bhavāgra. In fact, the pure (=undefiled) Path cannot be cultivated in Bhavāgra;¹⁰⁹ but on the other hand, Ākimcanya is very close to it.

***

What is the object of the Dhyāna and Ārūpya absorptions?

20c. Associated with thirst, absorption has its own existence (bhava) for its object.

"Absorption associated with thirst" (=desire) signifies the absorption of enjoyment (viii.6). It has for its object "its own bhava," that is, the bhava of its sphere. Bhava signifies "that which is defiled" [This is another manner of presenting the doctrine of viii.6: the absorption of enjoyment has for its object a pure but defiled absorption, not an undefiled absorption]. It does not have a lower sphere for its object, for the ascetic that cultivates the absorption of enjoyment of a certain sphere is detached from the lower sphere.¹¹⁰ He does not have a higher sphere for his object, for the spheres are delimited by desire.¹¹¹ He does not have an undefiled absorption for his object, which would imply that it is pure.¹¹²

20d. Pure absorption has all that exists for its object.

The pure or undefiled absorption takes as its object all of the
dharmas that exist, conditioned (saṁskṛta) and unconditioned (asamskrta). Nevertheless

21 a-b. The pure Ārūpya absorptions of the principal spheres do not have lower defiled absorptions for their object.

The pure absorptions cultivated in the principal spheres of Ārūpyadhātu—in opposition to the Dhyāna absorptions and to the absorptions cultivated in the sāmantakas of Ārūpyadhātu (viii.22)—do not have for their object the defiled dharmas of lower spheres, but the dharmas of their own sphere or of a higher sphere.

The undefiled dharmas grasp all inferential knowledge (anvayajñāna, vii.3c) for their object, the sarvānvayajñānapakṣa; they do not concern themselves with the knowledge of the dharmas (the dharma-jñāna, whose object, namely Kāmadhātu, is too distant); they no longer concern themselves with the extinction (which is undefiled) of a lower sphere, which would be possible only if they were concerned with this sphere.

The absorptions cultivated in the sāmantakas of Ārūpyadhātu have for their object the lower sphere, for they include an irresistible Path (ānantar-yāmārga) whose sole object is the lower sphere.

***

Among the three types of dhyāna and ārūpya absorptions,—undefiled and supermundane (anāsrava), pure (suddhaka), and defiled (kliṣṭa),—which one destroys the defilements (kleśas)?

21 c-d. The defilements are abandoned through the undefiled absorptions.
Any undefiled absorption is capable of cutting off the defilements; not the pure absorptions, nor even less, the defiled absorptions.

The pure absorption does not cut off the defilements of a lower sphere, for the ascetic can only obtain the pure absorption of a certain sphere because he is detached from a lower sphere; he does not cut off the defilements of his sphere, for he does not oppose these defilements; he does not cut off the defilements of a higher sphere, because they are more subtle than he himself.

21d. And also by means of the sāmantakas, (likewise pure).

If the sāmantakas of the dhyānas and the ārūpyas are pure, they cut off the defilements, because they are opposed to a lower sphere.

***

How many sāmantakas, prefatory or threshold absorptions, are there?

22a. There are eight sāmantakas in the basic absorptions.

Each basic absorption has a sāmantaka or prefatory absorption, through which one enters into the basic absorption.

Are the sāmantakas of three types,—undefiled, pure, or defiled,—like the basic absorptions? Do they possess the same sensations (vedanā, namely joy or prīti in the first two Dhyānas, happiness or sukha in the Third, and equanimity or upeksa in the Fourth) as they do?

22b. They are pure; they possess the sensation of equanimity.
Chapter Eight

The *sāmantakas* are exclusively pure and are associated with the sensation of equanimity, because one traverses them through effort, because the abhorance of the lower sphere has not yet disappeared, and because they are the Path by which one detaches oneself from the lower sphere. Therefore they only contain the sensation of equanimity and they are not associated with enjoyment.

22c. The first is also Āryan.

The first *sāmantaka* is called Anāgamyā. It is of two types, pure and Āryan, that is, undefiled.

The *sāmantaka* mind through which one enters an existence is defiled; but the *sāmantaka* mind through which one enters absorption cannot be defiled, for this thesis has been refuted (above, p. 1253, line 16).

22c. Some say that it is threefold.

Other masters say that the Anāgamyā *sāmantaka* is also associated with enjoyment.

***

Does *dhyānāntara*, the intermediate *dhyāna*, differ or not from *sāmantaka*?

It differs from it. In fact *sāmantaka* is the door to detachment from a lower sphere, but this is not the case for *dhyānāntara*. Furthermore

22d. *Dhyānāntara* is without *vitarka*.
The First basic *dhyāna* and the first *sāmantaka* are associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra*. In the seven higher absorptions (the basic Dhyānas and their *sāmantakas*), there is neither *vitarka* nor *vicāra*. Only *dhyānāntara* is filled with *vicāra* without being filled with *vitarka*; consequently it is superior to the First Dhyāna but inferior to the Second. This is why it is called *dhyānāntara*, or intermediate *dhyāna*.

Consequently in the higher spheres there is no *dhyānāntara*, for the other spheres do not have, like the First, a higher and a lower (*vīsesābhāvāt*).

***

To how many categories does *dhyānāntara* belong? What sensation does it have?

23a. To three;

It can be associated with enjoyment, a pure absorption, and an undefiled absorption.

23b. It has the sensation of equanimity.

Like the prefatory or threshold absorptions (*sāmantakas*), it has the neither-disagreeable-nor-agreeable sensation, for it is associated with the faculty of equanimity (iv.48). One progresses through it through effort (*abhīsamścāravāhin*) and therefore it cannot be associated with satisfaction (*saumanasya*). Hence it is considered to be a "difficult path" (*duḥkha pratipad*, vi.66).

What is the result of *dhyānāntara*?
23c. It has Mahābrahmā for its result.\textsuperscript{127}

Whoever cultivates this absorption to the highest degree is reborn as Mahābrahmā.

***

[We have explained the absorptions or \textit{samāpattis}.\textsuperscript{128}]

What are the \textit{samādhis}?]

The Sūtra\textsuperscript{129} says that there are three types of \textit{samādhi}: 1) \textit{samādhi} with \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra}, 2) \textit{samādhi} without \textit{vitarka} but with \textit{vicāra}, and 3) \textit{samādhi} without \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra}. \textit{Dhyānāntara} is \textit{samādhi} without \textit{vitarka} but with \textit{vicāra}.

As for \textit{dhyānāntara},

23d-e. Up to it, \textit{samādhi} exists with \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra}; (beyond, \textit{samādhi} exists without either).\textsuperscript{130}

All \textit{samādhi} that is below \textit{dhyānāntara} contains \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra}. This refers to the First Dhyāna and to any other \textit{samādhi} supported by the First Dhyāna.\textsuperscript{131}

23e. Beyond, \textit{samādhi} exists without either.

Above \textit{dhyānāntara}, all \textit{samādhi} is without \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra}, from the \textit{sāmantaka} of the Second Dhyāna to the Fourth Ārūpya absorption.

The Sūtra\textsuperscript{132} teaches that there are three absorptions, the absorption of emptiness (\textit{sūnyatāsamādhi}), the absorption of the absence of characteristics, (\textit{ānimittasamādhi}), and the absorption of the absence of intention (\textit{apranihitasamādhi}).
24a. The absence of characteristics has the aspect of the Tranquil.\(^{133}\)

The absorption associated with the aspect of the Truth of Extinction (nirôdhasatya),—that is, the absorption in which the ascetic considers extinction,—is called the absorption of the absence of characteristics. This absorption has four aspects.\(^{134}\)

Why does it receive this name?

Because Nirvāṇa or extinction, being free from ten characteristics (nimitta) is called animitta. The absorption that has Nirvāṇa for its object is thus ānimitta.\(^{135}\) The ten characteristics or marks (nimitta) are: 1-5) the five āyatana-s, external sources of the sense consciousnesses, physical matter (rupa), sound, etc.; 6-7) male and female; and 8-10) the three characteristics of conditioned things (the samaskṛtalaksana-s, ii.45), arising, duration-and-change, and death.

24b-c. Emptiness has the aspects of emptiness and non-self.\(^{136}\)

The absorption associated with the two aspects of emptiness (śūnya) and of non-self (anātman) is called the absorption of emptiness (śūnyatāsamādhi). There are thus two aspects, the last two aspects of the Truth of Suffering.

24c-d. The absence of intention is associated with the other Truths.

The absorption of the absence of intention is the absorption that grasps the other ten aspects.

On the one hand, there are aspects of impermanence (anîtya) and suffering (duḥkha, the first two aspects of the Truth of
Suffering) and the four aspects of the Truth of Origin, which provoke dread (*udvega*), and on the other hand, the four aspects of the Path, for the Path is like a raft and should necessarily be abandoned.\(^{137}\)

The absorption that grasps these ten aspects is turned toward the passing beyond of things that are impermanent, suffering, arising, and the Path; it is then called *apraṇihita*, free from *praṇidhāna*, the will or desire for something.

On the contrary however, Nirvāṇa, under these four aspects and as the object of the absorption of the absence of intention, should not be abandoned; and the last two aspects of the Truth of Suffering, namely emptiness and non-self, the object of the absorption of emptiness, do not provoke dread, for these two aspects belong to Nirvāṇa as well as to conditioned things.

***

These three absorptions (*samādhi*) are of two types

25a. Pure or immaculate (*amala*).\(^{138}\)

They are pure (*suddhaka*) or immaculate, that is undefiled (*anāsrava*), accordingly as they are worldly or transworldly. Worldly, they exist in eleven spheres; transworldly, they exist in the sphere of the Path.\(^{139}\)

25b. Immaculate, they are the three gates to deliverance (*vimokṣamukha*).\(^{140}\)

When they are undefiled, they are also called “the gates to deliverance”, because they are effectively the gates leading to Nirvāṇa or deliverance (*mokṣa*). We have emptiness as a gate to deliverance (*sūnyatāvimokṣamukha*), the absence of characteristics
as a gate to deliverance (ānimittavimokṣamukha), and the absence of intention as a gate to deliverance (apraṇihitavimokṣamukha).

25c-d. There are also three other absorptions (samādhi) called "emptiness of emptiness", etc.¹⁴¹

They are also called the absorption of the emptiness of emptiness (śūnyatāśūnyatāsamādhi), the absorption of the absence of intention in the absence of intention (apraṇihitāprapraṇihitasamādhi), and the absorption of the absence of characteristics in the absence of characteristics (ānimittānimittasamādhi), because they have respectively, and in a manner that we shall explain, the absorptions of emptiness, the absence of intention, and the absence of characteristics for their objects.

26a-b. The first two refer to the Āsaikṣa under the aspects of emptiness and impermanence.

They have for their object the absorption of the Āsaikṣa; that is, they have respectively the absorption of emptiness and the absorption of the absence of intention as realized by an Arhat for their object (see viii.27a).

The absorption of the emptiness of emptiness considers the absorption of emptiness, which considers the dharmas as empty and non-self, as empty but not as non-self, because a view of non-self does not provoke the same dread as does a view of emptiness.¹⁴²

The absorption of the absence of intention in the absence of intention (apraṇihitāprapraṇihitasamādhi) has the absorption of the absence of intention of the Āsaikṣa for its object, an absorption which considers things under ten aspects, impermanence, suffering, etc. (viii.24c), by considering them as impermanent. It does not consider them as suffering, nor as cause (hetu), origin (samudaya), condition (pratyaya), or appearance (prabhava), for
the absorption of the absence of intention, being undefiled, is not suffering or cause; and although the absorption of the absence of intention is the Path, the absorption of the absence of intention in the absence of intention (apranihitāpranihitāsamādhi) no longer considers it as a Path, the truth (nyāya), the route, (pratipad), nor as pertaining to the truth (nairyanika), because the goal pursued by the ascetic is that of becoming disgusted with the absorption of the absence of intention.\textsuperscript{143}

26c-d. The absence of characteristics in the absence of characteristics has for its object extinction (ksayam) not attained through conscious effort, and considers it as tranquil (sānta).\textsuperscript{144}

This is to say that the absorption of the absence of characteristics in the absence of characteristics has for its object the extinction that is not attained through conscious effort (apratisamkhyanirodha) of the absorption of the absence of characteristics,\textsuperscript{145} and considers this extinction under the aspect of tranquility, thinking, "This extinction is tranquil".

It does not have for its object the extinction attained through conscious effort (pratisamkhyanirodha) of the absorption of the absence of characteristics, for this absorption is undefiled, and there is no extinction attained through conscious effort of anything that is pure.\textsuperscript{146}

And of the four aspects under which one can consider extinction attained through conscious effort, namely extinction (nirodha), tranquility (sānta), excellent (pranīta), and leaving (nihsaraṇa, 9vii.13a), the aspect of tranquility is the only one that is appropriate here.\textsuperscript{147} In fact, the characteristic of extinction belongs to the extinction not attained through conscious effort, as well as to the extinction brought about by impermanence;\textsuperscript{148} the extinction not attained through conscious effort is not excellent, for it is morally neutral (avyākta);\textsuperscript{149} it is not leaving, for it is not disconnection from the defilements.\textsuperscript{150}
The three absorptions (samādhi) are exclusively

27a. Defiled (lit: possessing the defilements, sāsrava).

Because they hate the Path [: they turn away from it, regarding it as empty, etc.] Now such absorptions are not pure, or undefiled dharmas.

Where do they arise?

27a-b. Among humans, (among the Unshakeable Ones).\textsuperscript{151}

They are cultivated only by humans of the Three Dvīpas, and not by the gods.

Among whom do they arise?

27b. Among the Unshakeable Ones.

Only among the Arhats of the Unshakeable (akopya, vi.56a) class, and among no other Arhats.

In what sphere (bhūmi) do these also exist?

27c. With the exception of the seven sāmantakas.

These absorptions arise ("have for their support") eleven
spheres, namely Kāmadhātu, Anāgamya, the eight basic absorptions (Dhyāna and Ārūpya absorptions, with the exception of the prefatory absorptions, sāmantakas) and dhyānāntara.

***

The Sūtra says that there are four cultivations of absorption (samādhibhāvanā): "There is a cultivation of the absorption that cultivates, practices, repeatedly cultivates, which has for its result the possession of happiness in this world," and the rest.¹⁵²

27c. The First good Dhyāna is the cultivation of the absorption that has for its result happiness; (the supernormal knowledge of the [divine] eye has sight for its result; the cultivation of good arisen from exercise has comprehension for its result; the absorption likened to a Vajra (= Vajropamasamādhi) of the Fourth Dhyāna has the extinction of the defilements for its result.)¹⁵³

1. The "First good Dhyāna" is the first pure (śuddhaka) or undefiled dhyāna. Through this dhyāna, the ascetic obtains "happiness in this world" (drṣṭadharmanasukhavihāra).¹⁵⁴ This holds for the other three Dhyānas as for the First Dhyāna.

   This absorption does not necessarily have for its result happiness beyond this world, for the ascetic who possesses it can fall from it, he can be reborn higher, or he can obtain Nirvāṇa: in these three cases he does not enjoy happiness in a future life.

28a. The supernormal knowledge (abhijñā) of the eye has sight for its result.

2. The second cultivation of the absorption has for its result the acquisition of the seeing of knowledge (jñānadarṣana).¹⁵⁵ This is the supernormal knowledge of the divine eye (divyacaksurabhijñā).¹⁵⁶
28b. The cultivation of good arisen from exercise has comprehension for its result.

3. The third cultivation of the absorption has for its result the attainment of the excellent forms of prajñā (prajñāprabheda). This is the samādhiḥbāvana of the superior qualities which arise from cultivation, that is, the qualities of the three spheres and pure, undefiled qualities. The samādhi that produces these qualities is called the samādhiḥbhāvana of these qualities.

28c. The absorption likened to a Vajra of the Fourth Dhyāna has the extinction of the defilements for its result.

4. In the Fourth Dhyāna there is produced an absorption that is called the cultivation "like a Vajra" (vajropama). This absorption destroys all of the defilements.

***

According to the School, the Blessed One, in setting forth this fourfold cultivation of the absorptions, teaches his own cultivation. How is this?

Because he places himself in the Fourth Dhyāna in order to realize the Vajropamasamādhi (vi.44b) which, as we have seen, can be realized in other states of absorption.

***

We have explained the absorptions. Let us explain the qualities (guna) that the ascetic realizes by being in the absorptions.
29a. The Immeasurables (*apramāṇas*) are four in number.\(^{162}\)

They are goodwill or friendship (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekṣa*). They are called the Immeasurables (*apramāṇas*) because they apply to an immeasurable number of beings, drawing after them an immeasurable merit, and producing immeasurable [retributive] results.\(^{163}\)

29b. Because they oppose ill-will, etc.,\(^{164}\)

In order the four Immeasurables oppose ill-will (*vyāpadā*), harm (*vibimśa*), dissatisfaction (*arati*), and sensual craving (*kāmarāga*) and hostility (*vyāpadā*). Goodwill causes persons who are given over to ill-will to abandon ill-will, and so on.

We have seen that the meditation on loathsome things (*asubhābhāvanā*, vi.9c) opposes sensual craving (*kāmarāga*); we learn here that equanimity also opposes it.

What is the difference between the meditation on loathsome things and equanimity in their opposition to sensual craving?

According to the *Vibhāṣā* (*TD* 27, p. 427c), there is reason to distinguish, with respect to sensual craving, craving for the visible things (*varṇa*) of Kāmadhātu, and sexual craving (which is craving for a certain tangible thing). Now meditation on loathsome things opposes the first of these two craving, whereas equanimity is opposed to the second.\(^{165}\)

We would say rather that meditation on loathsome things is opposed to sexual craving, (for this meditation eliminates all desire relating to color, shape, aspect, contact, or bearing); whereas equanimity is opposed to craving that has for its object father, mother, children, and parents.
What are the Immeasurables?

29c. Goodwill is the absence of hatred.

The nature of goodwill is the absence of malice.

29d. So too compassion.

This is also the case for compassion.

29e. Joy is satisfaction.

The nature of joy is satisfaction (saumanasya, ii.8a).

30a. Equanimity is the absence of desire.

The nature of equanimity is the absence of desire.

[But if equanimity is the absence of desire,] how can it oppose ill-will?

[The Vaibhāṣikas answer:] Because ill-will is provoked by desire.

We would say rather that equanimity is both the absence of desire and the absence of ill-will.166

What are the aspects or the objects of the Immeasurables?
30a-c. Their aspects are happiness, unhappiness, joy, and beings.

Happy beings \((\text{sukhita})\) are the object of goodwill. The ascetic produces with regard to them a mind having the following aspect, "Beings are happy!"\(^{167}\) and by this, he enters the meditation of goodwill \((\text{maitribhavanā})\).

Suffering beings \((\text{duḥkha})\) are the object of meditation. With regard to them the ascetic thinks, "Beings are unhappy!"\(^{168}\) and, by this, he enters the meditation of compassion \((\text{karuṇābhavanā})\).

Joyful beings \((\text{modani})\) are the object of joy. With regard to them, the ascetic thinks, "Beings are joyful!"\(^{169}\) and, by this, he enters into the meditation of joy \((\text{muditabhavanā})\).

Beings considered merely as beings and without making any distinction, are the object of equanimity. With regard to them the ascetic produces a mind having the following aspect, "Beings!" and, by this, by means of what can be called "impartiality" \((\text{mādhyasthya})\),\(^{170}\) he enters into the meditation of equanimity \((\text{upeksābhavanā})\).

Yet, to consider the beings who do not possess happiness as happy is an intentional view \((\text{adhimokṣa})\)\(^{171}\) not conforming to the facts, and is erroneous \((\text{viparīta})\).

No; it is not erroneous: 1) when the ascetic thinks, "Beings are happy!" the sense is "May beings be happy!" 2) there is no error in his intention, for 3) the ascetic indeed knows that he conceives an intentional view. And even though the ascetic himself is mistaken, what harm in there in that? Would you say that the Immeasurables are bad because they take beings as they are not? But they are the roots of good since they oppose ill-will, etc.
The Immeasurables have living beings for their object. More precisely

30d. They have the living beings of Kāmadhātu for their sphere.

In fact they oppose ill-will with respect to these beings.

However, according to the Sūtra, the ascetic produces the mind of goodwill with regard to one cardinal direction, with regard to two cardinal directions, . . . The Sūtra speaks of the physical world but it has in view the beings that are to be found in the physical world.

In what spheres does the ascetic produce the Immeasurables?


One cultivates joy (muditā) in only the first two Dhyānas, for joy is satisfaction (saumanasya) and satisfaction is absent in the other Dhyānas.

31b. The others in six spheres.

The other three Immeasurables exist in six spheres: in Anāgamyā, in dhyānāntara, and in the Four Dhyānas.

31c. Or, according to some, in five.

However, according to other masters, they are in only five spheres, with the exception of the Anāgamyā.

According to still other masters, they exist in ten spheres, by adding to the six 7) Kāmadhātu and 8-10) the three sāmantakas of
the higher Dhyānas. The number varies accordingly as one attributes the Immeasurables to a state of non-absorption (i.e., Kāmadhātu) as to a state of absorption, or to the prefatory stages (the sāmantakas) as to the principal Dhyānas.

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We have said that the Immeasurables oppose ill-will, etc. Does this mean that one could abandon the defilements by means of the Immeasurables?

31d. There is no abandoning through the Immeasurables.

For the Immeasurables have the basic Dhyānas for their sphere or places of their arising;\textsuperscript{173} because they include an arbitrary or voluntary (adhimukti-, ii.72) judgment and not an exact judgment; and because they have for their object living beings and not the general characteristics of things (dharmasāmānyalakṣaṇas, ii.72, English trans. p. 320).

However in their preparatory stage (prayoga), the Immeasurables disturb ill-will, etc., and the Immeasurables dispel (lit.: "render distant") ill-will already abandoned: this is why we have said above that the Immeasurables oppose ill-will, etc.

More specifically:\textsuperscript{174} goodwill, compassion, etc., cultivated in Kāmadhātu and in Anāgamya (viii.22c), the preliminary stages (iv., p. 706), only resemble goodwill, compassion, etc. in a state of absorption which will be cultivated in the basic Dhyānas, the stages of the Immeasurables properly so called. After having disturbed ill-will, etc., by means of preliminary goodwill, compassion, etc., the ascetic produces, in the absorption of Anāgamya, a path of abandoning (prabhānaṃmārga)—independent of goodwill, compassion, etc.,—by which he abandons the defilements. Once the defilements are abandoned, the ascetic obtains detachment from Kāmadhātu, enters the basic Dhyāna, and then obtains the
Four Immeasurables of the sphere of the basic Dhyāna. The defilements are thus dispelled, and made distant, and the ascetic will henceforth be invincible, even when he encounters powerful causes of defilement.

How does the beginner (ādikārmika) cultivate goodwill?

He calls to mind the happiness that he himself has experienced; he hears one speak of the happiness experienced by others, by the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas, the Śrāvakas, and the Pratyekabuddhas. He forms the vow that all beings shall obtain this happiness.

When his defilements are too strong, the ascetic is not capable of carrying out his intention impartially: he should then divide all beings into three categories, friends, persons to whom he is indifferent, and enemies. The first category is also divided into three: good friends, medium friends, and lesser friends; and in the same way the third (=enemies). The category of persons to whom he is indifferent is not so subdivided: thus there are altogether seven groups. Having made this division, the ascetic first forms the vow of happiness with regard to his good friends; he then follows this with a vow of happiness with regard to the medium friends and lesser friends. Finally the ascetic no longer distinguishes the three categories of friends; he then forms the same vow with regard to persons to whom he is indifferent and with regard to his enemies. Through the force of all these, he produces, with regard to his greatest enemies, the same vow of happiness as with regards his dearest friends.

When this meditation or cultivation of the vow of happiness, sevenfold and impartial, is achieved, the ascetic then progressively enlarges the domain of this vow, embracing his town, his country, one cardinal direction, and then all the universe. When all beings, without exception, are embraced in his infinite mind of goodwill, the meditation of goodwill is achieved.

Those who take pleasure in the qualities of others easily and rapidly cultivate goodwill, but not so those who take pleasure in
discovering the faults of others. For even persons who have cut off their roots of good (iv.79) are not without their good qualities, and one can even find faults among the Pratyekabuddhas themselves: the consequences of the ancient good deeds of the former, and the bad deeds of the latter, are visible in their bodies, etc.

So too one should understand the meditation or cultivation of compassion and joy. One sees beings falling into the ocean of suffering: one forms the vow (adhimucyate): "May they be delivered from suffering! May they enter into joy." In this way one exercises himself in compassion and joy. One who cultivates equanimity takes as his point of departure the category of persons to whom he is indifferent, for the aspect of equanimity is, as we have seen, merely "Beings!"

***

In what sphere of rebirth does one cultivate the Immeasurables?

31e. One produces them among humans.

Only humans can cultivate the Immeasurables and not beings in any of the other spheres of rebirth.

***

When a person possesses one Immeasurable, does he necessarily possess all of the others?

He does not necessarily possess them all.

31f. He necessarily possesses three.
The person who has produced the Third Dhyāna or the Fourth Dhyāna cannot possess joy, since satisfaction is absent in these Dhyānas. When one possesses one Immeasurable, one always possesses three.

***

What are the Deliverances (vimokṣa)?

32a. The Deliverances are eight in number. 177

According to the Sūtra: 178 “One endowed with physical matter sees physical matter” (ṛūpi rūpāṇi paśyati): 179 this is the First Deliverance; 2) not having the idea of internal visible things, he sees external visible things: this is the Second Deliverance; 3) bringing forth agreeable Deliverance, he dwells in this absorption: this is the Third Deliverance (see below, note 196).

The Fourth to the Seventh Deliverances are the four absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu (Ākāśāntyāyatana, etc.). The Eighth Deliverance is the absorption of the extinction of ideas and sensations (samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti).

32a-b. The first two are meditations on loathsome things; (in two Dhyānas). 180

The first two Deliverances are, by their nature, meditations on loathsome things (vi.9), for they have for their aspect the idea of a corpse turning blue, etc. [The ascetic considers internal and external visible things, his body or external bodies, under the aspects of a corpse turning blue, etc.] Consequently the rules that concern the first two Deliverances are the same as for the meditations on loathsome things.
32b. They are in two Dhyānas.

They are cultivated only in the first two Dhyānas; when they are cultivated in the First Dhyāna, they oppose attachment to the visible things (varṇarāga) of Kāmadhātu; cultivated in the Second Dhyāna, they oppose attachment to the visible things of the First Dhyāna. [In the Second Dhyāna there is no attachment to visible things that should be opposed in the Third Dhyāna, viii, p. 1232, 1241,]

32c. The Third in the last Dhyāna.

The Third Deliverance can only be cultivated in the Fourth Dhyāna.

32d. It is the absence of desire.

It is by nature the root of good absence of desire, not a meditation on loathsome things; in fact it takes for its object a thing that it considers as good: it therefore has the aspect of something good.

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These three Deliverances, with the dharmas that are associated with them, are the five skandhas. As for the Deliverances of Ārūpyadhātu:

32d. They are good Ārūyas and absorption.

The Third to the Seventh Deliverances are the good ārūyas,
that is, they are pure or undefiled (viii.5), and they pertain to absorption (samahita), but not the ārūpya that is produced at the end of life\textsuperscript{182} [viii.16c, note 103].

According to others, the mind and mental states produced by retribution among beings born in Ārūpyadhātu are not concentrated.

The name of "Deliverance" is also given to the Path of Deliverance (Vimuktimārga) of the prefatory stages of the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu (ārūpyasāmantakasamāpatti, viii.22), but not to the Irresistable Path (the path of abandoning, Ānantaryamārga) of these same prefatory stages: for these have for their object the lower sphere that they abandon, and the Deliverances receive their name from the fact that they turn away from the lower sphere.\textsuperscript{183}

33a. The absorption of extinction (niruddhasamāpatti).

The Absorption of Extinction, or more fully the absorption of the extinction of ideas and sensations (samjñāveditaniruddhasamāpatti) is the Eighth Deliverance. We have already mentioned it.\textsuperscript{184} It is called "Deliverance" because it turns away from ideas (samjñā) and sensations (vedita = vedanā); or rather because it turns away from all conditioned things.\textsuperscript{185}

According to others, the Eight Deliverances\textsuperscript{186} are called deliverances because they deliver one from the obstacles to absorption.\textsuperscript{187}

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The absorption of extinction is realized

33b. Immediately after a subtle-subtle mind.\textsuperscript{188}
A mind in Bhavāgra (=Naivasamjñānāsāmjñāyatana), which belongs to the ascetic who is in a position to realize the absorption of extinction, is subtle in comparison with any mind associated with ideas (samjñā). "Subtle-subtle" (sūkṣmasūkṣma) signifies a mind more subtle, but yet one which enters the absorption of extinction [that is to say, "upon which there immediately succeeds ... "].

33c-d. Going out into a pure mind of the sphere of the same absorption, or into a lower Āryan mind.

The absorption of extinction comes to an end when there appears either a pure mind (viii.5) of the sphere of Bhavāgra, the Fourth Ārūpya—the sphere to which the absorption of extinction belongs—or an Āryan, that is, an undefiled mind of the sphere of the Third Ārūpya. Then there is entry into the absorption of extinction by a defiled mind, and going out by a defiled or undefiled mind.

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What is the object of the Deliverances?

34a. The first ones have for their object the visible things of Kāmadhātu.

The first three Deliverances have for their object the physical matter (rūpāyatana) of Kāmadhātu, unpleasant physical matter in the first two, pleasant physical matter in the Third.

34b. As for those that are non-material, all that which belongs to the Knowledge, the Suffering of their sphere and of a higher sphere, etc.
The Deliverances of Ārūpyadhātu have for their object the Suffering of their sphere and a higher sphere, the cause and the extinction of this Suffering, the totality of Non-dual Knowledge (anvayajñāna), the extinction not attained through conscious effort (apratisamkhyānirodha) and space (ākāśa).

***

We have seen (32a-c) that the first two Deliverances belong to the first two Dhyānas, that the Third Deliverance belongs to the Fourth Dhyāna. Why is there no Deliverance in the Third Dhyāna?

Since body consciousness is absent in the Second Dhyāna, there is no craving for the visible things of this Dhyāna [which should be opposed in the Third Dhyāna], because the Third Dhyāna is "agitated by its excellent pleasures".

But if there is no craving for visible things in the Third Dhyāna, what purpose does the ascetic pursue in producing the Third Deliverance [which is a meditation on an agreeable physical object]?

The ascetic should gladden his mind which the meditation on loathsome things has depressed; or rather he should take into consideration his achievement or his lack of achievement. He asks himself if the first two Deliverances have been achieved or not. If, in his contemplation on an agreeable object (the Third Deliverance), defilements do not arise, then the first two Deliverances have been achieved. In fact the ascetic cultivates the Deliverances, the Dominent Āyatanas, etc., with a twofold purpose: 1) to remove, to render more distant, the defilements; and 2) to obtain mastery in absorption. This mastery has for its result the production of the qualities, such as Absence of Contention (Araṇā), etc., and the production of the supernormal powers (rddhi) of the Āryans: the supernormal power by which a saint
transforms objects or causes them to last, by which he gives up his life, etc.\textsuperscript{195}

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Why does the Sûtra use the expression "having experienced [through the body] ([kāyena] sāksātkrtvā) in the definition of only the Third and the Eighth Deliverances?\textsuperscript{196}

It is because of their excellence and because they are found to exist in the final sphere of the two Dhātus.\textsuperscript{197}

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35a. The Dominant Āyatanas (abhībhūyatanas) are eight in number.\textsuperscript{198}

1. There is the idea of internal physical matter,\textsuperscript{199} and there is the seeing of a small amount of external attractive and unattractive physical matter: [at this time there is the thought, "I have succeeded in (abhībhūya) in knowing all of the rūpas, I have succeeded in seeing all of the rūpas.\textsuperscript{200} This is the First Dominant Āyatana.] 2. There is the idea of internal physical matter, and there is the seeing of an unlimited amount of external physical matter. 3. There is an absence of any idea of internal physical matter, but there is the seeing of a small amount of external physical matter. 4. There is an absence of any idea of internal physical matter, but there is the seeing of a large amount of external physical matter. These are the first four Dominant Āyatanas.

5-8. There is an absence of any idea of physical matter, but there is the seeing of external blue, yellow, red, and white. These make a total of eight.

35b. Two are like the First Deliverance.
The first two Dominant Āyatanas are similar to the First Deliverance.

35c. The following two are like the Second.

The Third and the Fourth Dominant Āyatanas are like the Second Deliverance.

35d. And the last four are like the Third Deliverance.

And the last four are like the Third Deliverance.

What is the difference between the Deliverances and the Dominant Āyatanas?

Through the Deliverances, one is only "delivered", but through the Dominant Āyatanas, one attains domination of their object. This domination includes the view of the object as one desires and the absence of any defilement provoked by the object.\(^{201}\)

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36a. There are ten All-Encompassing Āyatanas (\(krtsnāyatanas\)).\(^{202}\)

They are called "all-encompassing" (\(krtsna\)) because they embrace their object in its totality and exclusively.\(^{203}\)

They are ten in number: this is the totality of earth, water, fire, and wind; blue, yellow, red, and white; plus the uninterrupted āyatanas (\(ānantyāyatanas\)) of space and consciousness (the First and the Second Absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu).

36b. Eight are the absence of desire.
The first eight are, by nature, the root of good which is absence of desire: (with their concomitant dharmas, they are the five skandhas).

36c. They belong to the last Dhyāna.

They are realized by an ascetic in the Fourth Dhyāna.

36d. They have Kāmadravya for their object.

They belong to the last Dhyāna.

They are realized by an ascetic in the Fourth Dhyāna.

36e. They have the four skandhas of their sphere for their object.

Their objects are the four skandhas of the sphere to which they belong (the First and Second absorptions of Āruṇyadhātu).

36f. Two are pure ārūpya.

The last two are pure absorptions of Āruṇyadhātu.

The Eight Dominant Āyatanas have the Eight Deliverances for their “entry” and the Ten All-Encompassing Āyatanas have the
Eight Dominant Āyatanas for their entry: the following, in fact, are superior to the preceding ones.

All these qualities can have the mental series of a Prthagjana or the mental series of an Āryan for their support, with the exception of the Deliverance of Extinction (nīrodhavimokṣa) which can only be produced by Āryans.

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(Concerning the acquisition of these qualities and the persons who can produce them:)

37a. Extinction has been explained.

All of the types of the Deliverance of Extinction have been previously mentioned.

37b. The others are obtained either through detachment or through cultivation.

The qualities other than the Deliverance of Extinction are obtained either through detachment (vairāgya) or through cultivation (prayoga) accordingly as they have been, or have not been, habitually cultivated.

37d-c. The qualities of Ārūpyadhātu are obtained by beings of the Three Dhātus; the others, only by humans.

The Deliverances and the All-Encompassing Āyatanas of Ārūpyadhātu are cultivated by beings born in any of the Three Dhātus. But only humans can cultivate the other absorptions,—the three Deliverances, the Eight Dominant Āyatanas, and eight
All-Encompassing Ayatanas,—because these absorptions arise through the power of the Teaching.

If this is the case, how can beings born in the spheres (bhūmi) of Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu realize the dhyāna and ārūpya absorptions higher than the spheres in which they are born?

They can do this be reason of the power of cause, of actions (karma), and the nature of things (dharmatā).

38a-b. In two spheres, it is through the power of cause and of action (karma) that one produces the absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu.²⁰⁵

In Rūpadhātu and in the lower spheres of Ārūpyadhātu, the higher absorptions of Ārūpyadhātu arise through the power of cause,²⁰⁶ when they have been, in the course of a previous existence, closely and intensively cultivated.²⁰⁷ They also arise through the power of action (karma), that is to say, by reason of the imminent retribution of a previous action of the category "to be retributed later," including a sphere of retribution higher than that (Rūpadhātu or the lower spheres of Ārūpyadhātu) in which one is born. This is because someone who is not detached from a lower sphere cannot be reborn in a higher sphere.²⁰⁸

38c-d. In Rūpadhātu, it is through these two powers, and also by reason of the nature of things, that one produces the dhyānas.

Beings born in a lower stage of Rūpadhātu produce dhyānas higher than the stages in which they have been born because of the two powers described above. Also, at the period at the end of the world,²⁰⁹ they are produced through the force of dharmatā.²¹⁰ In this period, all the beings of lower spheres produce higher dhyānas, for the efficacy of good dharmas becomes fully developed.²¹¹
How long will the Good Law (saddharma) of the Blessed One last, during which time these different types of dharmas can be clearly known and seen?

39a-b. The nature of the Good Law of the Master is twofold, āgama and adhigama.

Āgama ("the traditions") is the teaching, the Sūtra, the Vinaya and the Abhidharma. Adhigama ("holiness" or understanding) are the dharmas aiding Bodhi (the bodhipāksikadharmas, vi.67b, cultivated by the Āryans of the Three Vehicles, and the results of the religious life, vi.51, obtained through the Three Vehicles.) Such is the Good Law, twofold in its nature.

39c-d. Those who preach it and who cultivate it support it.

Those who preach the Good Law, the Sūtras, etc., support the Good Law which is āgama. Those who cultivate or who realize the Good Law, the dharmas aiding Bodhi, etc., support the Good Law which is adhigama. As long as such persons exist in the world, the Good Law will last.

It is said (in the Samyuktāgama, TD 2, p. 177b19) that the Good Law will last one thousand years after the Parinirvāṇa.

This number refers to the adhigama; but according to others, the āgama will last longer.
This present treatise is based on the treatises of the Abhidharma [and includes the sense of the Abhidharma, i.2c]. [There are many ways of explaining the Abhidharma:] according to which interpretation is the Abhidharma explained in this treatise?  

40. The Abhidharma that is established through the interpretation of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmir is, in its totality, what I have explained. That some ideas, poorly grasped, are reproduced here is our fault, for only the Munis are authoritative (pramāṇa) in the interpretation of the Good Law.

For the most part, this Abhidharma, which has been spoken by me, is the Abhidharma as established by the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmir. That which, herein, has been poorly grasped, is my fault: for the Buddhas and the sons of the Buddhas alone are the authority for the interpretation of the Good Law.

41. The Master, the eye of the world, is closed; the witnesses, for the most part, have perished; the Law is put into confusion by persons who have not seen the Truth; and by bad sophists, independent, from whom nothing is gained.

42. For he who knows for himself has departed on the Supreme Path, as well as the supports of the Law of the one who knows for himself: the world no longer has a Protector. The defilements, which destroy spiritual qualities, now have full liberty.

43. Seeing that the Law of the Muni is in its last breath, and that it is the hour of the forces of defilements, those who desire liberation should be diligent.

This concludes the Eighth Chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhasyam, entitled "Instruction in the Absorptions."
1. The Kārikā has samāpattiḥ šubhaikāgryam; but the Sūtra speaks of samādhi. On the traditional summary of Chapter VIII and of samāpatti-samādhi, see below viii.23 note 128.

2. Paramārtha translates: "dhyāna produced through arising, dhyāna produced through concentration."

3. Kośa, iii.2c, vi.38a-b, 43 a-b, ii.41d. There are three (or two) stages in the heaven of the First Dhyāna, etc. On the "dhyāna existences," see viii.12, 14a, 16c, 19c.

4. Pāli: kusalacittekaggatā (Visuddhimagga, 84; see index); Majjhima, i.301, Samyutta, v.21, Dhammasaṅgani, 11 (cittassekaggatā) (The translator mentions Yogāvacara’s Manual, p. xxvi); Mrs Rhys Davis, Psychology, 1914, 104 (references to the canonical texts). samādhi=adhicitta, vi, p. 978; part of the Path, part of Bodhi, vi. 54d, 70; ādhipāda, vi.69c-d, part of the Śaikṣa and Āśaikṣa, vi.75.

Bodhisattvavānīm, fol. 82b, quotes viii. 27c-28.

On samādhi, a very "scholastic" text in Majjhima, i.301.

The samādhisitkandha embraces three parts of the Path, samyagvyāyāma, samyaksmrti, and samyaksamādhi it then follows that one distinguishes: 1. samādhi (=citassatīkaggatā); 2. the nimittas of the samādhi which are the samrtyupasthamas; 3. the pariskaras of the samādhi which are the samyakpradhānas; and 4. the cultivation (bhāvanā) of the samādhi which is the cultivation of the samādhi, the pradhānas, and the samṛtyupasthānas ["cultivation" is understood in the sense of pariśuddhi, pariśuddhi].

5. Whoever enters into dhyāna, that is to say whoever possesses the absorption called dhyāna, necessarily also possesses the mental states and the mind (the four skandhas), the "discipline of dhyāna" (iv. 2), which is a rūpa.

6. Ekālambanatā cittanām is the definition of the Abhidharma; but one should understand cittacittanām: "The fact that minds and the mental states . . ."


8. In the same way that the Vaiśeṣika maintains that a piece of cloth is white śuklagunayogā, through conjunction with the quality of white.

9. All minds contain samādhi, but a mind associated (samprayuktā) with a weak samādhi is not concentrated (ekāgra).

10. According to the Vyākhyā, the two definitions in the same Sūtra: adhicittam śikṣa katama / catvāri dhyānāni. On the three śikṣās, see Āṅguttara, i.235; ii.194, Kośa, vi.43c, p. The same way that adhisīlām śikṣā is śita, so too adhiprajñām śikṣā is prajñā, and adhicittam śikṣā is simply citta. Now the dhyānas are adhicittam śikṣa, and are thus citta; the dhyānas, moreover, are samādhi, thus samādhi is citta.

In the same way that śikapariśuddhi is śīla, dṛṣṭipariśuddhi is dṛṣṭi, and vimuktipariśuddhi is vimukti. (See Kośa, vi. 76c, p. 1035)

11. The Sarvāstivādin answers.

12. Māhāvyutpatti, 245, 1052 1055, upanidhātavya, nidhyāyati. Kośa, i.41c, where the Vyākhyā explains: samāpitaṃ . . . viṣayopanidhānapāvaśvam niścayākaraṇaṃ.

13. This formula figures notably in the Sūtra of the Five Vimuktyayatanas quoted in Vyākhyā ad i.27 (Māhāvyutpatti, 81, Dīgha, iii.241, Āṅguttara, iii.21); Samyutta, iii.13: samāhito bhikkhave bhikkhuṃ yathābhūtāṃ pajaññati; ii.31 samāhāpanisam yathābhūtāṃ nāpādassanam, etc. And elsewhere, Nettippakarana, 66, Āṅguttara, v.3, Visuddhimagga, 371, etc.

According to all these texts, samādhi is necessary for the exact knowledge necessary for salvation. On this point, see Compendium, 55, 75; Kośa, vi. Foreword p., viii.22d.
14. According to Hsüan-tsang and the glosses of Saeki. According to Paramārtha: “Some other masters say that ting (= samādhi) is dhyāna. What is the meaning of dhyāna? Through “ting” one obtains knowing, seeing, so it is called dhyāna. Why? Because the mind that obtains ting (= the samādhi mind] truly knows and sees. The word dhyāna signifies ssus 思 (cintā, cetanā); liang 量 (to measure). Ssu is prajñā. Such is the Siddhānta.”

15. As an advance chariot is pulled by two mares bound by a yoke, so dhyāna is bound by samatha and vipāsyanā. In the Ārūpyas, calm is great, intellection small; the opposite in Anāgāmya (viii.22); in the dhyānas, there is equilibrium.

Samatha = samādhi = absorption; vipāsyanā = prajñā.

The editors of the Pāli Text Society (against several manuscripts) read yuganandha (Patisambhidd, ii.92 and foll.; Visuddhimagga, 149): “Some cultivate vipassana preceded by samatha;... some cultivate samatha preceded by vipassana... some cultivate samatha and vipassana bound together (samathavipassanam yuganandham bhāveti).” “The dharmas bound together and which are called samādhi and prajñā do not go beyond one another... (samadhipaññāsanikhatā yuganandhadhamā aññamaññānam anativattamānā... ) Bodhicaryāvatāra, viii.4, Śīkṣāsamuccaya, 119, Sātrābhidhāra, xiv.9. Compendium, 55, 75.

In Tantrism, yuganaddhaka or yuganaddhakrama is the non-distinction of samāsāra and nirvāṇa, of grābaka and grāhya, etc. (Pañcakrama, p. 46-48).

16. On defiled dhyāna, the story of the monk who believes himself to be a Srotaāpanna of the First Dhyāna, an Arhat in the Fourth, but who in fact remains subject to desire, Przyluski, Açoka, 390.


17. The meaning of vitarka, vicāra, priti, and sukha, is explained below.

In Niddesa, p. 373, an interesting essay on the classification of the dhyānas.

18. There is a difficulty. How does the author, by saying that the First Dhyāna is vicārapritisukhavat, say implicitly that this Dhyāna also “contains vitarka”? In fact, dhyānāntara “contains vicāra” and “contains vitarka.” The Vyākhyā explains: yathā dhyānāntare vicāra na pritisukhavān ity avitarko na pritisukhavān ity vicāraḥ / vicārapritisukhavat ime pritisukhavatā vicārāṇa pritisukhena ca samprayuktam prathamaṃ dhyānam ity arthāb.

Vasubandhu does not say vitarkapritisukhavat, because he wishes to say that the other Dhyānas lose, in this order, the parts indicated. If one were to define the Second Dhyāna as without vitarka, then dhyānāntara would be confused with the Second Dhyāna.

19. On the Ārūpyas, see Majjhima, i.2, 164, 410, ii.261 (where the first two are ignored), Visuddhimagga, III. 336-340; Comm. on the Digha, Dialogues, iii. p. 273; akāsānañcāyatana is a dhyāna which has the infinity of space for its object; references to the notes of Rhys Davids, ibid. p. 216.

20. Paramārtha translates: “Separation-sphere-lower arises.” Hsüan-tsang: “Separation lower sphere arisen, from whence the division into four.” Pu-küang (TD 41, p. 418b16) explains, “It is fourfold because it arises from separation from arising in a lower sphere.” Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 788c3) says, “It is fourfold by reason of separation from arising in a lower sphere”: “separation from arising” signifies “separation from defiled dharmas,” or rather “to separate oneself and to arise.” One arises above because one separates oneself from what is below.

21. Kośa iii.3 explains how Ārūpyadhāru, which does not include any places, or stages, is still fourfold from the point of view of the mode of existence of the gods who arise there: Ārūpyadhātur asthāna upapattya catuvīdhab. The Abhisamayalamkārāloka (ad Aṣṭasāhasrikā 153, 18), after having quoted this definition, adds a line (borrowed from which Śāstra?): dhyānād urdhvam sacamsabhāno rūpesadbhavo 'tha vā (Sic MSS): "Or rather,
placed above the world of the dhyanas (= Rūpadhātu), it includes shape, for there exists there a small amount of rūpa.” Buddhist cosmology recognizes some heavens superimposed on Āruṇyadhātu in which there are mansions (kung 宮); see for example Hastings’ Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, article “Cosmology.”

Kathāvaththu, viii.8, xvi.9. The Andhakas maintain that some subtle matter exists in Āruṇyadhātu (by reason of the text = vijñānapratyayayanāmarūpam, see above p. 1222). See Vasumitra and Bhavaya.

The Mahāsāṃghikas and Mahiśasakas,—and the Vibhāṣa adds the Vibhajyāvādins (see below)—admit the existence of rūpa.

Notes of the Japanese editor—Commentary on the Samayabheda: The six types of consciousness (saḍ viññānakāyāh) exist in Rūpadhātu and Āruṇyadhātu. But, if rūpa exists in Āruṇyadhātu, why is it called Āruṇyadhātu? Because subtle rūpa exists there, but not gross rūpa.

Vibhāṣa, (TD 27, p. 431b6): Some say that rūpa exists in Āruṇyadhātu, as do the Vibhajyāvādins ... The Mahāsāṃghikas think that in Āruṇyadhātu there is a rūpa which is the result of action.

The Sāriputrabhūdharmacāya says that, in Āruṇyadhātu, there is a rūpa, namely the rūpa that forms part of the dharmāyatanas (Kośa, iv. English trans. p. 561).

The Mahāyāna says that in Āruṇyadhātu there is a rūpa which is the result of samādhi. See Mahādharmanabherisūtra (TD 9, p. 293c10) and the Mahāyāna Parinirvāna sūtra (TD 12, p. 415a17, a25): “The saints of the Two Vehicles cannot know how the gods of Naivasaṃjñānāsahajāyatanas are . . . Only the Buddha knows of those that have life (ayus, shou-ming 壽命 ) among the Asamjñīn gods; the same for beings in Naivasaṃjñānāsahajāyatanas.”

22. Vyākyā: “According to others, we should understand: By virtue of the text: sarvaśo rūpasamjñānām samatikramat, it is proved that there is no longer any rūpa in āruṇyasyamāpatti.” The Japanese editor understands: “Because it is denied that there is anāsrava samvara in this samāpatti.”

23. See iii.14a. “Transparent” poorly renders the sense of the word accha. This refers to a rūpa which can pass through other rūpas, a material resembling ether.”

24. For “the absorption existences” (upapatti), like the “absorptions” (samāpatti), become better and better.

25. See ii.14, iii.3.


Mahākoṭṭhita converses with Sāriputta on this subject, Majjhima, i.206 (See Kośa, ii.45, English trans. p. 233).

27. But the two Chinese versions, here and below, read: nāmarūpa-vijñānayor, a reading confirmed by the Pāli sources.

However the Vyākyā quotes the Sūtra: tadyathāyuṣman sāruputra dve naḍakalāpyāv akāśa uccritre syātām / teṇyonyanisrīte / anyonyam niśrītya tiṣṭheyātām / tatra kaścid ekām aparṇya / dvitiyā nipatet / dvitiyām aparṇya ekā nipatet / evam āyuṣman sāruputra nāma ca rūpaṃ cān anyonyam isrīsam anyonyam niśrītya tiṣṭhāti . . . Same comparison in Samyutta, ii.114; but nāmarūpa and viññāna, not rūpa and nāman.

28. Argument of the Vibhajyāvādins according to the Vibhāṣa, see above, note 21.


30. Vyākyā. The stanza: āyuḥ uṣmāṭha viññānam . . . “When life, heat and viññāna leave the body, it remains, deserted, insensible, like a piece of wood” (ii.45a), proves that the Sūtra refers only to Kāmadhātu, for 1. there is no physical body in Āruṇyadhātu; 2. in Rūpadhātu,
the body exists, but "does not continue after death": rūpabhātu tu yādi api kāyōṣti tatra
kāyanidbānam [according to iii.9].

31. The formula for those beings who spontaneously arise (upādūkas) is: vijñānapratyayāṁ
sādāyatanaṁ, for nāmarūpa are five skandhas which have not yet taken up the state of
sādāyatana (anispannāsādāyatanaśvastha); now sādāyatana exists from the very begining of
upāpādūka beings, Kośa, i.14, p. 175.

32. This results from the Sūtra of which we have the Pāli edition in Dīgha ii.63: vijñānam
ced ānanda mātuh kuhām navakṛmed api nu tan nāmarūpaṁ kalalatvā yaṁmārochet / no
bhadanta / vijñānam ced ānandaavakṛmya kṣipram evāpakṛmed api nu tan nāmarūpaṁ
iṣṭhatvā yā prajñāyeta / no bhadanta / vijñānam ced ānanda dāharasya kumārasya
kumārikāyā va uccbidyeta vmaṣyen na bhaved api nu tan nāmarūpaṁ vyādhim vipulantām
āpadyeta / no bhadanta.

33. The Udāyisūtra (Kośa, ii. 44d, English trans. p. 229) says: bhedāc ca kāyāyatikramya
devān kavadiśkarāhārābhakṣān anyatamasmin divye manomayakāya upapadyate.
Aṅguttara, iii.192, compare Dīgha, i.34, 186.

34. Prītyāhāravanāt; iii.98.

35. Ye te sāntavimokṣā atikramyā rūpāṇy ārūpāḥ . . . viii.32.

36. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 581b19.

37. Compare Udāna, iii.10. Bhava defined i.8c.

38. Vībhāṣā, TD 27, p. 431b15: Objection of the Vībhajyavādins: If there is absolutely no
rūpa or physical matter in Ārūpyadhātu, then the rūpa of beings who die in Kāmadhātu and
Rūpadhātu and who are reborn in Ārūpyadhātu, and who, later, die in Ārūpyadhātu and are
reborn below, will have been cut off for 20,000, 40,000, and 80,000 kalpas. How is their
rūpa produced anew? If, as you suppose, their rūpa, having been cut off, abandoned (prabhima),
is produced anew, what would prevent us from saying that the saṁskāras, even though cut off
and abandoned upon the obtaining of Nirvāṇa, would reappear later? In order to avoid this
problem, one should admit that rūpa exists in Ārūpyadhātu.

39. Paramārtha: "Because it is perfumed (vāsita) by a former cause which should ripen in
rūpa, the mind has the efficacy to now produce rūpa."

It indeed appears that the expression vāsanā (Kośa, iv.27d, p. 594, vii.28c, p. 1137, 30c,
32d) is foreign to the Sarvāstivāda. However this may be, Saṁghabhadra does not use it.

Saṁghabhadra, in his Prakaraṇaśāsana (TD 29, p 964b26) says, "What is the meaning of
the expression ārūpya? It means that there is no rūpa there. When one dies [in
Ārūpyadhātu] and is born below, the rūpa arises from citta. We maintain that, in this world,
material and non-material (rūpin, arūpin) dharmas are produced in fact in reciprocal
dependence: from the change of the mind there arises the diversity of rūpa; when the
material organs are modified, the vijñāna is likewise different. Thus, when a being dying in
Ārūpyadhātu arises below, the series of his mind (cittasantāti) is found to be favorable to
the production of rūpa, and, by its force, the rūpa of a lower existence if favorable to this
arising. However it is not permissible to say that rūpa arises solely from the mind. It also
exists by reason of the series-of-mind-accompanied-by-rūpa of a former existence: the rūpa,
destroyed for a long time, is its own seed. We maintain in fact that sabhāgabetus is at one and
the same time past and present (ii.52a, p. 262). For the Arhats who have already attained Nirvāṇa have cut off without residue the series of the skandhas; there does not remain any cause which could produce the arising of new skandhas: there is no case to which one could apply the example of a being who dies in Arūpyadhātu [and takes up a new rūpa]. (See the argument of the Vībhajyavādins, note 38).

In his Nyāyānusāra (TD 29, p. 757c17), Saṁghabhadra says, "The āgamas quoted by our adversary do not prove that rūpa exists in Arūpyadhātu. His argument from reason has no value, for, even though there is no rūpa in Arūpyadhātu, the rūpa of a being of Arūpadhātu who has just died and is about to be reborn below comes from the mind. We state that in this world . . .

40. iii.3c-d: nīkāyaṁ jīvitaṁ cātra niśritaṁ cittasaṁstātibh; see ii, 41, 45.

41. Vyākhyā: prayogakāla ākāśadīny ākambanāṇi. Hsuan-tsang: The ascetic, in his preparatory exercise, thinks "Space is infinite," "The sixfold vijnāna is infinite," "There is nothing."

On the ārupyas, and how one obtains them, see Majjhima, i.164, Sutta 121, Visuddhimagga, 326 and following.

Vībbhāṣā (TD 27, p. 432c23): "It is not by reason of its nature or by reason of its object, but by reason of its prayoga that ākāśānanyanta receives its name. The beginner (ādikārmika) considers the characteristic of emptiness of the top of a wall, of a tree, of a house; when he has 'grasped' this characteristic of infinite ākāśa." In the ārupyas, the ascetic considers anitya, pratītya, etc.

Vasumitra explains how, in ākīnīcanyā (preparatory stage), the notion of subject and object is dispelled; see above Chap. VII note 323.

42. This is a question as to whether or not there is samjñā in the fourth ārupya, the sphere of "non-samjñā and neither non-samjñā." Aṅguttara, iv.426; Kathāvatthu, xiii.12; Vasumitra and Bhavya.

The "absorption of the cessation of samjñā and vedanā" can be obtained only by an ascetic who has entered into this ārupya (ii.44d, English trans. p. 229 and iii.6c). From this fact, one can conclude that samjñā exists there. (On the subtle-subtle mind, viii. 33b).

43. Compare Majjhima, i.435, ii.230; Aṅguttara, iv.422; Visuddhimagga, 335. This refers to the samjñās of the lower absorptions. In fact one enters into the fourth ārupya by being disgusted with it, by a meditation practiced in the sāmantaka of the third ārupya.

44. That is to say "a cause of stupidity" (sammohakāraṇa).

45. kasmāt tu tais tad evam grhyate, that is to say, according to the Vyākyā: tair iti tattamāpattibhibhā tad iti naivasamjñānaśamjñāyatanam evam grhyata iti naiva samjñā nāsamjñāti grhyata ity arthab /

46. Hsuan-tsang: The maulasamāpattis, dhyānas and ārupyas, explained above are eight in number . . .

Paramārtha: The maulasamāpattis, considered as real dharmas (or dravyas), are solely eight dravyas: four rūpasamāpattis and four ārupyasamāpattis.

Vyākhyā: samāpattidravyāni maulanīti sākhāte śesām nopanyayanta ity abhiṣpryāh. The Śakhās or "branches" are the sāmantakas (viii. 22a) and dhyānāntara, or asamjñāsamāpattis and nirodhasamāpattis.

47. Here we should give up translating anāsrava by "pure," a translation justified elsewhere by the synonym amala, nirmala.

Vībbhāṣā, TD 27, p. 821c17. Anāsrava samāpatti is pure in the proper sense of the word; why not call it siddhāka? . . . Some say: The name is established by reason of the difference of meaning. The samāpatti which is at one and the same time good (kusaka) and
possessing-ásravas (sāsrava, laukika), is the first contradiction of the defiled dharmas: it is called siddha because the sense of purity is dominant in it. The sense of anāsrava is dominant in the Noble Path.

Suddhāka means kuśala sāsrava; anāsrava is the Path. But the kuśala sāsrava absorption is samala, sakaśāya, saviśa, sakāṇṭaka, sāsrava, and sadoṣa: how can one call it suddhāka? Now it is called thus, even though it is not absolutely pure, because it is partially so, because it is not mixed with kleśa; because it opposes the kleśas; because it favors the anāsrava absorption which is pure in the true sense of the word; because it is favorable (anukūla) to the Path; and because it is the escort of the anāsravas.

48. That is to say, "one cannot, having entered into this eighth absorption, meditate on the Path." Vibhāṣa, 162.11. One cannot practice the Path in Kāmadhātu, nor in Bhavāgra. See Foreword to Chapters V-VI.

49. Mahāvyaotpatti, 85.7: āsvadānasamprayuktadhyāna. Aṅguttara, ii.126: "A person . . . enters and abides in the First Dhyāna; he tastes it, loves it, and finds therein sensible delight (tam astādeti tām nikāmēti tena ca vittīm āpajjati). If he dies without having fallen from it, he is reborn in the world of the Brahmakāyikas." The same for the other Dhyānas, with rebirth in the heaven which is suitable to it.

This text is invoked by the Andhakas against the Theravadins in the Kathāvatthu, siii.7.

50. One will find in F. Heiler, Buddhistische Versenkung, 1922, a very complete European bibliography. The most notable Pāli sources are Vibhaṅga, 257, Visuddhi, 139. Among the European works, Burnouf, Lotus, 800, Senart, Mahāvastu, i.552 (forgotten by Heiler). It is quite evident that the canonical definitions remain obscure, in spite of the efforts of the Ābhidayāmarakas-Ābhidyāṁnakas.

51. In the Bhāṣya of the first line, Hsüan-tsang says, "The kārikā designates t'eng-ch'iḥ 等持 (= samādhi) by the word t'ing 定 (fixed, set): the words differ, but the meaning is the same. This is why the Sūtra (Samyuktasutra, 28.21; see also Madhyama, TD 1, p. 788c19) says "The t'ing 定 (stbity) of the mind, the t'eng-t'ing 等定 (samāṣṭhit) of the mind, is what is called samyaksamādhi; it is also called subhaikāgrya."

In the Bhāṣya of the third line, Paramartha says, "By chu 住 (stbity) one should understand subhaikāgrya, because chu 住 is another name for samādhi. The Sūtra says, 'What is samādhi? It is the chu 住 (fixedness) of the mind in a correct object (samyagviṣaya), correct condition (avasthā).'

The First Dhyāna: contains vitarka, vicāra, prīti (= saumanasya, agreeable sensation of the manas, "satisfaction," ii.8a), sukhā (= prāṣrabdhi, forming part of the saṃskāraskandha, ii.25, English trans. p. 191), and samādhi.

The Second Dhyāna: contains adhyātmasamprāṣāda (= śraddhendriya), prīti (= saumanasya), sukhā (= prāṣrabdhi) and samādhi.

The Third Dhyāna: contains upekṣā (= saṃskāropekṣā, ii. 25, English trans. p. 192), smṛti, samprajanya, sukhā (agreeable sensation, vedanā, ii.7c), and samādhi.

The Fourth Dhyāna: contains upekṣā (neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable sensation), upekṣā-pariṣuddhi (= saṃskāropekṣā), smṛtipariṣuddhi, and samādhi.

52. Here Paramārtha adds "These five in absorption are capable of bringing about opposing prāṣrabdhi."

53. Catuvraṅgasenavatī: compare Samantapāsādikā, i.146: "In the same way that one understands by "army" the parts of the army and no other (yathā senangesu eva sanāsāmutti), in this way one understands by Dhyāna the fine parts and nothing else . . . The Vibhāṅga says: "Dhyāna contains vitarka, vicāra, prītisukha, and cittasya ekāgrata"; . . . thus cittaiṅgratā is also a part." In this same way the Šūla school teaches that dharmaśaravicaya is at one and the same time both Bodhi and a part of Bodhi, that samyagdrṣṭi is both the
Path and a part of the Path, and that absorption from food is both Upavása and a part of Upavása (iv.29, English trans. p. 597).

54. The formula of this upeksā is given in Vākyāyā, iii. 35: caksuṣṭa rūpāni drṣṭvā naiva sumanā bhavati [= nānuniyate] na durmanā bhavati [= na pratihanyate] upeksako bhavati [= nābbujati / kathām nābbujai kimi pratisamākhya āhośvid apratisamākhya iti viśeṣayann āha] smṛtim samprajānaṇa [= smṛtisamprayuktāṣā prajñāyā pratisamīksamāṇah]. As is the case of visual consciousness and its objects, so too for the five other consciousnesses. This sixfold equanimity is the sixfold sātata, satatavibhogā. See vii.32, note 186.

55. It is for this reason that it is said that the Buddha is never apratisamākhyaya upeksā. How one can expell bad upeksa by good upeksa, iii.35d.

56. Vībhāṣā (TD 27, p. 412a26): The parts of the dhyānas have eighteen different names; but how many actual entities are there? Only eleven. In the First Dhyāna, there are five names and five things. In the Second Dhyāna, the parts are four in number, three as in the First and adhyātmasamprāsāda. In the Third Dhyāna, five parts: but the fifth has already been mentioned; and four new ones. In the Fourth Dhyāna, four parts; the last three have been mentioned; one adds the first...

In the first two Dhyānas, there is praśrabhāsisukha, that is, sukha consisting of praśrabdhī; in the Third, there is vedanāsukha, sukha consisting of sensation. The sukha of the first two Dhyānas forms part of the saṁskāraskandha; the sukha of the Third is part of the vedaṇāskandha.

The unity of the object of the mind (cittaiṅgrya) is dhyāna because dhyāna is by nature samādhi (that is to say cittaikāgrya). The samādhi and the other [dharmas] so enumerated are parts of the dhyāna.

See Kośa, vi. trans. p. 922.

57. In the Vībhāṅga, the sukha of the First Dhyāna is cetasika sukha, cetosamphassajā sukha; this sukha is accompanied by pīti and is thus called pītisukha; pīti is pāmojkā ... attamanatā cittasa.


Sāṃghabhadra, TD 29, p. 761a2: In our system it is not said that praśrabdhi is sukhendriya (=agreeable sensation), rather praśrabdhi is the cause of sukha, the sukha part of the first two Dhyānas ... In Scripture, it is not only the vedanā sukha (agreeable sensation) which is called sukha; some other dharmas receive this name. Thus it is said that there are three sukhas, prabhānasukha, virāgasukha (?), and nirodhasukha; elsewhere it is said that sukha is fivefold, pravrajyāsukha, vivekasukha, samathasukha, bodhisukha (see vi.50b, p. 1006), and nirvāṇasukha. The term sukha thus designates, in the Sūtras, all types of dharmas ...

58. Vākyāyā ad iii.32c. The sukha of the Third Dhyāna rests only on the manas, not on the other organs (mana evāśritam). Kāmadhātu has no sukha of the sphere of manas (manobhūmikā sukha).

59. "Agreeable sensation having for its support the five organs made up of the atoms, sensation associated with the five consciousnesses (visual ... touch)." ii 25, English trans. p. 191.

60. Beings arisen in the heaven of the First Dhyāna possess visual consciousness, etc.; but not the persons who have entered into the absorption of the First Dhyāna.

61. Vākyāyā: sāmāhitavasthāntarālasamudācāraī / dārstāntikāṇām kilaśa pakṣāb / teṣām hi na dvibhūmikām eva sukhendriyaṁ kāmapratihamadhyānabhūmikām kimi tarbī caturbhūmikām
Chapter Eight

Sukhendriya not only belongs to the two "spheres", to Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna, but also to the Second and to the Third Dhyāna. *Ata eva ca vibbāsāyām bhādantena sautrāntikenoktam ābhidhārmikānām paramaṭeneva (?) ca kacṣurviṣyānādikam adhastād ārthvam ākṛṣyata iti tad evam asyetaṃ bhavati kacṣurviṣyānādikam dvitiyādībhānmāmikam api bhavatīty api. The Ābhidhārmikas think that visual consciousness exists only in Kāmadhātu and the First Dhyāna (i.46, viii.13a); but they admit that beings in higher Dhyānas see by means of a lower visual consciousness: "the visual consciousness is drawn from below to above as with a machine" (?) In the Vibbāsā, the Sautrāntika Bhadanta thinks that it is simpler to admit that the visual consciousness is of the sphere of the Second Dhyāna...

62. How can a mental (cātīsākṣa) sensation be felt by the body (kāyena)?

63. The Vibhaṅga (p. 259) here understands sukha as cetasika sukha (as do the Vaibhāṣikas), and it explains kāya as the three skandhas of saṇñā, saṁkhāra, and viññāṇa.

Kāyena sākṣātkaroti, vi.43c, 58b, viii.9, 35n. SBE. 45, p.23.

64. Vyākhya: catutthre dhyāne praśrabdhisukham bhuyo bhavati babutaram bhavati dhyānāntarebhyaś caturbhāṣya praśrabdhataravāt / tadābhāvyasa "pi sukhasyāvacanam / caturbhāye dhyāne sukham nocyate / tasya sukhasyāvacanād vedanā sukham eva triṣṭyā dhyāne na caturbhāe sukham vedanāstīt tatra nocyate ity abhīptāyah.

In the Fourth Dhyāna the sukha which consists of praśrabdi, "well-being," is greater than in the lower stages, and yet one does not attribute sukha to this stage: hence it results that, in the lower stages the part of sukha signifies the sensation of sukha, the sukha of sensation [and not praśrabdhisukha], and that, in the Fourth Dhyāna, there is no sensation of sukha.

65. According to the Vyākhya. The Bhāṣya only gives the first words of the Sūtra (as we see in the version of Paramārtha).

a. Hsuan-tsang: Further, because the Sūtra (Saṁyukta, TD 2, p. 123a13) says: yasmin samaye āryaśravakāḥ praviveka-jāmiḥ prātim kāyena sāksāt-kṛtvopasampadya vīharati pāncasyā dharmas tasmā samaye prahīyante pāca dharmā bhavaṇāparipūrṇaṃ gacchānti [iti vistarāḥ yāvad bhāvanīyā dharmāḥ katame / tadyathā prāmodyām (?) prāthiḥ praśrabdhiḥ sukham samādhiḥ ca.]

Compare the list in Saṁyutta, iv.76. Aṅguttara, v.1, etc. (prāmodyādayah).

b. Paramārtha: "Further, because the Sūtra distinguishes praśrabdi and sukha. As the Sūtra says: yasmin samaye āryaśravakāḥ praśrabdhiḥ jāmiḥ kāyena sāksāt-kṛtvā upasampadya vīharati. In the Sūtra praśrabdhiḥ is named separately from sukha. We know thus that they differ." [The reading praśrabdhiṣa is perhaps a mistake.]

66. Vyākhya: "Thus, in the first three Dhyānas, sukha is only bodily sukha."


68. Vyākhya: A touch consciousness of the sphere of Kāmadhātu cannot grasp a tangible of the sphere of Rūpadhātu from whence it results that the touch consciousness which grasps praśrabdhi is of the sphere of Rūpadhātu, and that the agreeable sensation (sukha) associated with this consciousness can be a "part of dhyāna."

69. According to Hsuan-tsang: naiṣa dosah / praśrabdhipratyayasya viññānasya utpattah; according to Paramārtha: naiṣo'rtah svayam praśrabdhivijñānasya utpattah.

The Vyākhya gives a very satisfying explanation: "The organ of touch of the person in absorption [even though it is of the sphere of Kāmadhātu], passes into a state such [tāṃ anāsthām gatam yad... ] that it can be the support of a touch consciousness of a higher sphere.

Saṅghabhadra, TD 29, p. 761b10. The Vaibhāṣika: Further, it is inadmissible that, having
for its support (āśraya) an organ of touch (kāyendriya) of Kāmadhātu, there arises a consciousness of a tangible of the sphere of Rūpadhātu. Thus one cannot say that the touch consciousness (kāyavijñāna) of a Kāmadhātu body would grasp a tangible of praśrabdhi arisen from dhyāna. If one answers us that even though this tangible is produced internally (by supporting itself on an internal object), it is capable of producing a similar consciousness [of a tangible of Rūpadhātu] even though this latter is supported on a body in Kāmadhātu, this response is nothing more than vain words, without reason or texts to sustain it. What reason or text establishes that a body of Kāmadhātu would grasp a rūpa which is praśrabdhi, and not another tangible? This thesis contradicts the authorities; only the doctrine of the Abhidharma is irreproachable. Here the Sthavira says: How do you know that praśrabdhi is called of sukha? . . .

70. To the Vaibhaṣikas, praśrabdhi (=the part of dhyāna called sukha) is a samskāra which can be anāsraya. For his opponent, the said part of dhyāna is the sensation associated with touch consciousness which knows praśrabdhi, a certain tangible.

71. This question is discussed ii.25, English trans. p. 191.

72. Hsüan-tsang adds: "It is said in the Sūtra fifteen dhārus are solely sāsrava"; Kośa, i.31c-d: English trans. p. 95, in the note; see Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 871c11.


74. The V Śyākhā mentions two readings: vitarkavicārayor ayaugapadyāṃ dosavacanāc ca and dośavacanāt (= asamavadhānena ca na kaścid doṣa ucyata iṣy arthaḥ). Paramārtha follows the second reading.

75. The Sautrāntikas, according to Saeki; above, the Dārṣṭāntikas.

76. Paramārtha (p. 298c24): the ancient masters do not say this. One cannot, according to their authority, know which dharmas are parts of the Path? pr su i k'o chih 不隨可知 ) .

77. Vyākyā: yogācarabhūmidarśanena vicārayam etat. Then there follows an exposition of the doctrine of Saṁghabhadra: tatra kautuḥalam pātayetyācāryasamghabhadraḥ / ayaṁ cātārthhasanākṣepo draṣṭavyaḥ.

The dhyānas contain a large number of dharmas: why are certain dharmas considered as parts (anga)? The dharmas which are pratipakṣaṅga or opposition, anuṣaṃśaṅga or excellence, and tadubhyāṅga or both opposition and excellence are considered as parts, [In the absorptions of Ārūpadyātu one does not distinguish parts, because the taste of all of them is calmness, samathaikaraṃ]a]. In the First Dhyāna: 1. vitarka and vicāra are opposed to the bad minds (vitarka) of Kāmadhātu (kāma or lust, vyāpāda or injury, and vibhīṃsa or killing); 2. prīti and sukha are obtained when vitarka and vicāra have expelled their opposites (vipakṣa), and through the fact of the separation from these opposites; and 3. samādhi or cittadhyātavac, concentration or one-pointedness-of-mind through whose force the four other parts exist. In the Second Dhyāna: the adhyātasamprasāda is opposed to vitarka and vicāra; prīti and sukha constitute the part of excellence. In the Third Dhyāna: upēkṣā, smṛti and samāprajāmya are opposed to prīti; sukha is the part of excellence. In the Fourth Dhyāna: upēkṣāparipratisuddhi and smṛtyaparipratisuddhi are opposed to sukha; adhikāśukhavedanā is the part of excellence. See Vibhāṣa, 263.

78. Yogasūtra, i.47.

79. Śraddhā prasādāḥ; ii.25, English trans. p. 191.

Vasumitra (in Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 415c28) compares vitarka-vicāra to waves which trouble the waters; when they have been expelled the mind is samāprasanaṃ, like the water which becomes clear when the waves have been calmed; thus faith (śraddhā) is called adhyātasamprasāda.
80. Paramārtha omits these explanations.

81. The Vyākhya gives some examples: paryesakamanjāla-pāvasthā vitarkaḥ / pratyavekṣa- kamanjāla-pāvasthā vicāraḥ (see Kośa, ii, English trans. p. 203) / vākṣamuttāpikā-pāvasthā vita rkaḥ / sadanyāvasthā vicāra iti bhagavadviṣeṣāḥ / avākṣiptāvasthā samādhiḥ / praṇāvāhitavasthā cittasyādhyātmamasāntarāḥ / iī / On the existence of cittas distinct from the citta (and of bhautikas distinct from the mahābhūtas), see ii, English trans. p. 188.

82. Hsüan-tsang: "However reasonable this may be, this is not my system."

83. The Sthāvira, according to P’u-kang (TD 41, p. 424c5) and Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 792c29).

Hsüan-tsang: How does another school maintain that priti is not saumanasya? It says that there is a separate priti, a cittasīka dharma; as the sukha of the Three Dhyānas is totally saamanasya, priti and saumanasya are distinct.

84. See ii.7c-8a, p. 161, on priti.

85. Paramārtha (TD 29, p. 299a9) transcribes pi-p’o-li-to ching見波利多經 See also Kośa, v.9a, Madhyāma (TD 1, p. 695b4), Sāmyutta, v.213, Majjhima, iii.26, Atthasālīni, 175.

Hsüan-tsang translates: "The Buddha, in the Sūtra of the Explanation of the Vipāryyas, taught the gradual disappearance of the five indriyas of sensation, daurmanasya, etc. [In the First Dhyāna, the destruction of the daurmanasya, in the Second of duḥṣkha], in the Third of saumanasya, in the Fourth of sukha. Thus priti is saumanasya."

86. Definition of the Fourth Dhyāna: sa sukhasya ca prabhānāda duḥkhasya ca prabhānat pāruvam eva saumanasayadaurmanasayayor asamgamad adukham asukham upeksasmiotpamrītuddhām caturtham dhyānam . . .

87. The problem of seṇjīla and āniṇjūa is examined iv. 46, English trans. p. 621-3, (vi.24a-b); the apakṣālas, iii. 101. Madhyama, 5.1, Majjhima, i. 454, ii. 261 (āṇañjasappāya-sutta), Aṅguttara, v.135 (kaṇṭaka= apakṣāla).

88. Compare iii. 101.

89. See Kośa, i.30b (above p. 1232) and ii. 31 on the dhātus and the cittas which exist in Rūpadhātu.

90. Hsüan-tsang: "and because mental satisfaction is gross there" [Thus there is sukha of the sphere of manas there].

91. Saeki adds: "because mental satisfaction is subtle there."

92. See iv.8a.

93. Hsüan-tsang: "Beings arisen in the three higher bhūmis (=Dhyānas) produce three viññānakāyas (eye consciousness, etc.) and an "informative mind" (viññāpticitta) of the sphere of the First Dhyāna. See vii.50.

94. See vii.50. Hsüan-tsang: "Beings arisen above produce the dharma from below, for example nirmāṇacitta."

95. It is through usefulness (prayojanena) that these beings produce a viññāna of the First Dhyāna, and not through esteem (babumāna); furthermore, if this viññāna is good, it will contain a retribution which they must create; thus they do not make an effort in order to manifest a good viññāna.

96. Triprakāram anyatra nirvedhāgiyāt (see viii.17.)

97. Paramārtha: "In the Vibhāṣā."

The Vyākhya quotes the Vibhāṣā: syāc chuddbakaṁ vairāgyeṇa lābheta, paribhāṇyā
vijahyät / syāc cbuddhakam upapattiyā labbηta, upapattiyā vijahyät / abh / syat / katham ity āha / bānabhāgiyam prathamam dhyānam.

98. Vībhāṣā, TD 27, p. 822c14. When one obtains the state of Arhat (or ksayajñāna), one has already obtained the First Dhyāna, of the anāśrava class at the moment of entry into samyaktvaniyāma; why say that one obtains it upon obtaining the state of Arhat? The text should say that one obtains this Dhyāna at the moment of entry into samyaktvaniyāma, and not upon the obtaining of the state of Arhat.

99. Having entered the First Dhyāna the ascetic contemplates the Truths. He possesses the first anāśrava Dhyāna. If he continues his contemplation (pravābe) the moment of anāśrava Dhyāna is followed by a moment of anāśrava Dhyāna; if he leaves (vyuthānakāle) this contemplation, the anāśrava Dhyāna is followed by a pure or śuddhaka Dhyāna.

100. When an ascetic cultivated the mixed absorption (vi.42, vii. 23a) when the anāśrava and pure (śuddhaka) moments succeed one another, there is an ascending absorption, an “absorption that passes over certain spheres” (viii.18c), i.e., the First Dhyāna is followed by the Second or the Third Dhyāna.

101. After the Third Dhyāna: 1-2, two of this bhūmi (śuddhaka and anāśrava), 3-6, four, two of the Fourth Dhyāna, two of ākāśānantya; 7-10, four, two of the First, and two of the Second Dhyāna.

And so on for the Fourth Dhyāna and for ākāśānantya.

102. Hsüan-tsang adds: "After [pure] naivasanipānāsravasamjñanāya there can arise six types of absorption: the pure and the defiled of this same āyatana, the anāśrava and the pure of the Second and Third Ārāyas. Following upon the First [pure] Dhyāna, seven types: the three of the First Dhyāna; the anāśrava and the pure of the Second and Third. Following upon ākāśānantya, eight; following the Second Dhyāna, nine; following vijñānānantya, ten; following the other pure absorptions, eleven."

103. Up to here the author has spoken of the samāpattidhyānas, absorptions, or states of contemplation, and their succession; but the kusālasambhita, the “good mind of absorption,” which exists in the upapattidhyānas, that is, in Rūpādhatu (= of dhyāna; brahma-loka, etc.), and which is acquired through arising (upapattilābhika), is also called pure dhyāna (śuddhaka dhyāna). When a being in Rūpādhatu dies, this pure dhyāna comes to an end; can it be followed only by a defiled dhyāna of the same sphere? No: “At death, following upon the pure, there is a defiled state of some sphere.” In fact, death (maranabhava) is never absorbed (samābha) (iii.43): a being in Rūpādhatu, at the moment when he dies, never possesses the dhyāna of pure absorption. The “mind of reincarnation” (pratisamādhicitta) which follows “the mind at death” (maranabhava) will be defiled, not absorbed.

104. Paramārtha translates: “with the exception of the nirvedhabhāgiya.”

These four categories are the dippasauvija dharmas of Dīgha, iii.277. See the source quoted iv.125, English trans. p. 707, vi.20a, p. 707.

105. Hānabhāgiya succeeds upon hānabhāgiya when there is no progress, sthitisbhāgiya succeeds when pure absorption is strengthened and when there is progress (viṣeṣagamana).

106. Mahāvyutpatti, 68.5; see Kota, ii.44d, English trans. p. 229. Visuddhimagga, 374 (Atthasālinī, 187): jhānānukomato jhānapatisomato jhānukkantito.

107. According to Paramārtha. Hsüan-tsang differs: ... (3) to cultivate the sāravas and anāśravas in a mixed and continuous order (that is to go from the First sāravas Dhyāna to the Second anāśravas Dhyāna); (4) to cultivate the sāravas in a discontinuous order (that is to go from the First Dhyāna to the third ...); (5) the same with respect to the anāśravas; (6) to cultivate the sāravas and anāśravas in a mixed and discontinuous order. The Vībhāṣā (TD 27. p.835b7) differs: 1. a good mind of Kāmadhātu. 2. sāravas absorption, to go and

108. Hsüan-tsang: 1. for there is no usefulness for a being of a higher sphere to produce a lower absorption; 2. because his own sphere outweighs this absorption; 3. because the power of this absorption is weak; 4. because he has rejected this absorption; and 5. because this absorption is now the object of disgust.

109. See ii.45a-b (English trans. p. 236); vi.73a-b; above p. 1228, 1244. *Vyākhya*: yāvad eva samjñāsamāpattis āṭhavād ajñāprativedha iti vacanā (Āṅguttara, iv.426).

110. We have seen that the *dhyāna* "of delight" has for its object *dhyāna* which is pure (*suddhaka*), not *anāsrava*. Let us understand then: "It does not bear on the pure *dhyāna* of a lower sphere."

111. The *Vyākhya*, the text of which is unfortunately unsure, explains: *tṛṣṇāparicchinnatvād bhūminām iti / yā yasyām bhūmau tasyām eva bhūmau anussayanām (?) tayā sā bhūmiḥ paricchinnā bhavati / anyathā bi tasyottarataḥ (?) na sidhyet ekabhūmitbhānitaḥ / ati svauttarādhyāyotpātāhāryāyogāt: It is *tṛṣṇā* which determines the bhūmi. It is thus that the three *stbānas* or "places" of the first three Dhyānas and the eight *stbānas* of the heaven of the Fourth Dhyāna constitute only one bhūmi, even though these places are superimposed one over the other, because the same *tṛṣṇā* becomes active and grows in all of the bhūmis to which it belongs (v.17). See iii.3c, a definition of the Dhātus.

112. Desire for *anāsrava* is not thirst, but "desire for the good". *Kotā*, v.16, p. 794.

113. According to Paramārtha, Hsüan-tsang: "It has for its object all *samskṛta* of its sphere, of lower and higher spheres, and *asamskṛta*. Nevertheless the morally neutral *asamskṛtas* are not the object of an *anāsrava* absorption.

114. In order to become detached from the Fourth Dhyāna, the ascetic enters into the *śāmantaka* of the first *ārūpya* and considers the Fourth Dhyāna as gross, etc. (iv.49): this is the *anantaryamaṅga* of detachment from the Fourth Dhyāna. See iii.35a, on the *śāmantaka* of aṅkāśāmanā and the Ārūpyas.

115. *Vyākhya*: na hi bhavena bhavaniḥsaraṇam asti iti (see above viii. p. 1225).

116. See iii.35d, vii.26a, viii.22c.

117. Consequently *priti* and *sukha* are absent: *prūsisukhayor ayoga iti*.

118. Being paths of detachment, they cannot be associated with delight; thus they are pure.

119. Explanation of the term *anāgamya*, vi.44d, p. 981, note; below, note 125.

Actually the *śāmantakas* or prefatory absorptions of all the *dhyānas* and *ārūpyas* can be called *anāgamya*, because they do not enter the principal absorptions, and because they cut off the *kleśas*. But Saṃghabhadrā says that the name *anāgamya* is reserved for the *śāmantaka* of the First Dhyāna in order to show that this *śāmantaka* differs from the others. The ascetic produces it before entering any state of absorption and, when he is in one, he does not experience any delight (*āsvādana*). The other *śāmantakas* are produced by the force of a previous absorption; the ascetic who is in it can experience delight. This does not appear to be reconciliable with the definitions of Vasubandhu. The *Vibhāṣā* says, "It is called *anāgamya*, because it is produced without one having arrived (*an-āgamya*) at the principle sphere (*mauabhūmi*), for the qualities of the principle sphere are absent from it."

120. By saying that the *śāmantaka* is the path by which one becomes detached from a lower sphere: This is according to Paramārtha. The *Vyākhya* explains the first phrase of the *Bhāṣya*: aśṭāsv api *dhyānārūpyesu yasya yat śāmantakam tasya tena śāmantakacittena
The first thought of a dhyanā existence, **upapattibhava** (iii.38), belongs to the **sāmantaka** of this dhyanā; it is defiled by all of the **kleśas** of the sphere of this dhyanā.

121. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 719c13. Some say that the **sāmantaka** spheres include joy (priti), for the Sūtra says that by being supported by joy one abandons sadness (daurmanasya). According to other sources, the joy of the **sāmantaka** of the First Dhyanā includes movement and is not like of the principle dhyanā... The following two **sāmantakas** include sukha. Vibhāṣa, 164.5: The Dārṣṭāntikas say that the **sāmantakas** are only good; it is explained that they are good, defiled, or neutral.

122. Hsüan-tsang adds: "Because he who does not produce the principle absorption is also attached to the **sāmantaka**." The Vyākhya says: By reason of the aptitude (paṭutva) of the anāgāmya: he can be anāśrava, and he can also be associated with delight. Such is the intention (of this passage). Sarhghabhadra explains: maulapratispardhitvād āsvādanasaṃ-pattisaḍbhavat.


On dhyanāntara and the theory of the Saṁhmitīyas and Andhakas, see Kathāvatthu, xvii.7.

124. According to Hsüan-tsang. Paramārtha has "This dhyanā is not associated with vitarka. It is called dhyanāntara, because it differs from the two dhyanās. As it outweighs the First Dhyanā, it is not placed in the First Dhyanā. It is not placed in the Second, etc., in view of the absence of viśeṣa."

I doubt that the Chinese translators really understood this.

The Vyākhya says: The Bhāṣya has dhyanāvīseṣatvāt, that is, the first principle dhyanā, through the absence of vitarka, becomes more distinguished and receives the name of dhyanāntara: tad eva maulam prathamam dhyanānām vitarkāpagamād viśīṣṭān dhyanānātaram ucyata ity arthaḥ.

125. Sarhghabhadra reproduces the text of Vasubandhu and adds some useful explanations on anāgāmya and dhyanāntara. We shall put this explanations into paragraphs.

a. Dhyānāntara, which is included in the First Dhyanā, differs from this latter by the fact that it has less vitarka. In the higher sphere (Second Dhyanā, etc.), what are the dharmas whose suppression would give rise to a dhyānāntara? Thus there is a dhyānāntara in the First Dhyanā, but not in the higher spheres.

b. Doesn’t the Sūtra say that the seven absorptions (samāpatti)—namely the Four Dhyanās and the first three ārūpyas—are the support [of pure prajñā, of the "qualities," viii.20a, 27c]? Furthermore how do you prove that there is an anāgāmya, and a dhyānāntara?

c. We know that there is an anāgāmya by Scripture and by reasoning.

The Sūtra says, "He who is not capable of entering into the First Dhyanā, etc., and of remaining in it, obtains down here the destruction of the āsravas by means of an ārūpya or pure (anāśrava) prajñā." If there were no anāgāmya, what would be the support of this prajñā?

Furthermore, the Sūtra of the Good Precepts (Sūla-Sūtra?) says, "There is a person delivered-through-Prajñā (prajñāvimukta, vi.64) who has not obtained the principle dhyanā (mauladhyāna: the dhyanā itself.)" Now is it not by being in the dhyanā that the ascetic obtains the deliverance-through-prajñā? Thus there is a dhyanā which is not the mauladhyāna, namely the preliminary dhyanā, the anāgāmya. On the mixed character of anāgāmya, iii.35d.

d. The Sūtra says, with respect to dhyānāntara, that there are three saṁādhis, sa-vitarka,
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sa-vicāra, etc. (viii.23c). It says that the First Dhyāna contains vitarka and vicāra; and that, in the Second and the following Dhyānas, vitarka and vicāra have ceased. If there were no dhyānāntara, what samādhi would "possess vicāra and not vitarka"? Because the citta-caittas cease gradually, it follows that there would be a dhyāna with vicāra but without vitarka.

Furthermore, out from dhyānāntara, what would be the cause of the arising of Mahābrahmā the King of the World (kośa, viii.23b)?

e. The Buddha does not speak of anāgamyas and dhyānāntara, because both are included in the First Dhyāna. The word "dhyāna" includes them also.

f. The first "vestibule," saṁmāntaka, is called anāgama because one would distinguish it from the others. A dhyāna does not arise before one has entered into this first saṁmāntaka. (See above vi.44d, p. 981.)

126. Elsewhere abhisamāskāra-dhyāna; see iv.78c, (vahati = gacchati), vi.66a, 71d.

127. See ii.41d.


Vibhajjā, TD 27, p. 821c2. Opinions differ on the difference between samādhi and samāpatti. Samādhi is understood as a momentary (kṣanika) absorption; samāpatti as a prolonged (prābandhika) absorption. The samādhis always involve the mind (citta); they are sacitta; this mind can be either samābīta, absorbed, or vyagra (or vikṣipta, i.33c-d), dispersed. The samāpattis (ii.44d, English trans. p. 231) can be accompanied by mind or not (for example asaṃjñīsaṃmāpatti and asaṃjñāveditanirodhysaṃmāpatti). Thus we have: 1. exclusively samādhi, the [semi]-absorption associated with the vyagra mind [We do not understand how a non-samābīta mind can be in samādhi, see above note 4; but it is certain that a mind in Kāmadhātu can be in samādhi, vii.25a, etc.]; 2. exclusively samābīta, the states free from mind; and 3. samādhi and samāpatti, all states of absorbed mind. Samatha is a state accompanied by an absorbed mind.

A traditional summary of the Eighth Chapter holds that it treats of 1. the dhyānas, 2. the ārūpyas, 3. the samāpattis (all of which are "absorbed," samābīta, with or without mind (see ii.44d, p. 231); and of 4. the samādhis, that is to say in the proper sense of the word, the sUnyatāsamādhi group (viii.24).

129. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 538c3, Dirgha, TD 1, p. 110a24, Saṃyukta, TD 2, p. 132a18 (not closely related); Dirgha, iii. 219, 274, Majjhima, iii. 162, Saṃyutta, iv. 363, Ānāguta, iv. 300, Kathāvatthu, ix.8 and trans. p. 239, note; elsewhere only savitarka-savicāra and avitarka-avicāra are distinguished, Saṃyutta, v.iii, etc. [The role of avitakka-avicāra in the reading of the mind of another, Dirgha, iii.104.] See Compendium, Introduction, 58, Visuddhimagga, 169.

Vibhajjā, TD 27, p. 744b24. The Dārśāntikas think that there is vitarka and vicāra up to Bhavāgra.

130. On vitarka-vicāra, see above note 18.

131. Hsüan-tsang: "This refers to the First Dhyāna and its saṁmāntaka."

132. Dirgha, TD 1, p. 50b1, Ekottara, TD 2, p. 630b3; Dirgha, iii.219: suññato samādhi, animitto samādhi, appanibito samādhi; Dhammasaṅgani, 344, 505; Vibhanga, Preface, p. xviii; Atthasālinī, 221 and foll.; Sūtrālāmākāra, xviii, 77-79. Ānāguta, iii.397, animitta cetosamādhi. Below note 140.

a. Vibhajjā, TD 27, p. 538a27. The samādhis are numberless; why say that they are three? From the point of view of their opposition (pratipāta), their intention (āsaya), and their object (ālambana): 1. sānyatā-samādhi opposes the belief in a self (sakāyadṛśi); as it considers things under the aspects of non-self and emptiness, it is opposed to the aspects of self and mine; 2. apranibitasamādhi is the samādhi in which there is no intention (āsaya), no will (pranidhāna) with respect to any dharma of the Three Dhatus (or bhava, trībhāva,
threefold existence, i.8c). There is no complete absence of pranidhāna with respect to the Path; but, although the Path rests on bhava, intention relative to the Path is not related to bhava; 3. ānimittasamādhi has an object free from the nimittas, namely from rūpa, sabda, etc. For others, the three samādhis, in this order, oppose satkāyadṛṣṭi, śilavrata and vicikītā.

b. The Bodhisattvabhumi, fol. 106a, arranges the samādhis in the following order: sānyatā, apranibita, and ānimitta, and gives a definition of them very different from that of Vasubandhu:

tatra katamo bodhisattvasya sānyatāsamādhiḥ / īha bodhisattvasya sarvābhilāpātmaka- 
ena svabhāvena virahitam nirabhilāpasyavabhāvam vastu paśyatab yā cītastā sthitih āyam 
asyacyate sānyatāsamādhiḥ / apranibitasamādhiḥ katamah / īha bodhisattvasya tad eva 
nirabhilāpasyavabhāvam vastu mithyāvikalpasamutthāpitaṃ klesena pārighatativād 
anekadoṣaduṣṭāṃ samanupaśyato yā āyatāṃ tatrāpranidhānapūrvākā cītastasthir āyam 
asyāpranibitasamādhir ity ucyate / ānimittasamādhiḥ katamah / īha bodhisattvasya tad eva 
nirabhilāpasyavabhāvam vastu sarvāvikalpa-prapañcanimitṭāṃ āpanīya yathābhūtāṃ sāntato 
manasi kuriṣu yā cītastasthir āyam asyacyate ānimittasamādhiḥ /.

The second samādhi refers to conditioned (saṃkṣeta) things through which one does not form any pranidhāna; the third to unconditioned things (i.e. Nirvāṇa), the object of pranidhāna; the first to non-existent (asat) things, the self, mine, with respect to which one does not form either pranidhāna or apranidhāna, but which one regards solely as empty.

133. Calm = nirodha = Nirvāṇa, has four aspects of nirodha, pranīta, sānta, and niḥsaraṇa, vii.13a.

134. Hsüan-tsang: "This samādhi has the four aspects of nirodha; nirodha can be called sama [or sānta]."

135. On ānimitta as noun and adjective, see Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhumi p. 19-20. On nimitta, see Kṣaṇa, ii.14c.

136. The "emptiness" of the Hinayāna should be studied in greater depth.

137. See i.7c-d, note 33. Majjhima, i.135: . . . evam eva kho bhikkhave kullupamo mayā 
dhammo diseto nītharanatthāya no gabanatthāya / kullupamāṃ vo bhikkhave ājānantehi 
dhammā pi vo pahātābbā prag evāddhāmā.

Vajracchedikā, p.23: . . . na khulu punaḥ subhāte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena dharma 
ugrābhatyavo nādharbhā / tasmād āyam tathāgatena samādhiyā vāg bhāṣātā / kolopamāṃ 
dharmaparyāyam ājānadbhir dharmaeva prabhātvāh prag evāddhāmā iti.

Bodhicaryavatāra, ix.35: adhibhata upēya paścāt kolerapratvād upayasyāpi prabāṇam.

Compare the bhisi (uṣi, raft) of the Suttanipāta, 22: "I have passed over . . . there is no (further) use for a raft."

In Saṁyutta, iv.174-175, the magga is a raft, but it is not said that one should abandon it. The Vajracchedikāśākā (Tanjur, Mdo, xvi.237b) quotes the Ratnakaraṇa, where the formula: kolopamāṃ dharmaparyāyam . . . pragr evāddhāmāḥ is completed by the words: ye 
dharmāḥ prabhātvāh na te dhammā nāpy adharmāḥ.

One should examine the meaning of dharma and adharma in these sources.

138. See viii.5.

139. Excluding Kāmadhātu, Bhavāgra, and the sāmantaka from the sāmantaka of the Second Dhyāna.

140. Patisambhidāmagga, ii.35: tayo me bhikkhave vimokkhe suññato vimokkhe animitto 
vimukkhe appanihito; ibid. ii.67. Dhammasaṅgani, 344, Atthasālinī, 223, Visuddhadāmagga, 
658 (Compendium, 211, 216); Netipparakarana, 90, 119, 126; Miśinda, 413. Mahāvyutpatti, 
73, the Three Vimokṣaṃukhas, sānyata, animittam, apranibita, apraniphitam; Madhyamakavṛtti, 246: 
trιṇi vimokṣaṃukhāni sānyatānimittāpraṇibandhākhyāni vimuktyaye vineyebhyo bhagavatā
nirdīṣṭāni...; Madhyamakāvatāra, 319; Deva, Caṅḍāśatikā, p. 497; Bodhisattvabhūmi, I.17.14 (with nirodhasamāpatti, the three Vimokṣas constitute the āryavibhāra of the Buddha).

141. According to Ekottara, 26.5

The Vibbāṣa (see below) and Hsüan-tsang (in the Kōsa) call these samādhis chung - samādhis, "repeated" samādhis, "accumulated" samādhis, since they are sāṇya-sāṇya... The thought that inspires the theory of these samādhis is clearly explained by Sarṇghabhadra (in his Prakaraṇāśārama, TD 29. p. 971b26), "In the same way that one burns the wood of the funeral-pyre which first burned the body, so too when the absorption of emptiness (sāṇya-saṃādhi) burns the klesas, the ascetic namely produced sāṇyatāsaṃādhi in order to obtain disgust-abandon with respect to the first emptiness (=the first sāṇyatāsaṃādhi)."

The Vibbāṣa treats of these samādhis, TD 27, p. 543a27 (and c5 and following): 1. At what moment does one obtain them? According to one opinion, in dārśanamārga, when one obtains abhisamayāntika (vii.21a); according to another opinion, in bhāvanāmārga, when the detached (vīrakta) Ārya obtains nirmāṇacittā (vii.49c); according to a third opinion (the orthodox opinion), at the moment of kṣayajñāna (vi.44d), because, at this moment, the ascetic cultivates all the impure (sāsra) good dharmas of the three spheres (vii.26c). 2. Does one obtain them without effort? 3. After which jñānas? 4. In what spheres (viii.27b)? 5. With what dṛṣṭaya (viii..27a)? 6. What ākāras do they take up?

142. The Vyākhyā, doubtlessly quoting a Śāstra or the Vibbāṣa: āha / kim atra kāraṇāṃ yac chūnyatāsāṇyatāsaṃādhiḥ sāṇyatākāra eva na punar anātmakāro’pi sāṇyataśvat iti / atrocyate / sāṇyatākārapraṇāpattāsāṇyātāppṛṣṭhetopattīr na punar anātmakārapraṇāpattāsāṇyatāppṛṣṭheti / atrocyate / taddhyapattanakūtyāḥ eva hi sāṇyatākārāḥ sāṇyatāsaṃādhiḥ tasya sāṇyatāsāṇyatāsaṃādhiḥ utpattāv anukālayanāvatisṭhate nānātmakāraḥ / na by evam anātmadaranānam udvējayati yathā sāṇyataśdarṣanam / dṛṣṭiṣu hy anātmato bhavasya abhiratir asti samāśre sāṇyataśdarṣanābhāvāvāt / tadyathādhyavagyāsāṃśaṃādhaśdvyāsadārvānāḥ api prātiḥ / ekākāna tu tācyayatosv aśriti iti / tadat. Sāṇyataśdarṣanābhāvāvāt follows a sāṇyata-sāṇya-saṃādhi which has the aspect of sāṇya, not one which has the aspect of anātman. Sāṇyata disgusts more than anātmatā: one continues to find pleasure in things which one recognized as anātman, as a traveller sees with pleasure a path little frequented (asāṃbāda; MSS: asāmāndaḥ), but, alone, he has a fear of the path because it is empty.

143. dāsaṃiyatvāt. Vyākhyā: so’saikṣasasāṃādhir dāsaṃiyatvāt iti.

144. See viii.35b-d.

145. There are two nirodhas of ānimittasamādhi:

a. anityatānirodha [or svalaṃsanirodha or svarasanirodha] (i.20a, English trans. p. 77, ii.45c): the extinction of which is the law of all conditioned things (saṃskṛta).

b. apratisamkhyānirodha (see i.5c, 6c-d, ii.55d, English trans. p. 280). Here the word niroda cannot be legitimately translated by extinction, but it is not impossible to say what it refers to: when an Arhat leaves the ānimittasamādhi, some pure or impure thoughts arise in him which are no longer of this samādhi; if these thoughts had not arisen, some new moments of the ānimittasamādhi would have arisen. When these other thoughts arise, the Arhat takes possession of apratisamkhyānirodha of the new moments of ānimittasamādhi which, lacking causes, would not arise.

Vyākhyā: kathāṃ tasya [ānimittasamādhir] apratisamkhyānirodhāḥ / aśaikṣād ānimittat samādher vyutthitasya tadanantaram ye sāṣravāḥ kṣaṇā atikramaṇy anye vānāṣravāḥ(y)s yadi te notpannāḥ syur aśaikṣā ānimittaśaṃkhaṇā utpannāḥ syub / teṣām sāṣravānām anyeṣaṃ anāṣravānāṃ votpattikāle teṣām aśaikṣānām ānimittaśaṃkhaṇām apratisamkhyānirodho abhyate pratrayavaikañjya / tam apratisamkhyānirodham ālambate sāntākāraṇa.

Ānimittanīmītisasāmbhī thus takes the apratisamkhyānirodha of the ānimittasamādhi
as its object, for this nirodha is the enemy of this samādhi (tatpratyaarthikabhibhāvatvāt) and the ascetic desires to become disgusted (vidāsaṇam abhilāsan) with this samādhi.

146. As we have seen in i.6c. Pratisamkhyaṇirodha is the nirodha which one obtains by a type of prajñā called pratisamkhya.

The Vyākhyā explains: apratisikūlatvāt / yad dhi prātikulam āryāṇām tatsamyogavisamyogāya yatante / visamypogas ca pratisamkhyaṇirodha.

The pure dharmares are abhaya, i.40a, English trans. p. 112.

147. Sāṃghabhadrā (in his Prakaraṇaśāsana, TD 29, p. 972a3) says, "The sānta [characteristic or aspect] indicates only cessation (chib-hsi 止息); apratisamkhyaṇirodha thus has the characteristic of sānta; the prolonged practice of the Path (āryamārga) (which culminates in sānyata, apranihita, and anūmittasamādhi) includes fatigue, so one produces pleasure (sukhalaksana) with respect to its cessation."

148. If the ascetic were to consider the apratisamkhyaṇirodha of anūmittasamādhi under the aspect of nirodha or extinction, he would not consider it as "calm," sānta; he would consider it under an aspect which renders it hateful, and as a consequence he would not take a dislike to anūmittasamādhi.

149. As we have seen iv.9d.

150. The apratisamkhyaṇirodha of a certain klesa is not the visamyoga (ii.55d) of this klesa. Let us suppose that an ascetic takes possession of the apratisamkhyaṇirodha of good or bad dharmares, but he remains bound to these dharmares because their possession (prāpti), which alone can cut off the possession of pratisamkhyaṇirodha, has not been cut off. [A good example, Kṣaṇa, vi.23: the possessor of kṣaṇi contains the apratisamkhyaṇirodha of the klesas whose pratisamkhyaṇirodha can only be attained by dārsanamārga.]

151. Only the akopyadharman Arhat, by reason of his sharp faculties, has the power (śamarthya) to produce them; not the other Arhats. The Vyākhyā explains: tebhayo dṛṣṭadharmaśukhabhīrātvaḥ āsāngāśpadabhūtebhyo taikṣebhyāḥ sānyatādīsamādhibhyo vaismukhyāttham aparasaṃdham samāpadyante.

152. On samādhibhāvanā, above note 4; Visuddhi, 371.

The Vyākhyā quote the Sūtra: asti samādhibhāvanā āsevitā bhāvīta bahūlikṛtā dṛṣṭadharmaśukhabhīrāyā samvartate / asti ... divyacakṣurabhījñāṇanādāraṇāyā samvartate / asti ... prajñāprabhādāyā samvartate / asti ... āsrayākṣayāyā samvartate.

On the value of āsevitā, bhāvīta, bahūlikṛtā, the Vyākhyā says: āsevitā nīsavitā bhāvanāyā / bhāvīta vipakṣadārātatayā / bahūlikṛtā vipakṣadārākaraṇatayā. When this refers to the paths of action, iv.85a.

Dīgha, iii.222, Aṅguttara, ii.44: attbhāvuso samādhibhāvanā bhāvīta bahūlikatā dīṭṭhadharmasukhabhīrāyā samvattati ... nanadamānapitilabbhāyā ... satisampaṭajñāṇāyā ... āsāvanāṁ khyāya samvattati.

In Bodhisattvabhūmi (1,13, fol. 82), the theory of the three samādhibhāvanās is modified:

tatra katamo bodhisattvānāṁ dhyānasvabhāvasaḥ / bodhisattvāpīṭakaś-raṇaṇaṁtāpāravakam yā laukikam lokottaram bodhisattvānāṁ kuśalam cittaikāgyam cittasthātib samathāpaksyā vā vipāsyānapaksyā vā ... taddhābhāpaksyā vā āyaṁ bodhisattvānāṁ dhyānasvabhāvo veditavyah / tatra katamad bodhisattvānāṁ sarvadhyānam / tad dvividhām laukikam lokottaram ca / sat punar yatbāyogam trividhāṁ veditavyam dṛṣṭadharmaśukhabhīrāyā dhyānam bodhisattvasamādhiyogānimīrārāyā dhyānam sattvārthakriyāyai dhyānam / tatra yad bodhisattvānāṁ sarvavikalpāpagaṁ kāyikacaitisakprapaṁṣaṇānam manyamatāgam anāvādāṁ samānimīrāpagaṁ dhyānam idam āsāṁ dṛṣṭadharmaśukhabhīrāyā veditavyam / pratisamvīdāṁ arunāpaṇadhiṣṭām abhāviṣeṇām abhāvāḥ śrāvakāśādhārānānāṁ acchintāyā yā samvartate idam bodhisattvāsīya dhyānam samādhibhānābhānābhāyāyā veditavyam ...
153. The fourth pāda, the version of Paramārtha appears to be: praṇāprabhedāya saṃskārāraij; the version of Hsūn-tsang: praṇāprabhedāya prāyogikaśubhābhavāna.

The theory of Harivarman, TD 32, no. 1646, chap. 158, is very different from that of the Abhidharma.

154. On the drṣṭadharmaṣukhavibhāras, Koša, ii.4, vi.42c, 58b, 65b, (note 415).

Vibhāra = samādhiwijśeta (ii., note 229).

According to ii.4, English trans. p. 157, happiness here below depends on ajñātavindriya and thus supposes the state of Arhat; it consists of the fact of experiencing the "satisfaction" and the "well-being" of deliverance from the defilements (klesavimuktispratikṣaḥpratisamvedana); in other words, this happiness is the enjoyment (upabhoga) of Nirvāṇa) ii.6, English trans. p. 159).

We should distinguish sāntavibhāra from sukhavibhāra, the former being nirodhasamāpatti (ii.43b), which is similar to Nirvāṇa (the sānta vimokṣa, viii. p. 10, Majjhima i.472). We owe to Saṅghabhadra (above note 57) the fact that the word sukhā does not necessarily signify "agreeable sensation"; but sukhavibhāra, being pratīsamvedanā, is "sensation."

According to the Vibhāṣā, the sukhavibhāras solely refer to the four fundamental dhyānās, pure (suddhaka) or anāśrava, not to the prefatory spheres (sāmantakaś) or the arūpyas.

In Buddhaghosa, the Arhats (compare Majjhima, iii.4) cultivate the right samāpattis (four dhyānās and four ārūpyas) "in order to agreeably pass the day with their minds concentrated" (ekaggacittā sukhām divasaṁ vibhārissāma), and the ninth samāpatti (samjñāveditanirodhā) "in order to agreeably pass seven days delivered in mind, having attained nirodha, Nirvāṇa in this world": . . . sattāham acitakā butvā ditheva dhamme nirodhaṁ nibbānam patvā sukhām vibhārissāma (Samantapāsādikā, i.156).

155. The Vyākhyā explains the value of these two words. Jñāna is a discernment (praṇā) associated with the mental consciousness (manovijñānasamprayukta) which includes vikalpas (or "judgements" as here: "Beings, endowed with bad bodily actions..."; Darsāṇa, on the contrary, is discernment associated with the visual consciousness, and as such free from vikalpa (avikalpika prajñā, see i.33a-b, English trans. p. 97).

Some references to jñānadarsana:

i. Worldly insight-consciousness.

a. The Buddha possesses asaṅga apratihata jñānadarśana with respect to the past, present, and future (last three avenikās of the Mahāvṛttapatti, 9. Kośa, vii. note 162); this nāṇadarsana is atiraka, Dīgha, iii.134.

Nāṇadarsana has previous existences for its sphere, Nettipakarana, 28.

b. The ascetic obtains nāṇadarsana through ālokasaṅgāmanasikāra (by having, both day and night, the idea that it is daytime, divaṁsaṅgā); in this way sappabhaśam cittam bhāveto, Dīgha, ii.223.

c. The Bodhisattva obtains nāṇadarsana after sāmaṁsāṃpad, before the jñānas, Majjhima, i.203.

d. The Bodhisattva, before Bodhi, purifies his nāṇadarsana: he saṁjñānatis the obhāsa but does not see the rūpas; then the gods, Anuttara, iv.302.

e. The Nigantha affirms that "going, staying in place, lying down, awakening, nāṇadarsana is present in me without interruption," Anuttara, i.220, iv.428.

f. The jñānadarśana of Śakra views what is below, Āvadānasataka, i.189.

g. Bodhisattvasya sarvavidyāstānena avyāhata pariśuddhabhā pariśavādātā jñānadarśanam (Bodhisattvabhūmi, I.xv, Muséon 1906, 22a); later, by virtue of vipajyanāpariśuddhi, this jñānadarśana acquires prthuśraddhāvaiśpulyutā.

ii. Consciousness, knowledge, samābodha.

a. Kośa, vi.75b, ṛṣa = dassana; Majjhima, i.173: ṛṣaṁ nesaṁ dassanam udapādi: akuppa no vimusti; Mahāvṛttapatti, 81.9: vimuktaṁ vimukto'smi ti jñānadarśanam bhavati; this is the vimuktiṣjñānadarśanakhandha (ibid. 4.5, Kośa, vi. p. 1033, vii. p. 1157).
b. Kosa, vi.54, dasana = cakṣus, jñāna, vidyā, buddhi.

c. Mahāvyutpatti, 245.51: samyak pratyāmam jñānadarśanām pravartate.

d. Āṅguttara, ii.200: abhābba te jñānadarśanāya anvittarāya abhisambodhāya.

156. Why does the text say: "The abhijñā of divine sight has jñānadarśana for its result," and not: "The cultivation of the absorption of the abhijñā of divine sight has jñānadarśana for its result?" The Vākyāya explains:

abhā / divyacaksurabhijñā jñānadarśanāya samavartata ity uktam na ca divyacaksurabhijñāsāmādhibhāvanā / atrocute / ayam phale betūpacāraḥ / yasya betohā samādhibhāvanāyā divyacaksurabhijñāḥ phalam tatra phale betūpacāraḥ / jñānadarśanāyā samādhibhāvanetī / yeśāṃ puraṇa ayam pākṣāḥ śadvidhā muktimārgadhir (vii.42) iti dhyā nasamṛghit eva mānasya vimuktimārgaḥ saḥ abhijñā iti tesām acodyam evitayat tesām vimuktimārgānām samādhitavāt / pūrvaka eva tu pakṣodbhīdharmakosascintīkaṇānām ity avagantavāyāt / divyacaksuṣrūtravijñānāyōr abhijñānāvānabhiṣṭavāt.


158. The dharmas or guṇas, "qualities," of the Three D̄hatuṣ are aṣubha, anāpānasmṛti, araṇa (viii.36), pranidhiḥ, abhiñā, vimoṣa (viii.32), abhibhūyatana, etc. The pure "qualities" are vimokṣaṃukha (viii.25), vyutkṛṣṭaksaṃdṛṣṭi, etc.

159. Vākyāya: traibhātukā anāsravā iti traibhātukā aṣubha ... / atra tu samādhisamaprayogat prāyokīgānām guṇānām samādhibhāvanetī upacāraḥ.

160. Vākyāya: bodhisattvo hi karmāntarpayavekṣeyānaṃ niśkrānto jambumule prathamam dhyāṇam utpādāvatāvān (see Kosa, iii. 41) / bodhimule ca devapratamāraṃ bhāṅkātvā prathame yāme dhyāṇam cakṣuḥ utpādāvān / tena divyena cakṣuḥ sattvān cunyupapattasamākā nasthi bhāṅkātvā prahāviṣaya tatparitānānaḥ mahāyāne yāme dhyāṇavimoṣasamāpattīḥ samāmukhiṣṭavān / teṣām prāyogikaguṇaḥ prajñāprabhādāvya jāyante / tatas tṛṣṭīye yāme caturtham dhyāṇam niṣṛṣṭi niyāṇam (vi.26a) avakramya yāvadavajropamaṃ samādhibhā sarvayojanaprabhānam kṛtavān (Compare Majjhima, i.22). On the conquest of Bodhi by the Bodhisattva, vii. p. 1145.

161. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 420b8. "Why explain the Immeasurables immediately after the dhyānaṃ? Because the dhyānaṃ give rise to or produce the Immeasurable; because the dhyānaṃ and the Immeasurables reciprocally occasion one another; because the Immeasurables are the best qualities among [those that produce the] dhyānaṃ."

162. Mahāvyutpatti, 69; Dīgha, iii.223, catasso appamaṇḍaññayo; Dīgha, TD 1, p. 50c24, Ekottara, TD 2, p. 658a21, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 563b8.

These are the Four Brahmavīharas. Visuddhimagga, Atthasālini, 192, Itivuttaka, 15, Bodhisatvavabhūmi, Muséon, 1911, p. 177, Yogaśūtram i.33; cultivated by a Rājarasipravrajīta, Divya, 122.

Considered by many sects as parts of Bodhi (Bhavya), Kosa, vi. p.281; they figure in the presentation of the Path, Āṅguttara, i.38, between the dhyānaṃ and the smṛtyupasthānās.

On maitri and araṇa, Kosa, vii.36; formula of maitri, iv.124; difference between karuṇā and mahākaruṇā, vii.37.

Samghabhadra (in his Nyāyānusāra, TD 29, p. 769b17) observes here that the Immeasurables do no good to another. Why are they good and not morally neutral? Because they oppose hatred, etc.; because they assure the mind of mastery over itself.

On the miracles that maitrīsamāpattana manifests, Divya, 1886.2, Cullavagga, v.6, 1; Dīgha, ii.238, etc.

163. Paramārtha omits the second reason. P’u-kuang (TD 41, p. 433a10), because they produce immeasurable retributive results and outflowing results. Three reasons in Fa-pao
164. Vyāhāya: advesavahāvatvān maitrī vyāpādapratipakṣah / duṣkhāpanayanākaratvāc ca karunā duṣkhopasamārākāryāv vibhimsāyāḥ pratipakṣo bhavati / mudita cārateḥ pratipakṣah saumanasyaupatvāt / upeksā ca mādyasthayāt kāmaragavyāpādayoh pratipakṣa iti (āpalsāpātiśte naḥy anunīto nāpi pratihata iti), v.47, note 170.

165. Sarīghabhadra (in his Nyāyānysāra, TD 26, p. 769b16) says the contrary: Aśūbhā and upeksā oppose, in this order, sexual desire and the other desires. On the attachment to visible things, below viii.32a.

166. We do not mean to say that a single dharma, upeksā, possesses two natures; we mean to say that the word upeksā designates both non-desire and non-hatred.

167. Sukhitā vata sattvāḥ. The meaning is: "May they be happy!" Maitriibhāvanā analyzed as punyakriyāvastu, iv.112c; its efficacy, iv.121b; above note 162.

168. Duṣkhitvata sattvāḥ. The intention is: "May they be delivered from suffering!"

169. Compare the anumodanā of the Mahāyāna (Bodhibhāvatāra, Third Chapter).

170. The absence of sympathy (anunaya) and antipathy (pratighāta). On saṃskāropeksā, iii.35d.

171. See ii.72, English trans. p. 320, adhimuktimanasikāra; vi.9, viii.32, 34, 35.

172. Dīgga, i.250, iii.223, etc.

173. Maulaśuddhakadhyānabhūmikatvāt: "They have the fundamental dhyānas of the sūdhaka or pure category for their sphere" (viii.5). The prefatory (sāmantaka) absorptions bring about worldly abandoning of the defilements, not fundamental absorptions (viii.21c).

174. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 427b14. Do the Apramāṇas bring about the abandoning of the defilements? No. The abandoning (prabhāṇa) of the defilements is of two types, temporary abandoning and definitive abandoning. Concerning the first abandoning, the Sūtra says that the Apramāṇas cause abandoning; of the second, the Saṃdhikandha says that they do not bring about the abandoning.

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 819b10. Why do the Apramāṇas not bring about the abandoning of the defilements? For the following reasons: 1. on account of the diversity of their aspects; sixteen aspects cut off the defilements: the four aspects of the Apramāṇas do not; 2. the Apramāṇas are adhimuktimanasikāra; and only tattvamanasikāra cuts off the defilements; 3. the Apramāṇa are anugrahamanasikara (tseng-i 增益），beneficial act of attention; and only the acts of attention which do not have this characteristic cut off the defilements; 4. the Apramāṇas have for their object the present; and only the Path which has the three time periods, or the asamskṛta for its object, cuts off the defilements; and 5. only anantaryāmārga cuts off the defilements; and the Apramāṇas are obtained at the moment of vimuktimārga.

175. Hsüan-tsang adds: "He has the idea that they are delivered from suffering and obtain happiness."

176. Hsüan-tsang adds: "From equanimity one passes through the other categories to the moment when one has, for his greatest friends, the same thought as for those to whom he is indifferent."


Dīgga, ii.70 (Lotus, 824; Dialogues; O. Franke, 212), Atthasālini 190, Pañcimabhidā
magga, ii.38, Dhammasangani, 248 (seven).

Mahāvyutpatti, 70 (according to the Saṃgītāparyāya, TD 26, p. 443a26); Chavannes, Religieux éminents, p. 164, compare the Mahāvyutpatti and the Numerical Dictionary.

Vasubandhu follows Vibbhāṣa, TD 27, p. 434b15, where the svabhāva (nature) of the Vimokṣa, their bhāmi (the stage in which one produces them), their āśraya (the persons who produce them), their ākāra (aspect), their ālambana (object), their smṛtyupasthāna (of which "application of mindfulness" they consist), their lābha (mode of acquisition), etc. are explained.

178. Text of the Vyākhya:

a. rūpī rūpāṇi paśayati.

b. adhyātmaṁ arūpasamjñīi babhiradhā rūpāṇi paśayati.

c. suḥham vīmokṣaṁ kāyena sākṣātkarṇāvatāpasya vīharati.

d. sarvavo rūpasamjñānāṁ samatikramāṁ pratighasamjñānāṁ āstāyamamān nānātvasamjñānāṁ amanasikārārd anantām āśayas anantām āśayas ity ākāsānantaṁyāyatanam upasaṁpadya vīharati tad yathā devā ākāsānantaṁyāyatanopagāḥ.

e. punar aparāṁ sarvaśā ākāsānantaṁyāyatanam samatikramāṁ vinānaṁ anantām viṇānaṁ iti viṇānaṁyāyatanam upasaṁpadya vīharati tadyathā devā viṇānaṁyāyatanopagāḥ.

f. punar aparāṁ sarvaśā viṇānaṁyāyatanam samatikramāṁ nāstī kim cid ity ākāsānantaṁyāyatanam upasaṁpadya vīharati tadyathā devā ākāsānantaṁyāyatanopagāḥ.

g. punar aparāṁ sarvaśā ākāsānantaṁyāyatanam samatikramāṁ viṇānaṁyāyatanam upasaṁpadya vīharati tadyathā devā viṇānaṁyāyatanopagāḥ.

h. punar aparāṁ sarvaśā viṇānaṁyāyatanam samatikramāṁ viṇānaṁyāyatanam upasaṁpadya vīharati tadyathā devā viṇānaṁyāyatanopagāḥ.

179. It is very difficult to interpret this formula.

a. The Pāli sources read rūpi rūpāni passati; the Vyākhya comments: rūpi rūpāṇiti svātmanī rūpāni vibhāvya bahir āpi rūpāṇi paśayati.

Paramārtha, Hsūan-tsang, one of the versions of the Mahāvyutpatti, 70, and Harivarman (in his Tattvasiddhi), read adhyātmaṁ rūpasamjñīi babhiradhā rūpāṇi paśayati (which is the formula of the Abhibhūyatanaṁ, viii.35).

b. The exegesis of the Abhidhamma is developed in Paṭisambhidā, ii.38a and elsewhere: the ascetic considers rūpa (blue, nila, etc.) which is internal and external (First Vimokṣa), and then only external rūpa (Second Vimokṣa). It appears probable that the Kośa intends the same.

c. What is the meaning of the expression rūpāṇi vibhāvya (Vyākhya quoted above a.)? According to Atthasālinī, 163: “In the expressions rūpam saṁñāṁ vibbhāvehi, the word vibbhāvāna signifies antarabhāpana, to make disappear.” Above, Kośa, viii.3a, vibbhārūpasamjñā = which makes the notion of rūpa disappear.

Harivarman translates vibbhāvāna as "to expell, break." “First Vimokṣa: adhyātmaṁ rūpasamjñīi babhiradhā rūpāṇi paśayati [=He grasps the notion of internal rūpa (=of the body) as being horrible (aśubha), and continues to see external rūpa: The ascetic, by this Vimokṣa breaks and rends (p'o-lih 破裂 ) rūpa. How do we know this? Because, in the Second Vimokṣa, it is said: adhyātmaṁ arūpasamjñīi babhiradhā rūpāṇi paśayati. The ascetic is termed adhyātmaṁ arūpasamjñīi, because he has broken internal rūpa. By this we know that in the First Vimokṣa the ascetic sees only external rūpa, the internal rūpa having been eliminated. In the Third Vimokṣa, the external rūpa also having been eliminated, the ascetic no longer sees internal and external rūpa. This is what is called the notion of rūpa, he abandons-destroys desire; he does not see any internal or external ātman.” Compare Suttaniṭṭha, 1113: vibbhārūpasāṃñāsā sabbakāyaappabhāyino (the Chinese reads kāma) ajjhattam ca babiddhā ca n'atthi kim ciṣi passato.

180. Hsūan-tsang differs. Kārikā: The Vimokṣa are of eight types. The first three are
non-desire (alobha); two are in two absorptions; one in one absorption... Bhāya:... the first two are, by their nature, non-desire, because they oppose desire. The Sūtras (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 582a17) define Vimokṣa by saying that the ascetic sees (pasyati): [it does not mean that Vimokṣa is sight; it expresses itself thus] because seeing increases Vimokṣa. Hsüan-tsang puts into the text of Vasubandhu the definition of Vibhāṣa volume 84 (TD 27, p. 434b28) [where it is noted that the eighth Vimokṣa is a cittaviprayuktasamāskāraskandha].

181. This opposition is dūribhāvatipakṣa "opposition which renders distant" (v.61, p. 855) for, from the fact that the ascetic enters into the First Dhyāna, attachment to the rūpa of Kāmadhātu is already abandoned (prabhīna: by means of a prabhānapratipakṣa realized in anāgamyavīmaṇḍita, viii. p. 1268, line 25).

182. See iii.43: One does not die in a state of samādhi.

183. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p.434c1: Why are they called Vimokṣas? What is the meaning of vimokṣa? The meaning of vimokṣa is "rejection" (ch'i-pei 殃背, to discard, turn the back on)... The first two reject the mind of desire for rūpa (rūpalobha-citta); the third rejects asubha-samājñā; the Four Vimokṣas of Arūpyadhātu each reject the mind of the sphere immediately below; the Vimokṣa of nirodhasamāpatti rejects any thought having an object (sālambanacitta). Consequently the meaning of vimokṣa is "rejection." The Bhadanta says that the Vimokṣas are so called because they are obtained by the force of adhimokṣa; according to Pāśva, because they are the locus wherein one rejects.

184. See ii.44d, vi.64a, viii.196. Majjhima, i.160, 301,333,400,456, Aṅguttara, iv.426,448.

185. Hsüan-tsang corrects: "because it turns its back on everything that has an object (sālamba)," that is to say, the mind and mental states.

186. Hsüan-tsang: "The Eight Vimokṣa is called Vimokṣa because it delivers..."

187. The obstacle is the ineptitude of the mind (akarmayatā) which causes a person detached from the three Dhātus to be incapable at the same time of entering the First Dhyāna.

188. Vibhāṣa TD 27, p. 774a14: The Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins maintain that a subtle mind is not destroyed in nirodhasamāpatti. According to them, there is no being (sattva) without matter (rūpa), and there is no absorption without the mind. If absorption were free from mind, the vital organ (jīvitendriya) would be cut off; one would say that [the ascetic] is dead and not that he is in an absorption. In order to refute this opinion, one indicates that nirodhasamāpatti is absolutely without mind. See Kośa, ii.44d, note 253.

189. Definition of Bhavāgra, viii.4c.

190. According to the Mahāyāna, the "entering mind" of this absorption is always anāsrava, and the leaving mind is of two types, anāsrava or sāsrava... Among the Buddhas, the Eight Vimokṣas are anāsrava; among others, the Eighth is always anāsrava, the first seven are of two types accordingly as they have for their nature worldly or transworldly knowledge (laukikalokottarajñāna).
191. **Anvayajñā** is the Path with the exception of the part of Path relative to Kamadhatu. The Vyākhyā indicates the spheres where the Vimokṣas are cultivated: eleven spheres by excluding seven sāmantakas.


193. Ākāśa is the object of the ākāśaṁantyayatana Vimokṣa.

194. Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 436b10: Because he wishes to assure himself whether the kusālamulas are complete (man • 滿 ) or not. The ascetic thinks: Even though I contemplate the horrible (āsubha), I do not produce any defilements, but I do not know if the kusālamulas are complete; if, by contemplating the agreeable, the defilements do not arise, I would know that the kusālamulas are complete.

195. See vii.42, 48. On abhinirbhāra, see Speyer, Avadānaśataka, ii.221; index of the Mahāvastu and the Divya; Mahāvyutpati, 21.88, 25.12; Lévi ad Sūrālamkāra, iv.12; Rhys Davids-Stede.


196. Vyākhyā: atra sākṣātkṛtveti pratyākṣikṛtyety arthāh / upasampadya vibharati tām samāpattiṁ samapadya vibharitī arthāh.

vi.43c, 58b (p. 1006), 63; viii. p. 1232. Uttarādhyayana, v.23, SBE, 45, p. 23.

Compare the expressions phusati cetasamādhim, nirodham (Dīgha, 184), and catasso appamaññīyo (Theragāthā, 386), etc.

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 776a21: In the other Sūtras, the Bhagavat employs, in the definition of the Eight Vimokṣas, the expression kāyena sākṣātkṛtva upasampadya vibharati; notably in the Mahāhetupratyayasūtra .. Some say: "The Third and Eighth Vimokṣas are found at the end of the two Dhātus . . ." Some say: "These two Vimokṣas are found at the end of two bbūmis . . ."
of the Three Dvipas; one only obtains them with a human āśraya.

In a different usage of the word, a certain dhyaṇa, or a certain bhūmi is the āśraya, or the support, of the acquisition of a certain "knowledge," etc.

198. Dīgha, ii.110. iii.260, Samyutta, iv.85, Majjhima, ii.13, Visuddhimagga, 175, Atthasālinī, 187.

Mahāvyutpatti, 71; Śūtrālaṁkāra, xx-xxi.44.

When an ascetic considers the six āyatanas (physical matter, sound, etc.) without producing any bad ideas, these āyatanas have prevailed, abhibhūta: such as the ten abhibhāyatanas, Samyutta, iv.77.


In the Madhyama version, ch’u-ch’u 除處 “expelling āyata,” Paramārtha, chib-ju 制入 , Hsūn-tsang, sheng-ch’u 勝處 (abhi-āyatana). The abhibhūya of the formula tāni rūpāny abhibhūya is translated by chib-hsiu 制修 (control-bhāvana) or by ch’u 去 (to expel, vinodana, apanayana, vibhāvana).

199. Pañc.: eko babirdhā.


On jāna and darśana, above viii.27c.

201. On ākārayati, vi. p. 931, vii,p. 1144

202. The classical list Anguttara, v.46, 60 (Comm. i.27.10), Majjhima, i.423. ii.14, Dīgha, iii.268 (Sumaṅgala, i.115, Franke, p.210); Visuddhi, 110, replaces the last two by āloka, paricchinnakāsakāsana (see Childers); the last two omitted occasionally in Paṭisambhidā. On ālokanasakāsana, etc., vii. p. 1160, 1177.

Visuddhimagga, 425 (see Index and Warren, 293), Atthasālinī, 185, Compendium, passim; Spence Hardy, Eastern Monachism, 252; Kern, Geschiedenis, i.393 ("universal or cosmic circles"); Yogāvacara-Manual, p. xxix; Rhys Davis-Stede.

Mahāvyutpatti, 72, Saṁgītiśāpyāya, 11th section, Śūtrālaṁkāra, vii. 9, xx. 44.

These summary remarks in the Kośa have been extracted from a more complete treatise in the Vībhāṣā.

203. Paramārtha sometimes (TD 29, p. 303b12) translates kṛṣṇa as pien 遍 (= total), sometimes (p. 303b18) as uu-pien 無邊 (= ananta). There are Ten Kṛṣṇāyatanas (pien ju 遍入). They are called kṛṣṇa (uu-pien) because they totally embrace one type without interval-crack. What dharmas are kṛṣṇa (uu-pien)? Earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white: these contain rūpa (literally: rūpalaksanāni) . . . There are some masters who say that the vāyu-kṛṣṇāyata (feng uu-pien ju 風無邊入) has tangible things for its object.

The Vībhāṣā, TD 27, p. 440b17, translates kṛṣṇa by pien 遍 . . . They are called Kṛṣṇāyatanas for two reasons: because they do not present any interval (chien 間), and because they are extended (kuang-ta 廣大): on the one hand, the act of imaginative attention (adhimuktimanaskāra) bears exclusively on blue, etc., without being mixed with any other characteristic; on the other hand, the act of attention, bearing on all blue, etc., has for its object an infinite characteristic. The Bhadanta says: "Because their object is large-extended (k’uan-kuang 廣大), and because there is no interval-crack (chien-bsi 間隙)."

204. This last phrase is not in Hsūn-tsang.

205. This problem is examined Visuddhimagga, 415.

206. The cause or hetu, is the ārūpya absorption acting as sabbhāgabetu, that is to say, leading to a new ārūpya absorption.
207. Someone who produces an ārūpya absorption falls from this absorption, dies, and is reborn in a heaven of Rūpadhātu by virtue of some former action: there he will produce a new ārūpya absorption because the preceding ārūpya absorption is close (āsanna). Someone frequently enters an ārūpya absorption: he has a strong habit (abhikṣānābhyaśa) with respect to it; he dies, is reborn into Rūpadhātu, and here he will produce an ārūpya absorption again.

In the same way, born in Ākāśānāntyayatana, one could produce a higher ārūpya absorption, Viśānānāntyayatana, etc.

208. Someone accomplished an action which should be retributed in Ārūpyadātātu, not immediately upon his death, but in a later birth (iv.50). By reason of other actions “of immediate retribution,” he is first reborn in Rūpadhātu. The imminence of the retribution of the action retributable in Ārūpyadātātu makes this person produce an ārūpya absorption. This is necessary for the retribution of this action, for not being detached from the sphere where he is born (adhisthāna avitarāga), namely of Rūpadhātu, this person could not be reborn in Ārūpyadātātu if he were not detached from it, by an ārūpya absorption of the said sphere.

209. When the universe perishes by fire, Kāmadhātu and the heavens of the First Dhyāna disappear; when it perishes by water, the heavens of the Second Dhyāna disappear; when it perishes by wind, the disappearance also includes the spheres of the Third Dhyāna (Kośa, iii.100c-d). Thus, at the end of the world, all beings should be reborn in spheres sheltered from this destruction, and so they should produce absorptions entailing rebirth in the heavens of the Second, Third or Fourth Dhyāna.

Hsuan-tsang: The receptacle or physical world begins to perish by the force of dharmatā. Such is the law of nature (dharmatā) of beings in the lower spheres that they produce higher dhyānas, because, under these circumstances (avastha), the good dharmas undergo full development by the force of this dharmatā. Beings in the two higher Dhātus (in the heavens of the Fourth Dhyāna and in Ārūpyadātātu) produce ārūyasamāpatti by the force of cause and actions, and not by the force of dharmatā, for the Anabhāraka gods, etc. (Fourth Dhyāna) are not affected by the three catastrophes.

Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 779a28: Why do beings in Rūpadhātu first produce the dhyānas, the ārūyas, and not nirodhasamāpatti? They produce the dhyānas by reason of three causes (pratyaya): 1. by the force of cause (hetubala): in a former existence, they produced, and destroyed, the dhyānas; 2. by the force of action (karmabala): they did and accumulated actions of necessary retribution which should be retributed in a later existence in a sphere of dhyāna; this action will give forth its fruit; and 3. by the force of the “nature of things” (dharmatā): when the world perishes, beings in the lower spheres are necessarily reborn above . . . The first two reasons hold for the production of the ārūyas.


On dharmatā, see ii.46, English trans. p. 248, iv.17a, 20, 67, vi.34a.

211. On vāsanā, see vii. p. 1137 to 1143. Here, the good dharmas are adhipatipratyaya.

212. As long as the Good Law lasts, it is possible to know all the dharmas, pure and impure, to which Dhātu and sphere they belong, their aspect, etc.

213. According to Paramārtha. Hsuan-tsang: All these diversely specified dharmas have for their goal the expansion and duration of the Good Law. What is the Good Law? How long will it last?
214. The Saddhamma is threefold: pariyattisaddhamma: all the words of the Buddha in the Three Piṭakas; paṭipattisaddhamma: the thirteen dhutagunas, the fourteen khandhakavattas, the eighty-two mahāvattas, sīla, samādhi, and vipaśyanā; and adbigamasaddhamma: the four āriyamaggas, the four fruits and Nirvāṇa (Samantapāsādikā, i.225). See below note 219.

215. The twelve āṅgas are enumerated in the Abbisamayālaṁkārāloka:

sūtram geyam vyākaraṇam gāthodānāvādanakam /
iśvrtikam niśānam vaipulyam ca sajātakam /
upadeśo’dbhutā dharma dvādaśāngam idām vacaḥ //

216. It appears that “holiness” is not too bad an equivalent for adbigama, since adbigama is defined as being “the dharmas attendant upon Bodhi plus the results of brahmacarya.” [It is through the bodhipāksikas that brahmacariya is addhāniya ciraṭhitika, Dīgha, iii.27.] Moreover adbigama signifies “penetration, intelligence.”

Adbigama is a synonym for satyābīsamayā (see vi.27) in the definition of the three prajñās or discernments: A fool (bāla) is one who lacks innate (upapattilahbhikā) prajñā which proceeds from the traces of a former cultivation (parvābhāyāsavāsānāṁśrījāta); unlearned (aśrutavān) is one who lacks the prajñā which arises from the Teaching (āgama); an ordinary person (prthajasāna) is one who lacks the prajñā which arises from adbigama, which arises from the comprehension of the Truths (yasyādibigamaṁ satyābīsamayā nāsti . . . ) (iii.28a).

The Bodhisattvabhumi, in the definition of “refuge” (pratisarana), defines jñāna, which is a refuge—as adbigama-jñāna created from absorption, bhāvanāmya (See iv. English trans. p. 655, notes 341 to 343 and below Chapter IX, trans. Hsuan-tsang, xxix.l5a, note).

217. a. Hsün-tsang translates: “As long as there are bearers, preachers, and acquirers, the Law will endure.”

The two Chinese translators distinguish three categories: the first two (those who bear and those who preach) with respect to the āgama; the third (those who acquire) with respect to the adbigama. The āgama lasts as long as the first two categories exist; the adbigama lasts as long as the third exists. Thus the Law lasts because of these three classes of persons.

Paramārtha (TD 29, p. 303c23) adds: Why? Because there are two causes of the duration of the Good Law: speaking correctly and receiving correctly. There are some other masters who say that the Law lasts one thousand years: this is in reference to the adbigama, not to the āgama which lasts longer. Why? In the future, persons capable of bearing the Law will be of two types: those who believe by reason of hearing, and those who believe by reason of correct intelligence (? cheng-chieh 正解 ). The gods protect these persons in order that the āgama and the adbigama do not quickly disappear. Consequently one should, both literally and in meaning, meditate and practice.

b. Saṅghhabhadra (in his Nyāyānasūtra, TD 29, p. 775b1) corrects Vasubandhu on many points and adds some interesting details: The Saddharma of the Bhagavat is twofold, āgama and adbigama. The āgama is Sūtra, Vinaya, and Abhidharma. The adbigama is the pure path (anāśramaṁgāra) of the Three Vehicles. [For Vasubandhu, this is the bodhipāksikas which are not all necessarily pure.] As long as the adbigama-saddharmas lasts in the world, the āgama-saddharmas, increased and sustained by it, also lasts. At present, in the East, the adbigama-dharmapsis disappearing; the āgama has much disappeared. As the adbigama-dharmas flourishes in the North, the good āgama of the Bhagavat is being extended and augmented. Consequently, this is the land of the supreme knowledge of the Tathāgatas (... jñānāgocara). The Āryans dwell therein; the correct sense of the Abhidharma flourishes in this country; not in the East, etc., where tradition and practice are impossible (?). The āgama-adharmas, essentially depends on its "bearers" (dhātar, those who have learned it) and preachers in order for it to last in the world; the adbigama lasts solely depending on "those who practice" (pratipattar). But these are not only the supports of the adbigama; the āgama-adharmas also depends on pratipattar: as long as persons practice the Dharma without error (aviparīta), the adbigama will last; as long as the adbigama lasts, the āgama will last.
For the disappearance of the Law in the West, compare the Dreams of Krkin, *Vinaya of the Mahisásakas* (Wu-fen Lù, TD 22, p. 172a7), Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, II. p. 348. The eleventh dream (a piece of water whose center is troubled but whose sides are calm and clear) signifies that the Good Law will begin to disappear in the Middle (Kingdoms), but that it will prosper in the frontier kingdoms.

218. The *Vyākhya* approves of this explanation: *eṣa eva pākṣo yuṣṭa iti paśyāmah.*

219. a. Condition for the duration of the Law (respect for the Buddha; no mention of years), *Anūțṭara*, iv.84. *anāgatabhaya*, iii.15, 108, etc.


b. *Cullavagga*, x.1.6: "If women had not been admitted, this *brahmaścārya* would last a long time, it would last one thousand years; but as they have been admitted, this *brahmaścārya* will not last for a long time: the Saddharma will last five hundred years." No mention of years in the *Bhikṣunīkarmavācana* (Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, 1920, p. 125.), nor in Rockhill, *Life*, p.60.

Same doctrine in the *Pi-ni-mu ching* (TD 24, p. 818c5), where the explanation is given by Kāśyapa (Przybuski, *Açoka*, p. 173); see also *Madhyama, TD* 1, p. 607b8 (quoted by Saeki). Saeki also quotes the *Vinaya of the Mahisásakas* (TD 22, p. 186a14) "'If the Bhikṣunis observe the eight *gurudharmas*, the Law will last one thousand years.'"

But, in the *Vinaya of the Sarvāśṭīvādins* ("judgment of Ānanda"), the duration of the Law is limited to one thousand years because women have been admitted. Same doctrine in the other texts relative to the First Council (Przybuski, *ibid.*).

*Aṣokāvadāna*, and many other texts, have one thousand years; the *Mahāmāyāsūtra, TD* 12, p. 1013b21 - 1014a2, has fifteen hundred years (Przybuski, p. 161-173); see also the *[Fo lin nieh-p'an chi] Fa-chu ching, TD 12, p. 1113a2-c10.*

*I-ching* (Takakusu, 106) quotes the *Vinaya*: "As long as there is a *karmācārya* (? "the Upholders of rules"), my Law will not be destroyed. When there will be no person who "upholds and supports" the *karman*, my Law will end," and again: "As long as my precepts exist, I shall live." *Sum. Vil.* i.11.


"Disappearance of the shadow of the Buddha ... and how many Arhats do we have who can preserve the Good Law? It is said in a Treatise: The Great Lion has closed his eyes and his witnesses have disappeared one after the other ...," *I-ching*, Takakusu, p. 106 [compare above p. 1282].

The *Vajracchedikātikā*, Mdo, xvi. fol. 234a, explaining *Vajracchedikā*, p. 22: *paścime kāle paścime samaye paścimāyām paṇcaśatayām saddharmavipralopakāle vartamāne: *It is well known (prasiddha) that the teaching of the Bhagavat lasts five times five hundred years; this is why the text specifies: during the last period of five hundred years, for it is then that the five *kaśyās* (iii.4c, 93a) increase."

Nanjo (in Max Müller, *SBE.* 49, p. 116) mentions the *Mahāsāṃnipātasūtra* (TD 13, p. 363a29): In the first five hundred years, the Bhikṣus and others will be "strong in deliberation" (will obtain *satyābhīsamaya*?); in the second period of five hundred years, they will be strong in meditation (*samādhi, dhyāna*); in the third, in Scripture (*sūtra*); in the fourth, the building of monasteries; and in the fifth, in quarrels and slander. The White Law will become invisible.
d. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 226c6: In the Period when the Saddarma of Kaśyapa began to perish, a pratirūpaka Dharma arose; when this has arisen, the Saddharm will have perished." Saddharmapundarikā, 67.7: "The Saddharm of Padmaprabha will last thirty-two antarakalpas; when it is destroyed, the saddharmapratirūpaka will last the same number of kalpas"; 577: "The Saddharm of Jitavara was destroyed, and in the period when the saddharmapratirūpakā was disappearing, this religion (śāsana) was overrun by Bhikṣus who attributed to themselves spiritual gifts which they did not possess . . . ."

220. According to Hsüan-tsang. According to Paramārtha: I have presented in this treatise the Abhidharma of the Buddha Bhagavat. Have I presented it according to the school of the Sautrāntikas or as it is presented in the Viśbāṣa?

According to the Viśākhyā: Is the Abhidharma that I have taught here, namely the Abhidharmakośa, the Abhidharma of the canonical Treatises, the Abhidharma of the Jñānaprasthāna, etc.?

221. Viśākhyā: yo’yam iti vistaraḥ / yo’yam ibhābhidharmakosālaścana ‘bhiddharmakutaḥ kim eṣa eva sāstrābhidharmo jñānaprasthānādhibhikṣaṇo déśito’ta idam ucyate / kāśmiravaiśbāṣikā svāhātiśādhiḥ iti vistaraḥ / kāśmire bhavāḥ kāṁśābh ādityānābhaḥ / viśbāṣyāyād divyanta viśbāṣikā īti vyākhyātām etat / santi kāśmira na vaśbāṣikāe ye vinayacintādāyaḥ sāutrāntikā īti bhuddantādāyaḥ / santi vaśbāṣikā īti kāśmira ye bahirdeśaḥ īty udbhayavīṣeṣaṃ / ūśāṃ nityāḥ siddho śadābh ‘bhiddharmāḥ sa prāyene bahārīḥ / arthād uktām bhāvat / anyānātīśādhipi deśita īty / yad durgrhitam kāśmiravaiśbāṣikānayayānayayena vā tad iha vacane ’smadoga ’smadāpārādhab / kim kārṣānaṃ ēty āha / saddharmaniśṭo muṇayaḥ prāmāṇam īty / saddharmam āyamam ābhibhāṣikānāśa sa sāravār avadabdhaḥ bhagavanto buddhāpputrāḥ ca rṣayārṣavatiputtūrādyayaḥ prāmāṇam sarvākārasarvadhammavārdbodha āpāta īty arthaḥ.

222. a. Hsüan-tsang: "The discussion of the Abhidharma of the Viśbāṣikas of Kaśmir [=the Five Hundred Arhats, according to Saeki] is correctly established. [There is perhaps a mistake here with respect to the sense of siddha.] It is by depending on them that I have, in general, presented the Abhidharma. That which is false is my fault. The authority for judging the Dharma is only the Buddhas and the Mahāsāvakas."

b. Saṁghabhadra (in his Nyāyāṇusāra, TD29, p. 775b18): "... It is by depending on them that I have, in general, presented the Abhidharma. Here the Sautrāntika [= Vasubandhu] presents his fundamental thought, saying: Depending on the Mahāvaiśbāṣa, discussing the principles of the Abhidharma of the Saugatas of this land, and making an effort to correctly understand to the end that the Good Law will last a long time for the salvation of beings, I have composed this treatise. The great bulk of this book presents the system [of the Viśbāṣa]; a smaller part follows other paths, for example with respect to physical matter as shape (saṁsthitarūpa, iv. English trans. p. 557), with respect to the past and future (v.27), etc. But the nature of the dharmas is very profound, and my intelligence is weak: I am not capable of diligently searching out (chūn-chūn 勤求 ) the Preacher of Truth (yatbhābhuśūdām ) (?). Consequently, in the interpretation (niṣi) presented in this long treatise, if one small part is poorly supported (durgrhita = pien-liang 贬量 = of contestable authority; the meaning is perhaps "If I have, sometimes, reproduced some incorrect doctrines ..."), it is my fault. The Buddhas, having accumulated the provisions of knowledge (jñānaśambhāra) know any object of consciousness. The Pratyekabuddhas cannot judge the characteristics of the dharmas; even less the Śrāvakas, for the Dharma that they realize depends on a teaching. Thus, in order to judge the dharmas, there are only the true great Munis. By this we know that the Abhidharma is truly the word of the Buddha. One should accept it with faith, practice-meditate on it correctly, and diligently search out deliverance."

c. Paramārtha (TD 29, p. 304a5): The Viśbāṣikas of Kaśmir possess the two cheng1 = 二證 . This Abhidharma—the Abhidharmakośa—has been presented by me, in
general, conforming to their doctrine. If there is here anything that is badly grasped, it is my fault. In lieu of cheng capable of correctly judging the Good Law, only the Buddhas Bhagavats are the supreme measure (pramāṇa). Why? Because they immediately see all the dharmas. Apart from Scripture (āgama) and the Path (mārga), the Āryaśrāvākās of the Buddha are not even a mediocre measure in correctly judging the Good Law.

1. What is this twofold cheng (= sākṣin, pratibhā, etc.)? Perhaps persons who possess the āgama and the adhigama (as explained viii.39a), in other words the āgama and the mārga.

223. The first stanza is quoted in I-ching, Takakusu, p. 106.

Vyākhyā: nimilite sāstari lokacaksusiti / parinirvāte bhagavati lokasya cakṣurbhāte mārgāmārgasamādarsake / anenāndhabhūtatām lokasya darśayati // kṣayam gate sākṣijane ca bhūyaseti / sāksād draṣṭarī sākṣi / mārgāmārgajño bhagavan iti ye'dbigatatatvatā bhagavataḥ sākṣijanaḥ sabhyabhūtaḥ / tasmin parimitvāne kṣine / avidyāndhārṣṭatattvāir niravagrahāir niraṅkūsaib svayamārṣṭikatayā kutarkāpannair bhavadhīr bhagavataḥ sāsanām granthataḥ cārt bhātaḥ cākulaṁ kṛtam // gate hi śāntim paramāṁ svayambhūvityādi pūrvaślokākṣāyārthasya beturūpo'yaṁ dvitiyāḥ sloka upanyasyate / buddhabuddhāputreṣu hi parinirvāteṣu anāthajagati sāsanāntardhānabhetubhir dṛṣṭyādibhir malair doṣair niraṅkūsaib svayam yatheccham iba loke'dye sampratī caryate / bhāvasādhanam etat // tataḥ caivaṁ kaṇṭhagataśparṇam ity arthah / tad viditvā / balakākam ca mālānāṁ doṣāṇāṁ na pramādyaṁ mumukṣubhir iti bhāvasādhanam iti.
Homage to the Buddha.

Is there any liberation outside of Buddhism?¹

No, there is not.

What is the reason for this?

There is no liberation outside of this teaching, because other doctrines are corrupted by a false conception of a soul. The word as other doctrines conceive it is not a metaphoric expression for a series of skandhas. By the power of their belief in this soul as a substantial entity, there arises clinging to the soul, the defilements are generated,² and liberation is impossible.

How do we know that the word "soul" is only a designation for a series of skandhas, and that no soul exists in and of itself?³

We know this because no proof establishes the existence of a soul apart from the skandhas, no proof by direct perception, nor any proof from inference.⁴ If the soul were a real entity, separate like other entities,⁵ it would be attained (i.e., known) either by direct perception as are the objects of the five sense consciousnesses and the object of mental consciousness,⁶ or by inference, as are the five indriyas.

In fact, the five organs are known through inference. In the world, despite the presence of general causes, a result is not produced if certain specific causes are absent: for a sprout to be generated, one needs not only water, earth, and human effort, but also a seed. In the same way, even though general causes — the presence of an external
object, attention, etc.,—are present, the blind and the deaf do not see and hear to the extent that the non-blind and the non-deaf see and hear. The first are lacking, whereas the second have the specific causes for visual and auditory consciousness: these are the organs, material organs that are made of an invisible and intangible matter, and which is known only through inference.7

There is neither direct perception nor inference of a soul independent of the skandhas. We know then that a real soul does not exist.

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The Vātsiputriyas admit a pudgala which is neither identical to the skandhas nor different from them.8 We should examine whether this pudgala exists as an entity or as designation of a nominal existence. If it has a separate existence, like physical matter, then the pudgala exists as an entity. If it is only a collection, like milk, then it exists as a designation.9

[The Vātsiputriyas:] What is wrong with admitting the first or the second hypothesis?

If the pudgala is an entity, it will be different from the skandhas, because its nature is separate, as the skandhas are different one from another (or it will be produced by causes and then it will not be eternal as you say), and you will have to name its causes; or it will be unconditioned: and this is a non-Buddhist opinion; and if it is unconditioned, the pudgala will be useless.10 (It is thus false to believe that the pudgala is an entity.) But if you admit that the pudgala exists only as a title of designation, you will abandon your doctrine and you will be placed within our doctrines.

[The Vātsiputriyas:] We do not say that it is an entity, and we do not say that it exists only as a designation of the skandhas: for us the designation pudgala occurs in necessary relationship to present, internal skandhas (skandhān upādāya).11
A blind response, containing little to enlighten us! What does the expression "in relation to" mean? If you explain skandhaṃ upādāya as skandhānām lakṣate (characterized by the skandhas), you must then say "The designation pudgala occurs by taking the elements as an object": this is to recognize that pudgala is a word designating the skandhas, the same as the designation "milk" occurs taking as its object the constituents of milk—color, etc. If you explain skandhaṃ upādāya as skandhān pratītya "conditioned by the skandhas," the same conclusion follows. You admit, in fact, that it is the skandhas which are the cause of the designation pudgala.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] This is not the way that we conceive of the pudgala and its relationship with the skandhas, but rather as the world conceives of fire and its relationship with fuel.

How does it conceive of fire and its relationship with fuel?

The world conceives of fire "in relation to fuel": they do not conceive of fire independent of fuel; they believe that fire is not identical with fuel nor different from fuel. If fire were different from fuel, fuel would not be hot; if fire were the same as fuel the consumed would be the consumer. In the same way we do not conceive of the pudgala as independent of the skandhas; we hold that the pudgala is neither identical to the skandhas nor different from the skandhas: if it were different from the skandhas, it would be eternal and thus unconditioned; but if it were identical to the skandhas, it would then be susceptible of annihilation.

***

Define the terms "fire" and "fuel," so that I can better understand what the expression "fire in relation to fuel" signifies.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] What shall we say to you? The consumed is the fuel, the consumer is fire.

But that is precisely what I want to know with precision: what
is the thing consumed, and what is the thing that is the consumer?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] In the world, a thing to be burned, not on fire, wood, is called the combustible matter (i.e., fuel), the consumed;\textsuperscript{12} the thing that exercises the action of burning, bright, very hot, in flames, is called the consumer or fire. The series that constitutes the fuel, is ignited by the fire, and it is reduced to ashes;\textsuperscript{13} by means of fire, each moment of existence of the series of fuel is made different from the preceding moment. The fire and fuel are both made up of eight substances;\textsuperscript{14} consequently, fire is generated by reason of the fuel, as milk ferments and vinegar is created by reason of milk and wine. This is why the world agrees in saying that fire exists "in relation to fuel."

If this were the case, fire is different from the fuel, as their time-periods are different: there is first fuel, and then fire. If your pudgala exists in relation to the skandhas, as fire exists in relation to fuel, you then have to admit that, since it is produced by reason of the skandhas, it is different from the skandhas, and that it is, moreover, transitory.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] In the thing set on fire, wood, etc.,\textsuperscript{15} one of the substances, namely a tangible object which is heat, is the fire; the other substances are the fuels. Then your remark on the priority in time of the fuel does not hold.

But fire and fuel, generated at the same time, are "separate," since their characteristics are distinct.\textsuperscript{16} The meaning that you attribute to the expression "in relation to" has not yet been explained.\textsuperscript{17} Since fire and fuel are generated at the same time, how can one say that fire exists in relation to fuel? Fire, which is one of the substances of the object on fire, does not have fuel for a cause, which is the other substances of the said object, since all these substances were generated at the same time, each from its own, separate cause. One can say no more than that the term "fire" had for a cause (or object) fuel, since this term is applied to the tangible "heat."\textsuperscript{18}

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] The expression "fire in relation to fuel"
means that the fire has fuel as its basis, or that the fire coexists with fuel.¹⁹

This means that the pudgala coexists with the skandhas or that it depends on the skandhas: this then admits that it differs from the skandhas. And logic demands also that, as fire does not exist when fuel is absent, likewise the pudgala does not exist without skandhas. You do not admit these conclusions; then your explanation is worthless.

Fire is not different from fuel (p. 1315, line 18), because, in this hypothesis, fuel would not be hot.

What does "hot" mean? If "hot" is defined as being the tangible "heat" (namely fire), as has been done above, then fuel will not be hot (since fuel is the object on fire, without the tangible element "heat"). If "hot" is that which is associated with heat (i.e., if one admits that fuel is termed hot by reason of its association with heat), then this means that different things (of "heat") are called "hot": the one tangible "heat" is designated by "fire" and all that is associated with this tangible is designated by the name "hot." To think thus is to confess that fuel is termed hot although it is different from fire or from the tangible "heat."²⁰ The Vātisiputriyās are thus justified in saying that "fire is not different from fuel since fuel is hot."

[The Vātisiputriyās:] Wood on fire is called fuel; it is also called fire.

Explain then the meaning that you attribute to the expression "fire in relation to fuel"! The pudgala (the active data of relation, of the upādāya) will be identical to the skandhas (passive data of the said "relation"): no reasoning can establish the non-identity (of these two). The thesis of the Vātisiputriyās, that the pudgala exists in relation to the skandhas as fire exists in relation to fuel, cannot be rationally established in any hypothesis.

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The *pudgala* is ineffable in that which concerns its relationship—its identity or non-identity—with the *skandhas*. How can they distinguish “five categories of things susceptible of being known”: 1-3. conditioned things, in other words, past, present, and future things; 4. unconditioned, or non-caused things, and 5. the ineffable (or *pudgala*)?21

The *pudgala*, in fact, should also be ineffable from this point of view: if it is ineffable, one cannot say either that it is a fifth category, nor that this is not a fifth category.22

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Let us examine what this word “*pudgala*” depends on. If it depends on the *skandhas*, then the *pudgala* exists solely as a designation, as the expression *pudgala* depends on the *skandhas* and not on a real *pudgala*. If it depends on a real *pudgala*, why did the Vātsiputriyas say that the designation “*pudgala*” is “in relation to the *skandhas*”? Then would have had to say “in relation to the *pudgala*.” But, in fact, they do not maintain that the *pudgala* is established in relation to a *pudgala*. Moreover the expression *pudgala* is a simple designation of *skandhas*.

[The Vātsiputriyas:] Given the *skandhas*, the *pudgala* is perceived:23 that is why we say that the designation “*pudgala*” is “with relation to the *skandhas*.”

But color is perceived when diverse causes are present, the eye, light, etc.; may we thereby conclude that the designation “color” is “with relation to these diverse causes”?

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Another point. By which of the six consciousnesses—consciousnesses of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness—is the *pudgala* perceived?
[The Vātsiputriyas:] It is perceived by all six consciousnesses. When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter (=a body), it indirectly discerns the *pudgala*, and then we can say that the *pudgala* is known by the eye consciousness. But the relationship of the *pudgala* with physical matter, be it identical or different, is inexpressible. The same for the other consciousnesses: when the mental consciousness recognizes the *dharmas* (mind and mental states), it indirectly discerns the *pudgala*; it is then known by the mental consciousness, but its relationship with these states is inexpressible.

It follows from this explanation too that the *pudgala* exists solely as a designation exactly like milk. When the eye consciousness recognizes the color of milk, it indirectly discerns the milk: the milk is then known by the eye consciousness and one cannot say that the milk is the same thing as its color or is different from its color. The same for ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousness: the body consciousness recognizes tangibles; from whence there is the consciousness of milk; the milk is then known by the body consciousness without which one could only say that the milk is identical to the tangible, or different from the tangible. In fact milk is not fourfold: then it is not color, smell, taste, tangible; but furthermore, one cannot say that the milk is made of these four. The conclusion is that one metaphorically designates a complex of elements by "*pudgala*," the same as the designation "milk" is understood as a coming together of color, smell, etc. They are merely names without reality.

What meaning do you therefore attach to the phrase, "When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter, it indirectly discerns the *pudgala*"? Do you want to say that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the *pudgala*, or that the perception of physical matter and the *pudgala* takes place at the same time?

If the Vātsiputriyas answer that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the *pudgala* but that, nevertheless, one cannot say that the *pudgala* is different from physical matter, then the condition and the causes of the perception of physical matter—eye,
light, an act of attention—would not be different from physical matter.

If the Vātsīputriyas answer that one perceives the *pudgala* at the same time as one perceives physical matter,\(^{25}\) we would question whether one perceives the *pudgala* by the same operation which perceives physical matter, or by a different operation.

In the first hypothesis, the *pudgala* is only physical matter and the designation "*pudgala*" applies only to physical matter. It is then impossible to distinguish "This is physical matter; that is *pudgala*." Without this distinction, how can one prove that there is physical matter and that there is a *pudgala*? The existence of the *pudgala* cannot be proven by this distinction.

In the second hypothesis, since the time of the two perceptions is different, the *pudgala* will be as different from color and shape as yellow is from blue, as former is from latter.

The same reasoning follows for the other *skandhas*.

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[The Vātsīputriyas:] As one cannot say that the *pudgala* is the same thing as color and shape, nor that it is different from color and shape, likewise the perception of the *pudgala* is not the same as the perception of the color and shape, nor different from this perception.

This point of view obliges you to say that the perception of the *pudgala*, being ineffable, is not made part of the category of "conditioned things": but now you do not admit this thesis, since, for you, all perception is "conditioned".

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If the *pudgala* is an entity that one cannot define as being
matter (the rūpa skandha,) nor as being non-matter (the four non-material skandhas, vedanā skandha, etc.), why did the Blessed One say that “matter and the other skandhas are not self”?26

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The pudgala, you say, is attained by the eye consciousness. Is this consciousness generated by color and shape, or by the pudgala, or both? In the first hypothesis, one cannot maintain that this eye consciousness perceives the pudgala, because the pudgala is not the object of this consciousness, as neither is sound. In fact, all consciousnesses that are produced having as their condition a certain thing, has this same thing as an “object as condition”: now the pudgala, not being a condition of the eye consciousness, cannot be its object. Thus the visual consciousness does not perceive the pudgala.

The other two hypothesis contradict the Sūtra which says that the eye consciousness is generated by reason of two things,27 namely, by the eye and by physical matter and shape. The Sūtra says”Oh Bhikṣus, eye consciousness is generated having the eye as its cause (hetu) and physical matter as its condition (pratyaya = ālambanapratyaya). All eye consciousness is by reason of the eye and physical matter.”28

If the pudgala is the cause of the eye consciousness, it will be impermanent, because the Sūtra says, “All causes and all conditions that produce consciousnesses are impermanent.”

[The Vātsīputriyas:] We admit then that the pudgala is not an object as condition (ālambana) of consciousness.

[Very well; but then it is not discernible (vijñeya), an object of vijñāna; if it is not discernible, it is not cognizable (jñeya), the object of jñāna; if it is not cognizable, how can one prove that it exists? If one cannot prove that it exists, your system collapses.]
You have said that the *pudgala* is discerned by the six consciousnesses.  

But, if it is discerned by the eye consciousness, it will be, like physical matter and shape, different from sound; if it is discerned by the ear consciousness, it will be, like sound, different from physical matter and shape. And thus for those (consciousnesses) that follow.

Moreover, your thesis is in contradiction to the Sūtra. The Sūtra says, "Oh Brāhmin, the five organs (of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch) have distinct spheres (*gocara*) and objects (*viṣaya*). Each one of them perceives its own sphere and its own object, and does not perceive the sphere or the object of the others. And the mental organ perceives the spheres and the objects of the first five organs, and they have the mental organ as their refuge." Or rather would you say, in agreement with the Sūtra, that the *pudgala* is not the object (of the five organs)? In this case, it would not be discerned (by the five organs), and you put yourself in contradiction to your own system.

[The Vātsīputriyas:] (You affirm, according to the Sūtra, that each of the five organs has its own object, and you thus conclude that the *pudgala* is not the object of eye consciousness). But, according to the Sūtra, the mental organ also has its own object (and this is in contradiction to your system). In fact, the *Ṣaṭprāṇakopama-sūtra* says, "Each of these six organs has its own object and its own sphere; each seeks after its object and its sphere."  

This Sūtra does not intend to speak of the six organs, because the five material organs and the five consciousnesses which are dependent on them do not possess the desire to see, to hear, etc.
This Sūtra understands, by organ of the eye, etc., the mental consciousness which is induced and dominated by the eye, etc.\textsuperscript{35} By this fact, the mental consciousness which is isolated—that is to say, which is not induced and dominated by one of the five material organs, but solely by the mental organ—does not have any desire with regard to the spheres and objects of the five organs, but solely with regard to the dharmāyatana. Thus the Satprāṇakopama-sūtra does not contradict the Sūtra previously quoted.

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The Blessed One has said, "Oh Bhiksus, I declare to you all the dharmas that should be penetrated (abhijñeya) and known (parijñeya), namely: the eyes, physical matter, eye consciousness, eye contact, the sensation which is produced having as a cause eye contact, painful, pleasant, and neither painful nor pleasant sensation.... And thus following to: "the sensation which is produced having as its cause contact with the mental organ: these are what should be penetrated and known."\textsuperscript{36} This text teaches us that the dharmas to be penetrated and comprehended are only those enumerated. The pudgala does not figure in this list: then it is not susceptible of being discerned (vijñeya). In fact, the speculative consciousness (prajña) by which one penetrates or comprehends, has the same sphere (visaya) as does ordinary consciousness (vijñāna).\textsuperscript{37}

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The masters who maintain that the eye sees the pudgala should learn that the eye sees only that which is real in the pudgala (namely physical matter: the same for the other five organs). They fall into the abyss of harmful views in saying that it sees a soul in what is not a soul.\textsuperscript{38}

Furthermore, the Buddha explained that the word pudgala
designates the *skandhas*. In the *Sūtra of Man*, he said, "Supported by the eye, having physical matter for its object and condition, the visual consciousness arises: by reason of the coming together of these three, contact arises; at the same time there arises sensation, thought, the act of attention, etc." The last four terms—*vijñāna, vedanā, samjñā, cetanā*—are non-material *skandhas*: the eye and physical matter are the *rūpa skandhas*. Here is then all that one speaks of when one says "man." In order to express various nuances, one inserts various words, such as *sattva, being, nara, man, manuja, born of Manu, manava, young man, pośa, he who is nourished, jīva, vital principle, jantu, he who is born,* pudgala, person. One says to oneself, "My eye sees physical matter," and according to current usage, "This venerable one is of such a name, of such a family, of such a gotra, of such food, of such happiness and of such suffering, of such length of life; he lasts a time; he terminates his life in such a manner." Oh Bhiksūs, know that these are only manners of speaking, words, expressions conform­ing to the usage of the world, because there are only impermanent things in the *pudgala*, conditioned things, born of causes and conditions, created through deeds.

The Blessed One declares that the Sūtras of explicit meanings are the authority. The Sūtras that we have quoted are of explicit meaning; one cannot draw a divergent explanation from them.

Moreover, 1. The Blessed One said to a Brāhmin, "When I say that all exists, I mean that there are twelve sources of conscious­ness (*āyatana, i.20a*)." Then if the *pudgala* is not included in the twelve *āyatanas*, it does not exist; and if it is included one cannot say that it is ineffable.

2. The Vātsīputrīyas read a Sūtra which says, "All that is of the eye, all physical matter... the Tathāgata, Oh Bhiksūs, embraces this group (namely the twelve *āyatanas*), terms them 'all,' establishes that 'all' exists, so many dharmaś in themselves." Now, there is no
pudgala there: how can one say that the pudgala is a real entity?

3. The Bimbisāra-sūtra says, “A stupid, ignorant Prthagjana becomes attached to words, and he imagines that there is a self; but there is no self nor things pertaining to self, but only past, present and future painful dharmas.”

4. The worthy (arhat) Sila said to Māra, “You fall into wrong views by wrongly maintaining that there is a being in the group of conditions (samskāras) which is empty: the wise understand that such a being does not exist. As the name ‘chariot’ is given to a group of parts, the world uses the word ‘being’: one should know that this is a group of skandhas.”

5. In the Kṣudrakāgama, the Buddha said to the Brāhmin Daridra, “Daridra, those who understand the Truths can deliver themselves from all fetters: through the mind (there is) defilement, and also purification through the mind. The self, in fact, does not have the nature of a soul; it is through error that one thinks that a soul exists; there is no being (sattva), no soul, but only dharmas produced through causes: skandhas, sources-of-consciousness (āyatana), dhātus, that constitute the twelve limbs of existence; examined in depth, there is found to be no pudgala there. Seeing that the interior is empty, see that externals are empty; and there is no ascetic who meditates on emptiness.”

6. The Sūtra says, “Five calamities proceed from the belief in a soul: one creates a theory of the soul, of a being, of a vital principal; one is not distinguished from heterodox teachers; one takes a road which is not the Way; his mind does not enter into emptiness, his faith does not satisfy him, he is not established in it to his satisfaction, there is no propensity (for liberation); the Āryan qualities are not purified in him.”

[The Vātsiputriyas:] These texts are not authoritative, because
they are not read in our tradition.

What then is the authority in your system, your tradition or the words of the Buddha? If it is your tradition, then the Buddha is not your teacher, and you are not a child of the Śākyan. If it is the word of the Buddha, why do you not recognize the authority of all the words of the Buddha?

[The Vātsīputriyas:] The texts you have quoted are not the authentic word of the Buddha, \(^5^4\) since our tradition does not read them.

That is not a good reason.

Why is this?

Because all the other traditions read these texts, \(^5^5\) and because these texts do not contradict any other Sūtras, nor philosophic truths. \(^5^6\) Also, when you embolden yourself to brutally reject them by saying, "They are not authentic because we do not read them," this is only pure impudence contrary to all good sense.

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The position of the Vātsīputriyas is moreover more inadmissible since their sect reads a Sūtra which says, "The dharmas are not soul and do not contain a soul." \(^5^7\)

[The Vātsīputriyas:] Without doubt we read this Sūtra. But the pudgala is neither the dharmas which serve as its support, nor is it different from these dharmas; that is why it says that "no dharma is a soul."

Very well; but it is taught that the pudgala cannot be discerned by the mental consciousness, since the Sūtra establishes clearly that the mental consciousness is produced by reason of two conditions, \(^5^8\) the mental organ (manas) and the dharmas. Besides how would you explain the Sūtra which says, "To recognize a soul in what is not soul is a mistake of ideas, of mind, and of view"? \(^5^9\)
[The Vātsīputriyas:] This Sūtra says that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in that which is not a soul; it does not say that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in what is a soul.

What is understood by “that which is not a soul”? Would you say that it concerns the skandhas, āyatana and dhātu? This contradicts your theory that the pudgala is not identical to physical matter, etc. Further, a Sūtra says, “Oh Bhikṣus, know that all the Brāhmīns and monks that contemplate a soul, contemplate only the five skandhas-of-attachment.” Then this (contemplation) is not a soul, because the self that one recognizes as a soul is solely the dharmas that are not a soul but which one falsely imagines to be a soul. Another Sūtra says, “All those that have remembered, do remember, or shall remember their various past existences—their remembrance is solely with regard to the five skandhas-of-attachment.” Then there is no pudgala in any of this.

[The Vātsīputriyas:] But the same Sūtra says, “In the past, I was handsome (literally: I possessed physical matter).” This declaration is for the purpose of indicating that the saint capable of recollecting his past lives remembers the variety of characteristics of his series of these existences. But the Buddha does not mean that he sees a real pudgala possessing, in a past life, such physical matter, etc.: for to think such is to fall into satkāyadrsti. Or rather, if such is the meaning of this sentence, then its sole purpose is to reject it as non-authentic. We conclude that the Sūtra, insofar as it attributes the possession of physical matter, etc., to a soul, has in view “a self of designation”, as one speaks of a pile which, being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which, being only a succession (of waters), has no permanence.

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[The Vātsīputriyas:] The Blessed One would then not be
omniscient, since the mind and mental states are not capable of knowing all the dharmas, seeing that mind and mental states change, arising and perishing from moment to moment. Omniscience can belong only to a soul, a pudgala.

We would reply that the pudgala would be eternal if it does not perish when the mind perishes: a thesis which contradicts your theory of a pudgala about which one can only say that it is eternal or non-eternal. We do not say (as do the Mahāsāṃghikas) that the Buddha is omniscient in the sense that he knows all the dharmas at one and the same time:68 “Buddha” designates a certain series: to this series there belongs this unique ability that, by a single act of modulating his mind, he immediately produces an exact consciousness of the object relative to which a desire for knowing has arisen: one then calls this series “Omniscient.” One moment of thought is not capable of knowing everything. On this point, there is a verse: “As fire, by the capacity of its series, burns all, so too does the Omniscient One—but not by a universal, simultaneous knowledge.”69

[The Vātsiputriyas:] How do you prove that (the word “Omniscient” should be understood as a series, and not as a particular self of universal knowledge)?

It is spoken of in the Scriptures, on the subject of the Buddhas of the past, present and future. For example the verse: “Buddhas of the past, Buddhas of the future, and Buddhas of the present destroy the sorrows of many.”70 But, in your system, the skandhas of existence belong to the three periods of time, but not the pudgala.

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[The Vātsiputriyas:] If the term pudgala only designates the five skandhas-of-attachment, how can the Blessed One say, “Oh Bhikṣus, I shall explain to you the burden, the taking up of the burden, the laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the burden.”71
Why may it not be explained in these terms?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] Because, if the *pudgala* is only a name given to the *skandhas*, it cannot be the bearer of a burden.

Why not?

Simply because it is unheard of.

Do not speak then of an ineffable *pudgala*. No one has ever ascertained the existence of an ineffable thing. And moreover you will have to account for the other statements of the Sūtra that thirst (or desire) is the taking up of the burden: as thirst is a *skandha*, the “burden” (is too), and it is unheard of that a burden takes itself up. The “taking up of the burden” is included within the *skandhas*, and so too the bearer of the burden. These are the *skandhas* that the Blessed One designated by the name of “*pudgala*, the bearer of the burden,” as one sees in the explanation given a little farther on in the same Sūtra.

After having said that the burden is the five *skandhas*-of-attachment, that the taking up of the burden is thirst, and that the laying down of the burden is the abandoning of thirst, it is said that the bearer of the burden is the *pudgala*; but fearing that one understands the *pudgala* inexactely, as an eternal, ineffable, real entity, he explains, “(It is only to conform to the use of this world that one says:) This venerable one, of such a name, of such a gotra,” and the rest (as in the *Sūtra on Man*, above), in order that one might well know that the *pudgala* is effable, impermanent, and without a unique nature. The five *skandhas*-of-attachment are painful in their nature: they receive then the name of “burden”; each of the former moments of the series attract each of the latter moments: it receives then the name of “bearer of the burden.” The *pudgala* is then not an entity.

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[The Vātsīputrīyas:] The *pudgala* exists [as an entity,] as the
Sūtra says, “To say that apparitional beings do not exist is a false view.”

Who denies the existence of apparitional beings? We admit the existence of these beings in the sense that the Blessed One understands them. For him, “apparitional beings” designates a series of skandhas (the series of five skandhas of an intermediary being), susceptible of going to another world without the intervention of a womb, an egg, or of moisture forms of birth. To negate the existence of an apparitional being so defined, is a false view, because this type of series of skandhas truly exists.

If you maintain that the negation of the pudgala is false, you will have to say how this false view is given up. It cannot be given up by Seeing, nor by Meditation, for on the one hand, the pudgala is not included within the Truths, and, on the other hand, false views are not given up by Meditation but by Seeing.

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[The Vātsiputriyas:] But a Sūtra says, “A pudgala arises (utpadyate) in this world...” Now this does not refer to the five skandhas, but to an entity.

Such is not the meaning of the Sūtra that only metaphorically designates as a unit that which exists only as a complex; as the world speaks of a grain of hemp, or a grain of rice, or of a heap, or a word. Further, since the Sūtra attributes an arising to the pudgala, it is therefore conditioned (saṃskṛta).

[The Vātsiputriyas:] When it refers to the pudgala, the word “to arise” does not have the same meaning as when one speaks of the skandhas arising. For the skandhas, to arise means to exist after having been non-existent. One says that the pudgala arises because, at that moment, it takes on different skandhas (for example the manas of a human instead of the manas of an animal). As one says in the world, when a certain person acquires a certain knowledge, that a sacrificer, or a grammarian is born; when a
layman takes on certain characteristics, one says that a *bhikṣu*, a monk of a certain sect is born: one does not mean by these expressions that there has really been a birth of a sacrificer, or a monk. And again in the same way, through the acquisition of a certain trait, one says: an old man is born, a sick person comes into being.

This explanation of the phrase, "A *pudgala* arises in this world" has been condemned by the Blessed One. In the *Paramārthaśūnyata-sūtra*, the Blessed One said, "There is action; there is result; but, besides the causal production of the dharmas (which give the impression of a permanent agent), one does not maintain the existence of an agent which abandons these *skandhas* and which takes up other *skandhas*." And in the *Phālguṇa-sūtra*: "I do not say that there has been one who takes." There is then no *pudgala* that gives up or takes up the *skandhas*.

Nevertheless, let us examine your examples: "A sacrificer is born." What is the nature of that which became a sacrificer? Would you say that a "soul" became a sacrificer? But you have to precisely prove the existence of a "soul." Would you say that it is a series of minds and mental states? But minds and mental states appear from instant to instant after having been non-existent and they are not capable of abandoning and grasping. Would you say that it is the body (the organ of sense)? The same difficulty holds. Notice then that the knowledge the acquisition of which by a so-called person makes him a sacrificer, differs from this person: it would be then, by a legitimate comparison, that the *skandhas* acquired by a *pudgala* differ from the *pudgala*; and this goes against your definition of a *pudgala*. As for the example of an old man and a sick person, there is a succession of different bodies: to hold that an old man is the transformation of a young man is the Sāṁkhya thesis of transformation (*parināma*), a thesis already refuted. Then your examples are without value. And if you say that the *skandhas* arise, but that the *pudgala* does not arise, it follows that the latter differs from the *skandhas* and is eternal. You maintain again that the *skandhas* are five in number, but that the *pudgala* is one: this is to again recognize that the *pudgala*
differs from the *skandhas*.

[The Vātsīputriyās:] Your position is totally parallel (to ours), since you say that the primary elements, earth, etc., are four; but that secondary matter (*upādāyarūpa*)—color, for example—is one; but that, nevertheless, secondary matter does not differ from the primary elements.⁸⁶

This objection does not go against us, but only against the teachers who say that secondary matter is the four elements.⁸⁷ But, to adopt the opinion that you wrongly attribute to us, we say that in the manner that secondary matter is made up of the four elements, in that way the five *skandhas* constitute the *pudgala*.

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[The Vātsīputriyās:] If the *pudgala* is only a word serving to designate the five *skandhas*, why did the Buddha not declare that the vital principal (*jīva*) is the body?⁸⁸

Because the Buddha takes into consideration the intention (*āsaya*) of whomever asks him questions. The person who asks this question of the Buddha understood by *jīva*, not a being, a simple designation of the *skandhas*, but a person, a real living entity; and he was thinking of this person when he asked if the *jīva* is identical to the body or different from the body. Now this *jīva* does not absolutely exist; and so the Buddha only maintained that it is neither identical to nor different from the body, and then the Blessed One condemned the two answers. In like manner one cannot say that the hairs of a tortoise are hard or soft.⁸⁹

The ancient masters have already explained this difficulty. There was once a venerable one named Nāgasena, possessor of the three knowledges (*vidyās*), the six higher knowledges (*abhijñās*), and the eight liberations (*vimokṣas*). At that time, the King of Kalinga went up to him and said, “I have come with the intention of clearing up my doubts. But monks are verbose:⁹⁰ shall we agree
that you answer plainly to the questions that I ask?" Nāgasena accepted his request and the King asked, "Is the vital principal identical to the body or different from the body?" "To this question," said Nāgasena, "there are no grounds for answer." "Haven't we agreed that you shall answer plainly? Why speak off the point and not answer?" "I wish to ask the King concerning a doubt. But kings are verbose: shall we agree that the King answers plainly to the question that I shall ask?" The King consented and Nāgasena asked, "Do the mangos in the King's palace give sweet fruit or bitter fruit?" And the King answered him, "There are no mango trees within my palace." Nāgasena protested as the King had protested, saying, "Haven't we made an agreement? Why speak off the point and not answer?" "But," said the King, "as there are no mangos in my palace, how could there be any sweet or bitter fruits?" "In the same way, Oh King, the vital principal does not exist: one cannot then answer your question and say that it is identical to the body or different from the body." 91

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] But, if the pudgala does not exist, why didn't the Blessed One answer that the jīva absolutely does not exist?

Because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner, that questioning on the jīva may be with the idea that the jīva is a series of skandhas. If the Blessed One answered that the jīva absolutely does not exist, the questioner would have fallen into false views. Furthermore, as the questioner was not capable of understanding "dependent origination" (pratītyasamutpāda), he was not a fit receptacle for the Good Law: the Blessed One then did not tell him that the jīva exists except by way of designation.

The explanation that we have given here is the same that the Blessed One formulated: "Ānanda, the wandering monk Vatsagotra came to me to ask a question thusly: 'Is there, or is there not a soul (ātman)?' I did not answer him. In fact, to answer that there is a soul is to contradict the truth of things, because no dharma is a soul nor has any relationship with a soul; and if I had answered that there is no soul, I would have increased the folly of Vatsagotra,
for he would have thought: 'I had a soul, but this soul does not now exist.'

For, in comparison to the folly of the belief in the existence of a soul, this second folly is graver. Whoever believes in the soul falls into the extreme view of eternity; whoever believes that the soul does not exist falls into the extreme view of annihilation. Thoughtless error, heavy error...

1. Taking into consideration the injury that heresy does and, also, the falling off of good deeds, the Buddhas teach the Law in the manner in which a tigress carries its young.

2. Those who believe in the reality of the soul are torn by the teeth of heresy; those who do not recognize the conventional self let their good actions fall away, and perish.

And again:

1. Since a real *jīva* does not exist, the Buddha does not say that the *jīva* is identical or non-identical; he does not say any more than that the *jīva* does not really exist, fearing that one would only negate the conventional *jīva*.

2. Series of *skandhas*, actions, and the results of actions are what are termed *jīva*: if the Buddha were to negate the *jīva*, he would negate actions and their results.

3. And if the Buddha does not say that the so-called *jīva* is in the *skandhas*, it is because he sees that the questioner is not capable of tolerating the teaching of emptiness.

4. It is then because of the state of mind of Vatsa that the Buddha, asked if there was a soul, yes or no, did not answer. But if the soul were to exist, why wouldn't he have answered that it exists?

The Buddha did not answer four questions relative to the eternity of the world (*loka*): again this is because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner. If such a person understands *loka* to be a soul (*ātman*), the four alternatives are incorrect, since the soul does not absolutely exist. If he understands *loka* to be transmigration or *samsāra*, the four alternatives are
incorrect: if transmigration is eternal, no one could obtain Nirvāṇa; if it is not eternal, all would obtain Nirvana by spontaneous annihilation, and not through effort: if it is both eternal and non-eternal, some would never obtain Nirvāṇa, whereas others would obtain it spontaneously; finally, to say that loka, in the sense of saṃsāra, is neither eternal nor non-eternal, is to say that beings both would and would not obtain Nirvāṇa: a contradiction in terms. In fact, Nirvāṇa is possible through the Way; then no categorical response is acceptable. In the same way the Buddha did not answer the Nirgranthaśrāvaka who held a bird in his hand and asked if this bird was dead or alive.100

The four questions as to whether the world is infinite, namely if it has an end or not, has the same sense as the questions relative to the eternity of the world,101 and present the same defect.

How do we know that “the infinity of the world” should be understood in this sense? The wandering monk Uktika,102 after having asked the Buddha about infinity, resorted to a ruse in order to repeat his question and asked, “Does the whole world obtain deliverance through the Way, or only a part of the world?”103 The elder Ānanda then said to him, “You have already posed this question, Uktika. Why do you repeat it by changing the terms?”

If the Blessed One did not explain concerning the four questions relative to the existence of the Tathāgata after death, this is again because he took into account the intentions of the questioner. Such a person understood the Tathāgata to be a “soul” liberated from the defilements.

We ask in our turn those who hold to a “soul.” The Blessed One, according to you, declared that the pudgala exists, indescribable: why did he not declare that the Tathāgata exists after death?

If [the Vātsiputriyas] answer that the Buddha kept silent on this point because he feared that the disciple, by admitting the survival of a pudgala named Tathāgata, would fall into the view of eternity, we would then ask why the Blessed One predicted to Maitreya, “In the ages to come, you will be a Tathāgata, an Arhat, a
Samyaksambuddha;”

104 and speaking of one of his deceased disciples, he said, "He is at present reborn in such a place." 105 Are not these discourses defiled by the opinion of permanence?

If [the Vatsiputriyas] answer that the Blessed One does not say anything concerning the deceased Tathāgata because, seeing at first the pudgala, he now no longer sees the pudgala once it has attained Nirvāṇa; it is then through ignorance that the Tathāgata does not make any declaration concerning the deceased Tathāgata, and to speak thus is to deny the omniscience of the Master. Rather one should believe that if the Blessed One abstains from all declarations, it is because the "soul" that the questioner alluded to in speaking of the Tathāgata does not absolutely exist. If [the Vatsiputriyas] say that the Blessed One sees the pudgala, which is in Nirvāṇa, but that he still does not make a statement on this subject; and that the pudgala exists but is not, at the same time, an object of a statement of the Blessed One, we then conclude that [the Vatsiputriyas] admit that the pudgala is permanent.

If [the Vatsiputriyas] say that "whether the Blessed One does or does not see the pudgala" is indescribable, they then proceed to say that all is indescribable, and that one can only say that the Blessed One is omniscient or non-omniscient.

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[The Vatsiputriyas:] The pudgala really exists, as it is said, that "To say that I really, truly do not have an ātman 106 is an incorrect opinion."

This is not a proof, for it is also said that it is an incorrect opinion to affirm the existence of an ātman. 107 Scholars of the Abhidharma think that a belief in the existence of an ātman and a belief in its non-existence are two extreme opinions, as they identify them with the two branches of "the opinion that consists in believing in extremes." This doctrine is certain, as it is formulated in the Vatsagotra-sūtra, "Ānanda, those who affirm a
soul fall into the extreme of the belief in permanence; those who deny a soul fall into the extreme of the belief in annihilation..."¹⁰⁸

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[The Vātsīputriyas]: If the pudgala does not exist, what is it that wanders in saṁsāra? In fact, one can only allow that saṁsāra itself wanders. Further the Blessed One has said, "Beings misled by ignorance, bound by thirst, wander here and there, either among beings in hell, among animals, among pretas, humans, or the gods; thus for a long time they experience all suffering."¹⁰⁹

How does the pudgala wander in saṁsāra? Would you say that this wandering consists in abandoning old skandhas and in taking up new skandhas? But we have shown that this explanation is inadmissible. A good explanation is simple: one says that when a flame burns a field it travels, although they be only moments of flame, because it constitutes a series; in the same way the harmony of the skandhas which is constantly repeated receives, metaphorically, the name of being; supported by thirst, the series of skandhas travels in saṁsāra.

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[The Vātsīputriyas]: If only the skandhas exist, we do not see how one can explain these words of the Blessed One, "In the past, I was the teacher Sunetra."¹¹⁰ In fact, in the hypothesis of the existence of the individual skandhas metaphorically termed "soul," past skandhas are not the same as present skandhas, and so the Blessed One cannot express himself in this manner.

But what is the thing that the Blessed One calls "soul"? The pudgala, you would say: then, since the "soul" is permanent, a past "soul" is identical with a present "soul". For us, when the Blessed One said, "I was the teacher Sunetra," he teaches us that the skandhas that constitute his present "soul" formed part of the
same series as the *skandhas* that constituted Sunetra. In the same way one says, "This fire has been burning here."

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You affirm the existence of a real soul: we hold that only the Buddhas, Tathāgatas would see it (because it is subtle). But if the Buddhas see a soul, they would produce a firm belief in a soul; from this belief in a soul there would be produced among them a belief in things pertaining to a soul; from these two beliefs there would be produced among them affection for the soul and for things pertaining to a soul. The Blessed One said in fact that "whosoever believes in a soul, believes in things pertaining to a soul; believing in things pertaining to a soul, they become attached to the *skandhas* as they form a soul and things pertaining to a soul." There would be then *satkāyadrṣṭi* among the Buddhas; they would be bound by affection for a soul and for things pertaining to a soul; and they would be very far from liberation.

[The Vātsiputriyas]: Affection is not produced with regard to a soul. We explain: when one recognizes a soul in what is not the soul, as do the non-Buddhists, one feels affection for this pretended soul; but, when one sees the soul in that which is truly the soul, namely the ineffable *pudgala*, as do the Buddhas, no affection is produced with regard to the soul.

This statement has no support. The Vātsiputriyas, without any shadow of reason, introduce the sickness of heresy into the teachings of the Master. Whereas there are those who admit an ineffable *pudgala*, others deny the existence of all the *dharman*s; non-Buddhists imagine a soul apart from all other substances. All these doctrines are wrong and present the same flaw in that they do not lead to liberation.

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If the soul does not absolutely exist, how can a mind—which perishes as soon as it is generated—be capable of remembering an object perceived a long time before? How is it able to recognize an object similar to what it has formerly perceived?

Memory and recognition are generated immediately, in a series, from a certain type of mind, when this type of mind arises from the idea of object already perceived and which one calls “object of the memory.”

[Now then, let us first examine memory.]

What is the type of mind from whence memory immediately shoots up?

We answer: It’s a certain mind (citta-visesa), bent towards the object of memory, a mind in which one finds ideas related to that thing or resembling that thing, or even “resolutions” of a certain nature, etc.; with the condition however that the power that this mind possesses to produce memory is not paralysed by a psychosomatic change arising from sickness, from grief, from mental trouble, or the disturbing influence of magic formulas, etc.

1. It is necessary that a bending of the mind be produced, an act of attention, towards the object; 2. it is necessary that the mind involves an idea resembling the object, in the case where one remembers by reason of resemblance (for example, I remember fire perceived a long time ago because the idea of fire is placed in my mind by the sight of present fire); 3. or it is necessary that the mind involves an idea in relation to the object, in the case where one remembers without there being resemblance (for example, I remember fire because the idea of smoke is placed in my mind by the sight of smoke); 4. or it is necessary that the mind involves a prāṇidhāna, or resolution, an abhyāsa, or habit (for example, the resolution has been placed in the mental series, “I shall remember this at such a time”); 5. also when it is of this nature—that is to say, when it presents the characteristic 1. and one of the characteristics 2 - 4—if the thought does not proceed from the idea of the object of memory—that is to say, if the mind so envisaged is
not produced in a series where the idea of a certain object has been placed by perception, if this mind does not proceed from this idea—the mind cannot produce memory; 6. when it is not of this nature, even though it proceeds from an idea of the object of memory, it cannot produce memory.

[The Vātsiputriyas:] How can one mind see and another mind remember? It is contrary that Yajñadatta remembers an object that Devadatta has seen.

That is right. There is no connection between Devadatta and Yajñadatta: Their minds are not in the relationship of cause and effect, as is the case for minds which form series. Indeed, we do not say that one mind sees an object and that another mind remembers this object, because these two minds belong to the same series. We say that one past mind, bearing a certain object, brings about the existence of another mind, the present mind, capable of remembering this object. In other words, a mind of memory is generated from a mind of seeing, as fruit is generated from the seed through the force of the last stage of the transformation of the series. This point has been clarified. Memory is generated after recognition.

[The Vātsiputriyas:] In the absence of a soul, who remembers?

[Vasubandhu:] What do you understand by “to remember”?

[The Vātsiputriyas:] To grasp an object by the memory.

[Vasubandhu:] Does “to grasp” differ from memory? [The Vātsiputriyas:] Memory is the agent of the action “to grasp.”

[Vasubandhu:] We have explained what is the agent of this action: it is the cause of memory, namely a certain type of mind.

[The Vātsiputriyas:] But, if it is only a certain type of mind that is the cause of memory, how can one say that Caitra remembers?

[Vasubandhu:] One gives the name Caitra to a series; a mind of memory is generated, in this series, from a mind of seeing, and by reason of this fact one says that Caitra remembers.

[The Vātsiputriyas:] In the absence of a soul, whose is the
memory?

[Vasubandhu:] What is the sense of the genitive "whose"?
[The Vātsīputrīyas:] This genitive designates its master.

[Vasubandhu:] Explain by an example how you understand that someone is the master of memory. [The Vātsīputrīyas:] As Caitra is the master of the cow.

[Vasubandhu:] In what is Caitra the master of the cow?
[The Vātsīputrīyas:] In that he directs and employs the cow as he pleases.

[Vasubandhu:] To what then is the memory directed and employed by a master, for whom you search with great pains.

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] It is directed and employed on the object that one wants to remember (that is to say, it is employed on remembering).

[Vasubandhu:] To what purpose?
[The Vātsīputrīyas:] For the purpose of memory.

[Vasubandhu:] What idle talk! I direct and employ a certain thing with a view to the same thing! Explain to me then how memory is employed: do you want to say that one transmits it to a certain place? Do you want to say that one causes it to be produced?

[The Vātsīputrīyas:] Memory does not die out; it is then not transmitted. One causes it to be produced.

[Vasubandhu:] What you call "master" is then simply the cause, and what you call "subject" is simply the result. In fact the cause, by its command, operates the result; it is then "master"; and the result, in that it is subordinate to the cause at the moment of its arising, is called "subject." Since the cause suffices as master, why require a self to which you could attribute memory? Memory belongs to whatever causes memory. Complexes of saṃskāras, or the five skandhas forming a homogeneous series, are called
"Caitra" and "cow." One says that the Caitra-series possesses the cow-series, because the Caitra-series is the cause of the geographic displacement and the various changes of the cow-series. There is not there any one, real entity "Caitra," nor another entity called "cow;" there is not, for the Caitra-series, any quality of owner or master outside of its quality of cause.

[As with memory, so too with recognition.]

We would answer, mutatis mutandis, to the questions: "Who knows? To whom do we attribute consciousness?" and to other similar questions, "What feels, what makes ideas?" as we have responded to the questions, "What remembers? To whom do we attribute memory and recognition?"

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Certain scholars say that the soul (ātman) exists, as existence (bhāva) depends on an existing being (bhavitar), as the walking of Devadatta depends on Devadatta. Walking is an action, and Devadatta is the active being. In the same way consciousness (vijñāna) and all action depends on a "base of support" (āśraya), "one who knows (vijñātar)," the agent.

We would ask what it is that they understand by "Devadatta." If they regard Devadatta as a real individual, we have discussed and refuted this theory. Devadatta is an imaginary individual and not an individual entity; Devadatta is only the name that one gives to the series of saṁskāras. In the sense that one could say that such a Devadatta walks, in the same sense we can say that Devadatta knows.

How does Devadatta walk? "Devadatta" is only a homogeneous series of saṁskāras, moments of existence replaced without interruption and roughly similar one to another. The foolish see within this series an entity which would be the cause of the action that this series generates in a different place, the cause by the efficacy of which the successive moments of the existence of the
body of Devadatta is produced in different places. In fact, the walking of Devadatta is simply the act of the generation of the series which is the body in different locations; the cause of this action—that is to say, the previous moment of the series—receives the name of "walker."

It is in this sense that we say that Devadatta walks, in order to designate a walk totally similar to that of fire or sound: the fire walks, the sound walks, that is to say, the fire-series and the sound-series go being generated from one place to another.\textsuperscript{117} In the same way the world says that Devadatta knows (vijñānti) because the complex which is Devadatta is the cause of consciousness (vijñāna); and, in order to conform to received usage, the Āryans also express themselves in this manner, which is inexact.

Nevertheless, a Sūtra says that the consciousness knows the object. What does the vijñāna do with regard to the object?

Nothing: It is simply produced resembling the object. In the same way that fruit, although it does nothing,\textsuperscript{118} is said to correspond to the seed, to reproduce the seed, because it is produced resembling the seed;\textsuperscript{119} the vijñāna also, although it accomplishes no action with regard to the object, is said to know the object because it is produced resembling the object. This resemblance of the vijñāna consists in that it has the appearance of the object.\textsuperscript{120} By reason of this appearance one says that the vijñāna knows the object which is only one of its causes; the organ is also a cause of the vijñāna, but one does not say that the vijñāna knows the organ because the vijñāna does not take the aspect of the organ. This manner of speaking, "The vijñāna knows," is again justified from another point of view. Several successive moments of vijñāna are produced with regard to the object: the previous moment is the cause of the later moment; the vijñāna is then a cause of vijñāna; it is then called the agent (karta) since it is the cause:\textsuperscript{121} one attributes the action of knowing to it as one attributes the action of ringing to a bell or the action of moving to a lamp.

One says that the lamp moves: here is what the moving of the lamp consists of: "lamp" is the name metaphorically attributed to
the uninterrupted series of moments of the flame that one sees, wrongly, as a "unity." When one of these successive moments is produced in place other than that of the preceding moment, one says that the lamp moves. But there does not exist a "mover" apart from and distinct from the moment of the fire. In the same way, one metaphorically designates a series of minds by vijñāna, or consciousness: when one moment of mind is produced relative to a new object, one says that the consciousness knows this object. One says that the consciousness knows: the same way that one says that "physical matter" exists (bhavati), is produced, lasts, without there being an "exister" (bhavitṛ), a "producer," "anything that lasts," distinct from what is called its existence, etc.¹²²

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[The Sāṃkhya]:¹²³ If the later consciousness (vijñāna) is produced from the previous consciousness and not from a soul (ātman), why is not the later consciousness always similar to the previous consciousness? Why do not consciousnesses succeed themselves in a determined order, as do shoots, stems, leaves, etc?¹²⁴

Answer to the first question: Because everything that is produced through causes, i.e., conditioned things, presents the character of "transformation" (sthityanyathātvā); this is the nature of conditioned things: in the series which they form, the latter should differ from the former. If it were otherwise, the ascetics who had entered into meditation—in which the body and the consciousness are always produced in the same way, the successive moments of the series being identical—would not spontaneously get out of meditation.¹²⁵

As for the second difficulty: The production of consciousness is subject to a certain order. If a certain mind should be produced after a certain mind, it will be produced after this mind.¹²⁶ On the other hand, certain consciousnesses present a partial similarity that obliges them to produce one another by reason of the
particular character of their gotra.\textsuperscript{127} For example, upon the idea of “woman”\textsuperscript{128} there immediately arises the idea (among ascetics) of detesting the body of a woman, but (among non-ascetics) there immediately arises the idea of a wife or daughter. Later, following upon the differing development of the succession of ideas, the idea of a woman reproduces itself.\textsuperscript{129} This second idea of a woman would have the capacity of producing the idea of the detesting the body, or the idea of wife or daughter, accordingly as it has either of these ideas as gotra, that is to say, as a seed; but not when it does not have a similar gotra.\textsuperscript{130} And again innumerable different ideas can succeed the idea of a woman, and that by reason of multiple causes. Among all these ideas, those are produced first which are the most “numerous”—having formed a series in the past—the most “alive,” the “nearest”—as these ideas have most strongly impregnated the mental series:\textsuperscript{131} except, of course, at the moment when other ideas are produced by a certain state of the body or by certain external objects.

But why does the consciousness, which has most strongly impregnated the mental series, not continue to so impregnate it without ceasing?

Because, as we have said, transformation is a characteristic of the mental series; this characteristic is eminently propitious for the production of the result of ideas, having medium or small force.

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Here we have, in an incomplete and summary manner, explained the causes and conditions of the order of the reciprocal generation of different categories of consciousness. Complete knowledge of these causes belongs only to the Buddha. Thus the stanza says, “All the types of causes which go to produce a peacock feather—no one can know them except the Omniscient Ones: this is the power of knowledge of Omniscience (to know a thing completely).”\textsuperscript{132} The causes of the variety of material things are
difficult to know; how much more difficult is it to penetrate the variety of causes and conditions of non-material things, minds and mental states!\textsuperscript{133}

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A certain non-Buddhist\textsuperscript{134} believes that the consciousnesses are produced from a soul. One can successfully oppose his objections vainly formulated against us: Why isn’t the latter consciousness the same as the former consciousness? Why aren’t the consciousnesses produced in a fixed order?

This master\textsuperscript{135} explains the variety of consciousnesses and the absence of a fixed rule to their arising by the diversity that he terms “the conjunction (sāmyoga) of the soul with the manas or mental organ.” This explanation does not hold. No type of conjunction is proved.\textsuperscript{136}

On the other hand, reasoning shows that two things in conjunction should be delimited, that is to say, localized in distinct places. Judge if your definition of conjunction, “possession succeeding upon non-possession,\textsuperscript{137} admits of the same conclusion as our reasoning, namely that the soul is delimited, localized.\textsuperscript{138} (Whence it follows that the soul is not omnipresent: and this contradicts your system.)\textsuperscript{139}

It also results from your definition of conjunction that, when the manas moves—it goes to such and such a part of the body—the soul should also move to make a place for it (and then it is not nīskriya, or exempt from action) or that it should perish (and then it is not nītya, or eternal).\textsuperscript{140} On the other hand, you cannot admit that the soul is in partial conjunction\textsuperscript{141} with the manas, for, according to you, the soul is an entity without parts.

\textsuperscript{142}Supposing also that there is conjunction between the permanent soul and an always immoveable manas, how does one explain the diversity of the conjunction (necessary for the diversity of consciousness)? Would you say that this diversity results from
the diversity of the buddhi, "intelligence," (which is a quality, guṇa, of the soul)? But the buddhi presents the same difficulty as the manas: if the soul is not diversified, how would buddhi be diversified? Would you say that the diversity of the buddhi results from the diversity of conjunction of the soul and the manas, a variety which results from the saṃskāras? In this hypothesis, the soul serves no purpose; why not say that the diversity of consciousnesses comes from the consciousness itself which is diversified by the saṃskāras? The soul does not intervene in the beginning of consciousness, and to say that consciousness comes from a soul is to be as the charlatan who, although drugs suffice for the healing of the sickness, pronounces some magic syllables: Phuṭ! Svāḥā!

You would say without doubt that consciousness, like the saṃskāras, exists through conjunction with the soul: but this is merely a statement without proof. But you would insist, saying that the soul is its support (āśraya): please explain by an example the nature of the relationship of the support and the supported. The consciousness (that the saṃskāras influence) and the saṃskāras themselves are not a picture or a fruit that the soul supports as a wall supports a picture or as a plate supports fruit: in fact, on the one hand, one would have to admit physical contact (between the soul and the thought-saṃskāras); and, on the other hand, the picture and the fruit exist independently of the wall and the plate.

You say that you do not understand the support that the soul furnishes the thought-saṃskāras to be thus: the soul supports thought-saṃskāras as earth supports smell, color, taste, touch. We rejoice in this comparison, for it establishes the non-existence of the soul. In the same way that one cannot perceive the existence of earth independently of smell, etc.—what one designates by the word "earth" is only a collection of smells, etc.—in this same way there is no soul existing apart from the thought-saṃskāras: the thought-saṃskāras are what one designates by the word "soul". Who can obtain the idea of "earth" apart from smell, etc.?

But, if "earth" does not exist apart from smells, etc., how can one qualify certain smells, etc., as properties of earth: "The smell,
the taste of earth?"

One expresses oneself thus with a view to distinguishing: in other words, one wants to indicate that certain smells, tastes, etc., are what is termed "earth," not other smells or tastes which are termed "water." In the same way, one designates a certain thing as being "the body of a wooden statue" indicating by that that it is of wood, and not of baked clay.\textsuperscript{143}

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If the soul produces the consciousnesses by reason of the variety of the\textit{sam\textsk}aras, why doesn't it produce all the consciousnesses at the same time?

[The Vai\text{\textse{\textik}sikas:}] Because the strongest\textit{sam\textsk}ara opposes the weakest\textit{sam\textsk}ara in producing its result. And if the strongest\textit{sam\textsk}ara does not constantly produce its result, it is for the same reason that you have given in explaining the traces (\textit{v\text{\textas}an\text{\textas}s}) abandoned by the consciousness in the series: we think that the\textit{sam\textsk}aras are not permanent and are subject to change.

But then of what use is a soul? Diverse consciousnesses would be generated by the diverse force of the\textit{sam\textsk}aras, since there is no difference in nature between your\textit{sam\textsk}aras and our\textit{v\text{\textas}an\text{\textas}s}.\textsuperscript{144}

[The Vai\text{\textse{\textik}sikas:}] One cannot do without the soul. Memory, the\textit{sam\textsk}aras, etc.,\textsuperscript{145} are things (\textit{pad\text{\textar\textas}ras}) that are termed "attributes" (\textit{guna}); these attributes must of necessity have for their substratum, or support (\textit{\textas{\textra}ya}), a "substance" (\textit{dravya}) and, among the nine substances (earth, etc.), the soul, since it is inadmissible that memory and the other mental qualities would have for their substratum any substance other than the soul (namely earth, etc.), since the soul alone is intelligent.

But this system of substances and attributes is not proved. [You say that memory, the\textit{sam\textsk}aras, etc., are things included within the category of "attributes" and are not substances: we do
not agree.] We think that all that exists is "substance." A Sūtra says that "the result of the religious life consists of six substances (namely the five pure skandhas and pratisamākhyānirodha)." It is false that memory, etc., has the soul as its substratum: as we have criticized the idea of a substratum.

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[The Vaiśeṣikas say:] If the soul does not really exist, what is the result of actions?

The result of actions is that the "soul" experiences pleasure or pain.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] What do you understand by "soul"?

It is what one speaks of when one says "I," the object of the idea of self, the skandhas or object.

How do we know this?

It is to the series of skandhas, that is, to the skandhas—to one's body, to one's sensations—that one becomes attached; as the idea of "I" is generated with reference to the idea of white and other similar ideas: in the world does one not say "I am white, black, old, young, thin, fat"? What one regards as white, etc.,—evidently the skandha of physical matter—is also what one regards as "I." The "soul" imagined by the Vaiśeṣika is different from white, etc.; but, in fact, the idea of "I" is relative only to those skandhas and not to any "self" imagined [by the Vaiśeṣikas.]

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] It is through metaphor that the world designates the body by the word "I" when it says, "I am white." This metaphor is justified because the body is in the service of the true "I."

So be it: one metaphorically calls what is used by the "I" by the
name of "I." But one cannot explain in this manner the consciousness that says "I" (with regard to the body, sensations, consciousness, etc.).

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] If the idea of "I" has the body for an object why is not this idea generated with regard to the bodies of others?

Because there is no relationship between the series of *skandhas* of others and this idea. When the body or mind is in a relationship with the idea of "I"—a cause and effect relationship—this idea is generated with regard to this body and this mind; but not with regard to the *skandhas* of others. The habit of considering "my" series as "I" exists in "my" series from the very beginning.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] If there is no "soul," to what do you attribute the idea of "I"?

We have answered this question when we explained what memory belongs to. The master of memory is simply the cause of memory. It is the same for the idea of "I".

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[The Vaiśeṣikas:] What is the cause of the idea of "I"? It is a defiled mind, impregnated by this same idea of self, and having for its object the series of minds wherein it is produced.

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[The Vaiśeṣikas:] In the absence of a soul, who has suffering or pleasure? The *āśraya* within which suffering or pleasure is produced, in the same way that a tree is said to have flowers, a forest has fruit. And the *āśraya* in question may belong to any of the six internal *āyatanas*, the eye-*āyatana*, etc. This has been explained [in the First Chapter.]
[The Vaiśeṣikas:] In the absence of a soul, who is it that does a deed? Who is it that tastes the result?

What do you understand by "he who does," and "he who tastes"?

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] We understand this to be the agent, the taster.¹⁴⁹

Your explanation is merely words and explains nothing. The Vaiśeṣikas here invoke the doctrine of the Grammarians.¹⁵⁰ They say that the agent is he who has independent power, that the taster is he who enjoys the result of the deed. In the world he who possesses independent power with regard to a certain action is considered as the "agent"; for example, Devadatta, having the power to bathe himself, to seat himself, and to walk, is called "the bather," "the sitter," and "the walker."

This definition is not admissable. What does one understand by "Devadatta"? If one understands this to be a soul, the example is not proved, and is without value. If one understands a certain coming together or complex of skandhas, then Devadatta is indeed an agent, but he is not "an independent agent and creator of deeds." Action is threefold¹⁵¹—body, speech, and mind. That which produces bodily action is the wind agitating the body; the body and the mind depend again on their causes and conditions; these causes and conditions depend in their turn on their causes and conditions: in all this there is not any simple entity, a "producer" dependent on itself or, in other words, independent. For everything that exists depends on causes and conditions. The soul as you understand it does not depend on causes and conditions; furthermore, it does nothing: it is not then an independent agent. Nowhere does anyone maintain the existence of an agent conforming to your definition, "He who possesses independent power is termed an agent." That which one terms the agent of a certain action, is, amongst all its causes, that which is the principal cause of this action. Now even if we were to define the agent in this manner, your "self" is not an agent.
What is in fact the principal cause of the beginning of bodily action? Memory causes a wish or a desire for action to surge up; from desire there proceeds imagination; from imagination there proceeds effort which gives rise to a vapor which sets in motion bodily action. In this process, what activity do the Vaiśeṣikas attribute to a "soul"? This soul is certainly not an agent of bodily action. Vocal and mental action can be explained in the same way.

You say that the "soul" enjoys the result, because it discerns or knows the result: but soul has no role in discerning the result; it does not figure among the causes that produce consciousnesses as we have shown above.

[The Vaiśeṣikas:] If there is no soul, why do good and bad deeds not die out in "non-living things"?

Because the "non-assumed" elements, not constitutive of living beings, are not susceptible of serving as a support for sensation, etc. Only the six internal organs are the support of sensation, etc.; not a soul, as we have proved.

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[The Vaiśeṣikas:] In the absence of a soul, how can past action, which is now destroyed, produce a future result?

To this question we would answer now by asking how, even though a soul were to exist, destroyed action can have the force of producing the result. The Vaiśeṣikas would have it that the result is generated from merit or from demerit (dharma, adharma), inherent attributes (guna) of the soul, supported by the soul: but we have criticized the idea of a substratum or "support" and shown that it is not rational.

According to the Buddhists, future results are not generated from destroyed action; results are generated from the last moment in the evolution of a series that has its origin in action.

How does fruit proceed from the seed? One says, in the world,
that fruit is generated from a seed. But in speaking in this way, one does not intend to affirm that the fruit is generated from a destroyed seed, nor that the fruit arises immediately after the seed (that is to say, from a "dying" seed). In fact, the fruit is generated from the last moment in the evolution of a series that has its origin in the seed. The seed successively produces a sprout, a stalk, a leaf, and finally the flower that brings the fruit into existence. If one says that the seed produces the fruit, this is because the seed, through a series of intermediate stages, projects in the flower the efficacy of producing the fruit. If the efficacy of producing the fruit, efficacy which is found in the flower, did not have the seed as its original cause (as its antecedent, or pūrva), then the flower would not have produced a fruit resembling its seed. In the same way, one says that although a result is generated from an action, it is not generated from destroyed action, nor is it generated immediately after the action: it is generated from an ultimate moment in the evolution of a series issuing from the action.

Series, or saṃtāna, means the material and mental skandhas succeeding without interruption in a row which has an action for its original cause. The successive moments of this row are different: there is then evolution (parināma), or transformation of the series. The last moment of this evolution possesses a special efficacy, the capacity of immediately producing the result: it is distinguished, in this regard, from other moments; it is then termed viśeṣa, or the ultimate moment of evolution.

For example, when the mind at death is "associated with attachment," it possesses the capacity of producing a new existence. This mind has for its antecedents many actions of all types: nevertheless, it is the efficacy projected by a weighty action that informs (or qualifies) the last thought; in the absence of heavy action, the efficacy is projected by near action; in its absence by habitual action; and in its absence by the action of a previous life. There is a stanza (by Rāhula) which says, "Weighty action, near action, habitual action, old action: these four die in this order." There is good reason to establish a distinction between a
retributive result and an out-flowing result. When the force that produces a retributive result has given forth its result, this force is abolished. But the force that produces an out-flowing result, a force projected by a "cause similar to its effect" (sabhāgabeta), does not perish by the production of its result; when it is defiled, this force perishes by the force of its opposition; when it is not defiled, it perishes through Nirvāṇa, which involves the abolition of the series, both physical matter and mind.

Why is a new retribution not generated from the retributive result as a new fruit is generated from the fruit of a tree, or as a fruit is also a seed?

But a new fruit is not generated from the fruit seed.

From what is the new fruit generated, if not from the evolution of a new series?

The first fruit seed, encountering the conditions necessary for evolution (water, earth, etc.), finally produces the ultimate moment in the evolution—from whence the new fruit arises. When it produces the shoot, the old fruit takes the name of seed. If, before any evolution, (before any germinative processes), it is given the name of seed, it is an anticipative name, a name justified by the similarity of the ungerminated seed and the germinated seed. In the same way here: when a retributive result (body, etc.) encounters the conditions that produce good and bad—good teaching, bad teaching—it gives rise to minds that will be rewarded, namely bad or good-impure minds. From these minds there proceeds an evolution of their series that results in an ultimate state from whence a new retribution will emerge. This is not generated under any other conditions. The example then justifies our thesis.

One can also take into account the nature of the retribution by another example (that shows that a new retribution does not necessarily succeed the first). If one colors the flower of a lemon tree with milk, a certain evolution of the plant series will take place which will cause the seed of the new fruit to be red. But the
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red seed, once planted, will not generate another red seed. In the same way the retribution of an action does not produce a new retribution.\textsuperscript{165}

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I have, to the measure of my intelligence, taught in a summary and outline manner the result of actions. Only the Buddhas know how the series, impregnated by actions diverse in nature and in force, evolve from such a type that, arriving at such a stage, it produces a certain result: There is a stanza, "Action, the impression caused by the action, the active entry of this impression, the result that results from it—no one if not a Buddha, knows all this in the totality of its processes."\textsuperscript{166}

Seeing then, by a path of demonstrative arguments, that the doctrine of the teaching of the Buddhas is perfect, and rejecting the opinion of those blind through bad views and through bad steps, the non-blind see.\textsuperscript{167}

In fact, this doctrine of the non-existence of the soul is the only road to the city of Nirvāṇa; although illumined by the rays which are the words of this sun which is the Tathāgata, although followed by thousands of saints, and although it is without obstacles, it is not seen by persons of weak insight.\textsuperscript{168}

In this book one will find but a summary indication for the use of intelligent persons: but poison (of belief in soul), once within a wound, will spread itself everywhere by its own force.\textsuperscript{169}
Preliminary Notes

I. According to the Tibetan, this is "The Ninth Chapter (Koṣasthānam) entitled An Exposition of the Refutation of the Pudgala" (gan zag dgag pa bstan pa zhes bya ba mdzod kyi gnas dgu pa; Mdo 64, Cordier, p. 394).

But the colophon to the Eighth Chapter says that the Abhidharmakosabhāṣyam ends with that Chapter: chos mnön pa'i mdzod kyi bṣad pa las sūnms par 'jug pa bstan pa zhes bya ba mdzog kyi gnas brgyad pa'o / chos mnön pa'i mdzod 'di rdzogs so = Abhidharmakosabhāṣye Samāpattinīrdeśo nāma āṣṭamam koṣasthānam / samāpto'yam Abhidharmakosābāṣbāḥ.

According to the colophon of the Vyākhyā, this Chapter is "The Determination of the Pudgala, An Annex to the Eighth Chapter" (āṣṭamakoṣasthānasambaddha eva pudgalavīśayacayaḥ). And according to the Bhāṣyam, this section is entitled "The Treatise on the Refutation of the Pudgala," Pudgalapratisedha-prakarana (iv.73, p. 650), or "The Refutation of the Doctrine of the Soul," Ātmavādapratisedha (v.27, p. 818).

To certain commentators, the last of the final stanzas of the "Ninth Chapter" refer to the entire Koṣabhāṣyam; for others,— who appear to be the wiser,— to only the Refutation of the Pudgala.

Evidently the Abhidharmakosabhāṣyam, an exposition of the doctrines of the Abhidharma according to the principles of the Vaibhāṣikas, ends with Kārikā viii.40. The stanzas which follow on p. 1355 are the conclusion of the work.

The so-called "Ninth Chapter" does not contain any Kārikās; here Vasubandhu teaches many doctrines which are common to both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, but, on the whole, he adopts the position of the Sautrāntikas.

Saṅghabhādra does not concern himself with the Ninth Chapter.

The stanzas on p. 1355 are, we would say, the conclusion of the Abhidharmakosabhāṣyam. Hsüan-tsang (TD 29, p. 152b 17-22) places them at the end of his Chapter VIII; Paramārtha, on the contrary, makes them the preamble to Chapter IX (TD 29, p. 304a15-20). Thus it is evident that the "Treatise on the Refutation of the Pudgala" importunes,—if one can say this,—these stanzas (see below note 1).

II. Vasubandhu refutes the doctrines of the Pudgalavadins, "followers of the pudgala," and he calls them Vāṭśiputriyās. The Vyākhyā explains: vāṭśiputriyā āryasāṁmātyāyāḥ (see note 8). The sources (Vasumitra, Bhavya, and Vinitadeva) do not agree in their enumeration of the sects or schools which admit a pudgala. One will finds some information in Nirvāṇa, 1926, p. 34, and in a version of Vasumitra's treatise which I hope to publish in the Collection de Matériaux pour l'étude du Bouddhisme, by J. Przyłuski.

The question is asked: are the Pudgalavadins Buddhists? Vasumitra is very plain in this: na hi Vāṭśiputriyānām mukṣir nesye buddhatvāt; "one does not pretend that they cannot obtain deliverance, for they are Buddhists" (see note 8). An opposite opinion, however, is given on p. 1338 (Hsüan-tsang, TD 29, p. 156c25) and in the final stanzas where the Pudgalavadins are included among the Tīrthikas.

Lcan-skya hu-thug-hu expresses a very widespread opinion when he says that the five schools of the Mahāśāṁmītiyas, admitting that the "self" is a "person", cannot be considered as Buddhist (Wassilief, p. 270).

Śaṅtideva (Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.60) says, "The followers of a pudgala, internal non-believers (antaścarāśirbhika), admit a soul (ātman) called pudgala, and say that this soul is neither identical to the skandhas, nor different from them: otherwise one can see that they enter into the philosophy of the non-Buddhists." They call themselves Buddhists, saugatammanya.

Candrakīrti (Madhyamakāvatāra, vi.86) says, "The non-Buddhists (tīrthikas) speak of a pudgala, etc.; seeing that the pudgala and other supposed principles do not have any activity,
the Buddha declared that the mind alone is active. To say 'non-Buddhists' is a general manner of speaking; for there are Buddhists ('some sectarians of this Dharma') who admit a pudgala. From a certain point of view (rnam pa gcig tu na = okaprakārēṇa), they are not Buddhists, for, like non-Buddhists, they do not correctly understand the sense of the Teaching. Consequently, this designation ('non-Buddhist') is extended to all. It says in the Ratnāvalī, 'The world, with the Śāmkhya, Vaiśeṣikas, and Nirgranthas, believe in a pudgala, in the skandhas, and in other principles. We would ask them if they teach the means to pass beyond being and non-being (or rather: if they pass beyond the affirmation and the negation of existence)...' Consequently one must consider those who believe in the skandhas, etc., as persons outside (bāhya)." (We see that the "followers of the skandhas" or skandhavādins, that is to say, the orthodox Buddhists of the Hinayāna, are, like the followers of the pudgala, excluded from the Good Law).

III. The classical etymology of pudgala is represented in the Tibetan by gan zag and in the Chinese (Mahāvyutpatti, 207.7) as ts'eng-chien 增损 : pūryati galati ca (Sarvadarśana; and Sarad Candra Das and S. Lévi's translation of the Sūtraalāmākāra, p. 259: "through which demerit increases and merit decreases, and vice versa").

Buddhaghosa, in his Visuddhimagga, 310, has: pun ti vuccati nirayo tasmin galantitum puggalām.

The Abhidhammāyālāmākārāloka, commenting on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā 19.2, proposes the etymology: punah punar gatisi liyate, which is reflected in the translation of Hsūn-tsang "which, on many occasions, takes up the gatis."

The Aṣṭasāhasrikā has: sattvadṛṣṭyā jīvadṛṣṭyā pudgaladṛṣṭyā bhavadṛṣṭyā vibhavadṛṣṭyā ucchedadṛṣṭyā śāsvatadṛṣṭyā svakāyādṛṣṭyā etāsām evamādyānām dṛṣṭinām prabhānā yādharmaṃ desaṣṭiyatiti tenārthena bodhisattvo mahāsatvā ity ucyate.

The Abhidhammāyālāmākārāloka has: tattvāmākārdhānārthena ātmaḥ āhito 'hamākārā etāsām iti krtyā / sidāntakarikatāt sattvāh / jīvendriyavasaṇena nākāyasabhaṇge parīsamāptē varata iti jīvā / punah punar gatiṣu liyā iti pudgalāḥ / āvīrabhavatī bhavāḥ / tirobhabhavatī vibhavāḥ / nāstidānām abūtu pūrvaṃ ity ucchedāḥ (prasajyate) asti yac (ca) svabhāvena na tan nāstī śāsvaṭāḥ / ātmaṃśiyakāreṇa pañcaskandhādarṣanāṃ / evamādyānām dṛṣṭinām...

We would remark that the etymology of sattva as we have encountered in Kosa, v.7, note 27 (reading of S. Lévi). Buddhaghosa gets sattva from sakta, etc.

On other synonyms of pudgala, see above p. 1324 (Hsūn-tsang, TD 29, p. 154a28)

IV. Among the sources which must be compared with the present Treatise on the Refutation of the Pudgala, we would point out: 1. Kathavyutthu, i.1 (translation of S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy); 2. Vījñānakāya, TD 26, number 1539, Chap. II (translated and analyzed in Études Asiatiques, 1925, i. p. 358-376); 3. Sāṃśīyāṣṭāstra, TD 32, number 1649, an analysis of which will be published in the Collection de Matériaux pour l'étude du Bouddhisme, by Przyluski). Vasubandhu quotes part of these last two treatises: some indications on this subject are in the notes of our translation.

On the other hand, the Sūtraalāmākāra of Asaṅga (edited and translated by S. Lévi, 1907-1911), xviii.92-103, depends to a certain extent on the Treatise of Vasubandhu. We would mention for example the discussion of the relationship between fire and fuel, the use of the same scriptural texts, and the demonstration of the inactivity of the pudgala.

A dependence by Śāntideva (for example, the Bodhicaryāvatāra ix.73) and his commentator on Vasubandhu is no less evident.

Vasubandhu's observations on the inactivity of an ātman to transmigrate, and on the relationship of fire and fuel, is seen in the Madhyamakāsarūtras, x.14 and xvi.2.

All of the refutation to the pudgala in Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, is, one could say, inspired by Vasubandhu; for example vi.146: "Some maintain the real existence of a pudgala, of which one cannot say that it is identical to the skandhas or different from them, permanent or impermanent; it is known by the six viññānas, and it is the object of the idea..."
of self."

In his small *Treatise*, Vasubandhu refutes not only the followers of the *pudgala*, —Buddhists albeit heretical,—but also some non-Buddhists, the Grammararians, the Sāṁkhyaśas, and the Vaiśeśikas. He quotes Vāraṇaganyā (v.27, translation, p. 818). He has some details concerning the positions of these non-Buddhists which can be compared with the traditions preserved by Paramārtha and K’uei-chi (Takakusu, *T’oung-pao*, 1904, and *JRAS*, 1905).

V. An argument of the Pudgalavādins, not mentioned by Vasubandhu, is pointed out in the *Vyākyā* for i.42 (p. 85 of the Petrograd edition). The Sūtra says: *caksuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā na nimirṛtā dhāriḥ..."* "Having seen visibles by the eye, he does not conceive any affection..." As the eye sees, so too the *pudgala* sees by the eye (yasmā tāt caksuṣa paśyati; see below note 38).

The *Vyākyā* for iii.43a admits the two hypotheses that Vasubandhu attributes death (cāyūti) to the mind (citta), or to the *pudgala*.

Buddhaghosa, in his *Manorathapūrāṇi*, i.95, explains in terms of which Vasubandhu would approve, why the Bhagavat speaks of a *pudgala*, even though a *pudgala* does not exist.
Footnotes

1. Vyākhya: kim khalv ato'nyatra mokṣo nāstī / na pramāḍyaṁ mumukṣubhir iti vacanda / ay am eva moksopdyo nasty ato'nyo moksopdyas tad atra moktukdmaih pramāḍo na kartavya ity arthād uktam ācāryena / codakah prchati kim khalv ata iti vistarāḥ.

Vasubandhu said, "Those who desire deliverance should apply themselves without weakness to this doctrine." That is to say, "There is no deliverance outside of this doctrine." The opponent answers, "Is there then no deliverance . . . "

2. On this subject, see the stanza of the Stotrakāra (=Mātrceta, Takakusu, I-ssing, p. 156):
sāhamkāre manasi na śamam yāti janmaprabandho
nābhākāraś calati ṛddayaḥ ātmadṛśtav ca saṭyam /
anyaḥ śāśta jagati ca yato nāsti nairātmyavādi
nānyaḥ tasmād upāsamaividhes tvanmatād asti mārgaḥ //

"As long as the mind (manas = citta) is accompanied by the idea of "I," the series of rebirths cannot be stopped; the idea of "I" is not removed from the heart as long as there exists the view that there is a soul (ātman). Now there is not in the world any master who teaches the non-existence of the soul (nairātmya-vādin), except you. Thus, there is not, outside of your doctrine, any other path of deliverance."

Compare the stanzas attributed to the Ācārya, Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇjikā, 492: yah pāśyaty ātānām tasyāham iti śātvataḥ snebhaḥ / snebhaḥ suksesu tṛṣyati tṛṣnadośāṁ tisvarakurute . . .
The same for Candrakirti, Madhyamakāvīvāra, vi.120 (quoting the Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 340), "Seeing through, praṇā that all defilements and all evil (kēṭa, doṣa) comes from the idea of self (sakāyadṛśti), and taking into consideration that the object of this idea is the soul (ātman), the ascetic (yogin) denies the soul."

3. Saeki cites a commentary on the Vijñaptimātra, 2,4: a. the asaṁskṛtas do not exist; b. that which exists (astī-dharma= bhāva) is of three types: things known through direct perception, matter (color), the mind; things like pots and clothes (hsien shou yung fa & yu tso yungfa); c. three conceptions of the self: identical to the skandhas, different from the skandhas, neither identical or different.

4. Āgama, the proof from authority, is not mentioned because it is included within anumāṇa, inference.

5. Entity = bhāva; Hsüan-tsang translates this as yu-fa 有法 which calls to mind the atthidhamma of Buddhaghosa.

6. Vyākhya: pratyakṣam upalabdhir iti pratyakṣam ity upalabdhiṁ viśeṣaṇam / pratyakṣam tad upalabdhir pratyakṣata upalabdhir ity arthaḥ / athavā pratyakṣam pramāṇam upalabdhir upalabhyante'nayā ity upalabdhir /

The object of the mental consciousness is defined by Yaśomitra: (upalabdhi) dharmāyatanaṁ vedaṇādikākṣaṇaṁ yogi:vijñayaṁ ca = the perception of the dharmāyatana (that is to say, vedanā, etc.) and of things which the Yogins perceive. (In fact the mental consciousness of the Yogins knows the minds and mental states of others, vii.11).

But how can perception (upalabdhi) by the manas be pratyakṣam, immediate or direct perception? In fact the manas which has just arisen is known by the manas which immediately follows (i.17): manasaṁ ca kim pratyakṣam upalabdhir / samanantararud-dābam hi mano'nantarotpamena manovijñānena vijnāyate. There is a difficulty here. Some other masters (the Sautrāntikas) think that the mind knows itself: the subject and the object of the consciousness are both directly perceived: raktam vā dviṣtaṁ vā sukhasāmaiprayuktam vā duḥkkhasāmiprayuktam vā (iv. 49) ity evamadi svasāmvedyataḥ (pratyakṣam) ity apare / tad etad dvividhām pratyakṣam grāhyagataṁgrabakagataṁ vā.

7. Vyākhya: mahārṣipraṇidbijñānaparicchinnatvād asty eva caksurādikam indriyāṁ
8. Vyākhya: Vātsiputriya and the expression "vatsiputriyanām iti anena... mokṣo... bauddhatvāt atba va pāramāṣatirodham sāpakteśāyam pakṣo nāsty atma ity anena darsayati.

From two things, one. The Vātsiputriya believe in a certain type of self-realization: now they are Buddhists, and one cannot deny that they can obtain deliverance: thus the author is wrong in saying that a false conception of the self creates an obstacle to deliverance. Or rather the thesis which denies the self is false.

On the avaktavyata of the pudgala, see, for example, Madhyamakavrtti, 283.

9. Color, sound, etc., are distinct things (bhinnalaksana); milk, a house, and an army are complexes of colors, tastes, odors, and tangibles, of straw and wood, of elephants, horses, and chariots, not of separate things, bhāvāntara: milk is nothing other than color, etc.

Compare Sūtrālamkāra, xviii.92: prajñāptiṣṭhītyā vaiçyāḥ pudgalo dravyatā na tu.

10. Yaśomitra quotes this stanza of Dharmakīrti: varṣatāpābhyāṁ kīṁ veyomnaś carmany asti tayoh phalam / carmopamaś cet so'nityaḥ khatulyaś ced asatphalalāḥ //

Sarvadarśana, p. 10 (1858); Nyāyavārttika, ii.1, 5, Tātparya, 164; in Ślokavārttika: khatulyaś ced asatsamah; Naiskarmyasiddhi, ii. 60, etc.

If the pudgala is unconditioned (asamskṛta), eternal, unmodifiable, it is like space, it is like not existing. There exists only that which is "capable of action" (arthakriyā), which is momentary (yat sat tat kṣaṇikam): a thesis of the Sauntanyakas; for the Vaibhāṣikas, the asamskṛtas (space and the two niruddhas, i. 5c) exist.

11. For the Vātsiputriya, as for Vasubandhu, the skandhas of the past and of the future do not exist. The meaning of the expressions adhyātmika (or abhyantara) and upatta is explained in Kośa, i. 34d, 39a-b.

12. The Vyākhya attributes this paragraph to the author, not to the Vātsiputriyas.

13. For certain commentators, idhyate and dahyate are equivalent.

14. Aṣṭagravyaka (ii.22): the four mahābhūtas or primary substances, and the four upādāyarūpas, from rūpa (the visible) to the tangible.

15. The thing on fire (pradīpta) is a complex; it is at one and the same time burner (fire) and the thing burning (indhana): in fact this thing is constituted of four elementary substances (above note 13), and one of these substances which is "heat" is the fire.

16. Earth and water are different, for their laksanas differ; the same holds for the burner and the thing burned.

17. Vyākhya: upādāyaarthas tu vaktavya iti/ ananyatvād ity abhiprāyaḥ. We must give the word upādāya an explanation that justifies the thesis that fire and fuel are not different.

18. The fuel is made up of three mahābhūtas, and fire is its uśmalaksana, the fourth mahābhūta. They arise at the same time, like two horns.

19. One should understand: indhanam upādāya = indhanam āśritya: the fire takes it support from the fuel. Or rather the meaning is that of sahabāva, co-existence, or sahotpāda, co-arising.

20. Paramārtha: If he says, "that which is hot by its nature (the fire) is called hot. The object in question (fuel), although different from fire which is hot by nature, becomes hot through its association with that which is hot by its nature," we conclude that it is not incorrect to say that fire and fuel differ.
21. See below note 32. See the Sāṃśīyantikāyāsāstra.
23. This is perhaps better translated, "is ascertained."

24. The Chinese fen-pieh kuan 分別觀 maintains the version "to discern." By reason of physical matter, etc., which the eye perceives (as its own object), the visual consciousness "indirectly knows," "knows in second rank" the pudgala, because physical matter is the support (upādāna) of the pudgala. And one cannot say that the pudgala is physical matter.

25. In this hypothesis physical matter is not the cause of the perception of the pudgala: there is perception of the pudgala "through relationship" with physical matter.


27. Not by reason of three.

28. Samyutta, TD 2, p. 57c18. The Vyākhyā quotes the first words, caksur bhikṣo betur (caksurviṣṇuṇānotpādāya / rūpaṁ bhikṣo pratyayaḥ . . .).

Vyākhyā: betur assānaṁ pratyayaḥ / vipraκṛṣṭas tu pratyaya eva // janako betuḥ pratyayaḥ tu ālambanamātrām ity apare / paryāyāv evāv ity apare. See ii. 61c, vii. 13a, p. 1112, 1113.

29. Saeki has a note (fol. 14a) on the Dārśāntika theory of the six viśṇānas.

30. Thus none of them "perceive" a pudgala.

31. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 791b11-17: svakām gocaraviṣayām pratyayanubhavanti / nānyad anyasya gocaraviṣayām pratyayanubhavati / manaś caiva pratisaraṇaṁ.

Samyutta, v.218: paṇcimāni brāhmaṇa indriyāni nānāviṣayāni nānāgocarāṇi nānāmaṁśa nānāsaa gocaraviṣayām paccanubhoṭi / katamāni paṇca / . . . / imesam kho paṇcannam indriyānaṁ nānāviṣayānaṁ nānāgocarāṇaṁ na aṁśaṁaññassa gocaraviṣayām paccanubhoṭanānaṁ mano paṭisaraṇaṁ mano ca nesam gocaraviṣayām paccanubhoṭi.

On the formula mano caiva pratisaraṇaṁ, the Vyākhyā says: anusangenedam uktam / nedam udāharaṇam / tathāpi tu mano caiva pratisaraṇaṁ iti tadapeksāṇindriyāni viśṇānotpattā vā viśṇānotpattā kāraṇaṁ bhavantīy arthaḥ.

Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 449a16. The Dārśāntikas say, "The objects of the six viśṇānakāyas, caksurviṣṇāna, etc., are distinct." They say, "The manoviṣṇāna has a distinct object; it does not bear on the objects of the five viśṇānas, caksurviṣṇāna, etc." They say, "The six viśṇānas bear solely on external objects; they do not bear on the internal (ādhyātmika, see p. 1313) organs, nor on the viṇāna." In order to refute this opinion, it is explained that the first five viśṇānas have distinct objects, bearing solely on external objects, not bearing on the organs and the viṇāna; but that the manoviṣṇāna has an object common to the five viśṇānas and also a different object, which bears on the internal organs and also on the viṇāna. It has been explained, Koṣa, i.48a, that among the eighteen dhamma, thirteen are the object of a single manoviṣṇāna with the exclusion of visible things, of sounds, etc., which are also the object of the caksurviṣṇāna, etc.

32. The words in parentheses are according to Hsūn-tsang.

Bhāṣya and Vyākhyā: na va pudgalo viśaya iti (yadi sutram pramāṇikriyate) / na ced viśayaḥ (yadi na kasya cid viśṇānasya viśayaḥ) na tarbi viṇīyeyah (tata ca paṇcavidham jñeyam iti svasiddhānto bhūtibhye) (above note 21).

Paramārtha: Or rather the pudgala is not an object. If it is not an object, it is not discerned by the six consciousnesses.

33. In spite of the Sūtra, you affirm that the object of the mental consciousness is general; so too, in spite of the Sūtra, you affirm that the pudgala is discernible by the visual consciousness.
34. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 313a15; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 723c18; Samyutta, iv.198.  
... nānāgocarāni. ... kukkanrakṣasipītalīśumārasarpaṃkaraṇaḥ sat prāṇakāh  
kena cid baddha madhye graṁkṣaṃ kṛtvāt śrīstāḥ / te svakām svakāṃ gocarāvisayam  
ākāṃśante / grāmākṣaśmaśaṅadakavālām kāṅśaṇād evam saḍ imānāntrīyaṇi ...  

35. The desire (ākāṃśana) to see, to understand, etc., is certainly foreign to the organs of  
sight, hearing, etc., which are material (rupaśvabhāvavatvāt), and also to the visual  
consciousness, the auditory consciousness, etc., which are non-imaginative (nirvikalpakat-  
vatvāt). This refers, under the name of the organ of the eye (caksurāntrīya), to the mental  
consciousness led by the predominating, specifying action of this organ, tadādhīpātyād-  
hyābhyāta.

36. Samyutta, iv.29: sabham bhikkhave abhiññāpariññeyyam / kim ca bhikkhave  
abhiññāpariññeyyam / rūpam bhikkhave abhiññāpariññeyyam cakkhuviññānam ...  

37. Compare Vasumitra, Sectes, on jñeya, viññeya, and abhijñeya.

38. This according to Hsüan-tsang. Paramārtha: "The master who believes in a self says, 'I  
see the pudgala through (由 yu by means of) the eye'; as he sees that there is a self in  
(於 yū) that which is not a self, he falls ...

The Bhāṣya has the word anātmanā which the Vyākhyā glosses as caksuṣā  
caksurāvijñānāmy etat. Thus one should understand the yu of Paramārtha in the sense of  
the instrumental, "As he sees, through that which is not a self—that is to say through the  
eye, through the visual consciousness ..."

Stcherbatski: "This idea of yours that there is an existing self who through the opening  
of his eyes contemplates other selves, this idea it is which is called Wrong Personalism."

One can draw the conclusion from the formula caksuṣā rūpāni dyuṣvā that the pudgala  
sees through the eyes; Vyākhyā ad i.42, p. 117 (Petrograd ed.). Cullāṇiddesa 234 has:  
cakkhuṇā puriso dlokati rupagatāni. See below n. 67.

39. According to Paramārtha and Hsūan-tsang. Stcherbatski, "In the Ajita-sermon."

40. Version of Paramārtha. This is the well-known text: caksuḥ pratitya rūpāni cakṣuḥjñānām / trayanām samnipūtaḥ sparyāḥ / sabhajati vedaṇā samjñā cetanā ... See iii.  
32a-b.

41. Paramārtha transcribes; Hsūan-tsang: nara=na ramate, mānava-ju-t'ung = scholar-kumāra, jantu, "who is born".

A Yogācārin commentary quoted by Saeki says: sattva, because all the Aryans truly see  
that only the dharma exist, no other thing; or rather because there is affection therein  
(sattva from sakta, as in Buddhaghosa?); manoja (i-sheng 意生), because it is  
constituted by the manas ... pudgala, because it goes frequently taking up realms of rebirth  
without the power to be disgusted with them; jiva, because it presently lives through union  
with the āyus (Kośa, ii.45); jantu (sheng 生), because all the dharma which exist are  
edowed with arising.

Other lists contain thirteen names. Among them, yaksā, Suttanipāta, 875.

On sattva, see Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, 133, Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology,  
1914, 83. We have seen that sattva signifies "that which perishes," v. n. 27 and above p.  
1319.

42. See below note 71.

43. The Sūtra of the four "authorities," "supports," is quoted in the Vyākhyā ad ii.46,  
English trans. p. 241: catvārimāṇi bhikṣavāḥ pratisaraṇāṁ / katamāṇi catvāri / dharmāḥ  
pratisaraṇāṁ na pudgalāḥ / arthaḥ pratisaraṇāṁ na vyaśajanaṁ / nitārthaṁ sūtram  
pratisaraṇāṁ na neyārthām / jñāṇāṁ pratisaraṇāṁ na viśeṣaṁ.  

Mahāvyutpatti, 74, where the order differs: arthapratisaraṇena bhavatavyam na
vyanjanapratisaranena, dharma... jñāna... nitārthasūtrapratisaranena... (Extracted from the Hsien-yang, TD 31, Tokyo, xviii.7,10a).

Dharmasamgraha, 53; Śūtrālaṁkāra, xviii.31-33; J.As. 1902, ii.269, Madhyamakavytti, 268, 598.

Pratisarana, pratisarana (Divya, 427.22, 176.26, where the editor translates the word as “confidence”) is translated rton pa (confidence) and rten-pa (support), i 依 (support), and liang 量 (authority).

i. Bodhisattvabhūmi, Lxvi.

kathām bodhisattva caturśu pratisaranesu prayuyate.

iha bodhisattvaḥ arthārthī parato dharmanā śṛṇoti na vyanjanābhisamskārthī / arthārthi dharmanā śṛṇvam na vyanjanārthī prakṛtyāpy ācār dharmanā desyamānam arthapratisaranaḥ bodhisattvāḥ satkṛtya śṛṇoti.

punar bodhisattvaḥ kālāpadeśam mahāpadeśam ca (Dīgha, ii. 124, etc.) yathābhūtām prajānāti / prajānan yuktipratisaranā bhavati na sthaviṃśabhiṣajānena vā pudgalaṇa tathāgatena vā saṃghena vā ime dharmā bhaṣyā iti pudgalapratisaranaḥ bhavatī / sa evam yuktipratisaranāḥ na pudgalapratisaranāḥ tattvārtanāḥ na nicalai aparapratyayatī ca bhavati dharmanu. (aparapratyayatī= gzan las fes ma yin, Madhyamakavytti, xxviii.4).

punar bodhisattvaḥ tathāgata nivīṣṭaṃśradhāḥ nivīṣṭaprasādā aikāntiko vacasy abhiṣprasanṇas tathāgataniyārthasūtram pratisaranāti na noyāṛtham / noyāṛtham śūtram pratisaranāḥ asambhāro bhavatī asmād dharmanvayatī / tatra hi noyāṛthasya śūtrasya nānāṃkubhaṃ prakṛṭarthavibhāṅgo nisctāḥ saṃdehakaro bhavatī / sacet punar bodhisattvo noyāṛthe’pi sūtre’niyākṣtākāḥ syād evam asau sambhārasya syād asmād dharmanvayatī.

punar bodhisattvāḥ adhigamaṃśānane saradāśi (?) bhavati na ca śrutacintādharmatvābhijñānamāvakā yeṣu vijñātām iti viditā paramagarāṃbhīrān api tathāgataḥbhaṣītan dharmā svātva na prakṛṣṭipti nāpavadaī /

evam... caturnāṃ prāṃpanyam prakāṣītām bhaṣīyārthasvātvaṃ yukte śāstur bhavaṃśayāṃ cādhaśigamaṃśānāsa.

ii. arthaḥ pratisaranam... A notion expressed in the Mahāvagga, i. 23, 4, Majjhima, ii.240; developed in the Lanka: arthapratisaranena bhavatī... and again arthaṃsārāṃ bhavatī... na dhanābdhālāpabhinīṣṭena. A “word” is like a finger which touches the object that one should see; one must remove the finger in order to see the object (Lanka quoted in the Subhaṭīṣaṃgraha, ed. Bendall, fol. 34).

On the relation between the attha and the vyanjanas, see Dīgha, iii. 127-129, Nettipakarana, 21.

iii. dharmaḥ pratisaranam na pudgalaḥ. Variant: yuktipratisaranō bhavati na pudgalapratisaranaḥ.

The refuge is the truth itself, not authority whatever it may be, even the Buddha. This is the teaching of the Majjhima, i.265. He who says, “These dharmaṃ are taught by a Sthāvira, a person possessing the abhiṣāna, the Tathāgata, or the Saṅgha,” is pudgalapratisarana.

Do not lose sight of the teaching of the mahāpadesa, below note 56.

iv. A niyārtha Sūtra is a vibhaktārtha Sūtra, “of explicit meaning”; a neyārtha Sūtra is of undetermined meaning, of meaning yet to be determined (Vāyākyād iii.28). iv.30, English trans. p. 614, calls for a Sūtra of explicit meaning. Vasumitra, Sectes.

It appears that the sole canonical text of interest here is Anguttara, i.60: to attribute to the Tathāgata that which has not been said; to not recognize as said by him that which he has said; to consider as neyattā a niyattā Suttanta, and vice versa. (The theory of the Sūtra exact in its words but badly understood, Dīgha, iii. 127-128, can lead to the distinction between niyattā and neyayattā Sūtras).

Niyattā and neyayattā in the Nettipakarana (where the meaning conforms to the letter, yathāruttasvāna niyattathātham, where the meaning should be determined through reflection, niddhārtevā gahetabhattam); and in the Dīpavamsa (Oldenberg, ed., p. 36) quoted in the Introduction to the Commentary on the Kathāvattu (JPTS, 1889, p. 3). "To
confuse pariyāyabhāsita and nipariyāyabhāsita (compare Visuddhimagga, 473, 499: that which should not be understood literally, and that which should be understood literally, nīṭattha and neyyattha: to attribute another meaning (other than the true meaning) to what has been said with a certain intention (sanādhāya bhaṇīta): thus, respecting the letter destroys the meaning; to create pseudo-Sūtras . . .

Aṭṭhatālīni, 91, “We shall weigh the sense of the Sūtra that you allege . . .”

Sarīghabhadra, iii.25 (Tokyo xxiii.4, 33b16). According to the Sthavira, all āryā deśanā promulgated by the Buddha himself (tathāgataabhāsīta= abaccavacana of the Nettippakkaraṇa, 21) is nīṭatthasūtra; the other Sūtras are anīṭatthas. Sarīghabhadra observes initially that this definition is not found in Scripture; then it is bad reasoning: for there are Sūtras not promulgated by the Buddha which are nīṭatthas, and vice versa. Examples follow. It is said, “It is impossible to say, if not through abhimāna (or “presumption”): I shall enter into the animitta without supporting myself on the void” (These words are not by the Buddha himself, yet the Sūtra is nīṭattha) . . .

The Schools, as we see in Wassiliev, 329, and in the Madhyamakāvatāra, vi. 94, are not in agreement in placing Sūtras in these two categories.

v. We have seen that, according to the Bodhisattvabhūmi, adhigamajñana is absorption consciousness (bhavānāmaya), whereas vijnāna is consciousness obtained through hearing and reflection (frūtacintā).

According to the Vābhajyavādins, jñāna is good in and of itself; vijnāna is good when it is associated with jñāna (Kośa, iv.8b, note 46): it can be understood that jñāna is “supermundane knowledge,” and that the vijnāna, worldly knowledge, is good when it is consecutive to supermundane knowledge.

According to iv.75, an opinion of the “ancient masters,” adhigata (what one knows by absorption) forms part of the vijnāta: but this refers to a worldly consciousness, a worldly absorption.

(In the Sūtra of the Four Pratisaraṇas, jñāna primarily designates the knowledge of the Āryans, anāśravajñāna, exactly as prajñā is, among all the prajñās—which can be avyākṛta, klīṣta, or kuśala,—the pure prajñā). See above notes 36 and 37.

Some notes in the Madhyamakāvṛtti, xxv, 16, p. 65, 74. Jñāna is distinguished from vijnāna in the Gītā, iii.41, vi.8, vii.2, ix. 1, xviii.42.

44. Samyuktā, TD 2, p. 91a27, “All, that is to say, the twelve āyatanas, the eye, etc.”; Kośa, v. trans. p. 819, Mahāniddesa, 133, Samīyutta, iv.15: sabbān vuucatī dvāsāyatanānī.

On sarva, sabba, see Kośa, v.27c, Warren, p. 158, Mrs. Rhys Davids' Points of Controversy, 85, Stcherbatski, Central Conception, 5; Nirvāṇa (1925), p. 139.

45. Hsüan-tsang here translates Pudgala= shu ch’u chu 数取處 = “who frequently takes up rebirth,” see above note 41.

46. This Sūtra is quoted in Kośa, iii.28a-b. (Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 45).

One can compare the Sūtra quoted in Madhyamakāvṛtti, vi. at the beginning (Śīṣṣasamuccaya, 252, Madhyamakāvatāra, 217, Bodhicaryavātāra, ix.73, an extract of the Pitāputrasamāgama): bālo bhikṣavo (or mahārāja) aśrutavān prthbagijāh praṇāptim anupatita caksuṣa rūpāni ḍṛṣṭvā saumanasayastbāṇīyaṁ abhinivisate . . .

The Vyākhyā for iii.28a explains prajñāptim anupatiita iti yathā samjñā yathā ca vyavahāras tathānugataḥ. (It defines bāla, etc). Here we have the gloss: yatraiva praṇāptibh kṛtā atmā iti vyavahārārtham tatraśvātmya abhinivisita ity arthaḥ.

47. Paramārtha omits the first stanza. Śilā=shīh-lo 世羅, translated as “small mountain”; without doubt the Sela of Therāgāthās 57-59 who has a conversation with Māra. Stanzas attributed to Vajirā in the Samīyutta, i.135, trans. in the “Psalms,” p. 190 (Kathāvatthu, trans. p. 61, Madhyamakāvatāra, 246, 257).

Hsiao-āgama’ (TD 2, number 100).

49. *P'o-t'o-li* 婆柁梨 = old-beam-pear (Hsiian-tsang)= waves-cover-profit (Paramārtha); Stcherbatski reads: Bādarayana.

50. Paramārtha: Listen, Oh Bādari, (you shall obtain) the power to deliver yourself from all bonds; through them, the mind is defiled, through them also it is purified. The self does not have the nature of a self; through error, one imagines (fen-pieh 分別 ) it; there is no self, no jantu; only dharmas, cause and results . . .

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 731b11: Through trouble and defilement (samkleia) of the mind, the being (sattva) is troubled, defiled; through the purification (vyavādāna) of the mind, the being is purified; the two masculine and feminine organs exercise sovereignty over two things, sattvacchada and sattvavikalpabheda (see Kṣa, ii. English trans. p. 154).

Saeki remarks: the first stanza exhorts one to the hearing of the Truths.

51. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 37a12: Satkāyadṛṣṭi is opposed by the ten types of śunyata, adhyātmasūnyata, etc. (See the complete lists of the Mahāyutpati, 37= Madhyamakāvata, v.180= Sātasāhasrikā, 215; the Abbisamaya has twenty śunyatas.)

Saeki refers to the Saṃyuktabhādaya, (TD 28, p. 925b28).

52. śunyam adhyātmikam paśya paśya śunyam babirgatam / na vidyate so'pi kaścit yo bhūvayati śunyate //

This third stanza (with the reading paśya paśya) is attributed to the Bhagavat without any other details in the Madhyamakavrtti, p. 348. The reading paśya paśya is recommended by the Chinese versions: jo kuan nei chi kung 若观内之空 , “If you visualize that the interior is empty” (Paramārtha); chi kuan 既観 (Hsiian-tsang). The Gaudakārikā, very likely written under Buddhist influence, has: tattvam adhyātmikam drśtvā tattvam dṛśtvā tu bāhyataḥ (ii. 38).

Hsuan-tsang translates the last line, “A seer capable of meditating on emptiness is not to be found.” The Vyākhyā glosses: yogy api nāsti yah śunyatām abhyayati.

53. This text (according to Stcherbatski, from the Kṣudrāgama) is quoted in the Sūtrālambikāra, xviii.101 (p. 158) as an extract from the “Pentades” (pañcakesu, Chinese: “In the Ti’seng-wu 增五. Sūtra= Pañcottara?” S. Lévi): pañcākṣaṇa pañcādīnava ātpolambha iti deśitaḥ / ātmadṛṣṭir bhavati jivadṛṣṭiḥ / nirviśeṣo bhavati tirthikaiḥ / unmārgapratipanno bhavati / śunyatāyam asya cittaṁ na prakṣandati na prasiddati na santisthate nādhimucyate / āryadharmān asya na vyavādāyante.

These readings are confirmed by the Tibetan and the Vyākhyā, so close in fact that the Tibetan corresponds to an original ātmadṛṣṭir bhavati sattvadṛṣṭir jivadṛṣṭiḥ; the same for the Vyākhyā: ātmadṛṣṭir bhavati yāvaj jivadṛṣṭi iti prathama ādīnavaḥ. Hsuan-tsang and Paramārtha replace jivadṛṣṭi with “to fall into the dṛṣṭigataḥ.” The phraseology prakṣandati . . . in the Anūtattara, iii.246; Dīgha, iii.240, Saṃyutta, iii.133: . . . me nibbāne cittāṁ na pakkhandati na pprāsiddati na sanittāḥati na vimucati (var. nādhimucati) / parittassanā upādānam uppaṇjati paccudāvattati mānasam. (The editor of the Saṃyutta punctuates after parittassanā).

54. Vyākhyā: kenāpy adhyāropitāṁ etāṁ sūtrāṇīty abhiprāyahā.

a. “Sūtras promulgated by the Tathāgata (tathāgatabhāṣita), profound, of profound meaning, supermundane (lokuttara), teaching emptiness (suññatāpatisamutta): they do not listen to them with faith, they do not lend them an ear, they do not recognize them as true (aṭṭhācittam na uppāthāpessanti) . . . But the Sūtras made by poets (kavikata), poetical (kāveyya), of artistic syllable and phonemes, external (bābiraka), promulgated by disciples (sāvaka-bhāṣita), these they believe . . . It is thus that the Sūtras of the first category will disappear . . .” (Saṃyutta, ii.267).

Aṣṭasāhasrikā, 328: yad etat tvayedāni frutam naitad buddhavacanam kavikṛtam kāvyam etat / yat punar idam abhim bhāse etad buddhabhāṣītam etad buddhavacanam.
b. See Saṁghabhadra, Tokyo, xxiii.3, 6a, 25b (translated in Nirvāṇa, 1925, p. 23); mūlataṁgūṣibramśa, Kośa, iii.12d, 13a (Dreams of Kṛkin); muktiṣa sūtra, iii.4c; apāṭha eva, see below note 65.

Discussion on the text of the Sūtras, iii.30b, and elsewhere.

55. Vākyāya: Tāmrapārṇīyanīkādyādiṣu. (The school of Taprobane is named in Vākyāya ad i.17a, English trans. p. 75, note 85).

56. See the texts on the four mahāpadasesas (Dīgha, ii.123, Dialogues, ii.133, note, Anūguttara, ii.167, Nettipakarana, 21-22; Rhys Davids-Stede break this up as mahā-padesa, against the commentator of the Netti) and the rule, "That which is in the Sūtra ... that which does not contradict dharmata" (that is to say the paticcasamuppāda, Netti), Sūtrālāṁkāra, i.10, Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.42, p. 431, Abhisamayālāṁkārāloka. kalāpadeśa, above note 43.

57. sarve dharmā anātmānaḥ (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 66b14ff.) Vākyāya: na caita ātmavābhāvah na caitesev ātmā vidyata ity anātmānaḥ.

Sūtrālāṁkāra, xviii.101 (p. 158): dharmaddāneṣu sarve dharmā anātmāna iti deśitam.

58. If the mental consciousness bears on the pudgala, it will arise from the quality of being its object; thus it would arise from three conditions.

59. Anūguttara, ii.52; Kośa, v.9.

60. The thesis: nātmā skandhāyatanadabātavah, contradicts the thesis: no tu vaktavyāṁ rūpāṇi va no vā (see above note 24).

61. Samyutta, iii.46: ye keci bhikkhave samanā vā brāhmaṇā vā anekavahītam attānaṁ samanupassamāṇā samanupassanti sabbe te pañcāpadānākkhandbe samanupassanti etesāṁ vā āññataram. Same text quoted in the Madhyamakavātāra, vi. 126c-d.

62. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 38a7. The ātman is supposed to be abhinnaḷakaṇa, aviṣṭatāḷaṇaṇa, nitya, aviksaṇa, without arising-old age-sickness-death. How is it that the Tirthika says, “Gautama, I think that rūpa is ātman . . . ?” Why rūpa is not ātman, vii. 13a.


64. Only the pudgala can be designated by the word "I," aham.

65. If the word "I" is understood as you say, the Buddha, when he says "I," is evidently defiled by satkāyadṛṣṭi, "the view of personalism." This, as we know, is of some twenty points (vinītāśikotikā): rūpam ātmeti samanupāsyati / rūpaṇvāntam ātmānam . . / ātmiyām rūpam . . / rūpe ātmānam . . (Mahāvyutpatti 208; Madhyama TD 1, p. 788a25; Samyutta iii.3, 16, etc.) The Vibhāṣā gives four examples reproduced in the Mahāvyutpatti: svāmivat, alāmākāvat, bhṛtyavat, bhājanavat.

66. Vākyāya: ekasmin kṣane samavahītānāṁ babhūnām rāṣṭ/ babhūsu kṣaṇeṣu samavāhī/ tānāṁ dhāra/ rāsīdṛṣṭanāṇa babhūsu dharmesu pudgalaprajñāptim darṣayati / dhrādṛṣṭān- tēna babutve sati rūpavedānaṁāṁ skandhānāṁ pravāhe pudgalaprajñāptim darṣayati. There are other examples as the word aḍī indicates, for example, the chariot (yānaka).

67. Saeki quotes the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 42c20: "As the Vātsiputriyas say, it is the pudgala that knows, not knowledge (jñāna)."

68. According to the commentary on the Samayabheda, the Mahāsāṃghikas think that the Buddha, having cultivated his mind during numerous kalpas, can, in a single moment of thought, know sarvadharmanvabhāvāviśeṣa.

Saeki quotes the Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 43a11, "Is there a knowledge (jñāna) capable of knowing all the dharmas? Yes, lokasaṁvītijñāna . . . " (See Kośa, vii.18c). The
Footnotes

Samyuktahṛdaya (see above note 51), "One says universal knowledge (sarvajñāna) because he knows all. By "all" one should understand the twelve āyatanas, their specific characteristics and their general characteristics." See vii. p. 1146 On the omniscience of the Buddha, his knowledge of the future, etc., see Kṣa. 1.i, ii.62 (p. 300), vii.30, 34, p. 1146, 37a.

69. The Buddhabhūmi, TD 26, p. 309c9, refutes this stanza.
"Those are vain words. The paracittajñāna (knowledge of the mind of another), at the moment when it grasps a thing, does not grasp other things; because it does not know other things, it is not universal knowledge. The series also does not grasp (all), because it knows present being. In your system, it knows solely the general characteristics of a part of the dharmas. And if this is the case, it is only by metaphor that the Tathāgata is called omniscient . . ."

70. Mahāvastu, iii.327.

71. Bhārābrānātā (Sūtrālāmākāra, xviii.102) or simply the Bhārasutta (Visuddhi, 479, 512).

72. The phrases between parentheses are the additions by Hsiian-tsang. Vyākhyā: yadi dravyasat syāt pudgalaḥ / bhārābhāraḥ katamah / pudgala iti syād vacaniyam ity etāvad evoktam syāt / tatra sūtre pareṇa sa na vibhaktavyāḥ syāt yo’sāv āyuṣmān iti vistareṇa yāvad evamāyuṣparyanta iti / prajñaptisatpudgalaḥpratipattyartham by etat pareṇa viśeṣanam ity abhiprayaḥ.

If the pudgala exists as a thing, to this question "What is the bearer?", the Buddha would simply respond, "What is suitable to be called the pudgala"; he would not add the explanations, "It is such a venerable one, of such a name ... of such an end of life." The aim of these is to show that the pudgala exists only through designation.
expressions." It is thus that the *Vypakhyā* is understood: "The text has: among the *skandhas*, etc. The *skandhas* which cause one to suffer, the causes of suffering, receive for this reason the name of burden. The following, those which are tormented, receive for this reason the name of bearer of the burden." (*skandhānām iti vistarāḥ / tatra ye upaghātyā samvartante dukkhabhetavah skandhās te bhāra iti kṛtvoktāḥ / uttare ye pīdyante te bhārabhāra iti kṛtvoktāḥ).

74. On apparitional beings and the intermediate existence, see iii.8c.

75. According to the *Sāmrātyaniśayāśāstra*, the Third Chapter.

*Vibhāṣā, TD* 27, p. 988a14, "This world does not exist; the other world does not exist; there are no apparitional beings"; this is a false view, a negation of causes (Compare iv.78, 79b and v.7, p. 777). "There are no apparitional beings": there are some non-Buddhist (*bāhya*) masters who say that all beings arise by reason of seed and blood, etc.; that there are no beings who arise without *pratyayas*, suddenly, of themselves . . . According to some, apparitional beings are beings in the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*); to deny this world and the other world is to deny *upapattibhava*; to deny apparitional beings is to deny *antarābhava*.

The text of the *Karmaprajñāāśīpti* (chap. iv. Mdo, 62 fol. 218) differs from the usual version, "There is neither gift, nor sacrifice, nor oblation, nor good action, nor evil action, nor retributive result of good and evil actions. This world does not exist, nor does the other one. There is neither father, nor mother, nor apparitional beings. There is not in this world any well gone, well come Arhat, who knows and realizes by himself this world and the other, thinking, 'My births are destroyed, the religious life well practiced . . ."

76. *Kosa*, Chap. v and vi, p. xvi. The *pudgala*, as you understand it, is not contained within the Truths: it is not Suffering (=the *skandhas* of attachment), nor Arising, nor Extinction, nor Path. Thus if the negation of the *pudgala* is, as you say, a false view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), this false view cannot be expelled by Seeing the Truths. In fact a "view" (*dṛṣṭi*) is expelled through Seeing the Truth with which it is in contradiction (*yasmin satye vipratipannā*). On the other hand, a defilement is abandoned through Meditation (*bhāvanā*) when this defilement has for its object a thing abandoned through Meditation, a thing which is necessarily included within the Truth of Suffering or of Arising (*bhāvanāprabātasya hi klefo bhāvanāprabātasyam eva vastu duḥkham samudayam vālambate*) . . . Moreover no "view" is abandoned through Meditation.

77. *Ekottara, TD* 2, p. 561a18, p. 569b20. Paramārtha: "A *pudgala* arises in this world; arisen, it is for the use, profit, and happiness of many"= *Anguttara*, i.22, ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppajjamāno uppajjati babujanabhāṣya . . .

This text is used in the *Sāmrātyaniśayāśāstra*.

78. The grain of *tila* is made up of eight substances, a word is made up of syllables.

79. Thus we recognize that it arises; but it is not, for that, "conditioned."

80. *Paramārthasānyatāsūtra* in the *Samyukta*, TD 2, p. 92c15: When the eye arises, Oh Bhikkus, there is no place from whence it comes, and when it perishes, there is no place to which it goes. In this manner the eye is not real and yet it arises (*pu shih erh sbeng 不實而生*); having arisen, it perishes. There is retribution for action, yet there is no agent: when these *skandhas* are destroyed, other *skandhas* continue (*hsiang hsu 俗數法*) : outside of any *dharmaśamketa*. The ear . . . By *dharmaśamketa* (*su sbu fa 俗數法*) we understand: if this is, then that exists . . . If ignorance exists, then the *sannyāsas* exist . . .

By bringing together the different fragments preserved in our sources, we obtain a section of the *Sūtra*: *caksur bhikkava utpajjamānam na kutsaś cit āgacchati / niruddha- mānām ca na kva cit savāṅcayām gacchati / iti hi bhikkvavā caksur abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā
ca pratigacchati (Kośa, v.27, trans. p. 814) / asti karma asti vipākaḥ / kāraka tu no palabhyate ya māṁś ca skandhān nisṛṣi-pati anyāṁś ca skandhān pratisamabdabāti anyāatra dharmāsāṃkhetāt (the text that we have here, and also Kośa, iii.18, Sātrālaṃkāra, xviii.101, Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix.73 which presents some variants) / atravāmī dharmāsāṃketo yad utāṃśmin sati-dām bhava-ti asyotpādād idam utpadyate (Kośa, iii.18, Bodhicaryāvatāra, ibid.) / avidyāpratyayāh sati-kārāḥ . . .

81. See Kośa, v.27, p. 814; Buddhaghosa, Visuddhi, 602, quotes the Ancients (Porāṇa): kammassā kārako nathhi vibākassā ca vedako. (We see, p. 513, that dukkha, kamma, nibbuti, and magga exist, but not dukkha, kāraka, nibbuta . . .)

Same doctrine, or same text, in the sources of the Mahāyāna, Madhyamakāvatāra, vi.84, Śikṣāmuccaya, 244, 262, Sātrālaṃkāra (which depends on Vasubandhu), xviii.101.

82. The meaning of the expression anyatra dharmāsāṃkhetāt (chos su brdar rtags pa ma gtogs pa) is not in doubt. The Vyaṭkāya explains: dharmāsāṃkhetād iti prāṣṭīyasamutpādala-kṛṇat: "outside of the combination of the dharmas, that is to say, outside of the successive causation of the dharmas"; and elsewhere (ad iii.18): samketa- hetuphala-sambandhavyāvas-thā. But Paramārtha understands samketa as "metaphorical designation," from whence the translation, "One does not maintain the existence of an agent . . . except when, conforming to worldly usage, one says that the dharmas are a pudgala."

83. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 182a17; Samyutta, ii.14. Paramārtha: "I do not say that a being, apart from the series of the dharmas, takes up the elements." The Sanskrit edition has: upādatta iti phālguna na vadāmi / āhām ced evaṃ vadeyam upādatta iti atra te kalpaḥ syād vacanāya ko nu bhadanta upādatta iti.

Note nevertheless that the Bhagavat speaks of the man "who casts off this body and takes up another body," tām ca kāyaṁ nikkhi-pati aṁañā ca kāyam upādiyati (Samyutta, iv.60). (In the way that the flame which goes far without fuel has for the mind its support (upādāna) so too the being who casts off this body and has not (yet) taken up another body has thirst for his support, ibid. 400). We have seen above, note 41, the etymology of pudgala: punaḥ punaḥ.

84. Saeki quotes the Śāṁmūṇikāyā Śāstra, i.7 (fol. 2b).

85. Parināntum means to transform oneself, anyathāvamāpattum.

On parināma, iii.43a, 100a-b, v.26, p. 809; the samataipa-parināma of the Sautrāntikas is very different, ii.36c, iv.4a.

86. On the relationship between the primary elements (mahābhūta) and secondary matter (upādāyārūpa, bhautika rūpa), see i.35, ii.22, 65.

87. Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 661c14: "Buddhadeva maintains that rūpa is solely mahābhūtas, that mental states (cittas) are solely mind (citta); he says: upādāyārūpa is solely a type (viśesa) of the mahābhūtas; the mental states are solely a type of mind . . . The mahābhūtas see (when they form the organ of the eye) . . . There is no upādāyasabda apart from the primary elements (that is to say: sound, šabda, is not a separate thing existing independently of the primary elements). It is the primary elements which are called upādāyasabda."

Vibhāṣā, TD 27, p. 730b26: Buddhadeva says: Twenty-two names (mahābhūmikas, etc.), but solely one real thing, the mana-indriya . . . The conditioned dharmas are of two natures, mahābhūtas and citta. Apart from the mahābhūtas, there is no upādāyārūpa: apart from citta, there are no caittas.

Compare i, note 146; ii, p. 188.

Saeki: "Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of Buddhadeva, etc., that the primary elements and secondary matter do not differ; but, as this is not the "correct meaning" (ch'eng i 正意) of the Sarvāstivādins, he says that it is doṣa, an "error."

88. The Sūtra of Vatsagotra, Samyukta, TD 2, p. 245c10. The Bhagavat said to the monk.
Vatsagotra, "If one is of this opinion (dṛṣṭi), 'The world is eternal; this is true; any other theory is false,' this is dṛṣṭiviparyāsa (v.9d), this is kuan-t'sia chien 觀察見 (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa, v. p. 778). 'The world is not eternal ... the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death': this is dṛṣṭiviparyāsa."

89. On the "questions to be rejected," Kośa, v.22, Nirvāṇa, 1925, p. 108, where we see that Malebranche reasons quite closely to Vasubandhu.

90. We have Divya, 358: babubollaka sākyaputiya.

91. The present passage of the Kośa has been pointed out by S. Lévi, AIBL., 1893, 232. Chavannes has translated a very similar recension in Cinq Cents Contes, iii.120 (according to Nanjio 1329, Ratnakaranda Sūtra (?), Tokyo, xiv.10, fol.39), the same recension in Takakusu, "Chinese translations of the Milindapanha," JRAS, 1896, p. 7. See Pelliot, "Les noms propres du Milinda,"JAS, 1914, ii.380-381. (It appears indeed that the "Milinda" of the Tibetan text of the Avadānakalpalatā is a rash correction by the editor). Finally, Paul Demiéville, in a fine article on the Chinese versions of the Milinda, BEFEO, 1924, p. 64, completes our information.

92. Compare Samyutta, iv.400. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 245b11: Vatsagotra asks, "Gotama, is there an ātman?" The Bhagavat does not answer. He asks a second, a third time; and the Bhagavat, a second, a third time does not answer ... And the monk Vatsagotra, in his evil (pāpiñc), false view, says, "The Śramaṇa does not know how to answer my question." The Bhagavat says to Ānanda, "If I were to answer him that there is an ātman, then I would increase the false view that he already has; if I were to answer him that there is no ātman, would his first folly-doubt not increase? Infatuated, he would say, 'The ātman, which existed, is now annihilated.' The opinion that he has of the existence of an ātman is the opinion of permanence; to think that this ātman is annihilated is the opinion of annihilation. The Tathāgata, avoiding these two extremes, teaches the Dharma of the middle: if this is, then that exists ... if ignorance exists, then the samāskāras exist ..." 93. Missing in Paramārtha.

94. Vyākhyā: Bhadantakumāralābbha. On Kumāralābh, see Péri, Date de Vasubandhu, p. 22.

95. Vyākhyā: dṛṣṭir eva đamatrā / tayāvabhedham apekṣyā deśayanti buddhā dhammān naivrāmyam tatpratipakṣena / bhramiṣam ca karmanām apekṣyā kṛitvapraṇaśām apekṣyā pudgalāśītvam īva dāśayanto nyāthā deśayanti / vyākhyāpottāpābāravād iti / yathā vyākhyā nātmisṭhureṇa dantagrabhāṇena svapotam āpaharati / nayati māṣya dāṃstrāyā śārira [ ] kṛtam bhūd iti / nāpy atiśibhila dantagrabhāṇena tam āpaharati / māṣya bhramiṣam pātoṁśīmin viśaye bhūd iti yuktenaiva dāśya pābharatīty arthaḥ / tathārthaśīlānte kāraṇām dāśayann āba / ātmāstītvam iti vistarāḥ /
96. For the second stanza, the Vyākhyā is less clear: ātmāstitvam pratipannaś cet kaścid dṛṣṭidāṁśtrayā satkāyadṛṣṭikālaṁśanaṁ bhinnah sa vineyajānaṁ syād aprāpya samvīrṣiti (?) (samvīrṣitiś?) dharmasaṁketaṁ ajānanaṁ kuśalapotasya kuśalakarmaṇo vyāghripotabhātasya bhramam kuryāṁ nāstī kaścit grhiniyād ity ato nāstīti nāvocat.

97. Vyākhyā: prajñāptika iti prajñāpattau bhavaḥ prajñāpattah samvīrṣīsaṁ api pudgalo nāstīti kaścit grhiniyād ity ato nāstīti nāvocat.

98. The Vyākhyā has the last pāda: omitted by Hsüan-tsang.

Paramārtha: 3. This person is not capable of understanding the correct teaching of real emptiness; thus, when he asked if, yes or no, there is a soul, the Buddha did not say there was no soul. 4. And since he takes into consideration the intention of the questioner, if the soul existed, why did he not say that it existed? So too, on the question of his non-existence after Nirvāṇa, he said nothing because then the questioner would have fallen into difficulties.

99. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 246b2: Vatsa asks, "By reason of the consciousness of which dharma are you not of the opinion, you do not say that the world is eternal . . . that the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death?" "By reason of the consciousness of rūpa, vedaṇā, etc."

100. Vyākhyā: nirgranthasrāvavakaṭacakakud iti / nirgranthasrāvakeṇa caṭakam jīvantām gṛhistā bhaggavān prṣṭubhi kṣum ayaṁ caṭakā jīvataḥ na vetti / tasyayam abhīprayāh / yadi śramaṇo gautama ādiṣe jīvatiśi sa tam nipādaṇena mārayitvā dārśayet / yadi punar bhaggavān evam ādiṣen mṛtaḥ iti sa tam jīvantām eva dārśayet / kathaṁ nāmāyam āja iti loko jāmiyād iti tasyaṁbhāviniveśāḥ / bhaggavātā tv ayaśayaṁ jñātvā na vyākṛtam / tvacccita-pratibaddham evaitaj jīvati vā na vetti . . . nābhibhitaṁ / tadavat etan na vyākṛtam. Perhaps according to Tokyo, xxiv, 9, J.As. 1925, i.38.

101. The catuṣka (group of four questions): "Is the world infinite (anantavān)? etc." has the same meaning as the catuṣka: "Is the world eternal (sāsvata)? . . ." If this is the case, how are there fourteen separate points, namely three catuṣkas and one dvika (Is the vital principle the body? . . .)? To this question the Vyākhyā answers: paryāyaratvavyavasthāne'pi caturdasaṁvān bhavati adyoṣāḥ.


This is the Paribbajaka Utiya of the Aṅguttara, v.193-195 (perhaps different from the Utiya of the Samyutta, v.22,166) who interrogates the Bhagavat on fourteen points (beginning with the eternity of the world); the Bhagavat answers, "This is not explained by me . . ."; Utiya asks, "What do you explain?"; the Bhagavat answers, "I explain the Dhamma . . . for Nirvāṇa". Thereupon Utiya asks, "Does the whole world, half the world, or a third of the world attain to Nirvāṇa through this Dhamma?" The Bhagavat keeps silent. Ānanda then intervenes and explains to Utiya that he is asking that which has already been asked (To ask if the whole world attains to Nirvāṇa is to ask if the world is eternal). The Bhagavat teaches how one attains to Nirvāṇa: all those who have attained to it, are now attaining to it, and who shall attain to it, do so by the Path.

In Samyukta, TD 2, p. 247c18, Uktika's first question concerns the infinity of the world. Do all beings attain to Nirvāṇa? Dīgha, i.147 (yes), Mahāvastu, i.126 (yes), Milinda, 69 (no). Here we have the correct answer. The redactor of the Brahmapāla understands the "infinity of the world" in the sense of "infinite in space" (Dīgha, i.23: horizontal infinity, not towards the zenith or the nadir; on this point Kośa, iii.3d, to the end); it varies its formulas: it examines whether the self and the world are eternal, whether the world is infinite.
103. Uktika asks: *kim tu sarvo loko'nena márgena niryāsyati/ āhosvid ekadeso lokasya.*
In the Pāli recension: *sabbo ca tena (dhannena) loko niyyissati upadābo vā tibhāgo vā.*

104. On Maitreya, see Péri, *BEFEO;* xi.455, Przybulska, *Aśoka,* 169, 171, 332. *Madhyama,* TD 1, p. 510b19 (66th Sūtra: he will come at a period when human life is 80,000 years long), *Dirgha,* 6th Sūtra, TD 1, p. 41c29 and *Dīgha,* iii.76, *Sālistambasūtra* (see *Kota,* iii. 28a-b). We are reminded of Ajita and Tissametteya of the *Suttanipāta,* 1032, 1040. *Milanda,* 159; *Anāgatavamsa* in Warren, 482; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Hastings,* i.414. Ajita Maitreya and Mithra Invictus?

105. Saeki quotes the *Samyuktka,* TD 2, p. 244a14, “Gautama, is the vital principal the body? This has not been explained. Is the vital principal something else? Is the body something else? This has not been explained. It is strange that the monk Gautama explains, on the subject of a deceased disciple, that ‘Such a one is reborn in such a place . . . ’ and that the monk Gautama does not explain that the vital principle is something else, and that the body something else again.”

*Samyuktka,* TD 2, p. 213a27, sermon to Nanda: The disciple endowed with an unmoveable faith who desires long life and beautiful *rūpa,* shall obtain them. The disciple endowed with the *avetyparasādas,* is, at the end of his life, reborn among the *devas* and obtains ten qualities (*Samyuktka,* TD 2, p. 2, p. 215b10, c9 and following, *Madhyama,* TD 1, p. 545b15 and following).


107. *astfty apt drstisthdnam uktam.* Hsüan-tsang: *o chien ch'u* 惡見處 =*kudṛṣṭisthāna.*

This discussion is based on the *Sāmmittyanikāyasūtra.*

108. *Vibhāṣa,* TD 27, p. 255c13: The Bhagavat says, “You say that there is cause: I say so also; you say that there is no fruit: this is a foolish doctrine.” There are two doctrines, in all two extremes: the Bhagavat avoids the extreme of annihilation and the extreme of permanence, and he teaches the Middle Way. He also says, “I am not in contradiction with the world; but the world is in contradiction with me.”

*Vibhāṣa,* 77.17 “. . . he who says that (the jīva) is different from the body, is not the body, enters into the opinion of permanence. He is not of non-Buddhist doctrines (bāhya mārga), he is not of evil opinions (kudṛṣṭigata) who does not enter into the opinions of annihilation or of permanence. All the Tathāgatas, in order to oppose this, teach the path between the two, namely: *rūpa* and the mind are not annihilated, are not permanent.” See above note 93.


The same argument in the *Sāmmittyanikāyasūtra.*

From the point of view of the Madhyamikas, neither the permanent nor the impermanent can transmigrate: *nityasya samsāri māsti naivānityasya samsāriḥ/ svapnavat samsārīt proktā tvayā tattvavidāṁ vara* (Catustava, quoting *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā,* ix.108).


The *Saptāsūryaśūtra* of the *Anūguttara,* iv.103, does not identify Sunetra with the Bhagavat: *bhūtaspūbbam bhikkhave Sunetto nāma satthā abhosi tātthakaro kāmesu viñārağa ...*. (Compare *Anūguttara,* iii.371, 373). We also find some details in the *Vibhāṣa* on the rebirth of Sunetra’s disciples and on the rebirth of Sunetra *(TD 27, p. 424c15 and following).* There is no mention of Sunetra in the fragments of the *Saptāsūrya* of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya,* p. 247 and the *Karmaprajñāpatti,* Mdo. 62, fol. 66a. In the *Saundarananda,* xi.57, we only see that Sunetra is the Bhagavat.
111. Vyākhyā: ya ekesāṃ pudgalarāba iti vātsiputryānāṃ / ekesāṃ sarvanāstigrāba iti madhyamakacittānāṃ. This is the only reference to the Madhyamaka system that the work of Vasubandhu contains.

The translation is according to Hsuan-tsang. Paramārtha: "Thus, without cause or reason, one introduces the malady of opinion into the Good Law of the Tathāgatas: there are some scholars who deny nairūmya and produce a belief in the existence of an ātman; there are, furthermore, some masters who deny the existence and affirm the non-existence of everything; the non-Buddhists believe in an ātman conceived as a separate thing. In the Good Law, some masters produce a belief in an ātman and a belief in universal non-existence. None of these masters obtain deliverance, because they do not differ from one another."

112. Saeki quotes a Vijnaptimātra commentary: If the self is not real, who remembers, who recognizes things, who recites and retains books, who repeats texts, who loves some and hates others, who loves what is good and hates the rest? ... The Vātsiputriyas have a reasoning: "(In the system of our adversaries) beings (sattvas) do not remember because they are not selves, like space."

For eight different explanations of the cause of memory, see Vibhāṣa, TD 27, p. 55a18: There are some masters who maintain that the self is by its nature real, namely the Vātsiputriyas who say, "We say that there is a self that remembers what has been done; first oneself experiences, and then it is oneself that remembers. If there were no self, how could one remember what has been done? ..." Again there are some masters who say, "The previous mind goes and says to the later mind: I did this; you, retain it and remember it ... It is thus that one remembers what has been done."

Vibhāṣa, p. 56a7, teaches the "right" doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins.

For an explanation of memory in the Madhyamaka school, see notably Bodhisattvavatāra, ix.24 (against the Vijnānavāda), 73 (against the Pudgalavāda), 101.

Milinda, 78-80; Demiéville, 161, Compendium, Introduction, p. 42 (according to the Paṭṭhāna).

On memory, see Kosa, i.33 (p. 97), ii.24 (p. 190), 24a (p. 194), vi.15, p. 927.

113. Vyākhyā: smṛtivisayasamjñānayāc cittaṇīśeṣad iti / smṛtivisayonaubbhuto’rthaḥ / tatra samjñā nāsvayo hetu asetya smṛtivisayasyasamjñānayāb / cittaṇīśeṣaḥ kimcid eva cittaṇa na sarvaṃ ity arthaḥ / tasmāt smaranam bhava i praṇayabhiṣṇānam vā / evam ubbayaviśeseṇe kṛte pucchati kidrca cittaṇiśeṣad iti / āha / tadābhoga iti vistaranaḥ / yasmin smartavaya ābhogas tadābhogas / sa ca tena sadrṣaḥ sambandhin ca samjñādaya ye te vidyante ‘ṣyeī tadābhogasadṛṣaḥsambandhisamjñādinamāṃ cittaṇiśeṣaḥ / ādīgaraṇena praniḍhananibandhābhābhāsādigrahaṇam / āsrayaviśeṣaḥ ca sokaḥ ca vyākṣepaṣ cādir eṣām iti āsrayaviśeṣaṣaṣoka- vyākṣepadāni / tair anupahatabrābbhavaḥ cittaṇiśeṣaḥ sa evam anena pradaṁśuto bhava vi / tasmād idrṣaḥ cittaṇiśeṣati smṛti bhavati /

"tad idam uktam bhavati / tadābhagavataḥ : yadi tatrābhogaḥ kriyate / sadṛṣasamjñādīmataḥ : yatra sadṛṣyāḥ smṛti bhavati / sambandhisamjñādīmataḥ : yatrāntareṇāpi sādṛṣyāṃ dhīmaḍidārṣanāṃ smṛti bhavati / praniṭhānanibandhābhāsādīmataḥ ca : yatra praniṭhānaḥ atra kāle samtvayaṃ abhyāsō vāṣya smaranā / āśrayaviśeṣādibhir anupahatabrābbhavad iti / viyābhikṣaṇena āsrayaviśeṣena sūkṣma vyākṣepena anyatra kāye / ādīśabdāgraññitā ca karmavidyādibhiḥ /

tadābhogavānα (tatsadṛṣa) samjñādīmāṃ anupahatabrābbhavo’pīty arthaḥ / atadanvaya ity asmṛtivisayasyasamjñānaya ity arthaḥ / bhāvayitum utpādayitum // anyādṛṣa ity atadābhogayavatsamjñādīmāṃ upahatabrābbhavo vā.

The commentators on Hsuan-tsang debate this. P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 447a22-b10) has three explanations of smṛtivisayasamjñānaya, three explanations of resemblance (sadṛṣa) (that Fa-pao rejects, TD 41, p. 809a11 and following), two of necessary conjunction (sambandhitam), etc. (see Saeki, xxx, fol. 7a, 8b-9a).
114. The *Vyākhya* explains (below p. 1342) the discussion relative to the question, "In the absence of a soul, what knows?" evam ko= vijñānāśi vistarab. It suffices to replace vijñānati with smarati, vijnāna with smarana.

115. Paramārtha, "Not different from memory, for the memory grasps"; Hsüan-tsang, "No difference of memory, only (grasping) comes from the agent."

116. According to the commentators of Hsüan-tsang, these masters are the Sāmkhyas; according to the *Vyākhya*, this formula is that of the Grammarians; for Stcherbatski, Vasubandhu here continues his controversy with the Vatsiputriyas: and in fact the *Vyākhya* says that this argument tends to prove the existence of the *pudgala*. See Kośa, iii.28a, for a discussion of *pratityasamutpāda*, and a refutation of the *vaiyakarana-codya* (objection of the Grammarians), "There is no action (*kriyā*) without an agent (*akartkā*)." The *bhūti* is not different from the *bhūtār.

117. *Vyākhya*: gacchatigamandbhidhdnavad iti / yathā jv did gacchati sab do gacchatiti gacchatiśabdābhidhānam / yathā jvālayāḥ śabdasya vā gamanam evam devadatto gacchati devadattasya gamanam / anena dvīṣṭāntena vijñānati devadatta iti sidhyati.

It is the opinion of the Sarvāstivādins that *gati* (or *gamana*) is impossible, iv.2b, English trans. p. 552-4.

118. *Vyākhya*: parispandam akurvad aptty arthaḥ /


"Response to a seed," "to reproduce the seed," Hsüan-tsang: *ch'ou* 與 =to make parallel, respond to.

The *Vibhāṣa*, TD 27, p. 480a14, explains that one cannot attribute the action of *samyoga*, samanvāgama (*ch'eng chiu 成就*), Rosenberg, 204; see above, p. 1346, *samyoga* (= bo 合) neither to a *pudgala* nor to the *dharma*: the first does not exist, the second are bare of any activity. No *dharma* is either the agent or the object of an action of *samyoga*. But, as there is cause-result, defilement-purity, bond-deliverance, process-ceasing, so too the quality of being *samyukta* or *asamyukta* exists.

120. The consciousness of blue has a blue "aspect."

121. *Vyākhya*: karaṇam kṣātrbhūtam iti kṛtvā / tad yathā nādasya karaṇam ghanāta iti ghanōt rautīty ucyate.


"The existent," Paramārtha, *neng-yu 能 有; Hsüan-tsang, *yu... che*. 有... 者

Paramārtha: As the world says, "physical matter exists, arises, lasts." Now the existing thing (*bhavitṛ*), etc., does not differ from existence (*bhāva*), and yet nevertheless one employs two words. So too one employs two words for *vijñāna*.

123. According to Saeki. The Vaiśeṣikas, according to the *Vyākhya*: *vaiśeṣikamatātanusārād vā...*

124. Why does one successively have *gobuddhi*, *stribuddhi*, *mabhisuddhi*, the idea of cow, woman, and buffalo? Why does not the *mabhisuddhi* follow *gobuddhi*?

The Japanese editor understands, "Why is not the latter mind parallel to the former mind, good, defiled, etc. . . .?"

125. *Vyākhya*: nikāmena paryāptena samāptena dhyānena samāhitānām... .

126. See, for example, Kośa, ii. 71b.

127. *Vyākhya*: gotrvāśeṣād iti bhāvanāvāśeṣāt. Below gotra is explained as *bija*, "seed." The
gloss \textit{bhāvanāvīṣeṣā} gives a translation, “by reason of the particular manner in which they perfume the series.”

128. \textit{Vākyā}: stricci\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti vistaraḥ / stricci\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti ( \textit{= strīyālambarāc cittād) anantarām} tatkāyaviduṣānācit\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} itam} (= tasyāḥ strīyāḥ kāyasya viduṣānāyai yadi parivṛtakāsya anyasya vā sādhib cittam utp\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti bhavati) tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti ( \textit{= tasyāḥ patīputrādayah /} adiśabdena duhi\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti} grhyante / tādālambanām cittam tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti). Hsuans-
\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti tsang, “... the mind of an impure body.”

129. See ii. 36, English trans. p. 211.

130. \textit{Vākyā}: tat pas\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti utp\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti} stricci\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} itam samarthaṁ bhavati tatkāyaviduṣānācittotpā-\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} itane tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti / kasmāt / tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti} / tatkāyaviduṣānācitt\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} itam tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti / gotraṁ bījam asyetc tadgotraṁ... anyathāḥ atadgotraṁ.

131. \textit{Vākyā}: atha punaḥ paryāyenaistvā vistaraḥ / paryāyena ayugapāt / stricci\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti tatkāyaviduṣānācitt\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} itam / tatas tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti / tatas tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti} / tata eva ca taddūhi\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti / tata eva ca taddūhi\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti / tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti anantarotp\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} itane tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti} / tattat\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti}. Hsuan-
\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} iti tsang, “... the mind of an impure body.”

132. See also \textit{Vākyā} (Petrograd edition, 1918), p. 6: sarvākāram kāraṇam ekasya mayāracandrakasyāpi / nāsarvajñānair jñeyam sarvajñajñānabalam hi tat //


134. \textit{Vākyā}: the Vaiśeṣika.

135. The version of Hsuan-tsang strays from the original on many points: “If they say that the variety of the \textit{vijñānās} (consciousnesses) depends (apekṣa) on the variety of the conjunction (of the soul) with the \textit{manas}, we answer: No; 1. because the conjunction of the soul with another thing is not proved; 2. because the conjunction of two things is delimited (fen-hsien 分限 ); (that is to say two things can be joined on only one side). They themselves define conjunction: “possession succeeding upon non-possession”: the conjunction of the soul and the \textit{manas} should be delimited; 3. because, if the \textit{manas} changes (i-ch'uan 移轉 ), the soul should also change; 4. or rather the soul should perish with the \textit{manas}. If they say that conjunction is partial, we answer: No. For there are not diverse parts in one soul. To suppose that there is conjunction if the soul is permanent and if the \textit{manas} is not modified (pieb-i 别異 ), how can conjunction be diverse? If they answer that (this diversity) depends on the diversity of \textit{buddhi}, the difficulty is the same (as when they explain that variety depends on the \textit{manas}): we then ask how \textit{buddhi} is diverse. If they say that, through dependence on the \textit{sāṃskāras}, the conjunction of the soul and the \textit{manas} is diverse (jo tat hsing pieb wo i bo che 若待行別我意合者 ), it means that a single mind, through dependence on a variety of \textit{sāṃskāras}, produces the variety of the \textit{vijñānās}. What then would be the purpose of the soul?”

136. \textit{Vākyā}: na / anyasāmyogāśiddheḥ / naitad evam / kasmāt / tābhyaṁ atmananob-
\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}} itane anyasya sāmyogavyāśiddheḥ / na hi sāmyogo nāma bhāvaḥ kastād asmākam siddhoṁasti. A Buddhist does not admit the existence of an entity called \textit{sāmyoga}.

137. This is the definition of the Daśapadārthī, H. Ui, \textit{The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy}, 1917, p. 271. Stcherbatski quotes the \textit{Praśastapāda}: aprāptayoh prāptih sāmyogah, and observes that the \textit{Vaiśeṣikasūtra}, vii.2, 9, differs.
138. **Vyākyā**: paricchinnad aprāptipūrvikā prāptih saṃyoga iti manahsaṁcārād yam yam sārīradesam manah saṁcārati tatas tata atma saṁcāraty āpitītītī prasañjaya / tadātāḥ yam yam prthivīpradesam puruṣah saṁcārati tatas tata ṛta-prasarpai / tadā na saṁiśkriyatvam asya bādhitaṁ bhavatītī sa eva pratiśñādaosah.

vināśasya va / prasaṅga iti vartate / ātmana iti ca / yatra yatra manah saṁcārati tatra tatrātāṁ vināśayātītī sa eva cātā pratiśñādaosā ātmano nityatvaniśrteḥ.

139. An addition of Paramārtha.

140. **Vyākyā**: tato laksandā aprāptipurvikā prāptih saṁyogena manahupanti máraśa samyojata iti manah saṁcārti yam yam sarīradesam manah saṁcārati tatas tata atma saṁcāraty āpitītītītī prasañjaya / tadātāḥ yam yam prthivīpradesam puruṣah saṁcārati tatas tata ṛta-prasarpai / tadā ca saṁiśkriyatvam asya bādhitaṁ bhavatītī sa eva pratiśñādoṣah.

141. Vyākyā: pradeśasamyojita iti cet / syān matam ātmanā pradeśena saṁyogena manasaḥ / ātmanā vā pradeśena manasa śaba saṁyogena / yasmin sarīrapiradeśe mano'vasthitam bhavati tadgatenaatmaprādēsa mano na saṁyujyate / pradeśāntareṇu tā parśvataḥ (MS-ntipālvaḥ) saṁyujyate / tasmād aprāptipūrvakatve'pi saṁyogasya aprāptenaiva atmaprādēsa manah saṁyujyata iti / tata na / tasyaiva tadpradeśatvavōgat / na hy ātmano'nyapradeśa vidyante / na caivaṭmaiva ātmane pradeṣo yuyate.

One can suppose that the manas, when it occupies a certain part of the body, is not in conjunction with the part of the soul which is found in this part of the body, but rather with the other parts of the soul. Conjunction follows non-conjunction: the manas, being displaced, is found in conjunction with a part of the soul with which it was not in conjunction, namely that which occupies the part of the body that the manas has just quit.

142. **Vyākyā**: astu vā saṁyoga iti vistaraḥ / abhyupetyāpi saṁyogam tathāpi nirvikāratvād aviśīṣte manasi kathaṁ saṁyogaviśeṣaḥ kathāṁ aviśīṣṭaṁ saṁyogena bhavati yata evam uktam manah saṁyogaviśeṣaṁ teṣāt vā / buddhaviśeṣeṁ teṣāt vā iti cet sa evopari codyate kathāṁ buddhaviśeṣaḥ iti kathāṁ na nityam ādīśam evotpadyate cittam aviśīṣte aviśīṣte ātmanūtī / kāraṇaviśeṣaḥ hi kāraṇaviśeṣaḥ isyate saṁkāra-paṭākādādeśād bhāvavāt / saṁskārayaśeṣeṁ teṣāt ātmanāḥ saṁyogaṁ iti cet / syān matam nityam aviśīṣte yātāni manasi ca saṁskārayaśeṣaṁ teṣāt ātmanāḥ saṁyogam buddhaviśeṣaḥ iti / tad uktam bhavati saṁskārayaśeṣaḥ bhāvanaviśeṣaḥ lakṣanād ātmanāḥ saṁyogaviśeṣaḥ tad (viśeṣaḥ buddha) viṣeṣaḥ / atra brūmaḥ cittād evastva iti vistaraḥ /

143. Paramārtha: If there is no “earth” by itself independent of the quality of smell, etc., why does one say that earth has four qualities? In order to distinguish: in order that others may know that smells, tastes, etc., receive the name of “earth,” etc., that there is not, separately, earth, etc. In the same way one says: "the reflection of wood."

144. On saṁskāra, bhāvanaviśeṣa, see H. Ui, p. 162.

145. On the padārthas, gunas, and dravyas, see H. Ui, p. 93 and foll. Discussion of the gunin and the guna, Kośa, iii. 100a-b.

146. Hsüan-tsang: But the object of the notion of “I” is not of this sort. The text has na tv abāmākārah; the Vyākyā: na tv abām ity evamākārah pratyaya ity arthabhaḥ.

147. See above, p. 1341, line 2.).

148. **Vyākyā**: yathā tathoktam iti / yathā kṛtvāśrayah sādāyatanaṁ tathoktam ṛtadviśkāri viśeṣvad aśrayas cākṣurādāya ity arthabhaḥ (i.45a) / Pañcaskandhakam bhavān udāharaṇity adhyātām.

Vasubandhu is referring to his work, the Pañcaskandhaka.

149. According to Hsüan-tsang and to the Tibetan (Stcherbatski). Paramārtha: "Kartar is one who creates that which did not exist; upabhoktar is one who presently obtains the result of a former action."

150. Stcherbatski: the Logicians; Hsüan-tsang and Paramārtha: "Those who explain
the dharmalaksanas." But Stcherbatski states that the definition of these masters is that of Pāṇini, i.4, 54: svatantrah kartā.

We see, Kośa, iii.27 (p. 413), that the Grammarians, or Vaiyākaranas, protest against the thesis of "action without an agent" (akartṛkā kriyā). In the same passage, certain masters (kecid vādinaḥ) maintain that pratityasamutpāda supports a support, namely an ātman.

151. Vyākhyā: tasya tu svātantryāṃ nāstīti ārāṣyann ābha trividham cedām karmeti vistaraḥ / kāyasya cittaparantarāṃ vṛttiḥ citta-pravartīvat kāyakarmanah / cittasyāpi kāye vṛttiḥ svakāraṇaparantarāṇaḥ manodharmamānaśkāra-diparantarā / tasyāpy evam / tasya cittasvākāraṇasya svakāraṇaparantarāṇaḥ vṛttir itī nāsti karya cid api svātantryāṃ kāyasya cittasya cittakāraṇasyānyaya vā / pratitya-parantarāṇaḥ hi sarve bhāvāḥ
caturbhi cittacaitītā bi samāpattidvayaṁ tribhiḥ
dvābhyaṁ anye tu jáyante itī vacanāti (ii.65) / ātmano'pi ca niraṇekṣasya buddhiviṣeṣādyutpattāv akāraṇatvābhyupagamānān na svātantryāṃ sidhyati / tamān naivasvālaṁṣa na svatantrah karteti.

152. Vyākhyā: tasyākārānataṁ upadāraṇyān ābha / . . . pūrvarīvīmartvāṁ śmr̥tr̥ utpadyate / śmartes chandaḥ kartukāmatā / chandād vitarāḥ cetanāviśeṣo 'bhisāmskāra-kāksanāḥ prajñāviśeṣo 'bhisāmskāra-kāksanāḥ prajñāviśeṣo va yogācāraṇayena vaibhāsikam ayena tu abhinirūpana-vikalpalaksanaḥ (The MS is perhaps incorrect. Here Hsuan-tsang translates vitaraka with the two characters which, elsewhere give vitaraka-vicāra. For the Vaibhāsikas, vitaraka signifies here (abhi)nirūpana vikalpa, one of the three vikalpas defined in Kośa, i.35a; one type of prajñā (prajñāviśeṣa) which consists of examining, or deliberation. For the Yogācārin, vitaraka signifies prajñāviśeṣa abhisāmskāra-kāksanaḥ: one prajñā which has the characteristic of action or decision. For the author, vitaraka is a cetanā, "volition," the characteristic of which is "to create" (abhisāmśkar) (Kośa, i.15a) / vitarāḥ pratyaṇo vīryam / pratyaṇnayena vāyuh / tato vāyoh karma desantarotpattilaksanāna itim atitāṁ kurute.

153. Vyākhyā: vijñāne pratisedhād iti vaiyōpalabdhī tad eva vijñānam / vijñāne catmanah sāmarthyam pratisiddham cittād evāstvu samśkāraviṣeṣaṣeṣaṃ kāryaḥ na hi . . . phusvāhām iti / yatbā tatbhoktam iti / tadviśkāraviśkāriyo vāyṛyā ca kṣaṇa-bhūtiyo . . . niṣayā sa evam ātṛyāḥ (note 145).

154. According to the formula: na hi bhikṣavaḥ karmaṁi kṣāṇya upaśītanī bāhye prthivīdābātav vipacyante / api tāpateṣu skandhadhātvatvātāy asante . . . (Divya, 54 and passim). On satvābhya, upāṭta, see Kośa, i.10b, English trans. (p. 65), 34c (p. 98), 39 (p. 107), iv.5d (p. 569).

155. H. Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, 75, 98; Kośa, iv.2b (p. 555).

156. Above, p. 1347.

157. For the Sarvāśavāśins, the cause of retribution "gives forth" its fruit when it is past (ii.57, 59); as a consequence, the past exists (v.25a-b, p. 807). Vasubandhu remarked (v. p. 818) that the Sautrāntikas do not admit that the result arises directly from action. For the different results of action, see iv.85.

See Madhyamaka, xvii. 6 and following, "If an action lasts until its retribution, it would be eternal . . ." The doctrine that Vasubandhu presents here is refuted xvii.12; the opinion of Candrabhartī, xvii.13: When an action arises, there also arises in the series a dharma unassociated with the mind, morally neutral, destroyed through bhāvanā, that is called avipraṇāśa, which produces the result of the action.

From another point of view, the ankura cannot arise from either the destroyed bija, or from a non-destroyed bija; Catustava, quoted in Madhyamakāvatāra, 97, Bodhicaryāvatārā-pañjikā, ix.108.

158. For karmasamānataṇaparāṇamāvīṣa, see ii.36c (p. 211).
159. Hsün-tsong: For example the mind "associated with attachment" at the end of life. Although there are some traces (vāsanās) projected by all types of actions capable of producing a new existence, nevertheless that which manifests itself (at death), is (the mind) produced by heavy, near, and habitual action; not any other. There is a stanza . . .

160. Vyākhyā: yathoktam iti / sthavirābhuleṇa / yad guru yac cāsānannam iti vistarāḥ / ekasmin samitane catvāri karmāṇi guru āsānma abhyastam pūrvakṛtam ca / eśāṁ caturṇām guru karma pūrvam iti tribyhas tat pūrvam vipacyate / āsānābhyastapūrvakṛtānāṁ apy āśānam pūrvam iti tat pūrvam dvāvhyam vipacyate / abhyastapūrvakṛtayof cābhyaṣṭam pūrvam ity ekāsmāt pūrvam vipacyate / asatsu etesu pūrvajanmakṛtam vipacyate aprapatyā-yavedaniyam.

An ārya stanza, like note 166.

161. Better: . . . the capacity to produce the retributive result, the capacity that a cause places in the series . . . See Kośa, iii.37c. This problem has been pointed out ad iv.50, note 217, where one will find a part of this bibliography. The Andhakas affirm that vipāka is a vipākadhamma: retribution admits of a new retribution (Kathavatthu, vii.10); the Rājagirikas and the Siddhāṭṭhikas, warranted by Suttanipāta 654, affirm: sabbam idam kammato; the Theravādins are made to say that the murderer commits murder through retribution for murder: and Nirvāṇa becomes impossible (Kathavatthu, xvii.3). The Madhyamakāvatāra, vi.41, demonstrates that there is no new vipāka after vipāka. In the Karmaprajñāpāti (Mdo. 62, fol. 249b), Maudgalyāyana refutes the Nirgranthas who maintain that all sensation proceeds from previous actions (comp. Majjhima, ii.214): the sufferings of penance that the Nirgranthas impose upon themselves are, say the Nirgranthas, "retribution": "According to you, one experiences the retribution of a new retribution." "Do you admit purification, deliverance, Nirvāṇa?" "Yes." "Then do not say that a new retribution arises from retribution."

We have seen, iv.58, that daurmanasya and cittaksepa are not retribution; but they can necessarily proceed from troubled elements (mahābhūta), which is retribution.

162. Here we have several words which I have not translated. According to Hsün-tsong: ch‘ieh fei pi yū shih fa chieh teng 且非類喩是法皆等 = "The example is not dharma-totally-similar," and according to Paramārtha: tz‘u chung i-ch‘ieh so-li-i yū pi-i pu-pi hsi t‘ung 汝此中一切所立義與譬義不必悉同 = "Here the meaning established by all should not be totally parallel with the meaning of the example."

The Japanese editor puts this phrase in the mouth of Vasubandhu; the same for Stcherbatski, who translates: "The example may not fit in every detail. But even supposing it to be fitting, does it prove your tenet? Is new corn produced directly from old corn?"

Further, p. 1354 line 28 Hsian-tsong, concluding his explanation of this example says: ku yū t‘ung fa 故譬同法 = "Thus the example is parallel (sadharma)"; Paramārtha: tz‘u pi yū li-i t‘ung 此譬與立義同 = "Thus the example is analogous to the established meaning," or "Thus this example confirms our thesis."

163. We follow the version of Hsün-tsong. Compare the whole of the paragraph of the Bodhicaryavatāra, 472-473.

Vyākhyā: viklītivīśeṣajāt iti bhūmyudakasambhandhā phalasya sukṣmo vikāro viklītī / tasya viśeṣāḥ / evātisprakṛṣṭaḥ / tasmāj jāto vikāraviśeṣāḥ / tasmāt phalāntaram utpadyate / kidṛḍād vikāraviśeṣāḥ iti dārayaṁ aḥa / yo hi tatra bhūta-prakāro ‘nkarum nirvartayaṁ sa tasya bijam iti tasyāṅkuraya bijam nāṇyo bhūta-prakāro na pūrvavijāvastho bhūta-prakāra ity arthaḥ // bhāvinyā tu saṃjñayeti / odanam pacati saktum pīnāṣṭitī yathā bhāvinyā saṃjñāyā vyapadesaḥ evam pūrvako ‘pi saṃtāno aṁvīśśaaṁ bhūta-prakāra ity arthaḥ // bhāvinyā vṛti saṃjñāyeti / sādṛṣyād vetti vikātivīśeṣajena bhūtavikāraviśeṣena sādṛṣyaḥ sa pūrvako(saṃtāna) iti krīvā bijam ity akhyāyate / bhāvinyā vṛti saṃjñāyeti / sādṛṣyād vetti vikātivīśeṣajena bhūtavikāraviśeṣena sādṛṣyaḥ sa pūrvako(saṃtāna) iti krīvā bijam ity akhyāyate /

164. On vipākajāta, see i.37 English trans. (p. 103), ii.10, 53b (p. 270), 54c (p. 275), 57a (p. 288), 71b (p. 315), iv.11.
165. Vyākhyā: phale raktabh kesara iti phalābhyantarena kesarah / yatra bijāpuraśkarase āmlo'vatisphate / na ca sa tasmāt punar anya iti / na rasaratkha kesaras tasmād uktāt kesarāt punar upajāyate kim tarbi prakrta evārakha kesara upajāyata ity arthaḥ // idam atrodābaraṇam / yathā lākṣārasarakatāmāstulangapupaptahalād (MS. lākṣārasaram tatt mā) raktakesarān na raktam kesaraṁtaram punar bhavati evam karmajād vipākān na punar vipākāntaram iti / ābā cātra /

cittam hy etād anantabījasabātāṁ samānātāṁ vartate /
tat tad bijam upaśti puṣṭam udite svapratyayē cetasi /
tat puṣṭam drūmalabdhaṃvātītī phaladam kālēna samādyate /
raṅgasyeva bi māṭulangakusumem'nyas tasya takesare / punar ābā /
karpāsāyīte puṣṭe ca māṭulangaryarāṇīte /
laṅkāyā jāyate raktam yathā karpāsakesaram //
tasmim astam ite range samānātād bhāvitakramāt /
karmay astam ite caiva bhāvanātāḥ phalodayāḥ //

To these stanzas one should compare those quoted in the Sarvadarsāna (beginning of the chapter on Jainism):
yasminn eva saṃtana ahīta karmavāsānā /
phalām tatraiva badhiṣṭā kārpāse raktatā yathā //
kusumem bijāpūrāder yāl laṅkādy upasicyate /
saṅkītś adhiyate tatra kā cīt tāṃ kim na paśyasi //

The first of these stanzas is quoted in the Bodhicaryavatāra, ix, 73 (introduced by tad uktam); compare Ānandagiri ad 2.2.27 (vāsanāvaicitrīyāt), and the Ātmatattvaviveka (Calcutta, 1873) p. 102 (lākṣārasaśaśekād vā bhavaṁmaṇam aparājya raktatām upādāyavan-vartanāyaṁ kārpāsābyājīm ... ). The first line of the second stanza is used by Kumāra, Ślokavārttika, p. 267. On these different sources, see "Bouddhisme d’après les sources brāhmaniques," Muséon, 1902 (quoted in part, p. 63).

166. Forming without doubt part of the same work as the stanza, note 160.

Vyākhyā: karmeti sarvam tadbhāvanam karmabhāvanam tasmād bhāvanāyā vrūtīlabham tadvrūtīlabham tatās tadvrūtīlabhāḥ phalām ity etac cautsāyaṃ niyamena yadṛccchāya / buddhād anyah śrāvakādīḥ sarvatbā sarvākāram na prajānāśīty arthād uktam bhavati buddha eva tat sarvam sarvātāḥ prajānāśīti.

167. Understand: "looks towards Nirvāṇa" or "sees in this doctrine."

168. Paramārtha adds a stanza here: The Buddha Bhagavat says to Pūrṇa, 'Strive to keep this Dharma, for he who cultivates insight and conduct according to this Dharma will of necessity obtain the five qualities'.

169. Vyākhyā: a. itikaranah parīsamāpyartharthah / pradarsanartho vā // eṣām buddhānāṁ pravacanadbhārmavatāḥ svābhitena hetor mārgena hetumārgena sāddhāṁ niravadyāṁ

niśamya dṛṣṭvā // andhāḥ tirthyāḥ yathābhūtādaraṇāvasthāyāt / kūtātā drṣṭih kāṛṣṭhit /
tasya śeṣīśāṁ kūtātācīśiśāśīśī / kūtātā śeṣīśāśīśīśīśī śīśī śīśī śīśī śīśī śīśī śīśī /
svargāpargāgabeta vā pratiṣṭhānām mithyāpratiṣṭhānāḥ cety arthaḥ // tasmād evamvīśābhāṁ kāpiḷolukādāṁ matām darśanām apariddhā tyātivā yānti sāmśārāṁ nirvāṇam iti vāyādyābhārāḥ / ke te sattvāḥ / prajñācakṣusmaṁaṁ āryaśrāvakāḥ // atha vā tām eva pravacanadbhārmavatāṁ yānti praviṣapayānta ity arthaḥ /

pravacanadbhārmavatā punar atra nārātmayaṁ buddhānusāsani vā / anya ahaḥ / pravacanām svāyambhavāyaucavatā / saṃy bhavaḥ śvāvyābhatāḥ yutkṛtyopavatā nirvāṇapravān-
ata ca nirvāṇadyotanam / yathoktaṃ / sarva ime dharma nirvāṇaḥ pravānasravānaḥ nirvāṇaprāg-
bbhārāḥ nirvāṇam evābhivadanto bhavantānti / anātmasamātānaṁ ca nirvānā satyasaṁyāṁ samāttishyante atmocchedāśankāpyagamād iti tad evam anandā eva yānti nāndābāḥ / andhās tu bhramanty eva samsārārṇaṁ nairātmyam apāyantāḥ / tad darśayann ābā imāṁ bhūvistaraḥ /
b. iyam nirātmata / nirvāṇam eva pūram nirvāṇapuram / tasyai kā vartaniti
nirvāṇapuraikamārgo nānyo mārga ity arthab // tathāgata evādītyo gambhiradharmāva-kāṣākatau ṣādityabhātās tathāgataḥ / tasya vacāmśi / tāny evāṃśaṇaḥ / tair bhāṣvāty
ālokavatī tathāgatādītyayavacomśubhāṣvāty // āryānāṃ sahasraīr vāhitety āryasahasravāḥītā
// vivṛtā samitā // imāṃ nirvāṇapuraikavartanīṃ tathāgatādītyayavacomśubhāṣvāsim
vivrāṃ api nīrātmataṃ prajñācaksuṣo visādāsyabhāvād avidyākośopātala-paryavanaddha-
netatvād vā mandacaksuṣ tirthanko vātspatīryo vā nekṣate /

trayaś cēha mārgaṇāvāroryante / tadyathakāyarīṇo abhipriyātā / śālokātā
yato niśrāṅko gacchati / yātinuyataḥ ca pariṃarditastāṇukantakādītvād yena sukhām
gacchati / tattādharmyeṇeyam nīrātmataḥ vartani dṛṣṭavyā // caturbhīṣ ca kārāṇair mārgo
na vidyate sa (- -) tamaskatayā / prakāśito'py ādītyena avāhitatayā / babupurāśavāḥito'py
āvṛtatayā vivṛto'pi dṛṣṭur mandacaksuṣkatayā // teśāṃ ibaikam eva kārāṇam asya
mārgasyādarśana uktam / yato dṛṣṭṛdoṣenaivāyam mārga na dṛṣṭate na mārgadoṣeṇiṣi yata
ēṣa mandacaksuṣ etāṃ na paśyatīṣy avagantavyam /

c. iti digmātram evedam iti sarvam iti yathoktam / dig eva digmātram / evakārārtho
mātraśadaḥ / dik pramāṇam asyeta digmātram iti vā / mahāto'bhidharmaśastrād alpaṃ
idam upadiṣṭam / mayeti vākyāsasah // keśām / sumedhasām matimātaḥ ity arthab /
tādārthye şaṣṭhi / kīm vad ity āhā / vṛnaḍēśe viṣāṣyesa svasaṃarthavyaśarpiṇa iti / yathā
viṣaiṃ svasaṃarthyaḥ vṛnaḍēśam pṛāpya sarvesv anāṃśyamgeśv abhayantarvisarpātiṣi
matvā kena cī tasya vṛnaḍēśaḥ kṛtah kathāṃ nāmedam visarpātī / evam sumedhasaḥ
svasaṃarthvyavarpitvād viṣāṣṭhiṇyāḥ ity atas teśāṃ sumedhasām udgaṅgaśājñānāṁ
prājñānāṁ idam upadiṣṭam mayā kathāṃ alpaṃ granthena mahād abhidharmaśastrāṃ
kāṃśiravaibhāṣikānītisiddham arthataḥ pratiśpyeramm iti / apare pūnar vṛyaḥcaksate
digmātram evedam itidam eva nairāmyapratisedham adhiḥkṛtyoktam iti / kāṃśiravaibhā-
ṣikānītisiddhaḥ prāyo mayāyāṃ kathito'bhidhema ity (viii.40) anenaivārthasyabhābitatvād
iti.
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